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Pearl Harbor

Pearl Harbor was the site of the unprovoked aerial attack on the United States by Japan on December 7, 1941. Before the attack, many Americans were reluctant to become involved in the war in Europe. This all changed when the United States declared war on Japan, bringing the country into World War II.

Pearl Harbor was the most important American naval base in the Pacific and home to the US Pacific Fleet. In strategic terms, the Japanese attack failed. Most of the US fleet and aircraft carriers were not present at the time of the attack.

The Japanese rationalized the attack as retribution for the military and economic support from the US to the Chinese Republic, and for the economic sanctions against Japan that shortly followed. In summer-fall 1941, the United States froze Japanese assets and placed an embargo on oil exports to Japan.

The attack on Pearl Harbor had impacts far beyond the United States. Hitler applauded the attack and declared war on the United States—a maneuver historians believe was his greatest error in judgment.

When Did Pearl Harbor Happen?

While Japanese diplomats in Washington, DC, negotiated with Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Japanese planes bombed the naval base at Pearl Harbor. American outrage at the surprise attack overcame isolationist sentiment and the United States declared war on Japan the following day.

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On December 7, 1941, a date that President Franklin D. Roosevelt claimed would “live in infamy,” the Imperial Japanese Navy conducted a surprise aerial assault on Pearl Harbor. This unprovoked attack brought the United States into World War II, as it immediately declared war on Japan.

Pearl Harbor was, and still is, the most important American naval base in the Pacific and home to the US Pacific Fleet. It is located on the Hawaiian island of Oahu.

Background: Why did the Attack on Pearl Harbor Happen?

Japanese territorial   expansion in the 1930s.

Since the 1930s, the Japanese government had increasingly come under the influence of right-wing military leaders seeking to create a larger Japanese empire on the Pacific Rim. The United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the Republic of China, represented significant obstacles to this expansion.

Japanese aggression began with the seizure of Manchuria from China in September 1931. The following year, this conquered territory was transformed into a Japanese puppet state, Manchukuo (1932–1945), under the nominal leadership of the last emperor of China, Pu Yi. The League of Nations carried out an investigation of the incident and concluded that Japan had, without a declaration of war, forcibly seized and occupied a large section of Chinese territory. It urged Japanese troops to withdraw from the occupied lands. In response, Japan withdrew from the League of Nations in March 1933. Neither the League of Nations nor the United States recognized the allegedly independent state.

Japan Builds up its Military and Joins the Axis Powers

In the mid-1930s, the Japanese military began to exert more authority in foreign and domestic policy. Japan withdrew from participation in international naval conferences that had limited the size of the country's fleet. Naval construction dramatically increased so that the Japanese possessed the third largest navy in the world by 1941. In the Pacific, the Japanese navy surpassed the combined power of the British and American fleets. The army rapidly expanded as well, doubling in size between 1936 and 1941.

During this time, Japan was also drawing closer to Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy . In November 1936, Japan signed the Anti-Comintern Pact. Then in September 1940, Germany, Italy, and Japan signed the Tripartite Pact. This pact formalized the alliance between the three countries. They were subsequently referred to as the Axis powers.

In July 1937 fighting erupted between Japanese and Chinese forces and escalated into a full-fledged war that lasted until 1945.

The United States Responds to Japanese Expansion

Japanese territorial aggression triggered widespread condemnation in the United States and elsewhere. On October 5, 1937, President Franklin D. Roosevelt warned that the “very foundations of civilization” were being “seriously threatened.” Although he did not single out any particular nations, the warning aimed to raise American concerns about Japanese actions in China and German and Italian intervention in the Spanish Civil War. A “quarantine” was necessary to halt the spread of the “epidemic of world lawlessness.” Roosevelt feared that Japanese expansionism would not end in China, but spread to Hong Kong, Indochina, and the Philippines, representing a threat to the United States.

Although the League of Nations condemned Japan's actions in China, diplomatic efforts aimed at halting the fighting failed. Roosevelt considered a joint Anglo-American naval blockade of Japan, particularly in December 1937 after Japanese aircraft attacked and sank several American vessels, including the patrol boat, the USS Panay , as well as some British ships in China. Isolationism at home and appeasement abroad put an end to such efforts.

Following the outbreak of war on the European continent, Japan took advantage of the situation to occupy territory in Asia. After France's defeat by Nazi Germany, the Imperial Japanese government pressured the Vichy regime into cutting off military supplies to China from Indochina and then permitting the Japanese military to house its troops there. In fall 1940, the US government offered to provide the embattled Chinese republic with aircraft and loans, which were then followed by economic sanctions against Japan that banned the export of aviation gasoline and scrap metals, including iron and steel. In summer-fall 1941, the United States froze Japanese assets and placed an embargo on oil exports to Japan.

Planning for the Attack on Pearl Harbor

As US policy and sanctions became more aggressive, Japanese planners determined to attack American positions in the Pacific: specifically, the Philippines, Guam and Wake Islands, and the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor.

The dilemma faced by Japanese planners was how to counter the greater American naval power and economic potential.

The plan that emerged called for a surprise attack that would destroy the entire US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, while at the same time eliminating the other US forward positions. The strategic goal was to so cripple US naval power in the Pacific that the United States would be unable to interfere with Japanese conquests.

Japanese planners hoped that by the time the United States had recovered and rearmed it would face an imposing defensive perimeter that it would be unable or unwilling to defeat. A large naval strike force set sail from Japan operating under strict radio silence and avoiding shipping lanes to escape detection.

What Day and Time Did the Attack on Pearl Harbor Take Place?

[caption=e8f12946-a728-4138-bc67-53ebf4cd188a] - [credit=e8f12946-a728-4138-bc67-53ebf4cd188a]

At 7:55 am on December 7, 1941, the first of two waves of Japanese naval aircraft launched from six aircraft carriers attacked Pearl Harbor, catching US forces completely by surprise. Two thousand four hundred US sailors and soldiers were killed and 1,200 wounded. Well over half of the military aircraft were damaged or destroyed, almost all on the ground.

Of the US battleships present, all were hit and two, the Arizona and Oklahoma completely destroyed. Japanese air commanders requested a third strike, but Admiral Nagumo, in charge of the attacking force declined, preferring to avoid greater losses and presuming that the raid had been a success.

What were the Immediate Outcomes of the Attack on Pearl Harbor?

On its face, the attack on Pearl Harbor may indeed have seemed a brilliant strike. The US Pacific Fleet was effectively eliminated as an offensive force and would be unable to intervene in Japanese expansion for the foreseeable future. In addition, the attack had only cost 29 Japanese planes.

However, on closer inspection and in strategic terms, the assault was a failure for a number of reasons. First, the most important ships in the US fleet, the aircraft carriers, were away on maneuvers and not present during the attack. Second, US oil supplies, submarine fleet, and repair facilities remained undamaged. Third, while the all-important battleships had sustained heavy damage, all but two were eventually refloated, repaired, and returned to service. And finally, the attack galvanized a previously disinterested US public in support of the war.

Global Repercussions

The attack on Pearl Harbor had impacts far beyond Hawaii and the United States. Adolf Hitler applauded the attack and declared war on the United States even though the United States had only declared war against Japan. Before Pearl Harbor, many Americans maintained an isolationist stance and were reluctant to become involved in the war in Europe.

Hitler's declaration of war on the United States is seen by many historians as one of his greatest errors in judgment. In less than a year, American ground troops would be fighting German forces in North Africa. In addition, American materiel support of Nazi Germany's primary enemy, the Soviet Union, could proceed at full speed.

Pearl Harbor even had a small but identifiable impact on the Holocaust . The Wannsee Conference , whose goal was to coordinate the organizations responsible for the execution of the Final Solution, had originally been scheduled for 8 December. In light of the events of early December 1941, Reinhard Heydrich was forced to reschedule the meeting for 20 January 1942.

Critical Thinking Questions

• Investigate the context of war and mass murder in Europe at the time the United States entered the war.
• Did the course of the war in the Pacific affect the possibility of rescue of the endangered Jews by the Allies and other nations?
• What was the relationship between the progress of the war and the mass murder of Europe’s Jews?

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Pearl harbor attack, december 7, 1941.

The National WWII Museum commemorates the Day That Will Live in Infamy through articles, oral histories, artifacts, and more. 

Remembering Pearl Harbor

No moment in the history of the United States casts a longer shadow than Pearl Harbor. “Remembering” it has become a national imperative, a patriotic duty for the American people, and reminding us of that duty has become a ritual of media and political discourse—repeated so often and in so many ways that it’s become part of the routine of our communal life. 

- Rob Citino, PhD

Quick Links

• Overview of Attack
• Special Exhibit
• Path to Pearl Harbor EFT

Featured Articles

Featured videos.

By Rob Citino, PhD Samuel Zemurray Stone Senior Historian

The Long Fuse: Japan, the United States, and the Hawaiian Islands

The tangled relationship between the United States and Japan began with the forced opening of Japan in the nineteenth century, courtesy of Commodore Matthew Perry and this “black ships” of his squadron. Japan’s sudden exposure to the outside world, after centuries of isolation, generated a helt-er-skelter period of transformation, a revolutionary era in which Japan threw overboard many of its oldest traditions and built itself into a technologically advanced industrial state, with modern systems of administration and government—and a powerful military.

Japan’s rise to Great Power status was rapid, with victorious wars over China (1894-95) and Russia (1904-5), as well as successful, if subsidiary role on the side of the Allies in World War I (1914-1918). Again and again, Japan struck quickly to win wars over larger and theoretically more powerful opponents. The very success Japan enjoyed, however, placed the island empire squarely in the sights of the other Great Powers, and generated an increasingly tense strategic rivalry with the United States for domination of the Pacific. That was the “long fuse” of the Great Pacific War (1941-45), the long-term background to Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941.

Sitting in the Japanese crosshairs that fateful Sunday morning was not only the US Pacific Fleet, but the Hawaiian Islands. An independent kingdom with a long and proud history of its own, then “discovered” by the West and dubbed the Sandwich Islands, Hawaii had only become a US possession in the 1890s, when a rebellion by the Anglo population of the islands rose up in revolt against the rule of Queen Liliuokalani. Declaring a Republic of Hawaii, the rebels then requested annexation by the United States, which took place in 1898. Since then, a new society had grown up of native islanders, Americans, and Japanese immigrants. The economy was robust, based on the islands’ numerous sugar cane plantations. Hawaii also saw an increasingly strong US naval presence. A crucial moment came in 1940. As tensions built between the United States and Japan, President Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered the US Pacific Fleet to transfer from its homeport in San Diego, CA to Pearl Harbor, HI.

It was a fateful decision for all parties concerned: the United States, Japan, and Hawaii itself.

The Short Fuse 1940-1941: The Fate of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor

From mid-1940, when FDR moved the US Pacific Fleet from San Diego to Pearl Harbor, long-simmering tensions between the United States and Japan reached a new state of intensity. Japan had been embroiled in a brutal war of conquest in China since 1937. It had overrun much of north China, as well as most of the port cities along China’s long coastline. The Japanese army was badly overstretched, however. It could neither protect its supply lines to the rear, nor effectively control the territories it occupied. Its response was terror against Chinese civilians, hoping to cow them into submission. The policy of the “three alls” was the order of the day: “kill all, burn all, loot all.” Cities who resisted, like Nanjing in 1937, suffered the consequences, with Japanese troops slaughtering hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians.

Still, China fought on under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist Army, along with their allies, the Communist forces of Mao Tse-tung. Determined to help China and to halt Japanese aggression on the Asian mainland, FDR waged economic warfare against Japan. He hoped that embargoes on arms (1937), scrap iron (1938), and eventually oil (1941) would wound the Japanese economy sufficiently to halt Japan’s war in China. His own advisors were unsure how to proceed. Should the United States follow a policy of strength, warning the Japanese against the consequences of continued aggression? Or should there be a more conciliatory approach of negotiations leading to a long-term understanding?

Japan, for its part, was growing impatient. Stalemated by Chinese resistance, with over 1 million Japanese troops trapped in the quicksand of a war they could not win, Japan needed to find a solution to its strategic crisis. As Adolf Hitler’s armies rampaged across Europe, overrunning Germany’s neighbors in 1939-40 and threatening to invade the British Isles, the European colonial empires in Asia lay nearly undefended, ripe for the picking: the Malay Peninsula, the Dutch East Indies, Indochina. Rich sources of raw materials lay in all of them, rubber, tin, and especially oil, the precious lifeblood of any modern economy. Perhaps the time had come to reach out, pluck these “balls of rice” off the shelf, and final secure the resources necessary to end the war in China. At the same time, Japan’s leaders knew that such a policy would lead to war with the United States. As Japanese negotiators came to Washington for talks with US Secretary of State Cordell Hull in late 1941, military planners back in Tokyo had already decided to roll the iron dice. They needed to launch a great strike, one that would both seize the western colonies and ensure that the US could not and would not intervene.

As they surveyed a map of the Pacific, their gaze came to rest on one tiny spot in the great ocean.

Pearl Harbor.

The Great Pacific War: Then and Now

Pearl Harbor was a great gamble for Japan, and especially for the Imperial Japanese Navy. It was also a piece of skilled military planning, the work of Admiral Isoruku Yamamoto. Japan dispatched all six of his precious “fleet carriers” across 3,000 miles of open ocean in total secrecy, with the fleet arriving a few hundred miles north of the Hawaiian islands. The carriers launched their aircraft early on a Sunday morning. US forces were completely unprepared, and in less than ninety minutes, Japanese planes destroyed or damaged 19 US warships and 300 aircraft, and killed over 2,400 US servicemen. Almost half of the dead were crewmen from the battleship USS Arizona , which sank within minutes after a bomb struck its forward magazine, igniting more than a million pounds of ammunition. The ship’s remains still lie in the waters of Pearl Harbor, a constant memorial to that terrible morning.

With the US Navy temporarily out of the way, a massive Japanese offensive overran the European and colonial empires in Asia: Hong Kong, Malaya, the Dutch East EI; New Guinea. US possessions, too, came under attack: the Philippines, the major US base in Asia; Guam; and Wake Island. The Japanese assault seemed irresistible, and at two places there were mass surrenders. At Singapore on the tip of Malaya, 80,000 British, Indian, and Australian troops went into captivity in February 1942. On the Philippines, attacking Japanese forces outmaneuvered a combined US/Filipino army under General Douglas Macarthur. The defenders retreated into the Bataan Peninsula and finally onto tiny Corregidor Island. Macarthur evacuated the islands (vowing, however, “I shall return”), but his entire force of 75,000 men surrendered in April 1942, the worst military defeat in US history. Their Japanese captors now subjected them to a brutal 65-mile forced march to POW camps in the Philippines. Hence, the infamous Bataan Death March. In the course of just five days, at least 5,000 died, and perhaps many more, a grisly sign of what was to come in what the Japanese called the Great Pacific War.

Victory, defeat, shame, “infamy”: even today, the memory of these events is contradictory and contested. Different societies tend to “remember” events in their history differently, and that is especially true of traumatic moments. Japan and the United States have been friends and allies for decades, a welcome change from the 1930s and 40s. Nevertheless, the lessons, legacies, and memory of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor will continue to influence contemporary politics, diplomacy, and strategy into the future.

The Road to Pearl Harbor: The Long Fuse

The Road to Pearl Harbor: The Short Fuse

Remember Pearl Harbor!

Features from the collection.

Tropically Delicious: Holidays on Oahu

Routine in Paradise: The US Navy in Pearl Harbor

Sibling Witnesses to the Attack on Pearl Harbor

Shirley Temple in Hawaii

Road to Pearl Harbor: Asia Aflame 1937-1941

Hawaiian Monarchy at Iolani Palace

First-Generation Japanese American (Issei) Experience in Hawaii

Kualoa Ranch and the Attack on Pearl Harbor

Island of O'ahu after the Pearl Harbor Attack

USS Oklahoma Identification of Remains

Curtiss P-40 at The National WWII Museum

M3A1 Stuart Tank at The National WWII Museum

M3A1 Scout Car at The National WWII Museum

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Pearl Harbor 80th Anniversary Commemorative Ceremony

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• HISTORY & CULTURE

80 years after Pearl Harbor, here's how the attack changed history

Certain of inevitable war with the U.S., Japan launched a preemptive strike that shocked Americans and prompted the nation to enter World War II.

Masao Asada had just finished delivering groceries around Pearl Harbor, Oahu, when he heard some huge booms. No big deal, he thought—he was used to hearing noise from dredging activity in the Pacific Ocean lagoon. But the booms kept coming.

Asada jumped in his truck and drove toward the pier used by the U.S. Navy and Army. En route, he was flagged down by the driver of another car. “Get out of here!” the man shouted, Asada recalled in an oral history taken years later. “This is not practice! It’s war.” That’s when Asada looked to the sky and saw Japanese warplanes zooming overhead.

The grocery store owner was one of the thousands of eyewitnesses to Japan’s surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941—an act of war that, though just 90 minutes long, irrevocably changed the course of world history.  

( Pearl Harbor survivors forgive—but can't forget .)

The lead-up to the Pearl Harbor attack

Tensions between Japan and the U.S. simmered throughout the early 20th century and came to a boil in the 1930s as Japan attempted to conquer China, even attacking civilians. In 1937, China and Japan went to war. By 1940, the U.S considered the Japanese expansion into China threatening enough to its interests that it began to provide military aid to China and started to sanction Japan. After Japan signed mutual defense pacts with Nazi Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union in 1940 and 1941, the U.S. froze Japanese assets and forbade all exports into Japan.

Meanwhile, Nazi Germany continued its conquest of much of Europe. Though the U.S. was officially neutral in both conflicts, its stance was increasingly challenged both by Japan and Nazi Germany’s wars.

Neutrality was the most divisive public issue of its day, and a majority of the American public, which remembered the losses of World War I and was still recovering from the effects of the Great Depression, opposed entering any war overseas. Still, many Americans wanted the nation to help its embattled allies. President Franklin D. Roosevelt accomplished this through the Lend-Lease Program , which provided allies like Great Britain and China with weapons and military equipment.

But as Japan continued its war with China, a conflict with the U.S. became all but inevitable, prompting Japanese leaders to assess their options. The U.S. Navy was formidable, and Japan didn’t have the resources it needed to eliminate the American threat to their imperial ambitions. But they had one trick up their sleeve: surprise. Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku convinced Japan’s military officials that instead of declaring war on the U.S., they should confront them in the Pacific, doing as much damage to the Pacific Fleet as possible.

Planning the attack

While mainland U.S. forces mobilized in the wake of a surprise attack, Yamamoto argued, Japan could seize strategic Pacific islands. Japan was desperate for supplies, and the islands that lay between Japan and the furthest U.S. territory in Hawaii could provide much-needed oil and rubber.

Yamamoto spent months patiently planning the operation with naval captain Minoru Genda and others. In December 1941, Japan’s monarch, Hirohito, finally bowed to months of pressure from the military and authorized war.  

( Rare World War II maps reveal Japan's Pearl Harbor strategy .)

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Despite evidence that Japan was building up air forces, the attack took the U.S. by surprise. On December 6, 1941, Army intelligence officers even intercepted a message that indicated war was imminent. But the military had no idea Pearl Harbor was the target—and by the time the message was en route to a telegraph office in Honolulu, the attack had already begun .

What happened December 7

The first shot of the attack on Pearl Harbor was actually fired before dawn by the U.S.S. Ward , an American destroyer that had been alerted to an early-morning submarine periscope sighting near the harbor entrance. The Ward   sank the submarine. But since American forces did not expect an aerial assault, there was no general alarm. At 7:48 a.m. Hawaiian time, the first wave of Japanese dive bombers began flying over Pearl Harbor. Their targets were Navy-held Ford Island and seven nearby battleships located along what was known as “Battleship Row.”

Within minutes, much of the U.S. fleet had been damaged or destroyed. Over the course of two waves, a total of 353 Japanese planes and 28 submarines irreparably destroyed two battleships, Oklahoma   and Arizona , and damaged all of the rest and several other fleet craft. The Japanese also targeted nearby airfields.

Though caught by surprise, the Americans did fight back. They manned antiaircraft guns and even got some airplanes off the ground; in all, 29 Japanese planes were shot down during the attack.

The toll of Pearl Harbor

Ultimately, nearly 2,400 Americans died. Nearly half of those deaths took place on the Arizona , which took a direct hit to its hull. Thirty-eight sets of brothers , including multiple sets of three brothers, served on the ship, and only one of those sets survived.

Some civilians were killed by friendly fire when anti-aircraft ammunition that did not detonate while being fired at Japanese aircraft fell. Only 64 Japanese servicemen were killed that day.

The U.S. enters World War II

The attack shocked the nation—and thrust the U.S. into a war it had managed to sidestep for years. The day after the attack, President Roosevelt asked Congress for a declaration of war against Japan. Calling December 7 a “date which shall live in infamy,” he told the U.S. Congress that the nation was in grave danger. Only one member of Congress, Representative Jeannette Rankin of Montana, voted against the declaration . Rankin, a pacifist and the first woman in Congress, had also voted against the U.S. entering into World War I.

On December 11, both Germany and Italy honored their pact with Japan and declared war against the U.S., which swiftly reciprocated. What followed would be a conflict that laid waste to much of Europe and Japan and that ended in 15 million battle deaths, 25 million wounded in battle, and at least 45 million civilian deaths. Ultimately, 416,800 American service members would die in the war.

Pearl Harbor had other brutal legacies. The Japanese military’s act was used to justify the internment of about 120,000 people of Japanese descent in the mainland U.S., including 70,000 U.S. citizens. And it forever ended the U.S.’ pre-1941 stance of isolationism and neutrality.

The attack on Pearl Harbor marked the entry of the world’s mightiest military power into World War II. It was also a turning point for the nation. “Everyone I talk to seems to feel that the old world we lived in before December 7, 1941 has passed out of existence,” Pittsburgh cab company executive Paul L. Houston said in a man-on-the-street interview in February 1942. “And we are in a whole new universe.”

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Pearl Harbor

Find primary sources and reference materials related to the December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor.

"December 7, 1941 - a date which will live in infamy - the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan."

Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Day of Infamy" Speech , December 8, 1941

A primary source is a document or physical object which was written or created during the time under study.  These sources offer an inside view of a particular event. This guide includes links to resources, including primary sources, on the subject of Pearl Harbor.

Library of Congress includes primary source information for the air raid on Pearl Harbor. 

The Pearl Harbor Museum website provides information on the heroes, ships and the attack. Also included are maps.

World War II Valor in the Pacific National Monument is home to the USS Arizona Memorial. The website includes photos and video's and history about the attack.

Diaries & Personal Narratives

Evans, David C., ed. & trans. The Japanese Navy in World War II: In the Words of Former Japanese Naval Officers . 2nd ed. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1986. D777.J3 1986Evans reprints memoirs written by Japanese officers. 

Grew, Joseph C. Report from Tokyo: A Message to the American People . New York: Simon and Schuster, 1942. DS889.G7Q

Grew, Joseph C. Ten years in Japan: A Contemporary Record Drawn from the Diaries and Private and Official Papers of Joseph G. Grew, United States Ambassador to Japan, 1932-1942. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1944. DS849.U6G7Grew served as U.S. ambassador to Japan from 1932 through 1941.

The Memoirs of Cordell Hull . 2 vols. New York: Macmillan, 1948. E748.H93A3

Kimmel, Husband Edward, 1882-1968. Admiral Kimmel's Story . Chicago: H. Regnery, 1955. D767.92.K54Kimmel was Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Pearl Harbor when the Japanese attacked. 

King, Ernest J., and Walter Muir Whitehill. Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record . New York: W. W. Norton, 1952. E928.K56

U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey [Pacific]. Naval Analysis Division. Interrogations of Japanese Officials. 2. vols. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1946. XD767.2.U5 v.1-2Testimony from Mitsuo Fuchida, air group commander of the carrier Akagi, who led the attack.

Newspaper & Magazine Articles

"Blitz Chronology: Swift Stroke by Japanese Caught U.S. Forces Unawares." Newsweek , vol. 18, no. 24, December 15, 1941, pp. 19-21.An early description of the first days of the Pacific war.

Burns, Eugene. "Japs Declare War on U.S.: Honolulu, Manila Bombed; Naval Battle Off Hawaii." Sun (Extra Edition), December 7, 1941, page 1.Available online in the Baltimore Sun, Historical (1836-1990) Database (with library card).

"Forcing Showdown With Japan: Why U.S. is Pressing Tokyo for Quick Decision on War or Peace." United States News , vol. 11, no. 10, September 5, 1941, pp. 14-15.Written more than three months before the attack on Pearl Harbor, this article suggests that President Roosevelt was forcing Japan to decide the question of war or peace. 

Hale, William Harlan. "After Pearl Harbor." New Republic , vol. 105, no. 24, December 15, 1941, pp. 816-817.

"Nation's Full Might Mustered for All-Out War; Initial Reverse Stirs Demand for Investigation; Washington Banks on Its Long-Range Strategy." Newsweek, vol. 18, no. 24, December 15, 1941, pp. 15-17.This early assessment focuses on the military aspects of the war.

Stone, I. F. "War Comes to Washington." Nation , vol. 153, no. 24, December 13, 1941, pp. 603-604.Writing on December 8, 1941, liberal journalist I. F. Stone reflects on the failure of U.S.-Japanese negotiators in preventing war.

"Untold Damage Done Honolulu, Witness Says." Sun (Extra Edition), December 7, 1941, page 1.Written by an NBC observer while the Japanese attack on Hawaii was still in progress. Available online in the Baltimore Sun , Historical (1836-1990) Database (with library card).

"The U.S. at War." Time , vol. 38, no. 24, December 15, 1941, pp. 17-27.

A good overview of the events of December 7, 1941 and its immediate aftermath.

"The White House: M-Day Log." Newsweek , vol. 18, no. 24, December 15, 1941, p. 18.This article summarizes activity at the White House on Sunday, December 7, 1941.

Government Publications & Related Resources

Gantenbein, James W., comp. and ed. Documentary Background of World War II . New York: Octagon, 1975. D735.G25Gantenbein offers reprints of numerous official publications relating to the outbreak of war.

Japan's Decision for War: Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences. Translated and edited by Ike Nobutaka. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1967. D754.J3I4"Invaluable records of 62 conferences held in Tokyo between March and December of 1941" - Inside ft. cover.

U.S. Congress. Official Congressional Documents Relating to the U.S. Declaration of War against Japan. D767.92.U6

U.S. Department of State. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States - Japan: 1931-1941 . 2 vols. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1943. E183.8.J3U6

U.S. War Department. Army Pearl Harbor Board. Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board, Appointed by the Secretary of War . . . to Ascertain and Report the Facts Relating to the Attack Made by Japanese Armed Forces Upon the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941 . n.p., [1945]. D767.92.U64

Photographs

Goldstein, Donald M., Katherine V. Dillion, and J. Michael Wenger. The Way it Was: Pearl Harbor - The Original Photographs . Washington, DC: Brassey's (US), 1991. XD767.92G65 1991Q

Dye, Bob. Hawai'i Chronicles III: World War Two in Hawaii, from the pages of Paradise of the Pacific . Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000. D767.92.H376 2000

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Pearl Harbor at 75

Seventy-five years ago on the morning of December 7th, 1941, the Japanese attacked the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor in the Hawaii Territory.

Seventy-five years ago, on the morning of December 7th, 1941, the Japanese attacked the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor in the Hawaii Territory. In President Roosevelt’s address to Congress asking for a declaration of war, he called it a “day which will live in infamy.”

The Japanese hoped that the 184 aircraft in their first wave of attack would strike a paralyzing blow. They hit 24 American warships, including eight battleships (four of which sunk), destroyed several hundred aircraft, and killed 2,403 people. The blow, however, was far from paralyzing.

The attack has been called the worst military disaster ever suffered by the U.S. But political scientist John Mueller argues that, militarily, the attack was more of “an inconvenience than a catastrophe” for the U.S. He echoes the Navy Department’s official analysis: the attack only “temporarily disabled every battleship and most of the aircraft,” most of which were soon back in service or replaced many times over. Six of the eight damaged battleships actually saw service again. Only two ships hit at Pearl were complete losses.

The salvaged battleships—the youngest was 20 years old—mattered little in context of the unprecedented American industrial-military expansion unleashed by the war. Superior replacements in great numbers soon flooded the Pacific, where aircraft carriers were becoming infinitely more important than battleships in the new era of naval warfare. For airplanes, the situation was similar: in 1942, the U.S. produced 47,836 military aircraft, compared to Japan’s 8,86l.

The Japanese utterly failed to cripple the American navy. Some have argued that the attack was engineered to gain time for the simultaneous Japanese attacks on U.S. bases on the Philippines, Guam, and Wake, as well as on the British positions in Malaya, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Mueller and others respond that the U.S. was in no way prepared to fight those battles yet.

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Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, appointed chief of the Pacific Fleet just weeks after the attack, would later thank God that the antique fleet had been in Pearl Harbor rather on the open sea confronting a modern Japanese fleet. He felt the losses would have been far greater in those circumstances.

Mueller does go on to argue that “disaster” is a fitting word to describe Pearl Harbor if you look at the strategic and political consequences. It was certainly a monumental disaster for Imperial Japan. As an attempt to defeat the will of the American people, the attack “was phenomenally successful in its shock effect, but the shock was exactly the opposite the Japanese hoped for.”

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Why Did Japan Attack Pearl Harbor?

By: Sarah Pruitt

Updated: May 13, 2020 | Original: April 10, 2018

When Japanese bombers appeared in the skies over Pearl Harbor  on the morning of December 7, 1941, the U.S. military was completely unprepared for the devastating surprise attack, which dramatically altered the course of World War II , especially in the Pacific theater. But there were several key reasons for the bombing that, in hindsight, make it seem almost inevitable.

Tensions Began During the Great Depression

Before the Pearl Harbor attack, tensions between Japan and the United States had been mounting for the better part of a decade.

The island nation of Japan, isolated from the rest of the world for much of its history, embarked on a period of aggressive expansion near the turn of the 20th century. Two successful wars, against China in 1894-95 and the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-05, fueled these ambitions, as did Japan’s successful participation in World War I  (1914-18) alongside the Allies.

During the Great Depression of the 1930s, Japan sought to solve its economic and demographic woes by forcing its way into China, starting in 1931 with an invasion of Manchuria. When a commission appointed by the League of Nations condemned the invasion, Japan withdrew from the international organization; it would occupy Manchuria until 1945.

In July 1937, a clash at Beijing’s Marco Polo Bridge began another Sino-Japanese war. That December, after Japanese forces captured Nanjing (Nanking), the capital of the Chinese Nationalist Party, or Guomindang (Kuomintang), they proceeded to carry out six weeks of mass killings and rapes now infamous as the Nanjing Massacre .

The U.S. Was Trying to Stop Japan’s Global Expansion

In light of such atrocities, the United States began passing economic sanctions against Japan, including trade embargoes on aircraft exports, oil and scrap metal, among other key goods, and gave economic support to Guomindang forces. In September 1940, Japan signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, the two fascist regimes then at war with the Allies.

Pearl Harbor Wasn’t Japan’s Only Target

On that infamous December day in 1941, Japan also attacked Guam, the Philippines, Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaya.

How Was the US Involved in WWII Before Pearl Harbor?

Before formally entering World War II, FDR came up with a few key strategies to provide critical aid to allies in Europe in the fight against Hitler's Nazi Party.

Pearl Harbor: Photos and Facts from the Infamous WWII Attack

The surprise Japanese assault inflicted heavy losses but failed to strike a decisive blow.

Tokyo and Washington negotiated for months leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack, without success. While the United States hoped embargoes on oil and other key goods would lead Japan to halt its expansionism, the sanctions and other penalties actually convinced Japan to stand its ground, and stirred up the anger of its people against continued Western interference in Asian affairs.

To Japan, war with the United States had become to seem inevitable, in order to defend its status as a major world power. Because the odds were stacked against them, their only chance was the element of surprise.

Destroying the Base at Pearl Harbor Would Mean Japan Controlled the Pacific

In May 1940, the United States had made Pearl Harbor the main base for its Pacific Fleet. As Americans didn’t expect the Japanese to attack first in Hawaii, some 4,000 miles away from the Japanese mainland, the base at Pearl Harbor was left relatively undefended, making it an easy target.

Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto spent months planning an attack that aimed to destroy the Pacific Fleet and destroy morale in the U.S. Navy, so that it would not be able to fight back as Japanese forces began to advance on targets across the South Pacific.

Japan’s surprise attack on Pearl Harbor would drive the United States out of isolation and into World War II, a conflict that would end with Japan’s surrender after the devastating atomic  bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945.

At first, however, the Pearl Harbor attack looked like a success for Japan. Its bombers hit all eight U.S. battleships, sinking four and damaging four others, destroyed or damaged more than 300 aircraft and killed some 2,400 Americans at Pearl Harbor.

Japanese forces went on to capture a string of current and former Western colonial possessions by early 1942—including Burma (now Myanmar), British Malaya (Malaysia and Singapore), the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia) and the Philippines—giving them access to these islands’ plentiful natural resources, including oil and rubber.

But the Pearl Harbor attack had failed in its objective to completely destroy the Pacific Fleet. The Japanese bombers missed oil tanks, ammunition sites and repair facilities, and not a single U.S. aircraft carrier was present during the attack. In June 1942, this failure came to haunt the Japanese, as U.S. forces scored a major victory in the Battle of Midway , decisively turning the tide of war in the Pacific.

HISTORY Vault: Pearl Harbor - 75 Years Later

Journey through the "day that will live in infamy" by exploring the details that still surprise us 75 years later, including accounts from experts, military minds, and even those who lived through it.

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Sharing teaching and learning resources from the National Archives

Education Updates

Pearl Harbor Primary Sources & Teaching Activities

As the Pearl Harbor anniversary approaches, we’re sharing historical documents, posters, photographs, and more related to the attack and its impact on U.S. History.

On DocsTeach, the online tool for teaching with documents from the National Archives, you can find primary sources like maps and speeches – even images taken by the Japanese military during the attack that were later captured.

DocsTeach also includes posters that used the attack on Pearl Harbor as a rallying cry for a variety of war efforts, like joining the Coast Guard, buying war bonds, or working harder in a factory.

We also have online teaching activities related to Pearl Harbor. In Pearl Harbor Dispatch Analysis , students analyze the “This is Not Drill” naval dispatch sent from the Commander in Chief of the Pacific that announced the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. The activity forces students to look for evidence to decode the true meaning of the message.

Or students can explore one of the most famous presidential speeches of all time – FDR’s “Day of Infamy” speech – by comparing it with its first draft in Two Versions of FDR’s Infamy Speech .

Can you find the first major edit?

DocsTeach also includes audio, like this recording of FDR’s Fireside Chat After the Declaration of War on Japan . 

You can find more of FDR’s Fireside Chats on DocsTeach as well.

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How (Almost) Everyone Failed to Prepare for Pearl Harbor

The high-stakes gamble and false assumptions that detonated Pearl Harbor 80 years ago

Steve Twomey

The dawn watch had been as pacific as the ocean at their feet. Rousted by an alarm clock, Pvts. George E. Elliott Jr. and Joseph L. Lockard had awakened in their tent at 3:45 in the caressing warmth of an Oahu night and gotten their radar fired up and scanning 30 minutes later. Radar was still in its infancy, far from what it would become, but the privates could still spot things farther out than anyone ever had with mere binoculars or telescope.

Half a dozen mobile units—generator truck, monitoring truck, antenna and trailer—had been scattered around the island in recent weeks. George and Joe’s, the most reliable of the bunch, was emplaced farthest north. It sat at Opana, 532 feet above a coast whose waves were enticing enough to surf, which is what many a tourist would do there in years to come. Army headquarters was on the other side of the island, as was the Navy base at Pearl Harbor, the most important American base in the Pacific. But between the privates and Alaska, 2,000 miles away, there was nothing but wavy liquid, a place of few shipping lanes and no islands. An Army general called it the “vacant sea.”

The order of the day was to keep vandals and the curious away from the equipment during a 24-hour shift and, from 4 a.m. to 7 a.m., sit inside the monitoring van as the antenna scanned for planes. George and Joe had no idea why that window of time was significant. Nobody had told them. The two privates had been ordered out there for training. “I mean, it was more practice than anything else,” George would recall. Often with the coming of first light and then into the morning, Army and Navy planes would rise from inland bases to train or scout. The mobile units would detect them and plot their locations. Between them, George and Joe had a couple of .45-caliber pistols and a handful of bullets. The country had not been at war since November 11, 1918, the day the Great War ended, and the local monthly, Paradise of the Pacific , had just proclaimed Hawaii “a world of happiness in an ocean of peace.”

Joe, who was 19 and from Williams­port, Pennsylvania, was in charge of the Opana station that morning, and worked the oscilloscope. George, who was 23 and had joined the Army in Chicago, was prepared to plot contacts on a map overlay and enter them in a log. He wore a headset connecting him to Army headquarters.

George and Joe had detected nothing interesting during the early-morning scan. It was, after all, a Sunday. Their duty done, George, who was new to the unit, took over the oscilloscope for a few minutes of time-killing practice. The truck that would shuttle them to breakfast would be along soon. As George checked the scope, Joe passed along wisdom about operating it. “He was looking over my shoulder and could see it also,” George said.

On their machine, a contact did not show up as a glowing blip in the wake of a sweeping arm on a screen, but as a spike rising from a baseline on the five-inch oscilloscope, like a heartbeat on a monitor. If George had not wanted to practice, the set might have been turned off. If it had been turned off, the screen could not have spiked.

Now it did.

Their device could not tell its operators precisely how many planes the antenna was sensing, or if they were American or military or civilian. But the height of a spike gave a rough indication of the number of aircraft. And this spike did not suggest two or three, but an astonishing number—50 maybe, or even more. “It was the largest group I had ever seen on the oscilloscope,” said Joe.

He took back the seat at the screen and ran checks to make sure the image was not some electronic mirage. He found nothing wrong. The privates did not know what to do in those first minutes, or even if they should do anything. They were off the clock, technically.

Whoever they were, the planes were 137 miles out, just east of due north. The unknown swarm was inbound, closing at two miles a minute over the shimmering blue of the vacant sea, coming directly at Joe and George.

It was just past 7 in the morning on December 7, 1941.

The attack on Pearl Harbor, 80 years ago this month, was the worst day in the U.S. Navy’s history and the shock of a lifetime for just about any American who had achieved the age of memory. Although the disaster destroyed the careers of both the Navy and the Army commanders on Oahu, exhaustive investigations made it clear that its causes went beyond any individual in Hawaii or Washington, D.C. Intelligence was misread or unshared. Vital communiqués were ambiguous. Too many search planes had been diverted to the Atlantic theater.

Most devastating, Americans simply underestimated the Japanese. Their success at Pearl Harbor was due partly to astounding good luck, but also to American complacency, anchored in two assumptions: that our Asian adversary lacked the military deftness and technological proficiency to pull off an attack so daring and so complicated, and that Japan knew and accepted that it would be futile to make war on a nation as powerful as the United States. Even now, in the age of terror, the basic lesson of Pearl Harbor remains apt: When confronting a menacing opponent, you have to shed your own assumptions and think like him.

The architect of the attack was a diminutive admiral of 57 years, with gray close-cut hair and a deep fondness for Abraham Lincoln. Isoroku Yamamoto, the commander in chief of Japan’s Combined Fleet, stood only three inches taller than five feet and weighed 130 pounds, maybe. Geishas who did his fingernails called him Eighty Sen because the regular rate was ten sen a finger and he had only eight fingers, having given the left middle and index to vanquish the Russians in the war of 1904-5.

Yamamoto did not drink much, but he bet a lot. He could beat good poker players, good bridge players and win at Go, the ancient East Asian strategic board game. Roulette, pool, chess, mah-jongg—you’d pick and he’d play and he’d win. “Few men could have been as fond of gambling and games of chance as he,” one Japanese admiral said. “Anything would do.” Yamamoto bested subordinates so often he would not cash their checks. If he had, they would have run out of betting money, and he would have run out of people to beat.

As proud of his country as anyone of his generation, as eager to see Westerners pay some long-overdue respect to the Empire’s power and culture, Yamamoto nonetheless had opposed its 1940 alliance with Nazi Germany and Italy. That hardly endeared him to Japan’s extreme nationalists but did not dent his renown.

In planning the Pearl Harbor attack, Yamamoto knew full well the power of his adversary. During two tours in the United States, in 1919 and 1926, he had traveled the American continent and noted its energy, its abundance and the character of its people. The United States had more steel, more wheat, more oil, more factories, more shipyards, more of nearly everything than the Empire, confined as it was to rocky islands off the Asian mainland. In 1940, Japanese planners had calculated that the industrial capacity of the United States was 74 times greater, and that it had 500 times more oil.

If pitted against the Americans over time, the Imperial Navy would never be able to make up its inevitable losses the way the United States could. In a drawn-out conflict, “Japan’s resources will be depleted, battleships and weaponry will be damaged, replenishing materials will be impossible,” Yamamoto would write to the chief of the Naval General Staff. Japan would wind up “impoverished,” and any war “with so little chance of success should not be fought.”

But Yamamoto alone could not stop the illogical march of Japanese policy. The country’s rapacious grab for China, now in its fifth year, and its two bites of French Indochina, in 1940 and 1941, had been answered by Western economic sanctions, the worst being the loss of oil from the United States, Japan’s principal supplier. Unwilling to give up greater empire in return for the restoration of trade, unwilling to endure the humiliation of withdrawal from China, as the Americans demanded, Japan was going to seize the tin, nickel, rubber and especially oil of British and Dutch colonies. It would take the Philippines, too, to prevent the United States from using its small naval and land forces there to interfere.

Just 11 months before Privates Elliott and Lockard puzzled over the spike on their oscilloscope, Yamamoto set down his thoughts about a bold course by which to attack the United States. War with the Americans was “inevitable,” Yamamoto had written. Japan, as the smaller power, must settle it “on its first day” with a strike so breathtaking and brutal that American morale “goes down to such an extent that it cannot be recovered.”

But how? As with every innovation, someone gets there first. In this case, the Japanese led the world in appreciating the lethal possibilities of massed aircraft carriers. They still had battleships—the backbone of navies since cannon had made their way to wooden decks in the Age of Sail—but battleships and cruisers had to move to within sight of the enemy to sink him. Aircraft carriers could lurk 100, even 200, miles away, far beyond the range of any battleship gun, and send dive bombers and torpedo bombers to attack their unsuspecting adversary. And having a mass of carriers sail as one and launch simultaneously, rather than sail scattered or alone, dramatically enhanced their destructive power.

By the end of 1941, Japan had built ten aircraft carriers, three more than the United States. Yamamoto planned to send six of them 3,150 nautical miles across the vacant north Pacific and into battle off Hawaii.

After outlining his attack in impeccable handwriting on three pages of high-quality paper in January 1941, Yamamoto sent it to a subordinate admiral, who shared it with a military pilot. “For one week, I forgot sleeping and eating,” recalled the pilot, Minoru Genda, Japan’s leading apostle of seaborne air power, who helped refine and then execute the plan. Raiding Pearl Harbor, he thought, would be “like going into the enemy’s chest and counting his heartbeat.” Evaluating the idea was “a great strain on the nerves. The most troubling thing was to keep the plan an absolute secret.” Yamamoto’s grand bet would work only if the Americans lived in ignorance through the last days of peace as the strike force sneaked to the edge of Hawaii. Eventually, Genda concluded it could be done.

Others thought not.

The naval hierarchy in Tokyo rained doubt upon a Pearl Harbor raid. Many questions could not be answered by war games or staff research, only by going through with it. Yamamoto could not guarantee that the Pacific Fleet would be in port on the planned day of attack. If it had sailed away on an exercise, the strike fleet would be exposed far from home with the enemy’s naval power intact and whereabouts uncertain. Nor could he guarantee that his men could pull off the dozens of tanker-to-warship refuelings essential to getting the strike fleet into battle and back. The north Pacific becomes tempestuous as autumn gives way to winter; the fleet’s supply tankers would run a risk each time they sidled close to string hoses and pump their flammable contents.

Mostly, achieving surprise—the sine qua non of Yamamoto’s vision—seemed an absurd hope. Even if there were no leaks from the Imperial Navy, the north Pacific was so vast that the strike fleet would be in transit almost two weeks, during which it might be discovered any minute. The Japanese assumed American patrols would be up, flying from Alaska, from Midway Island, from Oahu; their submarines and surface ships would scour the seas. Unaware they had been spotted, the Japanese might sail valiantly to their destruction in a trap sprung by the very Pacific Fleet they had come to sink.

Success for Yamamoto’s raiders seemed 50-50, at best 60-40. Failure might mean more than the loss of ships and men. It might jeopardize Japan’s plan to conquer Malaya, Singapore, the Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines that fall. Instead of adding a mission to Hawaii that might wipe out much of the Imperial Navy, many officers preferred to leave Pearl Harbor alone.

Nothing punctured Yamamoto’s resolve. “You have told me that the operation is a speculation,” he told another admiral one day, “so I shall carry it out.” Critics had it backward, he argued: The invasions of British, Dutch and American colonies would be jeopardized if the Imperial Navy did  not  attack Pearl Harbor. Leaving the Pacific Fleet untouched would concede the initiative to the Americans. Let us choose the time and the place for war with the Pacific Fleet.

For Yamamoto, the place was Pearl and the time was immediately after—an hour or two after—the Empire submitted a declaration of war. He believed that an honorable samurai does not plunge his sword into a sleeping enemy, but first kicks the victim’s pillow, so he is awake, and then stabs him. That a non-samurai nation might perceive that as a distinction lacking a difference did not, apparently, occur to him.

Attacking Pearl would be the biggest bet of his life, but Yamamoto considered it no more dangerous than his country’s plan to add Britain, the Netherlands and the United States to its roster of enemies. “My present situation is very strange,” he wrote on October 11 to a friend. He would be leading the Imperial Navy in a war that was “entirely against my private opinion.” But as an officer loyal to His Majesty the Emperor, he could only make the best of the foolish decisions of others.

In the end, he prevailed over the critics. By late November, the strike fleet had assembled in secret at Hitokappu Bay, off one of the most desolate and remote islands in the Kurils. Two battleships. Three cruisers. Nine destroyers. Three submarines. Seven tankers. Six aircraft carriers. On November 23, as the attack plan was passed through to the enlisted men and the lower-rank officers, many exulted. Others began writing wills. A pilot named Yoshio Shiga would tell an American interrogator just how dubious the aviators were. “Shiga stated that the consensus...following this startling news was that to get to Hawaii secretly was impossible,” the interrogator would write, summarizing an interview conducted a month after the war’s end. “Hence, it was a suicide attack.”

At six o’clock in the morning of Wednesday, November 26, under a sky of solid pewter, the temperature just above freezing, anchors ascended from the frigid waters, propeller shafts began spinning and the strike fleet crept into the Pacific. Aboard the carrier  Akagi  was Minoru Genda, his faith in naval air power validated all around him. Working for many weeks on the fine points of the attack—how many planes, what mix of planes, what ordnance, how many attack waves—he had struggled most of all with an immutable characteristic of Pearl Harbor, its depth. Forty-five feet was not enough, not for the weapon of greatest threat to a ship’s hull.

Dropped from a plane, the typical torpedo in any navy plunged deeper than 45 feet, so instead of leveling off and racing toward an American ship, the weapon would bury itself in Pearl Harbor’s muddy bottom unless somebody thought of a way to make the plunge much shallower. Only in mid-November had the Japanese thought to add more stabilizing fins to each 18-foot weapon to prevent it from spinning as it plummeted from plane to sea. That would reduce how deeply it plunged. “Tears came to my eyes,” Genda said. There was, though, still the chance that the Americans would string steel nets around their anchored ships to thwart torpedoes. The pilots could not be sure until they arrived overhead.

Gradually, the strike fleet spread out, forming a box roughly 20 miles across and 20 deep, a line of destroyers out front, cruisers and tankers and more destroyers in the middle, the carriers and the battleships at the rear. The fleet would sail nearly blind. It did not have radar, and no reconnaissance planes would be sent aloft, because any scout who became lost would have to break radio silence to find his way back. There would only be three submarines inspecting far ahead. The fleet would sail mute, never speaking to the homeland. Radio operators would listen, however. One message would be Tokyo’s final permission to attack, if talks in Washington failed.

No navy had collected so many carriers into a single fleet. No navy had even created a fleet based around aircraft carriers, of any number. If the Japanese reached Hawaii undetected and intact, nearly 400 torpedo bombers, dive bombers, high-altitude bombers and fighter planes would rise from the flight decks of the  Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu, Soryu, Shokaku and Zuikaku  and deliver the largest and most powerful airborne assault from the sea ever.

Unaware that a secret fleet was on its way to Hawaii, the Americans did know—from the volume of radio traffic, from observers in the Far East—that many other Imperial warships were moving toward the Philippines and the rest of Southeast Asia. On November 27, the day after the strike fleet moved out of Hitokappu Bay, a message from Harold Stark, the chief of naval operations in Washington, flashed to all U.S. Navy outposts in the Pacific:

This dispatch is to be considered a war warning X Negotiations with Japan looking toward the stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days X The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo X Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL46.

The message contained rich dollops of intelligence—war is imminent, talks have ended, Japanese landings could happen here, here and here—but only one order: execute an appropriate defensive deployment so you can carry out the prevailing war plan. Left out, deliberately, was any hint of what qualified as that sort of deployment, whether taking ships to sea, elevating watch levels, sending protective fighter planes aloft or something else. That decision was left to the recipients. Fleet commanders had gotten their jobs by demonstrating judgment and leadership. If Harold Stark endorsed a single managerial tenet above all others, it was to tell people what you want done, but not how to do it. People loved him for it.

In Manila—4,767 nautical miles from Pearl Harbor—it was already November 28 when Stark’s warning reached the commander of the small Asiatic Fleet, Adm. Thomas Charles Hart. “Really, it was quite simple,” recalled Hart, whom Time magazine described as a “wiry little man” who was “tough as a winter apple.” The war warning meant that “we were to await the blow, in dispositions such as to minimize the danger from it, and it was left to the commanders on the spot to decide all the details of said defensive deployment.” Outnumbered and sitting only a few hundred miles from the nearest Japanese bases, Hart began to scatter his submarines, and his surface ships began to put to sea. A wise man in his situation, he said, “sleeps like a criminal, never twice in the same bed.”

The Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, on the other hand, enjoyed serious distance from the adversary, days and days of it. Given the number of Fleet battleships (9), aircraft carriers (3), cruisers (22), destroyers (54), submarines (23) and planes (hundreds), it could defend itself, too.

All through the year to that point, the commander of the Pacific Fleet, Adm. Husband E. Kimmel, had received alarming dispatches from Washington about possible Japanese aggression. He had gotten so many, in fact, that Vice Adm. William F. Halsey, who commanded the Fleet carriers and would become a figure of lore in the coming war, called them “wolf” dispatches. “There were many of these,” Halsey said, “and, like everything else that’s given in abundance, the senses tended to be dulled.”

The Navy had long-range seaplanes on Oahu, but the PBYs, as the floatplanes were known, had never been deployed for systematic, comprehensive searches of the distant perimeter. They only scoured the “operating areas” where the Fleet practiced, usually south of Oahu, as a precaution against a Japanese submarine taking a stealthy, peacetime shot during those exercises. But those sweeps covered only a slim arc of the compass at a time. Kimmel, the very picture of an admiral at two inches shy of six feet, with blue eyes and sandy-blond hair sliding toward gray at the temples, said that if he had launched an extensive search every time he received a warning from Stark, his men and machines would be so burned out they would be unfit to fight. He had to have solid information that the Japanese might be coming for him before he would launch his search planes.

As they read Stark’s latest alarum on November 27, Kimmel and his officers were taken aback by the phrase “war warning,” as Stark had hoped they would be. “I not only never saw that before in my correspondence with the Chief of Naval Operations,” Kimmel said, “I never saw it in all my naval experience.” Likewise,  execute an appropriate defensive deployment  struck everyone as an odd phrase because, as one officer said, “We do not use that term in the Navy.” But because the overall warning message never mentioned Hawaii—only places far away, near Admiral Hart—Kimmel and his men saw no imminent threat.

Neither did the Army on Oahu. On the same day as Kimmel, Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short, the Army commander, got a war warning of his own from Washington. The sending of two dispatches to Oahu, one per service, reflected the peculiar reality that no single person commanded the military there. The duality could easily lead to poor assumptions about who was doing what, and it did.

Seeing nothing in the Army’s warning about a threat to Oahu, Short opted to guard not against an external threat, but against saboteurs who might be lurking among the thousands of Oahu residents of Japanese descent. An Army officer would say afterward, however, he had always believed “that we would never have any sabotage trouble with the local Japanese. And we never did.”

As for the Pacific Fleet, it would carry on as before. It was not yet time to empty Pearl of as many ships as possible. It wasn’t time to hang torpedo nets from any that remained because everyone knew the harbor was too shallow for torpedoes. The harbor outside Kimmel’s office windows might have been an ideal refuge for ships in an earlier era, but not in the age of the warplane. Even landlubber Army officers knew that. “All you had to do was drive by down here when the Fleet was all in,” Short said. “You can see that they just couldn’t be missed if they had a serious attack....There was too little water for the number of ships.”

Japan’s absurd hope was met: Its strike fleet sailed the Pacific for 12 days without being detected, right up until Privates Elliott and Lockard saw the spike on their oscilloscope on the morning of December 7. The spike represented the leading edge of the attack, 183 planes. There had never been anything remotely like it in the history of warfare—and some 170 more planes would follow, as soon as they were elevated from hangar decks to the cleared fight decks.

Only after some debate did the privates decide to tell someone in authority. When they contacted the information center at Fort Shafter, the Army’s palm-strewn grounds a few miles east of Pearl Harbor, they were told to forget about it. They watched the oscilloscope as the unidentified planes closed the distance. At 15 or 20 miles out, with the radar now getting return echoes from Oahu itself, the cluster vanished in the clutter.

A Japanese communiqué to the United States, intended as a warning for the attack, was timed for delivery in Washington by 1 p.m. December 7, or 7:30 a.m. in Hawaii. But it was delayed in transmission until after the attack had begun.

It was 7:55 in Hawaii when Admiral Kimmel, his uniform not yet buttoned, stepped into his yard, overlooking Pearl. Aircraft were descending, climbing, darting, unmistakable red balls painted on every wing. Every resident of Oahu was accustomed to seeing military planes overhead, but only their own, and for the rest of their lives they would speak of the shock of those alien red spheres, the Japanese flying over the United States. Kimmel’s next-door neighbor joined him in the yard, two helpless witnesses to budding catastrophe. To her, the admiral seemed transfixed, incredulous, his face “as white as the uniform he wore.”

Torpedo bombers skimmed directly past Fleet headquarters to drop their 2,000-pound weapons, which did not impale in the mud but rose, leveled off and raced beneath the harbor’s surface until they smashed into the hulls of Battleship Row, where there were no torpedo nets. Three pierced the  California , opening gaping holes. A half-dozen riddled the  West Virginia , which began to tip sharply to port; three, four, then more punctured the  Oklahoma , which overturned in minutes, trapping hundreds of men within; one hit the  Nevada . When a bomb blasted the  Arizona 's forward magazine, the ship disappeared in a thousand-foot mountain of boiling, bluish-purple smoke.

At 8:12, Kimmel, having been driven to his headquarters, radioed the first true communiqué of the fledgling Pacific war, addressed to the Fleet—his carriers happened to be elsewhere, and needed to know—and to the Navy Department. “Hostilities with Japan commenced with air raid on Pearl Harbor,” which conveyed the idea the attack had concluded. It was just beginning.

Yet out there in the harbor, something deeply heroic was taking place. Through the ten months he had commanded at Pearl Harbor, Kimmel had insisted on endless training, on knowing the proper thing to do and the proper place to be; now that training was becoming manifest. His men began shooting back, from the big ships, from the destroyers and cruisers, from rooftops and parking lots, from the decks of the submarines right below his windows. Within five minutes or less, a curtain of bullets and anti-aircraft shells began rising, the first of 284,469 rounds of every caliber the Fleet would unleash. An enraged enlisted man threw oranges at the enemy. 

The Japanese planes kept coming in waves that seemed endless but lasted two hours. Amid the maelstrom, a bullet from an unknown gun, its velocity spent, shattered a window in Kimmel’s office and struck him above the heart, bruising him before tumbling to the floor. A subordinate would remember his words: “It would have been merciful had it killed me.”

By the end, 19 U.S. ships lay destroyed or damaged, and among the 2,403 Americans dead or dying were 68 civilians. Nothing as catastrophically unexpected, as self-image-shattering, had happened to the nation in its 165 years. “America is speechless,” a congressman said the next day, as the smell of smoke, fuel and defeat hovered over Pearl. Long-held assumptions about American supremacy and Japanese inferiority had been holed as surely as the ships. “With astounding success,”  Time  wrote, “the little man has clipped the big fellow.” The  Chicago Tribune  conceded, “There can be no doubt now about the morale of Japanese pilots, about their general abilities as fliers, or their understanding of aviation tactics.” It was now obvious the adversary would take the risks that defied American logic and could find innovative ways to solve problems and use weapons. The attack was “beautifully planned,” Kimmel would say, as if the Japanese had executed a feat beyond comprehension.

But Yamamoto was correct: Japan had begun a war it could never win, not in the face of the industrial might of an enraged and now-wiser America. The military damage of the attack—as opposed to the psychological—was far less than first imagined. Feverish repairs on the battleships commenced, in Hawaii and then on the West Coast. The Fleet would exact its revenge shortly, at the Battle of Midway, when American carrier pilots sank four of the Japanese carriers that had shocked Pearl. And on September 2, 1945, the battleship  West Virginia , now recovered from the wounds of December 7, stood among the naval witnesses to the surrender of the Japanese in Tokyo Bay. 

Related Reads

Countdown to Pearl Harbor: The Twelve Days to the Attack

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Steve Twomey | READ MORE

Steve Twomey is a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist, formerly at the Philadelphia Inquirer and the Washington Post . He is the author of Countdown to Pearl Harbor .

National Archives News

Remembering Pearl Harbor

Each year, we acknowledge the work done and sacrifices made by our men and women in uniform. On this date, our country remembers and reflects on the attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941. The National Archives and Records Administration is proud to serve veterans and their families , especially through our work at the National Personnel Records Center in St. Louis, MO. In addition to veterans’ records, our holdings include historical materials, such as photographs , video footage , and military records , which chronicle the military’s history and battles.

Historic Videos

Presidential Libraries

George Bush Presidential Library and Museum, College Station, TX 

New exhibit: “Pearl Harbor Remembered."  Presidential Rotunda - Through January 1, 2017.  

The attack on Pearl Harbor was the turning point of the 20th century. Life worldwide would never be the same. No nation could remain isolated from the actions of others. For Americans, it was galvanizing. People had a “unity of purpose”. Boys became men, and men became heroes. Men who would become future Presidents all felt the call to take action. Many were already in military service and in the Reserves. Those who could, enlisted. Those who were in government found effective ways to engage in the war effort. The paths they chose would influence the course of their lives for years to come. 

This exhibit consists of digital images, documents, an interactive station and a video which shows President Roosevelt’s “Day of Infamy” speech. The exhibit is located in the Presidential Rotunda and will be on display from now through December 31, 2016.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum, Hyde Park, NY  

New exhibit:  “Day of Infamy: 24 Hours that Changed History.”  William J. Vanden Heuvel Gallery - Through December 31, 2016.

Featured Documents on Display in Washington, DC

National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, DC

Featured Document Display: 75th Anniversary of Pearl Harbor: “A Date Which Will Live in Infamy.” East Rotunda Gallery -  Through January 4, 2017.

On December 8, 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt asked Congress for a declaration of war in response to Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. On display is the U.S. Senate’s copy of FDR’s famous “Infamy” speech. 

Nationwide Events

Author Talk and Signing: Julia C. Tobey

Book Talk: Captain McCrea’s War: The World War II Memoir of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Naval Aide and USS Iowa’s First Commanding Officer.  Henry A. Wallace Center - Wednesday, December 7, 2016 - 3 p.m.

Author Talk and Signing: Matthew Dallek

Book Talk: Defenseless Under the Night: The Roosevelt Years and the Origins of Homeland Security. Henry A. Wallace Center - Wednesday, December 7, 2016 - 7 p.m.

George Bush Presidential Library and Museum, College Station, TX  

Special Event: 75th Anniversary of The Battle of Pearl Harbor. Bush Library Plaza / Annenberg Conference Center - Wednesday, December 7, 2016 - 10 a.m. - brunch / 11:30 a.m. - program

The George Bush Presidential Library Foundation and the Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs invite you to the 75th anniversary of the Battle of Pearl Harbor at the Annenberg Presidential Conference Center at the Bush Center on Texas A&M University Campus. The event will feature a panel discussion with Brit Hume, former ABC and FOX News Commentator; James Bradley, author of  Flags of Our Fathers and Flyboys;  and Jon Meacham, author of  Destiny and Power . In partnership with Lenore and Francis Humphrys International Speakers Program, the Bush School of Government and the George Bush Presidential Library and Museum. Additional underwriting provided by American Momentum Bank.

Acceptances required by November 30, 2016. Please contact us at 979-862-2251 or [email protected] with any questions. For more information, please see the official website . See more at  http://bush41.org/events-listing#sthash.Yl3Y12vQ.dpuf

George Bush Presidential Library and Museum, College Station, TX

Special Event: “Accidental Hero” by Patrick Dewane. Rudder Theatre,  November 18, 2016 - 7 p.m .   Evening, Lectures & Discussions, Special Events:   As we look ahead to the 75th anniversary of the bombing of Pearl Harbor, Patrick Dewane presents the dramatic retelling of the story of his grandfather, Matt Konop, a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army. His unpublished memoirs were found in a box in a basement along with a treasure trove of pictures, videos and other memorabilia. Unbeknownst to his family, Konop had spent some of his latter years writing his war stories for posterity. The tale is a journey through landing on Omaha Beach, facing off with Nazi soldiers in the Ardennes Forest and liberating the small Czech towns where his ancestors lived.

National World War I Museum and Memorial, Kansas City, MO

"Reflections of Doolittle Raider Dick Cole on WWII."  Wednesday, December 7, 2016 - 6 p.m.   OFFSITE  – Before 9/11 there was 12/7, and on the 75th anniversary of the bombing of Pearl Harbor, Kansas City proudly welcomes Doolittle Raider veteran Lt. Col. Dick Cole, USAF (Ret.) with Park University Professor of EnglishDennis R. Okerstrom, author of the acclaimed book Dick Cole’s War. Join National World War I Museum and Memorial President and CEO Matthew Naylor as he and our distinguished guests reflect upon the impact of Pearl Harbor and present meaning of WWII. This program is a partnership of Park University and the National World War I Museum and Memorial in collaboration with the National Archives at Kansas City, the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library & Museum, and the Truman Center at the University of Missouri – Kansas City. Doors open at 5:45 p.m. RSVP  here .

Washington, DC, Events

Book Talk: Countdown to Pearl Harbor: Twelve Days to the Attack.  

National Archives Building, William G. McGowan Theater, Washington, DC.  Wednesday, November 30, 2016 - noon.  Pulitzer Prize–winning reporter Steve Twomey with book signing.  See the recording on YouTube .

National Archives Building, William G. McGowan Theater, Washington, DC.  Wednesday, December 7, 2016 - noon  Author Craig Nelson with book signing.

Film program:   From the Vaults: How Americans First Learned of Pearl Harbor

National Archives Building, William G. McGowan Theater, Washington, DC.  Wednesday, December 7, 2016 - 2 pm.  Author Craig Nelson (Pearl Harbor: From Infamy to Greatness)

•   December 7th (short version)
• Japanese Planes Bomb Pearl Harbor
• News Flash Describing the Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor  (audio only)
• President Franklin Roosevelt’s “Day of Infamy” Speech  (audio only)
• Recovery of Japanese Midget Submarine Off Pearl Harbor
• Pearl Harbor Deck Logs and Witnesses
• Digitizing Records from Pearl Harbor

National Archives Videos

• Online screening of December 7th  and other historic films
• Countdown to Pearl Harbor: Twelve Days to the Attack (author lecture)
• Pearl Harbor: From Infamy to Greatness (author lecture)
• Our Man in Tokyo: An American Ambassador and the Countdown to Pearl Harbor  (author lecture)
• Digitizing Records from Pearl Harbor (Know Your Records lecture)

Prologue: Quarterly of the National Archives

Attack on Pearl Harbor

Aftermath of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941: left to right, USS West Virginia , USS Tennessee, and USS Arizona .  View in National Archives Catalog

Myth Masquerading as History

An FDR scholar checks the historical record and refutes assertions that the President misled the public about the coming of war.

Day of Infamy Speech

President Roosevelt delivers the "Day of Infamy" speech to a joint session of Congress on December 8, 1941. When Roosevelt delivered the speech, most of his on-the-spot changes involved word order. 

Education Updates:  Pearl Harbor Primary Sources & Teaching Activities

Education Updates:  Responding to Pearl Harbor

Education Updates: Suspending the Right of Due Process: Japanese-American Relocation During World War II

Forward with Roosevelt: Day of Infamy

Forward with Roosevelt:  The True Story Behind the Most Important Speech of the 20th Century

Forward with Roosevelt:  Eleanor Roosevelt – My Day: December 8-14

Forward with Roosevelt:  Found in the Archives: Pearl Harbor Prisoner Petition, December 8, 1941

Legislative Archives: Featured Document - Day of Infamy Address

Pieces of History: Remembering Pearl Harbor: the Ni’ihau Incident

Pieces of History: The National Archives' Response to Pearl Harbor

Pieces of History: Remembering “a date which will live in infamy”

Pieces of History:  Gerald Ford, President and Veteran

Pieces of History: Crafting the Day of Infamy Speech

Text Message: Remembering Pearl Harbor

Text Message: Prologue to Pearl Harbor: The Spy Flight that Wasn’t, Part I and Part 2

Text Message:  The Curse of Hindsight: December 7, 1941

The Unwritten Record:  Visualizing Pearl Harbor 75 Years Later

The Unwritten Record:  It’s No Citizen Kane: Legendary Cinematographer Gregg Toland Directs December 7th

The Unwritten Record:  How a Booklet of General Plans Helped Save 32 Trapped Sailors After the Attack on Pearl Harbor

Primary sources related to Pearl Harbor on DocsTeach

World War II Records

Foreign Policy and Foreign Affairs/World War II and Aftermath

The Intelligence Community

The Power of Independent Thinking

Introductory Remarks:

On December 7, 1941, U.S. military installations at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii were attacked by the Imperial Japanese Navy. Could this tragic event that resulted in over 3,000 Americans killed and injured in a single two-hour attack have been averted?

After 16 years of uncovering documents through the Freedom of Information Act, journalist and historian Robert Stinnett charges in his book, Day of Deceit , that U.S. government leaders at the highest level not only knew that a Japanese attack was imminent, but that they had deliberately engaged in policies intended to provoke the attack, in order to draw a reluctant, peace-loving American public into a war in Europe for good or ill. In contrast, historian and author Stephen Budiansky (see his book, Battle of Wits ) believes that such charges are entirely unfounded and are based on misinterpretations of the historical record.

It’s been often said that “Truth is the first casualty of war.” Historians and policy experts now know that the official government claims, including those made by U.S. Presidents, that led to the Spanish-American War, World War I, Vietnam War, Gulf War, and other conflicts were deliberate misrepresentations of the facts in order to rally support for wars that the general public would otherwise not support. Was this also the case regarding the tragedy at Pearl Harbor and the U.S. entry into World War II—or are such charges false? We are very pleased to provide a debate between these two distinguished experts.

Presentation by Robert B. Stinnett ( “The Pearl Harbor Deception” ):

Two questions about the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor have ignited a controversy that has burned for 60 years: Did U.S. naval cryptographers crack the Japanese naval codes before the attack? Did Japanese warships and their commanding admirals break radio silence at sea before the attack?

If the answer to both is “no,” then Pearl Harbor was indeed a surprise attack described by President Franklin D. Roosevelt as a “Day of Infamy.” The integrity of the U.S. government regarding Pearl Harbor remains solid.

But if the answer is “yes,” then hundreds of books, articles, movies, and TV documentaries based on the “no” answer—and the integrity of the federal government—go down the drain. If the Japanese naval codes were intercepted, decoded, and translated into English by U.S. naval cryptographers prior to Pearl Harbor, then the Japanese naval attacks on American Pacific military bases were known in advance among the highest levels of the American government.

During the 60 years, the truthful answers were secreted in bomb-proof vaults, withheld from two congressional Pearl Harbor investigations and from the American people. As recently as 1995, the Joint Congressional Investigation conducted by Sen. Strom Thurmond and Rep. Floyd Spence, was denied access to a naval storage vault in Crane, Indiana, containing documents that could settle the questions.

Americans were told of U.S. cryptographers’ success in cracking pre–Pearl Harbor Japanese diplomatic codes, but not a word has been officially uttered about their success in cracking Japanese military codes.

In the mid-1980s I learned that none of the hundreds of thousands of Japanese military messages obtained by the U.S. monitor stations prior to Pearl Harbor were introduced or discussed during the congressional investigation of 1945-46. Determined to penetrate the secrets of Pearl Harbor, I filed Freedom of Information (FOIA) requests with the US Navy. Navy officials in Washington released a few pre-Pearl Harbor documents to me in 1985. Not satisfied by the minuscule release, I continued filing FOIAs.

Finally in 1993, the U.S. Naval Security Group Command, the custodian of the Crane Files, agreed to transfer the records to National Archives in Washington, D.C. In the winter of 1993-94 the files were transported by truck convoy to a new government facility built on the College Park campus of the University of Maryland inside the Washington Beltway, named Archives II. Mr. Clarence Lyons, then head of the Military Reference Branch, released the first batch of Crane Files to me in the Steny Hoyer Research Center at Archives II in January 1995.

Apparently, the pre-Pearl Harbor records had not been seen or reviewed since 1941. Though refiled in pH-safe archival boxes by Lyons’ staff, some of the Crane documents were covered with dust, tightly bunched together in the boxes and tied with unusual waxed twine. Lyons confirmed the records were received from the U.S. Navy in that condition.

It took me a year to evaluate the records. The information revealed in the files was astonishing. It disclosed a Pearl Harbor story hidden from the public. I believed the story should be told to the American people. The editors of Simon & Schuster/The Free Press published Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1999.

Day of Deceit was well received by media book reviews and the on-line booksellers, Amazon.com and Barnes & Noble.com, earning a 70 percent public approval rating. Day of Deceit continues among the top ten bestsellers in the non-fiction Pearl Harbor book category, according to Amazon.com and Barnes & Noble.com.

About 30 percent of the reviews have discounted the book’s revelations. The leaders of the dispute include Stephen Budiansky, Edward Drea, and David Kahn, all of whom have authored books or articles on code breaking. To bolster their pre-Pearl Harbor theories, the trio violated journalistic ethics and distorted the U.S. Navy’s pre-Pearl Harbor paper trail. Their efforts cannot be ignored. The trio has close ties to the National Security Agency, the overseer of U.S. naval communications files. Kahn has appeared before NSA seminars. The NSA has not honored my FOIA requests to disclose honorariums paid the seminar participants but has released records that confirm Kahn has been a participant.

Immediately after Day of Deceit appeared in bookstores in 1999, NSA began withdrawing pre-Pearl Harbor documents from the Crane Files housed in Archives II. This means the government decided to continue 60 years of Pearl Harbor censorship. As of January 2002, over two dozen NSA withdrawal notices have triggered the removal of Pearl Harbor documents from public inspection.

The number of pages in the withdrawn documents appears to be in the hundreds. Among the records withdrawn are those of Admiral Harold R. Stark, the 1941 Chief of Naval Operations, as well as crypto records authored by Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, the chief cryptographer for the Pacific Fleet at the time of Pearl Harbor. Under the Crane File transfer agreement with National Archives, NSA has the legal right to withdraw any document based on national defense concerns.

Concurrent with the NSA withdrawals, Budiansky, with the aid of Kahn and Drea, began a two-year media campaign to discredit the paper trail of the U.S. naval documents that form the backbone of Day of Deceit . One of the most egregious examples of ethical violations appeared in an article by Kahn published in the New York Review of Books on November 2, 2000. In that article, Kahn attempted to bolster his contention that Japanese admirals and warships observed radio silence while en route to attack American Pacific bases. Kahn broke basic journalism ethics and rewrote a U.S. Naval Communication Summary prepared by Commander Rochefort at his crypto center located in the Pearl Harbor Naval Yard.

About 1,000 intercepted Japanese naval radio messages formed the basis of each Daily Summary written by Rochefort and his staff. The Japanese communication intelligence data contained in the messages was summarized and delivered daily to Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet. Rochefort’s summary of November 25, 1941 (Hawaii time) was not to Kahn’s liking. It revealed the Commander Carriers of the Imperial Japanese Navy were not observing radio silence but were in “extensive communications” with other Japanese naval forces whose admirals directly commanded the forces involved in the Pearl Harbor attack. Because of the International Dateline, the “extensive communications” mentioned in the summary took place on November 26, 1941, Japan time, the exact day the Japanese carrier force began its journey to Hawaii.

In its entirety the Rochefort summary reads: “FOURTH FLEET—CinC. Fourth Fleet is still holding extensive communications with the commander Submarine Fleet, the forces at Jaluit and Commander Carriers. His other communications are with the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Base Forces.”

The meaning of the summary is unequivocal: The commanders of the powerful Japanese invasion, submarine, and carrier forces did not observe radio silence as they maneuvered toward U.S. bases in Hawaii, Wake, and Guam Islands in the Central Pacific. Instead they used radio transmitters aboard their flagships and coordinated strategy and tactics with each other.

The summary corroborates earlier findings by Pulitzer Prize-winning historian John Toland. In the late 1970s, Toland interviewed personnel and obtained U.S. naval documents from San Francisco’s Twelfth Naval District that disclosed that the “extensive communications” were intercepted by the radio direction finders of the U.S. Navy’s West Coast Communications Intelligence Network. Doubleday published Toland’s account in 1982 as Infamy: Pearl Harbor and its Aftermath .

Yet in his NYRoB article Kahn deleted portions of the Rochefort summary in the middle of the first sentence, profoundly diminishing its significance. Kahn’s version: “Fourth Fleet is still holding extensive communications with the Commander Submarine Fleet.”

Kahn violated basic journalism rules by deleting crucial words and not using ellipsis to indicate a deletion. When I cited these ethical violations to the editors of the NYRoB , Kahn offered an excuse and implied that Rochefort’s summary was too long. “I had to condense my review,” he wrote.

Kahn probably believes his deletion was insignificant because he denies that the Commander Carriers were involved in the Pearl Harbor attack. “The force that attacked Hawaii was not that of the Commander Carriers but the First Air Fleet,” he wrote in his reply to my Letter to the Editor of the NYRoB (February 8, 2001). Kahn revealed his ignorance of the Japanese naval organization. The First Air Fleet operated under Commander Carriers, that is, Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, who was in charge of the entire Hawaii Operation.

Captain A. James McCollum, USNR (Ret), who served in San Francisco’s Twelfth Naval District intelligence office (and later on the intelligence staff of Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz) accused Kahn of committing “journalistic crimes.” “That critic, David Kahn, seems to have deliberately distorted some facts and even altered quotations...,” McCollum wrote in his letter to the editors of the NYRoB on February 14, 2001. The letter was never published.

Stephen Budiansky continued his media blitz in the Wall Street Journal . In a December 27, 2001 Letter to the Editor of the Journal , Budiansky praised Kahn as “...widely regarded as the world’s leading authority on the history of code breaking...” Then in following paragraphs, Budiansky mimicked Kahn and misreported the facts concerning the U.S. naval monitor station on Corregidor, known as CAST. He challenged the Day of Deceit account and wrote that CAST was located in Cavite, Philippines.

Budiansky’s errors involving CAST reveal a poor understanding of U.S. naval communications intelligence operations. CAST was temporarily located at the Cavite Naval Base in 1936, then moved to Mariveles on the Bataan Peninsula. In October 1940, the station was relocated to Corregidor. The new quarters were located in an underground crypto center carved from the rock of Corregidor. CAST remained on the rock until the spring of 1942 when advancing Japanese troops forced its removal to Australia. Budiansky did not differentiate between the 1940-41 U.S. naval broadcast radio center at Cavite and the U.S. navy cryptographic monitor station on Corregidor.

The mistakes of the Budiansky-Drea-Kahn team concerning Station CAST worsen.

In the same Wall Street Journal edition, Edward J. Drea, a retired U.S. Army historian, also wrote a misleading account of the crypto operations at CAST in November 1941. Mr. Drea challenged a CAST report dated November 16, 1941, by its commanding officer Lieutenant John M. Lietwiler who reported to Washington that his staff was “current” in intercepting, decoding, and translating the Japanese navy’s Operation Code.

Lietwiler was a highly trained crypto expert in deciphering the Japanese navy’s main operation code known to Japan in the fall of 1941 as the Kaigun Ango-sho D, Ransuhyo nana (Navy Code Book D, random numbers table seven). He spent 1940 and most of 1941 learning the principles of decoding Code Book D from Agnes Meyer Driscoll, the brilliant Chief Civilian Cryptanalyst for the U.S. Navy. Ms. Driscoll was the first American to discover the solution of Code Book D, soon after Japan introduced it in June 1939.

Upon completing the Code Book D crypto course, Lietwiler was dispatched to CAST with the latest decoding details of Table Seven. He arrived and took command of CAST in September 1941. Lietwiler’s expertise and devotion to his crypto duty meant nothing to Drea. In his letter, Drea demoted Lieutenant Lietwiler and described him as a “1941 writer.”

Challenging my interpretation of Lietwiler’s letter, Drea states: “Nowhere in the cited communications is the Japanese naval code mentioned.” Drea is correct in the narrowest sense. To understand that Lietwiler was discussing the Japanese naval operations code requires a broader context.

Mr. Drea failed to comprehend Lietwiler’s technical crypto language used in the letter. It was addressed to Lietwiler’s counterpart in Washington, D.C., Lieutenant Lee W. Parke, another of the U.S. Navy’s brilliant cryptographers. Parke had devised a crypto machine that automatically decoded the additive/subtractive columnar tables of Table Seven. Parke called his invention the JEEP IV and sent it to CAST by officer courier. It arrived on Corregidor on October 6, 1941, via the armed U.S. naval transport U.S.S. Henderson.

The construction of JEEP IV was specifically authorized by Rear Admiral Royal Ingersoll, Acting Chief of Naval Operations. In a memo dated October 4, 1940, Ingersoll wrote, referring to Code Book D: “an additive key cipher is employed in this code, and, although the method of recovery is well defined, the process is a laborious one, requiring from an hour to several days for each message. A machine is under construction which will aide in the mechanical part of the solution, but it must be accepted that current information will seldom be available immediately...” The Ingersoll memo directly connects the Lietwiler memo to the Japanese naval operations code.

Lietwiler refers explicitly to JEEP IV in the letter and adds that his Crypto Yeoman Albert Myers Jr., bypassed JEEP IV and was able to “walk across” the many columnar tables of Code Book D. Readers of the Wall Street Journal should know that Code Book D used columnar random number Table Seven in the fall of 1941. If Mr. Drea had done more crypto homework, he would have known the purpose of JEEP IV. It is fully spelled out in U.S. Navy files. JEEP IV is derived from Parke’s unit whose secret navy crypto designator was GYP (phonetic = jeep). But he failed to understand the esoteric language used by the two code breakers.

I could point out more errors by the trio, but I will limit myself to one more. They refer to errors in dates in Day of Deceit . The so-called date “errors” they cite are not “errors” but are related to the geography of the International Date Line. Like many easterners who have never been west of the Hudson River, the trio does not realize that November 25 in Hawaii is November 26 in Japan. The mid-ocean date change between America and Japan is known throughout the world. It is the result of geographers establishing the Date Line in the Mid-Pacific. America’s day begins in Guam, not New York.

Presentation by Stephen Budiansky:

Robert Stinnett is hardly the first author, and I am sure he will not be the last, to advance a sensationalistic conspiracy theory concerning the Pearl Harbor attack. It is no surprise that conspiracy theories accusing President Roosevelt of treacherously concealing advance warnings of the Japanese attack find a ready market among a certain segment of the book-buying public. But if Mr. Stinnett expects his arguments to be taken seriously in more serious forums, he has an obligation to address the lapses in logic, evidence, and basic scholarly practice—notably the rather basic requirement that original documents not be misquoted to create a false impression of what they actually say—that knowledgeable historians have criticized his book for. So far Mr. Stinnett has failed to answer any of these criticisms or deal with the mass of documentary evidence and testimony that directly refutes his central contention.

Historians who have reviewed Mr. Stinnett’s book have been rightly critical of his work on several grounds. David Kahn, whose classic book The Codebreakers is widely acknowledged as the definitive work on cryptologic history, reviewed Mr. Stinnett’s book in the New York Review of Books and called it the “most irrational” of the many Pearl Harbor conspiracy books yet written. Mr. Kahn pointed out in devastating detail how Mr. Stinnett undermines his own case again and again by making elementary mistakes on fundamental points upon which his conspiracy theory depends: Mr. Stinnett gets crucial dates wrong; he gets basic cryptologic facts wrong; he miscites and misquotes archival documents and takes them out of their plain context. Archivists at the National Archives and Records Administration who have tried to locate documents Mr. Stinnett cites in his book have been unable to do so. His method of citing archival records is indeed so obscure that it is unlikely anyone who sought to verify Mr. Stinnett’s claims as to these documents’ content and context would be able to do so in most instances.

A far worse failing of Mr. Stinnett’s methodology is his practice of misrepresenting—or more often, simply ignoring—the overwhelming body of evidence that directly challenges his specific assertions. Mr. Stinnett has yet to even acknowledge the existence of the substantial, contemporaneous documentary evidence which shows unequivocally that the crucial Japanese naval codes were not successfully broken by the United States before the Pearl Harbor attack—evidence, in other words, that directly refutes the central claim of his book that the United States had, through cryptologic means, obtained secret advance knowledge of the Japanese plans. The documentary evidence that he does cite in his book is frequently taken out of context or quoted incompletely or inaccurately in an attempt to make it seem as if it supports his conspiratorial theories, when in fact it does nothing of the kind. For example:

Mr. Stinnett’s response to all of these criticisms has been to simply ignore their substance. When challenged at public forums where he has appeared to promote his book, the sum total of his defense against his critics has been to assert—literally—“I’m right and they’re wrong.”

His other tactic has been to hurl wild, reckless, and unsubstantiated ad hominem accusations: his critics have “violated journalistic ethics,” or have “close ties to the National Security Agency.” From his book and his other statements it is clear that Mr. Stinnett appears to believe that the NSA, as the successor agency to the World War II codebreaking agencies, has continued to perpetrate a massive conspiracy to hide the supposed truth about the Pearl Harbor attack. Thus, according to his particular logic, anyone who challenges his conclusions must apparently be a shill or paid minion of U.S. intelligence.

I would refer anyone who is interested in exploring in greater detail the historical validity of Mr. Stinnett’s arguments to David Kahn’s review in the New York Review of Books ( “Did Roosevelt Know?” November 2, 2000); Professor John C. Zimmerman’s review essay in Intelligence and National Security ( “Pearl Harbor Revisionism: Robert Stinnett’s Day of Deceit ,” Summer 2002); the articles in Cryptologia by Philip Jacobsen (“A Cryptologic Veteran’s Analysis of Day of Deceit ,” April 2000) and myself in the same issue (“Closing the Book on Pearl Harbor”); my article in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings ( “Too Late for Pearl Harbor,” December 1999); and my book Battle of Wits (Touchstone, 2001).

As anyone who reads these sources will discover, Mr. Stinnett’s frequent, pat answer to any and all criticisms—that his critics are relying on “a 1950s version of events”—is simply wrong. The major evidence that refutes Mr. Stinnett’s claim that the main Japanese naval code was broken before Pearl Harbor (and that a government “coverup” continues) comes from archival documents that were declassified in 1999, which I have described in full in my above-mentioned publications. These documents consist of contemporaneous reports made by U.S. codebreakers at the time in question, in particular a series of date-stamped, month-by-month progress reports filed by the U.S. Navy codebreaking bureau throughout 1940 and 1941. These give a monthly tally of precisely how many code groups had been recovered in every code system being studied at the time. They show unambiguously that only a very small percentage of code group recoveries had been made in the Japanese naval operations code by the time of the Pearl Harbor attack in December 1941, nowhere near enough to produce useful intelligence from the messages themselves.

Reviewing the large body of recently declassified materials in the National Archives, Philip Jacobsen has located the earliest of the actual decoded messages that U.S. codebreakers were able to produce from their cryptologic attack on this code system. The decoded messages are dated and sequentially numbered. Decrypt #1 bears a decryption and translation date of January 8, 1942—in other words, a full month after the Pearl Harbor attack.

This documentary evidence thus fully corroborates the testimony of the U.S. naval officers who were involved in this work, who have long stated that this key Japanese naval code was not readable until early 1942. As Duane Whitlock, who worked at the U.S. codebreaking station in the Philippines, testified: I can attest from first hand experience that as of 1 December 1941 the recovery of JN-25B [the Japanese naval operations code] had not progressed to the point that it was productive of any appreciable intelligence—not even enough to be pieced together by traffic analysis.” (Traffic analysis is the procedure whereby encoded signals that have not been deciphered are analyzed to see if any clues can be extracted about enemy movements or intentions by the pattern, frequency, or place of origin of the transmissions.) “The reason that not one single JN-25 decrypt made prior to Pearl Harbor has ever been found or declassified,” Mr. Whitlock continued, “is not due to any insidious coverup...it is due quite simply to the fact that no such decrypt ever existed. It simply was not within the realm of our combined cryptographic capability to produce a useable decrypt at that particular juncture.”

The commander of the Philippines station, Rudolph Fabian, stated similarly about the lack of pre-Pearl Harbor success on JN-25B despite collaboration with British codebreakers in Singapore: “We were exchanging values [with the British], both code and cipher recoveries, but we had not developed either to the point where we could read enemy intercepts.”

(It is important to note that the Japanese high-level diplomatic code, which the U.S. code named Purple, was being broken by U.S. intelligence at this time, as is well known. But Purple messages contained no information on naval operations or any suggestion that an attack on Pearl Harbor was imminent or planned. I should also mention here that Mr. Stinnett has some tortured conspiracy theory that attempts to portray the designation “JN-25” as part of the “cover up.” In fact the documentary record is absolutely clear that the main Japanese Navy operational code, which Mr. Stinnett refers to as the “5-Num” system or “Code Book D,” is exactly the same code system that from 1942 on was usually designated by the U.S. as JN-25. Everyone in the U.S. Navy who worked on it subsequently referred to it as JN-25, regardless of the several different earlier designations that were used.)

As for Mr. Stinnett’s wild charge of my having violated “journalistic ethics,” when pressed to substantiate that accusation Mr. Stinnett produced a single example: that I wrote that the U.S. radio intercept station in the Philippines was located at Cavite as of October 1941, and was only relocated to the tunnels on nearby Corregidor Island just prior to the Japanese attack, whereas Mr. Stinnett believes that the station’s move to Corregidor had already taken place by October 1941. His source was a U.S. Navy historical summary; mine was oral history testimony of people who worked there as well as logs and messages dating from November 1941 (including some quoted by Mr. Stinnett himself in his book) that refer to the Philippine codebreaking station as “Cavite.” I would, however, be the first to admit that oral history evidence may be mistaken and that the references to “Cavite” in November 1941 may have reflected old habit rather than current reality. This difference between us, by the way, has absolutely no bearing on any of Mr. Stinnett’s arguments about pre-Pearl Harbor codebreaking, one way or the other. It is a trivial historical footnote of little, if any, significance.

So how then, exactly, does this constitute a “violation of journalistic ethics” on my part? The justification Mr. Stinnett offers for making this most serious charge is that since, in his view, I am in error on this point, I have therefore failed to take due care to ascertain the truth, which, he says, is a violation of “ethics.” This is a fascinating argument, for if it is correct then Mr. Stinnett is by his own definition one of the greatest ethical malefactors in the history of journalism, given the number of factual errors, misinterpretations, out-of-context quotations, misquotations, sloppy citations, and refusal to consider contrary evidence that his book contains. I would not make that accusation myself, however. I am content to point out merely that he is one of the most mistaken writers in the history of journalism.

Finally, as ridiculous and offensive as Mr. Stinnett’s accusations of my having “close ties” to U.S. intelligence agencies are, I will nonetheless state for the record that I have no financial, legal, contractual, professional, personal, moral, political, or family associations or ties to any U.S. intelligence agencies, nor have I ever had any such associations or ties, nor have I ever been influenced by them in anything I have ever written on this, or any other subject.

Reply by Robert B. Stinnett:

Stephen Budiansky fails to answer the newest evidence that drastically alters the three main questions of Pearl Harbor: (1) Prior to December 7, 1941, did the U.S. break the Japanese operations code known as Code Book D, (2) did the Japanese fleet commanders break radio silence and (3) reveal their locations to U.S. Navy radio direction finders? Mr. Budiansky’s responds with 1950-era media cover stories and assures his readers that the answer is “no” to all three questions.

However, Mr. Budiansky is directly contradicted on all three counts by National Archive records, including for example, the 1941 records of the U.S. Navy’s principal Far East monitor facility, Station CAST on Corregidor Island. CAST was “current” in intercepting, decoding and translating Code Book D as of November 16, 1941, Manila time, according to Lieutenant John Lietwiler, commanding officer. In addition, Lietwiler’s staff obtained radio direction finder bearings on the Japanese forces en route to Pearl Harbor and identified the warships.

Mr. Budiansky wrongly identifying Station CAST’s commanding officer at the time as Rudolph Fabian and places the facility on Cavite Island in Manila Bay when it was on Corregidor, and identifies the Japanese operation code solved by Lietwiler’s group in 1941 as JN-25. By focusing on the wrong designator for Japan‘s naval code, Mr. Budiansky steers his readers in the wrong direction and prevents their accurate examination of Code Book D.

Lieutenant Fabian was relieved as commanding officer by Lietwiler in September 1941. Fabian, whose wife was seriously ill, was awaiting a return to the U.S. mainland when Japan bombed the Philippines on December 8, 1941 (Manila time). From Mr. Kahn’s claims, Mr. Budiansky charges date errors to me, but he is the one who is in error. He is apparently not aware of the International Date Line in the mid-Pacific which advances a full day from U.S. time zones. America’s morning begins in Guam, not in Washington, D.C. The November 16th Manila date listed above corresponds to November 15 in the U.S.

The Fabian, JN-25, and Cavite media cover stories originated with the Congressional Investigation of 1945-46 and were successfully used to derail an accurate Pearl Harbor inquiry. Mr. Budiansky won’t let go of these stories even though as detailed in my book, Day of Deceit , recent Freedom of Information Act releases disprove their accuracy.

Reply by Stephen Budiansky:

I have already discussed the considerable evidence, including many newly released archival documents, which confirms that the Japanese attack force did not break radio silence and that the main Japanese naval code was not broken by U.S. intelligence before Pearl Harbor. This is not a “cover story” but a thoroughly documented historical conclusion.

Mr. Stinnett cites the Lietwiler memorandum as proof that Station CAST was “current” in reading messages transmitted in the Japanese naval operations code in fall 1941. Here Mr. Stinnett continues his habit of incompletely quoting original documents. In fact Lietwiler refers not to the decryption of current traffic but rather to the massive and far from complete effort to reconstruct the code system itself, specifically the “current” version of its huge key book—a series of 50,000 random numbers that Japanese code clerks used to further disguise encoded messages before transmission. Far from showing that messages were being decoded by CAST at this time, it confirms that CAST in fact had a long way to go before any messages could be decoded at all. CAST personnel have stated repeatedly that their work was not far enough along to read any messages for intelligence value before Pearl Harbor. Are we to assume that they are all participants in the “cover up” too?

I am frankly at a loss as to how Mr. Stinnett can accuse me in one sentence of being mistaken in referring to Rudolph Fabian as commander of CAST and then acknowledge two sentences later that he was commander of CAST. I am not sure what Mr. Stinnett is referring to in his comments about the International Dateline, but they have no relation to any statements I have made here or elsewhere.

Mr. Stinnett’s focus on these few trivialities while ignoring the gaping lapses in logic and accuracy in his own case speaks for itself. He has been caught red-handed misquoting original sources to build his spurious case but his only response is to hurl anew the charge of “cover up.” Until he starts dealing with evidence as it actually exists, and not as it is misquoted and misinterpreted to fit his theories, it is hard to take his claims seriously.

END OF EVENT

Home — Essay Samples — History — History of the United States — Pearl Harbor

Essays on Pearl Harbor

Pearl harbor essay topics and outline examples, essay title 1: pearl harbor: the day that changed history.

Thesis Statement: This essay examines the events leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor, the devastating consequences of the attack, and the pivotal role it played in shaping the course of World War II and international relations.

• Introduction
• The Background: Japan's Expansionist Policies and U.S.-Japanese Relations
• The Attack on Pearl Harbor: Timeline and Key Details
• Consequences of the Attack: Military, Political, and Social Impact
• Pearl Harbor and World War II: U.S. Entry and the Road to Victory

Essay Title 2: Remembering Pearl Harbor: Commemoration, Memory, and Lessons Learned

Thesis Statement: This essay explores how Pearl Harbor is commemorated, remembered, and the lessons it imparts, including the importance of vigilance, diplomacy, and the enduring commitment to peace and global cooperation.

• Commemorating Pearl Harbor: Memorials, Museums, and Ceremonies
• Collective Memory and Its Role in Shaping National Identity
• The Lessons of Pearl Harbor: Diplomacy, Preparedness, and Peacekeeping
• Pearl Harbor's Relevance in Contemporary International Relations

Essay Title 3: The Intelligence Failure at Pearl Harbor: Unraveling the Causes and Consequences

Thesis Statement: This essay investigates the intelligence failures that led to the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, analyzing the factors contributing to these failures and the far-reaching consequences they had on U.S. military strategy and intelligence practices.

• The Role of Intelligence in National Security
• Factors Contributing to the Intelligence Failure at Pearl Harbor
• Immediate and Long-term Consequences on U.S. Military Strategy
• Post-Pearl Harbor Reforms: Strengthening U.S. Intelligence Agencies

A History and Effects of The Attack on Pearl Harbor

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Japanese Attack on Naval Base in Pearl Harbor

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December 7, 1941

Oahu, Territory of Hawaii, U.S.

The historical backdrop surrounding the Pearl Harbor attack holds paramount importance in comprehending the unfolding events on December 7, 1941. During that time, escalating tensions between the United States and Japan were driven by conflicting interests in the Pacific region. Japan, aiming to expand its empire, particularly in Southeast Asia, faced economic sanctions imposed by the U.S. due to Japanese aggression in China. Amidst these mounting hostilities, Japan meticulously devised a plan to incapacitate the U.S. Pacific Fleet stationed at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The element of surprise in the attack proved devastating, leading to the loss of countless American lives and the decimation of battleships, aircraft, and vital infrastructure. The assault on Pearl Harbor served as a catalyst for President Franklin D. Roosevelt's declaration of war against Japan, followed by subsequent declarations against Germany and Italy. The event profoundly influenced American public sentiment, galvanizing a unified national effort in support of the war.

Initial Air Assault: In the early hours of the morning, Japanese aircraft launched a surprise assault on the naval base. Waves of bombers and fighters targeted battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and aircraft stationed at Pearl Harbor. The attack resulted in extensive damage to the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Battleship Row: The Japanese bombers focused their attention on Battleship Row, where many of the U.S. battleships were moored. Several battleships, including the USS Arizona and USS Oklahoma, were hit by torpedoes and bombs, leading to their sinking or severe damage. The USS Arizona became a symbol of the attack, as it remains submerged at the harbor as a memorial. Aerial Bombardment: The Japanese continued their assault, targeting other important military installations, airfields, and infrastructure around Pearl Harbor. Aircraft hangars, fuel storage facilities, and military aircraft were specifically targeted to incapacitate the U.S. forces. U.S. Response: Following the attack, President Franklin D. Roosevelt declared war on Japan, leading to the United States' formal entry into World War II.

Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto: As the mastermind behind the attack, Admiral Yamamoto was the commander-in-chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet. He meticulously planned and executed the surprise assault on Pearl Harbor, recognizing its potential impact on the Pacific War. Lieutenant Commander Mitsuo Fuchida: Fuchida led the first wave of Japanese bombers during the attack. He famously radioed the code words "Tora! Tora! Tora!" to signify the successful surprise attack. Fuchida later became known for his efforts to reconcile Japan and the United States after the war. Captain Mervyn Bennion: Serving as the commanding officer of the USS West Virginia, Captain Bennion displayed exceptional leadership and bravery during the attack. Despite sustaining fatal injuries, he remained at his post, issuing orders and providing guidance to his crew. Dorie Miller: Miller, a mess attendant on the USS West Virginia, emerged as a hero during the attack. Despite having no formal training, he manned an anti-aircraft gun and shot down several enemy aircraft, displaying courage and resourcefulness. Lieutenant General Walter Short: Short was the commander of the U.S. Army forces in Hawaii during the attack. His decisions regarding defense preparations and the positioning of aircraft and equipment came under scrutiny and were subject to investigation after the attack.

U.S. Entry into World War II: The attack directly led to the United States' entry into the global conflict. Following the assault, President Franklin D. Roosevelt delivered a powerful speech to Congress, resulting in a declaration of war against Japan. This marked a turning point, as the United States officially joined the Allied forces in their fight against the Axis powers. National Unity and Mobilization: The attack on Pearl Harbor united the American public like never before. It galvanized support for the war effort, with citizens rallying behind the government and military. The nation mobilized its resources and industries to meet the demands of the war, propelling the United States into a total war footing. Shifting Priorities and Strategies: The attack forced the United States to reassess its military strategies and prioritize the Pacific theater. The focus shifted from a primarily European-centered war effort to a more balanced approach that addressed the threat in the Pacific. The Pacific theater became a critical battleground throughout the rest of the war. Technological and Strategic Advancements: The attack on Pearl Harbor highlighted the vulnerabilities of traditional naval forces against aerial assaults. As a response, the United States invested heavily in aircraft carriers and advanced military technology. The war's subsequent naval battles in the Pacific showcased the importance of air power and aircraft carriers.

"Tora! Tora! Tora!" (1970): This historical war film provides a detailed depiction of the events leading up to and including the attack on Pearl Harbor. It offers a balanced portrayal, showing both the American and Japanese perspectives. "Pearl Harbor" (2001): Directed by Michael Bay, this epic film dramatizes the attack on Pearl Harbor and its impact on the lives of fictional characters. While it incorporates fictional elements, it captures the intensity and devastation of the attack. "From Here to Eternity" by James Jones: This novel, published in 1951, explores the lives of U.S. Army soldiers stationed in Hawaii before the attack on Pearl Harbor. It delves into the personal struggles and relationships of the characters amidst the impending tragedy. "Pearl Harbor: From Infamy to Greatness" by Craig Nelson: This non-fiction book provides a comprehensive account of the attack, its aftermath, and the United States' response. It draws on various sources to present a detailed and well-researched narrative. "Pearl Harbor: The Day of Infamy" by Susan Wels: This children's book presents the events of the Pearl Harbor attack in a digestible and informative manner. It helps young readers understand the historical significance of the attack and its impact on American history.

1. The attack resulted in the death of 2,403 Americans, including 68 civilians, and the injury of 1,178 others. 2. The attack damaged or destroyed eight battleships, three cruisers, and four destroyers, while also causing significant damage to other ships and aircraft. 3. The Japanese attack destroyed or damaged 188 U.S. aircraft, primarily targeting the parked planes at airfields. 4. The main targets of the attack were the U.S. Pacific Fleet's battleships at Pearl Harbor, the Army Air Forces' airfields, and the Naval Station at Kaneohe Bay. 5. The entire attack on Pearl Harbor lasted approximately two hours, with the initial wave of Japanese planes striking just before 8:00 a.m. 6. The sunken battleship USS Arizona serves as a memorial to the attack, with the majority of its crew members still entombed within the ship. 7. The attack on Pearl Harbor is commemorated annually on December 7th as National Pearl Harbor Remembrance Day in the United States.

The topic of the Pearl Harbor attack holds immense importance in understanding the course of World War II and its impact on the United States. Exploring this historical event in an essay allows for a deeper analysis of its significance. Firstly, the attack marked a pivotal moment in history as it propelled the United States into active participation in the war. It led to a fundamental shift in the nation's foreign policy, triggering a united response and shaping the outcome of the conflict. Secondly, studying the Pearl Harbor attack provides insights into the consequences of military unpreparedness and the importance of intelligence gathering and defense strategies. Additionally, the attack's enduring legacy serves as a reminder of the human cost of war and the need for vigilance in safeguarding national security. By examining the Pearl Harbor attack, one gains a comprehensive understanding of the historical, political, and social factors that influenced its occurrence, leaving a lasting impact on both the United States and the global stage.

1. Goldstein, D. M., & Dillon, K. V. (2005). The Pearl Harbor papers: Inside the Japanese plans. Brassey's. 2. Gordon, D. (2016). The Pacific War: A short history with documents. Routledge. 3. Hoyt, E. P. (2000). Pearl Harbor. Da Capo Press. 4. Lord, W. (2012). Day of infamy. Open Road Media. 5. Parshall, J., & Tully, A. (2007). Shattered sword: The untold story of the Battle of Midway. Potomac Books. 6. Prange, G. W., Goldstein, D. M., & Dillon, K. V. (1982). At dawn we slept: The untold story of Pearl Harbor. Penguin Books. 7. Smith, C. L. (2016). Japan at war: An encyclopedia. ABC-CLIO. 8. Spector, R. H. (1990). Eagle against the sun: The American war with Japan. Vintage Books. 9. Toland, J. (2003). Infamy: Pearl Harbor and its aftermath. Berkley Trade. 10. Zimm, A. J. (2011). Attack on Pearl Harbor: Strategy, combat, myths, deceptions. Casemate Publishers.

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Protecting Pearl Harbor’s Marine Environment From Aquatic Invasive Species

By Kaitlyn Jacobs, Kevin Lino, and Michelle Bejder, Ph.D.

In 2020, the U.S. Navy discovered what was thought to be an isolated area in Pearl Harbor that housed an unknown octocoral. Following further investigation in 2023, the “isolated area” was discovered to actually spread across any hard bottom feature on the harbor floor for 80-acres. This confirmed beliefs that the octocoral had been growing, spreading, and invading the marine environment for much longer than just three years.

Aquatic invasive species are a primary, troublesome concern for marine resources managers because they have the capability to negatively alter food webs, affect hydrology and nutrient dynamics, and reduce native species richness and density. It is estimated that aquatic invasive species have cost the global economy $345 billion through resource damage, infrastructure impacts, and subsequent management. Oftentimes, once an invasive species is established, it takes over quickly and becomes near impossible to eradicate due to difficulties to spot and because removal techniques are complicated and expensive.

Given the preciousness of Hawaii’s marine ecosystem, however, and importance to the economy, the Navy moved forward with an extensive effort to remove this invasive species from Pearl Harbor.

Invasion Identification

Island ecosystems are at high risk to the devastating impacts of invasive species due to globalization and increased trade that increase the risk of introduction. Hawaii is no exception, termed the “extinction capital of the United States.” Natural resource managers in the state are still dealing with a variety of invasions from the early 1970s, including invasive marine algae, fish, and jellyfish. For more than 40 years, there has been a high emphasis on the early detection of aquatic invasive species to increase the chances of successfully removing it while still at relatively low manageable densities.

After discovering the true scale of the octocoral invasion, the Navy worked with partner marine biologists from the state, the Bishop Museum, and University of Hawaii to genetically identify it as Unomia stolonifera (“pulsing coral”), a popular aquarium species. This octocoral was severely destructive when it was illegally introduced in waters off the coast of Venezuela. Worse yet, later surveys and genetic analysis confirmed that a second octocoral was present in Pearl Harbor as well: another popular aquarium species, Capnella spicata (“Kenya Tree coral”).

Given the radiating distribution of both invasive species within proximity to a common access fishing area and the detection of a common aquarium trade reef fish (Apolemichthys xanthopunctatus, “Gold Flake Angelfish”), it is almost certain this issue stems from an illegal aquarium release. In Hawaii, it is against the law to have certain common aquarium species. Unfortunately, these species were released rather than turned over to appropriate agencies. The general public can anonymously surrender such illegal species without any impacts or consequences.

The Navy is also implementing other innovative techniques, including sending down dive teams to manually wrap pier piles with plastic wrap and smother the invasive octocorals growing on the surface of the piles.

Both species are native to the Indo-Pacific, with U. stolonifera first identified in Indonesia but also found in Japan and Taiwan. In Venezuela, the current invasion covers an extensive area—overgrowing much of the native fauna to up to 100 percent of bottom composition in many areas, and it is spreading east into the Caribbean Sea. U. stolonifera was identified recently in Cuba and presumed to have been introduced from Venezuela, further demonstrating an ability to survive in and colonize new habitats. C. spicata’s known range is currently Tasmania and other coastal parts of Australia into the Philippines, with presence likely in other areas of the Indo-Pacific. Because both of these octocorals are not native to the Hawaiian Islands, they possess no known natural predators, which gives them increased potential to reproduce and spread quickly while replacing slow-growing, reef-building, hard corals that are native to the ecosystem.

The limited scientific research on these species is partly due to the difficulty in species identification based on morphology alone, changes in the taxonomy, and creation of new genuses. In general, invertebrates are notoriously efficient at adapting morphologically without any hereditary changes. Genetic studies were required to determine, with confidence, which octocorals were present in Pearl Harbor. Consequently, the potential for the octocorals to cause state-wide reef ecosystem collapse became the primary focus of many of the Navy researchers and marine resource managers.

Eradication Efforts

Because the issue was larger than expected, the Navy has been collaborating on this eradication effort in a multi-agency taskforce led by the Coordinating Group on Alien Pest Species. Comprised of both government agencies and non-governmental organizations, the partnership is working collaboratively to protect Hawaii from invasive species. Through this partnership, a working group was formed specifically to address the octocorals, with marine biologists from the U.S. National Marine Fisheries Service, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, U.S. Geological Survey, State of Hawaii, University of Hawaii, Bishop Museum, and Williams College.

This newly developed coalition, the Hawaii Invasive Octocorals Working Group, since early 2023, has been joining resources and expertise to evaluate and determine the most efficient eradication methods for the octocorals. For example, an outbreak of corallimorph currently exists on Palmyra Atoll; an effective eradication method used there has been to smother the corallimorphs using tarps, sandbags, and bleach to essentially starve the organisms from oxygen, causing decomposition. Based on that study, the Navy is adapting a similar methodology for Pearl Harbor, using specialized tarp material to smother them and specific collection bags to prevent any accidental release of octocoral fragments. The Navy is also implementing other innovative techniques, including sending down dive teams to manually wrap pier piles with plastic wrap and smother the invasive octocorals growing on the surface of the piles.

Concurrent with the field eradication and planning, researchers are testing alternative methods of mortality to prevent further spread through gear and vessels. In the laboratory, the octocorals were subjected to fresh water and air exposure independently, resulting in recommendations to ensure death. The combination of in situ and laboratory trials is an adaptive management approach to eradicate the octocoral before it spreads wider while avoiding bringing in any further aquatic invasive species to the area.

Protecting an Ecosystem

Eradicating invasive species is critical. Any change to the natural marine ecosystems could devastate the level of food security in Hawaii and shatter the Native Hawaiian fishing traditions and sustenance capacity. Furthermore, millions of people travel to experience the unique coral reefs. If the octocorals were to invade the fragile reefs, they will eventually grow over every hard coral upon which the entire coastal marine ecosystem depends. Reef fish would struggle to find food. The octopuses, snails, or multitudes of crustaceans that provide an ecological foundation for the endangered Hawaiian monk seal and sea turtles would have no home or shelter. The direct, downstream effects could devastate the local economy, sustenance, and coastal storm protection for beaches and shorelines. Ultimately, without any control, an entire ecosystem collapse likely would be imminent with far-ranging impacts.

The Navy is entrusted to be good stewards of the environment, both on land and at sea. Eradicating these invasive species in Pearl Harbor will protect Hawaii’s precious marine ecosystem, creating an opportunity for the service to spearhead what would be an unprecedented engineering, scientific, and conservation success.

Kaitlyn Jacobs and Michelle Bejder, Ph.D., are Natural Resources Management Specialists for Marine Resources, and Kevin Lino is Marine Biologist, NAVFAC Pacific. They can be reached at [email protected]; [email protected]; and [email protected].

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The Impact of the Attack on Pearl Harbor Research Paper

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Introduction

The impacts of the pearl harbor attack, works cited.

Towards the end of the 1930s, Japan had managed to expand its military influence in the Pacific. This nation was also pessimistic that the United States’ entry into the ongoing global upheaval could affect its hegemonic position. In order to prevent this possible outcome, Japan designed a powerful plan to cripple the United States’ army and make it impossible for it to engage in war. This strategy led to the infamous Pearl Harbor attack that claimed the lives of over 2,400 people. This historical event would have long-term impacts that would eventually change the world forever.

Toland indicates that the Pearl Harbor attack compelled the U.S. government to investigate an attempt to understand the issues surrounding this event (31). The report led to the dismissal of different commanders who had failed to offer adequate protection. The short-term impact of this attack was that the government designed several camps on the country’s mainland. The purpose of such encampments was to confine all people who had Japanese descent. The same treatment was also used to punish Italians and Germans in the country.

Many historians have indicated that this attack informed the United States’ decision to declare war against Japan (Bode and Heo 135). Since this surprise assault led to the destruction of eight battleships and around 200 planes, the Japanese believed that America had a crippled navy that could not sustain the ongoing war. Fortunately, the country managed to join the Allies to deal with the challenges facing the world. Within a short duration, most of the battleships damaged after the attack were repaired and launched to engage in different battles.

The wave of militarism that had existed after the end of the 19 th century forced many countries to form and sign treaties. Such pacts were crucial due to the existing rivalry in Europe and beyond. The Tripartite Pact that had been signed by Germany, Japan, and Italy explained why the United States attracted new enemies. America’s declaration of war against the state of Japan forced the Axis to be against it (Nagata et al. 361). Consequently, America was forced to join the ongoing wars in Europe and Asia. With the country focusing on the reality of the Pearl Harbor attack, it was quite clear that there was a need to join the Allies (Russia, France, and Britain) and make the world safe again.

America’s entry into the war was critical since it sealed the fate of the Second World War and the future of the world. By the year 1940, the Allies were finding it hard to deal with the challenges and problems experienced in Europe. Toland indicates that the Germans were unstoppable and unpredictable during the time (73). They boasted of competent engineers and professionals who produced superior and sophisticated machines such as warplanes, submarines, and missiles. The infamous “enigma codes” used by the Germans were hard to monitor and crack (Bode and Heo 139). These aspects had made it impossible for the Allies to deal with the German problem in Europe.

The United States’ decision to retaliate after the Pearl Harbor attack sealed the Allies’ victory in Europe. This was the case because the war was not being fought on American soil (Bode and Heo 141). Consequently, the country’s citizens and professionals offered adequate materials and resources that turned the tables in Europe. Domestic workers in American produced different foodstuffs and commodities that met the needs of many soldiers in Europe and Asia. The country’s army was also equipped with superior resources and weapons. This means that the Americans provided essential assistance that made it easier for the Allies to emerge victoriously.

Toland goes further to acknowledge that the Pearl Harbor attack should be outlined as the most important event that made the United States a global superpower (64). The country’s engagement in Second World War proved to the world that a new order had emerged. The Japanese and Germans eventually realized that they had engaged a superior nation that possessed adequate resources and expertise.

Another consequence of this attack that cannot be taken lightly is the invention of the atomic bomb. In 1945, Japan surrendered after the Americans dropped two weapons in Japan’s Nagasaki and Hiroshima cities With these bombs claiming the lives of over one hundred thousand people and others perishing after several months, the world acknowledged that the nuclear age had come (Nagata et al. 362). These explosive devices marked the end of the Second World War. However, America realized that it had attracted a new enemy (Russia) after 1945. This rivalry would result in the infamous Cold War that transformed the nature of international relations.

Although Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor can be described as a small event, historians have admitted that it forced the United States to join the war in Europe. This decision would result in the defeat of Japan and Germany in 1945. The country would also emerge victoriously and develop the world’s first nuclear weapon. These subsequent events led to the Cold War, thereby changing global relations forever.

Bode, Ingvild, and Seunghoon E. Heo. “World War II Narratives in Contemporary Germany and Japan: How University Students Understand their Past.” International Studies Perspectives, vol. 18, no. 2, 2017, pp. 131-154.

Nagata, Donna K., et al. “Processing Cultural Trauma: Intergenerational Effects of the Japanese American Incarceration.” Journal of Social Issues: A Journal of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Studies, vol. 71, no. 2, 2015, pp. 356-370.

Toland, John. Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath. Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2014.

• Atomic Bomb as a Necessary Evil to End WWII
• Chapters 18-19 of O'Reilly's "Killing the Rising Sun"
• Pearl Harbor: A Look at the Historical Accuracy
• The Attack on Pearl Harbor
• Pearl Harbor Attack: U.S. and Japan
• Canada as British Ally in the Second World War
• The Postwar Struggle for Integration: City and Suburbs
• Deindustrialization After the World War II
• The Cold War: A New History
• The United States and the Second World War
• Chicago (A-D)
• Chicago (N-B)

IvyPanda. (2021, May 28). The Impact of the Attack on Pearl Harbor. https://ivypanda.com/essays/the-impact-of-the-attack-on-pearl-harbor/

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