problem solving as a method of teaching is supported by which philosophical thought

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Critical Thinking

Critical thinking is a widely accepted educational goal. Its definition is contested, but the competing definitions can be understood as differing conceptions of the same basic concept: careful thinking directed to a goal. Conceptions differ with respect to the scope of such thinking, the type of goal, the criteria and norms for thinking carefully, and the thinking components on which they focus. Its adoption as an educational goal has been recommended on the basis of respect for students’ autonomy and preparing students for success in life and for democratic citizenship. “Critical thinkers” have the dispositions and abilities that lead them to think critically when appropriate. The abilities can be identified directly; the dispositions indirectly, by considering what factors contribute to or impede exercise of the abilities. Standardized tests have been developed to assess the degree to which a person possesses such dispositions and abilities. Educational intervention has been shown experimentally to improve them, particularly when it includes dialogue, anchored instruction, and mentoring. Controversies have arisen over the generalizability of critical thinking across domains, over alleged bias in critical thinking theories and instruction, and over the relationship of critical thinking to other types of thinking.

2.1 Dewey’s Three Main Examples

2.2 dewey’s other examples, 2.3 further examples, 2.4 non-examples, 3. the definition of critical thinking, 4. its value, 5. the process of thinking critically, 6. components of the process, 7. contributory dispositions and abilities, 8.1 initiating dispositions, 8.2 internal dispositions, 9. critical thinking abilities, 10. required knowledge, 11. educational methods, 12.1 the generalizability of critical thinking, 12.2 bias in critical thinking theory and pedagogy, 12.3 relationship of critical thinking to other types of thinking, other internet resources, related entries.

Use of the term ‘critical thinking’ to describe an educational goal goes back to the American philosopher John Dewey (1910), who more commonly called it ‘reflective thinking’. He defined it as

active, persistent and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it, and the further conclusions to which it tends. (Dewey 1910: 6; 1933: 9)

and identified a habit of such consideration with a scientific attitude of mind. His lengthy quotations of Francis Bacon, John Locke, and John Stuart Mill indicate that he was not the first person to propose development of a scientific attitude of mind as an educational goal.

In the 1930s, many of the schools that participated in the Eight-Year Study of the Progressive Education Association (Aikin 1942) adopted critical thinking as an educational goal, for whose achievement the study’s Evaluation Staff developed tests (Smith, Tyler, & Evaluation Staff 1942). Glaser (1941) showed experimentally that it was possible to improve the critical thinking of high school students. Bloom’s influential taxonomy of cognitive educational objectives (Bloom et al. 1956) incorporated critical thinking abilities. Ennis (1962) proposed 12 aspects of critical thinking as a basis for research on the teaching and evaluation of critical thinking ability.

Since 1980, an annual international conference in California on critical thinking and educational reform has attracted tens of thousands of educators from all levels of education and from many parts of the world. Also since 1980, the state university system in California has required all undergraduate students to take a critical thinking course. Since 1983, the Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking has sponsored sessions in conjunction with the divisional meetings of the American Philosophical Association (APA). In 1987, the APA’s Committee on Pre-College Philosophy commissioned a consensus statement on critical thinking for purposes of educational assessment and instruction (Facione 1990a). Researchers have developed standardized tests of critical thinking abilities and dispositions; for details, see the Supplement on Assessment . Educational jurisdictions around the world now include critical thinking in guidelines for curriculum and assessment.

For details on this history, see the Supplement on History .

2. Examples and Non-Examples

Before considering the definition of critical thinking, it will be helpful to have in mind some examples of critical thinking, as well as some examples of kinds of thinking that would apparently not count as critical thinking.

Dewey (1910: 68–71; 1933: 91–94) takes as paradigms of reflective thinking three class papers of students in which they describe their thinking. The examples range from the everyday to the scientific.

Transit : “The other day, when I was down town on 16th Street, a clock caught my eye. I saw that the hands pointed to 12:20. This suggested that I had an engagement at 124th Street, at one o’clock. I reasoned that as it had taken me an hour to come down on a surface car, I should probably be twenty minutes late if I returned the same way. I might save twenty minutes by a subway express. But was there a station near? If not, I might lose more than twenty minutes in looking for one. Then I thought of the elevated, and I saw there was such a line within two blocks. But where was the station? If it were several blocks above or below the street I was on, I should lose time instead of gaining it. My mind went back to the subway express as quicker than the elevated; furthermore, I remembered that it went nearer than the elevated to the part of 124th Street I wished to reach, so that time would be saved at the end of the journey. I concluded in favor of the subway, and reached my destination by one o’clock.” (Dewey 1910: 68–69; 1933: 91–92)

Ferryboat : “Projecting nearly horizontally from the upper deck of the ferryboat on which I daily cross the river is a long white pole, having a gilded ball at its tip. It suggested a flagpole when I first saw it; its color, shape, and gilded ball agreed with this idea, and these reasons seemed to justify me in this belief. But soon difficulties presented themselves. The pole was nearly horizontal, an unusual position for a flagpole; in the next place, there was no pulley, ring, or cord by which to attach a flag; finally, there were elsewhere on the boat two vertical staffs from which flags were occasionally flown. It seemed probable that the pole was not there for flag-flying.

“I then tried to imagine all possible purposes of the pole, and to consider for which of these it was best suited: (a) Possibly it was an ornament. But as all the ferryboats and even the tugboats carried poles, this hypothesis was rejected. (b) Possibly it was the terminal of a wireless telegraph. But the same considerations made this improbable. Besides, the more natural place for such a terminal would be the highest part of the boat, on top of the pilot house. (c) Its purpose might be to point out the direction in which the boat is moving.

“In support of this conclusion, I discovered that the pole was lower than the pilot house, so that the steersman could easily see it. Moreover, the tip was enough higher than the base, so that, from the pilot’s position, it must appear to project far out in front of the boat. Moreover, the pilot being near the front of the boat, he would need some such guide as to its direction. Tugboats would also need poles for such a purpose. This hypothesis was so much more probable than the others that I accepted it. I formed the conclusion that the pole was set up for the purpose of showing the pilot the direction in which the boat pointed, to enable him to steer correctly.” (Dewey 1910: 69–70; 1933: 92–93)

Bubbles : “In washing tumblers in hot soapsuds and placing them mouth downward on a plate, bubbles appeared on the outside of the mouth of the tumblers and then went inside. Why? The presence of bubbles suggests air, which I note must come from inside the tumbler. I see that the soapy water on the plate prevents escape of the air save as it may be caught in bubbles. But why should air leave the tumbler? There was no substance entering to force it out. It must have expanded. It expands by increase of heat, or by decrease of pressure, or both. Could the air have become heated after the tumbler was taken from the hot suds? Clearly not the air that was already entangled in the water. If heated air was the cause, cold air must have entered in transferring the tumblers from the suds to the plate. I test to see if this supposition is true by taking several more tumblers out. Some I shake so as to make sure of entrapping cold air in them. Some I take out holding mouth downward in order to prevent cold air from entering. Bubbles appear on the outside of every one of the former and on none of the latter. I must be right in my inference. Air from the outside must have been expanded by the heat of the tumbler, which explains the appearance of the bubbles on the outside. But why do they then go inside? Cold contracts. The tumbler cooled and also the air inside it. Tension was removed, and hence bubbles appeared inside. To be sure of this, I test by placing a cup of ice on the tumbler while the bubbles are still forming outside. They soon reverse” (Dewey 1910: 70–71; 1933: 93–94).

Dewey (1910, 1933) sprinkles his book with other examples of critical thinking. We will refer to the following.

Weather : A man on a walk notices that it has suddenly become cool, thinks that it is probably going to rain, looks up and sees a dark cloud obscuring the sun, and quickens his steps (1910: 6–10; 1933: 9–13).

Disorder : A man finds his rooms on his return to them in disorder with his belongings thrown about, thinks at first of burglary as an explanation, then thinks of mischievous children as being an alternative explanation, then looks to see whether valuables are missing, and discovers that they are (1910: 82–83; 1933: 166–168).

Typhoid : A physician diagnosing a patient whose conspicuous symptoms suggest typhoid avoids drawing a conclusion until more data are gathered by questioning the patient and by making tests (1910: 85–86; 1933: 170).

Blur : A moving blur catches our eye in the distance, we ask ourselves whether it is a cloud of whirling dust or a tree moving its branches or a man signaling to us, we think of other traits that should be found on each of those possibilities, and we look and see if those traits are found (1910: 102, 108; 1933: 121, 133).

Suction pump : In thinking about the suction pump, the scientist first notes that it will draw water only to a maximum height of 33 feet at sea level and to a lesser maximum height at higher elevations, selects for attention the differing atmospheric pressure at these elevations, sets up experiments in which the air is removed from a vessel containing water (when suction no longer works) and in which the weight of air at various levels is calculated, compares the results of reasoning about the height to which a given weight of air will allow a suction pump to raise water with the observed maximum height at different elevations, and finally assimilates the suction pump to such apparently different phenomena as the siphon and the rising of a balloon (1910: 150–153; 1933: 195–198).

Diamond : A passenger in a car driving in a diamond lane reserved for vehicles with at least one passenger notices that the diamond marks on the pavement are far apart in some places and close together in others. Why? The driver suggests that the reason may be that the diamond marks are not needed where there is a solid double line separating the diamond lane from the adjoining lane, but are needed when there is a dotted single line permitting crossing into the diamond lane. Further observation confirms that the diamonds are close together when a dotted line separates the diamond lane from its neighbour, but otherwise far apart.

Rash : A woman suddenly develops a very itchy red rash on her throat and upper chest. She recently noticed a mark on the back of her right hand, but was not sure whether the mark was a rash or a scrape. She lies down in bed and thinks about what might be causing the rash and what to do about it. About two weeks before, she began taking blood pressure medication that contained a sulfa drug, and the pharmacist had warned her, in view of a previous allergic reaction to a medication containing a sulfa drug, to be on the alert for an allergic reaction; however, she had been taking the medication for two weeks with no such effect. The day before, she began using a new cream on her neck and upper chest; against the new cream as the cause was mark on the back of her hand, which had not been exposed to the cream. She began taking probiotics about a month before. She also recently started new eye drops, but she supposed that manufacturers of eye drops would be careful not to include allergy-causing components in the medication. The rash might be a heat rash, since she recently was sweating profusely from her upper body. Since she is about to go away on a short vacation, where she would not have access to her usual physician, she decides to keep taking the probiotics and using the new eye drops but to discontinue the blood pressure medication and to switch back to the old cream for her neck and upper chest. She forms a plan to consult her regular physician on her return about the blood pressure medication.

Candidate : Although Dewey included no examples of thinking directed at appraising the arguments of others, such thinking has come to be considered a kind of critical thinking. We find an example of such thinking in the performance task on the Collegiate Learning Assessment (CLA+), which its sponsoring organization describes as

a performance-based assessment that provides a measure of an institution’s contribution to the development of critical-thinking and written communication skills of its students. (Council for Aid to Education 2017)

A sample task posted on its website requires the test-taker to write a report for public distribution evaluating a fictional candidate’s policy proposals and their supporting arguments, using supplied background documents, with a recommendation on whether to endorse the candidate.

Immediate acceptance of an idea that suggests itself as a solution to a problem (e.g., a possible explanation of an event or phenomenon, an action that seems likely to produce a desired result) is “uncritical thinking, the minimum of reflection” (Dewey 1910: 13). On-going suspension of judgment in the light of doubt about a possible solution is not critical thinking (Dewey 1910: 108). Critique driven by a dogmatically held political or religious ideology is not critical thinking; thus Paulo Freire (1968 [1970]) is using the term (e.g., at 1970: 71, 81, 100, 146) in a more politically freighted sense that includes not only reflection but also revolutionary action against oppression. Derivation of a conclusion from given data using an algorithm is not critical thinking.

What is critical thinking? There are many definitions. Ennis (2016) lists 14 philosophically oriented scholarly definitions and three dictionary definitions. Following Rawls (1971), who distinguished his conception of justice from a utilitarian conception but regarded them as rival conceptions of the same concept, Ennis maintains that the 17 definitions are different conceptions of the same concept. Rawls articulated the shared concept of justice as

a characteristic set of principles for assigning basic rights and duties and for determining… the proper distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation. (Rawls 1971: 5)

Bailin et al. (1999b) claim that, if one considers what sorts of thinking an educator would take not to be critical thinking and what sorts to be critical thinking, one can conclude that educators typically understand critical thinking to have at least three features.

• It is done for the purpose of making up one’s mind about what to believe or do.
• The person engaging in the thinking is trying to fulfill standards of adequacy and accuracy appropriate to the thinking.
• The thinking fulfills the relevant standards to some threshold level.

One could sum up the core concept that involves these three features by saying that critical thinking is careful goal-directed thinking. This core concept seems to apply to all the examples of critical thinking described in the previous section. As for the non-examples, their exclusion depends on construing careful thinking as excluding jumping immediately to conclusions, suspending judgment no matter how strong the evidence, reasoning from an unquestioned ideological or religious perspective, and routinely using an algorithm to answer a question.

If the core of critical thinking is careful goal-directed thinking, conceptions of it can vary according to its presumed scope, its presumed goal, one’s criteria and threshold for being careful, and the thinking component on which one focuses. As to its scope, some conceptions (e.g., Dewey 1910, 1933) restrict it to constructive thinking on the basis of one’s own observations and experiments, others (e.g., Ennis 1962; Fisher & Scriven 1997; Johnson 1992) to appraisal of the products of such thinking. Ennis (1991) and Bailin et al. (1999b) take it to cover both construction and appraisal. As to its goal, some conceptions restrict it to forming a judgment (Dewey 1910, 1933; Lipman 1987; Facione 1990a). Others allow for actions as well as beliefs as the end point of a process of critical thinking (Ennis 1991; Bailin et al. 1999b). As to the criteria and threshold for being careful, definitions vary in the term used to indicate that critical thinking satisfies certain norms: “intellectually disciplined” (Scriven & Paul 1987), “reasonable” (Ennis 1991), “skillful” (Lipman 1987), “skilled” (Fisher & Scriven 1997), “careful” (Bailin & Battersby 2009). Some definitions specify these norms, referring variously to “consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it and the further conclusions to which it tends” (Dewey 1910, 1933); “the methods of logical inquiry and reasoning” (Glaser 1941); “conceptualizing, applying, analyzing, synthesizing, and/or evaluating information gathered from, or generated by, observation, experience, reflection, reasoning, or communication” (Scriven & Paul 1987); the requirement that “it is sensitive to context, relies on criteria, and is self-correcting” (Lipman 1987); “evidential, conceptual, methodological, criteriological, or contextual considerations” (Facione 1990a); and “plus-minus considerations of the product in terms of appropriate standards (or criteria)” (Johnson 1992). Stanovich and Stanovich (2010) propose to ground the concept of critical thinking in the concept of rationality, which they understand as combining epistemic rationality (fitting one’s beliefs to the world) and instrumental rationality (optimizing goal fulfillment); a critical thinker, in their view, is someone with “a propensity to override suboptimal responses from the autonomous mind” (2010: 227). These variant specifications of norms for critical thinking are not necessarily incompatible with one another, and in any case presuppose the core notion of thinking carefully. As to the thinking component singled out, some definitions focus on suspension of judgment during the thinking (Dewey 1910; McPeck 1981), others on inquiry while judgment is suspended (Bailin & Battersby 2009, 2021), others on the resulting judgment (Facione 1990a), and still others on responsiveness to reasons (Siegel 1988). Kuhn (2019) takes critical thinking to be more a dialogic practice of advancing and responding to arguments than an individual ability.

In educational contexts, a definition of critical thinking is a “programmatic definition” (Scheffler 1960: 19). It expresses a practical program for achieving an educational goal. For this purpose, a one-sentence formulaic definition is much less useful than articulation of a critical thinking process, with criteria and standards for the kinds of thinking that the process may involve. The real educational goal is recognition, adoption and implementation by students of those criteria and standards. That adoption and implementation in turn consists in acquiring the knowledge, abilities and dispositions of a critical thinker.

Conceptions of critical thinking generally do not include moral integrity as part of the concept. Dewey, for example, took critical thinking to be the ultimate intellectual goal of education, but distinguished it from the development of social cooperation among school children, which he took to be the central moral goal. Ennis (1996, 2011) added to his previous list of critical thinking dispositions a group of dispositions to care about the dignity and worth of every person, which he described as a “correlative” (1996) disposition without which critical thinking would be less valuable and perhaps harmful. An educational program that aimed at developing critical thinking but not the correlative disposition to care about the dignity and worth of every person, he asserted, “would be deficient and perhaps dangerous” (Ennis 1996: 172).

Dewey thought that education for reflective thinking would be of value to both the individual and society; recognition in educational practice of the kinship to the scientific attitude of children’s native curiosity, fertile imagination and love of experimental inquiry “would make for individual happiness and the reduction of social waste” (Dewey 1910: iii). Schools participating in the Eight-Year Study took development of the habit of reflective thinking and skill in solving problems as a means to leading young people to understand, appreciate and live the democratic way of life characteristic of the United States (Aikin 1942: 17–18, 81). Harvey Siegel (1988: 55–61) has offered four considerations in support of adopting critical thinking as an educational ideal. (1) Respect for persons requires that schools and teachers honour students’ demands for reasons and explanations, deal with students honestly, and recognize the need to confront students’ independent judgment; these requirements concern the manner in which teachers treat students. (2) Education has the task of preparing children to be successful adults, a task that requires development of their self-sufficiency. (3) Education should initiate children into the rational traditions in such fields as history, science and mathematics. (4) Education should prepare children to become democratic citizens, which requires reasoned procedures and critical talents and attitudes. To supplement these considerations, Siegel (1988: 62–90) responds to two objections: the ideology objection that adoption of any educational ideal requires a prior ideological commitment and the indoctrination objection that cultivation of critical thinking cannot escape being a form of indoctrination.

Despite the diversity of our 11 examples, one can recognize a common pattern. Dewey analyzed it as consisting of five phases:

• suggestions , in which the mind leaps forward to a possible solution;
• an intellectualization of the difficulty or perplexity into a problem to be solved, a question for which the answer must be sought;
• the use of one suggestion after another as a leading idea, or hypothesis , to initiate and guide observation and other operations in collection of factual material;
• the mental elaboration of the idea or supposition as an idea or supposition ( reasoning , in the sense on which reasoning is a part, not the whole, of inference); and
• testing the hypothesis by overt or imaginative action. (Dewey 1933: 106–107; italics in original)

The process of reflective thinking consisting of these phases would be preceded by a perplexed, troubled or confused situation and followed by a cleared-up, unified, resolved situation (Dewey 1933: 106). The term ‘phases’ replaced the term ‘steps’ (Dewey 1910: 72), thus removing the earlier suggestion of an invariant sequence. Variants of the above analysis appeared in (Dewey 1916: 177) and (Dewey 1938: 101–119).

The variant formulations indicate the difficulty of giving a single logical analysis of such a varied process. The process of critical thinking may have a spiral pattern, with the problem being redefined in the light of obstacles to solving it as originally formulated. For example, the person in Transit might have concluded that getting to the appointment at the scheduled time was impossible and have reformulated the problem as that of rescheduling the appointment for a mutually convenient time. Further, defining a problem does not always follow after or lead immediately to an idea of a suggested solution. Nor should it do so, as Dewey himself recognized in describing the physician in Typhoid as avoiding any strong preference for this or that conclusion before getting further information (Dewey 1910: 85; 1933: 170). People with a hypothesis in mind, even one to which they have a very weak commitment, have a so-called “confirmation bias” (Nickerson 1998): they are likely to pay attention to evidence that confirms the hypothesis and to ignore evidence that counts against it or for some competing hypothesis. Detectives, intelligence agencies, and investigators of airplane accidents are well advised to gather relevant evidence systematically and to postpone even tentative adoption of an explanatory hypothesis until the collected evidence rules out with the appropriate degree of certainty all but one explanation. Dewey’s analysis of the critical thinking process can be faulted as well for requiring acceptance or rejection of a possible solution to a defined problem, with no allowance for deciding in the light of the available evidence to suspend judgment. Further, given the great variety of kinds of problems for which reflection is appropriate, there is likely to be variation in its component events. Perhaps the best way to conceptualize the critical thinking process is as a checklist whose component events can occur in a variety of orders, selectively, and more than once. These component events might include (1) noticing a difficulty, (2) defining the problem, (3) dividing the problem into manageable sub-problems, (4) formulating a variety of possible solutions to the problem or sub-problem, (5) determining what evidence is relevant to deciding among possible solutions to the problem or sub-problem, (6) devising a plan of systematic observation or experiment that will uncover the relevant evidence, (7) carrying out the plan of systematic observation or experimentation, (8) noting the results of the systematic observation or experiment, (9) gathering relevant testimony and information from others, (10) judging the credibility of testimony and information gathered from others, (11) drawing conclusions from gathered evidence and accepted testimony, and (12) accepting a solution that the evidence adequately supports (cf. Hitchcock 2017: 485).

Checklist conceptions of the process of critical thinking are open to the objection that they are too mechanical and procedural to fit the multi-dimensional and emotionally charged issues for which critical thinking is urgently needed (Paul 1984). For such issues, a more dialectical process is advocated, in which competing relevant world views are identified, their implications explored, and some sort of creative synthesis attempted.

If one considers the critical thinking process illustrated by the 11 examples, one can identify distinct kinds of mental acts and mental states that form part of it. To distinguish, label and briefly characterize these components is a useful preliminary to identifying abilities, skills, dispositions, attitudes, habits and the like that contribute causally to thinking critically. Identifying such abilities and habits is in turn a useful preliminary to setting educational goals. Setting the goals is in its turn a useful preliminary to designing strategies for helping learners to achieve the goals and to designing ways of measuring the extent to which learners have done so. Such measures provide both feedback to learners on their achievement and a basis for experimental research on the effectiveness of various strategies for educating people to think critically. Let us begin, then, by distinguishing the kinds of mental acts and mental events that can occur in a critical thinking process.

• Observing : One notices something in one’s immediate environment (sudden cooling of temperature in Weather , bubbles forming outside a glass and then going inside in Bubbles , a moving blur in the distance in Blur , a rash in Rash ). Or one notes the results of an experiment or systematic observation (valuables missing in Disorder , no suction without air pressure in Suction pump )
• Feeling : One feels puzzled or uncertain about something (how to get to an appointment on time in Transit , why the diamonds vary in spacing in Diamond ). One wants to resolve this perplexity. One feels satisfaction once one has worked out an answer (to take the subway express in Transit , diamonds closer when needed as a warning in Diamond ).
• Wondering : One formulates a question to be addressed (why bubbles form outside a tumbler taken from hot water in Bubbles , how suction pumps work in Suction pump , what caused the rash in Rash ).
• Imagining : One thinks of possible answers (bus or subway or elevated in Transit , flagpole or ornament or wireless communication aid or direction indicator in Ferryboat , allergic reaction or heat rash in Rash ).
• Inferring : One works out what would be the case if a possible answer were assumed (valuables missing if there has been a burglary in Disorder , earlier start to the rash if it is an allergic reaction to a sulfa drug in Rash ). Or one draws a conclusion once sufficient relevant evidence is gathered (take the subway in Transit , burglary in Disorder , discontinue blood pressure medication and new cream in Rash ).
• Knowledge : One uses stored knowledge of the subject-matter to generate possible answers or to infer what would be expected on the assumption of a particular answer (knowledge of a city’s public transit system in Transit , of the requirements for a flagpole in Ferryboat , of Boyle’s law in Bubbles , of allergic reactions in Rash ).
• Experimenting : One designs and carries out an experiment or a systematic observation to find out whether the results deduced from a possible answer will occur (looking at the location of the flagpole in relation to the pilot’s position in Ferryboat , putting an ice cube on top of a tumbler taken from hot water in Bubbles , measuring the height to which a suction pump will draw water at different elevations in Suction pump , noticing the spacing of diamonds when movement to or from a diamond lane is allowed in Diamond ).
• Consulting : One finds a source of information, gets the information from the source, and makes a judgment on whether to accept it. None of our 11 examples include searching for sources of information. In this respect they are unrepresentative, since most people nowadays have almost instant access to information relevant to answering any question, including many of those illustrated by the examples. However, Candidate includes the activities of extracting information from sources and evaluating its credibility.
• Identifying and analyzing arguments : One notices an argument and works out its structure and content as a preliminary to evaluating its strength. This activity is central to Candidate . It is an important part of a critical thinking process in which one surveys arguments for various positions on an issue.
• Judging : One makes a judgment on the basis of accumulated evidence and reasoning, such as the judgment in Ferryboat that the purpose of the pole is to provide direction to the pilot.
• Deciding : One makes a decision on what to do or on what policy to adopt, as in the decision in Transit to take the subway.

By definition, a person who does something voluntarily is both willing and able to do that thing at that time. Both the willingness and the ability contribute causally to the person’s action, in the sense that the voluntary action would not occur if either (or both) of these were lacking. For example, suppose that one is standing with one’s arms at one’s sides and one voluntarily lifts one’s right arm to an extended horizontal position. One would not do so if one were unable to lift one’s arm, if for example one’s right side was paralyzed as the result of a stroke. Nor would one do so if one were unwilling to lift one’s arm, if for example one were participating in a street demonstration at which a white supremacist was urging the crowd to lift their right arm in a Nazi salute and one were unwilling to express support in this way for the racist Nazi ideology. The same analysis applies to a voluntary mental process of thinking critically. It requires both willingness and ability to think critically, including willingness and ability to perform each of the mental acts that compose the process and to coordinate those acts in a sequence that is directed at resolving the initiating perplexity.

Consider willingness first. We can identify causal contributors to willingness to think critically by considering factors that would cause a person who was able to think critically about an issue nevertheless not to do so (Hamby 2014). For each factor, the opposite condition thus contributes causally to willingness to think critically on a particular occasion. For example, people who habitually jump to conclusions without considering alternatives will not think critically about issues that arise, even if they have the required abilities. The contrary condition of willingness to suspend judgment is thus a causal contributor to thinking critically.

Now consider ability. In contrast to the ability to move one’s arm, which can be completely absent because a stroke has left the arm paralyzed, the ability to think critically is a developed ability, whose absence is not a complete absence of ability to think but absence of ability to think well. We can identify the ability to think well directly, in terms of the norms and standards for good thinking. In general, to be able do well the thinking activities that can be components of a critical thinking process, one needs to know the concepts and principles that characterize their good performance, to recognize in particular cases that the concepts and principles apply, and to apply them. The knowledge, recognition and application may be procedural rather than declarative. It may be domain-specific rather than widely applicable, and in either case may need subject-matter knowledge, sometimes of a deep kind.

Reflections of the sort illustrated by the previous two paragraphs have led scholars to identify the knowledge, abilities and dispositions of a “critical thinker”, i.e., someone who thinks critically whenever it is appropriate to do so. We turn now to these three types of causal contributors to thinking critically. We start with dispositions, since arguably these are the most powerful contributors to being a critical thinker, can be fostered at an early stage of a child’s development, and are susceptible to general improvement (Glaser 1941: 175)

8. Critical Thinking Dispositions

Educational researchers use the term ‘dispositions’ broadly for the habits of mind and attitudes that contribute causally to being a critical thinker. Some writers (e.g., Paul & Elder 2006; Hamby 2014; Bailin & Battersby 2016a) propose to use the term ‘virtues’ for this dimension of a critical thinker. The virtues in question, although they are virtues of character, concern the person’s ways of thinking rather than the person’s ways of behaving towards others. They are not moral virtues but intellectual virtues, of the sort articulated by Zagzebski (1996) and discussed by Turri, Alfano, and Greco (2017).

On a realistic conception, thinking dispositions or intellectual virtues are real properties of thinkers. They are general tendencies, propensities, or inclinations to think in particular ways in particular circumstances, and can be genuinely explanatory (Siegel 1999). Sceptics argue that there is no evidence for a specific mental basis for the habits of mind that contribute to thinking critically, and that it is pedagogically misleading to posit such a basis (Bailin et al. 1999a). Whatever their status, critical thinking dispositions need motivation for their initial formation in a child—motivation that may be external or internal. As children develop, the force of habit will gradually become important in sustaining the disposition (Nieto & Valenzuela 2012). Mere force of habit, however, is unlikely to sustain critical thinking dispositions. Critical thinkers must value and enjoy using their knowledge and abilities to think things through for themselves. They must be committed to, and lovers of, inquiry.

A person may have a critical thinking disposition with respect to only some kinds of issues. For example, one could be open-minded about scientific issues but not about religious issues. Similarly, one could be confident in one’s ability to reason about the theological implications of the existence of evil in the world but not in one’s ability to reason about the best design for a guided ballistic missile.

Facione (1990a: 25) divides “affective dispositions” of critical thinking into approaches to life and living in general and approaches to specific issues, questions or problems. Adapting this distinction, one can usefully divide critical thinking dispositions into initiating dispositions (those that contribute causally to starting to think critically about an issue) and internal dispositions (those that contribute causally to doing a good job of thinking critically once one has started). The two categories are not mutually exclusive. For example, open-mindedness, in the sense of willingness to consider alternative points of view to one’s own, is both an initiating and an internal disposition.

Using the strategy of considering factors that would block people with the ability to think critically from doing so, we can identify as initiating dispositions for thinking critically attentiveness, a habit of inquiry, self-confidence, courage, open-mindedness, willingness to suspend judgment, trust in reason, wanting evidence for one’s beliefs, and seeking the truth. We consider briefly what each of these dispositions amounts to, in each case citing sources that acknowledge them.

• Attentiveness : One will not think critically if one fails to recognize an issue that needs to be thought through. For example, the pedestrian in Weather would not have looked up if he had not noticed that the air was suddenly cooler. To be a critical thinker, then, one needs to be habitually attentive to one’s surroundings, noticing not only what one senses but also sources of perplexity in messages received and in one’s own beliefs and attitudes (Facione 1990a: 25; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001).
• Habit of inquiry : Inquiry is effortful, and one needs an internal push to engage in it. For example, the student in Bubbles could easily have stopped at idle wondering about the cause of the bubbles rather than reasoning to a hypothesis, then designing and executing an experiment to test it. Thus willingness to think critically needs mental energy and initiative. What can supply that energy? Love of inquiry, or perhaps just a habit of inquiry. Hamby (2015) has argued that willingness to inquire is the central critical thinking virtue, one that encompasses all the others. It is recognized as a critical thinking disposition by Dewey (1910: 29; 1933: 35), Glaser (1941: 5), Ennis (1987: 12; 1991: 8), Facione (1990a: 25), Bailin et al. (1999b: 294), Halpern (1998: 452), and Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo (2001).
• Self-confidence : Lack of confidence in one’s abilities can block critical thinking. For example, if the woman in Rash lacked confidence in her ability to figure things out for herself, she might just have assumed that the rash on her chest was the allergic reaction to her medication against which the pharmacist had warned her. Thus willingness to think critically requires confidence in one’s ability to inquire (Facione 1990a: 25; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001).
• Courage : Fear of thinking for oneself can stop one from doing it. Thus willingness to think critically requires intellectual courage (Paul & Elder 2006: 16).
• Open-mindedness : A dogmatic attitude will impede thinking critically. For example, a person who adheres rigidly to a “pro-choice” position on the issue of the legal status of induced abortion is likely to be unwilling to consider seriously the issue of when in its development an unborn child acquires a moral right to life. Thus willingness to think critically requires open-mindedness, in the sense of a willingness to examine questions to which one already accepts an answer but which further evidence or reasoning might cause one to answer differently (Dewey 1933; Facione 1990a; Ennis 1991; Bailin et al. 1999b; Halpern 1998, Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001). Paul (1981) emphasizes open-mindedness about alternative world-views, and recommends a dialectical approach to integrating such views as central to what he calls “strong sense” critical thinking. In three studies, Haran, Ritov, & Mellers (2013) found that actively open-minded thinking, including “the tendency to weigh new evidence against a favored belief, to spend sufficient time on a problem before giving up, and to consider carefully the opinions of others in forming one’s own”, led study participants to acquire information and thus to make accurate estimations.
• Willingness to suspend judgment : Premature closure on an initial solution will block critical thinking. Thus willingness to think critically requires a willingness to suspend judgment while alternatives are explored (Facione 1990a; Ennis 1991; Halpern 1998).
• Trust in reason : Since distrust in the processes of reasoned inquiry will dissuade one from engaging in it, trust in them is an initiating critical thinking disposition (Facione 1990a, 25; Bailin et al. 1999b: 294; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001; Paul & Elder 2006). In reaction to an allegedly exclusive emphasis on reason in critical thinking theory and pedagogy, Thayer-Bacon (2000) argues that intuition, imagination, and emotion have important roles to play in an adequate conception of critical thinking that she calls “constructive thinking”. From her point of view, critical thinking requires trust not only in reason but also in intuition, imagination, and emotion.
• Seeking the truth : If one does not care about the truth but is content to stick with one’s initial bias on an issue, then one will not think critically about it. Seeking the truth is thus an initiating critical thinking disposition (Bailin et al. 1999b: 294; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001). A disposition to seek the truth is implicit in more specific critical thinking dispositions, such as trying to be well-informed, considering seriously points of view other than one’s own, looking for alternatives, suspending judgment when the evidence is insufficient, and adopting a position when the evidence supporting it is sufficient.

Some of the initiating dispositions, such as open-mindedness and willingness to suspend judgment, are also internal critical thinking dispositions, in the sense of mental habits or attitudes that contribute causally to doing a good job of critical thinking once one starts the process. But there are many other internal critical thinking dispositions. Some of them are parasitic on one’s conception of good thinking. For example, it is constitutive of good thinking about an issue to formulate the issue clearly and to maintain focus on it. For this purpose, one needs not only the corresponding ability but also the corresponding disposition. Ennis (1991: 8) describes it as the disposition “to determine and maintain focus on the conclusion or question”, Facione (1990a: 25) as “clarity in stating the question or concern”. Other internal dispositions are motivators to continue or adjust the critical thinking process, such as willingness to persist in a complex task and willingness to abandon nonproductive strategies in an attempt to self-correct (Halpern 1998: 452). For a list of identified internal critical thinking dispositions, see the Supplement on Internal Critical Thinking Dispositions .

Some theorists postulate skills, i.e., acquired abilities, as operative in critical thinking. It is not obvious, however, that a good mental act is the exercise of a generic acquired skill. Inferring an expected time of arrival, as in Transit , has some generic components but also uses non-generic subject-matter knowledge. Bailin et al. (1999a) argue against viewing critical thinking skills as generic and discrete, on the ground that skilled performance at a critical thinking task cannot be separated from knowledge of concepts and from domain-specific principles of good thinking. Talk of skills, they concede, is unproblematic if it means merely that a person with critical thinking skills is capable of intelligent performance.

Despite such scepticism, theorists of critical thinking have listed as general contributors to critical thinking what they variously call abilities (Glaser 1941; Ennis 1962, 1991), skills (Facione 1990a; Halpern 1998) or competencies (Fisher & Scriven 1997). Amalgamating these lists would produce a confusing and chaotic cornucopia of more than 50 possible educational objectives, with only partial overlap among them. It makes sense instead to try to understand the reasons for the multiplicity and diversity, and to make a selection according to one’s own reasons for singling out abilities to be developed in a critical thinking curriculum. Two reasons for diversity among lists of critical thinking abilities are the underlying conception of critical thinking and the envisaged educational level. Appraisal-only conceptions, for example, involve a different suite of abilities than constructive-only conceptions. Some lists, such as those in (Glaser 1941), are put forward as educational objectives for secondary school students, whereas others are proposed as objectives for college students (e.g., Facione 1990a).

The abilities described in the remaining paragraphs of this section emerge from reflection on the general abilities needed to do well the thinking activities identified in section 6 as components of the critical thinking process described in section 5 . The derivation of each collection of abilities is accompanied by citation of sources that list such abilities and of standardized tests that claim to test them.

Observational abilities : Careful and accurate observation sometimes requires specialist expertise and practice, as in the case of observing birds and observing accident scenes. However, there are general abilities of noticing what one’s senses are picking up from one’s environment and of being able to articulate clearly and accurately to oneself and others what one has observed. It helps in exercising them to be able to recognize and take into account factors that make one’s observation less trustworthy, such as prior framing of the situation, inadequate time, deficient senses, poor observation conditions, and the like. It helps as well to be skilled at taking steps to make one’s observation more trustworthy, such as moving closer to get a better look, measuring something three times and taking the average, and checking what one thinks one is observing with someone else who is in a good position to observe it. It also helps to be skilled at recognizing respects in which one’s report of one’s observation involves inference rather than direct observation, so that one can then consider whether the inference is justified. These abilities come into play as well when one thinks about whether and with what degree of confidence to accept an observation report, for example in the study of history or in a criminal investigation or in assessing news reports. Observational abilities show up in some lists of critical thinking abilities (Ennis 1962: 90; Facione 1990a: 16; Ennis 1991: 9). There are items testing a person’s ability to judge the credibility of observation reports in the Cornell Critical Thinking Tests, Levels X and Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005). Norris and King (1983, 1985, 1990a, 1990b) is a test of ability to appraise observation reports.

Emotional abilities : The emotions that drive a critical thinking process are perplexity or puzzlement, a wish to resolve it, and satisfaction at achieving the desired resolution. Children experience these emotions at an early age, without being trained to do so. Education that takes critical thinking as a goal needs only to channel these emotions and to make sure not to stifle them. Collaborative critical thinking benefits from ability to recognize one’s own and others’ emotional commitments and reactions.

Questioning abilities : A critical thinking process needs transformation of an inchoate sense of perplexity into a clear question. Formulating a question well requires not building in questionable assumptions, not prejudging the issue, and using language that in context is unambiguous and precise enough (Ennis 1962: 97; 1991: 9).

Imaginative abilities : Thinking directed at finding the correct causal explanation of a general phenomenon or particular event requires an ability to imagine possible explanations. Thinking about what policy or plan of action to adopt requires generation of options and consideration of possible consequences of each option. Domain knowledge is required for such creative activity, but a general ability to imagine alternatives is helpful and can be nurtured so as to become easier, quicker, more extensive, and deeper (Dewey 1910: 34–39; 1933: 40–47). Facione (1990a) and Halpern (1998) include the ability to imagine alternatives as a critical thinking ability.

Inferential abilities : The ability to draw conclusions from given information, and to recognize with what degree of certainty one’s own or others’ conclusions follow, is universally recognized as a general critical thinking ability. All 11 examples in section 2 of this article include inferences, some from hypotheses or options (as in Transit , Ferryboat and Disorder ), others from something observed (as in Weather and Rash ). None of these inferences is formally valid. Rather, they are licensed by general, sometimes qualified substantive rules of inference (Toulmin 1958) that rest on domain knowledge—that a bus trip takes about the same time in each direction, that the terminal of a wireless telegraph would be located on the highest possible place, that sudden cooling is often followed by rain, that an allergic reaction to a sulfa drug generally shows up soon after one starts taking it. It is a matter of controversy to what extent the specialized ability to deduce conclusions from premisses using formal rules of inference is needed for critical thinking. Dewey (1933) locates logical forms in setting out the products of reflection rather than in the process of reflection. Ennis (1981a), on the other hand, maintains that a liberally-educated person should have the following abilities: to translate natural-language statements into statements using the standard logical operators, to use appropriately the language of necessary and sufficient conditions, to deal with argument forms and arguments containing symbols, to determine whether in virtue of an argument’s form its conclusion follows necessarily from its premisses, to reason with logically complex propositions, and to apply the rules and procedures of deductive logic. Inferential abilities are recognized as critical thinking abilities by Glaser (1941: 6), Facione (1990a: 9), Ennis (1991: 9), Fisher & Scriven (1997: 99, 111), and Halpern (1998: 452). Items testing inferential abilities constitute two of the five subtests of the Watson Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal (Watson & Glaser 1980a, 1980b, 1994), two of the four sections in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level X (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005), three of the seven sections in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005), 11 of the 34 items on Forms A and B of the California Critical Thinking Skills Test (Facione 1990b, 1992), and a high but variable proportion of the 25 selected-response questions in the Collegiate Learning Assessment (Council for Aid to Education 2017).

Experimenting abilities : Knowing how to design and execute an experiment is important not just in scientific research but also in everyday life, as in Rash . Dewey devoted a whole chapter of his How We Think (1910: 145–156; 1933: 190–202) to the superiority of experimentation over observation in advancing knowledge. Experimenting abilities come into play at one remove in appraising reports of scientific studies. Skill in designing and executing experiments includes the acknowledged abilities to appraise evidence (Glaser 1941: 6), to carry out experiments and to apply appropriate statistical inference techniques (Facione 1990a: 9), to judge inductions to an explanatory hypothesis (Ennis 1991: 9), and to recognize the need for an adequately large sample size (Halpern 1998). The Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005) includes four items (out of 52) on experimental design. The Collegiate Learning Assessment (Council for Aid to Education 2017) makes room for appraisal of study design in both its performance task and its selected-response questions.

Consulting abilities : Skill at consulting sources of information comes into play when one seeks information to help resolve a problem, as in Candidate . Ability to find and appraise information includes ability to gather and marshal pertinent information (Glaser 1941: 6), to judge whether a statement made by an alleged authority is acceptable (Ennis 1962: 84), to plan a search for desired information (Facione 1990a: 9), and to judge the credibility of a source (Ennis 1991: 9). Ability to judge the credibility of statements is tested by 24 items (out of 76) in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level X (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005) and by four items (out of 52) in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005). The College Learning Assessment’s performance task requires evaluation of whether information in documents is credible or unreliable (Council for Aid to Education 2017).

Argument analysis abilities : The ability to identify and analyze arguments contributes to the process of surveying arguments on an issue in order to form one’s own reasoned judgment, as in Candidate . The ability to detect and analyze arguments is recognized as a critical thinking skill by Facione (1990a: 7–8), Ennis (1991: 9) and Halpern (1998). Five items (out of 34) on the California Critical Thinking Skills Test (Facione 1990b, 1992) test skill at argument analysis. The College Learning Assessment (Council for Aid to Education 2017) incorporates argument analysis in its selected-response tests of critical reading and evaluation and of critiquing an argument.

Judging skills and deciding skills : Skill at judging and deciding is skill at recognizing what judgment or decision the available evidence and argument supports, and with what degree of confidence. It is thus a component of the inferential skills already discussed.

Lists and tests of critical thinking abilities often include two more abilities: identifying assumptions and constructing and evaluating definitions.

In addition to dispositions and abilities, critical thinking needs knowledge: of critical thinking concepts, of critical thinking principles, and of the subject-matter of the thinking.

We can derive a short list of concepts whose understanding contributes to critical thinking from the critical thinking abilities described in the preceding section. Observational abilities require an understanding of the difference between observation and inference. Questioning abilities require an understanding of the concepts of ambiguity and vagueness. Inferential abilities require an understanding of the difference between conclusive and defeasible inference (traditionally, between deduction and induction), as well as of the difference between necessary and sufficient conditions. Experimenting abilities require an understanding of the concepts of hypothesis, null hypothesis, assumption and prediction, as well as of the concept of statistical significance and of its difference from importance. They also require an understanding of the difference between an experiment and an observational study, and in particular of the difference between a randomized controlled trial, a prospective correlational study and a retrospective (case-control) study. Argument analysis abilities require an understanding of the concepts of argument, premiss, assumption, conclusion and counter-consideration. Additional critical thinking concepts are proposed by Bailin et al. (1999b: 293), Fisher & Scriven (1997: 105–106), Black (2012), and Blair (2021).

According to Glaser (1941: 25), ability to think critically requires knowledge of the methods of logical inquiry and reasoning. If we review the list of abilities in the preceding section, however, we can see that some of them can be acquired and exercised merely through practice, possibly guided in an educational setting, followed by feedback. Searching intelligently for a causal explanation of some phenomenon or event requires that one consider a full range of possible causal contributors, but it seems more important that one implements this principle in one’s practice than that one is able to articulate it. What is important is “operational knowledge” of the standards and principles of good thinking (Bailin et al. 1999b: 291–293). But the development of such critical thinking abilities as designing an experiment or constructing an operational definition can benefit from learning their underlying theory. Further, explicit knowledge of quirks of human thinking seems useful as a cautionary guide. Human memory is not just fallible about details, as people learn from their own experiences of misremembering, but is so malleable that a detailed, clear and vivid recollection of an event can be a total fabrication (Loftus 2017). People seek or interpret evidence in ways that are partial to their existing beliefs and expectations, often unconscious of their “confirmation bias” (Nickerson 1998). Not only are people subject to this and other cognitive biases (Kahneman 2011), of which they are typically unaware, but it may be counter-productive for one to make oneself aware of them and try consciously to counteract them or to counteract social biases such as racial or sexual stereotypes (Kenyon & Beaulac 2014). It is helpful to be aware of these facts and of the superior effectiveness of blocking the operation of biases—for example, by making an immediate record of one’s observations, refraining from forming a preliminary explanatory hypothesis, blind refereeing, double-blind randomized trials, and blind grading of students’ work. It is also helpful to be aware of the prevalence of “noise” (unwanted unsystematic variability of judgments), of how to detect noise (through a noise audit), and of how to reduce noise: make accuracy the goal, think statistically, break a process of arriving at a judgment into independent tasks, resist premature intuitions, in a group get independent judgments first, favour comparative judgments and scales (Kahneman, Sibony, & Sunstein 2021). It is helpful as well to be aware of the concept of “bounded rationality” in decision-making and of the related distinction between “satisficing” and optimizing (Simon 1956; Gigerenzer 2001).

Critical thinking about an issue requires substantive knowledge of the domain to which the issue belongs. Critical thinking abilities are not a magic elixir that can be applied to any issue whatever by somebody who has no knowledge of the facts relevant to exploring that issue. For example, the student in Bubbles needed to know that gases do not penetrate solid objects like a glass, that air expands when heated, that the volume of an enclosed gas varies directly with its temperature and inversely with its pressure, and that hot objects will spontaneously cool down to the ambient temperature of their surroundings unless kept hot by insulation or a source of heat. Critical thinkers thus need a rich fund of subject-matter knowledge relevant to the variety of situations they encounter. This fact is recognized in the inclusion among critical thinking dispositions of a concern to become and remain generally well informed.

Experimental educational interventions, with control groups, have shown that education can improve critical thinking skills and dispositions, as measured by standardized tests. For information about these tests, see the Supplement on Assessment .

What educational methods are most effective at developing the dispositions, abilities and knowledge of a critical thinker? In a comprehensive meta-analysis of experimental and quasi-experimental studies of strategies for teaching students to think critically, Abrami et al. (2015) found that dialogue, anchored instruction, and mentoring each increased the effectiveness of the educational intervention, and that they were most effective when combined. They also found that in these studies a combination of separate instruction in critical thinking with subject-matter instruction in which students are encouraged to think critically was more effective than either by itself. However, the difference was not statistically significant; that is, it might have arisen by chance.

Most of these studies lack the longitudinal follow-up required to determine whether the observed differential improvements in critical thinking abilities or dispositions continue over time, for example until high school or college graduation. For details on studies of methods of developing critical thinking skills and dispositions, see the Supplement on Educational Methods .

12. Controversies

Scholars have denied the generalizability of critical thinking abilities across subject domains, have alleged bias in critical thinking theory and pedagogy, and have investigated the relationship of critical thinking to other kinds of thinking.

McPeck (1981) attacked the thinking skills movement of the 1970s, including the critical thinking movement. He argued that there are no general thinking skills, since thinking is always thinking about some subject-matter. It is futile, he claimed, for schools and colleges to teach thinking as if it were a separate subject. Rather, teachers should lead their pupils to become autonomous thinkers by teaching school subjects in a way that brings out their cognitive structure and that encourages and rewards discussion and argument. As some of his critics (e.g., Paul 1985; Siegel 1985) pointed out, McPeck’s central argument needs elaboration, since it has obvious counter-examples in writing and speaking, for which (up to a certain level of complexity) there are teachable general abilities even though they are always about some subject-matter. To make his argument convincing, McPeck needs to explain how thinking differs from writing and speaking in a way that does not permit useful abstraction of its components from the subject-matters with which it deals. He has not done so. Nevertheless, his position that the dispositions and abilities of a critical thinker are best developed in the context of subject-matter instruction is shared by many theorists of critical thinking, including Dewey (1910, 1933), Glaser (1941), Passmore (1980), Weinstein (1990), Bailin et al. (1999b), and Willingham (2019).

McPeck’s challenge prompted reflection on the extent to which critical thinking is subject-specific. McPeck argued for a strong subject-specificity thesis, according to which it is a conceptual truth that all critical thinking abilities are specific to a subject. (He did not however extend his subject-specificity thesis to critical thinking dispositions. In particular, he took the disposition to suspend judgment in situations of cognitive dissonance to be a general disposition.) Conceptual subject-specificity is subject to obvious counter-examples, such as the general ability to recognize confusion of necessary and sufficient conditions. A more modest thesis, also endorsed by McPeck, is epistemological subject-specificity, according to which the norms of good thinking vary from one field to another. Epistemological subject-specificity clearly holds to a certain extent; for example, the principles in accordance with which one solves a differential equation are quite different from the principles in accordance with which one determines whether a painting is a genuine Picasso. But the thesis suffers, as Ennis (1989) points out, from vagueness of the concept of a field or subject and from the obvious existence of inter-field principles, however broadly the concept of a field is construed. For example, the principles of hypothetico-deductive reasoning hold for all the varied fields in which such reasoning occurs. A third kind of subject-specificity is empirical subject-specificity, according to which as a matter of empirically observable fact a person with the abilities and dispositions of a critical thinker in one area of investigation will not necessarily have them in another area of investigation.

The thesis of empirical subject-specificity raises the general problem of transfer. If critical thinking abilities and dispositions have to be developed independently in each school subject, how are they of any use in dealing with the problems of everyday life and the political and social issues of contemporary society, most of which do not fit into the framework of a traditional school subject? Proponents of empirical subject-specificity tend to argue that transfer is more likely to occur if there is critical thinking instruction in a variety of domains, with explicit attention to dispositions and abilities that cut across domains. But evidence for this claim is scanty. There is a need for well-designed empirical studies that investigate the conditions that make transfer more likely.

It is common ground in debates about the generality or subject-specificity of critical thinking dispositions and abilities that critical thinking about any topic requires background knowledge about the topic. For example, the most sophisticated understanding of the principles of hypothetico-deductive reasoning is of no help unless accompanied by some knowledge of what might be plausible explanations of some phenomenon under investigation.

Critics have objected to bias in the theory, pedagogy and practice of critical thinking. Commentators (e.g., Alston 1995; Ennis 1998) have noted that anyone who takes a position has a bias in the neutral sense of being inclined in one direction rather than others. The critics, however, are objecting to bias in the pejorative sense of an unjustified favoring of certain ways of knowing over others, frequently alleging that the unjustly favoured ways are those of a dominant sex or culture (Bailin 1995). These ways favour:

• reinforcement of egocentric and sociocentric biases over dialectical engagement with opposing world-views (Paul 1981, 1984; Warren 1998)
• distancing from the object of inquiry over closeness to it (Martin 1992; Thayer-Bacon 1992)
• indifference to the situation of others over care for them (Martin 1992)
• orientation to thought over orientation to action (Martin 1992)
• being reasonable over caring to understand people’s ideas (Thayer-Bacon 1993)
• being neutral and objective over being embodied and situated (Thayer-Bacon 1995a)
• doubting over believing (Thayer-Bacon 1995b)
• reason over emotion, imagination and intuition (Thayer-Bacon 2000)
• solitary thinking over collaborative thinking (Thayer-Bacon 2000)
• written and spoken assignments over other forms of expression (Alston 2001)
• attention to written and spoken communications over attention to human problems (Alston 2001)
• winning debates in the public sphere over making and understanding meaning (Alston 2001)

A common thread in this smorgasbord of accusations is dissatisfaction with focusing on the logical analysis and evaluation of reasoning and arguments. While these authors acknowledge that such analysis and evaluation is part of critical thinking and should be part of its conceptualization and pedagogy, they insist that it is only a part. Paul (1981), for example, bemoans the tendency of atomistic teaching of methods of analyzing and evaluating arguments to turn students into more able sophists, adept at finding fault with positions and arguments with which they disagree but even more entrenched in the egocentric and sociocentric biases with which they began. Martin (1992) and Thayer-Bacon (1992) cite with approval the self-reported intimacy with their subject-matter of leading researchers in biology and medicine, an intimacy that conflicts with the distancing allegedly recommended in standard conceptions and pedagogy of critical thinking. Thayer-Bacon (2000) contrasts the embodied and socially embedded learning of her elementary school students in a Montessori school, who used their imagination, intuition and emotions as well as their reason, with conceptions of critical thinking as

thinking that is used to critique arguments, offer justifications, and make judgments about what are the good reasons, or the right answers. (Thayer-Bacon 2000: 127–128)

Alston (2001) reports that her students in a women’s studies class were able to see the flaws in the Cinderella myth that pervades much romantic fiction but in their own romantic relationships still acted as if all failures were the woman’s fault and still accepted the notions of love at first sight and living happily ever after. Students, she writes, should

be able to connect their intellectual critique to a more affective, somatic, and ethical account of making risky choices that have sexist, racist, classist, familial, sexual, or other consequences for themselves and those both near and far… critical thinking that reads arguments, texts, or practices merely on the surface without connections to feeling/desiring/doing or action lacks an ethical depth that should infuse the difference between mere cognitive activity and something we want to call critical thinking. (Alston 2001: 34)

Some critics portray such biases as unfair to women. Thayer-Bacon (1992), for example, has charged modern critical thinking theory with being sexist, on the ground that it separates the self from the object and causes one to lose touch with one’s inner voice, and thus stigmatizes women, who (she asserts) link self to object and listen to their inner voice. Her charge does not imply that women as a group are on average less able than men to analyze and evaluate arguments. Facione (1990c) found no difference by sex in performance on his California Critical Thinking Skills Test. Kuhn (1991: 280–281) found no difference by sex in either the disposition or the competence to engage in argumentative thinking.

The critics propose a variety of remedies for the biases that they allege. In general, they do not propose to eliminate or downplay critical thinking as an educational goal. Rather, they propose to conceptualize critical thinking differently and to change its pedagogy accordingly. Their pedagogical proposals arise logically from their objections. They can be summarized as follows:

• Focus on argument networks with dialectical exchanges reflecting contesting points of view rather than on atomic arguments, so as to develop “strong sense” critical thinking that transcends egocentric and sociocentric biases (Paul 1981, 1984).
• Foster closeness to the subject-matter and feeling connected to others in order to inform a humane democracy (Martin 1992).
• Develop “constructive thinking” as a social activity in a community of physically embodied and socially embedded inquirers with personal voices who value not only reason but also imagination, intuition and emotion (Thayer-Bacon 2000).
• In developing critical thinking in school subjects, treat as important neither skills nor dispositions but opening worlds of meaning (Alston 2001).
• Attend to the development of critical thinking dispositions as well as skills, and adopt the “critical pedagogy” practised and advocated by Freire (1968 [1970]) and hooks (1994) (Dalgleish, Girard, & Davies 2017).

A common thread in these proposals is treatment of critical thinking as a social, interactive, personally engaged activity like that of a quilting bee or a barn-raising (Thayer-Bacon 2000) rather than as an individual, solitary, distanced activity symbolized by Rodin’s The Thinker . One can get a vivid description of education with the former type of goal from the writings of bell hooks (1994, 2010). Critical thinking for her is open-minded dialectical exchange across opposing standpoints and from multiple perspectives, a conception similar to Paul’s “strong sense” critical thinking (Paul 1981). She abandons the structure of domination in the traditional classroom. In an introductory course on black women writers, for example, she assigns students to write an autobiographical paragraph about an early racial memory, then to read it aloud as the others listen, thus affirming the uniqueness and value of each voice and creating a communal awareness of the diversity of the group’s experiences (hooks 1994: 84). Her “engaged pedagogy” is thus similar to the “freedom under guidance” implemented in John Dewey’s Laboratory School of Chicago in the late 1890s and early 1900s. It incorporates the dialogue, anchored instruction, and mentoring that Abrami (2015) found to be most effective in improving critical thinking skills and dispositions.

What is the relationship of critical thinking to problem solving, decision-making, higher-order thinking, creative thinking, and other recognized types of thinking? One’s answer to this question obviously depends on how one defines the terms used in the question. If critical thinking is conceived broadly to cover any careful thinking about any topic for any purpose, then problem solving and decision making will be kinds of critical thinking, if they are done carefully. Historically, ‘critical thinking’ and ‘problem solving’ were two names for the same thing. If critical thinking is conceived more narrowly as consisting solely of appraisal of intellectual products, then it will be disjoint with problem solving and decision making, which are constructive.

Bloom’s taxonomy of educational objectives used the phrase “intellectual abilities and skills” for what had been labeled “critical thinking” by some, “reflective thinking” by Dewey and others, and “problem solving” by still others (Bloom et al. 1956: 38). Thus, the so-called “higher-order thinking skills” at the taxonomy’s top levels of analysis, synthesis and evaluation are just critical thinking skills, although they do not come with general criteria for their assessment (Ennis 1981b). The revised version of Bloom’s taxonomy (Anderson et al. 2001) likewise treats critical thinking as cutting across those types of cognitive process that involve more than remembering (Anderson et al. 2001: 269–270). For details, see the Supplement on History .

As to creative thinking, it overlaps with critical thinking (Bailin 1987, 1988). Thinking about the explanation of some phenomenon or event, as in Ferryboat , requires creative imagination in constructing plausible explanatory hypotheses. Likewise, thinking about a policy question, as in Candidate , requires creativity in coming up with options. Conversely, creativity in any field needs to be balanced by critical appraisal of the draft painting or novel or mathematical theory.

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The effectiveness of collaborative problem solving in promoting students’ critical thinking: A meta-analysis based on empirical literature

• Enwei Xu   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0001-6424-8169 1 ,
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Collaborative problem-solving has been widely embraced in the classroom instruction of critical thinking, which is regarded as the core of curriculum reform based on key competencies in the field of education as well as a key competence for learners in the 21st century. However, the effectiveness of collaborative problem-solving in promoting students’ critical thinking remains uncertain. This current research presents the major findings of a meta-analysis of 36 pieces of the literature revealed in worldwide educational periodicals during the 21st century to identify the effectiveness of collaborative problem-solving in promoting students’ critical thinking and to determine, based on evidence, whether and to what extent collaborative problem solving can result in a rise or decrease in critical thinking. The findings show that (1) collaborative problem solving is an effective teaching approach to foster students’ critical thinking, with a significant overall effect size (ES = 0.82, z  = 12.78, P  < 0.01, 95% CI [0.69, 0.95]); (2) in respect to the dimensions of critical thinking, collaborative problem solving can significantly and successfully enhance students’ attitudinal tendencies (ES = 1.17, z  = 7.62, P  < 0.01, 95% CI[0.87, 1.47]); nevertheless, it falls short in terms of improving students’ cognitive skills, having only an upper-middle impact (ES = 0.70, z  = 11.55, P  < 0.01, 95% CI[0.58, 0.82]); and (3) the teaching type (chi 2  = 7.20, P  < 0.05), intervention duration (chi 2  = 12.18, P  < 0.01), subject area (chi 2  = 13.36, P  < 0.05), group size (chi 2  = 8.77, P  < 0.05), and learning scaffold (chi 2  = 9.03, P  < 0.01) all have an impact on critical thinking, and they can be viewed as important moderating factors that affect how critical thinking develops. On the basis of these results, recommendations are made for further study and instruction to better support students’ critical thinking in the context of collaborative problem-solving.

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Introduction.

Although critical thinking has a long history in research, the concept of critical thinking, which is regarded as an essential competence for learners in the 21st century, has recently attracted more attention from researchers and teaching practitioners (National Research Council, 2012 ). Critical thinking should be the core of curriculum reform based on key competencies in the field of education (Peng and Deng, 2017 ) because students with critical thinking can not only understand the meaning of knowledge but also effectively solve practical problems in real life even after knowledge is forgotten (Kek and Huijser, 2011 ). The definition of critical thinking is not universal (Ennis, 1989 ; Castle, 2009 ; Niu et al., 2013 ). In general, the definition of critical thinking is a self-aware and self-regulated thought process (Facione, 1990 ; Niu et al., 2013 ). It refers to the cognitive skills needed to interpret, analyze, synthesize, reason, and evaluate information as well as the attitudinal tendency to apply these abilities (Halpern, 2001 ). The view that critical thinking can be taught and learned through curriculum teaching has been widely supported by many researchers (e.g., Kuncel, 2011 ; Leng and Lu, 2020 ), leading to educators’ efforts to foster it among students. In the field of teaching practice, there are three types of courses for teaching critical thinking (Ennis, 1989 ). The first is an independent curriculum in which critical thinking is taught and cultivated without involving the knowledge of specific disciplines; the second is an integrated curriculum in which critical thinking is integrated into the teaching of other disciplines as a clear teaching goal; and the third is a mixed curriculum in which critical thinking is taught in parallel to the teaching of other disciplines for mixed teaching training. Furthermore, numerous measuring tools have been developed by researchers and educators to measure critical thinking in the context of teaching practice. These include standardized measurement tools, such as WGCTA, CCTST, CCTT, and CCTDI, which have been verified by repeated experiments and are considered effective and reliable by international scholars (Facione and Facione, 1992 ). In short, descriptions of critical thinking, including its two dimensions of attitudinal tendency and cognitive skills, different types of teaching courses, and standardized measurement tools provide a complex normative framework for understanding, teaching, and evaluating critical thinking.

Cultivating critical thinking in curriculum teaching can start with a problem, and one of the most popular critical thinking instructional approaches is problem-based learning (Liu et al., 2020 ). Duch et al. ( 2001 ) noted that problem-based learning in group collaboration is progressive active learning, which can improve students’ critical thinking and problem-solving skills. Collaborative problem-solving is the organic integration of collaborative learning and problem-based learning, which takes learners as the center of the learning process and uses problems with poor structure in real-world situations as the starting point for the learning process (Liang et al., 2017 ). Students learn the knowledge needed to solve problems in a collaborative group, reach a consensus on problems in the field, and form solutions through social cooperation methods, such as dialogue, interpretation, questioning, debate, negotiation, and reflection, thus promoting the development of learners’ domain knowledge and critical thinking (Cindy, 2004 ; Liang et al., 2017 ).

Collaborative problem-solving has been widely used in the teaching practice of critical thinking, and several studies have attempted to conduct a systematic review and meta-analysis of the empirical literature on critical thinking from various perspectives. However, little attention has been paid to the impact of collaborative problem-solving on critical thinking. Therefore, the best approach for developing and enhancing critical thinking throughout collaborative problem-solving is to examine how to implement critical thinking instruction; however, this issue is still unexplored, which means that many teachers are incapable of better instructing critical thinking (Leng and Lu, 2020 ; Niu et al., 2013 ). For example, Huber ( 2016 ) provided the meta-analysis findings of 71 publications on gaining critical thinking over various time frames in college with the aim of determining whether critical thinking was truly teachable. These authors found that learners significantly improve their critical thinking while in college and that critical thinking differs with factors such as teaching strategies, intervention duration, subject area, and teaching type. The usefulness of collaborative problem-solving in fostering students’ critical thinking, however, was not determined by this study, nor did it reveal whether there existed significant variations among the different elements. A meta-analysis of 31 pieces of educational literature was conducted by Liu et al. ( 2020 ) to assess the impact of problem-solving on college students’ critical thinking. These authors found that problem-solving could promote the development of critical thinking among college students and proposed establishing a reasonable group structure for problem-solving in a follow-up study to improve students’ critical thinking. Additionally, previous empirical studies have reached inconclusive and even contradictory conclusions about whether and to what extent collaborative problem-solving increases or decreases critical thinking levels. As an illustration, Yang et al. ( 2008 ) carried out an experiment on the integrated curriculum teaching of college students based on a web bulletin board with the goal of fostering participants’ critical thinking in the context of collaborative problem-solving. These authors’ research revealed that through sharing, debating, examining, and reflecting on various experiences and ideas, collaborative problem-solving can considerably enhance students’ critical thinking in real-life problem situations. In contrast, collaborative problem-solving had a positive impact on learners’ interaction and could improve learning interest and motivation but could not significantly improve students’ critical thinking when compared to traditional classroom teaching, according to research by Naber and Wyatt ( 2014 ) and Sendag and Odabasi ( 2009 ) on undergraduate and high school students, respectively.

The above studies show that there is inconsistency regarding the effectiveness of collaborative problem-solving in promoting students’ critical thinking. Therefore, it is essential to conduct a thorough and trustworthy review to detect and decide whether and to what degree collaborative problem-solving can result in a rise or decrease in critical thinking. Meta-analysis is a quantitative analysis approach that is utilized to examine quantitative data from various separate studies that are all focused on the same research topic. This approach characterizes the effectiveness of its impact by averaging the effect sizes of numerous qualitative studies in an effort to reduce the uncertainty brought on by independent research and produce more conclusive findings (Lipsey and Wilson, 2001 ).

This paper used a meta-analytic approach and carried out a meta-analysis to examine the effectiveness of collaborative problem-solving in promoting students’ critical thinking in order to make a contribution to both research and practice. The following research questions were addressed by this meta-analysis:

What is the overall effect size of collaborative problem-solving in promoting students’ critical thinking and its impact on the two dimensions of critical thinking (i.e., attitudinal tendency and cognitive skills)?

How are the disparities between the study conclusions impacted by various moderating variables if the impacts of various experimental designs in the included studies are heterogeneous?

This research followed the strict procedures (e.g., database searching, identification, screening, eligibility, merging, duplicate removal, and analysis of included studies) of Cooper’s ( 2010 ) proposed meta-analysis approach for examining quantitative data from various separate studies that are all focused on the same research topic. The relevant empirical research that appeared in worldwide educational periodicals within the 21st century was subjected to this meta-analysis using Rev-Man 5.4. The consistency of the data extracted separately by two researchers was tested using Cohen’s kappa coefficient, and a publication bias test and a heterogeneity test were run on the sample data to ascertain the quality of this meta-analysis.

Data sources and search strategies

There were three stages to the data collection process for this meta-analysis, as shown in Fig. 1 , which shows the number of articles included and eliminated during the selection process based on the statement and study eligibility criteria.

This flowchart shows the number of records identified, included and excluded in the article.

First, the databases used to systematically search for relevant articles were the journal papers of the Web of Science Core Collection and the Chinese Core source journal, as well as the Chinese Social Science Citation Index (CSSCI) source journal papers included in CNKI. These databases were selected because they are credible platforms that are sources of scholarly and peer-reviewed information with advanced search tools and contain literature relevant to the subject of our topic from reliable researchers and experts. The search string with the Boolean operator used in the Web of Science was “TS = (((“critical thinking” or “ct” and “pretest” or “posttest”) or (“critical thinking” or “ct” and “control group” or “quasi experiment” or “experiment”)) and (“collaboration” or “collaborative learning” or “CSCL”) and (“problem solving” or “problem-based learning” or “PBL”))”. The research area was “Education Educational Research”, and the search period was “January 1, 2000, to December 30, 2021”. A total of 412 papers were obtained. The search string with the Boolean operator used in the CNKI was “SU = (‘critical thinking’*‘collaboration’ + ‘critical thinking’*‘collaborative learning’ + ‘critical thinking’*‘CSCL’ + ‘critical thinking’*‘problem solving’ + ‘critical thinking’*‘problem-based learning’ + ‘critical thinking’*‘PBL’ + ‘critical thinking’*‘problem oriented’) AND FT = (‘experiment’ + ‘quasi experiment’ + ‘pretest’ + ‘posttest’ + ‘empirical study’)” (translated into Chinese when searching). A total of 56 studies were found throughout the search period of “January 2000 to December 2021”. From the databases, all duplicates and retractions were eliminated before exporting the references into Endnote, a program for managing bibliographic references. In all, 466 studies were found.

Second, the studies that matched the inclusion and exclusion criteria for the meta-analysis were chosen by two researchers after they had reviewed the abstracts and titles of the gathered articles, yielding a total of 126 studies.

Third, two researchers thoroughly reviewed each included article’s whole text in accordance with the inclusion and exclusion criteria. Meanwhile, a snowball search was performed using the references and citations of the included articles to ensure complete coverage of the articles. Ultimately, 36 articles were kept.

Two researchers worked together to carry out this entire process, and a consensus rate of almost 94.7% was reached after discussion and negotiation to clarify any emerging differences.

Eligibility criteria

Since not all the retrieved studies matched the criteria for this meta-analysis, eligibility criteria for both inclusion and exclusion were developed as follows:

The publication language of the included studies was limited to English and Chinese, and the full text could be obtained. Articles that did not meet the publication language and articles not published between 2000 and 2021 were excluded.

The research design of the included studies must be empirical and quantitative studies that can assess the effect of collaborative problem-solving on the development of critical thinking. Articles that could not identify the causal mechanisms by which collaborative problem-solving affects critical thinking, such as review articles and theoretical articles, were excluded.

The research method of the included studies must feature a randomized control experiment or a quasi-experiment, or a natural experiment, which have a higher degree of internal validity with strong experimental designs and can all plausibly provide evidence that critical thinking and collaborative problem-solving are causally related. Articles with non-experimental research methods, such as purely correlational or observational studies, were excluded.

The participants of the included studies were only students in school, including K-12 students and college students. Articles in which the participants were non-school students, such as social workers or adult learners, were excluded.

The research results of the included studies must mention definite signs that may be utilized to gauge critical thinking’s impact (e.g., sample size, mean value, or standard deviation). Articles that lacked specific measurement indicators for critical thinking and could not calculate the effect size were excluded.

Data coding design

In order to perform a meta-analysis, it is necessary to collect the most important information from the articles, codify that information’s properties, and convert descriptive data into quantitative data. Therefore, this study designed a data coding template (see Table 1 ). Ultimately, 16 coding fields were retained.

The designed data-coding template consisted of three pieces of information. Basic information about the papers was included in the descriptive information: the publishing year, author, serial number, and title of the paper.

The variable information for the experimental design had three variables: the independent variable (instruction method), the dependent variable (critical thinking), and the moderating variable (learning stage, teaching type, intervention duration, learning scaffold, group size, measuring tool, and subject area). Depending on the topic of this study, the intervention strategy, as the independent variable, was coded into collaborative and non-collaborative problem-solving. The dependent variable, critical thinking, was coded as a cognitive skill and an attitudinal tendency. And seven moderating variables were created by grouping and combining the experimental design variables discovered within the 36 studies (see Table 1 ), where learning stages were encoded as higher education, high school, middle school, and primary school or lower; teaching types were encoded as mixed courses, integrated courses, and independent courses; intervention durations were encoded as 0–1 weeks, 1–4 weeks, 4–12 weeks, and more than 12 weeks; group sizes were encoded as 2–3 persons, 4–6 persons, 7–10 persons, and more than 10 persons; learning scaffolds were encoded as teacher-supported learning scaffold, technique-supported learning scaffold, and resource-supported learning scaffold; measuring tools were encoded as standardized measurement tools (e.g., WGCTA, CCTT, CCTST, and CCTDI) and self-adapting measurement tools (e.g., modified or made by researchers); and subject areas were encoded according to the specific subjects used in the 36 included studies.

The data information contained three metrics for measuring critical thinking: sample size, average value, and standard deviation. It is vital to remember that studies with various experimental designs frequently adopt various formulas to determine the effect size. And this paper used Morris’ proposed standardized mean difference (SMD) calculation formula ( 2008 , p. 369; see Supplementary Table S3 ).

Procedure for extracting and coding data

According to the data coding template (see Table 1 ), the 36 papers’ information was retrieved by two researchers, who then entered them into Excel (see Supplementary Table S1 ). The results of each study were extracted separately in the data extraction procedure if an article contained numerous studies on critical thinking, or if a study assessed different critical thinking dimensions. For instance, Tiwari et al. ( 2010 ) used four time points, which were viewed as numerous different studies, to examine the outcomes of critical thinking, and Chen ( 2013 ) included the two outcome variables of attitudinal tendency and cognitive skills, which were regarded as two studies. After discussion and negotiation during data extraction, the two researchers’ consistency test coefficients were roughly 93.27%. Supplementary Table S2 details the key characteristics of the 36 included articles with 79 effect quantities, including descriptive information (e.g., the publishing year, author, serial number, and title of the paper), variable information (e.g., independent variables, dependent variables, and moderating variables), and data information (e.g., mean values, standard deviations, and sample size). Following that, testing for publication bias and heterogeneity was done on the sample data using the Rev-Man 5.4 software, and then the test results were used to conduct a meta-analysis.

Publication bias test

When the sample of studies included in a meta-analysis does not accurately reflect the general status of research on the relevant subject, publication bias is said to be exhibited in this research. The reliability and accuracy of the meta-analysis may be impacted by publication bias. Due to this, the meta-analysis needs to check the sample data for publication bias (Stewart et al., 2006 ). A popular method to check for publication bias is the funnel plot; and it is unlikely that there will be publishing bias when the data are equally dispersed on either side of the average effect size and targeted within the higher region. The data are equally dispersed within the higher portion of the efficient zone, consistent with the funnel plot connected with this analysis (see Fig. 2 ), indicating that publication bias is unlikely in this situation.

This funnel plot shows the result of publication bias of 79 effect quantities across 36 studies.

Heterogeneity test

To select the appropriate effect models for the meta-analysis, one might use the results of a heterogeneity test on the data effect sizes. In a meta-analysis, it is common practice to gauge the degree of data heterogeneity using the I 2 value, and I 2  ≥ 50% is typically understood to denote medium-high heterogeneity, which calls for the adoption of a random effect model; if not, a fixed effect model ought to be applied (Lipsey and Wilson, 2001 ). The findings of the heterogeneity test in this paper (see Table 2 ) revealed that I 2 was 86% and displayed significant heterogeneity ( P  < 0.01). To ensure accuracy and reliability, the overall effect size ought to be calculated utilizing the random effect model.

The analysis of the overall effect size

This meta-analysis utilized a random effect model to examine 79 effect quantities from 36 studies after eliminating heterogeneity. In accordance with Cohen’s criterion (Cohen, 1992 ), it is abundantly clear from the analysis results, which are shown in the forest plot of the overall effect (see Fig. 3 ), that the cumulative impact size of cooperative problem-solving is 0.82, which is statistically significant ( z  = 12.78, P  < 0.01, 95% CI [0.69, 0.95]), and can encourage learners to practice critical thinking.

This forest plot shows the analysis result of the overall effect size across 36 studies.

In addition, this study examined two distinct dimensions of critical thinking to better understand the precise contributions that collaborative problem-solving makes to the growth of critical thinking. The findings (see Table 3 ) indicate that collaborative problem-solving improves cognitive skills (ES = 0.70) and attitudinal tendency (ES = 1.17), with significant intergroup differences (chi 2  = 7.95, P  < 0.01). Although collaborative problem-solving improves both dimensions of critical thinking, it is essential to point out that the improvements in students’ attitudinal tendency are much more pronounced and have a significant comprehensive effect (ES = 1.17, z  = 7.62, P  < 0.01, 95% CI [0.87, 1.47]), whereas gains in learners’ cognitive skill are slightly improved and are just above average. (ES = 0.70, z  = 11.55, P  < 0.01, 95% CI [0.58, 0.82]).

The analysis of moderator effect size

The whole forest plot’s 79 effect quantities underwent a two-tailed test, which revealed significant heterogeneity ( I 2  = 86%, z  = 12.78, P  < 0.01), indicating differences between various effect sizes that may have been influenced by moderating factors other than sampling error. Therefore, exploring possible moderating factors that might produce considerable heterogeneity was done using subgroup analysis, such as the learning stage, learning scaffold, teaching type, group size, duration of the intervention, measuring tool, and the subject area included in the 36 experimental designs, in order to further explore the key factors that influence critical thinking. The findings (see Table 4 ) indicate that various moderating factors have advantageous effects on critical thinking. In this situation, the subject area (chi 2  = 13.36, P  < 0.05), group size (chi 2  = 8.77, P  < 0.05), intervention duration (chi 2  = 12.18, P  < 0.01), learning scaffold (chi 2  = 9.03, P  < 0.01), and teaching type (chi 2  = 7.20, P  < 0.05) are all significant moderators that can be applied to support the cultivation of critical thinking. However, since the learning stage and the measuring tools did not significantly differ among intergroup (chi 2  = 3.15, P  = 0.21 > 0.05, and chi 2  = 0.08, P  = 0.78 > 0.05), we are unable to explain why these two factors are crucial in supporting the cultivation of critical thinking in the context of collaborative problem-solving. These are the precise outcomes, as follows:

Various learning stages influenced critical thinking positively, without significant intergroup differences (chi 2  = 3.15, P  = 0.21 > 0.05). High school was first on the list of effect sizes (ES = 1.36, P  < 0.01), then higher education (ES = 0.78, P  < 0.01), and middle school (ES = 0.73, P  < 0.01). These results show that, despite the learning stage’s beneficial influence on cultivating learners’ critical thinking, we are unable to explain why it is essential for cultivating critical thinking in the context of collaborative problem-solving.

Different teaching types had varying degrees of positive impact on critical thinking, with significant intergroup differences (chi 2  = 7.20, P  < 0.05). The effect size was ranked as follows: mixed courses (ES = 1.34, P  < 0.01), integrated courses (ES = 0.81, P  < 0.01), and independent courses (ES = 0.27, P  < 0.01). These results indicate that the most effective approach to cultivate critical thinking utilizing collaborative problem solving is through the teaching type of mixed courses.

Various intervention durations significantly improved critical thinking, and there were significant intergroup differences (chi 2  = 12.18, P  < 0.01). The effect sizes related to this variable showed a tendency to increase with longer intervention durations. The improvement in critical thinking reached a significant level (ES = 0.85, P  < 0.01) after more than 12 weeks of training. These findings indicate that the intervention duration and critical thinking’s impact are positively correlated, with a longer intervention duration having a greater effect.

Different learning scaffolds influenced critical thinking positively, with significant intergroup differences (chi 2  = 9.03, P  < 0.01). The resource-supported learning scaffold (ES = 0.69, P  < 0.01) acquired a medium-to-higher level of impact, the technique-supported learning scaffold (ES = 0.63, P  < 0.01) also attained a medium-to-higher level of impact, and the teacher-supported learning scaffold (ES = 0.92, P  < 0.01) displayed a high level of significant impact. These results show that the learning scaffold with teacher support has the greatest impact on cultivating critical thinking.

Various group sizes influenced critical thinking positively, and the intergroup differences were statistically significant (chi 2  = 8.77, P  < 0.05). Critical thinking showed a general declining trend with increasing group size. The overall effect size of 2–3 people in this situation was the biggest (ES = 0.99, P  < 0.01), and when the group size was greater than 7 people, the improvement in critical thinking was at the lower-middle level (ES < 0.5, P  < 0.01). These results show that the impact on critical thinking is positively connected with group size, and as group size grows, so does the overall impact.

Various measuring tools influenced critical thinking positively, with significant intergroup differences (chi 2  = 0.08, P  = 0.78 > 0.05). In this situation, the self-adapting measurement tools obtained an upper-medium level of effect (ES = 0.78), whereas the complete effect size of the standardized measurement tools was the largest, achieving a significant level of effect (ES = 0.84, P  < 0.01). These results show that, despite the beneficial influence of the measuring tool on cultivating critical thinking, we are unable to explain why it is crucial in fostering the growth of critical thinking by utilizing the approach of collaborative problem-solving.

Different subject areas had a greater impact on critical thinking, and the intergroup differences were statistically significant (chi 2  = 13.36, P  < 0.05). Mathematics had the greatest overall impact, achieving a significant level of effect (ES = 1.68, P  < 0.01), followed by science (ES = 1.25, P  < 0.01) and medical science (ES = 0.87, P  < 0.01), both of which also achieved a significant level of effect. Programming technology was the least effective (ES = 0.39, P  < 0.01), only having a medium-low degree of effect compared to education (ES = 0.72, P  < 0.01) and other fields (such as language, art, and social sciences) (ES = 0.58, P  < 0.01). These results suggest that scientific fields (e.g., mathematics, science) may be the most effective subject areas for cultivating critical thinking utilizing the approach of collaborative problem-solving.

The effectiveness of collaborative problem solving with regard to teaching critical thinking

According to this meta-analysis, using collaborative problem-solving as an intervention strategy in critical thinking teaching has a considerable amount of impact on cultivating learners’ critical thinking as a whole and has a favorable promotional effect on the two dimensions of critical thinking. According to certain studies, collaborative problem solving, the most frequently used critical thinking teaching strategy in curriculum instruction can considerably enhance students’ critical thinking (e.g., Liang et al., 2017 ; Liu et al., 2020 ; Cindy, 2004 ). This meta-analysis provides convergent data support for the above research views. Thus, the findings of this meta-analysis not only effectively address the first research query regarding the overall effect of cultivating critical thinking and its impact on the two dimensions of critical thinking (i.e., attitudinal tendency and cognitive skills) utilizing the approach of collaborative problem-solving, but also enhance our confidence in cultivating critical thinking by using collaborative problem-solving intervention approach in the context of classroom teaching.

Furthermore, the associated improvements in attitudinal tendency are much stronger, but the corresponding improvements in cognitive skill are only marginally better. According to certain studies, cognitive skill differs from the attitudinal tendency in classroom instruction; the cultivation and development of the former as a key ability is a process of gradual accumulation, while the latter as an attitude is affected by the context of the teaching situation (e.g., a novel and exciting teaching approach, challenging and rewarding tasks) (Halpern, 2001 ; Wei and Hong, 2022 ). Collaborative problem-solving as a teaching approach is exciting and interesting, as well as rewarding and challenging; because it takes the learners as the focus and examines problems with poor structure in real situations, and it can inspire students to fully realize their potential for problem-solving, which will significantly improve their attitudinal tendency toward solving problems (Liu et al., 2020 ). Similar to how collaborative problem-solving influences attitudinal tendency, attitudinal tendency impacts cognitive skill when attempting to solve a problem (Liu et al., 2020 ; Zhang et al., 2022 ), and stronger attitudinal tendencies are associated with improved learning achievement and cognitive ability in students (Sison, 2008 ; Zhang et al., 2022 ). It can be seen that the two specific dimensions of critical thinking as well as critical thinking as a whole are affected by collaborative problem-solving, and this study illuminates the nuanced links between cognitive skills and attitudinal tendencies with regard to these two dimensions of critical thinking. To fully develop students’ capacity for critical thinking, future empirical research should pay closer attention to cognitive skills.

The moderating effects of collaborative problem solving with regard to teaching critical thinking

In order to further explore the key factors that influence critical thinking, exploring possible moderating effects that might produce considerable heterogeneity was done using subgroup analysis. The findings show that the moderating factors, such as the teaching type, learning stage, group size, learning scaffold, duration of the intervention, measuring tool, and the subject area included in the 36 experimental designs, could all support the cultivation of collaborative problem-solving in critical thinking. Among them, the effect size differences between the learning stage and measuring tool are not significant, which does not explain why these two factors are crucial in supporting the cultivation of critical thinking utilizing the approach of collaborative problem-solving.

In terms of the learning stage, various learning stages influenced critical thinking positively without significant intergroup differences, indicating that we are unable to explain why it is crucial in fostering the growth of critical thinking.

Although high education accounts for 70.89% of all empirical studies performed by researchers, high school may be the appropriate learning stage to foster students’ critical thinking by utilizing the approach of collaborative problem-solving since it has the largest overall effect size. This phenomenon may be related to student’s cognitive development, which needs to be further studied in follow-up research.

With regard to teaching type, mixed course teaching may be the best teaching method to cultivate students’ critical thinking. Relevant studies have shown that in the actual teaching process if students are trained in thinking methods alone, the methods they learn are isolated and divorced from subject knowledge, which is not conducive to their transfer of thinking methods; therefore, if students’ thinking is trained only in subject teaching without systematic method training, it is challenging to apply to real-world circumstances (Ruggiero, 2012 ; Hu and Liu, 2015 ). Teaching critical thinking as mixed course teaching in parallel to other subject teachings can achieve the best effect on learners’ critical thinking, and explicit critical thinking instruction is more effective than less explicit critical thinking instruction (Bensley and Spero, 2014 ).

In terms of the intervention duration, with longer intervention times, the overall effect size shows an upward tendency. Thus, the intervention duration and critical thinking’s impact are positively correlated. Critical thinking, as a key competency for students in the 21st century, is difficult to get a meaningful improvement in a brief intervention duration. Instead, it could be developed over a lengthy period of time through consistent teaching and the progressive accumulation of knowledge (Halpern, 2001 ; Hu and Liu, 2015 ). Therefore, future empirical studies ought to take these restrictions into account throughout a longer period of critical thinking instruction.

With regard to group size, a group size of 2–3 persons has the highest effect size, and the comprehensive effect size decreases with increasing group size in general. This outcome is in line with some research findings; as an example, a group composed of two to four members is most appropriate for collaborative learning (Schellens and Valcke, 2006 ). However, the meta-analysis results also indicate that once the group size exceeds 7 people, small groups cannot produce better interaction and performance than large groups. This may be because the learning scaffolds of technique support, resource support, and teacher support improve the frequency and effectiveness of interaction among group members, and a collaborative group with more members may increase the diversity of views, which is helpful to cultivate critical thinking utilizing the approach of collaborative problem-solving.

With regard to the learning scaffold, the three different kinds of learning scaffolds can all enhance critical thinking. Among them, the teacher-supported learning scaffold has the largest overall effect size, demonstrating the interdependence of effective learning scaffolds and collaborative problem-solving. This outcome is in line with some research findings; as an example, a successful strategy is to encourage learners to collaborate, come up with solutions, and develop critical thinking skills by using learning scaffolds (Reiser, 2004 ; Xu et al., 2022 ); learning scaffolds can lower task complexity and unpleasant feelings while also enticing students to engage in learning activities (Wood et al., 2006 ); learning scaffolds are designed to assist students in using learning approaches more successfully to adapt the collaborative problem-solving process, and the teacher-supported learning scaffolds have the greatest influence on critical thinking in this process because they are more targeted, informative, and timely (Xu et al., 2022 ).

With respect to the measuring tool, despite the fact that standardized measurement tools (such as the WGCTA, CCTT, and CCTST) have been acknowledged as trustworthy and effective by worldwide experts, only 54.43% of the research included in this meta-analysis adopted them for assessment, and the results indicated no intergroup differences. These results suggest that not all teaching circumstances are appropriate for measuring critical thinking using standardized measurement tools. “The measuring tools for measuring thinking ability have limits in assessing learners in educational situations and should be adapted appropriately to accurately assess the changes in learners’ critical thinking.”, according to Simpson and Courtney ( 2002 , p. 91). As a result, in order to more fully and precisely gauge how learners’ critical thinking has evolved, we must properly modify standardized measuring tools based on collaborative problem-solving learning contexts.

With regard to the subject area, the comprehensive effect size of science departments (e.g., mathematics, science, medical science) is larger than that of language arts and social sciences. Some recent international education reforms have noted that critical thinking is a basic part of scientific literacy. Students with scientific literacy can prove the rationality of their judgment according to accurate evidence and reasonable standards when they face challenges or poorly structured problems (Kyndt et al., 2013 ), which makes critical thinking crucial for developing scientific understanding and applying this understanding to practical problem solving for problems related to science, technology, and society (Yore et al., 2007 ).

Suggestions for critical thinking teaching

Other than those stated in the discussion above, the following suggestions are offered for critical thinking instruction utilizing the approach of collaborative problem-solving.

First, teachers should put a special emphasis on the two core elements, which are collaboration and problem-solving, to design real problems based on collaborative situations. This meta-analysis provides evidence to support the view that collaborative problem-solving has a strong synergistic effect on promoting students’ critical thinking. Asking questions about real situations and allowing learners to take part in critical discussions on real problems during class instruction are key ways to teach critical thinking rather than simply reading speculative articles without practice (Mulnix, 2012 ). Furthermore, the improvement of students’ critical thinking is realized through cognitive conflict with other learners in the problem situation (Yang et al., 2008 ). Consequently, it is essential for teachers to put a special emphasis on the two core elements, which are collaboration and problem-solving, and design real problems and encourage students to discuss, negotiate, and argue based on collaborative problem-solving situations.

Second, teachers should design and implement mixed courses to cultivate learners’ critical thinking, utilizing the approach of collaborative problem-solving. Critical thinking can be taught through curriculum instruction (Kuncel, 2011 ; Leng and Lu, 2020 ), with the goal of cultivating learners’ critical thinking for flexible transfer and application in real problem-solving situations. This meta-analysis shows that mixed course teaching has a highly substantial impact on the cultivation and promotion of learners’ critical thinking. Therefore, teachers should design and implement mixed course teaching with real collaborative problem-solving situations in combination with the knowledge content of specific disciplines in conventional teaching, teach methods and strategies of critical thinking based on poorly structured problems to help students master critical thinking, and provide practical activities in which students can interact with each other to develop knowledge construction and critical thinking utilizing the approach of collaborative problem-solving.

Third, teachers should be more trained in critical thinking, particularly preservice teachers, and they also should be conscious of the ways in which teachers’ support for learning scaffolds can promote critical thinking. The learning scaffold supported by teachers had the greatest impact on learners’ critical thinking, in addition to being more directive, targeted, and timely (Wood et al., 2006 ). Critical thinking can only be effectively taught when teachers recognize the significance of critical thinking for students’ growth and use the proper approaches while designing instructional activities (Forawi, 2016 ). Therefore, with the intention of enabling teachers to create learning scaffolds to cultivate learners’ critical thinking utilizing the approach of collaborative problem solving, it is essential to concentrate on the teacher-supported learning scaffolds and enhance the instruction for teaching critical thinking to teachers, especially preservice teachers.

Implications and limitations

There are certain limitations in this meta-analysis, but future research can correct them. First, the search languages were restricted to English and Chinese, so it is possible that pertinent studies that were written in other languages were overlooked, resulting in an inadequate number of articles for review. Second, these data provided by the included studies are partially missing, such as whether teachers were trained in the theory and practice of critical thinking, the average age and gender of learners, and the differences in critical thinking among learners of various ages and genders. Third, as is typical for review articles, more studies were released while this meta-analysis was being done; therefore, it had a time limit. With the development of relevant research, future studies focusing on these issues are highly relevant and needed.

Conclusions

The subject of the magnitude of collaborative problem-solving’s impact on fostering students’ critical thinking, which received scant attention from other studies, was successfully addressed by this study. The question of the effectiveness of collaborative problem-solving in promoting students’ critical thinking was addressed in this study, which addressed a topic that had gotten little attention in earlier research. The following conclusions can be made:

Regarding the results obtained, collaborative problem solving is an effective teaching approach to foster learners’ critical thinking, with a significant overall effect size (ES = 0.82, z  = 12.78, P  < 0.01, 95% CI [0.69, 0.95]). With respect to the dimensions of critical thinking, collaborative problem-solving can significantly and effectively improve students’ attitudinal tendency, and the comprehensive effect is significant (ES = 1.17, z  = 7.62, P  < 0.01, 95% CI [0.87, 1.47]); nevertheless, it falls short in terms of improving students’ cognitive skills, having only an upper-middle impact (ES = 0.70, z  = 11.55, P  < 0.01, 95% CI [0.58, 0.82]).

As demonstrated by both the results and the discussion, there are varying degrees of beneficial effects on students’ critical thinking from all seven moderating factors, which were found across 36 studies. In this context, the teaching type (chi 2  = 7.20, P  < 0.05), intervention duration (chi 2  = 12.18, P  < 0.01), subject area (chi 2  = 13.36, P  < 0.05), group size (chi 2  = 8.77, P  < 0.05), and learning scaffold (chi 2  = 9.03, P  < 0.01) all have a positive impact on critical thinking, and they can be viewed as important moderating factors that affect how critical thinking develops. Since the learning stage (chi 2  = 3.15, P  = 0.21 > 0.05) and measuring tools (chi 2  = 0.08, P  = 0.78 > 0.05) did not demonstrate any significant intergroup differences, we are unable to explain why these two factors are crucial in supporting the cultivation of critical thinking in the context of collaborative problem-solving.

Data availability

All data generated or analyzed during this study are included within the article and its supplementary information files, and the supplementary information files are available in the Dataverse repository: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/IPFJO6 .

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This research was supported by the graduate scientific research and innovation project of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region named “Research on in-depth learning of high school information technology courses for the cultivation of computing thinking” (No. XJ2022G190) and the independent innovation fund project for doctoral students of the College of Educational Science of Xinjiang Normal University named “Research on project-based teaching of high school information technology courses from the perspective of discipline core literacy” (No. XJNUJKYA2003).

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Xu, E., Wang, W. & Wang, Q. The effectiveness of collaborative problem solving in promoting students’ critical thinking: A meta-analysis based on empirical literature. Humanit Soc Sci Commun 10 , 16 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-023-01508-1

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The Study of Educational Psychology

Teaching Philosophy

A philosophy grounds or guides practice in the study of existence and knowledge while developing an ontology (the study of being) on what it means for something or someone to be—or exist. Educational philosophy, then, provides a foundation that constructs and guides the ways knowledge is generated and passed on to others. Therefore, it is of critical import that teachers begin to develop a clear understanding of philosophical traditions and how the  philosophical underpinnings inform their educational philosophies; because a clear educational philosophy will help guide and develop cohesive reasons for how each teacher designs classroom spaces and learning interactions with both teachers and students. A clear philosophy also frames the curriculum along a spectrum from teacher-centered curriculum to student-centered curriculum to society-centered curriculum.   

There are  many different ways  to teach, varying circumstances to take into account, and philosophies to apply to each classroom. And what better way to have a positive impact on the world than to offer knowledge for consumption? The term ‘teacher’ can be applied to anyone who imparts knowledge of any topic, but it is generally more focused on those who are hired to do so.  In imparting knowledge to our students, it is inevitable that we must consider our own personal philosophies, or pedagogies, and determine not only how we decide what our philosophies are, but also how those impact our students.  

In order to develop a teaching philosophy, a teacher should examine and continuously reflect on the following:

• Creation of an articulated philosophy that can become a foundation upon which an individual’s life work can be built.
• Consideration of how your attitude is a function of who you are, how it affects your philosophy towards education, and how it shapes who you are as a teacher.
• Formulation of a teaching style that integrates teaching strategies with one’s own personality and philosophy.

Exercise 1.6 Educational Philosophies Self-Assessment Survey

Before reading about the various philosophies, take this assessment to find with which you most align. This assessment will assist you in writing your teaching philosophy.

• Complete the   Educational Philosophies Self-Assessment Survey
• Compile your score using  Educational Philosophies Self-Assessment Scoring Guide

What does this survey reveal about your underlying philosophy?

Lessons in Pedagogy

Teacher preparation classes frequently separated the concept of philosophy into separate schools. “Philosophy has been taught in the theoretical realm rather than the practical sense,” meaning that the ideas were placed before the teachers without the scaffolding to create a bridge into the classroom (Roberson, 2000, p. 7). The teachers, as students, were given a body of thought and expected to translate that into lessons for their own students. Once you have the idea, how do you apply it to teaching?

What, exactly, are teaching philosophies? According to Thelma Roberson (2000), most prospective teachers confuse their beliefs with the ideas of teaching. Teaching philosophies, then, are not what you want to do in class to aid learning, but why you do them and how they work. For example, Roberson’s students state they “want to use cooperative learning techniques” in their classroom. The question posed is, why? “[I]s cooperative learning a true philosophy or is it something you do in the classroom because of your belief about the way children learn?” (Roberson, 2000, p. 6). Philosophies need to translate ideas into action – if you want to use certain techniques, then you need to understand how they are effective in the classroom to create that portion of your teaching philosophy. It helps to have an overview of the various schools out there.

Ontological Frameworks of Philosophy

Generally, four ontological perspectives frame schools of educational philosophy.  Two ontological frameworks, idealism and realism, stem from Ancient Greece. The Ancient Greek philosopher Plato developed the tradition of idealism; whereas, Aristotle, Plato’s student, formed an antithetical ontology of realism. Progressivism and existentialism grew from the philosophical remnants of the Age of Enlightenment in the 19th century. Pragmatism formed within the United States during the late 1800s; at the same time, existentialism developed as a continental philosophy in Europe. While the early public education system in the United States was guided by idealism and realism, pragmatism and existentialism have served as the influential foundations of the 20th and 21st-century educational philosophies.

For Idealists, ideas are the only true reality. Conscious reasoning is the only way to locate what is true, beautiful, and just. Plato founded Idealism and outlined its tenets in his book The Republic. For Plato, there are two worlds. The first world is home to the spiritual or mental world where universal ideas and truth were permanent; this world can only be found through conscious reasoning. The second world is the world of appearances and imperfection; a world experienced through sensory experiences of sight, sound, touch, smell, and taste. Plato outlines this duality between the two worlds in “The Allegory of the Cave.” In this famous allegory, people are chained against walls with a fire behind them. What the people perceive as real are only shadowed projections on the wall of the cave. If one were to break free, leave the cave, and discover the sun, this new “realm” would discover the true source of everything that was previously known. It would be the realm of pure fact and form. This is the source of all that is real. The real world is just an imperfect projection of these ideas, forms, and truth.

Almost two centuries later, Dutch philosopher Renè Descartes shifted Platonic Idealism toward mind-body dualism with his famous phrase “Cogito, ergo sum (I think; therefore, I am).” For Descartes, the only proof of his existence is his thinking—a thinking being. Like Plato, Descartes outlined a rationale for why perceptions are unreliable, and the external world is illusory. Only through rational deduction could one obtain truth. While Plato described a dualism between two separate worlds, Descartes established an Idealism founded on mind-body dualism where the thinking mind is given privilege over the physical body and external world. This dualism would heavily influence philosophy and educational philosophy well into the 20th century.

Teaching, for Idealists, focuses on moral excellence that will benefit society. Students should focus on subjects of the mind like literature, history, and philosophy. Students will demonstrate understanding through participation in lectures and through Socratic-dialogues, which engage students in introspection and insight that bring to consciousness the universal forms and concepts.

Figure 1.6.1.  Plato.

Realism’s central tenet is based on reality, or the external universe, independent from the human mind. Aristotle, Plato’s student, contradicted his teacher’s Idealist philosophy and formulated a philosophy on determining truth through observation. Reality can be truly understood by careful observation of all the data. Because of his emphasis on careful observation, Aristotle is often referred to as the Father of the Scientific Method. Through logic, humans can reason about the physical universe . The essence of things or substances, therefore, can be determined by examination of the object or substance. Aristotle’s logic, then, emphasizes induction as well as deduction, and the real world can be determined through both.

During the Enlightenment, Common Sense Realism began to counter the Idealism of Descartes. Rather than the skepticism of the external world espoused by Idealists, the Common Sense Realists, like John Locke, argue that ordinary experiences intuit a self and the physical world without the skepticism of the real world outside the mind. This realism would influence the development of Empiricism and Pragmatism later in the Enlightenment.

For realists, teaching methods should focus on basic skills and memorization and mastery of facts. Students demonstrate content mastery of these skills through critical observation and applied experimentation.

Figure 1.6.2.  Aristotle. viena-Wien. Kunsthistorisches Museum. Cap d’Aristotil. Copia romana d’ un original qrez. Ca. 320 Dc.” by Pilar Torres.

Like Realism, Pragmatism requires empirical observation of the real world; however, unlike Realism and Idealism, the real world is not an unchanging whole but is evolving and changing according to how thought is applied to action towards a problem. Thought cannot or should not describe or represent reality, but rather, should be applied by the practical applying thoughts and experiences to problems that arise. The universe, then, is always evolving according to new applied thoughts turned into actions. Pragmatism’s founder Charles Sanders Pierce posits thought must produce action towards an ever-changing universe.

John Dewey, the founder of Progressivism, believed that experience is central to explaining the world; moreover, the experience is what is needed to be explained. One needs practical experiences and uses explanations to find models that would best fit any given problem or situation. As new experiences and explanations arise, reality will evolve or change to new situations and problems.

Pragmatists focus on hands-on, experiential learning tasks such as experimenting, and working on projects in groups. Students will demonstrate understanding through applied learning tasks to concrete problems or tasks.

Existentialism

Existentialism grew from the continental philosophies forming in Europe during the 19th and early 20th centuries, most notably hermeneutic phenomenology—the examination of lived experience. Hermeneutic phenomenology and existentialism countered the dualisms inherent in both Idealism and Realism. The world does not have any meaning outside human existence within a world. The mind/body or mind/physical world duality and cannot have any meaning without a human being actively absorbed in the world. Jean-Paul Sarte posited that “existence precedes essence,” which means one’s existence comes before the nature, or fact, of a thing. This means that individual human beings are free to determine their own meaning for life and do not possess any inherent identity different than one the individual chooses or creates.

Existentialists position the individual as responsible for their own being, or existence. “Who am I? What should I do?”  become central questions for an individual’s project in being. If one identifies with being a teacher, or any other identity like being a parent, then one must evaluate what does one who teaches (or any other identity) do? After thoughtful and careful reflection, one must choose to authentically do the project of being a teacher (or any other identity). Acting in accordance with one’s chosen beliefs and values despite social pressures is the way to have an authentic existence. However, acting or adopting false values based on social pressures would be acting in “bad faith,” and one would be living an inauthentic existence, according to Sartre.

In educational settings, Existentialists focus on giving students personal choices where they must confront others’ views in order to clarify and develop authentic actions in terms of the students’ developing identities. Existentialists have difficulty positioning students as objects to be measured, tracked, or standardized. Teachers who adhere to an Existentialist ontology create activities that guide students to self-direction and self-actualization.

Philosophical Perspective of Education

There are several philosophical perspectives currently used in educational settings. Unlike the more abstract ontology, these perspectives focus primarily on what should be taught and how it should be taught, i.e., the curriculum.

Essentialism

Essentialism adheres to a belief that a core set of essential skills must be taught to all students, a universal pool of knowledge needed by all. Essentialists tend to traditional academic disciplines that will develop prescribed skills and objectives in different content areas as well as develop a common culture. Typically, essentialism argues for a back-to-basics approach to teaching intellectual and moral standards. Schools should prepare all students to be productive members of society.

The fundamentals of teaching are the basis of the curriculum: math, science, history, foreign language, and English. Vocational classes are not seen as a necessary part of educational training. Schools should be sites of rigor where students learn to work hard and respect authority.  Because of this stance, essentialism tends to subscribe to tenets of realism.  Essentialist classrooms tend to be teacher-centered in instructional delivery with an emphasis on lecture and teacher demonstrations. Assessments are predominately through testing, and there are few, if any, projects or portfolios. These instructors easily accept the No Child Left Behind Act because test scores are the main form of evaluation (Ornstein  & Levine, 2003).

Perennialism

Perennialism advocates for seeking, teaching, and learning universal truths that span across the ages. These truths, Perennialists argue, have everlasting importance in helping humans solve problems regardless of time and place. While Perennialism resembles essentialism at first glance, perennialism focuses on the individual development of the student rather than emphasizing skills. Perennialism supports liberal arts curricula that help produces well-rounded individuals with some knowledge across the arts and sciences. All students should take classes in English Language Arts, foreign languages, mathematics, natural sciences, fine arts, and philosophy. Like Essentialism, Perennialism may tend to favor teacher-centered instruction; however, Perennialists do utilize student-centered instructional activities like Socratic Seminar, which values and encourages students to think, rationalize, and develop their own ideas on topics.

Perennialists are instructors who believe that knowledge passed through the ages should continue to be the basis of the curriculum, like the classic works of Plato and Einstein. Perennialists base their teachings on reason, logic, and analytical thought. Only information that stood the test of time is relevant. They do not elicit student input. The classes most likely to be considered under this approach would be history, science, math, and religion classes (Ganly, 2007).

Positivism is a philosophical theory that believes information is derived from sensory experience and interpreted through reason and logic. The instructors whose teaching philosophies are based on documented facts and objective truths are normally those who would be in the math and science departments. These teachers do not feel that religion and the supernatural should be a part of the thinking process. The idea of uncertainty and the unknown is considered illogical (Ganly, 2007).

Behaviorism

Behaviorists believe in rewards and punishments as an approach to controlling the teaching environment due to their belief in the intrinsic nature of humans to react to internal or external stimuli. This teacher-centered system ultimately allows the students to be controlled by the educator, who makes the environment pleasant or unpleasant, depending on the students’ behavior (Ornstein  & Levine, 2003).

Progressivism

The curriculum is usually integrated across contents instead of siloed into different disciplines. Progressivism’s stance is in stark contrast to both Essentialism and Perennialism in this manner. Progressivism follows an explicit pragmatic ontology where the learner focuses on solving real-world problems through real experiences. Current events are used to keep students interested in the required subject matter. Students are active learners as opposed to passive learners. Evaluations include projects and portfolios.

Figure 1.6.3.  Progressive John Dewey.

Social Reconstructionism & Critical Pedagogy

Critical pedagogy is the application of critical theory to education. For critical pedagogues, teaching and learning is inherently a political act, and they declare that knowledge and language are not neutral, nor can they be objective. Therefore, issues involving social, environmental, or economic justice cannot be separated from the curriculum. Critical pedagogy’s goal is to emancipate marginalized or oppressed groups by developing, according to Paulo Freire, conscientização, or critical consciousness in students.

Figure 1.6.4.  Gloria Jean Watkins, better known by her pen name bell hooks.

Critical pedagogy de-centers the traditional classroom, which positions the teacher at the center. The curriculum and classroom with a critical pedagogy stance are student-centered strives to instill a desire to make the world a better place. It places a focus on controversial world issues and uses current events as a springboard for the thinking process. These students are taught the importance of working together to bring about change. These teachers incorporate what is happening in the world with what they are learning in the classroom (Ganly, 2007).

Constructivism

Active participation is the key to this teaching style. Students are free to explore their own ideas and share concepts with one another in nontraditional ways. “Hands on activity […] is the most effective way of learning and is considered true learning” (Ganly, 2007).

Humanism/ Existentialism

Also a student-centered philosophy, this educational method is based on the idea that the students should be presented with choices about the learning process. Students are engaged in all aspects of learning and work together with the teacher and her peers to develop a curriculum and evaluation system that allows for individual interests and abilities (Ganly, 2007).

“Your philosophy of education is what you believe about education and the way children learn”                   (Roberson, 2000, p. 4).

Four Philosophies in Assessment

In addition, the ‘constructivist’ school of philosophy, rooted in the Pragmatic pedagogy and branched off from the ‘Social Reconstructivist’ school, has gained much popularity. Around the turn of the century (the early 1990s), many teachers felt the rote memorization and mindless routine that was common at that time was ineffective and began to look for alternate ways to reach their students (Ornstein & Levine, 2003). Through the constructivist approach, “students “construct” knowledge through an interaction between what they already think and know and with new ideas and experiences” (Roberson, 2000, p. 8). This is an active learning process that leads to a deeper understanding of the concepts presented in class and is based on the abilities and readiness of the children rather than set curriculum guidelines. Constructivism “emphasizes socially interactive and process-oriented ‘hands-on’ learning in which students work collaboratively to expand and revise their knowledge base” (Ornstein & Levine, 2003, p. 112). Essentially, knowledge that is shaped by experience is reconstructed, or altered, to assist the student in understanding new concepts (Ornstein & Levine, 2003). You, as the teacher, help the students build the scaffolding they need to maintain the information even after the test is taken and graded.

Once you know how you want to lead your classroom, it is important to consider how to assess your students’ progress. And when we think of school, we automatically consider the threesome subjects, Reading, Writing, and ‘Rithmatic. In all aspects of learning, however, the ability to communicate comes to the forefront. Communication is used in-class discussion as well as unit test short answers. Writing is present in almost all subjects in some form, and writing translates to communication. Richard Fulkerson (2000), in his article “Four Philosophies of Composition,” questions whether “a […] set of four philosophies of composition might exist, each one stressing a different element in the communicative transaction” (p. 3). Fulkerson’s schools of communicative philosophy fall into the following categories:

• Expressionism: a way of writing that demonstrates the students’ thoughts and can be led by “non-directive teachers, some of whom insist that one neither can nor should evaluate writing” or more hands-on teachers who “design classroom activities to maximize student self-discovery” (p. 5). This school of thought emphasizes the student.
• Rhetorical:  this school states that good writing is adapted to achieve a specific reaction from the audience (p. 6). This is focused on the connection between goal and process in completing assignments, and it emphasizes the audience.
• Mimesis:  states that “a clear connection exists between good writing and good thinking” and focuses on logic and reason as exemplified in the completion of assignments (p. 5). This school emphasizes a well-rounded student in that, research, prior knowledge, and the ability to recognize both sides of an argument are necessary for success (p. 6).
• Formalism:  this school focuses primarily on the form of the assignment – it disregards content to the extent that poor grammar can distract the audience from absorbing the content, and therefore, the work is judged “primarily by whether it shows certain internal [mistakes]” (p. 4).

While most teachers fall primarily into one school of composition pedagogy, Fulkerson (2000) points out that it is necessary to hold on to them all when he states “they are not mutually exclusive” (p. 6). The trick is to learn when each is applicable and to what extent it should be employed.

Teaching philosophies are as abundant. How do you narrow the choices down? And even though the difference between one philosophy and the next seems small at the onset, the two are by no means exactly alike. Your classes will be just as diverse. You will have students from all economic classes, with differing levels of language ability, and all bringing various and beautiful experiences to your class. How do you reach each individual?

Knowing who you are as a teacher before you enter the classroom will help significantly. Teaching is so much more than just the content. Teaching is a learning curve on a philosophy that will never be finished. Just as your classroom will change every year, continue to alter your philosophies. See what works for you and your students on a collaborative level.

“A working philosophy is never completely developed, the ultimate working philosophy never reached. We’re always moving toward, hopefully, a more complete, and thus more useful, working philosophy”                   (Apps, 1973, p. 1).

Exercise 1.7 Draft Your Philosophy

While your teaching philosophy will never be finished, now is a good time to start writing one. This will be your first of many drafts. With each domain of teaching that you explore, you should expect that your new understanding will help you further develop and refine your philosophy.

Here are some helpful tools to get started:

Teaching Perspectives Inventory

Teaching Styles Inventory

Teaching Goals Inventory

Statement of Teaching Philosophy – Questions to Consider

Writing Your Teaching Philosophy

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• Foundations of Education. Provided by : SUNY Oneonta Education Department. Retrieved from : https://courses.lumenlearning.com/suny-oneonta-education106/. License : CC BY: Attribution
• What are Education Philosophies?. Authored by : Dionne Nichols. Provided by : Wikibooks. Retrieved from : https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Foundations_of_Education_and_Instructional_Assessment/Educational_Philosophy/Defined. License : CC BY-SA: Attribution-ShareAlike
• Educational Philosophies Self-Assessment. Authored by : LeoNora M. Cohen. Provided by : Oregon State University. Retrieved from : http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/ed416/selfassessment.html. License : All Rights Reserved
• Educational Philosophies Self-Assessment Scoring Guide. Authored by : LeoNora M. Cohen. Provided by : Oregon State University. Retrieved from : http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/ed416/scoringguide.html. License : All Rights Reserved

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Philosophical Issues in Critical Thinking

Critical thinking is active, good-quality thinking. This kind of thinking is initiated by an agent’s desire to decide what to believe, it satisfies relevant norms, and the decision on the matter at hand is reached through the use of available reasons under the control of the thinking agent. In the educational context, critical thinking refers to an educational aim that includes certain skills and abilities to think according to relevant standards and corresponding attitudes, habits, and dispositions to apply those skills to problems the agent wants to solve. The basis of this ideal is the conviction that we ought to be rational. This rationality is manifested through the proper use of reasons that a cognizing agent is able to appreciate. From the philosophical perspective, this fascinating ability to appreciate reasons leads into interesting philosophical problems in epistemology, moral philosophy, and political philosophy. Critical thinking in itself and the educational ideal are closely connected to the idea that we ought to be rational. But why exactly? This profound question seems to contain the elements needed for its solution. To ask why is to ask either for an explanation or for reasons for accepting a claim. Concentrating on the latter, we notice that such a question presupposes that the acceptability of a claim depends on the quality of the reasons that can be given for it: asking this question grants us the claim that we ought to be rational, that is, to make our beliefs fit what we have reason to believe. In the center of this fit are the concepts of knowledge and justified belief. A critical thinker wants to know and strives to achieve the state of knowledge by mentally examining reasons and the relation those reasons bear to candidate beliefs. Both these aspects include fascinating philosophical problems. How does this mental examination bring about knowledge? What is the relation my belief must have to a putative reason for my belief to qualify as knowledge? The appreciation of reason has been a key theme in the writings of the key figures of philosophy of education, but the ideal of individual justifying reasoning is not the sole value that guides educational theory and practice. It is therefore important to discuss tensions this ideal has with other important concepts and values, such as autonomy, liberty, and political justification. For example, given that we take critical thinking to be essential for the liberty and autonomy of an individual, how far can we try to inculcate a student with this ideal when the student rejects it? These issues underline important practical choices an educator has to make.

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Neither Humean nor (Fully) Kantian Be

This chapter offers a reply to Stefaan Cuypers’ explication and critique of the views of rationality and critical thinking laid out in the previous chapters and in earlier work (see his “Critical Thinking, Autonomy and Practical Reason,” 2004). While Cuypers’ discussion is praiseworthy in several respects, it (1) mistakenly attributes to those views a Humean conception of (practical) reason, and (2) unsuccessfully argues that the positions articulated and defended in those earlier chapters lack the resources required to defend the basic claim that critical thinking is a fundamental educational ideal. Cuypers’ analysis also raises deep issues about the motivational character of reasons; I briefly address this matter as well.

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Challenges Facing the Philosophy of Education in the Twenty-First Century

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New trends in the philosophy of education in the twenty-first century have sprung from their background in the twentieth century. This essay introduces the twentieth-century philosophies within Dewey’s early pragmatism and other “ism” movements as well as the educational revolution of analytic philosophy. The twenty-first century has introduced reactions (i.e., new pragmatism, post-structuralism, post-modernism, and constructivism), and each of these trends is shown to have provided a new horizon in philosophical thought on education. However, the new trends are also expected to have their own weaknesses. For instance, Rorty is too quick to reject scientific objectivity, Derrida undermines the roles of agents in favor of taking deconstruction as an event, post-modernists are too quick to reject generality in modern thought, and constructivists ignore the power of reality. Thus, educational thought could learn: from new pragmatism to resist naïve scientism but it should be alert not to ignore the real power of scientific thought; from post-structuralism to put educational structures under scrutiny in terms of educational justice but it should take the role of agents more seriously into account in moderating the power of structures; from post-modernism to be alert to local requirements for education but give similar weight to generality too; and finally from constructivism to embrace creativity in the classroom without replacing the discovery dimension of truth with it altogether.

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Analytical Philosophy of Education: A Critique from Marxist Lens

Introduction: Section 2 – Philosophy of Education: Schools of Thought

Against the spell of modern knowledge: education as multiplicity or the need for focused arbitrariness.

• Philosophy of education
• New pragmatism
• Post-structuralism
• Post-modernism

Constructivism

• Analytic philosophy

The philosophy of education faced challenges in the twentieth century that had derived from the challenges general philosophical thought had faced. The following sections introduce the first three main trends in the philosophy of education in the twentieth century (i.e., early pragmatism, “ism” movements, and analytic philosophy of education) along with the challenges these trends faced. Next, the new horizons for the twenty-first century are explained under the titles of new pragmatism, post-structuralism, post-modernism, and constructivism. In the meantime, new conceptions of knowledge and education along with the weaknesses associated with them are introduced and discussed.

Main Trends in the Twentieth Century

This section introduces the three main trends in the philosophy of education: early pragmatism, “ism” movements, and the analytic philosophy of education revolution.

Early Pragmatism

The philosophical view on education has occurred under different names such as philosophy of faith and philosophy of duty in different places around the world (Burbules, 2000 ). However, the philosophy of education arose as a particular discipline in 1935 with the formation of the John Dewey Society (Kaminsky, 1985 ). Thus, John Dewey can be claimed to be the father of the philosophy of education. This is why Dewey’s early pragmatism was the first source of this discipline.

According to Dewey’s pragmatism, which was inspired by Hegel and Darwin, dichotomies such as individual vs. society, mind vs. body, and theory vs. practice should be removed and ideas should be evaluated in terms of their practical consequences during the process of adjustment. Dewey held that the aim of education should be connected to the problematic situation in which students exist. As the aim of education, growth indicates that pupils need to have their end results in view in terms of the problems that should be solved. In this endeavor, methods of problem solving are much more important than absorbing cultural content for the sake of subject matters. This endeavor also needs to be conducted democratically, namely by providing all students with the opportunity to participate in the process of problem solving.

Even though Dewey attempted to eliminate the dichotomies in philosophical as well as educational thought, his emphasis on method of thinking in contrast to the cultural content of thoughts became the Achilles’ heel of his philosophy of education. Inspired by the scientific method, Dewey’s ( 1933 ) book How We Think suggested the best way to think in education to be the experimental method; Dewey formulated this as the method of problem solving being applicable to all realms of education. As the next section will show, post-modern thinkers have undermined the supremacy of the scientific method in thought as well as education. In particular, Richard Rorty ( 1991 ), a new pragmatist who once temporarily described himself as post-modern, attacked Dewey’s view on the supremacy of the scientific method.

Another challenge to Dewey’s reliance on science came from the new pragmatist Willard Quine ( 1981 ). He held an even stronger holistic view on knowledge than Dewey’s. As explained below, Quine’s holistic view undermined the supremacy of evidence on theory; instead holding a two-way road in which evidence has as much power to restrain or reject theory as theory does to restrain or reject evidence.

The “Ism” Movements

New movements appeared during the 1950s and 1960s. These movements are usually referred to as “isms” based on various philosophical schools being taken as a foundation in order to provide educational implications for dealing with educational problems. Thus, educational philosophies were introduced under titles such as idealism, realism, existentialism, and more. Based on these schools’ philosophical assumptions, certain aims, subject matters, and methods were suggested for education. For example, Harry Broudy is one important figure who used realism as the basis for inferring educational implications. He referred to the derivative method as the main method for drawing such implications (Broudy, 1969 , p. 118). William Frankena ( 1966 ) also suggested that Aristotle’s practical syllogism could be used for analyzing educational affairs in terms of their philosophical underpinnings. According to him, one can start the analysis regressively from educational methods, subject matters, and aims toward their underlying philosophical assumptions. In this way, how educational questions are answered is made clear by drawing philosophical implications (Bagheri Noaparast, 2016 ).

Taking philosophical schools as the basis for inferring implications also resulted in some difficulties being encountered in dealing with educational issues. The strong version of this inferential view providing a merely speculative attempt at dealing with educational problems undermined education’s empirical aspect. This weakness was the main problem for the “ism” movements. For instance, Sidney Hook ( 1969 ) attacked this view, accusing it of saying irrelevant things about education. He claimed that nobody would be able to infer new knowledge about learning from the epistemologies of the philosophical schools.

As mentioned above, the analytic philosophy of education was another source of the attack on the “ism” movements. According to the analytic view, the general task of philosophy, in particular the philosophy of education, was not to take the position of science, especially not the science of education.

The Revolution of the Analytic Philosophy of Education

The 1970s witnessed the climax of a so-called revolution in the philosophy of education brought about by the analytic philosophers of education. The analytic philosophy of education relied upon a general revolution in philosophy that, according to Gilbert Ryle ( 1956 ), had been in process since the beginning of the twentieth century. The transformation of analytic philosophy was called the second revolution in philosophy, the first being the one that had advanced with the rise of modern philosophy, particularly by Descartes.

Analytic philosophers of education take the philosophical inquiry as a second-order inquiry dealing with the language of education rather than educational activities per se. Thus, this trend in the philosophy of education looked to clarify educational concepts in order to help educationists understand and use educational terms properly and thereby avoid pitfalls in educational endeavors. Given the misuse of concepts such as teaching, punishment, and evaluation in educational settings, the analytic philosophy of education provided educationists with a therapeutic attempt by appealing to the educational damage they can prevent.

As Burbules ( 2000 ) pointed out, the analytic philosophy of education has had three important contributions. Firstly, it provided education with credibility and legitimacy. Credibility was due to the significant position that the analytic method had generally taken in philosophy and been transmitted to the educational sphere. Legitimacy was due to showing the analytic method’s usefulness in education for analyzing educational concepts. As an example, Richard Peters ( 1967 ) analyzed the concept of authority to show the times when a teacher can have a justified/unjustified authority. By differentiating between having authority and being an authority, he showed justified authority to be internal in teachers in terms of their knowledge and character whereas unjustified authority is external to teachers in terms of their title and position.

According to Burbules ( 2000 ), the analytic philosophy of education secondly broke the dominance Dewey and progressivism had in the philosophy of education by introducing a new view to education in terms of concept analysis.

Thirdly, the analytic philosophy of education was successful in defeating the deductive view associated with the “ism” movements. While teachers had been urged to choose their own philosophy among the philosophical schools in these movements, the analytic view stated that what teachers need is not to choose a philosophical school for drawing implications but rather to be able to think philosophically (i.e., analytically) on educational issues.

Two sources of challenges are found in the analytic philosophy of education: one from the inside and the other from the outside of the analytic tradition. The attack from the inside came from the towering figure of analytic philosophy, Ludwig Wittgenstein, who in his later period of thought rejected analytic philosophy’s claim of having a particular method of analysis. Unlike the early analytic philosophers who took mathematical logic as the criterion for analysis, Wittgenstein ( 1953 ) gave supremacy to ordinary language and denied logic’s dominance over ordinary language.

The outer source of the challenges to analytic philosophy came from its rival: continental philosophy. This source, which is referred to as a post-analytic philosophy, involves the different trends in Continental philosophy (e.g., post-structural and post-modern philosophy). Even though an attempt was made to have a conversation between the two traditions of European philosophy in 1958 in the Royaumont Colloquium in France, this attempt is mostly considered to have been fruitless. Michael Dummett ( 1993 , p. 26) stated that analytical philosophy and phenomenology are like the two European rivers, the Rhine and the Danube, that “rise quite close to one another and for a time pursue roughly parallel courses, only to diverge in utterly different directions and flow into different seas.” This rivalry led to continental philosophy’s revenge over analytic philosophy at the end of the twentieth century due to the arrogance the latter had shown in relation to the former because of having a noble philosophical method. Thus, the end of the twentieth century witnessed the rise of rival philosophies of education in terms of the continental philosophies’ concerns.

New Horizons in the Twenty-First Century

This section explains the responses to the above-mentioned challenges under the rubrics of new pragmatism, post-structuralism, and post-modernism.

New Pragmatism

The two most important figures in new pragmatism are Ricard Rorty and Willard Quine. Both of them challenged Dewey’s pragmatism in terms of its conception of science. However, while Rorty undermined Dewey’s reliance on scientific method altogether, Quine provided early pragmatism with an elaborated conception of science.

As for Rorty, the main weakness of early pragmatism was its reliance on the scientific method. In his essay titled “Pragmatism Without Method,” Rorty ( 1991 ) held that pragmatism would be more promising if it put aside its obsession with method. Instead of a rigorous scientific method, Rorty suggested that communication and looking for some better ways for conversation is what is needed in philosophy as well as education.

Inspired by Hans Gadamer’s conception of Bildung [self-formation], Rorty looked for a desirable conception of education. Referring to his preferred conception as “edification,” he stated, “Since ‘education’ sounds a bit too flat, and Bildung a bit too foreign, I shall use ‘edification’ to stand for this project of finding new, better, more interesting, more fruitful ways of speaking” (Rorty, 1979 , p. 360). Rory clearly saw a new way to speak about the lost element in education and gave edification two dimensions. One dimension indicates the edification of others and their cultures, which he referred to as hermeneutical activity. In this activity, what is needed is the ability to make the unfamiliar familiar. In other words, an educated person should have the ability to understand unfamiliar cultures instead of being closed minded in their own cultural conceptions.

The second dimension of edification consists of edifying oneself. Rorty referred to this dimension as poetic activity, by which he means the ability to make the familiar unfamiliar. In other words, a person with a university-level education should be able to question the basics of one’s own cultural concepts and criticize them more profoundly. The desirable person at this level of education is called the “liberal ironist.”

As far as the pre-university education is concerned, Rorty ( 1989 ) criticized Dewey’s extreme emphasis on teaching and learning the problem-solving method. According to Rorty, however, learning cultural content is crucial in this period of education so that one might call the education of this period enculturation. Rorty puts himself on the side of E. D. Hirsch in his controversy with Dewey on supporting content vs. method. In a conversation with Olson in response to the question, “Do you share E. D. Hirsch’s desire for increased ‘cultural literacy,’ a sharing of a common vocabulary and a common body of knowledge?” Rorty responded, “Yes, I think he’s perfectly right about that. The effect of the present system is to keep education for kids from relatively well-educated, middle-class families who pick up the common knowledge of society as a whole” (Olson, 1989 , p. 7).

Quine’s ( 1981 ) version of the new pragmatism centers its attention on the negligence of a whole-hearted holism. According to Quine, neither Dewey nor the other founders of early pragmatism (i.e., Charles Peirce and William James) took the holistic characteristic of knowledge seriously. In line with his rejection of the foundational theory of epistemology, Quine believed a tendency of strong coherence to exist in our knowledge and so talked about the theory of coherence of evidence. According to this view, no supremacy exists for the scientific method, rather a strong interaction is found between theory and experimental evidence so that they compromise with each other in order to keep the coherence of knowledge intact.

In looking for the consequences of Quine’s view on education, Walker and Evers ( 1982 ) suggested that any form of compartmentalization of knowledge, such as Paul Hirst’s ( 1974 ) forms of knowledge, is unacceptable, accordingly rejecting the distinction among disciplines and the search for a pluralistic methodology for different disciplines. Instead, knowledge should be taken to be in Quine’s ( 1966 , p. 56) words a “single sprawling system, loosely connected in some portions but no disconnected nowhere.” This requires a very strong problem-based education in which the distinction among subjects is taken to be artificial. Instead of holding serious epistemological gaps among disciplines, any division among subjects is only acceptable when looking for practical utility. Such a practical utility can be seen in how libraries separate books for finding them more easily. Thus, curriculum design in terms of subject matter is allowed only if doing so has a practical utility.

As far as Rorty’s new pragmatism is concerned, his suggested dichotomies appear indefensible. Rorty placed solidarity against the objectivity of science, supporting the former and undermining the latter. The question is why did he consider these two poles to be incompatible? In addition, he drew a clear-cut relation between pre-university enculturation and the edification of university education. The question here is how can a university student all of a sudden become a hard critic or liberal ironist without a background on critique during their pre-university education? I have dealt with these questions elsewhere and shown that they refer to some weaknesses in Rorty’s view (Bagheri Noaparast, 2014 ).

Post-Structuralism

One of continental philosophy’s reactions to the analytic philosophy of education is post-structuralism. The two important proponents of this view are Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida. Foucault’s views on archeology and genealogy have led to numerous studies on knowledge and power relations in education as well as the problematization of normalization in education (e.g., Gale, 2001 ; Macfarlane & Lewis, 2004 ). In what follows, I am going to mention Derrida’s influence in more detail.

Derrida ( 1983 ) critiqued the Enlightenment on the grounds of its severe distinction between reason and tradition. He talked about a New Enlightenment that removed the hard contrast between reason and tradition. According to Derrida, if the old Enlightenment assumed reason to be faith, this was because of its hard rejection of faith alongside tradition and a compensation for the void due to this rejection. In fact, Derrida ( 1995 , p. 130) combined fidelity and infidelity within tradition, stating, “We have gotten more than we think we know from ‘tradition,’ but the scene of the gift also obligates us to a kind of filial lack of piety, at once serious and not so serious, as regards the thinking to which we have the greatest debt.”

This point refers to Derrida’s key concept of deconstruction. Even though giving a clear definition of this term is too difficult, it indicates that structures are usually built upon a rejection of one element in favor of another one. However, justice that is somehow equal to deconstruction requires the rejected element being revived in a new guise. Thus, justice cannot be deconstructed; rather justice is the criterion for deconstruction, or in Derrida’s words, “Deconstruction is justice” (Derrida, 1992 , p. 15).

The basic concept of deconstruction has inspired educational studies. Accordingly, a suppressed element is always found in educational systems and their elements such as curriculum. This suppression develops during the process of deconstructing the foundational change in the educational system, mostly as an inevitable event.

The other important point in Derrida’s view is the centrality of text, as he stated that nothing exists outside of the text ( Il n'y a pas de hors-text ; Derrida, 1976 , p. 159). Accordingly, the reference is not outside the text but inside and undecidable. Plato regarded the art as a second mimesis because the artist imitates nature, which itself is an imitation of ideas. Along this line, Derrida talked about the simulacrum, a copy of copy but one for which there is no original reference (i.e., a double invagination). Accordingly, knowledge does not refer to the bare facts beyond it. Thus, Derrida ( 1981 , pp. 193–194) in a play with words stated knowledge to be not an “insight” but an “ in cit ation.” This conception of knowledge provides teachers as well as pupils with a cautious treatment of texts instead of a certainty with regard to knowledge that is considered written.

Derrida’s influence on the philosophy of education can also be investigated, particularly in the realm of values (Trifonas, 2004 ). This is because, as mentioned above, deconstruction is more tightly related to justice. As an example, a study was advanced by Biesta ( 2001 ) with regard to children’s rights that analyzed official international documents about children’s rights in terms of their natural rights. However, Biesta showed that children have no natural rights; what is taken as natural is only the situation of children with a high quality of life. In the meantime, what is suppressed and hidden is the rights of street children in third world countries. Having done this deconstruction, Biesta concluded with a new concept of children’s rights in a local meaning that would include both first world as well as third world countries’ children. This is in accordance with what is called a quasi-transcendental analysis in which street children’s rights are both the possibility and impossibility of talking about children’s world rights.

Another example of a deconstructive study was performed on religious education (Bagheri Noaparast & Khosravi, 2011 ). This study argued the dominant sphere of exclusivity in most religions and religious education to be due to other religions being suppressed. However, the proclaimed truth for any religion was made clear to be at the expense of the rejection of other religions through the deconstruction. Again in another quasi-transcendental analysis, a conception of religion and religious education is suggested that emphasizes the commonalities of religions.

In the case of Derrida’s post-structuralism, a question occurs as to what deconstruction amounts to. The dominant conception in Derrida’s writings is that deconstruction is an event. I have argued his writing to have some indications to the effect that deconstruction may be taken as an action in addition to being an event. In fact, if one wants to combine these two aspects, deconstruction can be referred to as a timely action with time indicating an aspect of the event (Bagheri Noaparast & Khosravi, 2012 ).

Post-Modernism

Post-modernism is not actually a coherent system of thought compared to pragmatism; it is instead a coalition in which having a common enemy is pivotal. In other words, this term is mainly negative in tone, which entails a negation of modernity. For this reason, post-modern thinkers can include Marxists, feminists, new pragmatists, and post-structuralists.

The most important characteristics of modernity are as follows:

Centrality of the subject, as derived from the Cogito of Descartes;

An absolute and universal conception of rationality and, in consequence, looking for grand narratives of human affairs; this is associated with the idea of progress in human history, as these ideas can be seen in the thoughts of Kant, Hegel, and Marx.

A strong reliance on science as the most important instrument of progress;

Rejecting tradition and old things and embracing new/modern things.

Thus, roughly speaking, a post-modern thought indicates the following characteristics:

Decentering the subject as it can be viewed in structuralism and post-structuralism;

Rejecting any grand narrative, which Jean-Francois Lyotard ( 1979 ) who coined the concept of post-modernism took it as the main mark of post-modernism. As a consequence of this rejection, post-modern thinkers embrace the local rationality that is associated with reasonability. While rationality indicates a universal characteristic, reasonability has contextual connotations.

An almost negative attitude toward the supremacy of science as elaborated upon by Rorty.

Embracing traditions along with edifying them as seen in Derrida’s remarks on what he called the new Enlightenment.

Post-modern thinkers have critiqued modern education on various grounds. Henry Giroux ( 1988 ), a left-wing thinker, rejected the idea of teaching in terms of techniques and instead talked about teachers as intellectuals who need to have a political position in undermining the ideology (i.e., false consciousness) derived from late capitalism and to retain its dominance in educational matters.

Along this line of critique, Robert Scholes ( 1987 ) differentiated three kinds of book reading in schools: reading within, in which the information within a book is received; reading upon, which indicates going beyond the text and looking for an inter-textual relationship that provides pupils with an interpretation of the text concerned; and lastly reading against, in which a critical position is taken about the text by looking for its presuppositions and deconstructing it.

Another important element in post-modern thinking about education concerns the “other.” The dominance of a higher culture is undermined alongside the rejection of universal rationality. Associating this culture with white men has become mainstream (male-stream) and is the means by which local cultures are marginalized. Putting emphasis on local and minor cultures, post-modern thinkers have talked about voice and border pedagogies, in which the “other” comes from the margin to the center of attention (Aronowitz & Giroux, 1991 , Ch. 5).

Aronowitz ( 2004 ) also emphasized edifying tradition instead of rejecting it altogether as the opposite of the modern. Citing Hannah Arendt, he stated, “I agree with Hannah Arendt that education ‘cannot forgo either authority or tradition.’ But authority must be earned rather than assumed, and the transmission of tradition needs to be critical rather than worshipful” (p. 32). This shows that the relation to tradition needs to be twofold, a simultaneous acceptance and critique.

Post-modernism generally seems to be too quick to reject the modern tendency toward objectivity. This has led post-modernism to a strong relativism associated with constructivism. I have argued elsewhere (Bagheri Noaparast, 2018 ) that post-modernism is self-defeating in its rejection of objectivity and realism related to modern thought. This is because one should accept humans as a constructive being. In other words, the very statement of human being as a constructive being is not itself a construct or subjective. To put it in Tarskian phrasing, one can say “‘The human is a constructive being' is true if and only if the humans is a constructive being.”

Immanuel Kant laid down the basis of constructivism when he stated that sense data should be organized by the categories of human understanding; otherwise, sense without understanding would be blind. In the more recent times, a milestone in constructivism was Nelson Goodman’s Ways of Worldmaking in 1978. Goodman formulated his argument in this regard as the inevitability of frame of reference: “If I ask about the world, you can offer to tell me how it is under one or more frames of reference; but if I insist that you tell me how it is apart from all frames, what can you say?” (Goodman, 1978 , pp. 2–3).

Goodman held that we are making our world in terms of our frames of reference, which always intervene between us and the world as it is. The world as it is (i.e., World 1) is not “our” world; the latter is what we make by means of our frames of reference, which can be referred to as World 2.

According to constructivism, knowledge is composed of the constructs that have shown themselves to be “viable” (von Glasersfeld, 1993 , p. 26). Viability is the constructivist’s alternative to the truth of knowledge. In other words, constructs cannot be evaluated in terms of correspondence to reality; they can only be judged as viable or working in relation to answering one’s needs. In addition, Desautels and Larochelle ( 1990 , p. 236) held that scientific knowledge is made to give meaning to our theory-laden observations, and no such thing as the Great Book of Nature exists that our theories can consult in order to provide correspondence to reality.

Based on the account that constructivism gives regarding human knowledge, education should be concerned about pupils constructing knowledge rather than transmitting the already discovered knowledge. This is because knowledge is invented rather than discovered. Thus, constructivism requires pupils to be active in suggesting new constructs or evaluating the viability of what is called knowledge. Jean Piaget ( 1972 ) was a pioneer in showing mathematics to be rooted first in children’s coordinated actions and to appear as concrete operations and then abstract operations. Accordingly, teaching and learning mathematics should not be conducted verbally; rather, the activity and manipulation of children is the right way in this regard.

As for constructivism, particularly its radical version, the most important weakness goes back to its subjectivism and affinity with idealism. By concentrating on Goodman’s position as the milestone of constructivism, one might say that Goodman did not escape the reality understood as World 1. However, he treated this world ambiguously and sometimes paradoxically; as such, he might be misunderstood. This can be seen in his argument “no perception without conception.” In giving this argument, Goodman was appealing to idealists. Even though his unrealism does not indicate him as an idealist, he did take idealism as an important background and support for his argument against realists:

The overwhelming case against perception without conception, the pure given, absolute immediacy, the innocent eye, substance as substratum, has been so fully and frequently set forth—by Berkeley, Kant, Cassirer, Gombrich, Bruner, and many others—as to need no restatement here. Talk of unstructured content or an unconceptualized given or a substratum without properties is self-defeating for the talk imposes structure, conceptualizes, ascribes properties. (Goodman, 1996 , p. 65)

I have two comments on this passage. First, if any kind of talk about unstructured content is self-defeating, then Goodman himself gives the same self-defeating talk when he refers to World 1 as “the world well-lost.” (Goodman, 1978 , p. 4). Anyway, this talk turns the lost world into a found world due to describing it with the label of the lost world. But if Goodman considers the use of such a phrase to be legitimate or takes it to be a non-descriptive description, then the same should be admitted for the talk about unstructured content.

Second, from among the idealists whom Goodman takes as his supports, Kant has shown that idealism itself needs to be supported by a kind of realism. As Philips pointed out, Kant ( 1929 , pp. 345–348) differentiated between transcendental idealism and transcendental realism on one hand and empirical idealism and empirical realism on the other in his Critique of Pure Reason . Empirical realism indicates that an external world exists with material objects in space and time, while the empirical idealist denies the existence of such a world. The transcendental idealist denies that external objects have an existence independent of the senses. Kant holds that transcendental idealism is compatible with empirical realism but that transcendental realism leads to empirical idealism. This is because the transcendental realist holds that objects of the senses have an existence independent of the senses, whereas he cannot deny objects of the senses being dependent on us (Philips, 1978 , p. 58).

The question to be asked from Goodman is whether he can admit the combination of his constructivism with an empirical realism like that of Kant. If not, then he should embrace skepticism or solipsism.

Goodman, along with idealists and constructivists, has shown that the mind matters when taking human knowledge into account as he puts emphasis on the frame of reference in talking about reality. Accordingly, we cannot escape our frames of reference. In other words, we are bound up in the world (or worlds) of our frames of reference. However, admitting that we are in the prison of the Kantian world does not indicate that we are living in illusive worlds. What this indicates is only that World 1 cannot be experienced as it is without being modified by our frames of reference in the first place. Our World 2 (i.e., right versions of World 1) is made up not in a vacuum but in relation to World 1. Thus, the viability of our constructs or workability of our maps is dependent on the reality of World 1, as this viability is dependent on the construct or the map itself because, after all, the construct is what is viable and the map is what works.

Given that our right versions (i.e., World 2) are related to World 1, this relation is the one in which they are considered to be right, and we have different right versions, logic follows that the compatibility of our right versions implies that they are supported one way or another by World 1. This support might be what Rescher ( 1987 ) referred to as the error tolerance of nature, as is seen in the case of the flat Earth theory. To follow Rescher’s phrasing, the support may occur through what I term as the “difference tolerance” of nature, as is seen in how different ways exist for defining the points and lines mentioned above. Still, a third way of support is what may be termed as “impaired objectivity.” Take the example of a man with impaired vision who systematically sees one thing doubled. He truly cannot see things as they are, but given that he systematically sees one thing as two and two as four ad infinitum, then he holds an impaired objectivity in his perceptions. Living in a Kantian world, we might nevertheless be considered like this man with impaired objective perception and knowledge. On the whole, our right versions need not correspond straightforwardly to the reality of World 1 to be considered right, but they are not needless of its support in any way.

Our different right versions, having different languages and being irreducible of one another, can be in harmony with each other. This harmonious relationship can be grasped in terms of different aspects of one reality, with each being approached from a distinct perspective. Interdisciplinary research has made this kind of relationship reasonable.

As each right version in World 2 is a version of World 1 in the final analysis, the harmonious relationship among the right versions will also be a version of World 1. In other words, the mono-reality of our right versions is an indication of the mono-reality of World 1. At the same time, the mono-reality of our right versions is not a reduction as it does not force us to eradicate the language differences pertaining to the right versions; we are only forced to take a higher mono-realistic stance.

What we seem to need in our future philosophy of education is a complicated combination between the subjective and objective aspects of mind, education, and culture. Finding the optimum point of balance between these two aspects has been the target of many thinkers, but its time is still to come.

Although the new trends in philosophy of education have their own weaknesses, they have provided educational thought with new directions. Let's have a look at some examples from these new trends.

First is the new pragmatism. One important area from the pragmatist point of view that has influenced the idea of curriculum since Dewey has been the concept of democracy. Dewey ( 1916 ) in his important book, Democracy and Education , revealed the connection and proximity between democracy and education. Dewey’s basic concept in this regard, namely individuals’ shared experience in dealing with and solving problems, has paved the way for a specific approach in curricula. Accordingly, curricula should be centered on the common problems individuals have during their shared experiences; consequently, special emphasis should be placed on the common interests and problems individuals have and their contributions in solving them, not on matters such as disciplines, books, lessons, or the like.

From the point of view of new pragmatism, revisions have been made to Dewey’s concept of democracy and its implications for curricula. Jim Walker ( 1987 ) addressed these revisions, and his main point is that, from the point of view of new pragmatism, criticisms are found regarding Dewey’s classical pragmatist ideas.

Due to these criticisms, Walker assigned a different role to democracy in curriculum planning.

According to Walker, Dewey believed that democracy depends on the shared experiences between individuals. In other words, he saw democracy as requiring individuals to have an active and dynamic relationship with each other in order to solve problems. Dewey, while skeptical of the need for a state, generally acknowledged that the modern nation-state framework was itself the basis for shared experiences between individuals. However, the critique on Dewey’s view in this regard is that the relationship between individuals’ shared experiences and the realities of government power in present-day societies is so complex that it does not necessarily allow for shared experiences between individuals. From the perspective of educational curricula, this has led to a kind of centralized government-run policy. According to Walker, shared experiences between individuals are impossible in today’s large and complex societies, especially because government and power relations can be other obstacles. However, despite democracy as a community of individuals being impossible, we are able to talk about a community of organizations.

Another point in Walker’s ( 1987 ) view regards educational planning. According to Walker, trusted groups evidently include parents and students’ representatives, and when students reach legal age or possibly after the stage of compulsory education, the majority of delegates should be students who determine the curriculum. The compulsory education stage has no need for a patriarchal curriculum, but the existence of optional units in a curriculum may prevent such a relationship. In addition, the general education curriculum should address common issues that stakeholders (parents and students) face; this can lead to a common curriculum, one that should not be considered the same as the core curriculum because in the former, special attention is given to stakeholders’ common issues while the latter is determined by experts and focuses on different topics in different sciences.

As for the influence post-structuralism has had on educational thought, one good example is Michel Foucault’s view. As Roger Deacon ( 2006 ) pointed out, Foucault’s studies have provided educational thought with new concepts (e.g., discipline and problematization), analytical techniques (e.g., archaeology and genealogy), and arguments (e.g., in terms of knowledge/power relations). Let’s consider a type of knowledge/power analysis. According to Foucault ( 1977 ), knowledge is intertwined with power, even though not necessarily always in a detrimental way. This idea leads to the notion of normalization, for which educational settings are the most appropriate. During normalization, individual differences are not so much tolerated, particularly those of individuals who might be in sharp contrast or critical to the existing settings. The destruction of existing norms is not necessarily always abnormal; rather it might exceed norms and formalities. However, the process of normalization regards geniuses and critical people in line with abnormal and anti-social persons. The important point that Foucault referred to is that power in combination with knowledge can punish students in elegant ways that are apparently non-violent. However, pushing students softly toward norms and formalities by means of things such as the laws of learning discovered by psychological knowledge can be as harmful to students’ psychology as violent methods are.

Post-modern thought has also provided education with change. As Usher and Edwards ( 1994 , pp. 1–2) claimed, post-modernism provided a different way of seeing things and an ironical, self-referential state of mind. In terms of this new way of seeing things, clear-cut distinctions are blurred, and a relativistic viewpoint is advanced. Thus, the absolute supremacy of things like male over female, whites over blacks, self over “other” is rejected. Even though this relativism is a double-edged sword, the positive side of post-modern thinking in supporting the oppressed and justice is admirable. Thus, post-modern thought provides a manifesto that, as Parker ( 1997 ) identified, requires us to be reflective educationists in order to provide a space for other voices.

Constructivism has also provided educational thought with new ideas. For example, Von Glasersfeld ( 1989 ) emphasized the construction of knowledge in the human mind in the direction of his extreme constructivism. According to this view on education, the teacher should try to create unbalanced conditions to motivate students to build knowledge in order to regain balance rather than try to convey information to students. In the lessons of history, constructivists believe in replacing teacher lecturing with student inquiry. In addition, creating a sense of empathy in students with historical figures and people participating in each event appears necessary due to the importance of storytelling and the construction of new historical narratives consistent with sources. According to Orril and Shapiro ( 2005 , p. 738), the lessons of history require sympathy, imagination, and emotion on the part of the student because of their special dependence on humanity. Constructivists’ emphasis on storytelling as a historian’s task highlights the need for strong imagination to process historical narratives.

All these new trends in the philosophy of education need to be examined over the processes of time, particularly in terms of their strengths and weaknesses as addressed above.

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Bagheri Noaparast, K. (2022). Challenges Facing the Philosophy of Education in the Twenty-First Century. In: Alpaydın, Y., Demirli, C. (eds) Educational Theory in the 21st Century. Maarif Global Education Series. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-9640-4_1

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5.1 Philosophical Methods for Discovering Truth

Learning objectives.

By the end of this section, you will be able to:

• Describe the role that dialectics plays in logic and reasoning.
• Define “argument” and “negation of a argument.”
• Define the laws of noncontradiction and the excluded middle.

Like most academic disciplines, the goal of philosophy is to get closer to the truth. Logic, reasoning, and argumentation are the predominant methods used. But unlike many other disciplines, philosophy does not contain a large body of accepted truths or canonical knowledge. Indeed, philosophy is often known for its uncertainty because it focuses on questions for which we do not yet have ways of definitively answering. The influential 20th-century philosopher Bertrand Russell explains that “as soon as definite knowledge concerning any subject becomes possible, the subject ceases to be called philosophy, and becomes a separate science” (1912, 240).

Because philosophy focuses on questions we do not yet have ways of definitively answering, it is as much a method of thinking as it is a body of knowledge. And logic is central to this method. Thinking like a philosopher involves thinking critically about alternative possibilities. To answer the question of whether there is a God (a question for which we lack a definitive method of answering), we can look at things we believe we know and then critically work through what those ideas entail about the existence or possible characteristics of God. We can also imagine God exists or God does not exist and then reason through what either possibility implies about the world. In imagining alternative possibilities, we must critically work through what each possibility must entail. Changing one belief can set off a cascade of implications for further beliefs, altering much of what we accept as true. And so, in studying philosophy, we need to get used to the possibility that our beliefs could be wrong. We use reason to do philosophy, and logic is the study of reason. Hence, logic helps us get closer to the truth.

Dialectics and Philosophical Argumentation

Philosophers love to argue. But this love does not mean that philosophy lectures are loud, contentious events. Most people think of an argument as a verbal disagreement, and the term evokes images of raised voices, heightened emotions, and possibly bad behavior. However, in philosophy, this word does not have a negative connotation. An argument in philosophy is a reasoned position—to argue is simply to offer a set of reasons in support of some conclusion. The goal of an individual argument is to support a conclusion. However, the long-term goal of argumentation between philosophers is to get closer to the truth. In contemporary academic philosophy, philosophers are engaged in dialogue with each other where they offer arguments in the publication of articles. Philosophers also engage in argument at conferences and in paper presentations and lectures. In this way, contemporary academic philosophers are engaged in a dialectic of sorts.

A traditional dialectic is a debate or discussion between at least two people who hold differing views. But unlike debate, participants in the discussion do not have the goal of “winning,” or proving that the other view is wrong. Rather, the goal is to get closer to the truth. Thus, dialectics make use of logic and reason, while debates often use rhetorical ploys or appeal to the emotions. Because of the tendency of participants to appeal to emotion and prejudice in many modern popular debates, philosophers often qualify their words and refer to reasoned debate when discussing proper public discourse between people. But even reasoned debates can become adversarial, while dialectics are mostly collaborative. The participants in a dialectic, whom philosophers refer to as “interlocutors,” enter into discourse with the aim of trading their poor or false beliefs for knowledge.

Dialectics usually start with a question. An interlocutor offers an answer to the question, which is then scrutinized by all participants. Reasons against the answer are given, and someone may offer a counterexample to the answer—that is, a case that illustrates that the answer is wrong. The interlocutors will then analyze why the answer is wrong and try to locate its weakness. The interlocutors may also examine what made the answer plausible in the first place. Next, someone offers another answer to the question—possibly a refined version of the previous answer that has been adjusted in light of the weaknesses and strengths identified in the analysis. This process is repeated over and over, with each iteration theoretically bringing participants closer to the truth.

While dialectics aims at the truth, the creation of knowledge is not its sole function. For example, a long, deep conversation with a friend about the meaning of life should not be viewed as a failure if you do not come up with a satisfactory answer to life’s purpose. In this instance, the process has as much value as the aim (getting closer to the truth). Contemporary academic philosophers view their practice in the same way.

Indian Dialectics and Debate

Dialectics played an important role in early Indian philosophy . The earliest known philosophical writings originate in India as sections of the Vedas , which have been dated as far back as 1500 BCE (Mark 2020). The Vedas are often considered religious texts, but it is more accurate to think of them as religious and philosophical texts since they explore what it means to be a human being, discuss the purpose and function of the mind, and attempt to identify the goal of life. The Upanishads , which are the most philosophical of the Vedic texts, often take the form of dialogues. These dialogues generally occur between two participants—one who knows a truth and the other who seeks to know and understand the truth. The Vedic dialectics explore fundamental concepts such as Brahman (the One without a second, which includes the universe as its manifestation), dharma (an individual’s purpose and duty), and atman (an individual’s higher self). As in many dialectics, questioning, reasoning, and realizations that arise through the dialogue are the aim of these texts.

Buddhist philosophical texts that were part of early Indian philosophy also contain narrative dialogues (Gillon 2021). Logical argumentation is evident in these, and as time progressed, texts became more focused on argument, particularly those relying on analogical reasoning, or the use of analogies. Analogies use an object that is known to draw inferences about other similar objects. Over time, the analogical arguments used in Buddhist texts took on structure . When arguments have structure, they rely on a form that captures a specific manner of reasoning, such that the reasoning can be schematized. The structure of arguments in classical Indian texts appears slightly different than in classical Western texts of logic. Below is an example of the canonical form of an argument about the nature of the soul from the Caraka-samhita (CS 3.8.31) (Gillon 2021). First, the canonical form identifies components to the argument:

Claim: The soul is eternal. Reason: because it is unproduced. Example: Space is unproduced and it is eternal. Application: Just as space is unproduced, so is the soul. Conclusion: Therefore, the soul is eternal.

Here, the text makes an analogy between space and the soul, where space exemplifies a necessary relationship between being unproduced and being eternal. We may imagine the argument in a slightly different form:

• The soul is unproduced.
• As in the case of space, whatever is unproduced is also eternal.
• Therefore, the soul is eternal.

This argument form gives us a scheme that could be applied to many different cases:

• X has property P.
• Y is a paradigmatic example of something that has property P. Y also has property S, where P is the cause of S.
• Therefore, X has property S because it has property P.

As you will see later in the section on deductive argumentation, relying on argumentative structure is a feature of logical reasoning.

Classical Indian philosophical texts also refer to the occurrence of reasoned public debates. Public debate was a further method of rational inquiry and likely the main mode of rational inquiry that most people had access to. One mode of debate took the form of assemblies in which experts considered specific topics, including those in politics and law (Gillon 2021). Arguments are the public expression of private inferences, and only by exposing one’s private thoughts through argument can they be tested. Public arguments are a method to improve one’s reasoning when it is scrutinized by others.

Greek Dialectics and Debate

Ancient Greek philosophy is also known for its use of dialectic and debate. Socrates , perhaps the most famous ancient Greek philosopher, claimed that knowledge is true opinion backed by argument (Plato, Meno ). “Opinion” here means unjustified belief: your beliefs could be true, but they cannot count as knowledge unless you have reasons for them and can offer justifications for your beliefs when questioned by others. Furthermore, Socrates’s method of gaining knowledge was to engage in dialectics with others. All of what we know about Socrates is through the writings of others—particularly the writings of Plato . Quite appropriately, Plato uses dialogues in all his works, in which Socrates is almost always a participant.

Socrates never wrote anything down. In the Phaedrus , one of Plato’s dialogues, Socrates criticizes written works as being a dead discourse of sorts. Books cannot respond to you when you ask questions. He states, “You’d think they were speaking as if they had some understanding, but if you question anything that has been said because you want to learn more, it continues to signify just the very same thing forever” ( Phaedrus , 275e). Clearly, dialectics was central to Socrates’s philosophical method.

Connections

Learn more about Socrates in the introduction to philosophy chapter .

Plato’s dialogues are a testament to the importance of public discourse as a form of rational inquiry in ancient Greece. Based on Greek philosophical writings, we can assume reasoned public debate took place and that Socrates preferred it as a method of teaching and learning. In Plato’s dialogues, many questions are asked, and Socrates’s interlocutors offer answers to which Socrates asks further clarifying questions. Through the process of questioning, false beliefs and inadequate understanding are exposed. Socrates’s goal was not simply to offer people truth. Rather, through questioning, Socrates guides people to discover the truth on their own, provided they are willing to keep an open mind and admit, when necessary, that they are in the wrong. In Plato’s dialogues, participants don’t always land on a determinate answer, but they as well as readers are always left with a clearer understanding of the correct way to reason .

If any ancient Greek philosopher most embodies the tie between dialectic and logic, it is Aristotle (c. 384–322 BCE), who was a student of Plato. Aristotle wrote books on the art of dialectic (Smith 2020). And he probably participated in gymnastic dialectic—a structured dialectic contest practiced in the Academy (the school founded by Plato, which Aristotle attended). But more importantly, Aristotle created a complex system of logic upon which skill in the art of dialectic relied. Aristotle’s logic is the earliest formal systematized account of inference we know of and was considered the most accurate and complete system until the late 19th century (Smith 2020). Aristotle’s system is taught in logic classes to this day.

The Use of Reason to Discover Truth

Reasoning allows us to hypothesize, work out consequences of our hypotheses, run thought experiments, assess the coherence of a set of beliefs, and generate plausible explanations of the world around us. As Chapter 1 explained, coherence is the property of consistency in a set of beliefs. Thus, when a set of beliefs is inconsistent, it is not possible for every belief in the set to be true. We must use reason to determine whether a set of beliefs is consistent and work out the logical implications of beliefs, given their truth. In this way, reason can be used to discover truth.

The rules of logic are like the rules of math; you cannot make 1 + 1 = 3. Indeed, math is a form of deductive reasoning that ensures truth. Answers to problems in math are derived using known functions and rules, which is also true in logic. Unlike math, however, not all of logic can guarantee correct answers. Nonetheless, logic supplies means by which to derive better answers—answers that are more likely to be true. Because logic is the study of proper reasoning, and proper reasoning is an essential tool for discovering truth, logic is foundational to the pursuit of learning.

Testing Hypotheses

A hypothesis is a proposed explanation for an observed process or phenomenon. Human beings formulate hypotheses because they wish to answer specific questions about the world. Usually, the sciences come to mind when we think of the word “hypothesis.” However, hypotheses can be created on many subjects, and chances are that you have created many hypotheses without realizing it. For example, if you often come home and find that one of your outside potted plants has been knocked over, you might hypothesize that “the wind must have knocked that one over.” In doing so, you answer the question, “Why is that plant often knocked over?” Generating and testing hypotheses engages different forms of reasoning— abduction, induction, and deduction—all of which will be explained in further detail below.

Clearly, simply coming up with a hypothesis isn’t enough for us to gain knowledge; rather, we must use logic to test the truth of our supposition. Of course, the aim of testing hypotheses is to get to the truth. In testing we often formulate if–then statements: “If it is windy, then my plant will get knocked over” or “If nitrogen levels are high in the river, then algae will grow.” If–then statements in logic are called conditionals and are testable. For example, we can keep a log registering the windy days, cross-checked against the days on which the plant was found knocked over, to test our if–then hypothesis.

Reasoning is also used to assess the evidence collected for testing and to determine whether the test itself is good enough for drawing a reliable conclusion. In the example above, if on no windy days is the plant knocked over, logic demands that the hypothesis be rejected. If the plant is sometimes knocked over on windy days, then the hypothesis needs refinement (for example, wind direction or wind speed might be a factor in when the plant goes down). Notice that logic and reasoning play a role in every step of the process: creating hypotheses, figuring out how to test them, compiling data, analyzing results, and drawing a conclusion.

We’ve been looking at an inconsequential example—porch plants. But testing hypotheses is serious business in many fields, such as when pharmaceutical companies test the efficacy of a drug in treating a life-threatening illness. Good reasoning requires researchers to gather enough data to compare an experimental group and control group (patients with the illness who received the drug and those who did not). If scientists find a statistically significant difference in positive outcomes for the experimental group when compared to the control group, they can draw the reasonable conclusion that the drug could alleviate illness or even save lives in the future.

Laws of Logic

Logic, like the sciences, has laws. But while the laws of science are meant to accurately describe observed regularities in the natural world, laws of logic can be thought of as rules of thought. Logical laws are rules that underlie thinking itself. Some might even argue that it is only by virtue of these laws that we can have reliable thoughts. To that extent, laws of logic are construed to be laws of reality itself. To see what is meant by this, let’s consider the law of noncontradiction .

Noncontradiction

To understand the law of noncontradiction, we must first define a few terms. First, a statement is a sentence with truth value, meaning that the statement must be true or false. Statements are declarative sentences like “Hawaii is the 50th state to have entered the United States” and “You are reading an online philosophy book.” Sometimes philosophers use the term “proposition” instead of “statement,” and the latter term has a slightly different meaning. But for our purposes, we will use these terms as synonyms. Second, a negation of a statement is the denial of that statement. The easiest way to turn a statement into its negation is to add the qualifier “not.” For example, the negation of “My dog is on her bed” is “My dog is not on her bed.” Third, a contradiction is the conjunction of any statement and its negation. We may also say that any statement and its opposite are contradictory . For example, “My dog is on her bed” and “My dog is not on her bed” are contradictory because the second is the negation of the first. And when you combine a statement and its opposite, you get a contradiction: “My dog is on her bed and my dog is not on her bed.”

The law of noncontradiction is a law about truth, stating that contradictory propositions cannot be true in the same sense, at the same time . While my dog may have been on her bed earlier and now she’s off barking at squirrels, it cannot be true right now that my dog is both on her bed and not on her bed. However, some of you may be thinking about dogs who lie half on their beds and half on the floor (Josie, the dog belonging to the author of this chapter, is one of them). Can it not be true that such a dog is both on and not on their bed? In this instance, we must return to the phrase in the same sense . If we decide that “lying on the bed” means “at least 50% of your body is on the bed,” then we must maintain that definition when looking at propositions to determine whether they are contradictory. Thus, if Josie is half out of the bed with her head on the floor, we can still say “Josie is on the bed.” But notice that “Josie is not on the bed” remains false since we have qualified the meaning of “on the bed.”

For Aristotle, the law of noncontradiction is so fundamental that he claims that without it, knowledge would not be possible—the law is foundational for the sciences, reasoning, and language (Gottlieb 2019). Aristotle thought that the law of noncontradiction was “the most certain of all principles” because it is impossible for someone to believe that the same thing both is and is not (1989, 1005b).

The Excluded Middle

The law of the excluded middle is related to the law of noncontradiction. The law of the excluded middle states that for any statement, either that statement is true, or its negation is true. If you accept that all statements must be either true or false and you also accept the law of noncontradiction, then you must accept the law of the excluded middle. If the only available options for truth-bearing statements are that they are true or false, and if a statement and its negation cannot both be true at the same time, then one of the statements must be true while the other must be false. Either my dog is on her bed or off her bed right now .

Normativity in Logic

What if Lulu claims that she is 5 feet tall and that she is 7 feet tall? You’d think that she was joking or not being literal because this is tantamount to saying that she is both 5 feet tall and not 5 feet tall (which is implied by being 7 feet tall). The statement “I’m 5 feet tall and not 5 feet tall” is a contradiction. Surely Lulu does not believe a contradiction. We might even think, as Aristotle did, that it is impossible to believe a contradiction. But even if Lulu could believe a contradiction, we think that she should not . Since we generally believe that inconsistency in reasoning is something that ought to be avoided , we can say that logic is normative. Normativity is the assumption that certain actions, beliefs, or other mental states are good and ought to be pursued or realized. Normativity implies a standard (a norm) to which we ought to conform. Ethics is a normative discipline because it is the study of how we ought to act. And because we believe people ought to be logical rather than illogical, we label logic as normative.

While ethics is normative in the realm of actions and behavior, logic is normative in the realm of reasoning. Some rules of thought, like the law of noncontradiction, seem to be imperative (a command), so logic is a command of reasoning. Some philosophers argue that logic is what makes reasoning possible (MacFarlane 2002). In their view, logic is a constitutive norm of reasoning—that is, logic constitutes what reasoning is . Without norms of logic, there would be no reasoning. This view is intuitively plausible: What if your thoughts proceeded one after the other, with no connection (or ability to detect a connection) between them? Without logic, you would be unable to even categorize thoughts or reliably attach concepts to the contents of thoughts. Let’s take a closer look at how philosophers use special logical statements to organize their reasoning.

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Problem-Solving Method in Teaching

The problem-solving method is a highly effective teaching strategy that is designed to help students develop critical thinking skills and problem-solving abilities . It involves providing students with real-world problems and challenges that require them to apply their knowledge, skills, and creativity to find solutions. This method encourages active learning, promotes collaboration, and allows students to take ownership of their learning.

Table of Contents

Definition of problem-solving method.

Problem-solving is a process of identifying, analyzing, and resolving problems. The problem-solving method in teaching involves providing students with real-world problems that they must solve through collaboration and critical thinking. This method encourages students to apply their knowledge and creativity to develop solutions that are effective and practical.

Meaning of Problem-Solving Method

The meaning and Definition of problem-solving are given by different Scholars. These are-

Woodworth and Marquis(1948) : Problem-solving behavior occurs in novel or difficult situations in which a solution is not obtainable by the habitual methods of applying concepts and principles derived from past experience in very similar situations.

Skinner (1968): Problem-solving is a process of overcoming difficulties that appear to interfere with the attainment of a goal. It is the procedure of making adjustments in spite of interference

Benefits of Problem-Solving Method

The problem-solving method has several benefits for both students and teachers. These benefits include:

• Encourages active learning: The problem-solving method encourages students to actively participate in their own learning by engaging them in real-world problems that require critical thinking and collaboration
• Promotes collaboration: Problem-solving requires students to work together to find solutions. This promotes teamwork, communication, and cooperation.
• Builds critical thinking skills: The problem-solving method helps students develop critical thinking skills by providing them with opportunities to analyze and evaluate problems
• Increases motivation: When students are engaged in solving real-world problems, they are more motivated to learn and apply their knowledge.
• Enhances creativity: The problem-solving method encourages students to be creative in finding solutions to problems.

Steps in Problem-Solving Method

The problem-solving method involves several steps that teachers can use to guide their students. These steps include

• Identifying the problem: The first step in problem-solving is identifying the problem that needs to be solved. Teachers can present students with a real-world problem or challenge that requires critical thinking and collaboration.
• Analyzing the problem: Once the problem is identified, students should analyze it to determine its scope and underlying causes.
• Generating solutions: After analyzing the problem, students should generate possible solutions. This step requires creativity and critical thinking.
• Evaluating solutions: The next step is to evaluate each solution based on its effectiveness and practicality
• Selecting the best solution: The final step is to select the best solution and implement it.

Verification of the concluded solution or Hypothesis

The solution arrived at or the conclusion drawn must be further verified by utilizing it in solving various other likewise problems. In case, the derived solution helps in solving these problems, then and only then if one is free to agree with his finding regarding the solution. The verified solution may then become a useful product of his problem-solving behavior that can be utilized in solving further problems. The above steps can be utilized in solving various problems thereby fostering creative thinking ability in an individual.

The problem-solving method is an effective teaching strategy that promotes critical thinking, creativity, and collaboration. It provides students with real-world problems that require them to apply their knowledge and skills to find solutions. By using the problem-solving method, teachers can help their students develop the skills they need to succeed in school and in life.

• Jonassen, D. (2011). Learning to solve problems: A handbook for designing problem-solving learning environments. Routledge.
• Hmelo-Silver, C. E. (2004). Problem-based learning: What and how do students learn? Educational Psychology Review, 16(3), 235-266.
• Mergendoller, J. R., Maxwell, N. L., & Bellisimo, Y. (2006). The effectiveness of problem-based instruction: A comparative study of instructional methods and student characteristics. Interdisciplinary Journal of Problem-based Learning, 1(2), 49-69.
• Richey, R. C., Klein, J. D., & Tracey, M. W. (2011). The instructional design knowledge base: Theory, research, and practice. Routledge.
• Savery, J. R., & Duffy, T. M. (2001). Problem-based learning: An instructional model and its constructivist framework. CRLT Technical Report No. 16-01, University of Michigan. Wojcikowski, J. (2013). Solving real-world problems through problem-based learning. College Teaching, 61(4), 153-156

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2.1: What are philosophies of education?

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• Jennfer Kidd, Jamie Kaufman, Peter Baker, Patrick O'Shea, Dwight Allen, & Old Dominion U students
• Old Dominion University

by Dionne Nichols

Introduction

What makes a teacher? Teaching is like a salad. Think about it. If you were to attend a party for any given holiday, the number of and variations to each salad recipe that might be present for consumption could outnumber those present at the party. There are so many different ways to teach, varying circumstances to take into account, and philosophies to apply to each classroom. And what better way to have a positive impact on the world than to offer knowledge for consumption? The term ‘teacher’ can be applied to anyone who imparts knowledge of any topic, but it is generally more focused on those who are hired to do so (teach, n.d., n.p.). In imparting knowledge to our students, it is inevitable that we must take into account our own personal philosophies, or pedagogies, and determine not only how we decide what our philosophies are, but also how those impact our consumers.

Lessons in Pedagogy

Early teacher education classes frequently separated the concept of philosophy into separate schools (Roberson, 2000, p. 8). “Philosophy has been taught in the theoretical realm rather than the practical sense,” meaning that the ideas were placed before the teachers without the scaffolding to create a bridge into the classroom (Roberson, 2000, p. 7). The teachers, as students, were given a body of thought and expected to translate that into lessons for their own students. Once you have the idea, how do you apply it to teaching?

An analogy is one of a teacher's most useful tools. It helps the instructor relate a difficult concept to something the students will already have the infrastructure for, thus enabling the students to cement the ideas in their mind.

What, exactly, are education philosophies? According to Thelma Roberson (2000), most prospective teachers confuse their beliefs with the ideas of teaching (p. 6). Education philosophies, then, are not what you want to do in class to aid learning, but why you do them and how they work. For example, Roberson’s students state they “want to use cooperative learning techniques” in their classroom. The question posed is, why? “[I]s cooperative learning a true philosophy or is it something you do in the classroom because of your belief about the way children learn?” (Roberson, 2000, p. 6). Philosophies need to translate ideas into action – if you want to use certain techniques, then you need to understand how they are effective in the classroom to create that portion of your education philosophy. It helps to have an overview of the various schools out there.

Philosophies of Education have traveled down a tree of branches. The first four support branches of philosophy are the Idealist school, the Realist school, the Pragmatist school, and the Existential schools of thought (Ornstein, 2003, p. 99). It might help to look at the tree and its individual branches rather than read about them...

• Idealism - focuses on a subject-matter curriculum emphasizing the great ideas of the culture. You must ponder ideas to make them whole (Ornstein, 2003, p. 99).
• Perennialism - Focuses on human concerns that have caused concern for centuries, revealed through 'great works' (Ornstein, 2003, p. 110)
• Essentialism - Rooted partially in Idealism, as well - Emphasizes skills and subjects that demonstrate the cultural heritage and contribute to society (Ornstein, 2003, p. 110)
• Progressivism - Instruction features problem solving and group activities - The instructor acts as a facilitator as opposed to a leader (Ornstein, 2003, p. 110)
• Social Reconstructionism - Instruction that focuses on significant social and economic problems in an effort to solve them (Ornstein, 2003, pg.110)
• Existentialism - Classroom dialogue stimulates awareness - each person creates an awareness gleaned from discussion and encourages deep personal reflection on his or her convictions (Ornstein, 2003, p. 108).

Perennialism

Perennialists are instructors who feel that the knowledge that has been passed through the ages should be continued as the basis of the curriculum, like the classic works of Plato and Einstein. Perennialists base their teachings on reason, logic, and analytical thought. Only information that stood the test of time is relevant. They do not illicit student input. The classes most likely to be considered under this approach would be history, science, math, and religion classes (Educational Philosophies in the Classroom, pg.1).

The instructors whose teaching philosophies are based on documented facts and tangible truths are normally those who would be in the math and science departments. These teachers do not feel that religion and the supernatural should be a part of the thinking process. The idea of uncertainty and the unknown is considered illogical (Educational Philosophies in the Classroom, pg.1).

Behaviorism

Behaviorists believe in rewards and punishments as an approach to controlling the teaching environment due to their belief in the intrinsic nature of humans to react to internal or external stimuli. This teacher-centered system ultimately allows the students to be controlled by the educator, who makes the environment pleasant or unpleasant depending on the students' behavior (Foundations of Education, pg.1).

Essentialism

Essentialists believe that there is a universal pool of knowledge needed by all students. The fundamentals of teaching are the basis of the curriculum: math, science, history, foreign language, and English. Vocational classes are not seen as a necessary part of educational training. Classrooms are formal, teacher-centered, and students are passive learners. Evaluations are predominately through testing, and there are few, if any, projects or portfolios. These instructors easily accept the No Child Left-Behind Act because test scores are the main form of evaluation (Foundations of Education, pg. 1).

Progressivism

This is a student-centered form of instruction where students follow the scientific method of questioning and searching for the answer. Evaluations include projects and portfolios. Current events are used to keep students interested in the required subject matter. Students are active learners as opposed to passive learners. The teacher is a facilitator rather than the center of the educational process. Student input is encouraged, and students are asked to find their interpretation of the answer (Educational Philosophies in the classroom, pg.1).

Reconstructionism

This student-centered philosophy strives to instill a desire to make the world a better place. It places a focus on controversial world issues and uses current events as a springboard for the thinking process. These students are taught the importance of working together to bring about change. These teachers incorporate what is happening in the world with what they are learning in the classroom (Educational Philosophies in the Classroom, pg.1).

Constructivism

Active participation is the key to this teaching style. Students are free to explore their own ideas and share concepts with one another in nontraditional ways. “Hands on activity […] is the most effective way of learning and is considered true learning” (Educational Philosophies in the Classroom, pg.1).

Humanism/ Existentialism

Also a student-centered philosophy, this educational method is based on the idea that the students should be presented with choices about the learning process. The student is engaged in all aspects of learning and works together with the teacher and her peers to develop a curriculum and evaluation system that allows for individual interests and abilities (Educational philosophies in the Classroom, pg.1).

Your philosophy of education is what you believe about education and the way children learn.” - Roberson pg 4

In addition, the ‘constructivist’ school of philosophy, rooted in the Pragmatic pedagogy and branched off from the 'Social Reconstructivist' school, has gained much popularity. Around the turn of the century (early 1990s), many teachers felt the rote memorization and mindless routine that was common then was ineffective, and began to look for alternate ways to reach their students (Ornstein, 2003, p. 111). Through the constructivist approach, "students “construct” knowledge through an interaction between what they already think and know and with new ideas and experiences” (Roberson, 2000, p. 8). This is an active learning process that leads to deeper understanding of the concepts presented in class, and is based on the abilities and readiness of the children rather than set curriculum guidelines (Ornstein, 2003, p. 112). Constructivism "emphasizes socially interactive and process-oriented 'hands on' learning in which students work collaboratively to expand and revise their knowledge base" (Ornstein, 2003, p. 112). Essentially, knowledge which is shaped by experience is reconstructed, or altered, to assist the student in understanding new concepts (Ornstein, 2003, p. 112). You, as the teacher, help the students build the scaffolding they need to maintain the information even after the test is taken and graded.

Four Philosophies in Assessment

Once you know how you want to lead your classroom, it is important to consider how to assess your students' progress. And when we think of school, we automatically consider the threesome subjects, Reading, Writing, and ‘Rithmatic. In all aspects of learning, however, the ability to communicate comes to the forefront. Communication is used in class discussion as well as unit test short answers. Writing is present in almost all subjects in some form, and writing translates to communication. Richard Fulkerson (2000), in his article “Four Philosophies of Composition,” questions whether “a […] set of four philosophies of composition might exist, each one stressing a different element in the communicative transaction” (p. 3). Fulkerson’s schools of communicative philosophy fall into the following categories:

• Expressionism: a way of writing that demonstrates the students’ thoughts and can be lead by “non-directive teachers, some of whom insist that one neither can nor should evaluate writing” or more hands-on teachers who “design classroom activities to maximize student self-discovery” (p. 5). This school of thought emphasizes the student.
• Rhetorical: this school states that good writing is adapted to achieve a specific reaction from the audience (p. 6). This is focused on the connection between goal and process in completing assignments, and it emphasizes the audience.
• Mimesis: states that “a clear connection exists between good writing and good thinking” and focuses on logic and reason as exemplified in the completion of assignments (p. 5). This school emphasizes a well-rounded student in that, research, prior knowledge, and the ability to recognize both sides of an argument are necessary for success (p. 6).
• Formalism: this school focuses primarily on the form of the assignment – it disregards content to the extent that poor grammar can distract the audience from absorbing the content, and therefore, the work is judged “primarily by whether it shows certain internal [mistakes]” (p. 4).

While most teachers fall primarily into one school of composition pedagogy, Fulkerson (2000) points out that it is necessary to hold on to them all when he states “they are not mutually exclusive” (p. 6). The trick is to learn when each is applicable and to what extent it should be employed.

Hooked on Phonics?

So, you know how you want to lead your class, and you have an idea as to which kind of 'grader' you are. What next? Another area where teachers have struggled is simply in helping their students learn to or improve their reading. How do we teach reading? The two battling schools of thought are between those who support Whole Language, and those who support Phonics. “The disputes have been dubbed the Reading Wars, and the participants call them ‘vicious’” (Collins, 1997, n.p.). Several states have even intervened and enacted laws mandating one or the other.

But what are they? Just as their names state, the difference is in how the words are read. Phonics was taught primarily in the 1970s (Collins, 1997, n.p.) and study the individual components of each word, called ‘phonemes,’ which are the “smallest meaningful sounds in a language” (Collins, 1997, n.p.). “Cat, for example, has three: “kuh-aa-tuh” (Collins, 1997, n.p.). A reader needs to understand how the words are broken up and that each letter has its own sound in order to read (Collins, 1997, n.p.). Phonic teaching focuses on code learning. Once the students understand the ‘code,’ and how the words phonemes are put together, they are supposed to be able to understand the entire word.

Whole language advocates disagree with the process of breaking each word down. They feel readers cannot focus on every letter in a word, or every word in a text (Collins, 1997, n.p.) and made their opinions known during the 1980s (Collins, 1997, n.p.). If they did, “and if they tried to translate what they saw into sounds, reading would be much too cumbersome” (Collins, 1997, n.p.). Instead, whole language teachers instruct their students in ‘skipping strategies’ – ways of guessing which word comes next to fill in any blanks (Collins, 1997, n.p.). Overall, reading is considered an organic process by which the students learn phonics “only when a question about phonics comes up in the course of reading” (Collins, 1997, n.p.). Whole language focuses on the meaning behind the words.

Which is better?

Just as in many other walks of life, statistics and studies show that one philosophy of teaching will prevail over another. The National Assessment of Educational Progress, as stated in J. Collin’s article (1997), claims that “from 1971 to 1980 there was a steady improvement in the reading comprehension of nine-year-olds. However, during the 1980s…the scores did not improve and rather declined” (n.p.).

The 1990s brought the topic full circle. It was then that Marilyn Adams, a cognitive psychologist, wrote a book describing the best methods to teach learning. “Programs that combined systematic phonics instruction with meaning emphasis seemed to work best of all” (Collins, 1997, n.p.). The key to reading is that words need to be recognized so the brain can interpret the meaning behind it (Collins, 1997, n.p.). Thus, putting the two methods together was necessary for correct comprehension of the concepts presented.

What else do I need to know?

We’ve discussed the accepted definition of pedagogy, varying schools of thought for assessment, and the difference between reading philosophies. Your salad components are increasing by number exponentially. But what toppings to you add to your thought salad? What else do you need to consider when you are setting up your classroom, your teaching styles, and your lessons?

Teaching is the hardest job you can have. You are in a position to touch hundreds of lives over the course of a career, and yet, how do you succeed? The fact remains that “when a teacher and his/her students face each other in the classroom they must truly work with each other” (Cadenas, 1999, n.p.). How else can you ensure that the students are learning what you are teaching?

The first thing to keep in mind is your own knowledge basis. Cadenas (1999) recommends that you “renew and refresh your knowledge of the subject matter” (n.p.) to stay on top of changes and help you incorporate them in to your lessons. Our world changes so rapidly that to stay on top of technology, your field of expertise, or even other areas that can be integrated into your subject matter, it is necessary to take a class or attend a seminar every once in a while (Cadenas, 1999, n.p.).

Next, “prepare interesting, colorful, captivating lesson plans and deliver then with gusto” (Cadenas, 1999, n.p.). An entertaining teacher will help cement information into a student’s memory with much more ease than one who is monotone or inactive (Cadenas, 1999, n.p.). The more entertaining you are, the deeper a connection you will make with your students, as well.

In addition to the captivating lesson, make sure “it [is] a number one priority to ensure that your student can follow the lesson” (Cadenas, 1999, n.p.). This will assist all your students in grasping the information you are placing before them in class, and will help you reach students of all learning styles (Cadenas, 1999, n.p.). You don’t want to end up teaching only to the auditory learners and leaving the visual learners to fend for themselves!

Last, “help your students to put their learning to use immediately” (Cadenas, 1999, n.p.). Show them how the lessons you are teaching are applicable to them so they feel like school is worth an investment of time and energy (Cadenas, 1999, n.p.). If nothing else, have them help each other out in class to reinforce the lesson!

[You] may spend as much as 60 hours a week creating lesson plans, teaching, advising students, grading, supervising extracurricular activities and meeting with colleagues and parents” Valerie Marchant – Time

You are ready to graze at a Fourth of July picnic. You walk over to the table, and you see an array of salads ready for you to dive in to them. How do you pick which ones you want to sample now or save for later? How do you narrow the choices down?

Educational philosophies are as abundant as salads at any holiday spread. And even though the difference between one potato salad and the one next to it is an addition of mustard, the two are by no means exactly alike. Your classes will be just as diverse. You will have students from all economic classes, with differing levels of English language ability, and all bringing various and beautiful experiences to your class. How do you reach each individual?

Knowing who you are as a teacher before you enter the classroom will help significantly. Teaching is so much more than just the content. Teaching is a learning curve on philosophy that will never be finished. Just as your classroom will change every year, continue to alter your philosophies. See what works for you and your students on a collaborative level. In the words of J. W. Apps, “a working philosophy is never completely developed the ultimate working philosophy never reached. We’re always moving toward, hopefully, a more complete, and thus more useful, working philosophy.” (The Educational Philosophies of Training and Development Professors, Leaders, and Practitioners, pg. 1)

Exercise \(\PageIndex{1}\)

1. Amy is working with her third grade class to improve their reading skills. She is asking them to write the words on a specific list down and break them apart based on their syllables and then combine them back into their original words. Amy is making use of which theory for reading?

a. Whole Language

c. A combination of the two

2. Lou asks his students to critique their formal essays for APA formatting and grammar. He then asks them to write him an informal letter explaining their thought process on the formal essay, and how they thought they did overall on it. Lou is implementing which two schools of philosophy of assessment?

a. Formalism and Mimesis

b. Mimesis and Rhetorical

c. Rhetorical and Expressionism

d. Expressionism and Formalism

3. A student who is writing her formal pedagogy paper for class expresses an interest in incorporating technology into her history class. She then lists several ways she will consistently make use of technology in her classroom. In order to ensure technology is part of her pedagogy, what does this student need to do?

a. Develop the reason behind why she wants to use technology, including an explanation for what she hopes to accomplish

b. Develop her lesson plans fully so she has alternatives in case the electricity goes out, her LCD projector blows a bulb, etc.

c. Research statistics that show pros and cons to using technology in the classroom

d. Interview experienced teachers to hear what they have to say about using technology in the classroom

4. A student receives his paper back from his teacher and on it is written a comment, “Where is the opponent’s viewpoint?” This student’s teacher is focusing on which philosophy for assessment?

a. Rhetoricism

c. Expressionism

d. Formalism

5. Adam has been teaching for 11 years and needs to complete his recertification points to maintain his licensure. He signs up for a conference on reaching students with learning disabilities. Which step is he taking to help him stay focused on his original purpose of teaching?

a. Applicability to real life

b. Ensuring all students can participate

c. Refresh his pedagogical knowledge

d. Preparation of lesson plans

Cadenas, H. G. (1999). Revitalize your teaching—four key elements for success. Contemporary Education , 70 (2), 5-7. Retrieved on January 28, 2008, from Wilsonweb.com website: http://vnweb.hwwilsonweb.com.proxy.lib.odu.edu/hww/jumpstart.jhtml?recid=0bc05f7a67b1790e1e9c442f93fe94fd3dd814f5b54d3854a715b6e9cc14f3538d830ddf5e8d15a6&fmt=H

Chef Larry's fall salad with fruit and roasted nut confetti walnut vinaigrette (n.d.). County Television Network . Retrieved on February 2, 2008, from USASearch.gov website: usasearch.gov/search?v%3aproject=firstgov-images&v%3afile=viv_896%4031%3ahDAOGw&v%3aframe=viewimage&v%3astate=root%7croot-20-20%7c0&id=Ndoc22&rpaid=&

Collins, J. (1997, October 27). How Johnny should read. Time . Retrieved on January 28, 2008, from Time.com website: www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,987253-1,00.html

Fulkerson, R. (2000). Four philosophies of composition. In E. Corbett, N. Myers and G. Tate (Eds.), The writing teacher’s sourcebook (4th ed.) (pp. 3–8). New York: Oxford University Press.

Marchant, V. (2000, May 29). Why not teach next? Time . Retrieved on January 28, 2008, from Time.com website: www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,997031-1,00.html

Ornstein, A. and Daniel Levine. (2003). Foundations of education (8th ed.). Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.

Pedagogy. (n.d.). Wordnet 3.0 . Retrieved February 3, 2008, from Dictionary.com website: http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/pedagogy

Roberson, T. (2000 September 29). Philosophy of philosophy: making the connection between philosophy and pedagogy for preservice teachers (Paper presented at Meeting for the Society for Philosophy and History of Education, Biloxi, MS 2000).

teach. (n.d.). Dictionary.com Unabridged (v 1.1). Retrieved February 3, 2008, from Dictionary.com website: http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/teach

Ganly, S. Educational philosophies in the classroom . Retrieved February 2, 2008, from Associated Content website: http://www.associatedcontent.com

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Teaching Students About Philosophy Through Art: Exploring the Intersection of Thought and Creativity

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Teaching philosophy through art is an effective method to stimulate students’ analytical and critical thinking skills. Art, in its various forms, can serve as a medium to bridge the gap between theoretical and practical applications of philosophy. A symbiotic relationship exists between the two subjects, with each enhancing the understanding and appreciation of the other.

To teach philosophy through art successfully, it is essential to introduce students to the fundamental concepts and principles of both subjects. This can involve exploring topics such as aesthetics, ethics, metaphysics, epistemology, and logic. Once students have a foundational understanding of these subjects, they can begin to investigate how art reflects or critiques various philosophical theories or ideas.

One way to facilitate this exploration is through analyzing the work of specific artists and discussing how their creations relate to philosophical concepts. For instance, Caravaggio’s painting, “The Calling of Saint Matthew,” can be an excellent example to demonstrate the concepts of free will, determinism, and divine intervention. Similarly, discussing the philosophy of human identity through the work of Frida Kahlo can highlight ideas about the nature of self and personal identity.

Another approach to teaching philosophy through art is by encouraging students to create their philosophical artwork. For example, they could create a painting, sculpture, or photograph that represents a particular philosophical theory. This process can allow students to visualize and internalize abstract philosophical concepts, making them more relatable and engaging.

Teaching philosophy through art can also help students develop interdisciplinary skills as it fosters creativity and encourages them to think critically and solve problems. This approach can teach students to be more self-aware, appreciate diversity, and provide tools to communicate complex ideas effectively. These skills are valuable in various fields, including business, science, and politics.

In conclusion, teaching philosophy through art is an effective method to engage students in a vibrant conversation between two fascinating subjects. Art can help students see the relevance and importance of philosophical concepts to their life experiences. Moreover, using art to teach philosophy can be a creative and engaging way to foster students’ critical thinking, problem-solving, and communication skills.

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