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Freedom of Speech

Freedom of speech is a person’s right to speak his or her own opinions, beliefs, or ideas, without having to fear that the government will retaliate against him, restrict him, or censor him in any way. The term “freedom of expression” is often used interchangeably, though the “expression” in this sense has more to do with the way in which the message is being communicated (i.e. via a painting, a song, an essay, etc.). The concept of freedom of speech dates back to a time long before the Constitution was drafted, potentially as far back as Athens in 5th or 6th centuries, B.C. To explore this concept, consider the following freedom of speech definition.

Definition of Freedom of Speech

• The right to express your beliefs, ideas, and opinions without the fear of governmental reprisal or censorship .

5th or 6th Century B.C.             Ancient Greece

1780s                                       America

What is Freedom of Speech

Freedom of speech is the right afforded to a person to be able to speak his or her mind without fear that the government will censor or restrict what they have to say, or will retaliate against them for expressing himself. People are often confused by this concept, however, thinking that they can say anything that pops into their heads without repercussion. Just because you are allowed to say whatever you want does not mean that you will not suffer consequences as a result – it just means that the government cannot violate your right to do so.

The U.S. has many laws that place limits on speech and other forms of expression, which may be seen as harsh restrictions. These include prohibitions against defamation , slander , copyright violations, and trade secrets, amongst others. American philosopher Joel Feinberg posited what is known as the “offense principle,” which works to prohibit speech that is clearly offensive, or which can harm society as a whole, or a group in particular, such as racial hate speech , or hate speech aimed at someone’s religion.

Different countries have different rules insofar as freedom of speech is concerned, with some countries’ governments becoming more involved than other governments in the affairs of their citizens. Communist countries like China are often in the news for blocking their citizens’ access to the internet, and restricting their ability to both read and express ideas and beliefs of which their government does not approve. Here in the United States, examples of freedom of speech include criticisms against the government, and the promotion of ideas or beliefs that others might find to be controversial. In the U.S., these kinds of statements are allowed, within the constraints of the “offense principle,” or the “harm principle.”

Freedom of Speech Amendment

The concept of freedom of speech came into being in the United States back in the 1780s, when Anti-Federalists, like Thomas Jefferson and Patrick Henry, expressed their concerns that the federal government could eventually become too powerful. To keep the government in check, the Bill of Rights was drafted, which gave us, among other guarantees, freedom of speech, as detailed in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which can also be considered the Freedom of Speech Amendment :

“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”

In addition to offering citizens protection from government interference in the expression of their ideas, the Freedom of Speech Amendment also them with the freedom to exercise one’s religion free from persecution. This is known as the Free Exercise Clause . Under this clause , citizens are permitted to adopt any religion they choose, and to take part in the rituals that the religion dictates.

Similarly, the Establishment Clause prevents the government from establishing one official religion that the country’s citizens all must follow. It also prevents the government from developing a preference for, or promoting one religion over another, religion over the lack of religion, or non-religion over religion.

In short, the Constitution guarantees that all people may worship who or how they may, but the federal government has no say in the matter, and may not adopt an official stance. There has been some misunderstanding about this “Separation of Church and State” clause, as it does not prohibit people from expressing their religious preferences in public, but only prevents a governmental entity from promoting any religion over another.

Freedom of the press, which allows publications to print opinions free of governmental censorship, is also permitted under the Freedom of Speech Amendment. Additionally, those who wish to gather in protest against the government are permitted, under the First Amendment, to “assemble peaceably,” which is why protests are permitted on public property, so long as they remain peaceful.

Freedom of Speech Quotes

Throughout time, people have craved, even when it was denied them, the right to freely express themselves. Freedom of speech quotes have survived centuries, to be used again and again, as people fight for this basic human right. What follows are ten great examples of freedom of speech quotes, wherein folks have either defended the policy as is, or have defended the laws that keep freedom of speech in check.

“If we don’t believe in freedom of expression for people we despise, we don’t believe in it at all.” – Noam Chomsky

“Freedom of speech is useless without freedom of thought.” – Spiro Agnew

“Without freedom of thought, there can be no such thing as wisdom; and no such thing as public liberty, without freedom of speech.” – Benjamin Franklin

“There has to be a cut-off somewhere between the freedom of expression and a graphically explicit free-for-all.” – E.A. Bucchianeri

 “For if men are to be precluded from offering their sentiments on a matter, which may involve the most serious and alarming consequences, that can invite the consideration of mankind, reason is of no use to us; the freedom of speech may be taken away, and, dumb and silent we may be led, like sheep, to the slaughter.” – George Washington

“Those who make conversations impossible, make escalation inevitable.” – Stefan Molyneux

“Freedom of speech is a guiding rule, one of the foundations of democracy , but at the same time, freedom does not imply anarchy , and the right to exercise free expression does not include the right to do unjustified harm to others.” – Raphael Cohen-Almagor

“Freedom of speech gives you the right to stay silent.” – Neil Gaiman

“Should freedom of speech include the freedom to tell lies? Who decides what is true and what is a lie? Should the young and impressionable be exposed to propaganda deliberately designed to make them hate others? If we deny the deniers the right to spread their venom, are we then putting our own right to free speech at risk? At which point does hate speech so directly provoke violence that it should be banned?” – Ted Gottfried

“Two things form the bedrock of any open society: freedom of expression and rule of law. If you don’t have those things, you don’t have a free country.” – Salman Rushdie

Freedom of Speech Examples in Legal Cases

More than inspirational freedom of speech quotes, the issue has inspired a number of court cases over the years. Some examples of freedom of expression and freedom of speech cases are discussed below in more detail:

Gitlow v. New York (1925)

In the first case to ever be tried by the American Civil Liberties Union, Benjamin Gitlow had been charged with criminal anarchy, after he printed the “Left Wing Manifesto” in his publication The Revolutionary Age . He defended the piece as being an historical analysis of the concept of communism, rather than acting as an advocate for the system. He was convicted upon the completion of his trial and was ordered to serve five to ten years in prison .

Gitlow appealed the conviction, and his appeal was granted, after he had already served two years at Sing Sing. He was released on bail , only to be re-incarcerated three years later when the Supreme Court upheld the original conviction.

The Court ultimately determined that publication of the “Left Wing Manifesto” was indeed a crime. Despite having served as a leader of the Communist Party in the late 1920s, Gitlow publicly rejected the party in 1939, having become an outspoken anti-communist in 1934, and he remained one of the leading opponents of communism until his death on July 19, 1965.

Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969)

In 1969, Ku Klux Klan leader, David Brandenburg, was convicted of criminal act, one of which was advocating “the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform.”

This followed his participation in a 1964 Klan rally in Cincinnati, Ohio, which Brandenburg had asked a local reporter to cover. During the rally, Brandenburg made a speech against the government, claiming that the government was “suppressing the Caucasian race.”

The court convicted Brandenburg, fining him $1,000, and sentencing him to one to ten years in prison. Brandenburg appealed, saying that his right to freedom of speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments had been violated. His appeal was denied by both the Ohio First District Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Ohio, with the latter flat-out dismissing it without even offering an opinion .

This case led to the establishment of what is known as the Brandenburg Test , which is the standard by which potentially inflammatory speech is measured. Speech can only be prohibited if (1) it is “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action,” and (2) it is “likely to incite or produce such action.”

Related Legal Terms and Issues

• Anti-Federalist – A political movement that opposed the creation of a stronger U.S. federal government, and opposed the ratification of the Constitution in 1787.
• Defamation – An intentional false statement that harms a person’s reputation, or which decreases the respect or regard in which a person is held.
• Copyright – A legal device that gives the creator of a literary, artistic, musical, or other creative work the sole right to publish and sell that work.
• Slander – An intentional false statement that harms a person’s reputation, or which decreases the respect or regard in which a person is held.
• Trade Secrets – Designs, practices, processes, commercial methods, techniques, or information that is not generally known by others, which gives a business an advantage over competitors.

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First Amendment

By: History.com Editors

Updated: July 27, 2023 | Original: December 4, 2017

The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects the freedom of speech, religion and the press. It also protects the right to peaceful protest and to petition the government. The amendment was adopted in 1791 along with nine other amendments that make up the Bill of Rights—a written document protecting civil liberties under U.S. law. The meaning of the First Amendment has been the subject of continuing interpretation and dispute over the years. Landmark Supreme Court cases have dealt with the right of citizens to protest U.S. involvement in foreign wars, flag burning and the publication of classified government documents.

Bill of Rights

During the summer of 1787, a group of politicians, including James Madison and Alexander Hamilton , gathered in Philadelphia to draft a new U.S. Constitution .

Antifederalists, led by the first governor of Virginia , Patrick Henry , opposed the ratification of the Constitution. They felt the new constitution gave the federal government too much power at the expense of the states. They further argued that the Constitution lacked protections for people’s individual rights.

The debate over whether to ratify the Constitution in several states hinged on the adoption of a Bill of Rights that would safeguard basic civil rights under the law. Fearing defeat, pro-constitution politicians, called Federalists , promised a concession to the antifederalists—a Bill of Rights.

James Madison drafted most of the Bill of Rights. Madison was a Virginia representative who would later become the fourth president of the United States. He created the Bill of Rights during the 1st United States Congress, which met from 1789 to 1791 – the first two years that President George Washington was in office.

The Bill of Rights, which was introduced to Congress in 1789 and adopted on December 15, 1791, includes the first ten amendments to the U.S. Constitution.

First Amendment Text

The First Amendment text reads:

“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”

While the First Amendment protected freedoms of speech, religion, press, assembly and petition, subsequent amendments under the Bill of Rights dealt with the protection of other American values including the Second Amendment right to bear arms and the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury.

Freedom of Speech

The First Amendment guarantees freedom of speech . Freedom of speech gives Americans the right to express themselves without having to worry about government interference. It’s the most basic component of freedom of expression.

The U.S. Supreme Court often has struggled to determine what types of speech is protected. Legally, material labeled as obscene has historically been excluded from First Amendment protection, for example, but deciding what qualifies as obscene has been problematic. Speech provoking actions that would harm others—true incitement and/or threats—is also not protected, but again determining what words have qualified as true incitement has been decided on a case-by-case basis.

Freedom of the Press

This freedom is similar to freedom of speech, in that it allows people to express themselves through publication.

There are certain limits to freedom of the press . False or defamatory statements—called libel—aren’t protected under the First Amendment.

Freedom of Religion

The First Amendment, in guaranteeing freedom of religion , prohibits the government from establishing a “state” religion and from favoring one religion over any other.

While not explicitly stated, this amendment establishes the long-established separation of church and state.

Right to Assemble, Right to Petition

The First Amendment protects the freedom to peacefully assemble or gather together or associate with a group of people for social, economic, political or religious purposes. It also protects the right to protest the government.

The right to petition can mean signing a petition or even filing a lawsuit against the government.

First Amendment Court Cases

Here are landmark Supreme Court decisions related to the First Amendment.

Free Speech &  Freedom of the Press :

Schenck v. United States , 1919: In this case, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Socialist Party activist Charles Schenck after he distributed fliers urging young men to dodge the draft during World War I .

The Schenck decision helped define limits of freedom of speech, creating the “clear and present danger” standard, explaining when the government is allowed to limit free speech. In this case, the Supreme Court viewed draft resistance as dangerous to national security.

New York Times Co. v. United States , 1971: This landmark Supreme Court case made it possible for The New York Times and Washington Post newspapers to publish the contents of the Pentagon Papers without risk of government censorship.

The Pentagon Papers were a top-secret Department of Defense study of U.S. political and military involvement in Vietnam from 1945 to 1967. Published portions of the Pentagon Papers revealed that the presidential administrations of Harry Truman , Dwight D. Eisenhower , John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson had all misled the public about the degree of U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

Texas v. Johnson , 1990: Gregory Lee Johnson, a youth communist, burned a flag during the 1984 Republican National Convention in Dallas, Texas to protest the administration of President Ronald Reagan .

The Supreme Court reversed a Texas court’s decision that Johnson broke the law by desecrating the flag. This Supreme Court Case invalidated statutes in Texas and 47 other states prohibiting flag-burning.

Freedom of Religion:

Reynolds v. United States (1878): This Supreme Court case upheld a federal law banning polygamy, testing the limits of religious liberty in America. The Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment forbids government from regulating belief but not from actions such as marriage.

Braunfeld v. Brown (1961): The Supreme Court upheld a Pennsylvania law requiring stores to close on Sundays, even though Orthodox Jews argued the law was unfair to them since their religion required them to close their stores on Saturdays as well.

Sherbert v. Verner (1963): The Supreme Court ruled that states could not require a person to abandon their religious beliefs in order to receive benefits. In this case, Adell Sherbert, a Seventh-day Adventist, worked in a textile mill. When her employer switched from a five-day to six-day workweek, she was fired for refusing to work on Saturdays. When she applied for unemployment compensation, a South Carolina court denied her claim.

Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971): This Supreme Court decision struck down a Pennsylvania law allowing the state to reimburse Catholic schools for the salaries of teachers who taught in those schools. This Supreme Court case established the “Lemon Test” for determining when a state or federal law violates the Establishment Clause—that’s the part of the First Amendment that prohibits the government from declaring or financially supporting a state religion.

Ten Commandments Cases (2005): In 2005, the Supreme Court came to seemingly contradictory decisions in two cases involving the display of the Ten Commandments on public property. In the first case, Van Orden v. Perry , the Supreme Court ruled that the display of a six-foot Ten Commandments monument at the Texas State Capital was constitutional. In McCreary County v. ACLU , the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that two large, framed copies of the Ten Commandments in Kentucky courthouses violated the First Amendment.

Right to Assemble & Right to Petition:

NAACP v. Alabama (1958): When Alabama Circuit Court ordered the NAACP to stop doing business in the state and subpoenaed the NAACP for records including their membership list, the NAACP brought the matter to the Supreme Court. The Court ruled in favor of the NAACP, which Justice John Marshall Harlan II writing: “This Court has recognized the vital relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in one's associations.”

Edwards v. South Carolina (1962): On March 2, 1961, 187 Black students marched from Zion Baptist Church to the South Carolina State House, where they were arrested and convicted of breaching the peace. The Supreme Court ruled in an 8-1 decision to reverse the convictions, arguing that the state infringed on the free speech, free assembly and freedom to petition of the students.

The Bill of Rights; White House . History of the First Amendment; The University of Tennessee, Knoxville. Schenck v. United States ; C-Span .

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Chapter 6: The Right to Freedom of Speech

The free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable rights of man; and every citizen may freely speak, write and print on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty.

Free speech is our most fundamental—and our most contested—right. It is an essential freedom because it is how we protect all of our other rights and liberties. If we could not speak openly about the policies and actions of government, then we would have no effective way to participate in the democratic process or protest when we believed governmental behavior threatened our security or our freedom. Although Americans agree that free speech is central to democratic government, we disagree sharply about what we mean by speech and about where the right begins and ends. Speech clearly includes words, but does it also include conduct or symbols? Certainly, we have the right to criticize the government, but can we also advocate its overthrow? Does the right to free speech allow us to incite hate or use foul language in public?

The framers of the Bill of Rights understood the importance of free expression and protected it under the First Amendment: “Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom of speech.” Both English history and their own colonial past had taught them to value this right, but their definition of free speech was much more limited than ours. Less than a decade after the amendment’s ratification, Congress passed the Sedition Act of 1798, making it a crime to criticize the government. Many citizens believed government could forbid speech that threatened public order, as witnessed by numerous early nineteenth-century laws restricting speech against slavery. During the Civil War, thousands of antiwar protestors were arrested on the theory that the First Amendment did not protect disloyal speech. Labor unrest in the 1800s and 1890s brought similar restraints on the right of politically unpopular groups, such as socialists, to criticize government’s failure to protect working people from the ills of industrialization and economic depression.

Freedom of speech did not become a subject of important court cases until the twentieth century when the Supreme Court announced one of the most famous principles in constitutional law, the clear and present danger test. The test was straightforward: government could not restrict speech unless it posed a known, immediate threat to public safety. The standard sought to balance the need for order with the right to speak freely. At its heart was the question of proximity, or closeness, and degree. If speech brought about an action that was dangerous under the immediate circumstances, such as falsely yelling “fire” in a crowded theater, then it did not enjoy First Amendment protection. With this case, Schenck v. United States (1919), the Court began a decades-long process of seeking the right balance between free speech and public safety.

The balance, at first, was almost always on the side of order and security. Another case decided in 1919, Debs v. United States , illustrates how restrictive the test could be. Eugene Debs was a labor leader from Indiana who had run for President four times as the candidate of the Socialist Party of America, once polling more than one million votes. At a June 1918 rally in Chicago, while U.S. troops were fighting in World War I, he told the working-class crowd, “You need to know you are fit for something better than slavery and cannon fodder.”

The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic . . . The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.

He was sentenced under an existing federal statute to twenty years in prison for inciting disloyalty and obstruction of military recruitment, which the Supreme Court upheld.

For the next five decades, the Court wrestled with the right balance between speech and order. Much of what defined freedom of speech emerged from challenges to the government’s ability to regulate or punish political protest. Each case brought a new set of circumstances that allowed the justices an opportunity to modify or extend the clear and present danger test. Many decisions recognized the abstract right of individuals to speak freely, but each one hedged this right in important ways. Always in the background were conditions that pointed to disorder, dissension, and danger—the Great Depression, World War II, and the Cold War, among them—so the justices were cautious in expanding a right that would expose America to greater threats. These cases, however, gradually introduced a new perspective on the value of free speech in a democracy, namely, the belief that truth is best reached by the free trade in ideas.

The belief that society is best served by a marketplace of ideas open to all opinions, no matter how radical, ultimately prevailed. In 1927, the Court had endorsed what came to be called the bad tendency test: if officials believed speech was likely to lead to a bad result, such as urging people to commit a violent act, it was not protected under the First Amendment even if no violence occurred. By 1969, however, similar facts produced a different outcome. Ku Klux Klan members in Ohio invited a television station to film their rally. Waving firearms, they shouted racist and anti-Semitic slurs and threatened to march on Congress before their leader was arrested and later convicted under a state law banning speech that had a tendency to incite violence. The Supreme Court overturned his conviction in Brandenburg v. Ohio and established the rule still in effect today: the First Amendment protects the right to advocate the use of force or violence, but it does not safeguard speech likely to incite or produce an immediate unlawful act. The Brandenburg test has allowed Nazis to march, Klan members to hold rallies, and other extremist groups to promote views far outside the mainstream of public opinion. With few exceptions—fighting words and obscenity, for example—government today cannot regulate the content of speech.

Even as society was coming to accept a wide range of political ideas, opposition to an unpopular war raised other questions about the limits and forms of free speech. By the mid- to late 1960s, the Vietnam War divided Americans. Although many citizens supported the use of U.S. troops to stop communism in Asia, a growing minority, including many draft-age young people, took to the streets to oppose the war. The protestors did not limit their efforts to antiwar speeches; they also wore shirts with obscene slogans, burned draft cards, and desecrated American flags. Using these symbols to protest, they argued, was a form of free speech. Soon, the Supreme Court faced the question squarely in a case involving a youthful protestor from the nation’s heartland: is symbolic speech—messages using symbols or signs, not words—protected by the First Amendment?

The first large-scale American demonstration against the Vietnam War occurred in November 1965 when more than 25,000 protestors converged on the nation’s capital. Fifty Iowans made the long bus ride, and on the way home they decided to make their opposition known locally by wearing black armbands to work and school. One member of the peace contingent was Lorena Tinker, the wife of a Des Moines Methodist minister and mother of five children. Mary Beth Tinker, a thirteen-year-old eighth grader, followed her mother’s suggestion and became one of a handful of local public school students who wore this symbol of protest to school. This act placed her in the middle of a national controversy about student rights and freedom of expression.

In many ways, Mary Beth was a normal eighth grader. She was a good student who enjoyed singing, spending time with her friends, and taking part in church activities. What made her different was a commitment to social justice, a passion encouraged by her parents, both of whom were known for their activism. Her parents wanted their children to share their moral and social values, and Mary Beth responded eagerly to their invitation to participate with them. By the time she became a teenager, she already had attended her first protest, accompanying her father to a rally about fair housing.

Mary Beth Tinker, her brother, John, and a handful of Des Moines students planned their demonstration for December 16, 1965. The students’ aim was not to protest the war but to mourn its casualties, Vietnamese and American, and to show support for proposed peace talks. School officials, however, promised to suspend anyone who came to school wearing the armbands, and the school principal suspended Mary Beth and sent her home. She was one of five students suspended that day for wearing the offending cloth. Significantly, the school ban applied only to armbands, in other words, to students who opposed the Vietnam War; a number of students that day wore an array of other symbols, including the Iron Cross, a Nazi medal.

When the school board upheld the suspensions, the Tinkers persuaded the Iowa Civil Liberties Union to take the case to federal court. Two lower federal courts agreed with the school’s action, rebuffing the argument that the policy violated the First Amendment guarantee of free speech. The Supreme Court decided otherwise. In its 7-to-2 decision, announced in February 1969, the justices held that the wearing of armbands is a symbolic act akin to “pure speech” and protected by the right to free expression. The protesting students posed no threat to the order required for effective instruction, nor did the wearing of armbands interfere with the school’s educational mission. In this instance, the balance between order and liberty was weighted on the side of the First Amendment. Students and teachers, the Court concluded, do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”

Symbolic speech has been the focus of some of our greatest constitutional drama. Words may be powerful and provocative, but symbols are often more inflammatory because they are visual and evoke an emotional response. We live in an age when we use pictures and symbols to convey important messages, whether in politics or the marketplace. For these reasons, the Supreme Court’s recognition of symbolic speech as a right protected by the First Amendment has been a significant development. Twenty-five years after Mary Beth Tinker put on her armband in remembrance of the war dead, Life magazine featured a handful of civil liberties cases to celebrate the bicentennial of the Bill of Rights. Mary Beth’s case was included, even though the rights of students remained, and still are, more limited than those of adult citizens. But her actions as an eighth grader expanded our conception of constitutionally protected speech to include the symbols we use to express our convictions.

Restriction of free thought and free speech is the most dangerous of all subversions. It is the one un-American act that could most easily defeat us.

More than most other recent decisions, cases involving symbolic speech have revealed how contentious the right of free speech remains in our society. In 1989, the Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment protected individuals who burned the American flag in protest. This decision was highly controversial, and it has resulted in numerous attempts to amend the Constitution to protect the flag and, in effect, limit speech in this circumstance. The outcome of this effort is uncertain, but the debate raises important questions: What role does this right play in our democracy? How does it contribute to our liberty as Americans?

The right to speak freely, without restraint, is essential to democratic government because it helps us develop better laws and policies through challenge, rebuttal, and debate. When we all have the ability to speak in the public forum, offensive opinions can be combated with an opposing argument, a more inclusive approach, a more effective idea. We tolerate offensive speech and protect the right to speak even for people who would deny it to us because we believe that exposing their thoughts and opinions to open debate will result in the discovery of truth. This principle is an old one in Western thought. U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s dissent in Abrams v. United States , a 1919 case suppressing free speech, is a classic statement of this view: “The best test of truth is the power of thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which [the public’s] wishes safely can be carried out.”

Governmental actions to deny differing points of view, even distasteful or unpopular opinions, rob us of the range of ideas that might serve the interests of society more effectively. In a case decided almost a decade before Tinker v. Des Moines , the Supreme Court found this rationale especially applicable to the classroom. “The Nation’s future,” the justices wrote, “depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth out of a multitude of tongues.” As a nation, we are willing to live with the often bitter conflict over ideas because we believe it will lead to truth and to improved lives for all citizens. We recognize that freedom of speech is the first freedom of democracy, as the English poet John Milton argued during his own seventeenth-century struggle to gain this right: “Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above all liberties.” The ability to speak freely allows us to pursue truth, to challenge falsehoods, to correct mistakes—all are necessary for a healthy society.

Free speech also reflects a commitment to individual freedom and autonomy, the right to decide for ourselves and to pursue our own destiny. Throughout our history, we have been so committed to individual choice that many foreign observers believe it is our most characteristic trait. We see it reflected daily in everything from advertising slogans—“Have It Your Way”— to fashion statements, but fail to recognize how closely freedom is tied to the right to speak freely. Free speech guarantees us an individual voice, no matter how far removed our opinions and beliefs are from mainstream society. With this voice we are free to contribute as individuals to the marketplace of ideas or a marketplace of goods, as well as to decide how and under what circumstances we will join with others to decide social and governmental policies.

A commitment to free speech, of course, will not resolve all conflict, not if our history is any guide. The debate is most contentious during times of war or other moments when national security is at stake. Even then—perhaps especially then—we will continue to fight over words and symbols because they express our deepest hopes and our most worrisome fears. This contest over what speech is acceptable and what is not has been a constant theme of our past. Rarely do these struggles produce a neat consensus. More often, intemperate rhetoric and bitter division have been their legacy, and this angry clamor is one of the basic noises of our history. What makes the struggle to protect free speech worthwhile is its ability to serve as a lever for change. When we practice our right to speak openly, we are defining the contours of our democracy. It is messy work, but through it, we keep the Constitution alive and, with it, our dreams of a just society.

“Free Trade in Ideas”

Jacob Abrams was a Russian immigrant and anarchist convicted of violating the Sedition Act of 1918, which made it a crime to advocate anything that would impede the war effort during World War I. In 1917 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., had written the Court’s opinion in Schenck v. United States , upholding similar convictions because Congress had a right to regulate speech that posed a “clear and present danger” to public safety. But by the time Abrams’s appeal reached the Court in 1919, Holmes had modified his views. Disturbed by anti-radical hysteria, he dissented from the majority’s decision upholding Abrams’s conviction in Abrams v. United States . His eloquent discussion of the connection between freedom of speech and the search for truth soon became the standard used by the Supreme Court to judge free speech cases until Brandenberg v. Ohio in 1972. The First Amendment, Holmes reasoned, protected the expression of all opinions “unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save the country.”

But as against dangers peculiar to war, as against others, the principle of the right to free speech is always the same. It is only the present danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring it about that warrants Congress in setting a limit to the expression of opinion where private rights are not concerned. Congress certainly cannot forbid all effort to change the mind of the country. Now nobody can suppose that the surreptitious publishing of a silly leaflet by an unknown man, without more, would present any immediate danger that its opinions would hinder the success of the government arms or have any appreciable tendency to do so . . .

Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result with all your heart you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition. To allow opposition by speech seems to indicate that you think the speech impotent, as when a man says that he has squared the circle, or that you do not care whole heartedly for the result, or that you doubt either your power or your premises. But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment. Every year if not every day we have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge. While that experiment is part of our system I think that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save the country . . . Only the emergency that makes it immediately dangerous to leave the correction of evil counsels to time warrants making any exception to the sweeping command, “Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech.” Of course I am speaking only of expressions of opinion and exhortations, which were all that were uttered here, but I regret that I cannot put into more impressive words my belief that in their conviction upon this indictment the defendants were deprived of their rights under the Constitution of the United States.

“Malicious Words” versus “Free Communication”

In response to fears about imminent wars with France in 1798, the Federalist-controlled Congress passed a series of four acts known collectively as the Alien and Sedition Acts. Section 2 of the Sedition Act made it a crime to make defamatory statements about the government or President. (Sedition is an action inciting resistance to lawful authority and tending to lead to the overthrow of the government.) The act was designed to suppress political opposition. Its passage by Congress reveals how limited the definition of the right of free speech was for some Americans only a few years after the ratification of the First Amendment.

Sec. 2 . . . That if any person shall write, print, utter, or publish, or shall cause or procure to be written, printed, uttered or published, or shall knowingly and willingly assist or aid in writing, printing, uttering or publishing any false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the government of the United States, or either house of the Congress of the United States, or the President of the United States, with intent to defame the said government, or either house of the said Congress, or the said President, or to bring them, or either of them, into contempt or disrepute; or to excite against them, or either or any of them, the hatred of the good people of the United States, or to stir up sedition within the United States, or to excite any unlawful combinations therein, for opposing or resisting any law of the United Sates, or any act of the President of the United States, done in pursuance of any such law, or of the powers in him vested by the constitution of the United States, or to resist, oppose, or defeat any such law or act, or to aid, encourage or abet any hostile designs of any foreign nation against the United States, their people or government, then such person, being thereof convicted before any court of the United States having jurisdiction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars, and by imprisonment not exceeding two years.

James Madison, congressman from Virginia, and Thomas Jefferson, the sitting Vice President, secretly drafted resolutions protesting the Sedition Act as unconstitutional. The Virginia and Kentucky legislatures passed these resolutions in 1798. Both resolutions especially pointed to the act’s violation of First Amendment protections, as seen in the Virginia Resolution here.

Resolved, . . . That the General Assembly doth particularly protest against the palpable and alarming infractions of the Constitution in the two late cases of the “Alien and Sedition Acts” passed at the last session of Congress; the first of which exercises a power no where delegated to the federal government, and which by uniting legislative and judicial powers to those of executive, subverts the general principles of free government; as well as the particular organization, and positive provisions of the federal constitution; and the other of which acts, exercises in like manner, a power not delegated by the constitution, but on the contrary, expressly and positively forbidden by one of the amendments thereto; a power, which more than any other, ought to produce universal alarm, because it is levelled against that right of freely examining public characters and measures, and of free communication among the people thereon, which has ever been justly deemed, the only effectual guardian of every other right.

That this state having by its Convention, which ratified the federal Constitution, expressly declared, that among other essential rights, “the Liberty of Conscience and of the Press cannot be cancelled, abridged, restrained, or modified by any authority of the United States,” and from its extreme anxiety to guard these rights from every possible attack of sophistry or ambition, having with other states, recommended an amendment for that purpose, which amendment was, in due time, annexed to the Constitution; it would mark a reproachable inconsistency, and criminal degeneracy, if an indifference were now shewn, to the most palpable violation of one of the Rights, thus declared and secured; and to the establishment of a precedent which may be fatal to the other.

The Sedition Act expired in 1801 but not until a number of the Federalists’ opponents, including Congressman Matthew Lyon of Vermont, had been convicted of violating the law. Today, historians consider the Sedition Act to have been a gross misuse of government power. In 1798, the Kentucky Resolutions focused on the rights of states to determine the limits of free speech.

Resolved, that it is true as a general principle, and is also expressly declared by one of the amendments to the Constitution, that “the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people;” and that no power over the freedom of religion, freedom of speech, or freedom of the press being delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, all lawful powers respecting the same did of right remain, and were reserved to the States or the people: that thus was manifested their determination to retain to themselves the right of judging how far the licentiousness of speech and of the press may be abridged without lessening their useful freedom, and how far those abuses which cannot be separated from their use should be tolerated, rather than the use be destroyed.

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Freedom of Speech

[ Editor’s Note: The following new entry by Jeffrey W. Howard replaces the former entry on this topic by the previous author. ]

Human beings have significant interests in communicating what they think to others, and in listening to what others have to say. These interests make it difficult to justify coercive restrictions on people’s communications, plausibly grounding a moral right to speak (and listen) to others that is properly protected by law. That there ought to be such legal protections for speech is uncontroversial among political and legal philosophers. But disagreement arises when we turn to the details. What are the interests or values that justify this presumption against restricting speech? And what, if anything, counts as an adequate justification for overcoming the presumption? This entry is chiefly concerned with exploring the philosophical literature on these questions.

The entry begins by distinguishing different ideas to which the term “freedom of speech” can refer. It then reviews the variety of concerns taken to justify freedom of speech. Next, the entry considers the proper limits of freedom of speech, cataloging different views on when and why restrictions on communication can be morally justified, and what considerations are relevant when evaluating restrictions. Finally, it considers the role of speech intermediaries in a philosophical analysis of freedom of speech, with special attention to internet platforms.

1. What is Freedom of Speech?

2.1 listener theories, 2.2 speaker theories, 2.3 democracy theories, 2.4 thinker theories, 2.5 toleration theories, 2.6 instrumental theories: political abuse and slippery slopes, 2.7 free speech skepticism, 3.1 absoluteness, coverage, and protection, 3.2 the limits of free speech: external constraints, 3.3 the limits of free speech: internal constraints, 3.4 proportionality: chilling effects and political abuse, 3.5 necessity: the counter-speech alternative, 4. the future of free speech theory: platform ethics, other internet resources, related entries.

In the philosophical literature, the terms “freedom of speech”, “free speech”, “freedom of expression”, and “freedom of communication” are mostly used equivalently. This entry will follow that convention, notwithstanding the fact that these formulations evoke subtly different phenomena. For example, it is widely understood that artistic expressions, such as dancing and painting, fall within the ambit of this freedom, even though they don’t straightforwardly seem to qualify as speech , which intuitively connotes some kind of linguistic utterance (see Tushnet, Chen, & Blocher 2017 for discussion). Still, they plainly qualify as communicative activity, conveying some kind of message, however vague or open to interpretation it may be.

Yet the extension of “free speech” is not fruitfully specified through conceptual analysis alone. The quest to distinguish speech from conduct, for the purpose of excluding the latter from protection, is notoriously thorny (Fish 1994: 106), despite some notable attempts (such as Greenawalt 1989: 58ff). As John Hart Ely writes concerning Vietnam War protesters who incinerated their draft cards, such activity is “100% action and 100% expression” (1975: 1495). It is only once we understand why we should care about free speech in the first place—the values it instantiates or serves—that we can evaluate whether a law banning the burning of draft cards (or whatever else) violates free speech. It is the task of a normative conception of free speech to offer an account of the values at stake, which in turn can illuminate the kinds of activities wherein those values are realized, and the kinds of restrictions that manifest hostility to those values. For example, if free speech is justified by the value of respecting citizens’ prerogative to hear many points of view and to make up their own minds, then banning the burning of draft cards to limit the views to which citizens will be exposed is manifestly incompatible with that purpose. If, in contrast, such activity is banned as part of a generally applied ordinance restricting fires in public, it would likely raise no free-speech concerns. (For a recent analysis of this issue, see Kramer 2021: 25ff).

Accordingly, the next section discusses different conceptions of free speech that arise in the philosophical literature, each oriented to some underlying moral or political value. Before turning to the discussion of those conceptions, some further preliminary distinctions will be useful.

First, we can distinguish between the morality of free speech and the law of free speech. In political philosophy, one standard approach is to theorize free speech as a requirement of morality, tracing the implications of such a theory for law and policy. Note that while this is the order of justification, it need not be the order of investigation; it is perfectly sensible to begin by studying an existing legal protection for speech (such as the First Amendment in the U.S.) and then asking what could justify such a protection (or something like it).

But of course morality and law can diverge. The most obvious way they can diverge is when the law is unjust. Existing legal protections for speech, embodied in the positive law of particular jurisdictions, may be misguided in various ways. In other words, a justified legal right to free speech, and the actual legal right to free speech in the positive law of a particular jurisdiction, can come apart. In some cases, positive legal rights might protect too little speech. For example, some jurisdictions’ speech laws make exceptions for blasphemy, such that criminalizing blasphemy does not breach the legal right to free speech within that legal system. But clearly one could argue that a justified legal right to free speech would not include any such exception. In other cases, positive legal rights might perhaps protect too much speech. Consider the fact that, as a matter of U.S. constitutional precedent, the First Amendment broadly protects speech that expresses or incites racial or religious hatred. Plainly we could agree that this is so as a matter of positive law while disagreeing about whether it ought to be so. (This is most straightforwardly true if we are legal positivists. These distinctions are muddied by moralistic theories of constitutional interpretation, which enjoin us to interpret positive legal rights in a constitutional text partly through the prism of our favorite normative political theory; see Dworkin 1996.)

Second, we can distinguish rights-based theories of free speech from non-rights-based theories. For many liberals, the legal right to free speech is justified by appealing to an underlying moral right to free speech, understood as a natural right held by all persons. (Some use the term human right equivalently—e.g., Alexander 2005—though the appropriate usage of that term is contested.) The operative notion of a moral right here is that of a claim-right (to invoke the influential analysis of Hohfeld 1917); it thereby correlates to moral duties held by others (paradigmatically, the state) to respect or protect the right. Such a right is natural in that it exerts normative force independently of whether anyone thinks it does, and regardless of whether it is codified into the law. A tyrannical state that imprisons dissidents acts unjustly, violating moral rights, even if there is no legal right to freedom of expression in its legal system.

For others, the underlying moral justification for free speech law need not come in the form of a natural moral right. For example, consequentialists might favor a legal right to free speech (on, e.g., welfare-maximizing grounds) without thinking that it tracks any underlying natural right. Or consider democratic theorists who have defended legal protections for free speech as central to democracy. Such theorists may think there is an underlying natural moral right to free speech, but they need not (especially if they hold an instrumental justification for democracy). Or consider deontologists who have argued that free speech functions as a kind of side-constraint on legitimate state action, requiring that the state always justify its decisions in a manner that respects citizens’ autonomy (Scanlon 1972). This theory does not cast free speech as a right, but rather as a principle that forbids the creation of laws that restrict speech on certain grounds. In the Hohfeldian analysis (Hohfeld 1917), such a principle may be understood as an immunity rather than a claim-right (Scanlon 2013: 402). Finally, some “minimalists” (to use a designation in Cohen 1993) favor legal protection for speech principally in response to government malice, corruption, and incompetence (see Schauer 1982; Epstein 1992; Leiter 2016). Such theorists need not recognize any fundamental moral right, either.

Third, among those who do ground free speech in a natural moral right, there is scope for disagreement about how tightly the law should mirror that right (as with any right; see Buchanan 2013). It is an open question what the precise legal codification of the moral right to free speech should involve. A justified legal right to freedom of speech may not mirror the precise contours of the natural moral right to freedom of speech. A raft of instrumental concerns enters the downstream analysis of what any justified legal right should look like; hence a defensible legal right to free speech may protect more speech (or indeed less speech) than the underlying moral right that justifies it. For example, even if the moral right to free speech does not protect so-called hate speech, such speech may still merit legal protection in the final analysis (say, because it would be too risky to entrust states with the power to limit those communications).

2. Justifying Free Speech

I will now examine several of the morally significant considerations taken to justify freedom of expression. Note that while many theorists have built whole conceptions of free speech out of a single interest or value alone, pluralism in this domain remains an option. It may well be that a plurality of interests serves to justify freedom of expression, properly understood (see, influentially, Emerson 1970 and Cohen 1993).

Suppose a state bans certain books on the grounds that it does not want us to hear the messages or arguments contained within them. Such censorship seems to involve some kind of insult or disrespect to citizens—treating us like children instead of adults who have a right to make up our own minds. This insight is fundamental in the free speech tradition. On this view, the state wrongs citizens by arrogating to itself the authority to decide what messages they ought to hear. That is so even if the state thinks that the speech will cause harm. As one author puts it,

the government may not suppress speech on the ground that the speech is likely to persuade people to do something that the government considers harmful. (Strauss 1991: 335)

Why are restrictions on persuasive speech objectionable? For some scholars, the relevant wrong here is a form of disrespect for citizens’ basic capacities (Dworkin 1996: 200; Nagel 2002: 44). For others, the wrong here inheres in a violation of the kind of relationship the state should have with its people: namely, that it should always act from a view of them as autonomous, and so entitled to make up their own minds (Scanlon 1972). It would simply be incompatible with a view of ourselves as autonomous—as authors of our own lives and choices—to grant the state the authority to pre-screen which opinions, arguments, and perspectives we should be allowed to think through, allowing us access only to those of which it approves.

This position is especially well-suited to justify some central doctrines of First Amendment jurisprudence. First, it justifies the claim that freedom of expression especially implicates the purposes with which the state acts. There are all sorts of legitimate reasons why the state might restrict speech (so-called “time, place, and manner” restrictions)—for example, noise curfews in residential neighborhoods, which do not raise serious free speech concerns. Yet when the state restricts speech with the purpose of manipulating the communicative environment and controlling the views to which citizens are exposed, free speech is directly affronted (Rubenfeld 2001; Alexander 2005; Kramer 2021). To be sure, purposes are not all that matter for free speech theory. For example, the chilling effects of otherwise justified speech regulations (discussed below) are seldom intended. But they undoubtedly matter.

Second, this view justifies the related doctrines of content neutrality and viewpoint neutrality (see G. Stone 1983 and 1987) . Content neutrality is violated when the state bans discussion of certain topics (“no discussion of abortion”), whereas viewpoint neutrality is violated when the state bans advocacy of certain views (“no pro-choice views may be expressed”). Both affront free speech, though viewpoint-discrimination is especially egregious and so even harder to justify. While listener autonomy theories are not the only theories that can ground these commitments, they are in a strong position to account for their plausibility. Note that while these doctrines are central to the American approach to free speech, they are less central to other states’ jurisprudence (see A. Stone 2017).

Third, this approach helps us see that free speech is potentially implicated whenever the state seeks to control our thoughts and the processes through which we form beliefs. Consider an attempt to ban Marx’s Capital . As Marx is deceased, he is probably not wronged through such censorship. But even if one held idiosyncratic views about posthumous rights, such that Marx were wronged, it would be curious to think this was the central objection to such censorship. Those with the gravest complaint would be the living adults who have the prerogative to read the book and make up their own minds about it. Indeed free speech may even be implicated if the state banned watching sunsets or playing video games on the grounds that is disapproved of the thoughts to which such experiences might give rise (Alexander 2005: 8–9; Kramer 2021: 22).

These arguments emphasize the noninstrumental imperative of respecting listener autonomy. But there is an instrumental version of the view. Our autonomy interests are not merely respected by free speech; they are promoted by an environment in which we learn what others have to say. Our interests in access to information is served by exposure to a wide range of viewpoints about both empirical and normative issues (Cohen 1993: 229), which help us reflect on what goals to choose and how best to pursue them. These informational interests are monumental. As Raz suggests, if we had to choose whether to express our own views on some question, or listen to the rest of humanity’s views on that question, we would choose the latter; it is our interest as listeners in the public good of a vibrant public discourse that, he thinks, centrally justifies free speech (1991).

Such an interest in acquiring justified beliefs, or in accessing truth, can be defended as part of a fully consequentialist political philosophy. J.S. Mill famously defends free speech instrumentally, appealing to its epistemic benefits in On Liberty . Mill believes that, given our fallibility, we should routinely keep an open mind as to whether a seemingly false view may actually be true, or at least contain some valuable grain of truth. And even where a proposition is manifestly false, there is value in allowing its expression so that we can better apprehend why we take it to be false (1859: chapter 2), enabled through discursive conflict (cf. Simpson 2021). Mill’s argument focuses especially on the benefits to audiences:

It is is not on the impassioned partisan, it is on the calmer and more disinterested bystander, that this collision of opinions works its salutary effect. (1859: chapter 2, p. 94)

These views are sometimes associated with the idea of a “marketplace of ideas”, whereby the open clash of views inevitably leads to the correct ones winning out in debate. Few in the contemporary literature holds such a strong teleological thesis about the consequences of unrestricted debate (e.g., see Brietzke 1997; cf. Volokh 2011). Much evidence from behavioral economics and social psychology, as well as insights about epistemic injustice from feminist epistemology, strongly suggest that human beings’ rational powers are seriously limited. Smug confidence in the marketplace of ideas belies this. Yet it is doubtful that Mill held such a strong teleological thesis (Gordon 1997). Mill’s point was not that unrestricted discussion necessarily leads people to acquire the truth. Rather, it is simply the best mechanism available for ascertaining the truth, relative to alternatives in which some arbiter declares what he sees as true and suppresses what he sees as false (see also Leiter 2016).

Note that Mill’s views on free speech in chapter 2 in On Liberty are not simply the application of the general liberty principle defended in chapter 1 of that work; his view is not that speech is anodyne and therefore seldom runs afoul of the harm principle. The reason a separate argument is necessary in chapter 2 is precisely that he is carving out a partial qualification of the harm principle for speech (on this issue see Jacobson 2000, Schauer 2011b, and Turner 2014). On Mill’s view, plenty of harmful speech should still be allowed. Imminently dangerous speech, where there is no time for discussion before harm eventuates, may be restricted; but where there is time for discussion, it must be allowed. Hence Mill’s famous example that vociferous criticism of corn dealers as

starvers of the poor…ought to be unmolested when simply circulated through the press, but may justly incur punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled before the house of a corn dealer. (1859: chapter 3, p. 100)

The point is not that such speech is harmless; it’s that the instrumental benefits of permitting its expressions—and exposing its falsehood through public argument—justify the (remaining) costs.

Many authors have unsurprisingly argued that free speech is justified by our interests as speakers . This family of arguments emphasizes the role of speech in the development and exercise of our personal autonomy—our capacity to be the reflective authors of our own lives (Baker 1989; Redish 1982; Rawls 2005). Here an emphasis on freedom of expression is apt; we have an “expressive interest” (Cohen 1993: 224) in declaring our views—about the good life, about justice, about our identity, and about other aspects of the truth as we see it.

Our interests in self-expression may not always depend on the availability of a willing audience; we may have interests simply in shouting from the rooftops to declare who we are and what we believe, regardless of who else hears us. Hence communications to oneself—for example, in a diary or journal—are plausibly protected from interference (Redish 1992: 30–1; Shiffrin 2014: 83, 93; Kramer 2021: 23).

Yet we also have distinctive interests in sharing what we think with others. Part of how we develop our conceptions of the good life, forming judgments about how to live, is precisely through talking through the matter with others. This “deliberative interest” in directly served through opportunities to tell others what we think, so that we can learn from their feedback (Cohen 1993). Such encounters also offer opportunities to persuade others to adopt our views, and indeed to learn through such discussions who else already shares our views (Raz 1991).

Speech also seems like a central way in which we develop our capacities. This, too, is central to J.S. Mill’s defense of free speech, enabling people to explore different perspectives and points of view (1859). Hence it seems that when children engage in speech, to figure out what they think and to use their imagination to try out different ways of being in the world, they are directly engaging this interest. That explains the intuition that children, and not just adults, merit at least some protection under a principle of freedom of speech.

Note that while it is common to refer to speaker autonomy , we could simply refer to speakers’ capacities. Some political liberals hold that an emphasis on autonomy is objectionably Kantian or otherwise perfectionist, valorizing autonomy as a comprehensive moral ideal in a manner that is inappropriate for a liberal state (Cohen 1993: 229; Quong 2011). For such theorists, an undue emphasis on autonomy is incompatible with ideals of liberal neutrality toward different comprehensive conceptions of the good life (though cf. Shiffrin 2014: 81).

If free speech is justified by the importance of our interests in expressing ourselves, this justifies negative duties to refrain from interfering with speakers without adequate justification. Just as with listener theories, a strong presumption against content-based restrictions, and especially against viewpoint discrimination, is a clear requirement of the view. For the state to restrict citizens’ speech on the grounds that it disfavors what they have to say would affront the equal freedom of citizens. Imagine the state were to disallow the expression of Muslim or Jewish views, but allow the expression of Christian views. This would plainly transgress the right to freedom of expression, by valuing certain speakers’ interests in expressing themselves over others.

Many arguments for the right to free speech center on its special significance for democracy (Cohen 1993; Heinze 2016: Heyman 2009; Sunstein 1993; Weinstein 2011; Post 1991, 2009, 2011). It is possible to defend free speech on the noninstrumental ground that it is necessary to respect agents as democratic citizens. To restrict citizens’ speech is to disrespect their status as free and equal moral agents, who have a moral right to debate and decide the law for themselves (Rawls 2005).

Alternatively (or additionally), one can defend free speech on the instrumental ground that free speech promotes democracy, or whatever values democracy is meant to serve. So, for example, suppose the purpose of democracy is the republican one of establishing a state of non-domination between relationally egalitarian citizens; free speech can be defended as promoting that relation (Whitten 2022; Bonotti & Seglow 2022). Or suppose that democracy is valuable because of its role in promoting just outcomes (Arneson 2009) or tending to track those outcomes in a manner than is publicly justifiable (Estlund 2008) or is otherwise epistemically valuable (Landemore 2013).

Perhaps free speech doesn’t merely respect or promote democracy; another framing is that it is constitutive of it (Meiklejohn 1948, 1960; Heinze 2016). As Rawls says: “to restrict or suppress free political speech…always implies at least a partial suspension of democracy” (2005: 254). On this view, to be committed to democracy just is , in part, to be committed to free speech. Deliberative democrats famously contend that voting merely punctuates a larger process defined by a commitment to open deliberation among free and equal citizens (Gutmann & Thompson 2008). Such an unrestricted discussion is marked not by considerations of instrumental rationality and market forces, but rather, as Habermas puts it, “the unforced force of the better argument” (1992 [1996: 37]). One crucial way in which free speech might be constitutive of democracy is if it serves as a legitimation condition . On this view, without a process of open public discourse, the outcomes of the democratic decision-making process lack legitimacy (Dworkin 2009, Brettschneider 2012: 75–78, Cohen 1997, and Heinze 2016).

Those who justify free speech on democratic grounds may view this as a special application of a more general insight. For example, Scanlon’s listener theory (discussed above) contends that the state must always respect its citizens as capable of making up their own minds (1972)—a position with clear democratic implications. Likewise, Baker is adamant that both free speech and democracy are justified by the same underlying value of autonomy (2009). And while Rawls sees the democratic role of free speech as worthy of emphasis, he is clear that free speech is one of several basic liberties that enable the development and exercise of our moral powers: our capacities for a sense of justice and for the rational pursuit a lifeplan (2005). In this way, many theorists see the continuity between free speech and our broader interests as moral agents as a virtue, not a drawback (e.g., Kendrick 2017).

Even so, some democracy theorists hold that democracy has a special role in a theory of free speech, such that political speech in particular merits special protection (for an overview, see Barendt 2005: 154ff). One consequence of such views is that contributions to public discourse on political questions merit greater protection under the law (Sunstein 1993; cf. Cohen 1993: 227; Alexander 2005: 137–8). For some scholars, this may reflect instrumental anxieties about the special danger that the state will restrict the political speech of opponents and dissenters. But for others, an emphasis on political speech seems to reflect a normative claim that such speech is genuinely of greater significance, meriting greater protection, than other kinds of speech.

While conventional in the free speech literature, it is artificial to separate out our interests as speakers, listeners, and democratic citizens. Communication, and the thinking that feeds into it and that it enables, invariably engages our interests and activities across all these capacities. This insight is central to Seana Shiffrin’s groundbreaking thinker-based theory of freedom of speech, which seeks to unify the range of considerations that have informed the traditional theories (2014). Like other theories (e.g., Scanlon 1978, Cohen 1993), Shiffrin’s theory is pluralist in the range of interests it appeals to. But it offers a unifying framework that explains why this range of interests merits protection together.

On Shiffrin’s view, freedom of speech is best understood as encompassing both freedom of communication and freedom of thought, which while logically distinct are mutually reinforcing and interdependent (Shiffrin 2014: 79). Shiffrin’s account involves several profound claims about the relation between communication and thought. A central contention is that “free speech is essential to the development, functioning, and operation of thinkers” (2014: 91). This is, in part, because we must often externalize our ideas to articulate them precisely and hold them at a distance where we can evaluate them (p. 89). It is also because we work out what we think largely by talking it through with others. Such communicative processes may be monological, but they are typically dialogical; speaker and listener interests are thereby mutually engaged in an ongoing manner that cannot be neatly disentangled, as ideas are ping-ponged back and forth. Moreover, such discussions may concern democratic politics—engaging our interests as democratic citizens—but of course they need not. Aesthetics, music, local sports, the existence of God—these all are encompassed (2014: 92–93). Pace prevailing democratic theories,

One’s thoughts about political affairs are intrinsically and ex ante no more and no less central to the human self than thoughts about one’s mortality or one’s friends. (Shiffrin 2014: 93)

The other central aspect of Shiffrin’s view appeals to the necessity of communication for successfully exercising our moral agency. Sincere communication enables us

to share needs, emotions, intentions, convictions, ambitions, desires, fantasies, disappointments, and judgments. Thereby, we are enabled to form and execute complex cooperative plans, to understand one another, to appreciate and negotiate around our differences. (2014: 1)

Without clear and precise communication of the sort that only speech can provide, we cannot cooperate to discharge our collective obligations. Nor can we exercise our normative powers (such as consenting, waiving, or promising). Our moral agency thus depends upon protected channels through which we can relay our sincere thoughts to one another. The central role of free speech is to protect those channels, by ensuring agents are free to share what they are thinking without fear of sanction.

The thinker-based view has wide-ranging normative implications. For example, by emphasizing the continuity of speech and thought (a connection also noted in Macklem 2006 and Gilmore 2011), Shiffrin’s view powerfully explains the First Amendment doctrine that compelled speech also constitutes a violation of freedom of expression. Traditional listener- and speaker-focused theories seemingly cannot explain what is fundamentally objectionable with forcing someone to declare a commitment to something, as with children compelled to pledge allegiance to the American flag ( West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette 1943). “What seems most troubling about the compelled pledge”, Shiffrin writes,

is that the motive behind the regulation, and its possible effect, is to interfere with the autonomous thought processes of the compelled speaker. (2014: 94)

Further, Shiffrin’s view explains why a concern for free speech does not merely correlate to negative duties not to interfere with expression; it also supports positive responsibilities on the part of the state to educate citizens, encouraging and supporting their development and exercise as thinking beings (2014: 107).

Consider briefly one final family of free speech theories, which appeal to the role of toleration or self-restraint. On one argument, freedom of speech is important because it develops our character as liberal citizens, helping us tame our illiberal impulses. The underlying idea of Lee Bollinger’s view is that liberalism is difficult; we recurrently face temptation to punish those who hold contrary views. Freedom of speech helps us to practice the general ethos of toleration in a manner than fortifies our liberal convictions (1986). Deeply offensive speech, like pro-Nazi speech, is protected precisely because toleration in these enormously difficult cases promotes “a general social ethic” of toleration more generally (1986: 248), thereby restraining unjust exercises of state power overall. This consequentialist argument treats the protection of offensive speech not as a tricky borderline case, but as “integral to the central functions of the principle of free speech” (1986: 133). It is precisely because tolerating evil speech involves “extraordinary self-restraint” (1986: 10) that it works its salutary effects on society generally.

The idea of self-restraint arises, too, in Matthew Kramer’s recent defense of free speech. Like listener theories, Kramer’s strongly deontological theory condemns censorship aimed at protecting audiences from exposure to misguided views. At the core of his theory is the thesis that the state’s paramount moral responsibility is to furnish the social conditions that serve the development and maintenance of citizens’ self-respect and respect for others. The achievement of such an ethically resilient citizenry, on Kramer’s view, has the effect of neutering the harmfulness of countless harmful communications. “Securely in a position of ethical strength”, the state “can treat the wares of pornographers and the maunderings of bigots as execrable chirps that are to be endured with contempt” (Kramer 2021: 147). In contrast, in a society where the state has failed to do its duty of inculcating a robust liberal-egalitarian ethos, the communication of illiberal creeds may well pose a substantial threat. Yet for the state then to react by banning such speech is

overweening because with them the system’s officials take control of communications that should have been defused (through the system’s fulfillment of its moral obligations) without prohibitory or preventative impositions. (2021: 147)

(One might agree with Kramer that this is so, but diverge by arguing that the state—having failed in its initial duty—ought to take measures to prevent the harms that flow from that failure.)

These theories are striking in that they assume that a chief task of free speech theory is to explain why harmful speech ought to be protected. This is in contrast to those who think that the chief task of free speech theory is to explain our interests in communicating with others, treating the further issue of whether (wrongfully) harmful communications should be protected as an open question, with different reasonable answers available (Kendrick 2017). In this way, toleration theories—alongside a lot of philosophical work on free speech—seem designed to vindicate the demanding American legal position on free speech, one unshared by virtually all other liberal democracies.

One final family of arguments for free speech appeals to the danger of granting the state powers it may abuse. On this view, we protect free speech chiefly because if we didn’t, it would be far easier for the state to silence its political opponents and enact unjust policies. On this view, a state with censorial powers is likely to abuse them. As Richard Epstein notes, focusing on the American case,

the entire structure of federalism, divided government, and the system of checks and balances at the federal level shows that the theme of distrust has worked itself into the warp and woof of our constitutional structure.

“The protection of speech”, he writes, “…should be read in light of these political concerns” (Epstein 1992: 49).

This view is not merely a restatement of the democracy theory; it does not affirm free speech as an element of valuable self-governance. Nor does it reduce to the uncontroversial thought that citizens need freedom of speech to check the behavior of fallible government agents (Blasi 1977). One need not imagine human beings to be particularly sinister to insist (as democracy theorists do) that the decisions of those entrusted with great power be subject to public discussion and scrutiny. The argument under consideration here is more pessimistic about human nature. It is an argument about the slippery slope that we create even when enacting (otherwise justified) speech restrictions; we set an unacceptable precedent for future conduct by the state (see Schauer 1985). While this argument is theoretical, there is clearly historical evidence for it, as in the manifold cases in which bans on dangerous sedition were used to suppress legitimate war protest. (For a sweeping canonical study of the uses and abuses of speech regulations during wartime, with a focus on U.S. history, see G. Stone 2004.)

These instrumental concerns could potentially justify the legal protection for free speech. But they do not to attempt to justify why we should care about free speech as a positive moral ideal (Shiffrin 2014: 83n); they are, in Cohen’s helpful terminology, “minimalist” rather than “maximalist” (Cohen 1993: 210). Accordingly, they cannot explain why free speech is something that even the most trustworthy, morally competent administrations, with little risk of corruption or degeneration, ought to respect. Of course, minimalists will deny that accounting for speech’s positive value is a requirement of a theory of free speech, and that critiquing them for this omission begs the question.

Pluralists may see instrumental concerns as valuably supplementing or qualifying noninstrumental views. For example, instrumental concerns may play a role in justifying deviations between the moral right to free communication, on the one hand, and a properly specified legal right to free communication, on the other. Suppose that there is no moral right to engage in certain forms of harmful expression (such as hate speech), and that there is in fact a moral duty to refrain from such expression. Even so, it does not follow automatically that such a right ought to be legally enforced. Concerns about the dangers of granting the state such power plausibly militate against the enforcement of at least some of our communicative duties—at least in those jurisdictions that lack robust and competently administered liberal-democratic safeguards.

This entry has canvassed a range of views about what justifies freedom of expression, with particular attention to theories that conceive free speech as a natural moral right. Clearly, the proponents of such views believe that they succeed in this justificatory effort. But others dissent, doubting that the case for a bona fide moral right to free speech comes through. Let us briefly note the nature of this challenge from free speech skeptics , exploring a prominent line of reply.

The challenge from skeptics is generally understood as that of showing that free speech is a special right . As Leslie Kendrick notes,

the term “special right” generally requires that a special right be entirely distinct from other rights and activities and that it receive a very high degree of protection. (2017: 90)

(Note that this usage is not to be confused from the alternative usage of “special right”, referring to conditional rights arising out of particular relationships; see Hart 1955.)

Take each aspect in turn. First, to vindicate free speech as a special right, it must serve some distinctive value or interest (Schauer 2015). Suppose free speech were just an implication of a general principle not to interfere in people’s liberty without justification. As Joel Feinberg puts it, “Liberty should be the norm; coercion always needs some special justification” (1984: 9). In such a case, then while there still might be contingent, historical reasons to single speech out in law as worthy of protection (Alexander 2005: 186), such reasons would not track anything especially distinctive about speech as an underlying moral matter. Second, to count as a special right, free speech must be robust in what it protects, such that only a compelling justification can override it (Dworkin 2013: 131). This captures the conviction, prominent among American constitutional theorists, that “any robust free speech principle must protect at least some harmful speech despite the harm it may cause” (Schauer 2011b: 81; see also Schauer 1982).

If the task of justifying a moral right to free speech requires surmounting both hurdles, it is a tall order. Skeptics about a special right to free speech doubt that the order can be met, and so deny that a natural moral right to freedom of expression can be justified (Schauer 2015; Alexander & Horton 1983; Alexander 2005; Husak 1985). But these theorists may be demanding too much (Kendrick 2017). Start with the claim that free speech must be distinctive. We can accept that free speech be more than simply one implication of a general presumption of liberty. But need it be wholly distinctive? Consider the thesis that free speech is justified by our autonomy interests—interests that justify other rights such as freedom of religion and association. Is it a problem if free speech is justified by interests that are continuous with, or overlap with, interests that justify other rights? Pace the free speech skeptics, maybe not. So long as such claims deserve special recognition, and are worth distinguishing by name, this may be enough (Kendrick 2017: 101). Many of the views canvassed above share normative bases with other important rights. For example, Rawls is clear that he thinks all the basic liberties constitute

essential social conditions for the adequate development and full exercise of the two powers of moral personality over a complete life. (Rawls 2005: 293)

The debate, then, is whether such a shared basis is a theoretical virtue (or at least theoretically unproblematic) or whether it is a theoretical vice, as the skeptics avow.

As for the claim that free speech must be robust, protecting harmful speech, “it is not necessary for a free speech right to protect harmful speech in order for it to be called a free speech right” (Kendrick 2017: 102). We do not tend to think that religious liberty must protect harmful religious activities for it to count as a special right. So it would be strange to insist that the right to free speech must meet this burden to count as a special right. Most of the theorists mentioned above take themselves to be offering views that protect quite a lot of harmful speech. Yet we can question whether this feature is a necessary component of their views, or whether we could imagine variations without this result.

3. Justifying Speech Restrictions

When, and why, can restrictions on speech be justified? It is common in public debate on free speech to hear the provocative claim that free speech is absolute . But the plausibility of such a claim depends on what is exactly meant by it. If understood to mean that no communications between humans can ever be restricted, such a view is held by no one in the philosophical debate. When I threaten to kill you unless you hand me your money; when I offer to bribe the security guard to let me access the bank vault; when I disclose insider information that the company in which you’re heavily invested is about to go bust; when I defame you by falsely posting online that you’re a child abuser; when I endanger you by labeling a drug as safe despite its potentially fatal side-effects; when I reveal your whereabouts to assist a murderer intent on killing you—across all these cases, communications may be uncontroversially restricted. But there are different views as to why.

To help organize such views, consider a set of distinctions influentially defended by Schauer (from 1982 onward). The first category involves uncovered speech : speech that does not even presumptively fall within the scope of a principle of free expression. Many of the speech-acts just canvassed, such as the speech involved in making a threat or insider training, plausibly count as uncovered speech. As the U.S. Supreme Court has said of fighting words (e.g., insults calculated to provoke a street fight),

such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. ( Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire 1942)

The general idea here is that some speech simply has negligible—and often no —value as free speech, in light of its utter disconnection from the values that justify free speech in the first place. (For discussion of so-called “low-value speech” in the U.S. context, see Sunstein 1989 and Lakier 2015.) Accordingly, when such low-value speech is harmful, it is particularly easy to justify its curtailment. Hence the Court’s view that “the prevention and punishment of [this speech] have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem”. For legislation restricting such speech, the U.S. Supreme Court applies a “rational basis” test, which is very easy to meet, as it simply asks whether the law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. (Note that it is widely held that it would still be impermissible to selectively ban low-value speech on a viewpoint-discriminatory basis—e.g., if a state only banned fighting words from left-wing activists while allowing them from right-wing activists.)

Schauer’s next category concerns speech that is covered but unprotected . This is speech that engages the values that underpin free speech; yet the countervailing harm of the speech justifies its restriction. In such cases, while there is real value in such expression as free speech, that value is outweighed by competing normative concerns (or even, as we will see below, on behalf of the very values that underpin free speech). In U.S. constitutional jurisprudence, this category encompasses those extremely rare cases in which restrictions on political speech pass the “strict scrutiny” test, whereby narrow restrictions on high-value speech can be justified due to the compelling state interests thereby served. Consider Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project 2010, in which the Court held that an NGO’s legal advice to a terrorist organization on how to pursue peaceful legal channels were legitimately criminalized under a counter-terrorism statute. While such speech had value as free speech (at least on one interpretation of this contested ruling), the imperative of counter-terrorism justified its restriction. (Arguably, commercial speech, while sometimes called low-value speech by scholars, falls into the covered but unprotected category. Under U.S. law, legislation restricting it receives “intermediate scrutiny” by courts—requiring restrictions to be narrowly drawn to advance a substantial government interest. Such a test suggests that commercial speech has bona fide free-speech value, making it harder to justify regulations on it than regulations on genuinely low-value speech like fighting words. It simply doesn’t have as much free-speech value as categories like political speech, religious speech, or press speech, all of which trigger the strict scrutiny test when restricted.)

As a philosophical matter, we can reasonably disagree about what speech qualifies as covered but unprotected (and need not treat the verdicts of the U.S. Supreme Court as philosophically decisive). For example, consider politically-inflected hate speech, which advances repugnant ideas about the inferior status of certain groups. One could concur that there is substantial free-speech value in such expression, just because it involves the sincere expression of views about central questions of politics and justice (however misguided the views doubtlessly are). Yet one could nevertheless hold that such speech should not be protected in virtue of the substantial harms to which it can lead. In such cases, the free-speech value is outweighed. Many scholars who defend the permissibility of legal restrictions on hate speech hold such a view (e.g., Parekh 2012; Waldron 2012). (More radically, one could hold that such speech’s value is corrupted by its evil, such that it qualifies as genuinely low-value; Howard 2019a.)

The final category of speech encompasses expression that is covered and protected . To declare that speech is protected just is to conclude that it is immune from restriction. A preponderance of human communications fall into this category. This does not mean that such speech can never be regulated ; content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations (e.g., prohibiting loud nighttime protests) can certainly be justified (G. Stone 1987). But such regulations must not be viewpoint discriminatory; they must apply even-handedly across all forms of protected speech.

Schauer’s taxonomy offers a useful organizing framework for how we should think about different forms of speech. Where does it leave the claim that free speech is absolute? The possibility of speech that is covered but unprotected suggests that free speech should sometimes be restricted on account of rival normative concerns. Of course, one could contend that such a category, while logically possible, is substantively an empty set; such a position would involve some kind of absoluteness about free speech (holding that where free-speech values are engaged by expression, no countervailing values can ever be weighty enough to override them). Such a position would be absolutist in a certain sense while granting the permissibility of restrictions on speech that do not engage the free-speech values. (For a recent critique of Schauer’s framework, arguing that governmental designation of some speech as low-value is incompatible with the very ideal of free speech, see Kramer 2021: 31.)

In what follows, this entry will focus on Schauer’s second category: speech that is covered by a free speech principle, but is nevertheless unprotected because of the harms it causes. How do we determine what speech falls into this category? How, in other words, do we determine the limits of free speech? Unsurprisingly, this is where most of the controversy lies.

Most legal systems that protect free speech recognize that the right has limits. Consider, for example, international human rights law, which emphatically protects the freedom of speech as a fundamental human right while also affirming specific restrictions on certain seriously harmful speech. Article 19 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights declares that “[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds”—but then immediately notes that this right “carries with it special duties and responsibilities”. The subsequent ICCPR article proceeds to endorse legal restrictions on “advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence”, as well as speech constituting “propaganda for war” (ICCPR). While such restrictions would plainly be struck down as unconstitutional affronts to free speech in the U.S., this more restrictive approach prevails in most liberal democracies’ treatment of harmful speech.

Set aside the legal issue for now. How should we think about how to determine the limits of the moral right free speech? Those seeking to justify limits on speech tend to appeal to one of two strategies (Howard and Simpson forthcoming). The first strategy appeals to the importance of balancing free speech against other moral values when they come into conflict. This strategy involves external limits on free speech. (The next strategy, discussed below, invokes free speech itself, or the values that justify it, as limit-setting rationales; it thus involves internal limits on free speech.)

A balancing approach recognizes a moral conflict between unfettered communication and external values. Consider again the case of hate speech, understood as expression that attacks members of socially vulnerable groups as inferior or dangerous. On all of the theories canvassed above, there are grounds for thinking that restrictions on hate speech are prima facie in violation of the moral right to free speech. Banning hate speech to prevent people from hearing ideas that might incline them to bigotry plainly seems to disrespect listener autonomy. Further, even when speakers are expressing prejudiced views, they are still engaging their autonomous faculties. Certainly, they are expressing views on questions of public political concern, even false ones. And as thinkers they are engaged in the communication of sincere testimony to others. On many of the leading theories, the values underpinning free speech seem to be militate against bans on hate speech.

Even so, other values matter. Consider, for example, the value of upholding the equal dignity of all citizens. A central insight of critical race theory is that public expressions of white supremacy, for example, attack and undermine that equal dignity (Matsuda, Lawrence, Delgado, & Crenshaw 1993). On Jeremy Waldron’s view (2012), hate speech is best understood as a form of group defamation, launching spurious attacks on others’ reputations and thereby undermining their standing as respected equals in their own community (relatedly, see Beauharnais v. Illinois 1952).

Countries that ban hate speech, accordingly, are plausibly understood not as opposed to free speech, but as recognizing the importance that it be balanced when conflicting with other values. Such balancing can be understood in different ways. In European human rights law, for example, the relevant idea is that the right to free speech is balanced against other rights ; the relevant task, accordingly, is to specify what counts as a proportionate balance between these rights (see Alexy 2003; J. Greene 2021).

For others, the very idea of balancing rights undermines their deontic character. This alternative framing holds that the balancing occurs before we specify what rights are; on this view, we balance interests against each other, and only once we’ve undertaken that balancing do we proceed to define what our rights protect. As Scanlon puts it,

The only balancing is balancing of interests. Rights are not balanced, but are defined, or redefined, in the light of the balance of interests and of empirical facts about how these interests can best be protected. (2008: 78)

This balancing need not come in the form of some crude consequentialism; otherwise it would be acceptable to limit the rights of the few to secure trivial benefits for the many. On a contractualist moral theory such as Scanlon’s, the test is to assess the strength of any given individual’s reason to engage in (or access) the speech, against the strength of any given individual’s reason to oppose it.

Note that those who engage in balancing need not give up on the idea of viewpoint neutrality; they can accept that, as a general principle, the state should not restrict speech on the grounds that it disapproves of its message and dislikes that others will hear it. The point, instead, is that this commitment is defeasible; it is possible to be overridden.

One final comment is apt. Those who are keen to balance free speech against other values tend to be motivated by the concern that speech can cause harm, either directly or indirectly (on this distinction, see Schauer 1993). But to justify restrictions on speech, it is not sufficient (and perhaps not even necessary) to show that such speech imposes or risks imposing harm. The crucial point is that the speech is wrongful (or, perhaps, wrongfully harmful or risky) , breaching a moral duty that speakers owe to others. Yet very few in the free speech literature think that the mere offensiveness of speech is sufficient to justify restrictions on it. Even Joel Feinberg, who thinks offensiveness can sometimes be grounds for restricting conduct, makes a sweeping exception for

[e]xpressions of opinion, especially about matters of public policy, but also about matters of empirical fact, and about historical, scientific, theological, philosophical, political, and moral questions. (1985: 44)

And in many cases, offensive speech may be actively salutary, as when racists are offended by defenses of racial equality (Waldron 1987). Accordingly, despite how large it looms in public debate, discussion of offensive speech will not play a major role in the discussion here.

We saw that one way to justify limits on free speech is to balance it against other values. On that approach, free speech is externally constrained. A second approach, in contrast, is internally constrained. On this approach, the very values that justify free speech themselves determine its own limits. This is a revisionist approach to free speech since, unlike orthodox thinking, it contends that a commitment to free speech values can counterintuitively support the restriction of speech—a surprising inversion of traditional thinking on the topic (see Howard and Simpson forthcoming). This move—justifying restrictions on speech by appealing to the values that underpin free speech—is now prevalent in the philosophical literature (for an overview, see Barendt 2005: 1ff).

Consider, for example, the claim that free speech is justified by concerns of listener autonomy. On such a view, as we saw above, autonomous citizens have interests in exposure to a wide range of viewpoints, so that they can decide for themselves what to believe. But many have pointed out that this is not autonomous citizens’ only interest; they also have interests in not getting murdered by those incited by incendiary speakers (Amdur 1980). Likewise, insofar as being targeted by hate speech undermines the exercise of one’s autonomous capacities, appeal to the underlying value of autonomy could well support restrictions on such speech (Brison 1998; see also Brink 2001). What’s more, if our interests as listeners in acquiring accurate information is undermined by fraudulent information, then restrictions on such information could well be compatible with our status as autonomous; this was one of the insights that led Scanlon to complicate his theory of free speech (1978).

Or consider the theory that free speech is justified because of its role in enabling autonomous speakers to express themselves. But as Japa Pallikkathayil has argued, some speech can intimidate its audiences into staying silent (as with some hate speech), out of fear for what will happen if they speak up (Pallikkathayil 2020). In principle, then, restrictions on hate speech may serve to support the value of speaker expression, rather than undermine it (see also Langton 2018; Maitra 2009; Maitra & McGowan 2007; and Matsuda 1989: 2337). Indeed, among the most prominent claims in feminist critiques of pornography is precisely that it silences women—not merely through its (perlocutionary) effects in inspiring rape, but more insidiously through its (illocutionary) effects in altering the force of the word “no” (see MacKinnon 1984; Langton 1993; and West 204 [2022]; McGowan 2003 and 2019; cf. Kramer 2021, pp. 160ff).

Now consider democracy theories. On the one hand, democracy theorists are adamant that citizens should be free to discuss any proposals, even the destruction of democracy itself (e.g., Meiklejohn 1948: 65–66). On the other hand, it isn’t obvious why citizens’ duties as democratic citizens could not set a limit to their democratic speech rights (Howard 2019a). The Nazi propagandist Goebbels is said to have remarked:

This will always remain one of the best jokes of democracy, that it gave its deadly enemies the means by which it was destroyed. (as quoted in Fox & Nolte 1995: 1)

But it is not clear why this is necessarily so. Why should we insist on a conception of democracy that contains a self-destruct mechanism? Merely stipulating that democracy requires this is not enough (see A. Greene and Simpson 2017).

Finally, consider Shiffrin’s thinker-based theory. Shiffrin’s view is especially well-placed to explain why varieties of harmful communications are protected speech; what the theory values is the sincere transmission of veridical testimony, whereby speakers disclose what they genuinely believe to others, even if what they believe is wrongheaded and dangerous. Yet because the sincere testimony of thinkers is what qualifies some communication for protection, Shiffrin is adamant that lying falls outside the protective ambit of freedom of expression (2014) This, then, sets an internal limit on her own theory (even if she herself disfavors all lies’ outright prohibition for reasons of tolerance). The claim that lying falls outside the protective ambit of free speech is itself a recurrent suggestion in the literature (Strauss 1991: 355; Brown 2023). In an era of rampant disinformation, this internal limit is of substantial practical significance.

Suppose the moral right (or principle) of free speech is limited, as most think, such that not all communications fall within its protective ambit (either for external reasons, internal reasons, or both). Even so, it does not follow that laws banning such unprotected speech can be justified all-things-considered. Further moral tests must be passed before any particular policy restricting speech can be justified. This sub-section focuses on the requirement that speech restrictions be proportionate .

The idea that laws implicating fundamental rights must be proportionate is central in many jurisdictions’ constitutional law, as well as in the international law of human rights. As a representative example, consider the specification of proportionality offered by the Supreme Court of Canada:

First, the measures adopted must be carefully designed to achieve the objective in question. They must not be arbitrary, unfair, or based on irrational considerations. In short, they must be rationally connected to the objective. Second, the means, even if rationally connected to the objective in this first sense, should impair “as little as possible” the right or freedom in question[…] Third, there must be a proportionality between the effects of the measures which are responsible for limiting the Charter right or freedom, and the objective which has been identified as of “sufficient importance” ( R v. Oakes 1986).

It is this third element (often called “proportionality stricto sensu ”) on which we will concentrate here; this is the focused sense of proportionality that roughly tracks how the term is used in the philosophical literatures on defensive harm and war, as well as (with some relevant differences) criminal punishment. (The strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny tests of U.S. constitutional law are arguably variations of the proportionality test; but set aside this complication for now as it distracts from the core philosophical issues. For relevant legal discussion, see Tsesis 2020.)

Proportionality, in the strict sense, concerns the relation between the costs or harms imposed by some measure and the benefits that the measure is designed to secure. The organizing distinction in recent philosophical literature (albeit largely missing in the literature on free speech) is one between narrow proportionality and wide proportionality . While there are different ways to cut up the terrain between these terms, let us stipulatively define them as follows. An interference is narrowly proportionate just in case the intended target of the interference is liable to bear the costs of that interference. An interference is widely proportionate just in case the collateral costs that the interference unintentionally imposes on others can be justified. (This distinction largely follows the literature in just war theory and the ethics of defensive force; see McMahan 2009.) While the distinction is historically absent from free speech theory, it has powerful payoffs in helping to structure this chaotic debate (as argued in Howard 2019a).

So start with the idea that restrictions on communication must be narrowly proportionate . For a restriction to be narrowly proportionate, those whose communications are restricted must be liable to bear their costs, such that they are not wronged by their imposition. One standard way to be liable to bear certain costs is to have a moral duty to bear them (Tadros 2012). So, for example, if speakers have a moral duty to refrain from libel, hate speech, or some other form of harmful speech, they are liable to bear at least some costs involved in the enforcement of that duty. Those costs cannot be unlimited; a policy of executing hate speakers could not plausibly be justified. Typically, in both defensive and punitive contexts, wrongdoers’ liability is determined by their culpability, the severity of their wrong, or some combination of the two. While it is difficult to say in the abstract what the precise maximal cost ceiling is for any given restriction, as it depends hugely on the details, the point is simply that there is some ceiling above which a speech restriction (like any restriction) imposes unacceptably high costs, even on wrongdoers.

Second, for a speech restriction to be justified, we must also show that it would be widely proportionate . Suppose a speaker is liable to bear the costs of some policy restricting her communication, such that she is not wronged by its imposition. It may be that the collateral costs of such a policy would render it unacceptable. One set of costs is chilling effects , the “overdeterrence of benign conduct that occurs incidentally to a law’s legitimate purpose or scope” (Kendrick 2013: 1649). The core idea is that laws targeting unprotected, legitimately proscribed expression may nevertheless end up having a deleterious impact on protected expression. This is because laws are often vague, overbroad, and in any case are likely to be misapplied by fallible officials (Schauer 1978: 699).

Note that if a speech restriction produces chilling effects, it does not follow that the restriction should not exist at all. Rather, concern about chilling effects instead suggests that speech restrictions should be under-inclusive—restricting less speech than is actually harmful—in order to create “breathing space”, or “a buffer zone of strategic protection” (Schauer 1978: 710) for legitimate expression and so reduce unwanted self-censorship. For example, some have argued that even though speech can cause harm recklessly or negligently, we should insist on specific intent as the mens rea of speech crimes in order to reduce any chilling effects that could follow (Alexander 1995: 21–128; Schauer 1978: 707; cf. Kendrick 2013).

But chilling effects are not the only sort of collateral effects to which speech restrictions could lead. Earlier we noted the risk that states might abuse their censorial powers. This, too, could militate in favor of underinclusive speech restrictions. Or the implication could be more radical. Consider the problem that it is difficult to author restrictions on hate speech in a tightly specified way; the language involved is open-ended in a manner that enables states to exercise considerable judgment in deciding what speech-acts, in fact, count as violations (see Strossen 2018). Given the danger that the state will misuse or abuse these laws to punish legitimate speech, some might think this renders their enactment widely disproportionate. Indeed, even if the law were well-crafted and would be judiciously applied by current officials, the point is that those in the future may not be so trustworthy.

Those inclined to accept such a position might simply draw the conclusion that legislatures ought to refrain from enacting laws against hate speech. A more radical conclusion is that the legal right to free speech ought to be specified so that hate speech is constitutionally protected. In other words, we ought to give speakers a legal right to violate their moral duties, since enforcing those moral duties through law is simply too risky. By appealing to this logic, it is conceivable that the First Amendment position on hate speech could be justified all-things-considered—not because the underlying moral right to free speech protects hate speech, but because hate speech must be protected for instrumental reasons of preventing future abuses of power (Howard 2019a).

Suppose certain restrictions on harmful speech can be justified as proportionate, in both the narrow and wide senses. This is still not sufficient to justify them all-things-considered. Additionally, they must be justified as necessary . (Note that some conceptions of proportionality in human rights law encompass the necessity requirement, but this entry follows the prevailing philosophical convention by treating them as distinct.)

Why might restrictions on harmful speech be unnecessary? One of the standard claims in the free speech literature is that we should respond to harmful speech not by banning it, but by arguing back against it. Counter-speech—not censorship—is the appropriate solution. This line of reasoning is old. As John Milton put it in 1644: “Let [Truth] and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse in a free and open encounter?” The insistence on counter-speech as the remedy for harmful speech is similarly found, as noted above, throughout chapter 2 of Mill’s On Liberty .

For many scholars, this line of reply is justified by the fact that they think the harmful speech in question is protected by the moral right to free speech. For such scholars, counter-speech is the right response because censorship is morally off the table. For other scholars, the recourse to counter-speech has a plausible distinct rationale (although it is seldom articulated): its possibility renders legal restrictions unnecessary. And because it is objectionable to use gratuitous coercion, legal restrictions are therefore impermissible (Howard 2019a). Such a view could plausibly justify Mill’s aforementioned analysis in the corn dealer example, whereby censorship is permissible but only when there’s no time for counter-speech—a view that is also endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio 395 U.S. 444 (1969).

Whether this argument succeeds depends upon a wide range of further assumptions—about the comparable effectiveness of counter-speech relative to law; about the burdens that counter-speech imposes on prospective counter-speakers. Supposing that the argument succeeds, it invites a range of further normative questions about the ethics of counter-speech. For example, it is important who has the duty to engage in counter-speech, who its intended audience is, and what specific forms the counter-speech ought to take—especially in order to maximize its persuasive effectiveness (Brettschneider 2012; Cepollaro, Lepoutre, & Simpson 2023; Howard 2021b; Lepoutre 2021; Badano & Nuti 2017). It is also important to ask questions about the moral limits of counter-speech. For example, insofar as publicly shaming wrongful speakers has become a prominent form of counter-speech, it is crucial to interrogate its permissibility (e.g., Billingham and Parr 2020).

This final section canvasses the young philosophical debate concerning freedom of speech on the internet. With some important exceptions (e.g., Barendt 2005: 451ff), this issue has only recently accelerated (for an excellent edited collection, see Brison & Gelber 2019). There are many normative questions to be asked about the moral rights and obligations of internet platforms. Here are three. First, do internet platforms have moral duties to respect the free speech of their users? Second, do internet platforms have moral duties to restrict (or at least refrain from amplifying) harmful speech posted by their users? And finally, if platforms do indeed have moral duties to restrict harmful speech, should those duties be legally enforced?

The reference to internet platforms , is a deliberate focus on large-scale social media platforms, through which people can discover and publicly share user-generated content. We set aside other entities such as search engines (Whitney & Simpson 2019), important though they are. That is simply because the central political controversies, on which philosophical input is most urgent, concern the large social-media platforms.

Consider the question of whether internet platforms have moral duties to respect the free speech of their users. One dominant view in the public discourse holds that the answer is no . On this view, platforms are private entities, and as such enjoy the prerogative to host whatever speech they like. This would arguably be a function of them having free speech rights themselves. Just as the free speech rights of the New York Times give it the authority to publish whatever op-eds it sees fit, the free speech rights of platforms give them the authority to exercise editorial or curatorial judgment about what speech to allow. On this view, if Facebook were to decide to become a Buddhist forum, amplifying the speech of Buddhist users and promoting Buddhist perspectives and ideas, and banning speech promoting other religions, it would be entirely within its moral (and thus proper legal) rights to do so. So, too, if it were to decide to become an atheist forum.

A radical alternative view holds that internet platforms constitute a public forum , a term of art from U.S. free speech jurisprudence used to designate spaces “designed for and dedicated to expressive activities” ( Southeastern Promotions Ltd., v. Conrad 1975). As Kramer has argued:

social-media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter and YouTube have become public fora. Although the companies that create and run those platforms are not morally obligated to sustain them in existence at all, the role of controlling a public forum morally obligates each such company to comply with the principle of freedom of expression while performing that role. No constraints that deviate from the kinds of neutrality required under that principle are morally legitimate. (Kramer 2021: 58–59)

On this demanding view, platforms’ duties to respect speech are (roughly) identical to the duties of states. Accordingly, if efforts by the state to restrict hate speech, pornography, and public health misinformation (for example) are objectionable affronts to free speech, so too are platforms’ content moderation rules for such content. A more moderate view does not hold that platforms are public forums as such, but holds that government channels or pages qualify as public forums (the claim at issue in Knight First Amendment Institute v. Trump (2019).)

Even if we deny that platforms constitute public forums, it is plausible that they engage in a governance function of some kind (Klonick 2018). As Jack Balkin has argued, the traditional model of free speech, which sees it as a relation between speakers and the state, is today plausibly supplanted by a triadic model, involving a more complex relation between speakers, governments, and intermediaries (2004, 2009, 2018, 2021). If platforms do indeed have some kind of governance function, it may well trigger responsibilities for transparency and accountability (as with new legislation such as the EU’s Digital Services Act and the UK’s Online Safety Act).

Second, consider the question of whether platforms have a duty to remove harmful content posted by users. Even those who regard them as public forums could agree that platforms may have a moral responsibility to remove illegal unprotected speech. Yet a dominant view in the public debate has historically defended platforms’ place as mere conduits for others’ speech. This is the current position under U.S. law (as with 47 U.S. Code §230), which broadly exempts platforms from liability for much illegal speech, such as defamation. On this view, we should view platforms as akin to bulletin boards: blame whoever posts wrongful content, but don’t hold the owner of the board responsible.

This view is under strain. Even under current U.S. law, platforms are liable for removing some content, such as child sexual abuse material and copyright infringements, suggesting that it is appropriate to demand some accountability for the wrongful content posted by others. An increasing body of philosophical work explores the idea that platforms are indeed morally responsible for removing extreme content. For example, some have argued that platforms have a special responsibility to prevent the radicalization that occurs on their networks, given the ways in which extreme content is amplified to susceptible users (Barnes 2022). Without engaging in moderation (i.e., removal) of harmful content, platforms are plausibly complicit with the wrongful harms perpetrated by users (Howard forthcoming).

Yet it remains an open question what a responsible content moderation policy ought to involve. Many are tempted by a juridical model, whereby platforms remove speech in accordance with clearly announced rules, with user appeals mechanisms in place for individual speech decisions to ensure they are correctly made (critiqued in Douek 2022b). Yet platforms have billions of users and remove millions of pieces of content per week. Accordingly, perfection is not possible. Moving quickly to remove harmful content during a crisis—e.g., Covid misinformation—will inevitably increase the number of false positives (i.e., legitimate speech taken down as collateral damage). It is plausible that the individualistic model of speech decisions adopted by courts is decidedly implausible to help us govern online content moderation; as noted in Douek 2021 and 2022a, what is needed is analysis of how the overall system should operate at scale, with a focus on achieving proportionality between benefits and costs. Alternatively, one might double down and insist that the juridical model is appropriate, given the normative significance of speech. And if it is infeasible for social-media companies to meet its demands given their size, then all the worse for social-media companies. On this view, it is they who must bend to meet the moral demands of free speech theory, not the other way around.

Substantial philosophical work needs to be done to deliver on this goal. The work is complicated by the fact that artificial intelligence (AI) is central to the processes of content moderation; human moderators, themselves subjected to terrible working conditions at long hours, work in conjunction with machine learning tools to identify and remove content that platforms have restricted. Yet AI systems notoriously are as biased as their training data. Further, their “black box” decisions are cryptic and cannot be easily understood. Given that countless speech decisions will necessarily be made without human involvement, it is right to ask whether it is reasonable to expect users to accept the deliverances of machines (e.g., see Vredenburgh 2022; Lazar forthcoming a). Note that machine intelligence is used not merely for content moderation, narrowly understood as the enforcement of rules about what speech is allowed. It is also deployed for the broader practice of content curation, determining what speech gets amplified — raising the question of what normative principles should govern such amplification; see Lazar forthcoming b).

Finally, there is the question of legal enforcement. Showing that platforms have the moral responsibility to engage in content moderation is necessary to justifying its codification into a legal responsibility. Yet it is not sufficient; one could accept that platforms have moral duties to moderate (some) harmful speech while also denying that those moral duties ought to be legally enforced. A strong, noninstrumental version of such a view would hold that while speakers have moral duties to refrain from wrongful speech, and platforms have duties not to platform or amplify it, the coercive enforcement of such duties would violate the moral right to freedom of expression. A more contingent, instrumental version of the view would hold that legal enforcement is not in principle impermissible; but in practice, it is simply too risky to grant the state the authority to enforce platforms’ and speakers’ moral duties, given the potential for abuse and overreach.

Liberals who champion the orthodox interpretation of the First Amendment, yet insist on robust content moderation, likely hold one or both of these views. Yet globally such views seem to be in the minority. Serious legislation is imminent that will subject social-media companies to burdensome regulation, in the form of such laws as the Digital Services Act in the European Union and the Online Safety Bill in the UK. Normatively evaluating such legislation is a pressing task. So, too, is the task of designing normative theories to guide the design of content moderation systems, and the wider governance of the digital public sphere. On both fronts, political philosophers should get back to work.

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• Tushnet, Mark, Alan Chen, and Joseph Blocher, 2017, Free Speech beyond Words: The Surprising Reach of the First Amendment , New York: New York University Press.
• Volokh, Eugene, 2011, “In Defense of the Marketplace of Ideas/Search for Truth as a Theory of Free Speech Protection Responses”, Virginia Law Review , 97(3): 595–602.
• Vredenburgh, Kate, 2022, “The Right to Explanation”, Journal of Political Philosophy , 30(2): 209–229. doi:10.1111/jopp.12262
• Waldron, Jeremy, 1987, “Mill and the Value of Moral Distress”, Political Studies , 35(3): 410–423. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.1987.tb00197.x
• –––, 2012, The Harm in Hate Speech (The Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures, 2009), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Weinstein, James, 2011, “Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of American Free Speech Doctrine”, Virginia Law Review , 97(3): 491–514.
• West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
• Whitten, Suzanne, 2022, A Republican Theory of Free Speech: Critical Civility , Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-78631-1
• Whitney, Heather M. and Robert Mark Simpson, 2019, “Search Engines and Free Speech Coverage”, in Free Speech in the Digital Age , Susan J. Brison and Katharine Gelber (eds), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 33–51 (ch. 2). doi:10.1093/oso/9780190883591.003.0003
• West, Caroline, 2004 [2022], “Pornography and Censorship”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2022 edition), Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = < https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2022/entries/pornography-censorship/ >.

How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

• International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) , adopted: 16 December 1966; Entry into force: 23 March 1976.
• Free Speech Debate
• Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University
• van Mill, David, “Freedom of Speech”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = < https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/freedom-speech/ >. [This was the previous entry on this topic in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy – see the version history .]

ethics: search engines and | hate speech | legal rights | liberalism | Mill, John Stuart | Mill, John Stuart: moral and political philosophy | pornography: and censorship | rights | social networking and ethics | toleration

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to the editors and anonymous referees of this Encyclopedia for helpful feedback. I am greatly indebted to Robert Mark Simpson for many incisive suggestions, which substantially improved the entry. This entry was written while on a fellowship funded by UK Research & Innovation (grant reference MR/V025600/1); I am thankful to UKRI for the support.

Copyright © 2024 by Jeffrey W. Howard < jeffrey . howard @ ucl . ac . uk >

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Library of Congress Catalog Data: ISSN 1095-5054

First Amendment

The First Amendment guarantees freedoms concerning religion, expression, assembly, and the right to petition. It forbids Congress from both promoting one religion over others and also restricting an individual’s religious practices . It guarantees freedom of expression by prohibiting Congress from restricting the press or the rights of individuals to speak freely. It also guarantees the right of citizens to assemble peaceably and to petition their government .

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Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.

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The first amendment, interpretation & debate, freedom of speech and the press, matters of debate, common interpretation, fixing free speech, frontiers for free speech.

by Geoffrey R. Stone

Edward H. Levi Distinguished Service Professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School

by Eugene Volokh

Gary T. Schwartz Distinguished Professor of Law; Founder and Co-Author of "The Volokh Conspiracy" at Reason Magazine

“Congress shall make no law . . .  abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” What does this mean today? Generally speaking, it means that the government may not jail, fine, or impose civil liability on people or organizations based on what they say or write, except in exceptional circumstances.

Although the First Amendment says “Congress,” the Supreme Court has held that speakers are protected against all government agencies and officials: federal, state, and local, and legislative, executive, or judicial. The First Amendment does not protect speakers, however, against private individuals or organizations, such as private employers, private colleges, or private landowners. The First Amendment restrains only the government.

The Supreme Court has interpreted “speech” and “press” broadly as covering not only talking, writing, and printing, but also broadcasting, using the Internet, and other forms of expression. The freedom of speech also applies to symbolic expression, such as displaying flags, burning flags, wearing armbands, burning crosses, and the like.

The Supreme Court has held that restrictions on speech because of its content —that is, when the government targets the speaker’s message—generally violate the First Amendment. Laws that prohibit people from criticizing a war, opposing abortion, or advocating high taxes are examples of unconstitutional content-based restrictions. Such laws are thought to be especially problematic because they distort public debate and contradict a basic principle of self-governance: that the government cannot be trusted to decide what ideas or information “the people” should be allowed to hear.

There are generally three situations in which the government can constitutionally restrict speech under a less demanding standard.

1. In some circumstances, the Supreme Court has held that certain types of speech are of only “low” First Amendment value, such as:

a. Defamation: False statements that damage a person’s reputations can lead to civil liability (and even to criminal punishment), especially when the speaker deliberately lied or said things they knew were likely false. New York Times v. Sullivan (1964).

b. True threats: Threats to commit a crime (for example, “I’ll kill you if you don’t give me your money”) can be punished. Watts v. United States (1969).

c. “Fighting words”: Face-to-face personal insults that are likely to lead to an immediate fight are punishable. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942). But this does not include political statements that offend others and provoke them to violence.  For example, civil rights or anti-abortion protesters cannot be silenced merely because passersby respond violently to their speech. Cox v. Louisiana (1965).

d. Obscenity: Hard-core, highly sexually explicit pornography is not protected by the First Amendment. Miller v. California (1973). In practice, however, the government rarely prosecutes online distributors of such material.

e. Child pornography: Photographs or videos involving actual children engaging in sexual conduct are punishable, because allowing such materials would create an incentive to sexually abuse children in order to produce such material. New York v. Ferber (1982).

f. Commercial advertising: Speech advertising a product or service is constitutionally protected, but not as much as other speech. For instance, the government may ban misleading commercial advertising, but it generally can’t ban misleading political speech. Virginia Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Council (1976).

Outside these narrow categories of “low” value speech, most other content-based restrictions on speech are presumptively unconstitutional. Even entertainment, vulgarity, “hate speech” (bigoted speech about particular races, religions, sexual orientations, and the like), blasphemy (speech that offends people’s religious sensibilities), and violent video games are protected by the First Amendment. The Supreme Court has generally been very reluctant to expand the list of “low” value categories of speech.

2. The government can restrict speech under a less demanding standard when the speaker is in a special relationship to the government. For example, the speech of government employees and of students in public schools can be restricted, even based on content, when their speech is incompatible with their status as public officials or students. A teacher in a public school, for example, can be punished for encouraging students to experiment with illegal drugs, and a government employee who has access to classified information generally can be prohibited from disclosing that information. Pickering v. Board of Education (1968).

3. The government can also restrict speech under a less demanding standard when it does so without regard to the content or message of the speech. Content-neutral restrictions, such as restrictions on noise, blocking traffic, and large signs (which can distract drivers and clutter the landscape), are generally constitutional as long as they are “reasonable.” Because such laws apply neutrally to all speakers without regard to their message, they are less threatening to the core First Amendment concern that government should not be permitted to favor some ideas over others. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC (1994). But not all content-neutral restrictions are viewed as reasonable; for example, a law prohibiting all demonstrations in public parks or all leafleting on public streets would violate the First Amendment. Schneider v. State (1939).

Courts have not always been this protective of free expression. In the nineteenth century, for example, courts allowed punishment of blasphemy, and during and shortly after World War I the Supreme Court held that speech tending to promote crime—such as speech condemning the military draft or praising anarchism—could be punished. Schenck v. United States (1919). Moreover, it was not until 1925 that the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment limited state and local governments, as well as the federal government. Gitlow v. New York (1925).

But starting in the 1920s, the Supreme Court began to read the First Amendment more broadly, and this trend accelerated in the 1960s. Today, the legal protection offered by the First Amendment is stronger than ever before in our history.

Three issues involving the freedom of speech are most pressing for the future.

Money, Politics, and the First Amendment

The first pressing issue concerns the regulation of money in the political process. Put simply, the question is this: To what extent, and in what circumstances, can the government constitutionally restrict political expenditures and contributions in order to “improve” the democratic process?

In its initial encounters with this question, the Supreme Court held that political expenditures and contributions are “speech” within the meaning of the First Amendment because they are intended to facilitate political expression by political candidates and others. The Court also recognized, however, that political expenditures and contributions could be regulated consistent with the First Amendment if the government could demonstrate a sufficiently important justification. In Buckley v. Valeo (1976), for example, the Court held that the government could constitutionally limit the amount that individuals could contribute to political candidates in order to reduce the risk of undue influence, and in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission (2003), the Court held that the government could constitutionally limit the amount that corporations could spend in the political process in order to influence electoral outcomes.

In more recent cases, though, in a series of five-to-four decisions, the Supreme Court has overruled McConnell and held unconstitutional most governmental efforts to regulate political expenditures and contributions. Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010); McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission (2014). As a result of these more recent decisions, almost all government efforts to limit the impact of money in the political process have been held unconstitutional, with the consequence that corporations and wealthy individuals now have an enormous impact on American politics.

Those who object to these decisions maintain that regulations of political expenditures and contributions are content-neutral restrictions of speech that should be upheld as long as the government has a sufficiently important justification. They argue that the need to prevent what they see as the corruption and distortion of American politics caused by the excessive influence of a handful of very wealthy individuals and corporations is a sufficiently important government interest to justify limits on the amount that those individuals and corporations should be permitted to spend in the electoral process.

Because these recent cases have all been five-to-four decisions, it remains to be seen whether a differently constituted set of justices in the future will adhere to the current approach, or whether they will ultimately overrule or at least narrowly construe those decisions. In many ways, this is the most fundamental First Amendment question that will confront the Supreme Court and the nation in the years to come.

The Meaning of “Low” Value Speech

The second pressing free speech issue concerns the scope of “low” value speech. In recent years, the Supreme Court has taken a narrow view of the low value concept, suggesting that, in order for a category of speech to fall within that concept, there has to have been a long history of government regulation of the category in question. This is true, for example, of such low value categories as defamation, obscenity, and threats. An important question for the future is whether the Court will adhere to this approach.

The primary justification for the Court’s insistence on a history of regulation is that this limits the discretion of the justices to pick-and-choose which categories of expression should be deemed to have only low First Amendment value. A secondary justification for the Court’s approach is that a history of regulation of a category of expression provides some basis in experience for evaluating the possible effects – and dangers – of declaring a new category of speech to have only low First Amendment value.

Why does this doctrine matter? To cite one illustration, under the Court’s current approach, so-called “hate speech” – speech that expressly denigrates individuals on the basis of such characteristics as race, religion, gender, national origin, and sexual orientation – does not constitute low value speech because it has not historically been subject to regulation. As a result, except in truly extraordinary circumstances, such expression cannot be regulated consistent with the First Amendment. Almost every other nation allows such expression to be regulated and, indeed, prohibited, on the theory that it does not further the values of free expression and is incompatible with other fundamental values of society.

Similarly, under the Court’s approach to low value speech it is unclear whether civil or criminal actions for “invasion of privacy” can be reconciled with the First Amendment. For example, can an individual be punished for distributing on the Internet “private” information about other persons without their consent? Suppose, for example, an individual posts naked photos of a former lover on the Internet. Is that speech protected by the First Amendment, or can it be restricted as a form of “low” value speech? This remains an unresolved question.

Leaks of Classified Information

The Supreme Court has held that the government cannot constitutionally prohibit the publication of classified information unless it can demonstrate that the publication or distribution of that information will cause a clear and present danger of grave harm to the national security. New York Times v. United States (The “Pentagon Papers” case) (1971). At the same time, though, the Court has held that government employees who gain access to such classified information can be restricted in their unauthorized disclosure of that information. Snepp v. United States (1980). It remains an open question, however, whether a government employee who leaks information that discloses an unconstitutional, unlawful, or unwise classified program can be punished for doing so. This issue has been raised by a number of recent incidents, including the case of Edward Snowden. At some point in the future, the Court will have to decide whether and to what extent the actions of government leakers like Edward Snowden are protected by the First Amendment.

I like Professor Stone’s list of important issues. I think speech about elections, including speech that costs money, must remain protected, whether it’s published by individuals, nonprofit corporations, labor unions, media corporations, or nonmedia business corporations. (Direct contributions to candidates, as opposed to independent speech about them, can be restricted, as the Court has held.) And I think restrictions on “hate speech” should remain unconstitutional. But I agree these are likely to be heavily debated issues in the coming years. I’d like to add three more issues as well.

Professional-Client Speech

Many professionals serve their clients by speaking. Psychotherapists try to help their patients by talking with them. Doctors make diagnoses, offer predictions, and recommend treatments. Lawyers give legal advice; financial planners, financial advice. Some of these professionals also do things (such as prescribe drugs, perform surgeries, or file court documents that have legal effect). But much of what they do is speak.

Yet the law heavily regulates such speakers. It bars people from giving any legal, medical, psychiatric, or similar advice unless they first get licenses (which can take years and hundreds of thousands of dollars’ worth of education to get)—though the government couldn’t require a license for people to become journalists or authors. The law lets clients sue professionals for malpractice, arguing that the professionals’ opinions or predictions proved to be “unreasonable” and harmful, though similar lawsuits against newspapers or broadcasters would be unconstitutional.

And the law sometimes forbids or compels particular speech by these professionals. Some states ban psychiatrists from offering counseling aimed at changing young patients’ sexual orientation. Florida has restricted doctors’ questioning their patients about whether the patients own guns. Many states, hoping to persuade women not to get abortions, require doctors to say certain things or show certain things to women who are seeking abortions. The federal government has tried to punish doctors who recommend that their patients use medical marijuana (which is illegal under federal law, but which can be gotten in many states with the doctor’s recommendation).

When are these laws constitutional? Moreover, if there is a First Amendment exception that allows such regulations of professional-client speech, which professions does it cover? What about, for instance, tour guides, fortunetellers, veterinarians, or diet advisors? Courts are only beginning to confront the First Amendment implications of these sorts of restrictions, and the degree to which the government’s interest in protecting clients—and in preventing behavior that the government sees as harmful—can justify restricting professional-client speech.

Crime-Facilitating Speech

Some speech contains information that helps people commit crimes, or get away with committing crimes. Sometimes this is general information, for instance about how bombs are made, how locks can be picked, how deadly viruses can be created, how technological protections for copyrighted works can be easily evaded, or how a contract killer can get away with his crime.

Sometimes this is specific information, such as the names of crime witnesses that criminals might want to silence, the location of police officers whom criminals might want to avoid, or the names of undercover officers or CIA agents. Indeed, sometimes this can be as familiar as people flashing lights to alert drivers that a police officer is watching; people are occasionally prosecuted for this, because they are helping others get away with speeding.

Sometimes this speech is said specifically with the purpose of promoting crime—but sometimes it is said for other purposes: consider chemistry books that talk about explosives; newspaper articles that mention people’s names so the readers don’t feel anything is being concealed; or novels that accurately describe crimes just for entertainment. And sometimes it is said for political purposes, for instance when someone describes how easy it is to evade copyright law or proposed laws prohibiting 3-D printing of guns, in trying to explain why those laws need to be rejected.

Surprisingly, the Supreme Court has never explained when such speech can be restricted. The narrow incitement exception, which deals with speech that aims to persuade people to commit imminent crimes, is not a good fit for speech that, deliberately or not, informs people about how to commit crimes at some point in the future. This too is a field that the Supreme Court will likely have to address in coming decades.

“Hostile Environment Harassment” Rules

Finally, some government agencies, courts, and universities have reasoned that the government may restrict speech that sufficiently offends employees, students, or business patrons based on race, religion, sex, sexual orientation, and the like. Here’s how the theory goes: Laws ban discrimination based on such identity traits in employment, education, and public accommodations. And when speech is “severe or pervasive” enough to create a “hostile or offensive environment” based on those traits, such speech becomes a form of discrimination. Therefore, the argument goes, a wide range of speech—such as display of Confederate flags, unwanted religious proselytizing, speech sharply criticizing veterans, speech suggesting that Muslims are disloyal, display of sexually suggestive materials, sexually-themed humor, sex-based job titles (such as “foreman” or “draftsman”), and more—can lead to lawsuits.

Private employers are paying attention, and restricting such speech by their employees. Universities are enacting speech codes restricting such speech. Even speech in restaurants and other public places, whether put up by the business owner or said by patrons, can lead to liability for the owner. And this isn’t limited to offensive speech said to a particular person who doesn’t want to hear it. Even speech posted on the wall or overheard in the lunchroom can lead to liability, and would thus be suppressed by “hostile environment” law.

To be sure, private employers and business owners aren’t bound by the First Amendment, and are thus generally free to restrict such speech on their property. And even government employers and enterprises generally have broad latitude to control what is said on their property (setting aside public universities, which generally have much less such latitude). But here the government is pressuring all employers, universities, and businesses to impose speech codes, by threatening liability on those who don’t impose such codes. And that government pressure is subject to First Amendment scrutiny.

Some courts have rejected some applications of this “hostile environment” theory on First Amendment grounds; others have upheld other applications. This too is something the Supreme Court will have to consider.

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What Does Free Speech Mean?

Among other cherished values, the First Amendment protects freedom of speech. The U.S. Supreme Court often has struggled to determine what exactly constitutes protected speech. The following are examples of speech, both direct (words) and symbolic (actions), that the Court has decided are either entitled to First Amendment protections, or not.

The First Amendment states, in relevant part, that:

“Congress shall make no law...abridging freedom of speech.”

Freedom of speech includes the right:

• Not to speak (specifically, the right not to salute the flag). West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette , 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
• Of students to wear black armbands to school to protest a war (“Students do not shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate.”). Tinker v. Des Moines , 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
• To use certain offensive words and phrases to convey political messages. Cohen v. California , 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
• To contribute money (under certain circumstances) to political campaigns. Buckley v. Valeo , 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
• To advertise commercial products and professional services (with some restrictions). Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Council , 425 U.S. 748 (1976);  Bates v. State Bar of Arizona , 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
• To engage in symbolic speech, (e.g., burning the flag in protest). Texas v. Johnson , 491 U.S. 397 (1989);  United States v. Eichman , 496 U.S. 310 (1990).

Freedom of speech does not include the right:

• To incite imminent lawless action. Brandenburg v. Ohio , 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
• To make or distribute obscene materials. Roth v. United States , 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
• To burn draft cards as an anti-war protest. United States v. O’Brien , 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
• To permit students to print articles in a school newspaper over the objections of the school administration.  Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier , 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
• Of students to make an obscene speech at a school-sponsored event. Bethel School District #43 v. Fraser , 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
• Of students to advocate illegal drug use at a school-sponsored event. Morse v. Frederick, __ U.S. __ (2007).

Disclaimer: These resources are created by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts for use in educational activities only. They may not reflect the current state of the law, and are not intended to provide legal advice, guidance on litigation, or commentary on legislation. 

DISCLAIMER: These resources are created by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts for educational purposes only. They may not reflect the current state of the law, and are not intended to provide legal advice, guidance on litigation, or commentary on any pending case or legislation.

27 Freedom of Speech Examples

Freedom of Speech refers to the right of any citizen to express their thoughts, ideas, and opinions without fear of government restraint or censorship (Legal Information Institute, 2020).

The notion of free speech extends beyond verbal communication. It can also defend our rights to use offensive sign language and body language, engage in symbolic and artistic expressions (e.g., flag burning), and even wear clothing that others may find offensive or revealing. Take, for example, the case of Cohen v. California, where the Supreme Court protected an individual’s right to wear a jacket with an expletive as a form of political protest.

Another practical example can be seen in newspapers or media outlets, who are often protected from government persecution by free speech laws. In liberal democracies like the USA and France, the free press are permitted to criticize the government openly.

Free speech helps defend our robust democracies, and makes our political systems more free, fair, and open than nations like Vietnam, China, Hungary, Turkey, and Cambodia whose governments largely control the media and therefore have a stronger monopoly over state power (Lidsky & Cotter, 2016).

Freedom of Speech Examples

• Peaceful protest signs: Peaceful protest signs are protected under free speech laws in most liberal democracies. They represent the direct expression of an individual’s or group’s thoughts and concerns on a political matter (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). These signs serve as a non-violent way to demand action, raise awareness, or critique governmental or societal issues. Regardless of the message’s popularity, the freedom to publicly display such signs is protected under freedom of speech, as long, however, as they do not incite violence or unlawful actions.
• Expressing religious beliefs: Freedom of speech in most liberal-democratic nations covers the public expression of religious beliefs (Roth, 2015). This includes wearing religious symbols, discussing religious topics, or participating in religious rituals in public. Importantly, this freedom is granted equally to all religions and even no-religion atheists and agnostics, who have the freedom to promote their non-beliefs. Such a law allows for a diverse array of religious expressions in public forums such as online and in universities.
• Wearing symbolic clothing: The Supreme Court of the USA has upheld the right of individuals to wear expressive clothing as a form of symbolic speech (Cohen v. California, 1971). This can include everything from protest t-shirts to flag pins and allows individuals to wear their opinions literally on their sleeves.
• Artistic expressions of dissent: Artistic expressions, including painting, music, and theater, are vehicles to express dissenting ideas or critique societal norms (Reitman, 2014). These expressions allow for creative commentary on the prevailing cultural, political, or social climates , contributing to the diversity of discourse within society. However, this would not be protected if the art were painted onto other people’s or public property, such as in the case of graffiti art.
• Criticizing government actions: In most liberal democratic nations, freedom of speech also includes the right to voice dissent publicly and criticize government policies or actions (Stroud, 2011). This encourages transparency and accountability, empowering citizens to serve as a check on governmental power.
• Satirical commentary on society: Protected under freedom of speech in many nations, satirical commentary allows for a critique of individuals, groups, and societal norms through humor and irony (Stankiewicz, 2017). Satire plays a vital role in maintaining a healthy society by promoting dialogue about difficult issues in a manner that engages audiences and provokes thought. For example, Charlie Hebdo’s incendiary satirical pictures of Islamic figures was offensive, but allowed, under France’s robust free speech laws.
• Advocating for social change : One of the most potent uses of free speech is the ability to advocate for social change (Meyerson, 2010). This can occur in many ways, such as public speeches, organized protests, or social media campaigns, allowing individuals and groups to bring attention to societal issues and push for change.
• Publicly debating controversial topics: Freedom of speech upholds the right to participate in public debate on controversial topics (Fish, 2016). Such debates often expose varying viewpoints and challenge assumptions , (even if you’re ill-informed!).
• Sharing scientific theories: Academic freedom, a facet of freedom of speech, allows researchers to share scientific theories or findings even if they are controversial (Karran & Mallinson, 2017), without facing fear of being fired. This is a central concept in the tenure system in the USA. This openness promotes progress and innovation by enabling knowledge exchange and peer scrutiny.
• Blogging personal political views: Blogging platforms provide a space for individuals to express their political opinions freely and discuss matters of public concern (Sunstein, 2017). This democratizes access to political discourse and helps cultivate a more informed public, but may also unfortunately spread misinformation – which is a key downside of free speech.
• Writing a critical book review: Freedom of speech permits individuals to write and publish critical reviews of books (or other forms of media), helping to facilitate discourse and contribute to the literary or artistic community (D’Haen, 2012). Such reviews, positive or negative, aid in the critical reception and evaluation of the work, influencing its public reception, but, generally, if not slanderous, cannot be censored.
• Political campaign speeches: When politicians deliver speeches during their campaign, they practice their freedom of speech (Kenski & Stroud, 2016). Their speeches allow voters to understand their stances on various issues, crucial for informed voting. They’re often critical of the government, but yet are allowed, in order to sustain a robust democratic society.
• Publishing an investigative article: Investigative journalism, protected by freedom of speech, involves in-depth reporting to uncover hidden issues in society or government (Tumber & Waisbord, 2019). It serves as a watchdog, promoting transparency , and accountability. This allows papers like the New York Times and Wall Street Journal to release cutting-edge investigative journalistic pieces.
• Whistleblowing on corporate wrongdoing: Freedom of speech protects whistleblowers who expose unethical practices within corporations, serving as a fundamental check on corruption and wrongdoing (Kohn, 2010). This form of expression is critical for maintaining trust and integrity within industries.
• The right to offend: Freedom of speech includes the right to offend, meaning individuals are allowed to voice opinions or ideas, however, potentially offensive they may be to some (Strossen, 2018). This freedom allows for a wide range of expressions, fostering diverse and dynamic dialogue within society.
• The right to silence: Often conceptualized as “the right to remain silent,” this right protects individuals from self-incrimination and stands as an integral aspect of free speech (Franks, 2014). This guarantees individuals’ liberty to choose when and how they express themselves. In the USA, this is protected under the 5th amendment.
• Social media activism: Activism through social media platforms falls under the umbrella of freedom of speech (Loader & Mercea, 2011). This allows individuals to raise awareness, mobilize supporters, and campaign for change at unprecedented speeds and scales.
• Public speaking at a rally: Individuals addressing a crowd at a public rally exercise their freedom of speech by expressing their beliefs and advocating for causes they support (Tufekci, 2017). Public speeches can rally support, influence opinions, and draw attention to essential issues.

See Also: 40 Types of Freedom

Free Speech and the US Constitution (First Amendment)

While encased in the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, freedom of speech was originally designed to maintain civil liberties an open, democratic society whereby all individuals could express their comments and opinions freely (Stroud, 2011).

The framers believed that unchecked and unrestricted discussion would lead to the truth, and bad ideas would be debunked by the good ideas. This idea is often described in the metaphor ‘sunshine is the best disinfectant’.

The USA has one of the most libertarian readings of free speech, and while other liberal democracies protect speech, none are quite as robust in their protections than the USA.

Interestingly, freedom of speech also covers the right to be silent. For instance, the Fifth Amendment of the United States constitution protects an individual’s right not to make self-incriminating statements under interrogation, often conceptualized as “the right to remain silent” (Franks, 2014).

The Constitutional Limits of Free Speech

Freedom of speech does not mean absolute freedom . Contrary to some misconceptions, this right is not without its boundaries (Smith & Kavanagh, 2015).

There are indeed restrictions that one must adhere to, such as libel, slander, obscenity, sedition, and incitement, to name a few.

For instance, hate speech that incites violence or harm towards a specific group is typically not protected by the right to free speech in the USA (Brimelow v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 2012).

Famous Freedom of Speech Cases in the United States

Tinker v. des moines (1969): student vietnam war protests.

This landmark case marked a significant decision protecting students’ rights to free speech (Abernathy, 2007). John Tinker and his fellow anti-war agitators were suspended from their Des Moines school for wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam War. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States argued that their actions we free speech. Being non-disruptive of minimally disruptive, are protected. The court stated, “students do not shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,” establishing a precedent for future freedom of speech cases in education settings, such as the freedom to wear political slogans on your clothing at public schools.

New York Times Co. v. United States (1971): Defending Press Freedom

In this case, better known as the “ Pentagon Papers Case ,” the government tried to prevent the New York Times from publishing classified documents containing information that the US government was trying to hide because it demonstrated unfavorable information about the USA’s role in the Vietnam War (Rudenstine, 2014). The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the New York Times. It affirmed the principle of no prior restraint, which means that the government cannot stop the publication of a news story pro-actively, except in extremely rare circumstances. This case reaffirmed the robustness of press freedom in the USA.

Texas v. Johnson (1989): The Right to Flag Burning

This case involved Gregory Lee Johnson who burned an American flag as a form of political protest. This led to his arrest under a now-defunct Texas law banning “flag desecration” (Goldstein, 2016). The Supreme Court overturned his conviction stating that Johnson’s act was symbolic speech and, therefore, protected by the First Amendment. Here, we can see that ‘speech’ isn’t just about speaking but also symbolism . This decision significantly reinforced the idea of protection for symbolic speech under the freedom of speech.

Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010): Money is Speech

This case addressed the issue of campaign financing, where the court found that giving money to a political candidate was seen as ‘political speech’ and therefore protected by the first amendment (Magarian, 2010). Citizens United, a non-profit organization, challenged a regulation barring corporations and unions from funding political campaign ads. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Citizens United . This, in turn, allowed unlimited corporate spending in elections, asserting that such “political speech” was protected under the First Amendment. Detractors – including myself – think this case essentially positioned corporations as people, which is ridiculous, and led to the devastating hyper-politicization of elections we see to this day.

Snyder v. Phelps (2011): The Right to Offend

This case involved the Westboro Baptist Church’s right to picket military funerals with fundamentalist anti-military sentiments, resulting in an emotional distress lawsuit from the father of a fallen marine (Carpenter, 2011). The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Westboro Baptist Church . The justices argued that the expression represented matters of public concern, thus protected under the First Amendment, no matter how offensive this behavior truly was.

Schenck v. United States (1919): The Limitations of Free Speech

Charles Schenck, Secretary of the Socialist Party, was arrested for distributing leaflets opposing the draft during World War I (Lewis, 2008). The Supreme Court upheld his conviction under the Espionage Act, ruling that Schenck’s actions posed a “clear and present danger” to national security. This case is important as it established the “clear and present danger” standard for limiting freedom of speech. Although, in my opinion, this ruling was counter to many other Supreme Court findings that held very absolutist perspectives toward free speech, and demonstrated the constant right-wing leanings of US supreme courts over the years.

While “freedom of speech” can often seem like an expansive term, understanding its roots in the democratic principles of open discussion and societal checks and balances can offer some enlightening contexts. However, as discussed above, there are indeed certain conditions and restrictions and, like any freedom, it necessitates responsible handling. Interestingly, strong free speech laws in the USA have led to many perverse outcomes which demonstrates that they may be too lenient; while in my home country of Australia, free speech is often protected, but the laws are much more strict. Finding the right balance is extremely difficult.

Abernathy, M. (2007). First Amendment Law Handbook . Thomson/West.

Brimelow v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 132 S. Ct. 2681 (2012).

Carpenter, D. H. (2011). Westboro Church’s Funeral Picketing is Free Speech . Supreme Court Debates.

Franks, D. D. (2014). The Fifth Amendment: Double Jeopardy, Due Process , and the Nature of the Interrogation Process. Routledge.

Goldstein, R. (2016). Flag Burning and Free Speech: The Case of Texas v. Johnson. University Press Of Kansas.

Legal Information Institute. (2020). Freedom of Speech. Cornell Law School. Retrieved from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/freedom_of_speech

Lewis, A. (2008). Freedom for the Thought That We Hate: A Biography of the First Amendment. Basic Books.

Lidsky, L. B. & Cotter, R. T. (2016 ). Freedom of the Press: A Reference Guide to the United States Constitution . Greenwood.

Magarian, G. P. (2010). The Democracy of Direct Speech. Wm. & Mary Law Review, 97.

Rudenstine, D. (2014). The Day the Presses Stopped: A History of the Pentagon Papers Case. University of California Press.

Smith, K. E., & Kavanagh, D. (2015). Freedom of Speech: The History of an Idea . Penn State University Press.

Stroud, N. J. (2011). Niche News: The Politics of News Choice . Oxford University Press.

Chris Drew (PhD)

Dr. Chris Drew is the founder of the Helpful Professor. He holds a PhD in education and has published over 20 articles in scholarly journals. He is the former editor of the Journal of Learning Development in Higher Education. [Image Descriptor: Photo of Chris]

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2 thoughts on “27 Freedom of Speech Examples”

Hi Professor Drew: I am so-o-o-o enjoying your site. I am an ESL teacher, and I use it extensively to introduce the students to American culture. I really like the deep dives into specific topics, like The American Dream, and Freedom of Speech. A fantastic resource! Thank you!

Hi Jane, thanks so much for reaching out and I’m so glad my website is a useful resource for you. All the best with your teaching!

Regards, Chris.

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• Six UChicago scholars elected to American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2024

UChicago scholar wins National Book Critics Circle Award

‘are we doomed’ class debates end of the world—and finds reason for hope, what is the role of free speech in a democratic society, book co-edited by prof. geoffrey stone examines evolution, future of first amendment.

Free speech has been an experiment from the start—or at least that’s what Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes suggested nearly a century ago in his dissent in  Abrams v. United States , one of the first decisions to interpret and shape the doctrine that would come to occupy a nearly sacred place in America’s national identity.

Since then, First Amendment jurisprudence has stirred America in novel ways, forcing deep introspection about democracy, society and human nature and sometimes straddling the political divide in unexpected fashion. In the past 100 years, free speech protections have ebbed and flowed alongside America’s fears and progress, adapting to changing norms but ultimately growing in reach.

And now, this piece of the American experiment faces a new set of challenges presented by the ever-expanding influence of technology as well as sharp debates over the government’s role in shaping the public forum.

That’s why Geoffrey R. Stone, the Edward Levi Distinguished Service Professor at the University of Chicago Law School, and Lee Bollinger, the president of Columbia University, two of the country’s leading First Amendment scholars, brought together some of the nation’s most influential legal scholars in a new book to explore the evolution—and the future—of First Amendment doctrine in America. 

The Free Speech Century  (Oxford University Press) is a collection of 16 essays by Floyd Abrams, the legendary First Amendment lawyer; David Strauss, the University of Chicago’s Gerald Ratner Distinguished Service Professor of Law; Albie Sachs, former justice of the Constitutional Court of South Africa; Tom Ginsburg, the University of Chicago’s Leo Spitz Professor of International Law; Laura Weinrib, a University of Chicago Professor of Law; Cass Sunstein, a professor at Harvard Law School; and others.

“Lee and I were law clerks together at the Supreme Court during the 1972 term,” Stone said. “I was with Justice Brennan and Lee was with Chief Justice Burger. We have both been writing, speaking and teaching about the First Amendment now for 45 years. This was a good time, we decided, to mark the 100th anniversary of the Supreme Court’s first decision on the First Amendment with a volume that examines four basic themes: The Nature of First Amendment Jurisprudence, Major Critiques and Controversies over Current Doctrine, The International Impact of our First Amendment Jurisprudence, and the Future of Free Speech in a World of Ever-Changing Technology. Our hope is that this volume will enlighten, inspire and challenge readers to think about the role of free speech in a free and democratic society.”

Stone, JD’71, has spent much of his career examining free speech— a topic he first became passionate about as a University of Law School student.

The University has a long tradition of upholding freedom of expression. UChicago’s influential 2015 report by the Committee on Freedom of Expression, which Stone chaired, became a model for colleges and universities across the country.

The collection takes on pressing issues, such as free expression on university campuses, hate speech, the regulation of political speech and the boundaries of free speech on social media, unpacking the ways in which these issues are shaping the norms of free expression.

One essay, for instance, explores how digital behemoths like Facebook, Twitter and Google became “gatekeepers of free expression”—a shift that contributor Emily Bell, a Columbia University journalism professor, writes “leaves us at a dangerous point in democracy and freedom of the press.” Her article examines foreign interference in the 2016 election and explores some of the questions that have emerged since, such as how to balance traditional ideas of a free press with the rights of citizens to hear accurate information in an information landscape that is now dominated by social media.

Technology, the editors write, has presented some of the most significant questions that courts, legal scholars, and the American public will face in the coming decades.

“While vastly expanding the opportunities to participate in public discourse, contemporary means of communication have also arguably contributed to political polarization, foreign influence in our democracy, and the proliferation of ‘fake’ news,” Stone writes in the introduction. “To what extent do these concerns pose new threats to our understanding of ‘the freedom of speech, and of the press’? To what extent do they call for serious reconsideration of some central doctrines and principles on which our current First Amendment jurisprudence is based?”

In another essay, Strauss, an expert in constitutional law, examines the principles established in the 1971 Pentagon Papers case,  New York Times Co. v. United States.  The landmark ruling blocked an attempt at prior restraint by the Nixon administration, allowing the  New York Times  and  Washington Post  to publish a classified report that reporters had obtained about America’s role in Vietnam. The threat to national security wasn’t sufficiently immediate or specific to warrant infringing on the papers’ right to publish, the Court said at the time.

But today’s world is different, Strauss argues. It is easier to leak large amounts of sensitive information—and publication is no longer limited to a handful of media companies with strict ethical guidelines. What’s more, the ease with which information can be shared—digitally as opposed to carefully sneaking papers in batches from locked cabinets to a photocopier, as military analyst Daniel Ellsberg did when leaking the Pentagon Papers—means that a larger number of people can act as leakers. That can include those who don’t fully understand the information they are sharing, which many have argued was the case when former IT contractor Edward Snowden allegedly leaked millions of documents from the National Security Agency in 2013.

“[T]he stakes are great on both sides,” Strauss writes, “and the world has changed in ways that make it important to rethink the way we deal with the problem.”

Ultimately, the health of the First Amendment will depend on two things, Bollinger writes: a continued understanding that free speech plays a critical role in democratic society—and a recognition that the judicial branch doesn’t claim sole responsibility for achieving that vision. The legislative and executive branches can support free speech as well.

What’s more, modern-day challenges do not have to result in an erosion of protections, Bollinger argues.

“[O]ur most memorable and consequential decisions under the First Amendment have emerged in times of national crises, when passions are at their peak and when human behavior is on full display at its worst and at its best, in times of war and when momentous social movements are on the rise,” he writes. “Freedom of speech and the press taps into the most essential elements of life—how we think, speak, communicate, and live within the polity. It is no wonder that we are drawn again and again into its world.”

—Adapted from an article that first appeared on the University of Chicago Law School website.

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The Free Speech Century

Geoffrey R. Stone, Lee C. Bollinger

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Great Free Speech Moments of the 20th Century

Home / Great Free Speech Moments of the 20th Century

Although all five freedoms found in the First Amendment are equally important, freedom of speech remains a cornerstone of any democratic and free society. As activist Deeyah Khan said, “Freedom of speech is a human right and the foundation upon which democracy is built. Any restriction of freedom of speech is a restriction upon democracy.”

According to a recent 2021 survey conducted by the Freedom Forum, freedom of speech is considered to be the “most vital” freedom found in the First Amendment with 59% of respondents citing it as such.

In honor of Free Speech Week 2021 , the First Amendment Museum has compiled a list of ten great free speech moments from 20th-century American history.

Note: The free speech moments chronologically listed below were selected by the staff at the First Amendment Museum, but there are many notable free speech moments in our history. What would you consider a great free speech moment of the 20th century? Tell us your picks!

Silent Sentinels Protest (1917)

Sometimes, the most powerful speech can involve no words at all. One of the most iconic protests of the Women’s Suffrage Movement was conducted by a group called the “Silent Sentinels” organized by Alice Paul, a Quaker women’s rights activist with a commitment to non-violence and women’s suffrage. The Silent Sentinels protested in front of the White House during Woodrow Wilson’s presidency, from January of 1917 to June of 1919. The protesters wore sashes, held banners, and carried flags with messaging on them in support of women’s right to vote.

The Silent Sentinels used silence instead of loud demonstrations as a form of protest, which was a new strategy within the national suffrage movement. Although the protesters were silent, their presence and messaging amplified the inequality that existed at home while the United States was fighting World War One abroad to make “the world safe for democracy.”

Throughout their two-and-a-half-year-long vigil, one of the longest continuous protests in American history, many of the nearly 2,000 women who picketed suffered from police brutality. In November of 1917, many of the Silent Sentinels were arrested and imprisoned, and further suffered cruelties that included being force-fed, beaten, choked, and abused until they were released weeks later. Over the course of the entire Silent Sentinel protest, nearly 500 women were arrested and 168 served jail time for their steadfast belief in the importance of women’s rights. These protests became one of the most effective in American history and helped spur the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment which granted women the Constitutional right to vote.

Abrams v. United States (1919)

The entry of the United States into World War One ushered in an unprecedented era of paranoia in the country. German spies, communist agents, and other “subversive elements” were thought to be pervasive. In 1917, Congress and President Woodrow Wilson passed the Espionage Act which was intended to prohibit interference with military operations or recruitment, to further restrict insubordination in the military, and to prevent the support of enemies of the United States during wartime.

Outspoken members of the Socialist Party, Charles Schenck, and Elizabeth Baer were arrested under the newly imposed restrictions on speech provided by the Espionage Act. They were charged with the distribution of flyers calling on men to “resist the draft,” which they viewed as a form of involuntary servitude. Schenck v. United States went all the way to the Supreme Court. Led by Chief Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., the Court upheld the conviction of Schenck and Baer, and therefore the legality of the Espionage Act itself. The court ruled that Schenck and Baer’s actions represented a “clear and present danger to the enlistment and recruiting service of the U.S. Armed Forces during a state of war.” This case, decided in March of 1919, gave the government a broad license to suppress free speech.

Later that year, in August of 1919, Hyman Rosansky was similarly arrested for throwing fliers off a building in New York City that criticized the US intervention in the Russian Revolution. He and his collaborators were charged under the Espionage Act, and the case, Abrams v. United States also reached the Supreme Court which upheld Rosansky’s conviction— with one notable exception . Unlike in Schenck v. US , this time, Chief Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. dissented, and commented, “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.” In this famous dissent, written only months after Schenck v. US , Holmes eloquently laid the groundwork for the “marketplace of ideas” doctrine that has guided much of American jurisprudence on free speech since. 

Scopes Monkey Trial (1925)

Today, the scientific theory of evolution is a common component of most public high school science curricula, but that was not always the case. In March of 1925 in Tennessee, the Butler Act made it a crime to teach the scientific theory of evolution in public schools. In response, the American Civil Liberties Union asked John Scopes, a high school science teacher, to purposefully violate the Butler Act by admitting to teaching evolution in order to challenge the law in court. Scopes, who had previously substituted for the regular high school biology teacher in the small town of Dayton, agreed and was charged with violating the Butler Act in May of 1925 for teaching evolution from a 1914 textbook.

Both sides lawyered up with star attorneys, and publicity around the trial swelled the public’s interest in the topic nationwide. For the defense, Scopes was represented by Clarence Darrow, a folksy celebrity lawyer. The prosecution was represented by William Jennings Bryan, a prominent Democratic politician who had previously run for president three times. What followed was one of the most memorable court cases in United States history. The lawyers sparred back and forth, culminating in Darrow calling upon Bryan to sit on the witness stand for the defense. Under questioning, Darrow, himself an agnostic, poked at Bryan’s personal Christian beliefs, embarrassing the latter. 

Although Bryan’s prosecution performance during the trial was considered lackluster, while Darrow’s was exulted, the jury decided to convict Scopes anyway. However, the highly-publicized trial humiliated the fundamentalists behind the Butler Act in the court of public opinion. By 1927, forty-one bills or resolutions similar to the Butler Act had been introduced into state legislatures. Due partly to the efforts of Scopes, the ACLU, and Clarence Darrow, only two of those bills passed. 

Near v. Minnesota (1931)

The catch-22 regarding freedom of speech in the United States is that it protects malicious hateful speech just as much as it protects positive or acceptable speech. Near v. Minnesota is an example of this dichotomy. In 1927, Jay M. Near, who was described as “anti-Catholic, anti-Semitic, anti-black, and anti-labor”, published The Saturday Press in Minneapolis, Minnesota. The paper falsely and derogatorily asserted that a Jewish cabal was running the city. Local politician Floyd B. Olson sued the paper under Minnesota’s Public Nuisance Law of 1925 which penalized those who made a “public nuisance” by publishing, selling, or distributing anything considered “malicious, scandalous, and defamatory.”

The case reached the Supreme Court which ruled in Near’s favor, holding that the Public Nuisance Law was unconstitutional since it violated both the Fourteenth and First Amendments. The case violated the First Amendment because it placed an unconstitutional “prior restraint” on the free press. Prior restraint is any law that chills, censors, or silences speech before it is produced. The Public Nuisance Law also violated the Fourteenth Amendment because the Fourteenth Amendment made the First Amendment applicable to state governments as well as the federal. Before the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, the First Amendment only applied to the federal government. 

Near v. Minnesota was undoubtedly a win for freedom of the press advocates in the United States and has been called the “first great press case” by public intellectual Anthony Lewis. However, the Supreme Court’s decision to allow the paper to spew what we would consider “hate speech” today has muddled the reputation of this landmark decision.

Montgomery Bus Boycotts (1955)

Rosa Parks is now widely known as one of the great icons of the Modern Civil Rights Movement, but in 1955 she was just a young activist standing up against systemic racism. One of the most famous protests in United States history was the Montgomery Bus Boycott which began in December of 1955 and lasted a whole year until December of 1956. Considered a foundational moment in the history of the American Civil Rights Movement of the mid-twentieth century, the boycott began after Parks, a black woman, was arrested for refusing to give up her bus seat to a white person in segregated Montgomery, Alabama.

Numerous events led up to the Montgomery Bus Boycotts. In 1946, the Supreme Court ruled that a Virginia state law enforcing segregation on interstate buses was unconstitutional after hearing a suit brought by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). Then, in 1953, activists in Baton Rouge, Louisiana boycotted the busing system in that city over its racist practices. Two years later, a 15-year-old member of Montgomery’s NAACP Youth Council named Claudette Colvin refused to give up her seat on a bus to a white man. This series of events inspired the NAACP to plant Rosa Parks in a “white’s only” section of a Montgomery public bus in order to spark the boycott. When Parks was arrested for her actions, the boycott began.

Because over 70% of Montgomery’s bus patrons were black, the boycott resulted in drastically reducing the profitability of the busing system. The organization leading the boycott was the Montgomery Improvement Association (MIA) which had just elected as their new president a charismatic preacher named Martin Luther King, Jr. Under his leadership, the boycott continued with astonishing success. Montgomery City Lines lost between 30,000 and 40,000 bus fares each day during the boycott. The boycott garnered national attention and pressured the Supreme Court to declare Montgomery’s policy of segregated busing unconstitutional, ending the boycott. The Montgomery Bus Boycott was an unmitigated success that helped usher in the modern era of Civil Rights, and is a textbook example of using First Amendment rights to shift thinking and policy for the greater good.

Greensboro Sit-Ins (1960)

On February 1st, 1960, four freshmen at North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University sat down at the lunch counter inside the F. W. Woolworth Company store in Greensboro, North Carolina. The four had previously been meeting regularly to discuss ways they could personally challenge the racist Jim Crow laws of their community. After sitting down, the men, Ezell Blair Jr., David Richmond, Franklin McCain, and Joseph McNeil, were refused service due to the color of their skin when they each asked for a cup of coffee. After being asked to leave repeatedly, the four refused and stayed until the store closed that night. Then began the Greensboro Sit-Ins. The four returned day after day for almost six months, with more and more publicity, hatred, and supporters following them, until the Greensboro F.W. Woolworth Company agreed to end its policy of racial segregation in July. The last F.W. Woolworth store was desegregated in 1965.

The Greensboro Sit-Ins spawned the subsequent “sit-in movement” in which the events of Greensboro would be repeated across the South until full desegregation of the stores was achieved by the mid-1960s. Over 70,000 people participated in the sit-in movement and many suffered abuse, insult, and disrespect at the hands of angry white mobs and authorities. The Greensboro Sit-Ins also helped catalyze the creation of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) which played an important role in the growing Civil Rights Movement. Today, the International Civil Rights Center & Museum is located in the former F.W. Woolworth store where the Greensboro Sit-Ins occurred.

March on Washington (1963)

The March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom remains one of the most famous and important events in all of American history. Perhaps no other event better exemplifies the soul of the First Amendment than the March on Washington. The march was organized by A. Philip Randolph and Bayard Rustin, prominent civil rights leaders who built a diverse coalition of activists for the March under the banner of “jobs and freedom.” It took nearly two years to plan and attracted civil rights groups, labor unions, and religious organizations. The organizers of the March ruled out civil disobedience and insisted the gathering be a peaceful and legal event with cooperation from the Washington D.C. police. 

On August 28th, 1963 around 250,000 activists arrived in Washington D.C. to make their voices heard. The March began at the Washington Monument with female participants marching down Independence Avenue, while male participants marched on Pennsylvania Avenue. Both converged and ended at the Lincoln Memorial. There, representatives from each of the March on Washington’s sponsoring organizations addressed the crowd from a podium on the memorial’s steps. The speeches culminated in the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. issuing his famous “I Have a Dream Speech.”

The March is credited with helping to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a landmark bill in Civil Rights history. The media coverage the March attracted gave many Civil Rights groups and leaders national exposure, carrying the organizers’ speeches and messages to a wide audience around the country and the world. Voice of America even translated the speeches and rebroadcast them in 36 languages. The March served as a template for the later Selma to Montgomery marches in 1965. Michael Thelwell, an activist and participant of the March, said, “so it happened that Negro students from the South, some of whom still had unhealed bruises from the electric cattle prods which Southern police used to break up demonstrations, were recorded for the screens of the world portraying ‘American Democracy at Work.’”

Berkeley Free Speech Movement (1964)

During the 1950s, heightened tensions with the Soviet Union ushered in a wave of hysteria regarding fears over the spread of Communism. In response, universities in California enacted numerous regulations limiting students’ political activities. By the mid-1960s, however, encouraged by the Civil Rights Movement and the burgeoning anti-war movement, students at the University of California, Berkeley, began testing the limits of their collegiate free speech. Students began meeting off-campus to hold political demonstrations and rallies, often raucous affairs which sometimes resulted in student arrests. The press took a special interest in the students’ activities and portrayed UC Berkeley as a haven for left-wing radicals. In response, the school’s administration vowed to enforce prohibitions on student speech and political demonstration.

In 1964, five hundred students marched on Berkeley’s administration building to protest the university’s anti-speech rules. The students called for an abolition of all restrictions on free-speech rights throughout the University of California system. In October of that year, former graduate student Jack Weinberg refused to show his identification to the campus police and was arrested. Thousands of students gathered in response and surrounded the police car Weinberg was detained in for the following 32 hours, all while Weinberg was inside it. The car was used as a speaker’s podium until the charges against Weinberg were dropped. Then, on December 2, thousands of students occupied a campus building to force the school administration to relinquish restrictions on political speech and action on campus. After these events, Berkeley’s officials began to relent. By January of 1965, the new acting chancellor, Martin Meyerson, established provisional rules that allowed political activity on the Berkeley campus. The win for free speech was seen by many as a watershed moment for white youth activism during the 1960s. The Berkeley Free Speech Movement not only essentially dismantled free speech restrictions on college campuses in California, but also helped catalyze the anti-war movement amongst young people who could now use their voices safely and legally.

Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969)

During the summer of 1964, Ku Klux Klan member Clarence Brandenburg addressed a small gathering of fellow Klan members in a rural Ohio field. In Brandenburg’s speech, he issued vague threats against the federal government if it continued to “suppress the white, Caucasian race.” Portions of Brandenburg’s speech had been filmed and when authorities saw it they charged him with violating “Ohio’s criminal syndicalism statute,” a policy that made it a crime to “advocate … the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform.”

Initially convicted in court in Hamilton County, Ohio, Brandenburg was fined $1,000 and sentenced to one to ten years in prison. With the help of the American Civil Liberties Union, Brandenburg filed an appeal, claiming that his First Amendment free speech rights had been violated. The Ohio Supreme Court refused to hear his appeal so Brandenburg appealed to the US Supreme Court. In a landmark decision, the US Supreme Court sided with Brandenburg and said it was his First Amendment right to make his speech, ruling that  Ohio’s criminal syndicalism statute was unconstitutional.  SCOTUS articulated a new test, the “imminent lawless action” test (now known as the Brandenburg Test), to judge what was illegal seditious speech under the First Amendment. 

The imminent lawless action test stated that speech could be punished only if it met two criteria: “where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.” Therefore, speech can only be restricted if it presents a threat that is both likely to actually happen and is to happen soon. As with many Supreme Court cases involving freedom of speech, Brandenburg v. Ohio is yet another clear demonstration that speech that is repellent is just as legal as speech that is popularly approved of under the First Amendment.

New York Times v. United States (1971)

In 1968, a secret government study on America’s involvement in Vietnam was completed. The project, which comprised 47 volumes containing more than 7,000 pages, documented how presidential administrations and politicians going back to the Truman era consistently escalated America’s involvement in Vietnam. It also detailed many government secrets regarding the U.S. military’s goals, objectives, strategies, and tactics in the then-still raging conflict. The work was classified and only 15 copies were made.

In early 1971 Daniel Ellsberg, who had worked on the project, secretly made copies of the documents and passed them to reporters for the New York Times . In June of 1971, the Times began to publish the documents which they called the “Pentagon Papers.” After the Pentagon Papers were published, President Richard Nixon’s administration, citing national security concerns, filed a restraining order to halt further publication of the Papers. When an Appeals Court upheld the order, the Times made an emergency appeal to the Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case the next day resulting in the case, New York Times v. United States.

On June 30, 1971, the Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision, rejected the restraining order and allowed the Times to continue with publication. Justice Hugo L. Black reasoned that “only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in government.” Justice Byron R. White wrote that “in no circumstances would the First Amendment permit an injunction against publishing information about government plans or operations.” Nixon’s attempt to censor the New York Times’ freedom to publish the Pentagon Papers had been soundly defeated. The case resulted in a firestorm of outcry against government censorship and the circumstances of America’s involvement in Vietnam. The case remains one of the most important and iconic wins for freedom of speech and of the press in United States history.

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Academic Freedom and Free Speech Are Distinct. Both Matter.

All year we’ve bandied about phrases like “civil discourse,” “open inquiry,” “academic freedom,” and “free speech.” It’s time to clarify them, and what living by them requires.

“Civil discourse” and “open inquiry” name an aspiration to discourse where disagreements — even fierce ones — can spark mutual learning because we engage with each other earnestly and respectfully. They promise a world where good-faith arguments, directed toward truth-seeking, bound by standards of evidence and logic, and inclusive of all perspectives, are welcome — even when they run counter to a majority point of view.

If “civil discourse” and “open inquiry” are the “what” of good discourse on campus, “academic freedom” and “free speech” are the “how.” Often used interchangeably, both phrases name specific policy regimes governing types of speech, but there is a critical difference between them.

Academic freedom is a creature of colleges and universities and specifically protects the right to make arguments in academic contexts, subject to review of one’s work according to scholarly standards.

Free speech rights, in contrast, name a protection against governmental interference restricting speech in the public sphere. In the U.S., they are broadly defined by the First Amendment of the Constitution.

The first set of protocols is organizational — The policies of universities; the second set is legal — governmental policy.

Academic spaces — including classrooms, labs, seminars, and public events sponsored by academic units — should resemble a courtroom. To achieve a verdict — Latin for “speaking the truth” — trials require witnesses for both sides.

So too in the academy. We should always want to hear the other side’s best arguments. This requires intellectual diversity — of methods, data sources, and normative frameworks, as well as viewpoints.

The need for multiple viewpoints is why academic freedom goes hand in hand with inclusion and belonging: Protecting and supporting the participation of people with diverse identities or divergent ideologies is necessary for robust academic inquiry.

But diversity of perspective doesn’t mean “anything goes.”

When a journal article is submitted without appropriate pursuit of the truth, the submission may be rejected or receive a “revise and resubmit” notice, an invitation to the author to try again. Speaker panels, too, can be judged to be ill-constructed and receive notice that further work is needed before they see the light of day.

These are not cases of cancellation or sanctioning — they reflect a legitimate evaluation of the contribution’s caliber with regard to truth-seeking.

Similarly, policies against classroom disruption, which protect the academic freedom required to sustain inquiry, do not violate free speech rights, because the classroom is not where free speech rights apply. Instead, policies against disruption protect the right of people to make the best argument they can, from whatever their point of view may be, in pursuit of the truth.

Yet free speech, including the right to protest, also matters on campus. How, why, and where should protests receive protection here?

At a public university, free speech rights follow directly from First Amendment rights. The state sponsorship of universities like U.C. Berkeley or UMass-Boston makes university leaders state representatives with formal legal obligations to respect free speech.

But at a private university, free speech rights are a privilege granted by the university in a public-spirited effort to contribute additional public spaces to those otherwise available for political debate — street corners, parks, some coffee shops, the Internet, and so on.

Though Harvard was founded by officials of the Massachusetts Bay Colony and technically continues to be legally accountable to the state legislature, Harvard is nonetheless considered a private university. As such, it is out of a public-spirited orientation that our University treats parts of the campus as the public sphere, where expression is broadly more protected than under the more constrained norms of academic freedom.

Speaking loosely, free speech rights apply in spaces and to events that are both extracurricular and public. These are, of course, fuzzy categories on a campus, hence our confusion.

For example: At the Harvard Kennedy School, the Institute of Politics clearly functions as a public forum, so protests against its speakers that adhere to the “time, place, and manner” restrictions on free speech on our campus can be expected and must be respected there.

Other public speaker events also fall into this category, as does speech that takes place in our outdoor public space. But what about key campus rituals — from Commencement, or Match Day in the medical school, or weekly Community Teas at the Divinity School?

To address these edge cases, we rely on the following principle: Wherever spaces and events are integral to academic work and experience, they should be off-limits to disruption.

But perhaps this rules out too much? With our harsh winters, for instance, perhaps we need indoor spaces that can serve as public forums, with sensible restrictions?

Such questions deserve our more direct attention. Maybe we need a campus map that identifies places and hours where free speech rights, rather than the protocols of academic freedom, apply.

Still, even under free speech norms, it’s not the case that anything goes. The fifth value in the University’s values statement assigns us “responsibility for the bonds and bridges that enable all to grow with and learn from one another.” As an ethical matter, this value should govern how we choose to express our political views.

Even when we passionately pursue a political cause, using public spaces at Harvard to do so, including Harvard-linked online fora, we do that as a member of this campus community, in compact and covenant with everyone else here.

We cannot forget: Our use of these spaces is a privilege. We should pay for that privilege by taking responsibility for using them in ways that sustain healthy relationships with one another.

Danielle Allen is the James Bryant Conant University Professor at Harvard University and director of the Allen Lab for Democracy Renovation.

This piece is the second installment in a series that will identify and assess the difficult ethical questions surfaced by Harvard’s recent leadership crisis.

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Freedom of speech and LGBT rights: Americans’ views of issues in Supreme Court case

A majority of Americans think business owners should be able to refuse to provide services in situations where providing them may “suggest support for beliefs about lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender (LGBT) issues” to which they have personal or religious objections, according to a new Pew Research Center survey.

Pew Research Center conducted this analysis to provide insight into Americans’ views about a prominent issue currently before the U.S. Supreme Court. We surveyed 5,079 adults from March 27 to April 2, 2023. Everyone who took part in this survey is a member of the Center’s American Trends Panel (ATP), an online survey panel that is recruited through national, random sampling of residential addresses. This way nearly all U.S. adults have a chance of selection. The survey is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by gender, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education and other categories. Read more about the ATP’s methodology .

Here are the questions used for the report, along with responses, and its methodology .

In earlier surveys, the public has expressed positive views of the impact of legalization of same-sex marriage and broad support for policies aimed at preventing discrimination against transgender Americans.

But in a question reflecting the arguments in a pending Supreme Court case, 60% of Americans think business owners should not have to provide services if it might signal support for beliefs on LGBT issues that they oppose, according to the survey conducted in early April. Around four-in-ten (38%) say business owners should be required to provide services in these situations.

The Supreme Court case centers on a challenge to Colorado’s public accommodations law by website designer Lorie Smith, who says the law violates her right to freedom of speech by requiring her to design wedding websites for same-sex couples.

The oral arguments in the case highlighted the competing rights at issue. Smith’s attorney said her client’s complaint is based on the message being conveyed by her work, not the customers who may be affected. However, Colorado’s solicitor general said that by ruling in favor of Smith, the court would undermine the state’s accommodations law and open the door to discrimination because of a person’s race or religion, in addition to their sexual or gender identity.

The survey question does not ask whether business owners should have the right to discriminate against lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender people. Rather, it asks whether business owners who object to providing services that could suggest beliefs on LGBT issues – such as a “designer of wedding websites who has objections to same-sex marriage” – should be required to provide these services or be able to refuse to do so.

Views by party, religion

As with opinions on same-sex marriage and transgender issues, there is a wide partisan gap in views of whether business owners should be able to refuse to provide services if it conflicts with their views on LGBT issues. Republican and Republican-leaning independents overwhelmingly side with business owners who object to providing services in these situations (82% vs. 17%). By a smaller margin (59% to 40%), Democrats and Democratic leaners say business owners should have to provide services in these cases.

Opinions also differ by religious affiliation. For example, while 83% of White evangelical Protestants say business owners should be able to deny services in situations where it could conflict with their beliefs, just half of religiously unaffiliated adults say the same.

Note: Here are the questions used for the report, along with responses, and its methodology .

• Free Speech & Press
• Gender & LGBTQ
• LGBTQ Acceptance
• Partisanship & Issues
• Religion & LGBTQ Acceptance
• Religious Freedom & Restrictions

Jane Doe is a a research analyst focusing on social and demographic research at Pew Research Center

Carroll Doherty is director of political research at Pew Research Center

Most Americans say a free press is highly important to society

­most americans favor restrictions on false information, violent content online, most u.s. journalists are concerned about press freedoms, the role of alternative social media in the news and information environment, more so than adults, u.s. teens value people feeling safe online over being able to speak freely, most popular.

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Student Opinion

How Should Colleges Handle Student Protests?

Where is the line between protecting students’ right to freedom of expression and ensuring their safety and ability to get an education?

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By Natalie Proulx

Since the Oct. 7 surprise attack in which Hamas killed 1,200 Israelis and took hostages — around 100 of whom remain in Gaza — and the start of an Israeli counteroffensive in Gaza that has killed over 33,000 Palestinians, colleges and universities across the United States have been struggling to handle the debate and protests over the war.

In recent weeks, many of those institutions have been clamping down on pro-Palestinian demonstrations, in which students have been seeking their universities’ divestment from companies with ties to Israel and a cease-fire in Israel’s war in Gaza. On Monday morning, nearly 50 people were arrested at Yale University in New Haven, Conn., following the arrests last week of more than 100 protesters at Columbia University in New York City. The arrests unleashed a wave of activism across other campuses, including the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the University of Michigan and Stanford University.

Have you been following this story? Have you witnessed demonstrations at college campuses near you? If not, before reading the article below, scroll through these photos and videos of the protests. What do you notice? What questions do you have? What is your initial reaction to what you see?

In “ Colleges Warn Student Demonstrators: Enough ,” Jeremy W. Peters writes about how some universities have begun to take harsher measures against student protesters:

After years of often loose enforcement of their own rules, some of the country’s most high-profile academic institutions are getting bolder, suspending and in some cases expelling students. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, New York University and Brown University have recently taken swift and decisive action against student protesters, including making arrests . And on Thursday, Columbia University hit its limit with student protesters who had set up dozens of tents on campus, sending in the New York Police Department to make arrests. The arrests followed congressional testimony on Wednesday, in which the president of Columbia, Nemat Shafik, said the school had delivered an unambiguous message to students that misconduct would not be tolerated. College officials are driven by criticism from alumni, donors and Republican lawmakers, but in interviews they also described a gnawing sense that civility on campus has broken down. They say that lately, some student protests have become so disruptive that they not only are interfering with their ability to provide an education, but they also have left many students, particularly Jewish ones, fearing for their safety. Recalibrating isn’t necessarily easy, as many universities are learning. Efforts by administrators to claw back some of their authority over campus demonstrations are being met with pushback from students, faculty and civil liberties groups who say a university’s role is to foster debate — even if it’s messy, rude and disruptive — not attempt to smother it. Campus activists said the aggressive enforcement of the student disciplinary process by universities is a new and concerning development. “This is an escalation,” said Rosy Fitzgerald of the Institute for Middle East Understanding, a nonprofit that is tracking how schools are responding to student demonstrators. Suspensions and expulsions “didn’t used to be a tactic,” she said. “But now we’re seeing that as an immediate response.” In her congressional testimony, Dr. Shafik revealed that 15 Columbia students have been suspended in recent weeks. She also said the school had for the first time in 50 years made the decision to ask the N.Y.P.D. to assist with protests. Vanderbilt University issued what are believed to be the first student expulsions over protests related to the Israel-Hamas conflict. More than two dozen demonstrators stormed the university president’s office — injuring a security guard and shattering a window — and occupied it for more than 20 hours. Vanderbilt suspended every student involved in the demonstration. Three were expelled. Student protests have a history of being disruptive and occasionally violent, from the Vietnam War era to today. Since Donald J. Trump’s election in 2016, many campuses have become especially volatile places, seeing an increase in angry demonstrations over conservative speakers, some of whom have been disinvited out of fear for their safety. The Oct. 7 Hamas attack on Israel has sparked another wave of protests, which university administrators and free speech advocates say poses new challenges. In interviews, they described encountering students who were unwilling to engage with administrators when invited to do so, quick to use aggressive and sometimes physical forms of expression, and often wore masks to conceal their identities.

Students, read the entire article and then tell us:

Now that you’ve looked at images and read more about these protests, what are your reactions to the student demonstrations and schools’ attempts to clamp down on them?

Have there been protests or demonstrations at your school about the Israel-Hamas war or any other issues? If so, how did your administration respond? Do you think it handled the situation well? What, if anything, do you think your school should have done differently?

According to the article, some students, faculty and civil liberties groups say that “a university’s role is to foster debate — even if it’s messy, rude and disruptive — not attempt to smother it.” To what extent do you agree with that point of view? Why?

When, if ever, do you think a school or university should step in to manage or stop student protests, demonstrations or debates? For example, according to the article, college officials have said that some of the protests have left many students, particularly Jewish ones, fearing for their safety. And the federal government has opened discrimination investigations into half a dozen universities following complaints about antisemitic and anti-Muslim harassment. Where is the line between protecting students’ right to freedom of expression and ensuring their safety and ability to get an education?

Do you think suspensions, expulsions and arrests are an appropriate response from schools given the tenor of some of these protests? If you were a decision maker at one of these universities, what would you be weighing to decide how to respond?

Colleges, universities and schools have long been sites of protest and activism, over causes including the Vietnam War and, in recent years, gun violence and the Black Lives Matter movement . Why do you think that is? What role do young people have to play in political issues like these?

What would you want your teachers, school administrators, parents or other adults to know about what it’s like to be a student during this conflict and navigating the fraught emotions and passionate protests it has brought on?

Students 13 and older in the United States and Britain, and 16 and older elsewhere, are invited to comment. All comments are moderated by the Learning Network staff, but please keep in mind that once your comment is accepted, it will be made public and may appear in print.

Find more Student Opinion questions here. Teachers, check out this guide to learn how you can incorporate these prompts into your classroom.

Natalie Proulx joined The Learning Network as a staff editor in 2017 after working as an English language arts teacher and curriculum writer. More about Natalie Proulx

Ohio State faculty adviser: Student protest arrests show start of 'A wave of repression'

Two Ohio State University students were arrested Tuesday and charged with misdemeanor criminal trespassing during an on-campus demonstration.

Ohio State University police officers arrested the students at Meiling Hall, a classroom and administrative building near the Wexner Medical Center, according to police reports. About 60 individuals had gathered to protest the Hamas-Israel war in Gaza and fossil fuel divestment.

The Dispatch is not naming the students, as they have not been charged with a felony. One student, a sociology major, is a member of Ohio Youth for Climate Justice, and the other is a journalism major and a member of OSU's Students for Justice in Palestine chapter.

Police said the students "failed to leave the area and failed to stop disrupting" an event being held in the building's lobby.

I am no longer a proud Buckeye. Ohio State president using dog whistle to muzzle free speech

A video posted by student organizers shows a group of protesters gathered on the steps outside Meiling Hall wearing pro-Palestine shirts and chanting "Free Palestine." In the video, an OSU police officer walks down the steps, points at a student, turns back to give a thumbs up to other officers before three officers walked the individual up the steps and into custody.

Another video showed about a dozen police officers and university officials blocking the building's entrance and pushing a student after officers pulled the student inside the building's safety vestibule.

What happened at Tuesday's protest at Ohio State?

Isabella Guinigundo — an Ohio State fourth-year student and communications director of Ohio Youth for Climate Justice, a statewide organization that advocates for environmental justice — said the protest was organized by several groups. It was meant to be Ohio Youth for Climate Justice's last event of the semester.

Guinigundo said students initially gathered at Mirror Lake and were met by Office of Student Life employees and OSU police officers, who warned them that there would be "no tolerance for amplified noise" because it was Reading Day, a day on the academic calendar before exams begin for students to study. They were also told they could only chant outdoors, she said.

Guinigundo said the students chose not to use the megaphones and loud speakers they brought to comply with the rules. The group eventually marched to Meiling Hall, where the OSU Wexner Medical Center Board of Trustees' Quality and Professional Affairs committee was meeting.

The group held its own "People's Board Meeting" outside the building, Guinigundo said. At some point, she said police officers told the group it could be heard from inside the building's lobby. One was arrested shortly after the warning.

Ben Johnson, a university spokesman, said the students received "multiple warnings" before their arrest that they were being too loud. The two students who were arrested were individuals who "continued at the same volume" after being warned, he said.

"Well established university policy prohibits disrupting the university’s mission, administrative functions and campus-life activities. This includes demonstrations that disrupt classroom and administrative buildings," Johnson said.

Disruptive noise, according to the university's space rules, includes, but is not limited to: amplified sound, other loud noise that is audible more than 50 feet from the source of the sound and/or noise occurring during the restricted hours above.

Guinigundo said most protesters took a step back from the doors to regroup when police arrested another student.

Johnson said it was "only when warnings weren't heeded" that students were arrested.

"Ohio State has an unwavering commitment to freedom of speech and took this action in alignment with our space use rules to provide for the orderly conduct of university business," Johnson said.

Ohio State students, faculty say police 'wanted to make an example'

Sumaya Hamadmad, an Ohio State research scientist, attended the protest as a member of the Faculty and Staff for Justice in Palestine group. She said students complied with all rules given by university officials. They were so quiet at times, she said, she could barely hear what was being said to the group.

"You could hear more noise on a regular school day," she said. "This was meant to intimidate students."

Guinigundo agreed.

"OSUPD wanted to make an example out of our organizations," she said.

Pranav Jani, faculty adviser for Students for Justice in Palestine and an associate professor of English at Ohio State, said he believes "Ohio State has been laying the groundwork for these arrests for a long time."

"A wave of repression is starting, and we can expect it to get worse," he said.

Jani said Ohio State has suspended a student group, charged individual students under the university's code of conduct for nonviolent protests and "has basically accused students of inciting violence and hate." He said he's been in meetings with administrators and students for weeks, "and while private sympathies are expressed, actions and arrests speak louder than words."

Hamadmad said she is worried that universities calling police officers on their own students, like what is happening with student protesters at Columbia University , is setting dangerous precedent.

"Ohio State, like universities around the country, has failed to protect or even show basic empathy for their Palestinian and pro-Palestinian students and faculty, which include Muslim, Arab, Jewish, Christian and many others," Jani said. "It’s a damn shame."

Ohio State president said university will 'continue to prioritize safety'

The arrests come a day after Ohio State President Ted Carter said in an end-of-the-semester email that he respects students' right to freedom of speech, but "will not compromise" on matters of safety.

Ohio State will "continue to prioritize safety," Carter said in the email, including having university police officers and trained staff on-site for demonstrations, and enforcing space rules that prohibit "intentional disruptions of university events, classes, exams or programming, including commencement."

OSU's spring commencement is May 5 at Ohio Stadium.

Johnson said he is "cautiously optimistic that people will by and large be respectful" at protests as the semester draws to a close.

Guinigundo said protesters appreciate the support they've received, but she hopes people remember the reason they are protesting in the first place.

"Our hearts should be with Gaza," she said.

Sheridan Hendrix is a higher education reporter for The Columbus Dispatch. Sign up for Extra Credit, her education newsletter,  here .

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The politics of sedition

Long afflicted with foot-in-mouth syndrome, Davao del Norte Rep. Pantaleon Alvarez kicked a hornets’ nest two Sundays ago by asking the military and police to withdraw their support from President Marcos to force him to abdicate the presidency.

Unfortunately for the Mindanao lawmaker, a one-time Speaker, his call was greeted with brickbats instead of bouquets.

The Department of Justice (DOJ) has launched an investigation on Alvarez’s possibly seditious words, while the Department of National Defense eyes a parallel inquiry.

By turns defiant and apologetic, Alvarez has tried to walk back his comments by invoking free speech, while the Duterte family, the likely beneficiary of his incendiary proposal, sit grimly on the sidelines, protected by a political alliance that teeters on the edge of collapse.

Brink of war

Speaking at the April 14 rally in Tagum City in support of former president Rodrigo Duterte, his long-time ally, Alvarez had warned that the administration’s stance on China was pushing the country to the brink of war.

“When trouble breaks out in the West Philippine Sea, there will be countless dead bodies. There would be unimaginable destruction, famine, hunger,” he said, addressing the troops. “If you withdraw support from him, he will have nothing else to do but step down.”

Right on cue, Mr. Marcos’ allies came running to his defense. Justice Secretary Jesus Crispin Remulla said the DOJ would determine “whether [Alvarez’s call] has risen to the level of sedition, inciting to sedition or even rebellion.” Defense Secretary Gilbert Teodoro Jr. warned that such a call “will not amount to anything but a possible criminal investigation.” A House inquiry is in the works, and there is talk that Alvarez, a Marine reservist, might be stripped of his rank.

Freedom of speech clause

Last Tuesday, Alvarez said he had been overcome by emotion at the prospect of “being dragged to war by Malacañang.”

“I love the Philippines, especially Mindanao. How could I keep quiet?” he said, arguing that his speech was not seditious at all, “because it is protected by the freedom of speech clause of the 1987 Constitution.”

That is rich coming from someone who spent his entire term as Speaker trying to revise the Constitution, and doubly so, from the one who threatened to oust the sitting vice president in 2017 for the crime of criticizing the drug war before a United Nations body.

At the time, Alvarez had blustered on television: “Yes, it’s true she (Leni Robredo) is entitled to freedom of speech. But it does not exempt any official from an irresponsible act.”

In a breathtaking display of karmic retribution, the Davao lawmaker’s own words have come back to haunt him, this time, under a government that’s not as keen to coddle him as the last one.

A textbook example

The Revised Penal Code defines inciting to sedition as an offense committed by “any person who, without taking any direct part in the crime of sedition, should incite others to the accomplishment of any of the acts which constitute sedition, by means of speeches, proclamations, writings … or other representations.”

At face value, it would appear Alvarez’s comments are a textbook example of this, although, of course, such a determination could only be made by state prosecutors, and ultimately, the judiciary.

That said, other people have been taken to court for less. Former senator Antonio Trillanes IV, a constant target of similar complaints, was indicted on an inciting-to-sedition charge six years ago for telling the military and police in September 2018, that “Duterte will not be there for long; please do not do anything illegal or unconstitutional.”

From just the sound of it, such rhetoric might well have belonged to the pages of Alvarez’s own speech.

Duterte’s veiled threats

But one can hardly dismiss Alvarez’s comments as silly ramblings when Duterte himself and his other loyalists have uttered similar remarks.

In November, the former president admitted talking to retired generals and, at one point, threatened his foes in the House leadership: “I am not scaring you, but watch the military and the police closely.” In February, Duterte batted for a “separate and independent Mindanao,” with the caveat that “it is not a rebellion, not a bloody one.” In March, his ex-legal counsel Salvador Panelo warned during a Manila rally: “The day will come when the people who installed you will be the ones to remove you.”

Through all these, nary a peep was heard from the government, for the privilege Duterte enjoys over Alvarez is not because of his identity as the former president but because of his identity as the father of the President’s constitutional successor.

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On that score alone, it is sheer folly on the part of the Marcos administration to ignore Alvarez’s spoken warning, but it would be utter madness to ignore Duterte’s veiled threats.

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