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Politic Sphere

Difference between Globalization and Regionalization

Kevin Gurley

Globalization refers to the process of expanding your business operations onto a global scale. This can include selling products or services in other countries or setting up offices or factories in other parts of the world. Regionalization is the opposite of globalization – it refers to the process of dividing your business into smaller units that operate within specific geographic regions. Let’s take a closer look at these two concepts.

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What is globalization.

Globalization is a “process of interaction and integration among people, companies, and governments worldwide”. It describes the growing interdependence of the world’s economies, cultures, and populations, brought about by cross-border trade in goods and services, technology, and flows of investment, people, and information”  [Source] .

What is an example of Globalization?

Globalization is the growth on a worldwide scale. This can be seen in religions such as Christianity and Islam. Other examples of globalization include spreading human rights, women’s rights and equality values, music genres, and political ideologies. 

What is Regionalization?

Regionalization is the process of dividing an area into smaller segments called regions. It points to the “decomposition of the world into smaller economic units and regional integration groupings”  [Source] .

What are different types of Regionalism?

Types of regionalism include “economic regionalism, linguistic regionalism, political regionalism and even sub-regional movements”  [Source] . In terms of establishing states, the types of regionalism are supra-state, inter-state and intra-state regionalism. In politics, “regionalism is an ideology that highlights the local identity, the need for independent regional planning and administrative freedom. It promotes the manifestation of cultural singularities and prioritizes the region’s interest over the interest of the nation as a whole”  [Source] .

What is the function of Regionalization?

Regionalization “breaks larger territories into useful units that geographers need to conduct their specific research”. Also, regionalization’s “goal is to create a given number of districts, each comprising a contiguous block of territory and within a set margin of error for its total population or electorate”  [Source] . Regionalization “establishes the regions as administrative and political units within the national state”. More so, “From the aspect of the state as a superior entity, regionalization contributes to achieving a balanced development of the region and more efficient connection of state authorities to the local one”  [Source] . All these factors show that regionalization is vital in creating manageable units of a larger scale of land and integrating the smaller units into an administrative branch with distinctive functions. 

What is an example of Regionalism?

Regionalism is a “political focus on one specific area of a country. In the U.S., the perceived difference between Southerners and New Englanders is one example of regionalism”  [Source]

The difference between globalization and regionalization is that globalization refers to “international integration arising from the interchange of world view, products and ideas, and other aspects such as technology”, and regionalization is the division of an area into smaller segments called regions. Globalization promotes the integration of economies worldwide, but regionalization tends to oppose integration and bring divisions. There is a free market and opportunity to trade internationally with globalization, while regionalization promotes monopolization. Globalization tends to propel multiculturalism, but regionalization creates boundaries in distinctive cultures.

Due to globalization, a community can help others worldwide, but a regionalized system might choose not to get involved in foreign matters. Globalization led to advanced technology because of sharing ideas whilst a regionalized system tend to lag  [Source] . 

Similarities between Globalization and Regionalization

Similarities between globalization and regionalization include that these terms are social drivers that can either unite or divide people. Also, both entities can be used in politics, society and economies. Globalization and regionalization have led to the removal of certain traditions and cultures in society. This happened when people became a global village, and others distanced themselves from the rest of the world. 

Is Regionalization synonymous with Globalization?

Wikipedia notes that “Regionalization as a trend of global development”  [Source]  means that globalization influenced regionalization, but this does not imply that regionalization is synonymous with globalization.

What is the difference between State-to-State Regionalism and Non-Regionalism?

State-to-state regionalism means “regionalized unitary state, ” a term used to denote a formally unitary state where a high degree of political power has been highly decentralized to regional governments. In many cases, the regions are based on long-standing cultural divisions”, and non-state regionalism is also called “Non-state nation or stateless nation. An ethnic group or nation that does not possess its state (state to state) is not the majority population in any nation-state. The term non-state implies that the group should have such a state”  [Source] .

Kevin Gurley

Photography, fine art, and yoga.

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Globalization and Regionalization: Historical Perspectives

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The Complementary Nature of Globalization and Regionalization

Regional integration: europe vs. east asia, the evolving landscape: future implications.

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Global Interdependence, Decoupling, and Recoupling

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Global Interdependence, Decoupling, and Recoupling

5 Regionalization versus Globalization

  • Published: November 2013
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Both global and regional economic linkages have strengthened substantially over the past quarter century. This chapter employs a dynamic factor model to analyze the implications of these linkages for the evolution of global and regional business cycles. The model allows us to assess the roles played by the global, regional, and country specific factors in explaining business cycles in a large sample of countries and regions over the period 1960-2010. The findings show that, since the mid-1980s, the importance of regional factors has increased markedly in explaining business cycles especially in regions that experienced a sharp growth in intra-regional trade and financial flows. By contrast, the relative importance of the global factor has declined over the same period. In short, the recent era of globalization has witnessed the emergence of regional business cycles.

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Globalization and Regionalization: Conceptual Issues and Reflections

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Jeffrey Hart

globalization vs regionalization essay

Irah Kučerová

The end of the 20 th century has brought a number of both qualitative and quantitative changes in the functioning of the world economy. A new phenomenon is the process of the economic globalization implementing itself fully which has become the impulse for other developmental changes. The process of the economic globalization limiting the autonomy of national subjects completed the disintegration of the Westphalian system, when a state was not capable to control fully the activities of the economic subjects within its territory. But, the national states, especially in Europe, are responsible for the protection of public interests and for the supply of public goods. This dichotomy between the state power and the economic effectiveness leads to the current crisis of states, let us say crisis of the welfare states, when the strengthening competitive pressure of the liberalized world economy reduces social benefits , which the postwar generations were accustomed to. In Europe, this is especially reflected in a high degree of the institutional protection of the labour market and the pension systems that are entirely inconvenient nowadays. The process of globalization has been enabled by the institutional and political changes of the world economy in the 80's. These changes have led to the transformation of economic relationships , intensified thanks to the technological discoveries and their practical application. The gradual institutional standardization within the Uruguay Round of the GATT 1 increased the mobility of capital, and, in the same round of the negotiations, the liberalization of the international trade led to the growth of the international exchange. The fall of the Iron Curtain unified the bipolar, divided world into one economic area. Globalization has various definitions, yet, thanks to its multi-level character, it is necessary to render its most important aspects, at least. In any case, it is a process, in which the importance of the transnational and international companies within the economy of particular states is growing, and the shares of the direct foreign investments and import are going up. However, it is also a manifestation of an accelerated economic dependence of nations within the world system, which is mediated and amplified by the mass media and transport (Kottak: 1996). A logical consequence of this are changes in many aspects of the social existence of nations, states. Then, the economic globalization is a process, in which law, market and politics limit the autonomy of national subjects, because the development of economy and legislature also involves changes in politics. The economic globalization has thus contributed to the disintegration of the Westpha-lian system of international relations. For nearly 350 years, this system regulated the position of the state in foreign relations, when the state was controlling fully the activities of all

Michel Fouquin

EDITORIAL BOARD

Ramona Frunza

Rosana Pinotti

Economic Geography

Jonathan V Beaverstock

Dr. Hari Prasad Mishra

Globalization has become a familiar enough word, the meaning of which has been discussed by others before me during this conference. Let me nonetheless outline briefly what I understand by the term. I shall then go on to consider what has caused it. The bulk of my paper is devoted to discussing what we know, and what we do not know, about its consequences. I will conclude by considering what policy reactions seem to be called for.

Revocatus kashaga

Vincent Dietrich

Globalisation is what we make of it; why economic globalisation is optional and how post 2008 we are seeing a potential shift away from the hegemonic rhetoric and the beginnings of a post globalised world. Nation states have been the centre of political authority since the signing of the treaty of Westphalia in 1648 (Bowen, 2018; 2). Yet over the past 35 years the common discourse has become one of globalisation and the demise of the nation state, and its authority, especially in terms of the economy (Creveld, 2000; 5). For this reason and due to the relatively short length, this essay will focus on economic state authority, looking in particular at the power of Western states. During the late 1980s and early 1990s hyper-globalists such as Ohmae (1989) and Reich (1991) began to suggest that improvements in technology, especially in communication and transportation, were having damming effects on the power and the role nation states play in international politics (Hay, Lister, and Marsh, 2006;172-173). They further argued that labour, goods, and capital move across state boarders with ease, co-operations being able to move where it suits them best which makes the world seem borderless (Ohmae, 1996). However, this view soon came under fire from more sceptical voices, the likes of Hirst and Thompson (1999) suggesting that state power had not hugely changed; this view has since been repeated by several other theorists (see Hay, Lister, and Marsh, 2006; 174). This essay will position itself somewhere between these two arguments, suggesting that there has been an erosion of state authority-especially to large co-operations-but that this is not down to the material reality of technological advancements, faster transportation and better communication, but is instead down to its rhetorical construction. This essay will start by looking at the inaccuracies of the classic business school theory of globalisation; it will then move on to look at how globalisation theory has been constructed and how this has led to a transfer of state power to non-state actors.

Sapida Barmaki

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Hideaki Hirata

Reischauer institute, harvard university.

Hideaki Hirata

Regionalization vs. Globalization

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             This is a collection of selected papers presented at the UNU Global Seminar '96 "Shonan Session" on "Globalism and Regionalism", held 2-6 September 1996 at Shonan International Village, Hayama, Kanagawa, Japan. THE NEW REGIONALISM AND EAST ASIA Björn Hettne, Professor, University of Gothenburg, Sweden Over the last decade the issue of regionalism has once again "been brought back in", albeit in a different form compared to the debate on regional integration some three decades ago. Thus, I shall argue that we are dealing with a "new" regionalism. I shall also argue that this regionalism can be seen as a response to the process of globalization and the social eruptions associated with this process. The second part of the paper applies the framework to the case of East Asia. Globalism can be defined as programmatic globalization, the vision of a borderless world. I see globalization as a qualitatively new phenomenon. If globalization implies a tendency towards a global social system, its origins may be traced far back in history, but one could also argue that the process reached a new stage in the post-Second World War era. The subjective sense of geographical distance is dramatically changed, some even speak of "the end of geography". Also in ecological terms the world is experienced as one. Economic interdependence was made possible by the political stability of the American world order, which lasted from the end of the Second World War until the late '60s or early '70s. Basically, globalization indicates a qualitative deepening of the internationalization process, strengthening the functional and weakening the territorial dimension of development. What do I mean by the new regionalism? The new regionalism differs from the "old" regionalism in a number of ways, and I want to emphasize the following five contrasts: A rough distinction can be made between three structurally different types of regions: core regions, peripheral regions and, between them, intermediate regions. How do they differ from each other? The core regions are those regions which are politically capable, no matter whether such capability is expressed in the form of a political organization or not. So far only one of the three core regions, namely Europe, aspires to build such an organization. The other two, that is North America and East Asia, are both economically strong, but so far they lack a regional political order. Remaining in the periphery are thus the following five regions: Thus, the peripheral regions are "peripheral" because they are stagnant, turbulent and war prone. The only way for these regions to become less peripheral is to become more regionalized, i.e. to increase their levels of "regionness". Otherwise, their only power resource would rest in their capacity to create problems for the core regions ("chaos power"), and thereby inviting some sort of external engagement. What shall we then understand by "regionness"? It means that a region can be a region . There are five degrees of "regionness": The degree of "regionness" of particular areas can increase or decrease depending on regional dynamics, in which global as well as national/local forces of course have an impact. Regionalization affects and is affected by many levels of the world system: the system as a whole, the level of interregional relations, and the internal structure of the single region. It is not possible to state which of these levels comes first or which is the more important, since changes on the various levels interact. There are also different dimensions of the process relating to each other. Although the region is slowly becoming an actor in its own terms, the nation states typically still conceive it as an arena where so-called "national interests" could be promoted, and these interests are, of course, differently conceived by different social groups in society. Whereas certain groups may find it rewarding to move into the supranational space, others cling to the national space where they have their vested interests to protect. Regionalization thus creates its own counterforces. Regionalization does not come about unless the states in a particular region want it. It may come about through a more or less spontaneous or unintended convergence in terms of political regime, economic policy or security, but often one can identify a triggering political event which sets the process in motion. Naturally, this political event is related to the main players in the region, the policy makers, in contradistinction to policy takers, the smaller players. In order to understand the regionalization in various areas of the world, it is thus wise to observe the behaviour of the policy makers. The policy takers can be further subdivided into: , , . The final issue I want to discuss here concerns the consequences of regionalization in terms of security and development. What are, first, the security problems to which regionalization may provide a solution? They can be summarized in the metaphor of "black holes", or what in UN terminology is referred to as "failed states". National disintegration seems to reinforce the process of regionalization via threats to regional security, provoking some kind of reaction on the regional level. It may even form part of the process of regionalization, since the enlargement of political space provides opportunities for different sub-national and micro-regional forces, previously locked into state structures, to reassert themselves. In sum, development regionalism contains the traditional arguments for regional cooperation such as territorial size and economies of scale, but, more significantly, add some which are expressing new concerns and uncertainties in the current transformation of the world order and world economy. Asia-Pacific is becoming the new centre of global capitalism. It can also be seen as an emerging trade bloc under the leadership of Japan, its distinctness depending on the relative degrees of cooperation and conflict among competing capitalisms: North America, Europe and Asia-Pacific. It contains several potential regional formations, the shapes of which, due to unresolved security dilemmas, are still uncertain. It is thus not so easy to tell what is intraregional and interregional in the case of Asia-Pacific. So far the three regions within the Asia-Pacific area show a low degree of regionness. East Asia lacks any kind of formal regionalist framework. South-East Asia earlier contained two regional formations: the now more or less post-Communist Indo-China and the previously anti-Communist ASEAN grouping. The political rationales for these formations have thus completely changed, much like in Europe, and there are new possible alignments. The "European Pacific" (Australia and New Zealand) may turn Euro-Asian, but they may also be seen as regional great powers in a fourth "region" of Pacific micro states: the South Pacific. In the sections below we first describe the historical heterogeneity of the Pacific region, secondly experiences of regional conflict and conflict resolution, and thirdly integrative forces that nevertheless exist. In the first section of this chapter an argument was made that regionalization is a worldwide process forming a part of global transformation. A crucial issue is thus what regional formations can be found in this particular geographical area, and what, if any, shared cultural basis there is to form a regional identity. The Asia-Pacific area, which in itself hardly constitutes a region except in a purely geographical sense, contains three more distinct regional formations: East Asia, South-East Asia and Australia/New Zealand, which, although physically distant from Europe, have cultural European origins. Under the impact of successive immigrations this heritage is becoming less distinct and economically the region is becoming part of Asia. Sixty-five per cent of Asia-Pacific trade is now intraregional (compared to 62% in the EC). Also the embryonic security network (ASEAN Regional Forum) is extended throughout the Asia-Pacific area. The Pacific also includes the South Pacific islands of Polynesia, Melanesia and Micronesia, and reaches parts of the USA and Latin America. Although not seen as "Asian" (being far away from the Asian continent), the South Pacific is also becoming part of the East Asian economic space. Thus regionalism can be discussed in terms of maximalist and minimalist regionalist options (Öjendal 1996a). 18 June 1992). The latter would necessitate that Japan acted more like a powerful nation state, less like an international trading firm (Pyle 1993). Asia-Pacific is a Cold War era . This means that previous conflicts have had a strong element of external superpower intervention in accordance with the Cold War pattern. This situation is now changing quite dramatically, and more traditional rivalries are resurging, more similar to a 19th century Europe-type situation. The larger Asia-Pacific "region" (or rather geographical area) was most affected by the Cold War, and the recent lifting of the superpower overlay therefore has created a kind of vacuum and a great uncertainty in the security field. Several powers (great powers and middle powers) have more or less open regional ambitions, which must be related to turbulent and highly unpredictable domestic situations in the countries concerned. Regarding the China-Japan relation, Barry Buzan has made an interesting comparison with the role of restless Germany, now played by China, in 19th century Europe, whereas the British role as the global power fully satisfied with the status quo is played by Japan (Buzan 1996). The avoidance of a replay of this drama is obviously necessary for regional peace. Korean unification is another key to real regional cooperation. Considering the economic superiority of South Korea and the political lag in North Korea, such a reunion may take different forms: war, a spontaneous process of the German type (an ) or a more organized path through preparatory negotiations. Regional conflict management is thus an important step towards further regionalization. At the same time the overall regional framework for conflict resolution is weak, hardly existing in East Asia, and so far confined to one of the two subregions in South-East Asia. 27 May 1993). The history goes much further back, actually to the Viet Nam war. The ultra-leftist Khmer Rouge regime pursued an extreme autarkic line which included the physical elimination of urban ("cosmopolitan") elements. The first intervention was of the unilateral (neighbourly) kind. The Vietnamese intervention led to a sharp polarization both at the regional and the global level. In 1991, when the Soviet veto had disappeared from international decision-making, an agreement in the Security Council (permanent five) on the "framework for a comprehensive settlement of the Cambodia conflict" was reached and the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was created. This, the largest UN operation so far, was the beginning of the peace process and included a democratic election. The non-participation of the Khmer Rouge in the elections fueled the fears that the guerrillas planned a division of the country. However, their political strength was much less than generally expected. They had become "rebels without a cause" (Theyer 1995). The turnout of the voters, on the other hand, was much larger than expected and was a triumph for the UN. The operation gave an opportunity for Japan to participate in a large international operation, probably indicating a more far-going security interest in the region. For Cambodia several question marks remain, above all the question of how the Khmer Rouge may rejoin the national community and on what conditions. Only when this problem has found a solution, is it possible to talk about real conflict resolution. So far this is rather a case of multilateral conflict management with a strong regional component. Cambodia has strongly declared its intention to become a member of ASEAN, and this co-optation (which can be compared to the inclusion of Greece, Spain and Portugal in the EEC) is also seen by the regional organization as a stabilizing measure. Whether this implies the survival of democracy (particularly of the kind imposed by the UN) remains to be seen (Öjendal 1996b). East Asia and South-East Asia are, due to economic linkages, becoming hard to separate from each other, and will be even more converging in the future, as countries such as Malaysia and Thailand (apart from Singapore, which is already known as an NIC) are more or less successfully trying to apply the NIC strategy. Thus, the Asian core of the Pacific rim, east and south-east, will probably follow its own economic course. ) are implemented. Viet Nam, and behind it the Soviet Union, was earlier seen as a threat by the ASEAN countries. This threat was a crucial factor behind the relative cohesiveness of the organization in the Cold War era. The source of common cause and identity was thus partly an external threat, and there were few incentives for economic cooperation. Only recently (January 1993) a free trade agreement, AFTA, within the 330-million-people ASEAN region was agreed to be realized within a fifteen-year period. The planned tariff slopes of the different countries differ according to starting point and speed, which complicates the competitive situation in the intraregional trade of the constituent countries. The more protectionist countries will probably use AFTA to dump into more open economies. Many therefore doubt that this free trade zone will be realized. ASEAN countries are direct competitors in many areas and it will take a long time for them to develop into complementary economies. From the very beginning ASEAN was a political, rather than economic, organization (Yamakage 1990), and now the political preconditions have changed. , Bangkok, 23 July 1992). Ad hoc consultations may no longer be sufficient (Leifer 1992). puts it "first it must prove that it is proud to be part of Asia" (quoted from EPW, 24 April 1993). Australia is publicly criticizing the regionalist project of creating an East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), which is a proposition from the South-East Asian region, while backing the much looser Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Politically they are thus still not quite part of the region, and there has also been a discussion on Australia joining NAFTA ( , 12 Sept. 1992). The Australian attitude to Europe is becoming increasingly negative. Similarly, New Zealand is one of the major victims of European agricultural protectionism. ) East Asia can strengthen regional integration through trade liberalization and promotion of foreign direct investment within the framework of the multilateral trading system. "A trading block would more likely foster an inward orientation, impairing the world wide search for market opportunities that has served East Asia so well" (quoted from the , 15 April 1993, p. 25). 25 July 1991). In order to test the argument that there is a worldwide process of regionalization taking the shape of a new regionalism, it might have been simpler to choose another example than Asia-Pacific. East Asian regionalism is often described as de facto regionalism, whereas regionalization is supposed to take place in Europe and North America. This contrast may be due to differences in political culture, but an alternative explanation could lie in the fact that the inter-state relations in East Asia are rather tense and unsettled (albeit not openly hostile). Thus a growing maturity of the regional security complex may lead to a more formal regionalism, just as the normalization of the relations among the countries in South-East Asia has been accompanied by a more formal and predictable regional arrangement than presently seems to be possible in East Asia. This having been said, it is obvious that on other levels than the inter-state level, there has been an impressive process of regionalization. The future of the region is either very black - in case the potential conflicts are translated into war - or very bright - if the degree of interdependence proves to be a point of convergence of interests where every state gets a stake in stable peace. In some of the South-East Asian states this condition must apply also to various domestic groups, a condition which makes the optimistic scenario somewhat unrealistic. Quite a few states may, due to domestic problems, have fewer resources to devote to regional cooperation in the future. The two giants China and Japan face different problems but the problems as such cannot be easily dismissed. China is an old empire becoming a modern region-state, but the level of regionness is far from sufficient to maintain a central legitimate authority throughout the region ( i. e. the previous empire). In the case of Japan there is also a lack of clear perception of regional policy, not because of isolation but too much dependence on one of the former superpowers. Thus there is not only a lack of formal regionalism (which is less serious), but a lack of policy makers with region-wide authority, i.e. hegemony. In spite of that there are many reasons, particularly in the areas of development and conflict management, to believe that the global process of regionalization will have a deep impact also on East Asia and South-East Asia in the future. The NICs are facing changes in those objective conditions which originally made them into NICs. Their strategy in the 1990s will probably be betting on the domestic market, preferably a regional market. The regional framework is still, however, in a flux. I am grateful for comments from Takashi Inoguchi, who chaired the Shonan session, and Joakim Öjendal, Padrigu. 29, no. 1, pp. 7-21. , 13 August 1992. State of the Art Report, Helsinki: WIDER. . Lexington Books. Washington, D.C.: AEI Press. , 27 April 1995. 15, no. 3, pp. 430-446. Hong Kong Bangkok Bangkok Singapore Bombay Hong Kong New York OR REGIONAL: WHAT CAN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DO? Bruce Russett, Professor, Yale University, USA I begin the discussion with the example of the European Union, or rather the set of organizations that formed predecessors of the contemporary EU and of the various organizations that currently constitute the EU system. It can serve to illustrate all of the above-mentioned purposes. It is especially worth noting that the origins of the EU lie in a history of warfare. As a regional organization, it arose after centuries of violent conflict among neighbouring states. Indeed, as with individuals, most conflicts among states occur between states which are close together. By virtue of their closeness they have what has been termed both the opportunity to fight and the willingness, or reasons, to fight. They have the opportunity because it is relatively easy even for a militarily weak state to mobilize its armed forces on its borders and to use those forces against a contiguous or other nearby state. It may not have the "global reach" of an imperial power or superpower, but can exert force against its neighbours. Similarly, states within the same region have issues about which they can readily come into conflict. The most obvious concern territorial borders, often including irredentist claims and cross-national ethnic conflicts. Pairs of such states frequently carry on what have been termed long-term rivalries. Global organizations, whether organized on a functional basis to include states from various regions but on a less-than-universal basis (for example, the Commonwealth of Nations or the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) or quasi-universal organizations like the UN, address one or more of these same four basic purposes. The United Nations, in its various programmes and agencies, which themselves often constitute separate IGOs, is devoted to all those purposes. In analysing the UN with this in mind I sometimes refer to "the three UNs" of security against violence, economic security, and security of human rights. Such a distinction is not meant to be applied as a rigid taxonomy of institutions, but simply as a way to appreciate how the institutions and their purposes can conveniently be clustered. and Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali declared his belief that development and human rights were essential for stable peace. More generally, it is more than plausible that, conversely, peace facilitates and encourages economic development and the securing of human rights. In effect, a set of virtuous circles operates, with each of these causal arrows reinforcing the others. Nor is this vision limited to Boutros Boutros-Ghali and some of his contemporaries. It was clearly evident in the thought of many of the founders of the UN, in the United Kingdom and the United States, when they devised its institutions in 1945. For all their "realist" concerns with power politics and the institutions of collective security, these founders also found room for the liberal institutionalist vision of the broader underpinnings of a peaceful order that would in many instances make direct resort to the collective security operations unnecessary and virtually irrelevant. Before proceeding further with some thoughts on the relative capability and suitability of regional or global institutions, it is worth pausing to be clearer about why IGOs come to exist at all. To do so one can usefully begin with the economists' concept of collective goods, or public goods. Collective goods are those goods, or benefits, that no individual person or state can acquire for itself. They are goods which, to be achieved at all or at least to an optimal degree, must be provided by collective action. They must be provided cooperatively, with some provision for minimizing "free-riding" by those who would like to enjoy the benefits without paying for them. Within states, the provision of collective goods is, writ large, the primary purpose of government. Public health can reliably be secured only by regulation or other collective action (as for compulsory vaccination, or the provision of safe water). Environmental protection also often requires collective action and regulation, since the effects of pollution may extend far beyond its source and, in the absence of public policy, polluters may lack sufficient incentive to change their practices. In the absence of regulation, subsidy or effective taxation, the temptation for everyone to try to free-ride is likely to lead to widespread violation of restraints. Public order and defence against attack similarly require collective action, and the assessment and collection of taxes to ensure that everyone pays what is deemed a fair share of the cost. At some time in their history, the great majority of states practised torture rather routinely. Although many states continue to inflict torture on their citizens, its legitimacy is lost and governments may ultimately he held criminally responsible. When addressing the case for regional action, it helps to begin with an understanding of the term region. What is a region? In practice it is a very loosely defined term, often used in an ad hoc fashion. It is typically defined with some geographical reference, often to a continent or part of a continent. But such geographic references may be very imprecise, and laden with economic, cultural or political distinctions. Whereas a decade or so ago people readily spoke of Eastern Europe or Western Europe as distinct entities, it is now much more common to refer implicitly or explicitly to the cultural and other unities of a single Europe. Some people, to identify (still quite imperfectly) the area of industrial states refer to the North Atlantic area, or to a Europe from Vladivostok to Ireland. Mexico is physically located on the continent generally referred to as North America, but when Mexicans speak of norteamericanos they do not mean themselves. Is Taiwan a part of East Asia, or not? It depends on the circumstances and purposes of those who use the term. Physical, political, economic and cultural definitions of regions rarely delineate the same boundaries. The need to establish international organizations is often evident, and strong. Some of the problems that IGOs are created to manage must be addressed at both regional and global levels. In many cases there should be no a priori preference for regional over global efforts, or vice versa. Some issues can best be handled at the regional level, among states that are heavily involved in overlapping interests. Others can best, or even only, be managed on a global basis. Among these are some trade issues, some security issues, and such global environmental issues as warming and greenhouse gases. The choice between regional and global organization needs to be made in each case, contextually, informed by theory and empirical evidence, and sensitive to local conditions and needs. It is important to focus attention not on the general question of regionalism vs. globalism, but on what needs to be done, as identified in the four purposes listed at the outset of this chapter. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991). (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996). 75:3 (May/June 1996), pp. 63-78. (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1993), pp. 68-80. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967). ASIA IN THE GLOBAL AND REGIONAL CONTEXT: SECURITY OPTIONS FOR THE NEXT CENTURY Chung-Si Ahn, Professor, Seoul National University, Republic of Korea The world today is at a turning point. The changes that we are undergoing are global in scope, and in content revolutionary, fundamental and structural. North-East Asia is also in a period of a great political and economic transformation. Amidst these changes, peoples and societies of the region are facing new sources of hope, challenges and uncertainties. The nature of change in the world and Asia can be summed up as optimism and uncertainty. A half-century's Cold War is over. Reduced war potential among major powers has increased the prospect for global peace and regional stability. Trade and economic issues are gaining increasing importance in international relations. The communication and information revolutions now under way are turning the world into a truly "global village". In addition, an era of competitive coexistence between capitalism and socialism as the two alternative social systems has ended with victory for the market system. This (marketization) will facilitate a single, comprehensive, global economic system (that is, the Uruguay Round and World Trade Organization system) to emerge. These positive changes together with other negative global problems, such as deteriorating environments, pollution, and draining natural resources and so forth, foster and at times force international cooperation. As we near the end of the 20th century, there still remain obstacles and uncertainties that pose challenges for us to overcome. A few of them are highlighted below. In Asia and the wider Pacific region, a new cycle in political thinking is on the rise. The region in general continues to move towards a period of relative peace and stability in the post-Cold War era. Bilateral relations between countries that were distant for so long have greatly improved in recent years. Simultaneously, an awareness of the need for multilateralism in economic, security and cultural cooperation has gained renewed strength among the major countries in the region. However, these positive signs of development may be misleading. Although the region as a whole has moved towards deepening economic interdependence, the structure of security relations in the post-Cold War era is fraught with uncertainty. While the need for a new security order is widely recognized, a more durable security order has not yet emerged. In particular, North-East Asia remains a dangerous place. has been one of the primary arenas of international conflict and competition over the past century. The region has been subjected to a recurring pattern of major power rivalries and military interventions, colonialism and revolutionary nationalism, and international as well as civil conflicts. However, unprecedented economic growth in recent decades enabled the region to achieve enhanced social well-being and political stability. Economic prosperity also helped major regional powers to improve their bilateral relations with every country in East and South-East Asia, perhaps with the exception of North Korea. Furthermore, the post-Cold War international environment fostered positive incentives for cooperative international behaviour. In consequence, direct military conflict between the major powers in North-East Asia has now become a remote possibility for the first time in this century. Perspectives on the region's future differ between adherents of varying models of power and international relations. The optimists are usually guided by the "liberalist" model, while sceptics tend to project the future primarily in terms of political "realism". Optimist arguments focus on the pacifying effects of growing trade and economic interdependence, slow but steady movement toward democracy and the trend towards the proliferation of multilateral organizations and institutions. Furthermore, the World Bank estimates that half of the world's 10 largest economies will come from East Asia by the year 2020. Intra-regional trade and investment will continue to expand steadily. For the first time since the Industrial Revolution, the centre of the world economy is moving towards the Asia-Pacific region and away from Europe. With the well-publicized economic miracle in East Asia - Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and China as well as the USA - the North-East Asian region is being recognized as the centre of gravity for global trade and investment. , liberals predict that "flows of trade and investment among Asian states not only make all parties better off, they also tend to create incentives for continued cooperation and to dampen whatever tendencies there might otherwise be toward hostility and conflict". Today's advanced communication and transportation technology increases the potential return of cooperation, while multiplying the cost of war. In other words, liberal optimists believe, as did their forebears of the 18th and 19th century, that dynamic economic growth in the region promotes peace by fostering more trade and interdependence. As Asia's economic dynamism draws global attention, a renewed sense of international partnership, according to the liberalists, is replacing the patron-client relationship between Asia and the rest of the world. The formation of APEC was a step towards making the "Pacific Century" a reality. APEC, founded in 1989 in Canberra by 12 Asia-Pacific countries, now has 15 member countries. The APEC summit in Seattle in November 1993 was, in the eyes of the United States, a symbol of Asia's transformation from "troublesome security clients to a mature partner with the US in co- prosperity". APEC is neither a security forum, nor directly involved in the peacemaking role. But it is widely believed that it will in the future play a constructive role in deterring future threat to Pacific Rim prosperity, and significantly contribute to the reduction of security tensions that will inevitably be generated by the rapidly changing political and economic terrain of post-Cold War North-East Asia, such as the rise of China with its military preponderance, and possible collapse of North Korea and its absorption by South Korea (at great expense), as well as the reduction/withdrawal of US troops from Korea and Japan, and so on. In essence, the optimists tend to believe in the pacifying effects of the region's growing economic dynamism and intensifying interdependence. Democracy fosters economic growth and enables an efficient management of the economy, in order to enhance citizen welfare. Democracy has also brought about a safer, more peaceful world and a lower level of violence than non-democracies. We have seen recently, in countries like South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and Taiwan, that economic development nurtures forces for democratic change. For economies to grow and mature, nations need to reach out and work for more stable and secure international economic-political environments. It is also true that open, democratic societies make better trading partners and more peaceful neighbours. Thus, liberal optimists expect that, as Asian powers achieve democracy, the possibility of building lasting peace will be greater. In the 21st century, therefore, Asians may become as democratic as the Europeans, and enjoy a new economic, social and cultural renaissance. Plans for multilateral security cooperation have also been proposed with more limited regional or subregional scope in North-East Asia by such countries as the US, Russia, Australia, Canada, Malaysia and so on. Moreover, in South Korea, Foreign Minister Han Sung-joo said in November 1993 that the time had come for countries in North-East Asia to join together in a multilateral security framework. In this respect, Japan's foreign policy and its role in Asia are still ill-defined. The question then is what kind of Asia the Japanese see themselves as part of - a broad and inclusive one, or one that is narrow and resentful. The souring of Japan's relations with Europe or the US or both can result in the latter. Will Japan continue to depend on the US security umbrella, or will its political role commensurate with its economic power lead Japan to rearmament and tensed relations with its neighbours? How can one help the "optimist" future to be realized? What needs to be done to safeguard our future against the "realist" nightmares, as depicted in George Orwell's 1984 or Huntington's "clash of civilizations"? The logical answer is to reduce uncertainty and make every country act positively for the future of the world and Asia. Effective measures can be sought on multiple levels - global, regional and national; governmental as well as civic domains; by groups or individuals, and so on. and a proliferation of cross-national (and cross-regional) activities being performed by various non-governmental organizations. Paul M. Evans noted in this respect that, 16, no. 3 (December 1994): 45-56. (Spring 1996): 12-15, 68. See also, Jonathan D. Pollack, "Pacific Insecurity: Emerging Threats to Stability in East Asia", in the same : 8-11. (United Nations University Press, 1997), pp. 181-206. 2 June 1994, p. 21. (Washington, DC: A World Bank Policy Research Report, the World Bank, 1993). 4 (January 1996): 233-262. 27, no. 1 (1983): 21-71; Rummel, "Libertarian Proposition on Violence Within and Between Nations: A Test Against Published Results", 29, no. 3 (1985): 419-455; and Bruce Russett, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). (Spring 1996): 18. , 11 November 1993, p. 42. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1996, revised). AND SECURITY IN THE POST-COLD WAR Carolina G. Hernandez, Professor of Political Science, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City A highly fluid and flexible regional strategic environment in the Asia Pacific region was one of the major consequences of the removal of the Cold War overlay that defined superpower relations and the global strategic environment. Site of the most economically dynamic region in the world, the Asia Pacific faces the challenge of moderating the destabilizing impact of strategic fluidity and flexibility, and forging a new arrangement to ensure that peace and security continue to define the region. Aware that sources of tension and conflict which were allowed to recede into the background during the Cold War are likely to resurface as they have in other parts of the world, regional states have begun to take measures including those some of them previously avoided. Among these measures are the adoption of regional dialogue mechanisms for the management of conflict, whether general or specific, the generation of regional codes of conduct for inter-state behaviour and the expansion and deepening of regional cooperation, including enhanced security cooperation. Security can be conceptualized as comprehensive and multidimensional, whose core goal is the achievement of well-being, whether of the region, the nation state, the society, the community or the individual. It has military, political, economic, socio-psychological, cultural, and ecological dimensions. Cooperation between and among states is necessary in order to bring security about. Peace ensues when the security of relevant actors is attained. For the purpose of this paper, however, while a comprehensive view of security is being adopted, it will only pertain to the level of the nation state and the Asia Pacific region. The end of superpower competition removed the stabilizing impact of the balance of power that underpinned global and regional security for over four decades. While the Asia Pacific was not the main theatre in superpower competition, the global character of the Cold War, nevertheless, required the creation of a network of bilateral and multilateral military alliances led by the United States in the post-war period. Known as the San Francisco system, this network of alliances enabled an American military presence in various military bases in allied territory, thereby providing the region with a security umbrella. The cornerstone of this alliance system and security umbrella was the US-Japan Security Treaty. China played the role of a balancer after the Sino-Soviet rift in the 1960s. Under this stable strategic environment, rapid economic development took place in Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore, followed soon after by Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia. the absence of a known enemy makes the US commitment a doubtful one in the eyes of its Asian allies. This perception is reinforced by the assessment that US power is in relative decline, circumscribed by continuing economic problems and the rise of isolationist sentiments at home. and in the 1980s led to a change in the regional strategic environment, leading key states like China and India to restructure their forces. Their goal of military modernization, together with those of small and medium-sized states in the region, has made them parts of an emerging multipolar structure of power in the Asia Pacific, particularly when economic power is thrown into the equation. Military modernization and force restructuring, the probability of nuclear proliferation within the context of the availability of military inventories from the former Soviet Union and other arms merchants, and new wealth in North-East and South-East Asia have combined to raise the prospects for an arms race in the region. China is rising not only as a military power, which it was even during the Cold War, but also as an economic power. The World Bank estimates that China will become the world's largest economy by 2020. Its large and expanding domestic market has moderated the backlash from international public opinion of its brutal handling of the Tienanmen incident. Uncertainty about its foreign policy intentions combined with its actual and potential military and economic power make it a formidable regional force. China's military modernization is likely to enhance its military power, especially its power projection capability in the neighbouring waters. Freedom and safety of navigation in the strategic sea lanes of communications (SLOCs)in East Asia is a for the continuous economic prosperity of regional states whose energy supplies, trade and commerce pass through these international waterways. Whether growing Chinese power will be exercised in the absence of internal and external constraints remains debatable at this point. In addition, the uncertainty of US commitment to regional security and the absence of a settled regional order make the rise of China a serious challenge to regional security. Another important challenge to regional peace and security is arms modernization and nuclear proliferation. As already noted, the fluidity of the regional strategic environment, the rise of regional states and the availability of arms for sale and cash with which to finance arms modernization have shaped arms acquisition in the past few years. While these arms purchases have markedly increased, they do not yet constitute an arms race. Nevertheless, the challenge for regional states is to avert their evolution into one. As already noted, both the removal of the Cold War overlay and domestic factors have influenced the re-emergence of territorial disputes in recent years. Among those that have the greatest potential for destabilizing the region are the reunification of China and Taiwan and the South China Sea disputes, although the disputes between South Korea and Japan over the Takeshima (Tokto) islands and that between China and Japan over the Senkaku (Tiao-yu-tai) islands have occasionally created tension in their bilateral relations. Economic development tends to bring about changes not only in the economy, but also in the society's social, cultural and political values and structures. By their nature changes are unsettling and destabilizing because they alter the status quo. Losers become instant enemies of change while prospective beneficiaries suspend their support until the benefits of change materialize. They cannot be expected to support the reforms enthusiastically and may even actively block them if the conditions would permit it. Finally, new challenges to peace and security surfaced after the end of the Cold War. Sometimes referred to as non-military or non-conventional threats to security or soft security issues, they now compete with other issues in the national and international political agenda for the priority attention of states. Among them are international terrorism, environmental degradation, the international movement of peoples, highly infectious and life-threatening diseases like AIDS, and drug trafficking. These affect peace and security in all its dimensions and at all levels. They are only beginning to be recognized as real threats to the security of peoples and their various associations, including the nation state and the international community. A few examples are the only ones cited here for illustrative purposes. This is a global problem whose effective solution requires no less than international action and cooperation. For example, in the case of labour migrants, if the parent state relies on their earnings for its foreign exchange needs, a drastic change in the labour market could undermine foreign labour remittances as a source of foreign currency that is used for economic development and consumption purposes. Migration also undermines the social and psychological well-being of the family, especially the children who are left with only one or no parent to care for them. Labour migration has also resulted in many broken homes and the collateral damage to children this phenomenon brings. Threats to the physical and emotional well-being of migrant workers, especially women, are well-documented in the continuing saga of the labour diaspora experienced by developing countries. Moreover, the threat of "cultural pollution" has also been raised by host countries, and host country dependence on foreign labour could undermine their own economic development in the event of a sudden repatriation of imported labour. Finally, friction from problems engendered by labour migration can also undermine the bilateral relations of parent and host states as in the diplomatic rift between the Philippines and Singapore over the celebrated Flor Contemplacion case in 1995. Aware of these challenges to regional peace and security, states have resorted to several means to meet them more effectively over the past few years. Their responses to some of these challenges include the forging and redefinition of military security arrangements, the creation of dialogue mechanisms, the adoption of codes of conduct of inter-state behaviour, preventive diplomacy and confidence-building measures, the expansion of regional cooperation and the rise and increasing utility of track-two diplomacy. The drawing down of the US forces from the Asia Pacific and their withdrawal from the Philippine bases in 1992 led to the forging of a number of ports of call, access rights and other defence-related arrangements between the US and a number of countries in ASEAN. Still linked by bilateral mutual defence agreements with the Philippines and Thailand, the US expanded or upgraded its security relationships through various defence-related agreements with Singapore, Brunei, Malaysia and Thailand in an effort not to seriously undermine its capability to sustain a credible military presence in the region. Such a more widely distributed military presence was thought to compensate for the loss of the Philippine bases, an event that was regarded by the Bush administration "as a routine adjustment to the changing strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific" despite earlier warnings of the security implications of the loss of these bases for regional security. it is a recognized fact in the region that this security relationship remains the backbone and core of the region's security as it assures the US commitment to regional security beyond the Cold War. The fact that it took place after the Taiwan Straits crisis of March 1996 and amid the unfortunate Okinawa incident indicates that there is a common recognition that threats to regional security remain a concern of both the US and Japan and that they are prepared to meet them through their bilateral security arrangement. This should help assuage continuing concern in this regard among regional states not able to provide for their security in the face of more powerful regional neighbours with hostile intentions. It also ensures that Japan's security role is not pursued in a unilateral manner. There has also been a rise in the creation and use of dialogue mechanisms to deal with potential sources of tension and conflict in the region. On the economic front, the increasing relevance of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) as a forum for regional economic cooperation and for averting the rise of tension and conflict over economic issues is widely acknowledged. Its three past heads of state summits have moved economic cooperation forward, with the Osaka Summit marking the beginning of the second stage of APEC, in which the principal task is the advancement of the Seattle vision and the implementation of the Bogor goals of free trade. APEC also serves as a rare venue for China and Taiwan to get together beyond their narrow, though important, cross-straits relations. Regional states have also adopted and extended existing codes of conduct of inter-state behaviour as a hedge against instability and conflict. The ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) has been acceded to by Viet Nam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar. It contains the principles of peace and good neighbourliness which the parties to it are expected to observe. They include pacific settlement of disputes and respect for the national independence and territorial integrity of states. Within the context of the ARF both confidence-building measures and preventive diplomacy are being promoted as a response to post-Cold War peace and security needs in the region. The publication and exchange of defence white papers, intelligence information sharing, joint military exercises and participation in the UN Register of Conventional Arms are among the confidence-building measures considered by this body. There is also a recognition of the need to move preventive diplomacy forward, in response to the UN Secretary-General's , in the efforts of the ARF. A non-governmental task force met on preventive diplomacy in Paris in November 1996 to draft proposals on this matter for the ARF to consider in its 1997 meeting. The creation of both APEC and the ARF is evidence of expanding regional economic and political cooperation in the region. It is possible that the limits of regional cooperation in terms of the number of relevant participants and the continuing manageability and usefulness of these dialogue processes may soon be reached if they have not yet been reached with the inclusion of all the major regional states in these two processes. As regional cooperation mechanisms increase in number and in membership and as new functional areas of cooperation open up, the role of non-governmental organizations in the promotion of regional cooperation for peace, security and prosperity is likely to increase. Already recognized by ASEAN, the ARF and APEC, these non-governmental organizations engaged in track-two diplomacy23 have played very crucial roles in thinking through the directions formal mechanisms should take in furthering the cause of peace, security and prosperity in the region. The contribution of the ASEAN Institutes for Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) in ASEAN decision-making has been recognized and encouraged by the ASEAN foreign ministers in their joint statements over the past several years. The role of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Committee (PECC) in APEC has also been invaluable. The newly organized Council for Asia Pacific Security Cooperation (CSCAP), stalled over the manner in which Chinese and Taiwanese individuals and institutions can meaningfully participate in its activities, may finally be recognized by the ARF as its principal track-two partner once Chinese participation as a full member has been effected. The post-Cold War Asia Pacific region has been a beneficiary of the benign peace brought by the removal of superpower competition, a development that facilitated the resolution of problems like the Cambodian conflict and enabled the emergence of d�tente between key states in the region. Nevertheless, challenges to regional peace and security resurfaced or emerged with the removal of the Cold War overlay. These come from sources that had little or nothing to do with superpower competition. They are likely to preoccupy the region in the coming years.
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Globalization and globality.

  • Agnieszka Paczynska Agnieszka Paczynska School of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University
  • https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.206
  • Published in print: 01 March 2010
  • Published online: 22 December 2017

Globalization has opened up new avenues of investigation in many disciplines. Among these are political science and political sociology, where scholars have engaged in heated debates over issues such as the ways in which state sovereignty is changing, the role of new nonstate actors in shaping international social and political dynamics, and how globalization processes affecting patterns of social and political conflict. Scholars have extensively explored the impact of globalization on the nation-state. While some view the nation-state as increasingly constrained and weakening, others see it as the main actor in the international arena. Since the 1990s, the number of non-governmental organizations has grown significantly and increasing numbers are engaged in and form alliances with other civil society organizations across state borders. Some are engaged in long-term development work, others in humanitarian assistance, yet others focus primarily on advocacy. The extent of their influence and its consequences remain topics of often contentious debate within the literature. The debate on how globalization shapes conflict processes has also been contentious and deeply divisive. Some analysts view globalization processes as contributing to the emergence of new cultural and religious conflicts by challenging local cultural, religious, or moral codes, and imposing Western, secular, and materialistic values alien to indigenous ways of organizing social life. For others, the link between globalization processes and ethnic and cultural conflicts is at best indirect or simply nonexistent.

  • globalization
  • nation-state
  • state sovereignty
  • international relations
  • social conflict
  • political conflict

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Abstract: Both global and regional economic linkages have strengthened substantially over the past quarter century. We employ a dynamic factor model to analyze the implications of these linkages for the evolution of global and regional business cycles. Our model allows us to assess the roles played by the global, regional, and country-specific factors in explaining business cycles in a large sample of countries and regions over the period 1960–2010. We find that, since the mid-1980s, the importance of regional factors has increased markedly in explaining business cycles especially in regions that experienced a sharp growth in intra-regional trade and financial flows. By contrast, the relative importance of the global factor has declined over the same period. In short, the recent era of globalization has witnessed the emergence of regional business cycles.

  • I. Introduction

The inexorable forces of globalization and regionalization have reshaped the world economic landscape over the past quarter century. Global trade and financial flows have registered unprecedented growth during this period. Intra-regional economic linkages have also become much stronger with the proliferation of regional trade agreements and common currency areas.

These developments have appeared to affect the evolution of global and regional business cycles in unexpected ways. For example, despite the presence of strong global trade and financial linkages, there was significant variation in growth performance across different regions during the 2008–09 financial crisis. Specifically, some regions (e.g., Asia) exhibited surprising resilience during the worst of the financial crisis and rapidly returned to high growth whereas some others (e.g., North America and Europe) experienced deep and prolonged contractions. 2

These observations lead to a basic question: “Have regional elements become more important in driving business cycles in an era of globalization?” We answer this question using a dynamic factor model. Our model allows us to analyze the sources of fluctuations in output, consumption, and investment in a large sample of countries over a long period of time. Specifically, it includes 106 countries over the period 1960–2010 and covers seven geographical regions: North America, Europe, Oceania, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa. The model decomposes fluctuations in these variables into four factors: a global factor that captures the broad common elements in the fluctuations across countries; regional factors, which capture the common elements in the cyclical fluctuations in the countries in a particular region; country-specific factors, which capture factors common to all variables in a particular country; and residual (“idiosyncratic”) factors, which are associated with elements in the fluctuations of an individual variable that cannot be attributed to the other factors.

Our results indicate that, since the mid-1980s, the importance of regional factors has increased markedly in explaining business cycles especially in regions that experienced a sharp growth in intra-regional trade and financial flows. These patterns are particularly strong among the North American, European, Oceanian, and Asian regions. By contrast, the importance of the global factor has declined over the same period. Moreover, there has been no significant change in the degree of international synchronization of cycles as measured by the joint contribution of the global and region-specific factors to fluctuations during the past quarter century. These patterns are valid not only for output, but also for consumption and investment fluctuations. In short, the recent era of globalization has witnessed the emergence of regional business cycles.

There have been profound changes in the volume, direction, and nature of international trade and financial flows over the past quarter century ( Kose and Prasad, 2010 ). These changes certainly have global dimensions, but at the same time they have also been driven by regional forces. First, while global trade flows have been growing at a much faster rate than world output, intraregional trade flows have been playing an increasingly more prominent role in global trade. This reflects, in part, the process of economic unification in different regions and some emerging economies’ (e.g., China, India, and Korea) rapid growth during the past quarter century. In addition, intra-regional trade and financial linkages have further strengthened by the explosion in the number of regional trade agreements (from 5 in 1985 to 200 in 2011). 3

Second, intra-industry trade flows have contributed significantly to the unprecedented increase in global trade during the past two decades. These flows have grown rapidly in certain regions, including North America, Europe and Asia. 4 International vertical specialization, which refers to the fragmentation of production processes into sequential chains in multiple countries, has been a major factor fuelling the substantial increase in global trade flows. This has led to a significant rise in the ratio of trade to value added in North America, Europe, Asia, and some parts of Latin America ( Hummels, Ishii, and Yi, 2001 ; and Yi, 2003 ).

Moreover, the volume of global financial flows has reached unprecedented levels since the mid-1980s overshadowing the increase in global trade over the same period. Intra-regional flows have also been on the rise for the past 15 years, especially in Europe and Asia. Financial flows among advanced economies have still been the main driving force of the increase in international financial flows, but there has also been a significant rise in flows between regions with advanced countries and those with developing economies over the past 25 years (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007; Milesi-Ferretti, Strobbe, and Tamirisa, 2010 ).

Neither economic theory nor empirical research provides definitive guidance concerning the impact of increased trade and financial linkages on the degree of synchronization of global and regional cycles. On the one hand, international trade and financial linkages generate both demand and supply-side spillovers across countries that can result in more highly correlated business cycles. On the other hand, if stronger trade and financial linkages are associated with increased specialization, they can lead to a decline in the degree of business cycle synchronization. While a number of empirical studies conclude that trade linkages have a positive effect, they report mixed findings on the impact of financial flows on the synchronization of business cycles. Although the quantitative importance of region-specific factors in explaining business cycles has been an area of intensive study, the results of this research program have been far from conclusive.

In light of the mutually complementary nature of globalization and regionalization, we turn to an empirical approach that has the potential to provide a comprehensive perspective on the evolution of global and regional business cycles. Our methodology builds on our earlier work ( Kose, Otrok, and Whiteman, 2003 ), but we consider a different question and employ a much larger dataset with a substantially longer time span in this paper (see Appendix I for the sample of countries and regions). The use of a large sample of countries allows us to draw a sharp contrast across different regions in terms of their exposure to external shocks. In addition, the relatively long time span of the data enables us to consider distinct sub-periods and to analyze the changes in business cycles that have taken place during the recent wave of globalization (1985–2010) relative to the earlier period. These differences are essential to uncover our headline result on the emergence of regional cycles.

Our model simultaneously captures contemporaneous spillovers of shocks as well as the dynamic propagation of business cycles in a flexible manner, without a priori restrictions on the directions of spillovers or the structure of the propagation mechanism. The dynamic factor model we employ can be seen as a reduced-form solution of a standard open economy Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model in the sense that data generated from that model has an approximate representation as a dynamic factor model ( Crucini, Kose, and Otrok, 2011 ). However, typical DSGE models face the curse of dimensionality that limits the number of shocks and driving variables that can be analyzed in these models. Our factor model provides a parsimonious representation of the data, allowing us to consider a large number of macroeconomic variables to study the evolution of global and regional business cycles.

The estimated global, regional and country factors in our model reflect elements of commonality of fluctuations in different dimensions of the data. The importance of studying all of these factors in one model is that they obviate problems that could be caused by studying a subset of factors, which could lead to a mischaracterization of commonality. For instance, regional factors estimated in a smaller model may simply reflect global factors that are misidentified as being specific to a particular region. Moreover, by including different macroeconomic aggregates, we get better measures of the commonality of fluctuations in overall economic activity. 5

We present a brief survey of theoretical and empirical studies on the impact of integration on the degree of business cycle synchronization in Section II . Our empirical model and database are introduced in Section III . Section IV reports the results of estimations for the full sample. Section V discusses the evolution of global and regional cycles over time. Section VI summarizes the results of our sensitivity experiments. Section VII concludes.

  • II. What do We know about the Evolution of Global and Regional Business Cycles?

What are the implications of increasing trade and financial integration for the evolution of global and regional business cycles? This section provides a brief review of theoretical and empirical studies focusing on this question. We start with a summary of the basic predictions of theory with respect to the implications of integration on business cycle synchronization. Next, we discuss the results of empirical studies analyzing the linkages between integration and synchronization. We conclude with a short summary of the research program on the importance of global and regional factors in explaining business cycles.

Our brief review highlights the three major findings of this literature. First, theoretical studies are inconclusive about the effects of integration on the degree of synchronization of business cycles. Second, most empirical studies suggest that trade integration has a positive impact on synchronization, but the role of financial integration in driving business cycles is still an open question. Third, while there is an extensive literature about regional dimensions of business cycles, these studies fail to provide a clear conclusion with respect to the evolution of these cycles. Differences in country coverage, sample periods, aggregation methods used to create country groups, and econometric methods employed appear to lead to diverse conclusions about the temporal evolution of synchronization. Our review also shows that there has been no comprehensive study analyzing the evolution of global and regional cycles using a large sample of countries and regions over a long time period.

Theoretical Implications . There is no consistent theoretical prediction across different models about how trade and financial integration should affect the degree of synchronization of business cycles. For example, international trade linkages generate both demand and supply-side spillovers across countries. Through these types of spillover effects, stronger trade linkages can result in more highly correlated business cycles. Increased intra-industry trade and vertical specialization could further amplify these spillover effects.

However, both classical and “new” trade theories imply that increased trade linkages also lead to increased specialization. The impact of increased specialization on the degree of comovement depends on the nature of specialization (intra- vs. inter-industry) and the types of shocks (common vs. country-specific). If stronger trade linkages are associated with increased interindustry specialization across countries, then the impact of increased trade depends on the nature of shocks. If industry-specific shocks are more important in driving business cycles, then business cycle comovement is expected to decrease ( Krugman, 1993 ). If common shocks are more dominant than industry-specific ones, then this would lead to a higher degree of comovement ( Frankel and Rose, 1998 ).

The impact of increased financial flows on the synchronization of business cycles is also ambiguous in theory. By generating large demand-side effects, financial linkages could result in a higher degree of synchronization of output fluctuations. Contagion effects that are transmitted through financial linkages could also result in heightened cross-country spillovers of macroeconomic fluctuations ( Claessens and Forbes, 2001 ).

However, international financial linkages could also stimulate specialization of production through the reallocation of capital in a manner consistent with countries’ comparative advantage in the production of different goods ( Kalemli-Ozcan and others, 2001 ). Such specialization of production, which could result in more exposure to industry- or country-specific shocks, could lead to lower business cycle correlations. More generally, financial integration, by helping countries to diversify away country-specific risk associated with consumption fluctuations, should result in stronger comovement of consumption fluctuations across countries. The impact of financial integration also depends on the nature of financial flows: equity flows appear to reduce the degree of comovement while debt flows tend to increase it ( Davis, 2011 ).

Empirical Implications . A number of empirical studies find that trade linkages have a positive impact on the synchronization of business cycles suggesting that the traditional demand and supply spillovers dominate the effects of specialization associated with inter-industry trade flows ( Frankel and Rose, 1998 ; Kose, and Yi, 2006 ). Trade intensity also has a larger effect on crosscountry business cycle correlations in countries with stronger intra-industry trade linkages and more similar sectoral structures ( Imbs, 2004 ; Calderon, Chong, and Stein, 2007 ). Moreover, some studies document that regional trade agreements, such as NAFTA, tend to have a positive impact on comovement (Calderon, 2003; Bejan, 2011 ).

Empirical studies report mixed findings on the impact of financial flows on the degree of business cycle comovement. For example, Imbs (2006) reports that financial integration leads to higher output and consumption correlations in advanced countries. This effect appears to be much smaller in the case of developing countries ( Kose, Prasad, and Terrones, 2003 ). Jansen and Stokman (2004) find that countries with stronger FDI linkages have more correlated business cycles in the second half of the 1990s whereas Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou, and Peydro (2011) report a strong negative effect of banking integration on the degree of output synchronization.

Research has been unable to provide a concrete explanation about the evolution of comovement properties of the main macroeconomic aggregates over time in response to changes in the volume of trade and financial flows. Some of these studies find evidence of declining output correlations among industrial economies over the last three decades. For example, Heathcote and Perri (2004) document that the correlations of output, consumption, and investment between the United States and an aggregate of Europe, Canada, and Japan are lower in the period 1986–2000 than in 1972–85. 6

However, other studies document that business cycle linkages have become stronger over time. Kose, Otrok, and Whiteman (2008) , for example, employ a dynamic factor model to analyze the evolution of comovement across the G-7 countries. They document that the common factor on average explains a larger fraction of output, consumption, and investment volatility in the 1986–2003 period than that in 1960–72. They interpret this result as an indication of increasing degree of business cycle synchronization in the age of globalization. Using a longer sample of annual data, Artis and others (2011b) and Bordo and Helbling (2011) also document that the degree of synchronization across advanced countries has increased over time.

Regional Business Cycles . The quantitative importance of region-specific factors in explaining the degree of business cycle synchronization has been an area of intensive study. Although this research program has utilized a variety of methodologies (cross-section and panel regressions, VAR, FAVAR and dynamics factor models), the results have been far from conclusive. We briefly survey a select set of studies focusing on different regions here. We present a summary of a number of empirical studies on the synchronization of business cycles in different regions in Appendix II .

Research on the existence of a common European business cycle has produced inconclusive results ( De Haan, Inklaar, Jong-a-Pin, 2008 ; Giannone, Lenza, and Reichlin, 2010 ). Artis and Zhang (1997) , Bergman and others (1998) , Lumsdaine, and Prasad (2003) and Artis, Krolzig, and Toro (2004) analyze the implications of integration for the synchronization of business cycles in the advanced European countries and confirm the presence of a region specific cycle. However, Artis (2003) , Canova, Ciccarelli, Ortega (2007) , and Camacho, Perez-Quiros, and Saiz (2008) argue that the empirical evidence does not support a specific European cycle since the 1990s.

Some studies suggest that the rapid increase in intra-regional trade flows appears to be a major driving force of the high degree of synchronization of business cycles in various regions. For example, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has been associated with a substantial increase in the degree of business cycle synchronization between Canada, Mexico, and the United States ( Bergman and others, 1998 ; Kose, Meredith, and Towe, 2005 ). 7 Moneta, and Rüffer (2009) find evidence of increased synchronization in East Asia. With respect to other regions, Balcilara and Danjub (2010) and Hakura (2009) find regional factors play a minor role in MENA while Kose and Rebucci (2005) and Aiolfi, Catao, and Timmermann (2011) report the growing importance of the regional factors in explaining the degree of output comovement across Central American and Latin American countries, respectively. In related research, Tapsoba (2010) finds that intra-regional trade flows have led to enhanced business cycle comovement in Africa.

Recent research also considers the importance of global and regional (or group) specific factors in explaining business cycles with the help of dynamic factor models involving multiple regions. 8 Kose, Otrok, and Whiteman (2003) document that there is a significant global factor accounting for national business cycles, but regional factors appear to play smaller roles in a sample of 60 countries and 7 regions over the period 1960–90. Helbling and others (2007) extend this study to 93 countries with different regional configurations and analyze the 1960–2005 period. They document that the regional factors have become more important over time. Karagedikli and Thorsrud (2012) document that regional demand and supply shocks play important roles in explaining national business cycles using a FAVAR model. Mumtaz, Simonelli, and Surico (2011) use a dynamic factor model and report that while the importance of the global factor has declined, regional cycles have become more pronounced over time. There has been a recent debate on the ability of emerging market economies, especially emerging countries in the Asia-Pacific region, to decouple from a potential slowdown in advanced countries ( Helbling and others, 2007) . Kose, Otrok, and Prasad (2012) find that there has been some convergence of business cycle fluctuations among the group of advanced economies and among the group of emerging market economies while there has been a concomitant decline in the relative importance of the global factor. They argue that these results partly suggest that there has indeed been a decoupling of business cycles between the advanced and emerging market economies. 9

III. Database and Methodology

We introduce the dataset and econometric methodology we employ in this section. Our dataset covers a large number of countries and regions in order to truly account for the evolution of global and regional business cycles. We use a dynamic factor model to be able to capture various sources (global, regional and national) of business cycle fluctuations and explain the evolution of dynamic interactions across different macroeconomic variables in the context of a large dataset.

  • A. Database

Our database includes 106 countries partitioned into seven regions: North America (NA), Europe, Oceania, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The groupings of countries by region are especially useful to identify a “regional factor” given countries that are geographically close to each other are likely to be affected by similar types of (region-specific) shocks.

The primary source of our data series is the World Bank’s World Development Indicators . The database comprises annual data over the period 1960–2010. Real GDP, real private consumption, and real fixed investment correspond to the measures of national output, consumption, and investment, respectively. Using multiple macroeconomic aggregates, rather than just output, allows us to derive more robust measures of global, regional and national business cycles. All variables are measured at constant national prices. We compute the growth rates and remove the mean from each series. Appendix I shows the distribution of countries across seven regions.

In order to examine how global and regional cycles have evolved over time, we divide our sample into two distinct periods—the pre-globalization period (1960–84) and the globalization period (1985–2010). In addition to having roughly equal number of observations in each sub-period, there are three reasons for this demarcation. First, global trade and financial flows have increased markedly since the mid-1980s. 10 In addition, regional economic linkages have become much stronger during the second period as evidenced by the rapid increase in regional trade agreements as discussed earlier.

Second, after a period of stable growth during the 1960s, the first period witnessed a set of common shocks associated with large fluctuations in the price of oil in the 1970s and synchronized contractionary monetary policies in the major industrial economies in the early 1980s. This demarcation is essential for differentiating the impact of these common shocks from that of globalization on the degree of business cycle comovement. Third, the beginning of the globalization period coincides with a structural decline in the volatility of business cycles in both advanced and developing countries until the financial crisis of 2008–09. 11

  • B. Econometric Model

We employ a dynamic factor model to study the evolution of global and regional business cycles over time. Dynamic factor models have recently become a popular econometric tool for quantifying the degree of comovement among macroeconomic time series as some new estimation methods have been developed to perform factor analysis in large datasets. 12 The motivation underlying these models is that the covariance or comovement between (observable) macroeconomic time series across countries is the result of a relationship between these variables and a small number of unobservable common factors, which can be thought of as the main forces driving economic activity. These factors can capture common fluctuations across the entire dataset (i.e., the world) or across subsets of the data (i.e., regions). 13 Dynamic factor models are particularly useful for characterizing the degree and evolution of synchronization in various dimensions without making strong identifying assumptions to disentangle different types of common shocks.

In addition, factor models have the advantage that they are motivated by DSGE models, as was first noted by Sargent (1989) for a general equilibrium model. Recent research on international business cycles shows that one can view the dynamic factor model we employ as a reduced-form solution of a standard open-economy DSGE model as the data generated from that model has a representation of a dynamic factor model ( Crucini, Kose, and Otrok, 2011) . The typical DSGE model suffers from the curse of dimensionality, limiting the number of shocks and number of driving variables that can be analyzed using such models. The advantages of the dynamic factor model employed here are that it is parsimonious and allows one to consider larger, more interesting datasets than if one was estimating a multi-country DSGE model.

Our dynamic factor model features: (i) a global factor common to all variables (and all countries) in the system; (ii) a factor common to each region; (iii) a country factor common to all variables in each country; and (iv) an idiosyncratic component for each series of each country. Since our primary interest is in comovement across all variables in all countries (or regions), we do not include separate factors for each of the macroeconomic aggregates (including factors in yet another dimension would also make the model intractable for the large number of countries we study). The dynamic relationships in the model are captured by modeling each factor and idiosyncratic component as an autoregressive process.

Specifically, let Y t i,j,k denote the growth rate of the i th observable variable in the j th country of region k. We have three variables (output, consumption and investment) per country (indexed by i ), seven regions (indexed by k ), and 106 countries (indexed by j ). The model can then be written as:

where ϕ i,j,k (L) and ϕ m (L) are lag polynomial operators, v t i,j,k are distributed N ( 0 , σ i,j,k 2 ) , μ t m are distributed N ( 0 , σ m 2 ) , and the innovation terms μ t m and v t i,j,k are mutually orthogonal across all equations and variables in the system. The β parameters are called factor loadings and capture the sensitivity of each observable variable to the latent factors (denoted by f t m ; we have a total of 114 factors (1 global factor + 7 regional factors + 106 country factors) indexed by m ). For each variable, the estimated factor loadings quantify the extent to which that variable moves with the global factor, the regional factor, and the country-specific factor, respectively. The lag polynomials can in principle be of different order; however, for simplicity and parsimony, we restrict them to be AR(3) for each factor and idiosyncratic term. Since we are using annual data, this should capture most spillovers, either contemporaneous or lagged, across variables and countries.

The model is estimated using Bayesian techniques as described in Kose, Otrok, and Whiteman (2003) and Otrok and Whiteman (1998) . There are two related identification problems in the estimation of the model given by equations (1) – (3) : neither the signs nor the scales of the factors and the factor loadings are separately identified. We identify the signs by requiring one of the factor loadings to be positive for each of the factors. In particular, we impose the conditions that the factor loading for the global factor is positive for U.S. output; that country factors have positive factor loadings for the output of each country; and factors for each region have positive loadings for the output of the first country listed in each region in Appendix I . 14 Following Sargent and Sims (1977) and Stock and Watson (1989) , we identify the scales by assuming that each σ m 2 equals a constant. The constant is chosen based on the scale of the data, so that the innovation variance is equal to the average innovation variance of a set of univariate autoregressions on each time series. The results are not sensitive to this normalization. 15

There is a rich literature on large dynamic factor models that is closely related to our work (e.g., Forni, Hallin, Lippi, and Reichlin, 2000 ; Stock and Watson, 2002 ; Doz, Giannone, and Reichlin, 2008 ). Our approach is related to this literature, but a virtue of our methodology is that we can easily employ a factor structure where there are simultaneously estimated factors using large and small cross-sections of the data without relying on asymptotics. In our parametric approach, we can estimate factors for small cross-sections of the data (e.g., individual countries) conditional on larger cross-sections (i.e., global and regional factors).

  • C. Variance Decompositions

To measure the importance of each factor for explaining the volatility of macroeconomic aggregates, variance decompositions are calculated. The formula for the variance decomposition is derived by applying the variance operator to each equation in the system. This provides an empirical assessment of how much of a country’s business cycle fluctuations are associated with global fluctuations or fluctuations among countries in each region. We estimate the share of the variance of each macroeconomic variable attributable to each of the three factors and the idiosyncratic component. With orthogonal factors, the variance of the growth rate of the observable quantity Y t i,j,k can be written as follows:

Then, the fraction of volatility due to, say, the regional factor k would be:

These measures are calculated at each pass of the Markov chain; dispersion in their posterior distributions reflects uncertainty regarding their magnitudes.

IV. How Important are Regional Cycles (1960–2010)?

Before analyzing the evolution of global and regional business cycles over time, we first consider the sources of business cycle fluctuations over the full sample period. As a summary measure of the importance of the factors, we present the average variance shares (within the relevant regions of countries) attributable to each factor for the world and seven regions defined earlier. We do not report standard errors for these cross-country averages, but will do so later when we look at individual country results. 16 As we discussed in Section II , most of the literature on regional business cycles have studied output as the main indicator of cyclical activity. We also consider the sources of cycles in consumption and investment.

We briefly summarize the major results from the analysis of variance decompositions for the period 1960–2010. First, the global factor plays an important role in explaining business cycles implying that there exists a world business cycle. Second, regional factors are also significant drivers of business cycles. The regional factor on average accounts for a slightly larger share of variance of output and investment than does the global factor. Regional cycles tend to be more pronounced especially in regions with relatively stronger intra-regional trade and financial linkages. As discussed in the next section, this result is mainly driven by the emergence of the regional cycles in the second sub-period (1985–2010). Third, the average degree of synchronization of business cycles in individual countries with the rest of the world, measured by the sum of the variance shares explained by the global and regional factors, is quite high. In addition, a larger fraction of output variation is captured by the global and regional factors than that of consumption variation implying that there are still unexploited global and regional risk-sharing opportunities.

  • A. Global and Regional Cycles

How important is the global business cycle? As Table 1 shows, the global factor explains a significant fraction of business cycle fluctuations in all three macroeconomic variables over the period 1960–2010, implying that there is indeed a sizeable world business cycle. The global factor on average accounts for 10 percent of output growth variation among all countries in the sample. It also explains roughly 9 percent and 5 percent of the volatility of growth rates of consumption and investment, respectively. Although the variance shares attributed to the global factor appear to be small at first sight, it is important to remember that the global (common) factor across the three macroeconomic aggregates is for a very large and diverse set of countries.

Variance Decompositions (1960–2010)

Variables / Regions Global Regional Global +

Regional Country Idiosyncratic
World 10.40 12.86 23.26 40.79 34.46 North America 16.64 33.59 50.23 36.79 12.42 Europe 26.85 21.62 48.46 33.07 18.08 Ocenia 7.45 3.60 11.04 60.49 25.90 Asia 8.92 21.36 30.28 46.74 22.32 Latin America and the Caribbean 8.00 17.42 25.42 36.85 36.95 Sub-Saharan Africa 4.58 2.52 7.10 41.40 48.95 Middle East and North Africa 5.99 5.95 11.94 52.58 32.61 World 8.52 7.44 15.96 34.27 48.43 North America 17.87 27.41 45.29 35.85 17.83 Europe 26.31 7.23 33.54 31.39 34.41 Ocenia 4.53 6.11 10.64 35.29 50.22 Asia 8.12 11.89 20.01 31.85 47.51 Latin America and the Caribbean 4.72 11.00 15.72 34.98 48.61 Sub-Saharan Africa 2.81 2.83 5.64 35.31 57.06 Middle East and North Africa 1.30 4.04 5.35 38.12 54.07 World 4.95 11.00 15.95 27.06 55.73 North America 5.47 34.58 40.05 44.81 13.80 Europe 12.72 22.73 35.45 34.98 29.18 Ocenia 0.18 8.23 8.40 64.88 23.81 Asia 5.35 10.91 16.27 35.05 48.19 Latin America and the Caribbean 3.16 14.48 17.64 28.59 52.99 Sub-Saharan Africa 2.90 1.96 4.86 14.40 78.89 Middle East and North Africa 1.15 7.37 8.52 31.47 57.05
Factors

The global factor tends to be important in each region, but on average it plays a more dominant role in explaining business cycles in advanced country regions (North America and Europe) with stronger intra-regional trade and financial linkages than those regions with emerging market and developing economies (Asia, LAC, SSA, and MENA). The global factor on average explains about 17 (27) percent of output fluctuations in North America (Europe). In contrast, in the latter group of regions, the global factor explains between 5 percent (in SSA) to 9 percent (in Asia) of output fluctuations. The global factor is also associated with a substantial share of the variance in consumption and investment growth among regions of advanced countries, accounting on average for about 25 percent and 12 percent of the total variance of these variables, respectively. These shares are also much larger than the corresponding numbers for other regions.

How important are regional cycles ? The results indicate that the regional factor on average plays a slightly more important role than the global factor in explaining output fluctuations. Table 1 shows that the regional factor accounts for about 13 percent of output growth fluctuations in the full sample. The fraction of output variance explained by the regional factor is larger than that of the global factor in three of the seven regions. The regional factor, like the global factor, tends to be more important for advanced country regions. On average, it accounts for about 34 percent and 22 percent of output growth fluctuations in North America and Europe, respectively. While the regional factor explains a relatively smaller share of variance of output for Oceania, SSA and MENA, it explains a significant part of variation for Asia and LAC.

The regional factor also appears to be a major driver of business cycles in consumption and investment. While it accounts for only a slightly small share of consumption variation than does the global factor, its contribution to investment volatility is two times larger than that of the global factor. In six out of the seven regions, the regional factor is more important than the global one in explaining the volatility of consumption and investment.

We also examine the overall synchronization of global business cycles by using the sum of the variance contributions of the global and regional factors. The rankings of different regions remain much the same, although the magnitudes are of course larger. Among North America and Europe, the total contribution of these two factors averages between 48 and 50 percent for output, 34 and 45 percent for consumption, and 35 and 40 percent for investment. For other regions, the average for output variance is between 7 percent (for SSA) and 30 percent (for Asia).

Our results also indicate that the factor loadings associated with output and consumption growth on the global factor are positive for 70 percent and 83 percent of countries, respectively (i.e., the posterior distributions of the factor loadings have very little mass in symmetric intervals about zero). These findings imply that positive developments in the U.S. economy are generally associated with higher growth in the rest of the world since the global factor is identified by a positive factor loading for U.S. output growth.

  • B. Country-Specific Cycles

We next turn our attention to the roles played by country and idiosyncratic factors in explaining business cycles. Both of these play important roles in driving business cycles around the world ( Table 1 ). The country factor is on average more important in explaining output variation than is the idiosyncratic factor (41 percent vs. 34 percent), but the reverse is true for fluctuations in consumption (34 percent vs. 48 percent) and investment (27 percent vs. 56 percent). Given that consumption and investment series tend to have larger measurement problems than those of output, it is normal that fluctuations in consumption and investment exhibit larger idiosyncratic components.

With respect to different regions, the results indicate that as countries get more exposed to global trade and financial flows and establish stronger intra-regional economic linkages, the global and region-specific factors increasingly become more relevant in explaining national business cycles at the expense of the country and idiosyncratic factors. For example, country and idiosyncratic factors together explain about 50 percent of output variation in North America and Europe, but their share is on average more than 80 percent in five other regions.

How different are the factors explaining fluctuations in output and consumption? The total contribution of the global and regional factors is greater for output than for consumption for the sample as a whole and also for each region. Indeed, Figure 1 shows that this is true even when we look at the global and regional factors by themselves. This implies that, on average, country-specific and idiosyncratic factors play a more important role in explaining consumption fluctuations than in the case for output fluctuations. This result is very similar to a well-known stylized fact in the literature that, contrary to the predictions of conventional theoretical models of international business cycles, output is more highly correlated across countries than consumption ( Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1995) refer to this as the “quantity anomaly”).

Figure 1.

Average Variance Explained by Global and Regional Factors (1960–2010)

Citation: IMF Working Papers 2013, 019; 10.5089/9781557753281.001.A001

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As one would expect, the contribution of the idiosyncratic factor in regions populated with relatively less developed countries is greater than that of any other factor. This is true for all variables, but especially so for investment, where on average the idiosyncratic factor accounts for 79 percent of fluctuations in SSA and 57 percent of fluctuations in MENA. This result implies that investment fluctuations in these regions do not appear to be influenced much by either national or global business cycles.

  • C. Global, Regional, and Country Factors

We also study the temporal evolution of the global, regional and country factors. These factors are able to capture the main cyclical episodes of the past fifty years. For example, the estimated global factor closely matches the major peaks and troughs observed in the global business cycle, including the recessions in 1974–75, the early 1980s, the early 1990s, the slowdown in the early 2000s, and the recent global recession. 17 Moreover, there is considerable overlap in the evolution of the global factor and U.S. growth, especially during U.S. recessions.

Regional factors also reflect some of the major region specific episodes. For example, the Asian regional factor captures the Asian financial crisis, the LAC factor is consistent with the debt crisis of the early 1980s, and the North American and European factors exhibit the sharp contraction associated with the global financial crisis of 2008–09. We also examine relationships among the global factor, regional factors, country factors, and output in some select countries. These factors play different roles at different points in time and around the globe. In some episodes, the country factor is more strongly reflective of domestic economic activity, while in others the domestic growth appears to be influenced by movements in the global and/or regional factors.

Do global business cycles exhibit more persistent behavior than do the regional and national cycles? In order to measure persistence of cycles, we calculate the first-order autocorrelation of each factor. The global factor has large and positive autocorrelation (0.60), and compared to the autocorrelations of the regional factors and most of the country factors, it is much more persistent. The average persistence is about 0.20 for regional factors while it is around 0.10 for country factors. These results suggest that the global factor accounts for most of the persistent (or low frequency) comovement across countries whereas the global and regional factors appear to be responsible for the higher frequency comovement. 18

V. Business Cycles: Regionalization or Globalization? (1960–84 and 1985–2010)

We have briefly documented in our introduction that there has been a dramatic increase in global trade and financial flows over the past 25 years. This period has also witnessed a rapid growth of intra-regional trade and financial linkages in some regions. In light of these observations, it is natural to study the evolution of the roles played by the global and regional factors in explaining business cycles over time. We estimate our dynamic factor model over two periods, 1960–84 and 1985–2010, for this purpose. As we have already discussed in Section II , there are a number of good reasons justifying the selection of these two sub-periods.

By estimating the model over two sub-periods, we allow the model parameters, such as the factor loadings and those that determine the structure of propagation of shocks, to vary across time. This naturally yields a different variance decomposition for each sub-period. It is important to note that the estimate of the global factor itself is similar whether it is estimated over the full sample or over sub-samples. This is not surprising as the index of common activity in a period should not be affected by data many periods away ( Stock and Watson, 2009 ).

In this section, we first analyze the evolution of the importance of various factors in explaining output variation over time. Next, we consider how the global and regional cycles in consumption and investment have evolved over time. Before delving into the details, we briefly summarize the major results of this section. First, the results suggest that the global factor on average has played a significant role during the full sample, but its role has become less important in the second period. Second, regional factors have become more influential in explaining business cycles over time. These factors account for a much larger variation of business cycle volatility especially in regions where intra-regional trade and financial linkages have increased substantially during the second sub-period. Our findings indicate that while both global and regional factors are significant drivers of business cycles, regional factors increasingly play a more important role.

  • A. Evolution of Global and Regional Cycles

Tables 2 – 3 show the variance decompositions based on models estimated separately for the pre-globalization (1960–84) and globalization (1985–2010) periods, respectively. A number of commentators argue that because of the forces of globalization, national business cycles should have become more synchronized over time. Contrary to these popular arguments, the average contribution of the global factor to output fluctuations registers a sizeable decline in the second sub-period, from 13 percent to 9 percent for the full sample of countries. The same pattern holds for consumption fluctuations while the importance of the global factor registers a slight increase in fluctuations in investment ( Figure 2 ).

Variance Decompositions (1960–84)

Variables / Regions Global Regional Global +

Regional Country Idiosyncratic
World 13.40 10.68 24.08 41.00 32.56 North America 22.46 24.28 46.74 39.02 12.62 Europe 27.72 18.28 46.00 30.46 22.13 Ocenia 11.82 4.37 16.19 52.93 27.30 Asia 11.45 7.71 19.16 51.41 27.05 Latin America and the Caribbean 14.53 16.41 30.94 37.55 29.81 Sub-Saharan Africa 6.68 4.61 11.29 41.65 44.19 Middle East and North Africa 8.05 6.99 15.04 50.78 30.22 World 10.57 8.24 18.81 36.95 41.78 North America 27.69 16.10 43.79 38.99 15.40 Europe 25.15 9.09 34.24 30.16 33.87 Ocenia 4.92 5.29 10.21 34.45 50.31 Asia 9.84 7.13 16.96 38.98 41.35 Latin America and the Caribbean 10.23 11.18 21.41 35.96 41.00 Sub-Saharan Africa 4.54 6.38 10.92 40.20 45.97 Middle East and North Africa 1.21 6.58 7.79 36.77 51.92 World 6.12 9.55 15.67 27.99 54.00 North America 7.41 32.15 39.55 46.33 10.95 Europe 11.55 18.18 29.73 35.64 32.98 Ocenia 1.27 6.23 7.50 62.99 23.33 Asia 6.23 7.60 13.82 34.12 49.42 Latin America and the Caribbean 5.65 11.39 17.04 28.76 52.55 Sub-Saharan Africa 4.58 3.16 7.73 16.06 73.86 Middle East and North Africa 2.18 9.60 11.79 35.71 48.53
Factors

Variance Decompositions (1985–2010)

Variables / Regions Global Regional Global +

Regional Country Idiosyncratic
World 9.16 19.46 28.63 34.61 33.53 North America 30.41 32.87 63.28 23.03 11.09 Europe 19.85 40.25 60.10 19.69 19.06 Ocenia 20.93 20.33 41.26 29.40 25.76 Asia 5.08 32.49 37.56 33.88 26.14 Latin America and the Caribbean 6.55 14.55 21.10 41.19 34.67 Sub-Saharan Africa 5.70 7.64 13.34 36.56 45.82 Middle East and North Africa 3.72 8.61 12.33 49.93 32.17 World 6.49 13.85 20.34 30.38 46.31 North America 31.06 22.01 53.07 26.55 17.95 Europe 14.16 29.50 43.66 18.74 35.55 Ocenia 14.75 11.30 26.05 33.46 35.44 Asia 2.21 24.18 26.39 27.84 43.74 Latin America and the Caribbean 3.40 10.27 13.67 34.61 48.85 Sub-Saharan Africa 4.49 4.38 8.86 33.28 54.56 Middle East and North Africa 2.80 8.51 11.30 38.36 44.92 World 8.58 15.72 24.30 29.12 43.79 North America 24.96 30.17 55.12 33.77 9.77 Europe 19.57 31.40 50.97 26.01 22.22 Ocenia 16.36 29.21 45.57 34.59 16.02 Asia 5.11 26.29 31.40 32.19 34.09 Latin America and the Caribbean 5.89 12.12 18.01 37.06 42.25 Sub-Saharan Africa 4.46 5.43 9.89 22.42 64.08 Middle East and North Africa 7.31 7.36 14.67 36.74 43.31
Factors

Figure 2.

Variance Explained by Global Factor

These patterns also hold up and are in fact stronger in most cases when we evaluate the variance decompositions of output fluctuations for different regions ( Figure 2 ). The global factor appears to play a smaller role in explaining business cycles in the second sub-period in all regions except North America and Oceania. The share of the variance of output due to the global factor increases from 22 (12) percent to 30 (21) percent in North America (Oceania) in the second period.

In contrast, the regional factor has on average played an increasingly more dominant role in explaining business cycles over time ( Tables 2 – 3 and Figure 3 ). For example, the average share of the variance of output attributed to the regional factor has risen from 11 percent to 19 percent during the second period. These patterns are particularly strong among the following regions: North America, Europe, Oceania, and Asia regions. In particular, in the second sub-period, the regional factor has accounted for roughly one-third of output fluctuations in North America and Asia, and 40 percent in Europe, 20 percent in Oceania. In a similar fashion, the regional factor for SSA and MENA has played a more important role in the second period, but the increase in the variance share of output attributed to the regional factor is much smaller in these regions. In LAC, the importance of the regional factor does not change much over the two sub-periods.

Figure 3.

Variance Explained by Regional Factors

How can we explain these results? It is useful to answer this question in two steps. First, the decline in the importance of the global factor supports the interpretation that the strong business cycle synchronization observed during the 1970s and early 1980s reflected large common disturbances—the two oil price shocks—and the effects of correlated disturbances in the major advanced countries, notably the disinflationary monetary policy stance in the early 1980s. Although the latest financial crisis can also be seen as a massive global shock, its full impact on our variance decompositions has probably yet to be fully realized (as we have only three years of observations associated with the crisis). 19 Moreover, as we indicated in our introduction, there was substantial variation in the performance of different regions during the latest crisis. These developments have collectively led to an overall decline in the importance of the global factor in explaining business cycles during the globalization period.

Second, there has been on average an increase in the importance of regional factors. In particular, regional linkages have become much more significant in regions where intra-regional trade and financial flows have increased substantially after the mid-1980s (North America, Europe, Oceania, and Asia). These regions have undertaken substantial steps to strengthen regional economic linkages during the second sub-period. For example, intra-regional trade and financial linkages have registered significant growth over the past quarter century in the North American region where the process of economic integration started in the mid-1980s and culminated with the ratification of the NAFTA in 1994. 20 During the past decade, intra-regional trade flows accounted for nearly 55 percent of total trade while intra-regional financial assets were about 20 percent of total assets in the North American region. 21

One of the greatest regional integration projects of history took place in Europe with the eventual establishment of the European Union and creation of euro area. Intra-regional trade flows have constituted roughly 75 percent of total trade in Europe during the past decade. Intra-regional asset holdings went up from 55 percent to roughly 75 percent of total assets in Europe over the same period.

Regional integration in Asia has been mainly driven by the ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) and complemented by a number of bilateral regional arrangements ( Plummer, 2006 ). The region has seen a rapid increase in intra-regional trade and financial flows especially over the past decade. The share of intra-regional trade flows was around 55 percent over the past decade while intra-regional asset holdings increased to more than 5 percent of total assets. In the case of Oceania, the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Agreement in 1983 marked the beginning of a period of rapid growth in intra-regional trade and financial linkages (Gonuguntla, 2010). 22

The nature of trade has also changed in these four regions over time. One of the major driving forces of the rapid growth in regional trade flows has been the acceleration of intra-industry trade. The surge in intra-industry trade linkages has been associated with vertical specialization of trade ( Yi, 2003 ; De Backer and Yamano, 2007 ) which is associated with a higher degree of business cycle synchronization ( di Giovanni and Levchenko, 2010 ; Ng, 2010 ). Moreover, during the second sub-period, countries in these regions have increased the pace of diversification of their industrial (and trade) bases. This has been accompanied by a greater degree of sectoral similarity across countries within regions further contributing to the increase in the degree of business cycle synchronization ( Imbs, 2004 ; Kose and Prasad, 2010 ).

The evolution of global and regional cycles is of course affected by various types of shocks, in addition to increased trade and financial integration. For example, common shocks, such as abrupt, unexpected changes in commodity prices or sharp fluctuations in asset prices in the major financial centers, can lead to a higher degree of synchronization of global or regional business cycles. Both the global and regional cycles can also be affected by cross-border spillovers of disturbances originating in a large economy. Moreover, global and regional business cycles can emerge simply because of correlated shocks, such as shocks associated with the implementation of similar policies. It is easy to see how these types of shocks have been influential in some of the regions that have experienced more pronounced regional cycles. For example, while the implementation of similar policies has contributed greatly to the convergence of national cycles in Europe over the period 1985–2010, cross-border spillovers originating in the United States and China have probably been important in explaining regional cycles in North America and Asia, respectively.

Not surprisingly, the importance of regional factors in explaining business cycles in less developed regions, such as SSA and MENA, which are also the regions relatively less exposed to the forces of globalization, has registered only a slight increase between the two periods. In LAC, the importance of the regional factor does not change much over the two sub-periods. This could reflect the region specific developments, such as the buildup in external debt, the subsequent debt crises in the early 1980s, and regional contagion following the financial crisis of the 1990s and early 2000s.

The total contribution of global and regional factors together to output fluctuations has, on average, has recorded a small increase from 24 percent in the first sub-period to 29 percent in the second sub-period ( Figure 4 ). This is of course the consequence of a substantial increase in the relative importance of the regional factor. Since the total contribution of global and regional factors is a measure of the extent of co-movement across national business cycles, these results show that while there is some evidence implying that business cycles have become more synchronized over time, the increase in the change of variance explained by the global and regional factors is relatively small. However, as we present in Section VI , this small increase is entirely driven by the period of highly synchronized cyclical activity due to the global financial crisis of 2008–09.

Figure 4.

Variance Explained by Global and Regional Factors

How do our findings compare with the results in the literature? Most of the earlier studies have typically focused on just output or industrial production fluctuations and limited their analysis to specific regions. However, as we briefly discuss in Section II , these studies often report conflicting results. For example, some recent papers document that there is a distinct European business cycle while others argue the opposite ( De Haan, Inklaar, Jong-a-Pin, 2008 ). 23 Other studies find regional cycles specific to East Asia and North America. Some of these studies resort to simple correlations (over much shorter time-periods and smaller samples than ours here) and report that business cycles within certain regions have become more correlated over time. Most of the studies are unable to properly account for the extent of regional business cycle comovement since they mostly rely on bilateral correlations, which are fraught with a number of problems. For example, deriving summary correlation measures from large datasets requires one to take averages across the estimated correlations, a procedure that can mask the presence of comovement across a subset of the data. One way to reduce the number of bivariate correlations is to specify a country or weighted aggregate to serve as the reference against which other countries’ correlations are computed. However, changes in the reference country/aggregate often lead to significantly different results. Such weighting schemes also inevitably give rise to questions about the weights and concerns that a large county may dominate the global/regional business cycle by virtue of its size when, in fact, that country may be disengaged from other countries. Moreover, static correlations cannot capture the dynamic properties of the data, such as autocorrelations and cross-autocorrelations across variables.

Factor models obviate these problems. They do not require one to average across variables or define a “numeraire” country. Instead, they identify the common component and, at the same time, detect how each country responds to that component. More importantly, factor models are flexible enough that multiple factors can be specified in a parsimonious way to capture the extent of synchronicity across the entire dataset as well as the synchronicity specific to subsets of the data, such as regions. Furthermore, since the factors are extracted simultaneously, we can assign a degree of relative importance to each type of factor.

Our findings are consistent with the results reported by studies that employ dynamic factor models. For example, Karagedikli and Thorsrud (2012) and Mumtaz, Simonelli, and Surico (2011) also report that regional business cycles have become more pronounced over time. We focus on a much larger dataset than these studies do. 24 Our large dataset, which allows us to consider the synchronization of cycles in many regions, our long sample, which covers a substantial period of the recent era of globalization, and our demarcation of the pre-globalization and globalization periods are essential in enabling us to identify the emergence of regional cycles during the second sub-period. 25

  • B. Synchronization of Cycles in Consumption and Investment

We next assess the evolution of variance shares attributable to different factors in explaining consumption and investment fluctuations. For the world as a whole, the increase in the variance contribution of regional factors to consumption fluctuations is on average about 6 percentage points (from 8 percent to 14 percent), but the joint share of the global and region-specific factors has not changed much ( Tables 2 – 3 ). For the North American, European, Oceanian, and Asian regions, the two common factors jointly account for a substantially higher share of consumption fluctuations in the second sub-period whereas, for SSA and LAC, the share of these factors has on average declined over time. The share of consumption variation due to the country and idiosyncratic factors is much smaller in North America, Europe and Oceania than those of others. In particular, the average variance of consumption explained by these two factors is about 54 percent in these three regions, but it is 83 percent in the other four regions.

These findings indicate that the three regions populated mostly by advanced countries have been able to use globalization relatively more effectively to share national consumption risk. In addition to their relatively more advanced levels of financial development, these regions are more exposed to global trade and financial linkages in the second sub-period. These results are confirmed by some recent studies as well ( Sorensen, Wu, and Zhu, 2007 ; Kose, Prasad, and Terrones, 2009 ). On the other hand, regions with relatively less developed domestic financial markets and with less exposure to cross-border linkages are probably at earlier stages of utilizing this benefit of globalization as their consumption fluctuations are still closely tied to national cycles.

The share of investment variance attributable to the global and regional factors increases for the world and for all the regions in the second sub-period. The variance of investment growth due to the global and regional factors rises from 16 percent in the first sub-period to 24 percent in the second sub-period for the full sample. These two factors on average account for 51 percent of investment variation in North America, Europe and Oceania and 16 percent in the other four regions in the second sub-period. One interpretation of this finding is that fluctuations in investment have been becoming more synchronized over time, especially in regions with more pronounced global and intra-regional linkages.

However, these findings imply different outcomes than those offered by the predictions of standard international business cycle models. The basic theory implies that stronger trade and financial linkages translate into lower investment correlations across countries. Specifically, when restrictions on capital and current account transactions are relaxed in these models, capital and other resources rapidly move to countries with more favorable technology shocks because of the standard “resource shifting” effect in standard business cycle models (see Backus and others, 1995 ; Ravn and Mazzenga, 2004 ; and Heathcote and Perri, 2002 ). 26

The results with respect to the synchronization of consumption and investment fluctuations suggest that the data paint a different picture than do the standard business cycle models. In particular, the forces of globalization have not translated into an increase in the degree of risk sharing achieved by all of the regions in our sample as would be expected on the basis of standard models. In addition, contrary to the predictions of these models, the importance of global and regional factors for investment fluctuations has risen during the period of globalization, implying a higher degree of cross-country comovement of fluctuations in this variable.

VI. Sensitivity Experiments

We now analyze the robustness of our main findings considering a variety of sensitivity experiments. Specifically, we conduct four types of experiments to address the following issues: the correspondence between the aggregate results and those at the country level; implications of alternative break points and changes in the composition of regions; effects of crises; and the dynamic relationship between the global factor and observable variables. We discuss below the results of each of these experiments in turn.

  • A. Country-Specific Results

Do the averages we presented so far accurately reflect the sources of business cycle variation at the country level? In order to address this question, we examine the relative contributions of global and regional factors to each of the macroeconomic variables for each country. Figures 5 – 6 present the relative contributions of the global and regional factors to output fluctuations in individual countries in four regions: North America, Europe, Asia and Oceania. These regions are especially interesting cases as they experience a substantial increase in the importance of the regional factor in the second period. Moreover, the global factor becomes less influential in all of these regions except North America. We present the contributions of the global and regional factors separately for the two sub-periods. We also show the posterior coverage intervals (of length two standard deviations) around the posterior means of the estimated variance contributions. Non-overlapping posterior coverage intervals indicate statistically significant changes between the two periods.

Figure 5.

Output Variance Explained by Global Factor North America and Europe

Figure 6.

Output Variance Explained by Regional Factor North America and Europe

The variance contribution of the global factor drops from the first period to the second for 16 countries, remains unchanged for 16 others, and increases for only 7 countries, for North America, Europe, Asia and Oceania. In the case of North America, the global factor becomes more important in the United States, but it does not become significantly more influential in Canada and Mexico. When we examine the importance of the regional factor over time, we observe a different pattern: it goes up for 27 countries, stays unchanged for 8, and declines for 4 for these four regions.

These patterns are quite similar when we look at the three other regions as well, with the relative importance of the global factor going up for only 12 countries but declining for 27 of them. The relative importance of the regional factor, by contrast, rises for 23 and falls for 15 countries. There is no significant change in the share explained by the global or regional factors in other countries. For the world as a whole, the share of the global factor rises in the second sub-period in 21 countries, remains unchanged in 42 countries, and declines in 43 countries. For the world as a whole, the share of the regional factor rises in the second sub-period in 50 countries, remains unchanged in 37 countries, and declines in 19 countries. These findings indicate that our headline results with respect to the evolution of the importance of the global and regional factors over time are confirmed by the country-specific analysis. 27

  • B. Demarcation of Time and Configuration of Regions

We next analyze the robustness of our results to alternative break points in the sample and changes in configurations of regions. In Section III , we have already discussed a variety of reasons why 1985 is a logical break point to analyze the evolutionary changes in the roles played by global and regional factors in explaining business cycles. We also estimated the model for alternative sample periods using 1983 and 1987 as break points. The results for these sub-samples lead to qualitatively similar conclusions ( Table 4 ). In addition, the individual variance decomposition patterns documented in Figures 5 – 6 remain essentially the same, confirming that our results do not hinge on the exact break date. 28

Variance Decompositions for the World (Different Breaks)

Variables / Regions Global Regional Global +

Regional Country Idiosyncratic
Output 13.40 10.68 24.08 41.00 32.56 Consumption 10.57 8.24 18.81 36.95 41.78 Investment 6.12 9.55 15.67 27.99 54.00 Output 9.16 19.46 28.63 34.61 33.53 Consumption 6.49 13.85 20.34 30.38 46.31 Investment 8.58 15.72 24.30 29.12 43.79 Output 13.91 9.71 23.63 41.04 32.77 Consumption 11.29 8.19 19.48 36.38 41.36 Investment 6.50 9.12 15.62 27.65 54.13 Output 8.19 20.45 28.64 35.67 32.98 Consumption 5.16 15.40 20.56 30.30 46.31 Investment 6.65 18.16 24.82 28.13 44.48 Output 13.72 9.07 22.79 42.22 32.80 Consumption 10.39 6.79 17.18 37.38 43.09 Investment 5.89 9.23 15.11 28.09 54.66 Output 13.74 18.76 32.51 32.88 32.40 Consumption 8.30 15.96 24.26 29.47 44.21 Investment 12.15 14.81 26.96 27.94 43.02
Factors

We also analyze how our main results change in response to variations in the country composition of regions. We consider three separate experiments involving the following changes: moving Mexico from North America to the LAC region; moving Turkey from Europe to the MENA region; and moving Israel from MENA to Europe. Although these experiments slightly change the quantitative results, our qualitative findings remain intact. 29

  • C. Crises and Synchronization

It is natural to study whether our results are driven by crises since periods of crises often coincide with highly synchronized business cycles in regions (or groups of countries). The crises episodes can potentially bias our findings and lead to changes in the shares of variance captured by different types of factors. During the second sub-period, the most prominent widespread crises have of course been the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98, which directly affected a handful of countries in the region, and the global financial crisis of 2008–09, which led to sharp contractions in a number of advanced countries.

We undertake three experiments to study the impact of these periods. First, we exclude the four countries (Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand) directly affected by the Asian crisis from our sample and re-estimate the model. Second, we use the original model estimates and then compute the variance contributions of different factors for the Asian region excluding the crisis countries. Finally, to account for the impact of the global financial crisis, we consider two complementary experiments by excluding the last three years from the second sub-sample (2008–10) and by extending the sample to 2015 using forecasts of the data for the 2011–15 period.

The results of these experiments indicate that our headline findings are preserved. However, the last experiment suggests that the global financial crisis affects some of our other results ( Table 5 ). In particular, we reported in the previous section a small increase in the total contribution of global and regional factors together to output fluctuations in the second sub-period. This finding appears to be driven by the global financial crisis. If the second sub-period includes only the 1985–07 period, the variance share due to the global factor decreases more in the second sub-period leading to a slight decline in the total variance share of output due to the global and regional factors.

Variance Decompositions for the World (Different End Years)

Variables / Regions Global Regional Global +

Regional Country Idiosyncratic
Output 13.40 10.68 24.08 41.00 32.56 Consumption 10.57 8.24 18.81 36.95 41.78 Investment 6.12 9.55 15.67 27.99 54.00 Output 9.16 19.46 28.63 34.61 33.53 Consumption 6.49 13.85 20.34 30.38 46.31 Investment 8.58 15.72 24.30 29.12 43.79 Output 6.25 17.24 23.50 36.99 34.13 Consumption 4.76 12.89 17.65 32.23 45.31 Investment 5.01 14.54 19.55 32.43 43.58 Output 10.82 19.76 30.58 33.87 33.48 Consumption 6.70 13.74 20.44 29.66 47.93 Investment 10.25 14.52 24.77 27.35 45.99
Factors

We also analyze the possible effects of the global financial crisis on our results considering a longer time period. Specifically, we extend our sample by including forecasted values of the three macroeconomic variables for the period 2011–15 (these forecasts are based on the IMF’s World Economic Outlook, April 2011). The results point to similar conclusions we get from the 1985–2010 sample.

  • D. Dynamics of the Global Factor

Although our factor structure is dynamic, the observable variables depend on the factors only contemporaneously in the model. If the global factor has lagged effects on the observables, it is possible that our model understates the importance of the global factor. Given the dynamic nature of our factors, we think that these effects are likely to be small. Moreover, since we use annual data, the lagged effect would have to be fairly slow moving to have an impact on the results. We address the potential for lagged effects by regressing each observable variable on the global factor and two lags of the factor. The coefficients on the first lag were significant for only a small fraction of the time series we have. 30 We conclude that lagged responses are of minor importance and would not affect our main conclusions about the relative importance of the global and regional factors.

VII. Conclusion

We have analyzed the evolution of global and regional business cycles over the past five decades. Our results indicate that regional business cycles have increasingly become more pronounced especially in regions where intra-regional trade and financial linkages have registered rapid growth since the mid-1980s. In particular, the regional factor has explained a larger fraction of business cycle variation in the North American, European, Oceanian, and Asian regions over the past twenty-five years. Surprisingly, the importance of global factor has declined over time. The total contribution of common factors (global and regional) has not registered a significant change implying that there has been no change in the degree of international business cycle synchronicity during the past quarter century.

These results present a different interpretation of the impact of globalization on the synchronization of business cycles. Most commentators argue that globalization of trade and financial linkages have led to the globalization of business cycles as well. Contrary to these popular arguments, regional factors, rather than global ones, have become the driving forces of business cycles during the recent era of globalization. This has led to the emergence of regional business cycles.

A wide range of developments at the regional level can explain the emergence of regional cycles. For example, the dramatic increase in intra-regional trade and financial flows fueled by regional integration initiatives can promote a higher degree of business cycle synchronization across countries in a region. Regional business cycles can also emerge because of the prominent role of region-specific shocks driven by the implementation of similar policies in a region. Moreover, cross-border spillovers of disturbances originating in a large country in a region can translate into more synchronized national business cycles in that region.

There are a number of interesting research questions to be explored in future studies. We briefly mention three of them here. First, we documented the emergence of regional cycles and provided some intuitive arguments explaining their emergence, but it is important to go a step beyond and analyze the main driving forces of the global and regional cycles. Do we observe the emergence of regional cycles because of the growth in intra-regional trade and financial linkages, or because of the more prominent role played by region-specific shocks, including technology and policy disturbances?

The second interesting issue to explore is the evolution of financial cycles. Although financial cycles appear to be highly synchronized across countries, they do not translate into highly synchronized business cycles at the global level. What are the major factors explaining the globalization of financial cycles while business cycles have been becoming more regionalized? Third, it would be very useful to consider the policy implications of the emergence of regional cycles. As recent developments in Europe have clearly demonstrated, we need to have a better understanding of region-wide policies for the volatility of synchronization of cycles. We plan to address some of these issues in our future research.

  • Appendix I: List of Regions and Countries
Countries United States, Canada, Mexico Germany, Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Greece, Iceland, Turkey Australia, New Zealand Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, RB, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Jamaica, Barbados, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Panama, Trinidad and Tobago Japan, China, Korea, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Taiwan, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal South Africa, Botswana, Cape Verde, Lesotho, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Congo, Dem. Rep., Rwanda, Seychelles, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Ghana, Ethiopia, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Rep., Benin, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, The, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Togo, Burkina Faso, Zimbabwe, Burundi Israel, Iran Islamic Rep., Jordan, Syrian Arab Republic, Egypt Arab Rep., Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia
Region
North America (3)
Europe (19)
Oceania (2)
Latin America and the Caribbean (22)
Asia (15)
Sub-Saharan Africa (37)
Middle East and North Africa (8)
  • Appendix II. Summary of Empirical Studies on Synchronization of Cycles in Different Regions
Authors Country Sample Variables / Period Methodology Objective ( O ) and Results ( R ) USA, IDN, MYS, PHL, THA, HKG, SGP, KOR, TWN, CHN, JPN and the rest of OECD countries Real output 1975-1998 SVAR ( ) Estimate the effects of trade linkages and indirect multiplier effects transmitting shocks across countries.

( ) The multiplier effects in Asia tend to be large.
SGP, MYS, IDN, THA, PHL, TWN, HKG, CHN, JPN, KOR, USA Real output 1975Q1-2007Q1 Time varying cohesion approach ( ) Analyze the feasibility of a monetary union in East Asia.

( ) There is a common cycle in East Asia, but it is heavily influenced by external factors. The degree of coherence of cycles is significant at the longer frequencies but insignificant at the medium and short frequencies.
IDN, THA, MLY, PHL, SGP, MMR, VNM, KHM, LAO, JPN, CHN, KOR, AUS, NZL Real output 1970-2003 Structural VAR Correlation analysis ( ) Examine the feasibility of a Common Currency Area (CCA) for the ASEAN and the broader ASEAN+5.

( ) No common shock is reported, but some countries exhibit similarities in business cycles probably due to the geographic proximity.
BRN, KHM, IDN, LAO, MYS, MMR, PHL, SGP, THA, VNM IP 1968-1996 (quarterly) SVAR ( ) Examine the possibility of monetary integration in Asia and ASEAN and compare the results with the Euro area.

( ) Disturbances are highly correlated across certain ASEAN countries. High correlation between the aggregate supply disturbances affecting Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore is found, suggesting the possibility of Optimum Currency Area(OCA).
AUS, HKG, IDN, JPN, KOR, MYS, NZL, PHL, SGP, TWN, THA Real output 1969-1989 SVAR ( ) Explore the possibility of forming a monetary union in Asia.

( ) Some Asian countries have highly correlated aggregate supply or aggregate demand shocks which lead to synchronization of cycles supporting the formation of OCAs.
TWN, JPN, USA Real output 1962Q1-2004Q4 Granger causality, Markov-Switching VAR ( ) Examine whether the locomotive hypothesis (a shock in a major country is typically transmitted abroad) or common shock hypothesis is more relevant in TWN, JPN, and USA.

( ) Japanese cycles weakly leads those in Taiwan possibly because of the strong linkages of two countries with the USA.
CHN, JPN, KOR Real output 1993Q4-2001Q4 VECM ( ) Examine the prospects of forming a currency union among China, Japan, and Korea.

( ) The three countries share a common stochastic component at both long-run and short-run horizons.
CHN, HKG, IDN, JPN, MYS, PHL, KOR, TWN, THA Real output 1981-1995 Correlation analysis, regression ( ) Examine the impact of trade linkages in the synchronization of cycles in the East Asian countries.

( ) Japan plays a significant role in driving the degree of business cycle
HKG, IDN, MYS, PHL, SGP, KOR, TWN Real output 1971Q1-1997Q1 Structural VAR ( ) Examine the feasibility of a Common Currency Area in East Asia.

( ) Regional shocks are less important in East Asia than in European countries.
Asia
Authors Country Sample Variables / Period Methodology Objective ( O ) and Results ( R ) ASEAN 5 Real output 1962-1996 Frankel and Rose type regression ( ) Examine whether increasing intra-industry trade and specialization influence the synchronization of cycles in ASEAN countries. Explore the possibility of a common currency union.

( ) Increasing intra-industry trade results in higher business cycle comovement in ASEAN countries.
AUS, CHN, HKG, IDN, JPN, MYS, NZL, PHL, SGP, KOR, TWN, THA, USA Real output 1980-1999 Correlation analysis, regression ( ) Explore the sources and extent of business cycle synchronization among Asia-Pacific economies.

( ) Structural and technological similarities have a positive impact on synchronization, but trade linkages do not appear to be important.
CHN, HKG, IDN, JPN, KOR, MYS, PHL, SGP, THA, TWN Real output 1990Q1-around 2008 (different by country) SVAR ( ) Employ a more sophisticated identification method of demand and supply shocks in an SVAR model. Include the role fo foreign shocks and allow possible correlation between domestic aggregate demand and aggregate supply disturbances.

( ) The number of significant correlations shown in the previous studies goes down.
CHN, HKG, IDN, JPN, KOR, MYS, PHL, SGP, TWN, THA Real output 1975Q2-2002Q3 Markov-Switching VAR ( ) Analyze the extent of business cycle comovement in Asian economies at different phases of the growth cycle.

( ) Japan and some emerging East Asian countries exhibit a high degree of business cycle synchronization during the growth-recession and rapid-growth regimes, but the extent of synchronization is quite low during the normal-growth regime.
CHN, HKG, IDN, JPN, KOR, MYS, PHL, SGP, TWN, THA Real output 1975Q2-2002Q3 Markov-Switching VAR ( ) Examine the similarities in the characteristics of growth-cycles in East Asia and analyze the interactions of cycles between countries in East Asia and those in Japan and China.

( ) Linkages in the region show different patterns in each regime (the state of the growth cycle). The impacts of cycles in Japan and China are significant in the region.
NZL, AUS, USA, GBR, GER, JPN, KOR, TWN, HKG, SGP Real output 1977Q2 to 1995Q1 Correlation Turning point ( ) Examine the characteristics of business cycles in New Zealand and its trade partners.

( ) Cycles in New Zealand is more synchronized more with the U.S. cycle than with those in Asian countries.
NZL, AUS Real output and real state final demand 1985Q3 to 2007Q4 Unobserved components approach ( ) Examine the importance of region-specific cycles in Australian States and New Zealand.

( ) West Australian and New Zealand region-specific growth cycles exhibit different features relative to the common cycle.
HKG, CHN, IDN, KOR, MYS, PHL, SGP, TWN, THL and G7 Real output 1981Q1-2008Q4 SVAR with a factor model ( ) Identify demand and supply factors driving the Asian business cycles.

( ) Cycles in Asia are less synchronized with the global factors than G7 countries are, but the importance of the global factors has been increasing over the past 10-20 years. The Asian regional factors, in particular regional supply factor through vertical trade integration, tend to be more important for Asian countries.
Asia
Authors Country Sample Variables / Period Methodology Objective ( O ) and Results ( R ) CHN, HKG, IDN, JPN, KOR, MLY, PHL, SGP, THA Nominal output / CPI 1970-2002 Structural VAR ( ) Examine the feasibility of a Common Currency Area (CCA) for East Asia.

( ) Forming a currency union in the entire region is not ideal, but it is feasible for a group of countries with similar shocks and cyclical responses.
CHN, HKG, JPN, MYS, PHL, SGP, TWN, IDN, THA, KOR, VNM, and other 33 advanced countries. Real GDP 1984Q1-2009Q2 Regression ( ) Examine the dynamics of business cycles in East Asia.

( ) Business cycles appear to be more synchronized when bilateral trade decreases. Relatively richer countries tend to experience more synchronized cycles during the 2008-09 financial crisis.
AUS, CHN, IND, IDN, JPN, KOR, MYS, NZL, PHL, SGP, TWN, THA, USA Real output 1983-2004 Frankel and Rose type regression ( ) Assess the degree of business cycle comovements among Asia-Pacific economies.

( ) The degree of specialization in electronics industry is more important than trade linkages in driving business cycle comovements.
KOR, MYS, PHL, SGP, THA Real output and CPI 1991Q2-2005Q2 SVAR and Markov Switching Model ( ) Examine the possibility of a currency union in East Asian countries.

( ) The cross-country correlations of supply shocks are larger than those of demand shocks leading to more synchronized cycles in the region. The degree of the synhcronization of cyclical turning points has been increasing over time in the
IDN, MYS, PHL, SGP, THA, HKG, CHN, KOR, JPN, TWN Real consumption 1970-2000 Regression ( ) Analyze the degree of risk sharing among Asian countries and the OECD countries.

( ) The degree of risk sharing appears to be low among Asian countries.
IDN, MYS, PHL, SGP, THA, HKG, CHN, KOR, JPN, TWN Real output Real consumption 1971-2000 SUR ( ) Analyze consumption smoothing/risk sharing properties in the East Asian countries.

( ) The degree of risk sharing appears to be low in the region.
CHN, HK, IDN, KOR, MAL, PHI, SGP, TWN, THA, and G7 Real output 1990Q4-2007Q2 Panel VAR ( ) Study the characteristics of business cycle interdependence between East Asian countries and developed countries.

( ) G7 originated shocks explain 10 percent of the variation in the 1990s and around 20 percent in the 2000s.
ASEAN 5, CHN, KOR, and JPN Real output 1970-2007 Dynamic common factor model similar to Kose et al. (2003) ( ) Examine the features of business cycles and identify the causes of shocks during major events in East Asia.

( ) The country-specific factors (rather than the regional factors) explain the largest share of output fluctuations in East Asia. The role of the world factor is relatively minor in emerging Asian countries.
CHN, HKG, IDN, JPN, KOR, MYS, PHL, SGP, THA Real output, unemployment, IP 1998Q1-2003Q4 Frankel and Rose type regression ( ) Analyze the degree of business cycle comovement in East Asian countries and explore the feasibility of forming a monetary union.

( ) Aggregate bilateral trade intensity appears to have an ambigous impact on the degree of comovement of Asian business cycles.
Asia
Authors Country Sample Variables / Period Methodology Objective and Results IDN, MLY, PHL, SGP, THA, CHN, KOR, and JPN Real output 1970-2006 A system GMM approach using panel procedures. ( ) Assess the dynamic relationships between trade, finance, industrial specialization, and business cycle comovements in East Asia

( ) Trade increases the degree of synchronization, whereas industrial specialization and financial integration decrease synchronization.
CHN, AUS, CAN, IDN, BEL, MEX, JPN< DEN, USA, KOR, FIN, MLY, FRA, PHL, DEU, SGP, GRC, THA, IRE, ITA, LUX, NLD, NOR, PRT, ESP, SWE, CHE, GBR Real output, consumption and investment 1970-2007 Dynamic factor model ( ) Analyze the feasibility of a monetary union in East Asia.

( ) Country-specific factors are dominant in the region implying that a monetary union is not feasible. However, the share of country specific factors in explaining cycles has been declining whereas the importance of the regional factor has been rising.
IDN, MLY, PHL, SGP, THA, CHN, KOR, and JPN Real output 1970-2008 Structural VAR ( ) Analyze the feasibility of a monetary union in East Asia.

( ) The structural shocks are less symmetric in East Asia, but the adjustment to shocks is fast. This implies that it is difficult to form a monetary union for the entire region but some of the countries tend to have more synchronized cycles implying the possibility of a union.
IDN, MLY, PHL, SGP, THA, JPN, CHN, HKG, KOR, TWN, AUT, BEL, DEN, FRA, IRE, ITA, NDL, FIN, GRC, DEU, NOR, PRT, ESP, SWE, CHE, GBR, USA, CAN Real output 1978-1990 Dynamic factor model ( ) Study the prospects of an East Asian currency union by focusing on the extent of trade and financial integration.

( ) Regional shocks are important for explaining output fluctuations in the Asian economies. This fact supports the formulation of the currency union. The growth in trade is expected to enhance the role of regional shocks.
CHN, HKG, IDN, JPN, MYS, PHL, SGP, KOR, TWN, THA Real output 1975Q1-2005Q3 Dynamic factor model similar to Monfort et al. (2003) ( ) Examine the dynamics of business cycle comovement in East Asia.

( ) A common factor exists in the region except for China and Japan. Trade linkages and the exogenous factors, such as oil prices, appear to be important in explaining the degree of synchronization of business cycles.
CHN, HKG, IDN, JPN, MYS, PHL, SGP, KOR, TWN, THA, USA, EU13 Real output 1990:Q1–1996:Q4, 1999:Q1–2002:Q4, 2003:Q1–2006:Q4 Regression analysis similar to Frankel and Rose ( ) Analyze the divergence of business cycles between East Asia and the rest of the world by focusing on the role of intra-regional and extra-regional trade and financial integration.

( ) Emergence of intra-regional trade in East Asia and that of diversified destination of exports make cycles in East Asian countries less synchronized with those of the US. The role of financial integration is ambiguous.
CHN, JPN, KOR, and ASEAN 10 Real output 1990Q1-1996Q4, 1999Q1-2002Q4, 2003Q1-2006Q4 Panel regression ( ) Investigate the effects of intra-regional and extra-regional financial integration on East Asian business cycle synchronization since 1990.

( ) Regional trade linkages enhance the regional comovements of business cycles but financial linkages (defined as high frequency movements of stock prices) do not.
CHN, IDN, JPN LAO, MYS, PHL, SGP, KOR, THA, USA, VNM Industrial production 1989-2003, 1989M1-2004M12 Frankel and Rose type regression ( ) Analyze the changes in the degree of synhronization of East Asian business cycles.

( ) Increase in bilateral trade linkages and the degree of monetary policy coordination have a positive impact on business cycle synchronization in eight Asian countries particularly after the financial crisis. Business cycles in China tend to exhibit different features.
Asia
Authors Country Sample Variables / Period Methodology Objective ( O ) and Results ( R ) CHN, IDN, JPN MYS, PHL, SGP, KOR, THA Industrial production 1989M1-2004M12 Shin and Wang (2004) type of regression ( ) Examine the role of trade linkages in driving the synchronization of business cycles in the East Asian economies.

( ) Intra-industry trade linkages have a positive impact on business cycle synchronization.
CHN, HKG, IDN, JPN, MYS, PHL, SGP, KOR, TWN, THA, USA, EU13 Real output 1980Q1 to 2000Q3 Structural VAR ( ) Examine the feasibility of monetary integration in East Asia.

( ) Even though some groups of countries appear to be suitable for monetary integration, but the entire region does not have the necessary features.
JPN, KOR, TWN, HKG, SGP, MLY, IDN, THA, PHL, CHN Real output 1978Q1-2007Q4 Structural VAR ( ) Identify the impact of external and internal shocks in explaining the comovements of macroeconomic variables in East Asia.

( ) Although the region has been becomoing more integrated, shocks originating in the U.S. are still prominent. Oil prices have been becoiming a less important factor.
CHN, HKG, IDN, JPN, MYS, PHL, SGP, KOR, TWN, THA, USA Real output,1 978Q1-2004Q4 Johansen’s Cointegaration approach ( ) Investigate the extent of regional integration and the suitability of a monetary union in the East Asian economies.

( ) Short-run common cycles are shared by ASEAN countries, Northeastern countries, Japan, and Taiwan. Long-run common cycles are shared by NIEs and Japan, ASEAN countries, and China and Hong Kong.
KOR, JPN IP, CPI, interest rates, money, FOREX 1960M1-2002M1 SVAR ( ) Investigate the transmission of business cycles between Korea and Japan.

( ) Cyclical dependence has been rising over time and the Japanese cycles moderately influence the Korean cycles.
IDN, MYS, PHL, SGP, THA, USA, AUS, JPN, EU Real output 1961-1997 SVAR, Spectral analysis ( ) Examine the extent of the transmission and sychronization of cycles in the ASEAN countries and their major trading partners.

( ) Little evidence of business cycle transmission within the ASEAN nations and between ASEAN and its major trading partner advanced economies. The ASEAN countries appear to share a common cyclical component.
CHN, HKG, IDN, JPN, MYS, PHL, SGP, KOR, TWN, THA, BGD, IND Real output 1976-1997 Frankel and Rose type regression ( ) Examine the role of trade linkages in the comovement of business cycles in Asia.

( ) Stronger intra-industry trade linkages lead to more correlated cycles.
Asia
Authors Country Sample Variables / Period Methodology Objective ( O ) and Results ( R ) CHN, HKG, IDN, JPN, MYS, PHL, SGP, KOR, TWN, THA, BGD, IND Real output 1976-1997 Frankel and Rose type regression ( ) Examine the business cycle linkages betwee Korea and other Asian countries.

( ) Stronger intra-industry trade linkages improve business cycle comovement between Korea and other Asian countries.
CHN, HKG, IDN, JPAN, KOR, MYS, PHL, SGP, THA Real output, real consumption, CPI 1971-2003 Frankel and Rose type regression ( ) Examine the role of financial and trade integration on business cycle synchronization, price comovement, and risk sharing.

( ) Trade integration leads to output comovement but does not lead to consumption comovement in East Asia. The role of financial integration proxied by interest rate correlations is minor.
CHN, HKG, IDN, JPN, KOR, MYS, PHL, SGP, TWN, THA Real output 1985Q2-1997Q4 1998Q3-2003Q4 Dynamic factor model ( ) Examine the commonality of cycles among the East Asian economies.

( ) Business cycle correlation between Japan and East Asia has been increasing after the mid-90s. Japan shares 75 percent of output variation with the region in the first sample period, while it shares just 3 percent in the second sample period. In the case of the NIEs, their output variation can be attributed to themselves by 13 percent, to regional factor by 42 percent and the global factor seemingly mainly due to the US by 44 percent.
AUS, NZL, HKG, SGP, KOR, TWN, JPN, MYS, THA, IDN, PHL Real output Sample period differs for each country VECM ( ) Examine whether the growth of exports and investment drives the dynamics of GDP growth and study the presence of coherence in the Asia-Pacific region.

( ) Growth of exports and investment tend to drive the growth of income in the region. Shocks to exports and investment have significant impacts on the long-run output and shocks to exports have stronger effects in the case of developing economies.
KOR, SGP, TWN, (HKG) Real output 1975Q1-2006Q4 VECM ( ) Explore whether South-East Asia shares common cyclical characteristics and analyze the sources of cyclical transmission among them.

( ) There appear to be common cycles among Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan in the long- and medium-run.
Asia
Authors Country Sample Variables / Period Methodology Objective ( O ) and Results ( R ) ARG, AUS, AUT, BEL, BRA, CAN, CHL, DNK, FIN, FRA, DEU, GRC, IND, ITA, JPN, NLD, NOR, PRT, ESP, LKA, SWE, CHE, GBR, USA, URY Real output 1880-2006 Correlation analysis FSVAR ( ) Examine the historical international business cycles.

( ) European group and English-speaking (Anglo-Saxon) group show an increase in the degree of synchronization of cycles after the WWII, which has been enhanced by the increase in trade. In the other country groups, idiosyncratic shocks are still dominant.
41 regions of BEL, DEU, ESP, FRA, ITA, LUX, NLD, AUT, PRT Gross Value Added 1982–2007 Panel model with spatial effects ( ) Check the tendency for national business cycles to converge after the 1960s is also applicable to the regional level data.

( ) Business cycle convergence at regional level in European countries using euro is not confirmed. Cyclical heterogeneity is reported.
GER, FRA, ITA, GBR, USA IP Around 1960-2001 Real output and its components 1970-2001 Dating methods (One is HP (2002) type and the other is original) ( ) Develop a dating algorithm based on Markov chains that enforces alternation of peaks and troughs and duration constraints.

( ) Using deviation (filtered) cycles, high synchronization within the Euro area is reported. Using classical cycles, country pair concordances among Germany, France and Italy appear to be high.
AUT, FIN, FRA, GER, ITA, ESP, SWE, GBR, EU 15, USA, CAN, JPN, CHE, AUS, KOR, NDL, PRT, NOR, BEL, MEX, NZL, DNK, IRN Real GDP 1970-2001 Classical Multidimensional scaling, Panel regression ( ) Identify European cycles and check which country belongs to it by using classical multidimensional scaling and clustering and study the determinants of synchronization.

( ) A unique European cycle has not emerged over time. The financial structure and the share of oil imports can explain the business cycle correlations between some European countries and Germany (or the U.S.).
USA, JPN, CAN, GBR, FIN, NOR, SWE, GER, FRA, ITA, NDL, BEL, ESP, PRT, IRL IP 1961M1- 1993M12 (pre-ERM period (1961 M1-1979 M3) and the ERM period (1979M4-1993M12)) Simple correlation with various methods of filtering ( ) Investigate how the Exchange-Rate Mechanism of the EMS affects the business cycle synchronization.

( ) Business cycles of EMS countries are more synchronized with German cycles and less synchronized with the US cycles.
USA, JPN, CAN, GBR, FIN, NOR, SWE, GER, FRA, ITA, NDL, BEL, ESP, PRT, IRL, LUX, GRC, CHE, IRE IP 1961M1- 1995M10 (pre-ERM period (1961M1–1979M3) and the ERM period (1979M4–1995M10)) Non-parametric rank correlation ( ) Investigate how the Exchange-Rate Mechanism of the EMS affects the business cycle synchronization.

( ) Business cycles of EMS countries are more synchronized with German cycles and less synchronized with the US cycles.
BGR, CZE, EST, HUN, LVA, LTU, POL, ROU, SVK, SVN, GER, EU15, USA, IRL, PRT, ESP Real output 1990Q1-2002Q2 SVAR ( ) Measure the degree of shock asymmetry between the EU and the candidate countries to examine the effects of economic integration on the synchronization of shocks.

( ) Higher symmetry of demand shocks is due to an increase in trade intensity. The impact of integration on the symmetry of supply shock is ambiguous.
Europe
Authors Country Sample Variables / Period Methodology Objective ( O ) and Results ( R ) GER, FRA, BEL, NDL, DNK, GBR, ITA, ESP, IRL, POR, GRC Real and nominal output (and prices) 1960-1988 SVAR ( ) Identify supply and demand disturbances of the EU economies, compare them with those of the US regions, and discuss the possibility of sound operation of the monetary union.

( ) A core group of EU countries (Germany + neighbors) share underlying shocks of similar magnitude and cohesion, but the EU as a whole does not exhibit the some properties.
A panel of 31 regions from BEL, FRA, GER, IRL, NDL, ESP Employment 1975-1997 Panel regression ( ) Examine the impact of regional specialization patterns on the synchronicity of regional employment cycles to analyze the challenges of conducting a common monetary policy in the Euro zone.

( ) Sector similarity is the key for synchronization of cycles. Specialization has a significant on the correlations of regional employment cycles in the EU. Core-EMU tends to change into two pairs of regions. On the one hand, there are regions converging and displaying increasingly more synchronous employment cycles.
A panel of 31 regions from BEL, FRA, GER, IRL, NDL, ESP Employment 1975-1997 Pooled regression ( ) Test the degree of regional specialization patterns on the synchronicity of regional employment cycles.

( ) Core-EMU will tend to change into two types of regions by converging to each other and the opposite. The degree of comovement has decreased in the past for the majority of countries.
BEL, DEN, FRA, GER, ITA, LUX, NDL, PRT, ESP, GBR, AUT, FIN, SWE, CYP, EST, LVA, LTU, POL, SVK, SVN, CZE, HUN, ROU, TUR, CAN, JPN, NOR, USA IP 1962M1(or 1990M1)-2004M3 Stationary bootstrap and model-based clustering methods, similar to Artis ( ) Offer a comprehensive framework to analyze business cycle characteristics (eg. similarities or differences) other than synchronization.

( ) There is evidence against the existence of just one European cycle. There are multiple clusters in business cycles of European economies.
AUT, BEL, GER, GRC, FIN, FRA, ITA, IRN, LUX, NDL, PRT, ESP, CYP, CZE, EST, HUN, LVA, LTU, MLT, POL, SVK, CAN, NOR, JPN, USA, DEN, SWE, GBR, BUL, ROU, TUR IP 1990M1-2003M1 Clustering techniques and classical multidimensional scaling ( ) Examine whether the cycles in Europe driven by a common factor.

( ) There is no leading country in driving the regional cycles.
DZA, CYP, EGY, FRA, GRC, ISR, ITA, JOR, LBN, MLT, MKD, MAR, PRT, SRB, SVN, ESP, TUN TUR Real output, unemployment, IP, real income, real sales 1961-2009 Dating method (date then average approach) ( ) Construct turning points of macro variables for the Mediterranean economies and examine the role of trade in driving the synchronization of the cycles in the region.

( ) The role of trade on the degree of business cycle synchronicity in the Mediterranean basin is limited. Financial interdependencies also do not play a keyrole.
Europe
Authors Country Sample Variables / Period Methodology Objective ( O ) and Results ( R ) AUT, BEL, DNK, FIN, FRA, GER, GRC, IRL, ITA, NDL, PRT, SPN, SWE, GBR Employment 1961-1997 Real output 1963-1996 IV and OLS regressions ( ) Identify the role of national borders in explaning the synchronization of European business cycles in comparison with the US regional cycles.

( ) There is a higher output and employment comovement within the U.S. than within Europe. This difference is due to the national borders in European countries. The border effects reflect lower level of trade and higher specialization. However, the border effects have become smaller over time.
82 regions (in DEU, GBR, FRA, ITA, BEL, NLD) and 138 regions (in DEU, GBR, FRA, ITA, BEL, NLD, GRC, ESP, POR) Nominal output or gross value added / CPI 1973-1993 or 1980-1993 Dynamic factor model ( ) Analyze the main features of the regional output fluctuations in Europe to examine the potential role of European federal policies in stabilizing cycles.

( ) Europe is as integrated as the US states at the regional level.
ARG, AUS, AUT, BGD, BEL, BOL, BRA, CMR, CAN, CHL, COL, CRI, CIV, DNK, DOM, ECU, SLV, FIN, FRA, DEU, GRC, GTM, HND, HKG, ISL, IND, IDN, IRL, ITA, JAM, JPN, KEN, KOR, LUX, MYS, MEX, MAR, NLD, NZL, NOR, PAK, PAN, PRY, PER, PHL, PRT, SEN, SGP, ZAF, ESP, LKA, SWE, CHE, THA, TTO, GBR, USA, URY, VEN, ZWE Real output 1961-2007 Dynamic factor model ( ) Propose a new factor model with an endogenous block structure for the factor loadings and examine the roles played by regional factors.

( ) Similarities in institutional factors such as legal systems and language diversity are important for blocking. Regional factor has an important role.
AUT, BEL, FIN, FRA, DEU, GRC, IRL, ITA, LUX, NLD, PRT, ESP, DEN, SWE, GBR Per-capita real output 1970-2003 SVAR concordance index ( ) Analyze output dynamics in member countries of the Euro area and describe stylized facts on output differentials within the union, the synchronization of recessions, and the relation with respect to the U.S. cycles.

( ) Persistent idiosyncratic shocks lead to heterogeneity, but a common shock in the Euro area is the most important factor in explaining output variation. A common world shock is also important. Persistent shocks and low volatility are common features of cycles in the Euro area.
AUT, AUS, BEL, LUX, CAN, DEN, FIN, FRA, GER, GRC, IST, IRE, ITA, JPN, NLD, NZL, NOR. PRT, ESP, SWE, CHE, GBR, USA Real output 1980 to 2007 DiD estimation ( ) Examine whether business cycle comovements increased more among EMU countries than among OECD countries after 1999.

( ) Cycles among EMU countries are more correlated.
EMU 28 countries Total employment 1970-1997 Markov switching model and bootstrapping ( ) Examine the existence of regional cycles.

( ) German, French, and Italian employment cycles do not coincide with EMU’s total employment cycles.
Europe
Authors Country Sample Variables / Period Methodology Objective ( O ) and Results ( R ) CZE, HUN, POL, EST, LVA, LTU Real Output and its components 1993Q1-2008Q3 Correlation analysis ( ) Examine the degree of business cycle comovements and the impact of world cycles in six CEEC countries.

( ) Mixed evidence about the strenght of business cycle comovements. Business cycles of some countries show high correlations with world cycles.
GER, FRA, ITA, SPN, NDL, GBR), the Euro area (12 countries) aggregate, USA Real output 1970Q1 - 2001Q1. Multivariate Markov-switching VAR ( ) Investigate the business cycle comovement among the Euro Area countries by estimating an unobserved components model that accounts for time-varying phase difference and time-varying relation between cycles.

( ) France and Germany show a high degree of comovement with the Euro Area cycles. Cycles in Spain, Italy and the Netherlands have become more correlated with cycles in the Euro Area.
AUT, BEL-LUX, FIN, FRA, GER, IRN, ITA, NDL, PRT, SPN Real output 1969-1997 SVAR ( ) Assess the long-run viability of the EMU.

( ) Euro zone shares many of the regional business cycle characteristics, and EMU is getting close to being an OCA.
DEN, FIN, NOR, SWE, Euro area (AUT, BEL, GRC, IRE, LUX, NLD, POR, and EU-4), and EU-4 (FRA, DEU, ITA, and ESP) Real output 1970-2009 Business cycle asymmetry index method (Hassler, 2003) ( ) Examine whether business cycles in Nordic coutries have been converging to cycles in the Eurozone.

( ) Cycles in the Nordic countries did not converge to those in the EU-4 or the Euro area during 1970-2009. However, business cycles in Denmark and Finland, whose exchange rates are tied to the Euro, have become more synchronized with the Euro area cycles and the EU-4 during the Maastricht period (1993-2007).
AUT, BEL, FIN, FRA, GER, GRC, IRE, ITA, LUX, NDL, POR, ESP, DEN, NOR, SWE, CHE, GBR and the other 8 OECD countries. Real output 1970-2010 Dynamic factor model with time-varying parameters ( ) Analyze the evolution of comovements of cycles across the European countries over time.

( ) Business cycle synchronization rose in European countries in the process to the third stage of EMU, but more convergence has not been observed since then.
AUS, BEL, FIN, FRA, GER, GRC, IRE, ITA, LUX, PRT, and ESP IP 1960M1-2001M8 Various measures ( ) Examine whether the differences in convergence measures matter in the case of euro area.

( ) The results are sensitive to the measures. There have been periods of convergence and divergence. The degree of synchronization has been increasing over
Euro area (NUTS1’s 53 regions) Gross value added 1975-2005 Correlation analysis, cluster analysis ( ) Examine the synchronization of regional business cycles in the Euro Area.

( ) Synchronization on average has been increasing between Euro zone and Euro Area’s regions with some exceptions.
Europe
Authors Country Sample Variables / Period Methodology Objective ( O ) and Results ( R ) GRC, ITA, PRT, ESP, FRA Real output per capita 1980-2000 1975-2005 Regression ( ) Sudy the extent of regional business cycle convergence in the southern periphery of Europe.

( ) The degree of synchronization of cycles has been on average increasing between the Euro zone and Euro area’s regions.
BEL, GER, ESP, FRA, ITA, NLD, USA, EURO area (12 countries) + SVK Real output per capita 1970Q1-2009Q4 Structural VAR ( ) Examine the sources of business cycles in the Euro Area.

( ) The main driving force of Euro area business cycles is the global shock. This shock becomes weaker in the EMU period than in the pre-EMU period. The sources of business cycle heterogeneity are country-specific shocks, but the heterogeneous responses to global shocks are not significant.
AUT, DNK, FIN, FRA, IRN, ITA, GRC, GER, NDL, NOR, PRT, SPN, SWE, GBR Real output 1977-1999 Frankel and Rose type regressions ( ) Examine how the business cycles of European countries have been affected by the increased trade among them.

( ) Intra-industry trade linkages are important in explaining business cycle in the region.
208 Regions (NUT2) in the EU15 (AUS, BEL, DEN, FIN, FRA, GER, GRC, IRE, ITA, LUX, NLD, POR, ESP, SWE, and GBR) Real output and value added 1989-2002 Panel regression ( ) Examine the patterns and determinants of the comovement between regions in the EU and the Euro Area.

( ) Trade leads to more synchronization. Industrial specialization and forex volatility have direct and indirect effects on the divergence and convergence of cycles.
USA, JPN, CAN, IND, KOR, MYS, TWN, SGP, HKG, THA, AUS, NZL, BRA, PER, CHL, ARG, MEX, BEL, DEN, FRA, DEU, NLD, ESP, CHE, SWE, GBR, NOR, ITA, FIN, POR Real output, IP, CPI, PPI 1990Q1-2009Q4 FAVAR ( ) Analyze the importance of global and regional shocks’ components in explaining the movements in real and nominal variables.

( ) Global and regional components are important in North America, Asia, and South America. In Europe, regional components have limited importance. Supply shocks explain cycles in the long-run, demand shocks explain them in the short-run.
EU12 (AUT, BEL, DEU, ESP, FIN, FRA, GRC, IRE, ITA, LUX, NLD, PRT), SWE, SVK, SVN, ROU, POLMLT, LTU, LVA, GBR, HUN, EST, DEN, CZE, CYP, BGR, JPN, USA Real output 1970Q1-2007Q3 Correlation analysis; Frequency domain analysis; Coherence; dynamic correlation; and phase analysis ( ) Examine the changes in comovement between Euro area countries (particularly after 1999) and between non-Euro area countries and the Euro area average.

( ) In the Euro area, no significant changes in the degree of comovement are observed.
Europe
Authors Country Sample Variables / Period Methodology Objective ( O ) and Results ( R ) LAC-4 (ARG, BRA, CHL, and MEX) Index of Maddison (2003) similar to real output 1870-2004 1950-2004(Factor model) Dynamic factor model; Business cycle dating; Regressions ( ) Examine the sources of business cycle volatility using historical time series.

( ) There is cyclical commonality among LAC-4 (between individual country components with the regional common factor as well as the global factor). The role of the regional factor has been increasing over time, but the regional commonality is mainly driven by external variables and common external shocks.
ARG, BRA, CHL, MEX, URY Real output 1991-2007 Bayesian SVAR ( ) Explore the possibility of forming a monetary union in the region, examine the presence of common shocks, the impact of international disturbances and different exchange rate regimes.

( ) Countries in the region are vulnerable to international disturbances transmitted through the real and financial channels. Foreign variables conform the commonality of business cycles in the region.
ARG, BOL, BRA, CHL, COL, ECU, MEX, PRY, PER, URY, VEN Real output 1960Q1-2000Q4 Correlation analysis, Cofeature and cointegration analysis ( ) Study the degree of business cycle comovement in Latin American countries.

( ) Business cycle comovement in the region is very limited. Shocks are idiosyncratic and the speed of adjustment differs across countries.
MEX, USA Manufacturing production 1980M1-2004M6 Cointegration and error correction model ( ) Test whether the NAFTA has enhanced the business cycle comovement between MEX and USA.

( ) More business cycle synchronization among the NAFTA members can be attributed to the stronger production-side links between Mexico and the U.S. manufacturing sectors after the NAFTA was enacted. China’s entry has a significant third country effect on business cycle comovements among the NAFTA countries.
ARG, BRA, CAN, ChL, MEX, USA, FRA, GER, IRE, ITA, POR, ESP, GBR Real output, IP 1981-2001 Factor Analysis Simple regression analysis Correlation ( ) Examine the changes in the degree of synchronization between Mexico and its NAFTA partners.

( ) The synchronization over time has increased.
CRI, SLV, GTM, HND, NIC, PAN, ARG, BRA, MAX, CAN, USA, FRA, GER, PRT, SPN, GBR Real output 1965-2005 IP 1965M1-2005M1 Frankel and Rose type ( ) Construct a model that captures the current trade structure and the degree of business cycle synchronization between Central America and the United States.

( ) Within Central America, the degree of comovement is not very strong, but the degree of comovement between the U.S.A. and the region is high in some cases. Trade and remittance flows between the U.S.A. and Central America can partly explain the synchronization.
MEX, USA Real output 1993Q1-2001Q4 VECM ( ) Examine whether Mexico and the U.S.A. share common business cycle movements in the short- and the long-run.

( ) Mexico and the U.S. appear to share a common cyclical component since 1993.
North America and Latin America and the Caribbean
Authors Country Sample Variables / Period Methodology Objective ( O ) and Results ( R ) ARG, BOL, BRA, CHL, PRY, URY Real output 1970-1997 SVAR ( ) Analyze the homogeneity of cycles in Latin American countries.

( ) The similarity cannot be found and the benefit of policy coordination is limited, even though the timing of peaks and troughs coincide in some countries.
NAFTA countries Real output, Real manufacturing output, IP 1980-2002 Dynamic factor models ( ) Analyze the impact of NAFTA on business cycles in Mexico using various methods.

( ) Regional factors have become more important in driving business cycles with the advent of NAFTA.
ARG, BRA, CHL, COL, CRI, DMA, ECU, SLV, HND, MEX, PRY, URY, VEN. IDN, JPN, KOR, MYS, SGP, THA, TWN, AUS, BEL, FRA, GER, ITA, ESP Sectral real output 1970-1994 Regressions similar to Stockman (1988) and Costello (1993) ( ) Identify country-specific, sector-specific, and common shocks for Latin American, European, and East Asian countries.

( ) The degree of commonalities in cycles is low in Latin America compared with Europe and Asia. Latin American countries have their dominant domestic idiosyncratic factors.
CIV, MWI, NGA, SEN, ZAF, ISR, JOR, MAR, TUN, ARG, BRB, BRA, CHL, COL, MEX, PER, TTO, URY, BGD, HKG, IND, KOR, MYS, PAK, PHL, TUR, HUN, LTU, MKD, ROU, SVK, SVN, GBR, USA, JPN Real output 1980-2004 Dating method (Harding and Pagan, 2002) ( ) Examine the business cycle characteristics and synchronicity for the large sample of developing countries.

( ) Business cycle turning points are more synchronized among the Latin America and Asian countries than the other developing countries. No clear patterns of concordance are found within region and across regions, but some developing countries show a higher degree of concordance with the US or Japan.
ATG, AUS, AUT, BEL, BRA, CAN, CHL, CHN, COL, DNK, FIN, FRA, DEU, GRC, HUN, IND, IRL, ITA, JPN, MEX, NLD, NZL, NOR, PER, PHL, POL, PRT, ESP, SWE, CHE, TWN, TUR, GBR, USA, URY, VEN Real output, CPI 1860-2007 Dynamic factor model ( ) By using historical data, examine jointly the comovement of real and nominal variables.

( ) In explaining each country’s output growth, the role of comovements with the world cycles has become less important while the role of comovements with the regional cycles has become more important.
Four Texas border Metropolitan Statistical Areas(MSAs), USA, MEX Employment, retail sales, wages, unemployment rate 1981-2002 Dynamic factor model ( ) Examine how MSAs’ business cycles synchronize with those of the broader economies that surround MSAs.

( ) MSAs are involved more in US and Mexico’s cycles and in particular after 1994 that tendency has been accelerated.
MEX, USA Real output 1996Q1-2007Q4 SVAR model with block exogeneity restrictions ( ) Assess the impact of the recent slowdown of the US economy on Mexico.

( ) The shocks to U.S. demand for Mexico’s exports account for 40 percent of Mexico’s output fluctuations.
MAX, CAN, USA, JPN, Euro area Real output 1970Q1-2007Q2 Quasi-Bayesian approach to identification within a VAR framework ( ) Examine business cycle comovement and the spill-over across NAFTA. Examine the size and sources of spillovers from the major regions of the rest of the world to Canada and Mexico.

( ) Canadian cycles are linked to the US cycles throughout the last few decades. Mexican cycles are dominated by domestic factors from 1970 through 1995; and U.S. shocks play a more substantial role in affecting the Mexican cycles in recent decades.
MEX, USA Real output 1991Q1-2001Q4 Correlation analysis and simple regression ( ) Examine whether the degree of business cycle synchronization has increased in response to the increase in manufacturing trade between the US and Mexico during the last ten years.

( ) Comovement between Mexico and the US has been going up as the trade linkages have become stronger after the NAFTA.
North America and Latin America and the Caribbean
Authors Country Sample Variables / Period Methodology Objective ( O ) and Results ( R ) BHR, IRN, ISR, JOR, KWT, LBY, OMN, SAU, SYR, ARE, DZA, EGY, MLT, MAR, TUN Real output 1960-2007 Small open economy SVAR ( ) Examine the relative importance of country-specific, regional, and global shocks in explaining output volatility in 15 MENA countries.

( ) The country specific factors are the most important whereas the regional factors play a minor role.
POR, ESP, FRA, ITA, GRE, ALB, MCD, CYP, TUR, ISR, SYR, EGP, TUN, ALG, MOR Real GDP, consumption, investment 1980-2009 FAVAR ( ) Examine the comovement of business cycles of the Mediterranean basin countries.

( ) Convergence and divergence coexist in the region. They are temporary in nature and reversible. Domestic cyclical fluctuations are still largely due to national causes.
67 developing countries (MENA: DZA, EGY, IRN, ISR, JOR, MAR, SYR, TUN, and TUR) Real output 1970-2003 Bayesian dynamic factor model ( ) Explore the factors driving the volatility of cycles.

( ) Country-specific factor is the most important one in explaining the volatility of the MENA cycles.
Oil-exporting 4 countries (IRN, SAU, KWT, IDN) Real output (real industrial value added)1970-2002 SVAR a la Blanchard and Quah (1989) and Clarida and Gali (1994) ( ) Identify which shocks (nominal demand, real demand, supply, or oil price shocks) are important in oil-exporting countries.

( ) Iran and Saudi Arabia are strongly affected by oil price shocks, while Kuwait is influenced by domestic supply shocks.
EGY, JOR, MAR, and TUR, SAU, KWT, BHR, UAE Real output and its components 1980-2002 Panel regression ( ) Examine the sources of macroeconomic volatility in the MENA region.

( ) Financial openness (gross capital flows as a ratio to GDP) tends to increase consumption volatility.
FRA, ITA, GRE, ESP, ISR, SYR, TUR, ALG, EGY, MOR, WBG GDP 1950-1998 AR models ( ) Analyze the main features of business cycles.

( ) There are differences between the business cycles of the European and the MENA countries. There are changes in degree of business cycle comovement over the observation period of these two groups.
53 African countries Real output 1965-2004 Frankel and Rose type SVAR ( ) Examine the role of trade linkages in explaining business cycle synchronization in Africa.

( ) Trade intensity among African countries has enhanced business cycle comovements.
Middle East and North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa

Abeysinghe , T. and K. Forbes , 2005 , “ Trade Linkages and Output-Multiplier Effects: a Structural VAR Approach with a Focus on Asia ,” Review of International Economics , Vol. 13 , No. 2 , pp. 356 – 75 .

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Hirata: Faculty of Business Administration, Hosei University and Japan Center for Economic Research; Kose: Research Department, International Monetary Fund; Otrok: Department of Economics, University of Missouri-Columbia and Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis Conference on “Challenges in Open-Economy Macroeconomics after the Financial Crisis,” the CESIFO Venice Summer Institute on “Global Interdependence, Decoupling and Recoupling,” the CEPR-RIETI Conference on “International Finance and Corporate Finance: Japanese and European Perspectives,” the Spring Meetings of the Japan Economic Association, and seminars at the Bank of Japan, the Canon Institute for Global Studies, the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, and UC-Berkeley. We would like to thank our discussants (Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, Claudia M. Buch, John Driffill, and Yosuke Takeda), Stijn Claessens, Massimiliano Marcellino, numerous colleagues, and seminar and conference participants for their useful comments. Ezgi O. Ozturk provided excellent research assistance. Hirata has received financial support for this project under the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B) 24730253. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent views and policies of the IMF or Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis.

A number of studies analyze the sources of variation in performance across different countries and regions during the global financial crisis (Blanchard, Faruqee, and Das, 2010; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2011; Rose and Spiegel, 2011).

These numbers are based on the statistics from the WTO’s Regional Trade Agreements Gateway. For a detailed discussion of the evolution of preferential and regional trade agreements, see WTO (2011).

Ando (2006), Athukorala and Yamashita (2006), Clark (2002), Fullerton, Sawyer, Sprinkle (2011) present evidence for the rapid growth of intra-industry trade in Asia, North America, and the Latin America and the Caribbean.

We analyze global and regional business cycles based on a few key macroeconomic variables rather than focusing solely on output. Our approach of using multiple macroeconomic indicators rather than just GDP to characterize business cycles can be traced back to classical scholars of business cycles (Burns and Mitchell, 1946; Zarnowitz, 1992). The NBER also looks at a variety of indicators for determining turning points in U.S. business cycles, including real GDP, real income, employment, industrial production, and wholesale-retail sales.

In a related paper, Stock and Watson (2003) employ a factor-structural VAR model to analyze the importance of international factors in explaining business cycles in the G-7 countries since 1960. They conclude that comovement has fallen in the 1984–2002 period relative to 1960–83 due to diminished importance of common shocks. Results by Doyle and Faust (2005) indicate that there is no significant change in the correlations between the growth rate of output in the United States and in other G-7 countries over time.

Some empirical studies report that increased volume of intra-regional trade flows, especially in the form of intra-industry trade, has been an important factor in explaining the degree of business cycle synchronization in certain regions (for North America, see Swiston and Bayoumi, 2008; for Asia, see Shin and Wang, 2003 and 2004; Shin and Sohn, 2006; Kumakura, 2006; Rana, 2008; and Cortinhas, 2007; for Europe, see Bower and Guillemineau, 2006; and Shin and Wang, 2005). He and Liao (2010) emphasize the importance of the region specific supply factors in explaining the degree of synchronization of Asian business cycles. There also have been some studies focusing specifically on North-South business cycle linkages (Hoffmaister, Pradhan, and Samiei (1998), Kouparitsas (2001) and Akin and Kose (2008)). Hirata, Kim and Kose (2004, 2007) present stylized facts of cycles in the MENA region and analyze the sources of these cycles using a small open economy DSGE model.

Di Mauro, Dees, and Mc Kibbon (2008) present a summary of different types of factors affecting global and regional linkages.

Other studies also consider the decoupling potential of emerging economies using various methodologies (He, Cheung and Chang, 2007; Asian Development Bank, 2007; and Fidrmuc and Korhonen, 2010).

As countries have intensified their efforts to liberalize external trade and financial account regimes, there has been a dramatic increase in global trade and financial flows, both in absolute terms and relative to world income, during the globalization period (Kose and Prasad, 2010; Milesi-Ferretti, Strobbe, and Tamirisa, 2010).

For a detailed discussion of this demarcation, see Kose, Otrok, and Prasad (2012). Blanchard and Simon (2001) and Stock and Watson (2005) present evidence for the Great Moderation. We provide a set of sensitivity experiments to check the robustness of our main results to changes in this demarcation.

For explanations of these estimation approaches, see Stock and Watson (2002), Forni and others (2000), and Otrok and Whiteman (1998).

We do not interpret the factors as representing specific types of shocks such as technology—instead, we view them as capturing the effects of many types of common shocks, including technology, monetary and fiscal policies, world interest rate, and terms-of-trade shocks etc.

The sign restriction is simply a normalization that allows us to interpret the factors in an intuitive way. For instance, we normalize the factor loading for the U.S. output growth on the global factor to be positive. This implies that the global factor falls in 1974, 1981, 1992, and 2009 consistent with the fact that the United States and most other countries experienced recessions in those years.

The procedure draws the regional factor conditional on the global factor, and then the country factor conditional on the global and regional factors. This assumes an orthogonality between the global and regional factor innovations. The model assumes that the country factor innovations are orthogonal to each other. Even though the factors are uncorrelated, samples taken at each pass of the Markov chain will not be, purely because of sampling errors. To ensure adding up, we orthogonalized the sampled factors, ordering the global factor first, the regional factor second, and the country factor third. Our simulations suggest that the order of orthogonalization has little impact on the results. In particular, all of the results remain qualitatively similar under alternative orderings, and the quantitative differences are small.

We also calculated the median (rather than mean) variance shares attributable to each factor for the full sample and each region. As these lead to qualitatively similar conclusions, we only report results using means.

Specifically, our global factor model captures the global recessions of 1974, 1982, 1991, and 2009 identified by Kose, Loungani and Terrones (2013).

We do not present the factors and results with respect to their persistence here. They are available from the authors upon request.

To examine the implications of the post-crisis period on our findings, we extend our sample to 2015 using forecasted series in Section VI.C , but our headline results do not change.

Mexico and the United States undertook trade negotiations on specific sectors and reached framework agreements in 1985, 1987, and 1989. Mexico and Canada started discussions toward closer bilateral trade relations in 1990. Canada and the United States began negotiations for a free trade area in 1986 and launched the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) in 1989 (Kose, Meredith, and Towe, 2005; Lederman, Maloney, and Servén, 2005).

Statistics for intra-regional financial assets are based on the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey .

See Devereux and others, (2011) and Waysand, Ross, de Guzman (2010) for the evolution of financial integration in Asia and Europe, respectively. See Petri, Plummer, and Zhai (2011) and Arribas, Pérez, and Tortosa-Ausina (2011) analyze the growth of trade linkages in Asia and Europe, respectively.

de Haan, Inklaar, and Jong-A-Pin (2008) present a survey of the rich literature on business cycle synchronization in the euro area. They argue that this literature has been unable to produce conclusive results on the convergence of cycles in the euro area because of differences in data series and methodologies employed.

Karagedikli and Thorsrud (2012) employ a FAVAR model to analyze the evolution of activity (GDP and IP) and price (CPI and PPI) factors over time. They use the quarterly data of 31 countries covering four regions (Asia, Europe, North and South America) over the period 1990:1-2009:4. They document that regional demand and supply shocks play important roles in explaining national business cycles. Mumtaz, Simonelli, and Surico (2011) analyze the evolution of global and regional cycles in GDP and inflation for 35 counties in five regions (Asia, Europe, Oceania, North and South America) over the period from the mid 1800s to 2007 using a dynamic factor model. They find that while the importance of the global factor has declined, regional cycles have become more pronounced in all regions except North America during the period 1985–2007.

Although our findings on the surface appear to be different from those of Kose, Otrok, and Whiteman (2003), they are indeed consistent. The new study provides a nuanced view about the existence (and emergence) of regional cycles. The differences between our findings and theirs are primarily driven by the differences in the selection of regional groupings, the number of countries in the sample, and most importantly the time period covered. The regional cycles have become more important in the 1985–2010 period most of which was not included in the sample in Kose, Otrok, and Whiteman (2003) which ends in 1990. Moreover, our use of a larger sample (and larger sub-samples in most regions) allows us to draw a sharper contrast across regions in terms of their exposure to the global economy.

Some studies present models that are able to produce results consistent with the dynamics of investment we report here. In Head’s (2002) model, cross-country correlations of investment are positive because of increasing returns to the worldwide variety of intermediate goods. Heathcote and Perri (2004) show that changes in the correlation structure of shocks and extent of the portfolio diversification affect cross-country investment correlations in international business cycle models.

If we focus on the absolute changes in the importance of global and regional factors in explaining output variation, our results indicate that the share of the global factor rises in the second sub-period in 39 countries and declines in 67 countries. Similarly, the share of the regional factor rises in the second sub-period in 69 countries and goes down in 37. Detailed results are available from the authors upon request.

We also conduct some formal tests to examine whether there is a structural break in the sample. In particular, we perform some univariate break tests for a variance break following Stock and Watson (2005). We use the Andrews (1993) test for a break in either the unconditional variance or the persistence of each time series at an unknown date. Searching over the middle two-thirds of the full time span of the sample, we find that the majority of those time series that have a break in their unconditional variance experience that break in or before 1984. A similar test for a break in the autoregressive parameter of a univariate AR(1) model indicates that a substantial share of the series that have a break have it by 1984.

The details of sensitivity results reported in this sub-section are available from the authors upon request.

The first lag is significant in only 12, 10, 13 (out of 106) time series of output, consumption, and investment, respectively. Focusing on the North America, Europe, Asia and Oceania regions, the first lag is significant in only 3, 4, 6 (out of 39) time series for output, consumption, and investment, respectively. The second lag is of similar importance, with a significant coefficient in 9, 7, 16 percent of the time series for output, consumption, and investment, respectively.

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Regionalization and Globalization in the Modern World Economy

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Originally published in 1998. This collection of outstanding essays explores the importance of regionalization and globalization to the world economy. International contributions explore the process of regionalization in the Pacific Area, The Americas, Africa and Europe, and question whether the world economy is characterized by increasing regionalization, rather than globalization. The book is an excellent contribution to debate on development economics. It investigates how the processes of globalization and regionalization, driven by liberalization of trade and capital markets, weaken nationally established monopolies and protected industries and it looks at the challenge to Third World nations and the countries of the former socialist bloc.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1 | 26  pages, globalization versus regionalization, chapter 2 | 27  pages, external pressures shaping regionalism: a critical assessment, chapter 3 | 11  pages, central and eastern europe: catching up or marginalization in the european free trade zone, chapter 4 | 21  pages, economic reform and new patterns of post-soviet regionalism, chapter 5 | 42  pages, preparing the russian economy for world market integration, chapter 6 | 18  pages, regional economic integration in sub-saharan africa, chapter 7 | 26  pages, the european union and its expanding eastern and southern borders, chapter 8 | 21  pages, a regionalizing middle power: turkey's role between europe and asia, chapter 9 | 37  pages, morocco's economy between the maghreb and europe, chapter 10 | 21  pages, regional integration processes in latin america: argentina and mercosur, chapter 11 | 36  pages, the politics of open regionalism and neo-liberal economic integration in latin america: the case of chile and mexico, chapter 12 | 20  pages, trade liberalization and economic integration in central america, chapter 13 | 22  pages, association of the south-east asian nations' (asean) free trade area (afta): the changing environment and incentives, chapter 14 | 31  pages, external liberalization, regionalization and openness in indochina's economic transformation.

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CAMA Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis Regionalization vs . Globalization CAMA Working Paper 09 / 2013 February 2013

  • Hideaki Hirata , M. A. Kose , Christopher Otrok
  • Published 2013

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