terrorism term paper

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17 The Causes of Terrorism

Jeff Goodwin, New York University

Published: 04 April 2019
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Terrorism, understood as the killing of noncombatants in order to frighten, intimidate, or provoke others, has long been an important method of warfare or contention for both states and non-state groups. Yet states and rebels clearly do not attack just any noncombatants. Indeed, both states and rebels are also usually interested in securing the support of noncombatants. So who are the noncombatants whom warriors choose to attack? Armed groups have an incentive to attack and terrorize those noncombatants who support enemy states or rebels politically or economically. Terrorism is thus a method of undermining indirectly one’s armed enemies. By contrast, armed groups do not have an incentive to attack noncombatants who do not support enemy states or rebels. Whether noncombatants are supporters of states or rebels, in other words, is the key to understanding why terror tactics are or are not likely to be employed against them in any particular conflict.

Ascertaining the causes of terrorism depends of course on how we define terrorism. Alas, as is well known, scholars have been unable to reach a consensus on the meaning of the word. In 1981, Martha Crenshaw, a well-known scholar of terrorism, wrote an important article titled “The Causes of Terrorism,” published in the journal Comparative Politics . Crenshaw was interested in discovering the causes of “symbolic, low-level violence by conspiratorial organizations” (Crenshaw 1981 , 379), which is one of the ways in which scholars have defined terrorism. Crenshaw had in mind violence by such groups as the Irish Republican Army, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Red Army Faction in West Germany. To be sure, Crenshaw was well aware that states as well as dissident groups can employ terrorism—in some sense of the word. In fact, the first sentence of her article states, “Terrorism occurs both in the context of violent resistance to the state as well as in the service of state interests” (Crenshaw 1981 , 379). But Crenshaw focused exclusively on anti-state terrorism by “conspiratorial organizations” in her article.

In this chapter, I want to consider the possible causes of terrorism defined in a rather different way, one which encompasses both state and anti-state or rebel violence. I define terrorism, like many scholars, as violence against noncombatants, usually common or ordinary people, in order to advance a political cause (cf. Richards 2014 ). The immediate purpose of this violence, furthermore, is not just to kill or injure people but to frighten, intimidate, provoke, or otherwise influence a larger population, among which the killed and wounded were either randomly or selectively targeted (Goodwin 2006 ). Terrorism thus differs from other forms of political violence, such as conventional (or guerrilla) warfare and assassination, which aim to kill soldiers (whether state or rebel troops) and political leaders, respectively.

Formally, I define terrorism as any tactic or set of tactics used by any government, group, organization, or individual, in pursuit of a political goal (broadly defined), which is intended to kill or harm civilians or noncombatants (as opposed to soldiers or political leaders) so as to frighten, intimidate, demoralize, provoke, or pressure other civilians and/or political leaders . A shorter, “sound bite” definition of terrorism is the killing or harming of civilians to intimidate others .

Terrorism, then, is not an ideological movement like socialism or conservatism, nor is it violence by a particular type of organization (e.g. covert or conspiratorial). Rather, terrorism refers to tactics that may be employed by either states or rebels, whether they are ideologically conservative, moderate, or radical. This definition encompasses (1) forms of violence or other lethal actions against noncombatants by rebel groups (i.e. “terrorism” as many if not most people tend to think of it today) but also (2) forms of violence or other lethal actions by states or allied paramilitary forces against noncombatants in conflicts with rebels. (Much counter-insurgent and indeed counterterrorist violence is itself terrorist in nature.) It also encompasses (3) violence or other lethal actions by states against noncombatants in international conflicts, and (4) violence or other lethal actions against an oppressed racial or ethnic (or other) group for purposes of controlling or intimidating that group.

“State terrorism,” for its part, is important for scholars to consider for several reasons, not least because state violence against noncombatants has claimed many more victims than has anti-state violence, and because terrorism by rebel groups is sometimes a strategic response to state terrorism (see e.g. Herman and O’Sullivan 1989 , chs 2 – 3 ; Gareau 2004 ).

My definition of terrorism entails a distinct understanding of what exactly we must explain in order to explain terrorism. What we must explain, plainly, is not why states or political groups sometimes resort to violence as such, but why they employ violence against (or otherwise seek to harm) civilians or noncombatants in particular, with the further goal of intimidating many others in the process. Indeed, one virtue of this definition is that it squarely focuses our attention on violations of the idea (and the ideal) of noncombatant immunity —the principle that noncombatants should never be targeted in wars or civil conflicts, whether by states or rebels. Noncombatant immunity is a fundamental principle of “just war” theory and international law, including the Geneva Conventions.

How, then, are we to explain terrorism defined in this way? In the remainder of this chapter I will critically review two traditional theories of terrorism, then examine at greater length the currently dominant “radicalization” perspective on terrorism, and then develop and briefly illustrate an alternative account of terrorism, which I call the “indirect-war” theory. I argue that neither the traditional theories nor the radicalization perspective tell us much at all about terrorism as I have defined it, but that the indirect-war perspective offers greater promise for the empirical analysis of a wide range of cases of terrorism.

Traditional Theories of Terrorism

How have social scientists and other analysts traditionally attempted to explain why states or rebels have sometimes used violence against, or otherwise sought to harm, civilians? Many theories have been proposed—far more than I can review here—but prior to the 9/11 attacks two hypotheses were especially influential: (1) terrorism is a product of the weakness and/or desperation of some rebels or states (a “weapon of the weak”), and (2) much terrorism is a retaliatory response to violence, including terrorism, by the perpetrators’ armed enemies, whether states or rebels. After 9/11, a new theory of terrorism has become dominant. This theory holds that terrorism is the result of the “radicalization” of particular individuals or groups.

Before the radicalization perspective became dominant, perhaps the most common idea about what causes terrorism was the notion that oppositional or rebel movements turn to terrorism when they are very weak, lack popular support, and yet are desperate to redress their grievances. A similar argument has been proposed as an explanation for state terrorism, claiming that states turn to terrorism—or “civilian victimization”—when they become desperate to win wars (Downes 2008 ). The core idea here is that rebels and states which lack the capacity or leverage to pressure their opponents either nonviolently or through conventional or guerrilla warfare, or who fail to attain their goals when they do employ these strategies, will turn to terrorism as a “last resort.” Disaffected elites sometimes resort to violence, according to Crenshaw’s influential account ( 1981 ), because it is easier and cheaper than strategies that require mass mobilization, especially when government repression makes mass mobilization extremely difficult if not impossible.

There are, however, a number of logical and empirical problems with this “desperation” theory of terrorism, as we might call it. Most importantly, the theory seems simply to assume that desperate rebels or politicians would automatically view attacks upon civilians as beneficial instead of detrimental to their cause. But even if terrorism is cheaper and easier than many other strategies, why would one employ it at all? We need to know what beneficial consequences rebels or state officials believe their attacks on civilians, or on specific kinds of civilians, would bring about. How exactly will these attacks advance their cause? Why would officials or rebels not assume that attacks on civilians would undermine their popularity or otherwise hurt their cause?

Second, there does not in fact seem to be a particularly strong empirical relationship between the strength of states and rebel groups, on the one hand, and their use (or not) of terrorism, on the other. For example, the US government was hardly desperate when it imposed economic sanctions on Iraq during the 1990s, which may have resulted in the deaths of more than half a million children (Gordon 2010 ). (Although these sanctions did not entail direct violence against Iraqi civilians, they fit our definition of terrorism because they deliberately resulted in the deaths and suffering of noncombatants.) The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, to take another example, was a powerful rebel movement during the 1990s according to most accounts. The LTTE sometimes even waged conventional warfare against Sri Lankan government forces, and it used small aircraft in some of its attacks. Yet the LTTE, which was predominantly Tamil, also engaged in indiscriminate attacks on ethnic Sinhalese civilians, and it did so long after it had decimated rival Tamil nationalist groups (Bloom 2005 , ch. 3 ). So its growing strength did not lead it to abandon terror tactics. The desperation theory does not tell us why.

One can also point, conversely, to relatively weak states and rebel movements that have largely eschewed terrorism. Perhaps the best example of the latter is the armed wing of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa. In 1961, as many of their leaders were being arrested and many others driven into exile, the ANC and the Communist Party of South Africa established an armed wing called Umkhonto weSizwe (“Spear of the Nation” or MK). The ANC explicitly adopted armed struggle as one of its main political strategies. By most accounts, however, MK failed to become an effective guerrilla force, as the South African Defense Forces were simply too strong and effective (Cherry 2011 ). And yet MK did not then embrace terror tactics against the dominant white minority, despite the fact, as Gay Seidman points out, that, “In a deeply segregated society, it would have been easy to kill random whites. Segregated white schools, segregated movie theaters, segregated shopping centers meant that if white deaths were the only goal, potential targets could be found everywhere” (Seidman 2001 , 118). (I address the question of why the ANC rejected terrorism later in this chapter.)

In short, weak and desperate rebels and states do not necessarily adopt terror tactics, and strong states and rebels do not necessarily eschew such tactics. As Turk concludes, “Because any group may adopt terror tactics, it is misleading to assume either that ‘terrorism is the weapon of the weak’ or that terrorists are always small groups of outsiders—or at most a ‘lunatic fringe’” (Turk 1982 , 122). Indeed, terrorism is often and perhaps usually a weapon of the strong, and of strong states in particular.

The main insight of the desperation theory of terrorism is that states and rebel groups do often take up arms after they have concluded that diplomacy and nonviolent politics cannot work or that these work far too slowly or ineffectively to redress urgent grievances. But notice that this does not tell us why armed actors would employ violence against noncombatants in particular. Moreover, the argument that attacking “soft” targets such as unprotected civilians is easier than waging conventional or guerrilla warfare does not explain why states or rebels would ever wage conventional or guerrilla warfare. The argument implies that rational people would always prefer terrorism to these strategies, which is clearly not the case. In sum, the most we can say is that weakness and desperation may be a necessary but not sufficient cause of terrorism in some cases. But as a general theory of terrorism, this perspective is clearly inadequate.

A second traditional view of terrorism is that it is a retaliatory response to violence, including terrorism. Leftist and radical analysts of terrorism have often made this claim about oppositional terrorism, and it is emphasized by Herman and O’Sullivan ( 1989 ). They suggest that the “retail” terrorism of dissident groups is caused or provoked by the “wholesale” or “primary” terrorism of states, especially powerful Western states, above all the United States. The terms “wholesale” and “retail” are meant to remind readers that state terrorism has generally been much more deadly than oppositional terrorism, which is undeniable. Other scholars have rightly emphasized how state and non-state terrorism have been dynamically intertwined (e.g. English, 2016 ) and how, as a result, revenge often becomes a powerful motivation for terrorism (e.g. Richardson, 2006 : ch. 4 ).

But how far does this view take us? It is certainly true that indiscriminate state violence, especially when perpetrated by relatively weak and ineffective states, has encouraged the development of violent rebel movements (Goodwin 2001 ). But the question is why these movements would attack and threaten civilians as opposed to the state’s armed forces. If rebels are responding to state terrorism, after all, why would they not employ violence against the state ? State terrorism, in other words, would seem more likely to induce rebels to employ guerrilla or conventional warfare than terror tactics.

Empirically, one can also point to dissident organizations that have arisen in contexts of extreme state violence which have nonetheless largely eschewed terror tactics. For example, Central American guerrilla movements of the 1970s and 1980s, including the Sandinista Front in Nicaragua and the Farabundo Martí Front for National Liberation in El Salvador, confronted states that engaged in extensive violence against noncombatants, yet neither movement engaged in much terrorism. Another example is, again, the ANC in South Africa. Interestingly, Herman and O’Sullivan’s book devotes considerable attention to both South African and Israeli state terrorism ( 1989 , ch. 2 ). And yet, while they note the “retail” terrorism of the Palestine Liberation Organization during the 1970s and 1980s—emphasizing that Israeli state terrorism was responsible for a great many more civilian deaths during this period—they do not discuss the oppositional terrorism in South Africa which their theory would seem to predict. In fact, as we have noted, the ANC simply did not carry out much terrorism at all. So “wholesale” state terrorism, clearly, does not always cause or provoke “retail” oppositional terrorism.

Having said this, it is indeed difficult to find a rebel group that has carried out extensive terrorism which has not arisen in a context of considerable state violence. For example, those rebels in French Algeria, the West Bank and Gaza, Sri Lanka, and Chechnya who engaged in extensive terrorism have been drawn from, and claim to act on behalf of, populations that have themselves suffered extensive and often indiscriminate state repression. The question is what to make of this correlation. Why, in these particular contexts, have rebels attacked certain civilians as well as government forces? The retaliatory theory of terrorism does not tell us.

The Radicalization Perspective

A huge literature on terrorism has appeared following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Much of this literature is descriptive or focuses on particular aspects of terrorism, broadly conceived (e.g. recruitment, organization, ideology, etc.). Surprisingly little of this literature is concerned with proposing general causal hypotheses about the choice of terror tactics by either rebels or states. One theory of terrorism, however, has clearly risen to a position of dominance in both the journalistic and academic literature—the idea that terrorism is the result of “radicalization.”

At its core, the radicalization approach to terrorism has a simple thesis: not all radicals may be terrorists, but all terrorists are radicals . It thus follows that a process of ideological “radicalization” (or “violent radicalization” in some accounts) is a necessary if not sufficient cause of terrorism . And it follows in turn that scholars need to identify the factors and processes that cause or facilitate “radicalization” if we are to explain terrorism. It also follows that individuals will be weaned away from terrorism if they can somehow be “de-radicalized.”

These claims, alas, are based on a misunderstanding and misappropriation of the concept of radicalization. Indeed, there are several fundamental problems with the radicalization perspective. This approach often assumes, first of all, that terrorism is a kind of ideological movement—like socialism or conservatism, for example—which seeks out converts. The idea is that terrorists seek to radicalize people or recruit people who are already radicalized. But terror tactics have clearly been employed by groups and states with a very wide range of ideologies, not all of them “radical” in any sense of the word. In fact, the basic theoretical assumption of this approach—that only radicals engage in terrorism—is plainly wrong, unless one defines “radicalism,” tautologically, as a propensity to kill civilians in order to intimidate others. It follows that the basic causal claim or hypothesis of this perspective—that radicalization is a necessary cause of political violence and terrorism—is also plainly wrong.

What does it mean, we might ask, to be a “radical”? The word has had a straightforward, uncontroversial meaning in historical and social-science discourse for many decades. According to the Oxford English Dictionary , “radical” means “Advocating thorough or far-reaching political or social reform … Now more generally: revolutionary, esp. left-wing” ( Oxford English Dictionary online: < www.oed.com/view/Entry/157251#eid27277866 >). A radical, in other words, is a revolutionary—usually on the left but possibly on the right. A radical desires fundamental as opposed to limited social change. Radicals differ from reformists, who desire modest or incremental socio-political changes, and from conservatives, who seek to preserve the existing order more or less as it is.

It follows from this longstanding definition that to “radicalize” means that one comes to have revolutionary or at least far-reaching goals. Historians and social scientists have always used the concept in just this sense, especially those who have written about revolutions or revolutionary movements. The point to emphasize is that the concept of radicalization clearly speaks to ends, not means, let alone violent means . “Radical” has never meant “violent.” In fact, violence and coercion are not associated with any of the several definitions of “radical” which are found in the Oxford English Dictionary . The close association between radicalism and violence, alas, is a very recent and not particularly helpful invention of certain scholars of political violence and terrorism.

Many scholars who employ the term, to be sure, do not explicitly define “radicalization” at all (see e.g. Sageman 2008 ; Horgan 2008 ; Ranstorp 2010 ). And many understand “radicalization” tautologically, that is, as nothing other than the process or processes—whatever they may be—by which one becomes a terrorist. So, for example, according to two leading scholars of terrorism, “Radicalization may be understood as a process leading towards the increased use of political violence, while de-radicalization, by contrast, implies reduction in the use of political violence” (della Porta and LaFree 2012 , 5). “Radicalization” and “de-radicalization” seem to have no other content or meaning for these authors. According to two other prominent scholars,

Functionally, political radicalization is increased preparation for and commitment to intergroup conflict. Descriptively, radicalization means change in beliefs, feelings, and behaviors in directions that increasingly justify intergroup violence and demand sacrifice in defense of the ingroup … [B]ehavioral radicalization means increasing time, money, risk-taking, and violence in support of a political group. (McCauley and Moskalenko 2008 , 416)

These definitions empty the words “radical” and “radicalization” of their traditional meaning. The word “radical” no longer means revolutionary, but is simply used as a synonym or placeholder for the word terrorist, and the word “radicalization” becomes a synonym for whatever process or processes might lead people to become terrorists. The underlying claim is thus entirely circular and unenlightening: Terrorism is a product of radicalization, we are told, and radicalization is the process which leads to terrorism.

It is not clear why some scholars have emptied the word “radicalization” of its traditional meaning in this way. It may be that they have done so because of the obvious fallaciousness of the basic theoretical assumption of the radicalization perspective, namely, that only revolutionaries engage in political violence or terrorism. Of course, no one would deny that revolutionaries have sometimes used violence and terrorism. The term terrorism, after all, was first used to describe the actions of French revolutionaries. Moreover, some scholars who write from the radicalization perspective have correctly emphasized that not all radicals use violence or terrorism. Indeed, some employ the concept of “violent radicalization” precisely in order to address this reality (e.g. Bartlett and Miller 2012 ).

But the assumption remains for most who write from this perspective that all terrorists are revolutionaries (or “extremists”). This assumption, however, is empirically wrong. There is, to begin with, what we might call conservative terrorism or what some have termed “pro-state” terrorism—in other words, non-state terrorism in defense of the status quo (e.g. Bruce 1992 ; White 1999 ). Two better-known cases of such conservative terrorist movements would be the Ku Klux Klan in the United States, which for many decades used terror tactics to reinforce white supremacy, and the Loyalist paramilitary movement in Northern Ireland, which used terrorism in order to maintain Protestant domination of those six counties as well as their union with Great Britain. It simply makes no sense to describe Klan members or Loyalists as radicals or revolutionaries who sought “fundamental socio-political changes.”

The radicalization perspective fails just as clearly to explain most state terrorism, which, like conservative or pro-state terrorism, has also been mainly employed to defend the status quo. Again, state terrorism has sometimes been employed in the service of political projects aimed at radically transforming societies, as in France and Russia. But much more state violence has been used to intimidate civilians so as to maintain the existing social order or to defeat domestic rebels or foreign enemies (Downes 2008 ). State terrorism, indeed, is quite often counter -revolutionary violence in defense of the status quo.

The Indirect-War Theory of Terrorism

A causal explanation of terrorism, as we have defined it, requires us to specify why and under what conditions armed actors (state or non-state) come to regard the killing and intimidation of civilians or noncombatants as a reasonable and perhaps necessary (although not necessarily exclusive) means to attain their political ends. A causal theory should also tell us why and under what conditions armed groups consider terror tactics unnecessary and perhaps even counterproductive. Because terrorism cannot be unintended according to our (and most) definitions, the deliberate targeting of civilians—often just ordinary people—may be considered the sine qua non of terrorism.

Of course, terrorism, like other forms of violence, requires a certain infrastructure (weaponry, means of gaining proximity to targets, etc.) as well as warriors willing and able to carry out the violence. But neither of these is specific to terrorism. Conventional and guerrilla warfare as well as a strategy of assassination also require these things. The essential characteristic of terrorism is the intent to kill or harm as well as to intimidate civilians, and it is this intent which demands an explanation.

Let me now sketch what I call the indirect-war theory of terrorism, which follows in the footsteps of Charlies Tilly’s “relational” approach to terrorism (Tilly 2004 , 2005 ), so named because social relations among key actors (states, armed rebels, and civilians) carry the primary explanatory burden. The indirect-war theory is based on the idea that terrorism is an indirect way for armed groups (state or non-state) to attack their enemies. The theory proposes that an armed group will employ terror tactics against those civilians who are supporters of the group’s armed enemies—provided those civilians are not also seen by the group as their own potential supporters. Terrorism arises, in other words, when one or more parties to an armed conflict seeks to harm their adversaries by harming the civilians who support those adversaries. Killing and terrorizing civilians is thus an indirect means of undermining one’s armed enemies, instead of, or in addition to, directly attacking these enemies. By contrast, there is no incentive to attack civilians who are not supporters of one’s armed enemies.

The indirect-war theory requires a consideration of the characteristics of the civilians or noncombatants whom states and rebels (sometimes) target for violence or harm. Why and how states and rebels come to see particular noncombatants as enemies or appropriate targets of violence is a puzzle that the aforementioned theories of terrorism, as we have seen, generally ignore. Yet states and rebels clearly do not attack just any civilians or noncombatants. Indeed, both states and rebels are also usually interested in winning the active support or allegiance of civilians—or at least civilians of a certain type. So who are the “bad” or enemy civilians whom warriors choose to attack? And what good, from the warriors’ perspective, might come from attacking them?

When states or rebels employ terror tactics in a civil or international conflict, they generally attack and try to intimidate civilians who in one way or another are valuable to or support their armed enemies. These are civilians upon whom enemy armed actors are dependent in different ways. Again, attacking such civilians is a way to attack indirectly one’s armed opponents, and it is perfectly rational from this standpoint, despite the widespread moral condemnation of terror tactics.

The main tactical objective of and incentive for terrorism in armed conflicts is to induce the targeted civilians to stop supporting certain government or rebel policies. Terrorism, in other words, typically aims to apply such intense pressure to civilians that they will demand that their government or movement change certain policies or activities. Better yet, from the perpetrators’ perspective, these civilians may even cease supporting the government or rebels altogether in order to end the violence directed at them. The perpetrators may also hope that the states or rebels they are fighting will unilaterally change or abandon certain policies or activities in order to end the killing of civilians. In either case, the government or rebels cannot be indifferent to attacks on civilians who are valuable to them.

In short, there is a general incentive for armed groups to attack and intimidate those civilians who are supporters of states or rebels with whom they are at war. But how exactly do certain civilians support armed groups? Civilians may support armed groups in two main ways—politically and economically—each of which produces a distinct incentive for armed enemies to attack them. First, terrorism is likely to be employed against noncombatants who politically support one’s armed enemies. In this context, terror tactics are a reasonable means to weaken civilian political support (or tolerance) for violence by “their” government or rebels. For example, Al Qaeda and other “jihadist” groups have attacked civilians in the United States, the UK, France, and other Western countries in order to erode political support for their governments’ policies in the Middle East. By contrast, terrorism is much less likely to be employed against civilians who do not politically support—or are substantially divided in their support for—one’s armed enemies. In this case, terrorism may alienate potential allies.

Second, terrorism is likely to be employed against noncombatants who economically support one’s armed enemies by, for example, supplying them with weapons, transportation (or the means thereof), food, and other supplies needed to employ violence. In this context, terrorism is a reasonable means to weaken civilian economic support for violence by “their” government or rebels. For example, the “terror bombing” of World War II, which resulted in hundreds of thousands and perhaps millions of civilian deaths, was undertaken primarily to destroy the industrial economies of England, Germany, and Japan (in part by eroding civilian morale), on which those countries’ armed forces were dependent. Such destruction required massive civilian victimization. By contrast, terrorism is much less likely when soldiers are supplied by foreign states, for example, or through covert, black markets that involve few civilians.

Terrorism is also likely to spread and escalate in conflicts in which an armed actor has begun to attack the civilian supporters of their armed enemies. When this occurs, terrorism may become a reasonable means (other things being equal) to deter terrorism by armed enemies, thereby protecting one’s civilian supporters, or, alternatively, to avenge such terrorism, thereby winning or reinforcing the political support of those civilians who feel they have been avenged.

Generally speaking, civilians who enjoy extensive civil and political rights are more likely to support their government than those who do not enjoy such rights. It follows that civilians with rights are more likely to be attacked by rebels or enemy states during times of conflict than civilians without rights, other things being equal. For example, when extensive and indiscriminate state violence appears to be supported by civilians, it is hardly surprising that rebel movements would tend to view such civilians, as well as the states perpetrating such violence, as legitimate targets of violence; the purpose of such violence is to undermine these civilians’ support for their government. Extensive state (“wholesale”) terrorism thus begets extensive rebel (“retail”) terrorism in conflicts in which a citizenry with significant democratic rights supports the state’s violence. Such a citizenry would appear to be a common if not strictly necessary precondition for extensive terrorism by rebel movements (see Pape 2005 ; Goodwin 2006 ).

The indirect-war theory also helps us to understand why rebels who are fighting autocratic or authoritarian regimes tend to eschew terror tactics. Relatively few civilians tend to support such regimes, so there is no benefit in employing terror tactics against the general civilian population, unless for economic purposes. For example, the Sandinista Front in Nicaragua carried out virtually no terror attacks during its armed conflict with the autocratic Somoza dictatorship during the late 1970s, an otherwise bloody insurgency during which some 30,000 people were killed (Booth 1983 ). Civilians who supported the dictatorship consisted of a small number of Somoza cronies and a loyal elite opposition, both of which were drawn mainly from Nicaragua’s small bourgeoisie. Virtually all other civilians in Nicaragua, from the poorest peasant to Somoza’s bourgeois opponents, were viewed by the Sandinistas as potential allies, and indeed many would become such. It obviously made no sense to attack such people. Of course, had the Somoza dictatorship been supported by broader sectors of the population—by a broader class coalition, for example, or a large ethnic group—then the Sandinistas might very well have employed terror tactics against such sectors in order to undermine their support for the dictatorship.

In summary, armed groups, whether states or rebels, are likely to attack and terrorize noncombatants who politically or economically support enemy states or rebels. This is a way to undermine indirectly one’s armed enemies. By contrast, armed groups are unlikely to attack noncombatants who do not support enemy states or rebels. In such instances, attacking such noncombatants would serve no purpose and would alienate potential allies. Whether civilians are supporters of states or rebels, in other words, is the key to understanding why terror tactics are or are not likely to be employed against them in specific conflicts.

Contrasting Case Studies: Al Qaeda and the ANC

In the final section of this chapter, I want to illustrate, if only briefly, how the indirect-war theory of terrorism just outlined can help us to understand the contrasting tactics of two non-state armed groups—one that decided to employ terror tactics and one that rejected terror tactics, although not violence as such.

Al Qaeda, and armed groups affiliated with it, have carried out a number of terrorist attacks in recent years against US and certain European noncombatants (see e.g. Hoffman and Reinares 2014 ). Why does Al Qaeda attack such civilians? Why, in other words, has it chosen to employ terror tactics?

Al Qaeda adheres to the view that the global Muslim community, or umma , is currently oppressed by both “apostate” secular and “hypocritical” pseudo-Islamic regimes, from Morocco to the Philippines, as well as by the “Zionist entity” (Israel) in Palestine. And standing behind these regimes is the powerful US government and its European allies, especially the UK and France. Al Qaeda and other jihadist groups are hostile toward the United States and its allies for supporting repressive, un-Islamic regimes in Muslim countries. Al Qaeda believes that unless and until the US and its allies—the “far enemy”—can be compelled to end their support for these regimes—the “near enemy”—and withdraw their troops and other agents from Muslim countries, local struggles to overthrow these regimes cannot succeed (Gerges 2009 ).

Al Qaeda and other jihadist groups have attacked US military forces in the Middle East. But why have they also decided that ordinary civilians are legitimate targets of violence? After all, terrorism is rejected not only by mainstream Islamists, but also by many jihadists themselves. In fact, “when finally informed about the major attack against the United States [i.e. the 9/11 plot], most senior members of the Al Qaeda Shura Council reportedly objected on religious and strategic grounds; bin Laden overrode the majority’s decision, and the attacks went forward” (Gerges 2009 , 19).

Shortly after 9/11, Osama bin Laden described the rationale for the 9/11 attacks in an interview that first appeared in the Pakistani newspaper Ausaf on November 7, 2001:

The United States and their allies are killing us in Palestine, Chechnya, Kashmir, Palestine and Iraq. That’s why Muslims have the right to carry out revenge attacks on the U.S. … The American people should remember that they pay taxes to their government and that they voted for their president. Their government makes weapons and provides them to Israel, which they use to kill Palestinian Muslims. Given that the American Congress is a committee that represents the people, the fact that it agrees with the actions of the American government proves that America in its entirety is responsible for the atrocities that it is committing against Muslims. I demand the American people to take note of their government’s policy against Muslims. They described their government’s policy against Vietnam as wrong. They should now take the same stand that they did previously. The onus is on Americans to prevent Muslims from being killed at the hands of their government. (Quoted in Lawrence 2005 , 140–1.)

In short, bin Laden believed that American citizens support their government and its policies in the Middle East. They have elected and pay taxes to their government, which in his view makes them responsible for its actions in Muslim countries (Wiktorowicz and Kaltner 2003 , 88–9). Al Qaeda views American citizens, in other words, not as “innocents,” but as economically and politically complicit in US-sponsored massacres and the oppression of Muslims. Bin Laden hoped that attacks on US citizens would lead them to reject and demand a change in the policies of their government in the Middle East. He hoped that Americans would oppose their government’s actions—as they did during the Vietnam War—in order to stop it from killing more Muslims and supporting oppressive regimes (Lawrence 2005 , 141). In short, Al Qaeda has attacked US citizens because they support Al Qaeda’s armed enemy (the US government) both politically and economically, and the purpose of such attacks is to undermine this support. All this is consonant with the indirect-war theory of terrorism.

The indirect-war theory, as we have seen, also proposes that armed groups are unlikely to employ terror tactics against civilians who are not supporters—or are divided in their support—of these groups’ armed enemies. An armed group is especially unlikely to employ terror tactics against a particular civilian group when some significant fraction of it has come to support that group; it would obviously make no sense for an armed group to attack a civilian population from which it draws a substantial number of supporters. Such terrorism would not only put at risk the support these warriors are receiving from those civilians, but would also make it much less likely that additional civilians would come to support these warriors.

The existence of a substantial group of “dissident civilians” of this type (i.e. civilians who support the armed enemies of “their” government or rebel group) seems largely to explain why the African National Congress—the leading anti-apartheid organization in South Africa—rejected the use of terror tactics against white South Africans. The ANC eschewed such tactics even though the apartheid regime that it sought to topple employed extensive violence, including terrorism, against its opponents. This violence, moreover, was clearly supported or tolerated by large segments of the white population. The Nationalist Party governments of the apartheid era which unleashed the security forces against the regime’s enemies were elected and widely supported by the white population, which enjoyed a range of political privileges and economic benefits under apartheid.

So why did the ANC refuse to view whites as such as enemies or to employ terror tactics against them? The answer lies in the ANC’s long history of “multiracialism,” that is, the collaboration of whites with black South Africans in the ANC (and with South Asian and “colored” or mixed race people), both inside the ANC and in allied organizations. Especially important in this respect was the ANC’s long collaboration with the South African Communist Party, which also has a long history of multiracialism. Tellingly, an important, long-time leader of the ANC’s armed wing was Joe Slovo, a white Communist. (This is analogous to an Israeli Jew leading Hamas’s armed wing or a Christian American directing Al Qaeda’s covert operations.)

For the ANC to have indiscriminately attacked white South Africans would have soured this strategic relationship, which, among other things, was essential for securing substantial Soviet aid for the ANC. Terrorism directed at white South Africans would also have put at risk the large amount of aid that the ANC received from Western Europe during the anti-apartheid struggle. In sum, given the longstanding multiracial—including international—support for the anti-apartheid movement, the use of terrorism against white civilians made little strategic sense to ANC leaders. The ANC would have been much more likely to employ terror tactics against white South Africans if the latter (as well as Europeans) more or less exclusively supported the apartheid regime and opposed the ANC.

Terrorism, understood as the killing of noncombatants in order to frighten or intimidate others, has long been an important method of warfare or contention for both states and non-state armed groups. However, neither traditional theories nor the currently dominant “radicalization” perspective on terrorism help us very much in understanding why states or rebels would choose to attack and intimidate civilians as opposed to soldiers or political elites. Some armed groups undoubtedly employ terrorism out of weakness and desperation, as a “last resort,” but many and probably most do not. Similarly, some warriors use terrorism as a retaliatory response to violence by others, but not always; and this claim fails to explain why warriors would retaliate against noncombatants in particular as opposed to soldiers. And the radicalization perspective, for its part, errs in assuming that all terrorists are ideologically radical and that individuals therefore become terrorists through a process of radicalization. In fact, terror tactics have been employed by rebels and states with a wide range of ideological views. Not all radicals, furthermore, employ terrorism or any other type of violent tactic for that matter.

I have argued, by contrast, that what I have called the indirect-war theory of terrorism offers a more adequate causal account of why some but not all states and armed groups have employed terror tactics. I have suggested that armed groups are likely to attack those civilians who are supporters—politically or economically—of these groups’ armed enemies. The purpose of terror tactics is to undermine civilian support for armed groups—and thereby to attack the latter indirectly. On the other hand, I have suggested that armed groups are unlikely to employ terror tactics against a civilian population when such groups are themselves supported by some significant fraction of that population. I illustrated this theory with the contrasting cases of Al Qaeda, which has employed terrorism in order to undermine civilian support for US and European government policies in the Middle East, and the African National Congress, which largely rejected terror tactics in its fight against apartheid, tactics which would have undermined the support it received from white South Africans and Europeans.

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The New Terrorism Revisited: Some Remarks on Terrorism Evolution and Its Strategic Significance After 9/11

2022, Studia Politologiczne

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The author approaches the issue of terrorism, contrasting the “old” with the “new” one. Firstly, the different meanings attached to terrorism throughout history are discussed. The aim is not to add a new definition but to offer a proper context for the concept of “new terrorism” to be better understood. Secondly, the characteristics of the “new terrorism” are listed. Thus, the “new terrorism” is described as being global and amorphous, its perpetrators having wide-ranging motivation. In addition, it results in numerous and innocent victims, as the attacks are more and more lethal. Moreover, the diverse support systems act like force multipliers. Thirdly, different means of countering the “new terrorism” are mentioned. Having in view its complex nature, a “new” set of counter-terrorist policies is required. Appropriate methods should be used to prevent as well as to deter terrorists. In addition, a multilateral approach is imperative. In conclusion, the author states that it is necessary for the fight against terrorism to be compatible with fundamental freedoms and human rights.

Marian Żuber

Terrorism has been present in human history since ancient times, but it was not considered a serious threat for global security. The attacks on the World Trade Center have demonstrated that it is a threat of a global nature. It is an effective weapon used by the "weaker" against the stronger opponents. The subject of terrorism is very complex, difficult and elusive. There is a divergence among the scholars in understanding terrorism studies due to the lack of uniform criteria for the determination of a clear definition. Therefore, this article is an attempt to characterize the diversity of the terrorist activities that deviate from the “conventional” terrorism such as agro-terrorism, cyber-terrorism, super-terrorism, etc.). In addition, the paper stresses the need of combating terrorism as a partial solution to improve the safety of the international community.

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Terrorism Definitions and Controversies Term Paper

History of terrorism, why do we need to define terrorism, existing scholarly definitions, existing practical definitions, the sources of controversy.

Bibliography

In the last 10 years, over 190,000 people perished as the result of terrorist attacks. 1 These numbers are indeed staggering. They indicate that terrorism has truly become one of the most pressing issues of the 21st century. Yet, terrorism is not a new notion. It has existed in some way, shape, or form, throughout the history of humanity. The concept likely appeared along with the concept of warfare. However, there is a stark difference between the two. While a clear and well-known definition for warfare already exists, the international community is still unable to create a definition for terrorism that is universally agreed upon. The feeling of uneasiness over the inability to come up with an all-inclusive term, along with the perceived necessity to do so, had been plaguing the UN ever since the 1980s.

The consultations regarding the matter were reinvigorated after the events of 2001, when Al-Qaeda committed an attack on the World Trade Center. However, the impulse quickly died out as the committee failed to come up with any reasonable conclusions. Now, faced with the threat of ISIS, which is often referred to as a “Terrorist State,” the world feels the necessity for clear definitions arises once more. The history of failed attempts at defining terrorism on an international scale indicates that the goal is likely unattainable, as it seeks to find a compromise between a wide range of conflicting parties. The purpose of this paper is to explore this issue, provide facts that support its thesis, and come up with comprehensive conclusions about what needs to be done.

The face of terrorism today is much different from what it was several centuries ago. Modern terrorist organizations are massive and powerful. They possess numerous ways of causing havoc to promote their nefarious agendas. The history of the word “Terrorism” traces back to the French Revolution of 1794 and the Revolutionary Terror – a statewide strategy against the people who were perceived to be the enemies of the New Order. Therefore, the first definition of terrorism that appeared in the world was that of state terrorism, which conflicts with the majority of modern definitions of the act. The enactors viewed terrorism as a form of social justice. 2 Naturally, they did not use bombs as means to an end. However, the actual practice is much older than that. It is as ancient as warfare itself – there are many surviving accounts of atrocities committed by either ancient states or individuals that were meant to sway, coerce, or intimidate others to follow a particular line.

To know the history of terrorism is to understand why a concise and practical definition of the term is so problematic to come up with – the practice continues to evolve. While certain terminologies could be used to describe the acts of terrorism that happened a couple of centuries ago, they would be hopelessly outdated when confronted with the events that happened in the recent past. While terrorism had changed substantially over the years, it retained certain essential characteristics that are universal, no matter the country or time period. However, these characteristics are very basic and are not enough to differentiate terrorism from open war or simple criminal acts committed by either singular offenders or groups of individuals.

An ancient military axiom says that one cannot fight that which he or she cannot see. The lack of a proper and practical definition of what could and what could not be considered terrorism is the reason why it exists on such a large scale. A unified action could not be taken if the members of the coalition do not agree on the target. As a result, the efforts made to neutralize it are often inadequate and haphazard. This issue is clearly illustrated by the modern operations of Russia and the USA-led coalition against ISIS. The point of contention appears over whether or not the Syrian rebel army should be considered terrorist. The USA claims that they are freedom fighters since their proclaimed goals involve dethroning the Syrian dictator, Bashar Assad. Russia does not make a difference between the rebels and ISIS terrorists because their methods are very similar and involve bombings and guerilla warfare. 3 If we cast aside the political interests both sides have in the region, these are all very valid concerns.

Aside from these practical points, there are also theoretical and scholarly concerns that must be addressed. A clear definition is the building block for any research conducted on the subject. According to Papacharissi and De Fatima Oliveira, “Definitions of terrorism determine how research is conceptualized, executed, and employed in public policy.” 4 The lack of definite criteria makes it harder to account for all the victims of terror and classify them as such. The Global Terrorism Database reports experiencing significant difficulties when compiling and gathering information, without having a precise definition to rely upon. To set example, let us assess the situation in Syria again. Could the people killed by the Syrian rebels be considered victims of terrorism? The answer would depend on the definition of what terrorism is. Without it, any answers given to this question are moot. This situation alone proves that the need for a definition is much more fundamental than a simple argument about the semantics.

There is a great number of definitions of terrorism. Trying to address all of them within this paper would be a meaningless exercise that would only distract the reader from the subject at hand. Still, the more popular and influential definitions must be analyzed in order to create a more concrete picture of the topic.

According to the Free Dictionary, terrorism is the use of violence, especially against civilians, in the pursuit of political goals. While a definition from an online dictionary does not hold any academic value, it shows us the popular perception of the word “terrorism.” It is very basic and does not address many important aspects of the issue. It does not tell us about the nature of the offenders, their modus operandi or any other goals they could be trying to achieve. This definition might be enough to get a general understanding of the situation, but when inspected up close it does not hold up to scrutiny.

This definition is similar to that provided by Bruce Hoffman – a known theorist and expert on the subject of terrorism. He classifies terrorism as “violence – or equally important, the threat of violence- used and directed in pursuit of, or in service of, a political aim.” 5 While this definition has many elements absent, it does consider the threat of violence – a very important factor, which significantly broadens the margins of what should be considered terrorism. It addresses the practice of taking hostages or threatening violence to further certain agendas and goals. Carsten Bockstette gives the term a much broader definition:

Terrorism is defined as political violence in an asymmetrical conflict that is designed to induce terror and psychic fear (sometimes indiscriminate) through the violent victimization and destruction of noncombatant targets (sometimes iconic symbols). Such acts are meant to send a message from an illicit clandestine organization. The purpose of terrorism is to exploit the media in order to achieve maximum attainable publicity as an amplifying force multiplier in order to influence the targeted audience(s) in order to reach short- and midterm political goals and/or desired long-term end states. 6

This definition covers many points; it mentions the targets, the perpetrators’ agendas, the methods of achieving their goals and spreading the message. Psychological terror is a key component of terrorism that is often overlooked in many interpretations of the word. Successful acts of terrorism tend to have a great negative impact on the population. The memory of past tragedies plays an important part in coercing the population and the governments into collaboration, as nobody wants to live under the threat of it happening again.

Unlike the scholars, the governments of the world that often have to deal with domestic terrorism require personal definitions of the word, which are often tailored to address the issues within a particular region. The same could be said for the intelligence organizations such as the CIA and MI-6, each having their own definitions of terrorism. In order to understand the governmental stance on the issue of terrorism, let us look at their definitions of the term:

India, in its Prevention of Terrorism Act, defines it as a war crime committed during the time of peace. This interpretation is built upon the works of Alex Schmid, and it is an interesting one since it equates terrorism with war crimes, putting them under the jurisdiction of the military tribunal. 7

The definition of terrorism in Pakistan is a peculiar one. It equates the acts of robbery, child molestation and rape to acts of terrorism, alongside the standard practices that are branded as such. Rape has a history of being used as a fear weapon since ancient times, and this found its imprint on the Pakistani definition of terrorism. 8

The Terrorism Act of the United Kingdom defines terrorism as an act of violence or threat of violence against someone’s life, health, and property in order to help advance political and ideological goals, to frighten the population and to influence the government or international governmental organizations. The bill also labels acts that seriously disturb the stability of electronic systems as terrorism. This doctrine is currently in use by the MI-6. 9

The CIA, on the other hand, uses a different definition, when identifying and conducting operations against the organizations it considers terrorist: “The term ‘terrorism’ means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.” 10

What is similar between all these definitions is that all of them identify terrorists as strictly non-state agents, thus excluding any governmental actions from being potentially regarded as terrorist. This leads to the next important point in our discussion.

While the entire world agrees that terrorism is evil and must be stopped, the issues tend to begin whenever a congress is assembled in order to work on a resolution regarding the definition of terrorism and how it should be opposed. While individual governments have their own views and ideas on the term, the United Nations did not come up with any official words considering the definition of terrorism. Numerous drafts were written, but neither was fully approved. There are three main sources of controversy for the issue:

The negative emotional perception of the term
The legitimacy aspects
The scenario where the State could be branded terrorist

The term “terrorism” is a very emotionally charged word, which creates certain difficulties whenever there are attempts at formulating a definition for it. Instead of an emotionally neutral connotation that is expected from a legal term, the word is commonly associated with unlawful violence. This stretches the definition outside its area of legislation, which effectively ruins it. Historically, the term did not always have a negative connotation. In the past, the states of the world often branded their political opponents as terrorists, and the term was synonymous with the word “freedom fighter,” such as it was in the Russian Empire. Russian terrorists were often in opposition to the authoritarian monarchy and sought to end the tyranny through political assassinations, often employing bombs. Western media turned the word into a pejorative, often associated with Islamic terrorism and deaths of countless innocents over religious motives, which is not always the case. Consequently, anyone branded terrorist will be viewed by the public with scorn, regardless of their motivations, methods and the extent of damage done.

The legitimacy aspect is another thing that raises many legitimate questions and considerations. As it stands, the states currently hold the monopoly over the legitimacy of violence enacted against individuals, groups or other states. Many governments define terrorists to be explicitly non-state agents. This creates a moral dilemma, as the states have a possibility to dismiss their own actions that otherwise fit all the required definitions of terrorism, while simultaneously accusing non-government groups and organizations of using similar methods and tactics. Some scholars, such as Hoffman, Hoen, Masters, and Weinberg, argue that such a stance is a fallacy and a semantic device that allows the governments to escape the consequences of their own infractions and crimes. 11 Another qualm considering the legitimacy of violent actions comes from the conflict of definitions between terrorists and freedom fighters. Both groups use similar methods to achieve their goals and often engage in urban and guerrilla warfare. However, freedom fighters supposedly possess some validity and legitimacy to their goals and claims while the terrorists do not. The blurry line between these two concepts serves as another reason why a precise definition of the word was not yet adopted.

The issue of legitimacy is closely tied with the concept of the State being considered terrorist. This issue became increasingly prominent ever since the rise of ISIS as a terrorist state. Historically, the states have been responsible for organized terror and violence on a much greater scale than any non-state organizations and agents. The death tolls between the two are incomparable. The Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union are the two most prominent examples, as both used terror tactics both inside and outside of their countries to facilitate their agendas. The number of civilian casualties caused by the allied operations in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Afghanistan can rival that of the terrorists.

This issue makes many people uncomfortable with the fact that the states are currently excluded from many modern definitions of the term. In order to create a successful and universally accepted definition of terrorism, the controversy regarding the use of terror tactics by the state has to be resolved. Right now, it is causing division, which circumvents any progress on the issue. The states are naturally apprehensive of the idea of sharing the definition, as it would take away a powerful tool, which they could use to discredit any legitimate movement that opposes the state tyranny, should they move beyond peaceful protests and use direct action and violence. At the same time, it has to be acknowledged that the reversed situation is equally bad – equating terrorist organizations to freedom fighter groups is going to generate even more controversy regarding whether the international community has the right to oppose them or not.

Terrorism has proven itself to be an ever-evolving, complex, and multi-faceted issue. It is very difficult, if not outright impossible, to create a short, crisp and practical definition that would include all the major points without contradicting one another. Even if such a definition were to be created, it is unlikely it would last long due to the changing nature of terrorism. Once it becomes outdated, the community would have to face the same issues again. While the need for a clear definition is universally acknowledged, there are too many conflicting interests of numerous parties involved, making consensus an unlikely option. The political interests of different countries often come into play during the negotiations, particularly over the issues of the state terror and the vagueness between terrorists and freedom fighters. The latter presented a large issue during the latest UN congress, as the Arabic delegation insisted on outlining the difference between these terms.

Instead, the world should give up on the pointless exercise of trying to come up with an all-inclusive definition and instead create multiple definitions that would fit particular situations and scenarios. Many governments already employ similar strategies in order to solve the problems of domestic terrorism at home. With the adoption of a multitude of specialized definitions that would satisfy certain parties involved, the counter-terrorist efforts would not be impeded by a universal lack of consensus. Of course, this idea has its own flaws. There is the ever-present risk of division, as certain members of the anti-terrorist coalition might get into an argument over which definition is applicable towards a certain situation, thus generating duplicity and confusion.

In order to avoid the numerous issues that come with the pejorative meaning of the word “terrorism,” it is advised to replace it with a term that does not have a clearly negative emotional coloration. Adopting the word “militantism,” for example, would help avoid the exploitation of the term by the states and solve many issues that would arise in the future creation of the set of definitions that would fit particular scenarios and situations. It remains to be seen whether such an approach towards terrorism is going to succeed or fail. However, it is obvious that the current method, marked by numerous failures, is a waste of time.

Chaliand, Gerard and Arnaud Blin. The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to al Qaeda . California: University of California Press, 2007.

Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism . Colombia: Columbia University Press, 2006. “Number of Casualties due to Terrorism Worldwide between 2006 and 2015.” Statista. Web.

“Pakistan Anti-terrorist (Amendment) Ordinance.” Pakistan Government. Web.

Papacharissi, Zizi and Maria de Fatima Oliveira. “News Frames Terrorism: A Comparative Analysis of Frames Employed in Terrorism Coverage in US and UK Newspapers.” The International Journal of Press/Politics 13, no. 1 (2008): 52-74.

“Terrorism Act.” UK Government. Web.

“Terrorism – Definition.” Liquisearch. Web.

“Terrorism FAQs.” Central Intelligence Agency. Web.

“The Prevention of Terrorism Act.” Indian Government . Web.

“What is the Difference between Russia’s and US’ Air Campaigns in Syria?” Sputnik International. Web.

“Number of Casualties due to Terrorism Worldwide between 2006 and 2015,” Statista, Web.
Gerard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin, The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to al Qaeda , (California: University of California Press, 2007), 34.
“What is the Difference between Russia’s and US’ Air Campaigns in Syria?” Sputnik International, Web.
Zizi Papacharissi and Maria de Fatima Oliveira, “News Frames Terrorism: A Comparative Analysis of Frames Employed in Terrorism Coverage in US and UK Newspapers,” The International Journal of Press/Politics 13, no. 1 (2008): 60.
Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism , (Colombia: Columbia University Press, 2006): 13.
“Terrorism – Definition,” Liquisearch, Web.
“The Prevention of Terrorism Act,” Indian Government . Web.
“Pakistan Anti-terrorist (Amendment) Ordinance,” Pakistan Government. Web.
“Terrorism Act,” UK Government. Web.
“Terrorism FAQs,” Central Intelligence Agency, Web.
Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism , (Colombia: Columbia University Press, 2006): 78.
Foreign Fighters and Contemporary Terrorism
Government: Islam as a Source of Legitimacy
Why Do Critics Argue That the WTO Is Suffering From a Crisis of Legitimacy?
Cybercrime and United States National Security
Terror Attacks and Intelligence Community in the US
Islamic State's Online Propaganda to Men and Women
Pulse Nightclub Attack: Events and Success Factors
Homegrown Radical Individuals in the United States
Chicago (A-D)
Chicago (N-B)

IvyPanda. (2020, August 9). Terrorism Definitions and Controversies. https://ivypanda.com/essays/terrorism-definitions-and-controversies/

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Before the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001, the subject of terrorism did not loom large in philosophical discussion. Philosophical literature in English amounted to a few monographs and a single collection of papers devoted solely, or largely, to questions to do with terrorism. Articles on the subject in philosophy journals were few and far between; neither of the two major philosophy encyclopedias had an entry. The attacks of September 11 and their aftermath put terrorism on the philosophical agenda: it is now the topic of numerous books, journal articles, special journal issues, and conferences.

While social sciences study the causes, main varieties, and consequences of terrorism and history traces and attempts to explain the way terrorism has evolved over time, philosophy focuses on two fundamental—and related—questions. The first is conceptual: What is terrorism? The second is moral: Can terrorism ever be morally justified?

Philosophers have offered a range of positions on both questions. With regard to the problem of defining terrorism, the dominant approach seeks to acknowledge the core meaning “terrorism” has in common use. Terrorism is understood as a type of violence. Many definitions highlight the experience of terror or fear as the proximate aim of that violence. Neither violence nor terror is inflicted for its own sake, but rather for the sake of a further aim such as coercion, or some more specific political objective. But there are also definitions that sever the conceptual connection of terrorism with violence or with terror. With regard to the moral standing of terrorism, philosophers differ both on how that is to be determined and what the determination is. Consequentialists propose to judge terrorism, like everything else, in light of its consequences. Nonconsequentialists argue that its moral status is not simply a matter of what consequences, on balance, terrorism has, but is rather determined, whether solely or largely, by what it is. Positions on the morality of terrorism range from justification when its consequences on balance are good, or when some deontological moral requirements are satisfied, to its absolute, or almost absolute, rejection.

Philosophers working in applied philosophy have also sought to complement the discussions of terrorism in general with case studies—studies of the role and rights and wrongs of terrorism in particular conflicts, such as “the Troubles” in Northern Ireland (George 2000; Simpson 2004; Shanahan 2009), the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Ashmore 1997; Gordon and Lopez 2000; Primoratz 2006; Kapitan 2008; Law (ed.) 2008), and the bombing of German cities in World War II (Grayling 2006; Primoratz 2010).

1.1.1 The reign of terror

1.1.2 propaganda by the deed, 1.1.3 the state as terrorist, 1.1.4 terrorists and freedom fighters, 1.2.1 violence and terror, 1.2.2 wide and narrow definitions, 1.2.3 some idiosyncratic definitions, 2.1 complicity of the victims, 2.2.1 terrorism justified, 2.2.2 terrorism unjustified, 2.3.1 basic human rights and distributive justice, 2.3.2 supreme emergency and moral disaster, 2.3.3 terrorism absolutely wrong, books, book chapters, and articles, special journal issues, other internet resources, related entries, 1. the conceptual issue.

The history of terrorism is probably coextensive with the history of political violence. The term “terrorism”, however, is relatively recent: it has been in use since late 18th century. Its use has repeatedly shifted in some significant respects. Moreover, in contemporary political discourse the word is often employed as a polemical term whose strong emotional charge occludes its somewhat vague descriptive meaning. All this tends to get in the way of sustained rational discussion of the nature and moral standing of terrorism and the best ways of coping with it.

1.1 “Terrorism” from the French Revolution to the early 21st century

When it first entered public discourse in the West, the word “terrorism” meant the reign of terror the Jacobins imposed in France from the fall of 1793 to the summer of 1794. Its ultimate aim was the reshaping of both society and human nature. That was to be achieved by destroying the old regime, suppressing all enemies of the revolutionary government, and inculcating and enforcing civic virtue. A central role in attaining these objectives was accorded to revolutionary tribunals which had wide authority, were constrained by very few rules of procedure, and saw their task as carrying out revolutionary policy rather than meting out legal justice of the more conventional sort. They went after “enemies of the people”, actual or potential, proven or suspected; the law on the basis of which they were operating “enumerated just who the enemies of the people might be in terms so ambiguous as to exclude no one” (Carter 1989: 142). The standard punishment was death. Trials and executions were meant to strike terror in the hearts of all who lacked civic virtue; the Jacobins believed that was a necessary means of consolidating the new regime. This necessity provided both the rationale of the reign of terror and its moral justification. As Robespierre put it, terror was but “an emanation of virtue”; without it, virtue remained impotent. Accordingly, the Jacobins applied the term to their own actions and policies quite unabashedly, without any negative connotations.

Yet the term “terrorism” and its cognates soon took on very strong negative connotations. Critics of the excesses of the French Revolution had watched its reign with horror from the start. Terrorism came to be associated with drastic abuse of power and related to the notion of tyranny as rule based on fear, a recurring theme in political philosophy.

In the second half of the 19th century, there was a shift in both descriptive and evaluative meaning of the term. Disillusioned with other methods of political struggle, some anarchist and other revolutionary organizations, and subsequently some nationalist groups too, took to political violence. They had come to the conclusion that words were not enough, and what was called for were deeds: extreme, dramatic deeds that would strike at the heart of the unjust, oppressive social and political order, generate fear and despair among its supporters, demonstrate its vulnerability to the oppressed, and ultimately force political and social change. This was “propaganda by the deed”, and the deed was for the most part assassination of royalty or highly placed government officials. Unlike the Jacobins’ reign of terror, which operated in a virtually indiscriminate way, this type of terrorism—as both advocates and critics called it—was largely employed in a highly discriminate manner. This was especially true of Russian revolutionary organizations such as People’s Will or Socialist Revolutionary Party (SR): they held that it was morally justified to assassinate a government official only if his complicity in the oppressive regime was significant enough for him to deserve to die, and the assassination would make an important contribution to the struggle. Their violence steered clear of other, uninvolved or insufficiently involved persons. Some instances of “propaganda by the deed” carried out by French and Spanish anarchists in the 1880s and 1890s were indiscriminate killings of common citizens; but that was an exception, rather than the rule. The perpetrators and some of those sympathetic to their cause claimed those acts were nevertheless morally legitimate, whether as retribution (exacted on the assumption that no member of the ruling class was innocent) or as a means necessary for the overthrow of the unjust order. Accordingly, in their parlance, too, the term “terrorism” implied no censure. When used by others, it conveyed a strong condemnation of the practice.

The terrorism employed by both sides in the Russian Revolution and Civil War was in important respects a throwback to that of the Jacobins. The government set up in Russia by the victorious Bolsheviks was totalitarian. So was the Nazi rule in Germany. Both sought to impose total political control on society. Such a radical aim could only be pursued by a similarly radical method: by terrorism directed by an extremely powerful political police at an atomized and defenseless population. Its success was due largely to its arbitrary character—to the unpredictability of its choice of victims. In both countries, the regime first suppressed all opposition; when it no longer had any opposition to speak of, political police took to persecuting “potential” and “objective opponents”. In the Soviet Union, it was eventually unleashed on victims chosen at random. Totalitarian terrorism is the most extreme and sustained type of state terrorism. As Hannah Arendt put it, “terror is the essence of totalitarian domination”, and the concentration camp is “the true central institution of totalitarian organizational power” (Arendt 1958: 464, 438). While students of totalitarianism talked of terrorism as its method of rule, representatives of totalitarian regimes, sensitive to the pejorative connotation of the word, portrayed the practice as defense of the state from internal enemies.

However, state terrorism is not the preserve of totalitarian regimes. Some non-totalitarian states have resorted to terrorism against enemy civilians as a method of warfare, most notably when the RAF and USAAF bombed German and Japanese cities in World War II (see Lackey 2004). Those who designed and oversaw these campaigns never publicly described them as “terror bombing”, but that was how they often referred to them in internal communications.

After the heyday of totalitarian terrorism in the 1930s and 1940s, internal state terrorism continued to be practiced by military dictatorships in many parts of the world, albeit in a less sustained and pervasive way. But the type of terrorism that came to the fore in the second half of the 20th century and in early 21st century is that employed by insurgent organizations. Many movements for national liberation from colonial rule resorted to it, either as the main method of struggle or as a tactic complementing guerrilla warfare. So did some separatist movements. Some organizations driven by extreme ideologies, in particular on the left, took to terrorism as the way of trying to destroy what they considered an unjust, oppressive economic, social and political system. This type of terrorism is, by and large, indiscriminate in its choice of target: it attacks men and women of whatever political (or apolitical) views, social class, and walk of life; young and old, adults and children. It shoots at people, or blows them up by planting bombs, in office buildings, markets, cafes, cinemas, places of religious worship, on buses or planes, or in other vulnerable public places. It also takes people hostage, by hijacking planes and in other ways.

As “terrorism” has by now acquired a very strong pejorative meaning, no-one applies the word to their own actions or to actions and campaigns of those they sympathize with. Insurgents practicing terrorism portray their actions as struggle for liberation and seek to be considered and treated as soldiers rather than terrorists or criminals. They often depict their enemy—the alien government, or the agencies of the social, political and economic system—as the “true terrorists”. For them, the test of terrorism is not what is done , but rather what the ultimate aim of doing it is. If the ultimate aim is liberation or justice, the violence used in order to attain it is not terrorism, whereas the violence aiming at maintaining oppression or injustice, or some of the “structural violence” embodying it, is. On the other hand, governments tend to paint all insurgent violence with the brush of “terrorism”. Government spokespersons and pro-government media typically assume that terrorism is by definition something done by non-state agents, and that a state can never be guilty of terrorism (although it can sponsor terrorist organizations). For them, the test of terrorism is not what is done , but who does it. When a state agency uses violence, it is an act of war, or reprisal, or defense of the security of the state and its citizens; when an insurgent group does the same, it is terrorism. Under these circumstances, one person’s terrorist is indeed another’s freedom fighter, and public debate about terrorism is largely conducted at cross purposes and to little effect. Attempts of the United Nations to propose a definition of “terrorism” that could be accepted by all states and embedded in international law so far have been frustrated by the same sort of relativism. Islamic countries would accept no definition that allowed national liberation movements in the Middle East and Kashmir to be portrayed as terrorist, whereas Western countries would accept no definition that allowed for state agencies to be guilty of terrorism.

1.2 Two core traits of terrorism and two types of definition

The evaluative meaning of “terrorism” has shifted considerably more than once. So has its descriptive meaning, but to a lesser degree. Whatever else the word may have meant, its ordinary use over more than two centuries has typically indicated two things: violence and intimidation (the causing of great fear or terror, terrorizing). The dominant approach to the conceptual question in philosophical literature reflects this. Terrorism is usually understood as a type of violence. This violence is not blind or sadistic, but rather aims at intimidation and at some further political, social, or religious goal or, more broadly, at coercion.

That is how (political) “terrorism” is defined by Per Bauhn in the first philosophical book-length study in English:

The performance of violent acts, directed against one or more persons, intended by the performing agent to intimidate one or more persons and thereby to bring about one or more of the agent’s political goals (Bauhn 1989: 28).

Another good example of a mainstream definition is provided in C.A.J. Coady’s article on terrorism in the Encyclopedia of Ethics :

The tactic of intentionally targeting non-combatants [or non-combatant property, when significantly related to life and security] with lethal or severe violence … meant to produce political results via the creation of fear (Coady 2001: 1697).

Yet another example is the definition proposed by Igor Primoratz:

The deliberate use of violence, or threat of its use, against innocent people, with the aim of intimidating some other people into a course of action they otherwise would not take (Primoratz 2013: 24).

These definitions put aside both the question of who the actor is and the question of what their ultimate objectives are, and focus on what is done and what the proximate aim of doing it is. They present terrorism as a way of acting that could be adopted by different agents and serve various ultimate objectives (most, but perhaps not all of them, political). It can be employed by states or by non-state agents, and may promote national liberation or oppression, revolutionary or conservative causes (and possibly pursue some nonpolitical aims as well). One can be a terrorist and a freedom fighter; terrorism is not the monopoly of enemies of freedom. One can hold high government or military office and design or implement a terrorist campaign; terrorism is not the preserve of insurgents. In this way much of the relativism concerning who is and who is not a terrorist that has plagued contemporary public debate (see 1.1.4 above) can be overcome.

Beyond concurring that violence and intimidation constitute the core of terrorism, the definitions quoted above differ in several respects. Does only actual violence count, or do threats of violence also qualify? Must terrorist violence be directed against life and limb, or does violence against (some) property also count? Does terrorism always seek to attain some political goal, or can there be non-political (e.g. criminal) terrorism? All these points are minor. There is also one major difference: while Coady and Primoratz define terrorism as violence against non-combatants or innocent people, respectively, Bauhn’s definition includes no such restriction. Definitions of the former type can be termed “narrow”, and those of the latter sort “wide”. Philosophical literature on terrorism abounds in instances of both types.

Should we adopt a wide or a narrow definition? A wide definition encompasses the entire history of “terrorism” from the Jacobins to the present, and is more in accord with current ordinary use. A narrow definition departs from much ordinary use by restricting terrorist violence to that directed at non-combatants or innocent persons. Thus it leaves out most of 19th century “propaganda by the deed” and political violence perpetrated by Russian revolutionaries which they themselves and the public called terrorist.

For these reasons, historians of terrorism normally work with a wide definition, and social scientists do so much of the time. But philosophers may well prefer a narrow definition. They focus on the moral standing of terrorism and need a definition that is particularly helpful in moral discourse. Morally speaking, surely there is a difference—for some, a world of difference—between planting a bomb in a government building and killing a number of highly placed officials of (what one considers) an unjust and oppressive government, and planting a bomb in a tea shop and killing a random collection of common citizens, including children. While both acts raise serious moral issues, these issues are not identical, and running them together under the same heading of “terrorism” will likely hamper, rather than help, discerning moral assessment.

Narrow definitions are revisionary, but (unlike those discussed in the next section) not implausibly so. They focus on the traits of terrorism that cause most of us to view the practice with deep moral repugnance: (i) violence (ii) against non-combatants (or, alternatively, against innocent people) for the sake of (iii) intimidation (and, on some definitions, (iv) coercion). In highlighting (ii), they relate the issue of terrorism to the ethics of war and one of the fundamental principles of just war theory, that of non-combatant immunity. They help distinguish terrorism from acts of war proper and political assassination, which do not target non-combatants or common citizens. It does not matter very much whether the victims of terrorism are described as “non-combatants” or “innocent people”, as each term is used in a technical sense, and both refer to those who have not lost their immunity against lethal or other extreme violence by being directly involved in, or highly responsible for, (what terrorists consider) insufferable injustice or oppression. In war, these are innocent civilians; in a violent conflict that falls short of war, these are common citizens.

Talk of involvement of individuals and groups in injustice or oppression raises the question: is the injustice or oppression at issue, and thus the standing of those implicated in it, to be determined by some objective criteria, or from the point of view of those who resort to violence? Coady chooses the former option. He approaches terrorism from the standpoint of just war theory and its principle of noncombatant immunity. “Combatants” is a technical term designating agents of aggression or, more broadly, “dangerous wrongdoers” or “agents of harm”; they are legitimate targets of potentially lethal violence. All others are noncombatants, and enjoy immunity from such violence (Coady 2004). This approach may not be difficult to apply in war, where the wrong or harm at issue is either aggression that needs to be repelled, or systematic and large-scale violations of human rights that provide the ground for humanitarian intervention. Issues of injustice or oppression that arise in an internal conflict that falls short of war, however, tend to be highly contentious: what some consider an imperfect, but basically morally legitimate political and social order, others may see as the epitome of injustice and oppression that must be overthrown, if need be by violence. Under such circumstances, when a highly placed political official is killed by insurgents, that may be characterized (and condemned) by many as an act of terrorism, while the insurgents and those sympathetic to their struggle may reject this characterization and portray (and justify) the killing as political assassination.

In order to avoid this kind of relativism, Primoratz puts forward a view that in one important respect takes on board the standpoint of the terrorist. The direct victims of terrorism are innocent in the sense of not being responsible, on any credible understanding of responsibility and liability, for the injustice or oppression the terrorists fight against—not responsible at all, or at least not responsible to the degree that makes them liable to be killed or maimed on that account. The injustice or oppression at issue need not be real; it may be merely alleged (by the terrorists). Being responsible for a merely alleged great injustice or oppression is enough for losing one’s immunity against violence, as far as the type of immunity and innocence relevant to defining terrorism is concerned. According to the traditional version of just war theory one does not lose immunity against acts of war only by fighting in an unjust war, but by fighting in any war. Similarly, one does not lose immunity against political violence only by holding office in or implementing policies of a gravely unjust government, but by holding office in or implementing policies of any government: as King Umberto I of Italy said after surviving an assassination attempt, such risk comes with the job. Members of these two classes are not considered innocent and morally protected against violence by those attacking them; the latter view their acts as acts of war proper or of political assassination, respectively. If the terrorists subscribe to a credible view of responsibility and liability, then, when they attack common citizens, they attack people innocent from their own point of view, i.e., innocent even if we grant the terrorists their assessment of the policies at issue. (This is not to say that those who consider a government to be gravely unjust have a moral license to kill its officials, but only that if they do so, that will not be terrorism, but rather political assassination. We can still condemn their actions if we reject their judgment of the policies at issue, or if we accept that judgment, but believe that they should have opposed those policies by nonviolent means. But we will not be condemning their actions qua terrorism.)

On this account, not only real, but also merely alleged injustice or oppression counts in determining the innocence of the victims and deciding which acts are acts of terrorism; thus such decisions are not hostage to endless debates about the moral status of contested policies. Nevertheless, a residue of relativity remains. The account presupposes a certain understanding of responsibility and liability: a person is responsible for a state of affairs only by virtue of that person’s voluntary, i.e., informed and free, act or omission that has a sufficiently strong connection with that state of affairs, and thereby becomes liable to some proportionately unfavorable response. Provided the terrorists accept some such understanding of responsibility and liability, they kill and maim people they themselves must admit to be innocent. To be sure, some militant organizations resort to violence which we perceive as terrorist, yet object to the label. They profess a view of responsibility and liability based on extremely far-fetched connections between states of affairs and human choices and actions, and argue that entire social classes or nations are responsible for certain policies and practices and all their members are liable to be attacked by deadly violence (for more on this, see 2.1 below). Such arguments can only be regarded as preposterous. We should insist on viewing their actions as terrorist, although they reject this description. It is not clear how this residue of relativity could be removed (Primoratz 2013: 16–21).

Some object to defining “terrorism” as violence against non-combatants or innocent persons. They argue that doing so runs together the question of the nature of terrorism and that of its moral status, and begs the moral issue by making terrorism unjustified by definition. We should rather keep these questions separate, and take care not to prejudge the latter by giving a wrong answer to the former. What is needed is a morally neutral definition of terrorism, and that means a wide one (Corlett 2003: 114–20, 134–35; Young 2004: 57). But it is doubtful that “terrorism” can be defined in some morally untainted way. The wide definitions these philosophers adopt contain the word “violence”, which is itself morally loaded. A narrow definition is not completely morally neutral, as violence against the innocent is clearly morally wrong. But what is clear is that such violence is prima facie wrong. The definition implies a general presumption against terrorism, not its sweeping moral condemnation in each and every instance, whatever the circumstances and whatever the consequences of desisting from it. The definition does not rule out that in certain circumstances it might not be wrong, all things considered. Ethical investigation is not preempted: a particular case of terrorism still needs to be judged on its merits.

Another way of settling the issue of wide vs. narrow definition is offered by Georg Meggle. He adopts a wide definition of terrorism, and goes on to distinguish two different types: terrorism in the strong sense, which deliberately, recklessly, or negligently harms innocent people, and terrorism in the weak sense, which does not. Obviously, the moral assessment of the two types of terrorism is going to be significantly different (Meggle 2005).

The vast majority of cases almost anyone without an ax to grind would want to classify as “terrorism” exhibit the two traits implied in ordinary use and highlighted by mainstream philosophical definitions such as those quoted above: violence and intimidation. But philosophical literature also offers definitions that leave out one or the other core component.

Some seek to sever the connection between terrorism and violence. Carl Wellman defines terrorism as “the use or attempted use of terror as a means of coercion”. Terrorism is often associated with violence, but that is because violence is a very effective means of intimidation. Yet “violence is not essential to terrorism and, in fact, most acts of terrorism are nonviolent” (Wellman 1979: 250–51). The last claim seems false on any non-circular interpretation. There may be many acts generally considered terrorist that do not involve actual violence, but are meant to intimidate by threatening it; but that is not enough to support the notion of “non-violent terrorism”, which seems odd. So does Wellman’s example of “classroom terrorism”: a professor threatens to fail students who submit their essays after the due date, causes panic in class, and thereby engages in terrorism.

Robert E. Goodin offers a similar account, emphasizing the political role of terrorism: terrorism is “a political tactic, involving the deliberate frightening of people for political advantage” (Goodin 2006: 49). This, he claims, is the distinctive wrong terrorists commit. Whereas on Wellman’s account one can commit an act of terrorism without either engaging in or threatening violence, merely by making a threat in order to intimidate, on Goodin’s account one need not even make a threat: one acts as a terrorist by merely issuing a warning about the acts of others that is meant to intimidate. This, too, seems arbitrary, although it makes sense as a step in an argument meant to show that “ if (or insofar as ) Western political leaders are intending to frighten people for their own political advantage, then (to that extent ) they are committing the same core wrong that is distinctively associated with terrorism” (Goodin 2006: 2).

It has also been suggested that terrorism need not be understood as inducing terror or fear. According to Ted Honderich, terrorism is best defined as “violence, short of war, political, illegal and prima facie wrong” (Honderich 2006: 88). This definition might be thought problematic on several counts, but the idea of “terrorism” without “terror” seems especially odd. The two are connected etymologically and historically, and this connection is deeply entrenched in current ordinary use. Intimidation is not the morally salient trait of terrorism ( pace Goodin), but it is one of its core traits that cause most of us to condemn the practice. We might consider severing the connection if Honderich offered a good reason for doing so. But he supports his highly revisionary definition by the puzzling claim that to define terrorism as violence meant to intimidate is to imply that terrorism is particularly abhorrent and thereby “in effect … invite a kind of prima facie approval or tolerance of war” (Honderich 2006: 93).

2. The moral issue

Can terrorism be morally justified? There is no single answer to this question, as there is no single conception of what terrorism is. If we put aside definitions that depart too much, and for no compelling reason, from the core meaning of “terrorism” (such as those cited in 1.2.3), we still need to decide whether the question assumes a wide or a narrow understanding of terrorism. A narrow conception of terrorism seems to be better suited to ethical investigation (1.2.2). Moreover, philosophers who work with a wide definition typically hold that terrorism that targets non-combatants or innocent persons is much more difficult to justify than “selective” terrorism which attacks only those who cannot plausibly claim innocence of the injustice or oppression at issue (and which accordingly does not count as “terrorism” on a narrow definition of the term). The present discussion therefore focuses on terrorism understood as violence against innocent civilians or common citizens, intended to intimidate and thereby to achieve some further (political) objective or, more broadly, to coerce.

One might try to justify some acts or campaigns of violence of this kind in two ways. One could argue that the victims may be non-combatants or common citizens, but nevertheless are not innocent of the wrongs the terrorists are fighting against. Alternatively, one could concede the innocence of the victims and argue that attacks on them are nevertheless justified, either by their consequences on balance, or by some deontological considerations.

If the former line of argument is successful, will it prove too much? In showing that an instance of violence was justified because those targeted were not really innocent, we will have shown that the act or campaign of violence at issue was actually not a case of terrorism. This may be merely a matter of semantics. There is a much more damaging objection. A terrorist act is characteristically the killing or injuring of a random collection of people who happen to be in a certain place at a certain time. Arguments to the effect that those people are not innocent of the wrongs the terrorist fights against will therefore have a very wide reach, and accordingly will be based on some simplistic conception of collective responsibility. These arguments will be of the sort offered, for example, by the 19th century anarchist Emile Henry. He planted a bomb at the office of a mining company which, if it had exploded, would have killed or injured a number of people who did not work for the company, but lived in the same building. He also planted a bomb in a café that did go off, injuring twenty people, one of whom later died of his injuries. At his trial, Henry explained: “What about the innocent victims? […] The building where the Carmeaux Company had its offices was inhabited only by the bourgeois; hence there would be no innocent victims. The whole of the bourgeoisie lives by the exploitation of the unfortunate, and should expiate its crimes together” (Henry 1977: 193). When commenting on the second attack, he said:

Those good bourgeois who hold no office but who reap their dividends and live idly on the profits of the workers’ toil, they also must take their share in the reprisals. And not only they, but all those who are satisfied with the existing order, who applaud the acts of the government and so become its accomplices … in other words, the daily clientele of Terminus and other great cafés! (Henry 1977: 195)

This is an utterly implausible view of responsibility and liability. It claims that all members of a social class—men and women, young and old, adults and children—are liable to be killed or maimed: some for operating the system of exploitation, others for supporting it, and still others for benefiting from it. Even if, for the sake of argument, we grant the anarchist’s harsh moral condemnation of capitalist society, not every type and degree of involvement with it can justify the use of extreme violence. Giving the system political support, or benefiting from it, may be morally objectionable, but is surely not enough to make one liable to be blown to pieces.

Another, more recent example, is provided by Osama Bin Laden. In an interview in the aftermath of the attacks on September 11, 2001 he said:

The American people should remember that they pay taxes to their government and that they voted for their president. Their government makes weapons and provides them to Israel, which they use to kill Palestinian Muslims. Given that the American Congress is a committee that represents the people, the fact that it agrees with the actions of the American government proves that America in its entirety is responsible for the atrocities that it is committing against Muslims (Bin Laden 2005: 140–141).

This, too, is a preposterous understanding of responsibility and liability. For it claims that all Americans are eligible to be killed or maimed: some for devising and implementing America’s policies, others for participating in the political process, still others for paying taxes. Even if, for the sake of argument, we grant Bin Laden’s severe condemnation of those policies, not every type and degree of involvement with them can justify the use of lethal violence. Surely voting in elections or paying taxes is not enough to make one fair game.

Attempts at justification of terrorism that concede that its victims are innocent seem more promising. They fall into two groups, depending on the type of ethical theory on which they are based.

2.2 Consequentialism

Adherents of consequentialism judge terrorism, like every other practice, solely by its consequences. Terrorism is not considered wrong in itself, but only if it has bad consequences on balance. The innocence of the victims does not change that. This is an instance of a general trait of consequentialism often highlighted by its critics, for example in the debate about the moral justification of legal punishment. A standard objection to the consequentialist approach to punishment has been that it implies that punishment of the innocent is justified, when its consequences are good on balance. This objection can only get off the ground because consequentialism denies that in such matters a person’s innocence is morally significant in itself.

Those who consider terrorism from a consequentialist point of view differ in their assessment of its morality. Their judgment on terrorism depends on their view of the good to be promoted by its use and on their assessment of the utility of terrorism as a means of promoting it. There is room for disagreement on both issues.

Kai Nielsen approaches questions to do with political violence in general and terrorism in particular as a consequentialist in ethics and a socialist in politics. The use of neither can be ruled out categorically; it all depends on their utility as a method for attaining morally and politically worthwhile objectives such as “a truly socialist society” or liberation from colonial rule. “When and where [either] should be employed is a tactical question that must be decided … on a case-by-case basis … like the choice of weapon in a war” (Nielsen 1981: 435). Nielsen has a wide definition of terrorism, but his examples show that the innocence of the victims of terrorism makes no difference to its justification—that is, that his conclusions apply to terrorism in both the wide and narrow sense. In his view,

terrorist acts must be justified by their political effects and their moral consequences. They are justified (1) when they are politically effective weapons in the revolutionary struggle and (2) when, everything considered, there are sound reasons for believing that, by the use of that type of violence rather than no violence at all or violence of some other type, there will be less injustice, suffering and degradation in the world than would otherwise have been the case (Nielsen 1981: 446).

Historical experience, in Nielsen’s view, tells us that terrorism on a small scale, used as the sole method of struggle in order to provoke the masses into revolutionary action, is ineffective and often counterproductive. On the other hand, terrorism employed in conjunction with guerrilla warfare in a protracted war of liberation may well prove useful and therefore also justified, as it did in Algeria and South Vietnam. (For an earlier statement of the same view, see Trotsky 1961: 48–59, 62–65.)

Nicholas Fotion also uses a wide definition of terrorism. He, too, is a consequentialist (although some of his remarks concerning the innocence of many victims of terrorism might be more at home in nonconsequentialist ethics). But he finds standard consequentialist assessments of terrorism such as Nielsen’s too permissive. If some types of terrorism are justifiable under certain circumstances, such circumstances will be extremely rare. Terrorists and their apologists do not perform the requisite calculations properly. One problem is the “higher good” to be promoted by terrorism: more often than not, it is defined in ideological terms, rather than derived from settled preferences or interests of actual people. But for the most part Fotion discusses the issue of means. If a terrorist act or campaign is to be justified instrumentally, it must be shown (1) that the end sought is good enough to justify the means, (2) that the end will indeed be achieved by means of terrorism, and (3) that the end cannot be achieved in any other way that is morally and otherwise less costly. Terrorists not only, as a matter of fact, fail to discharge this burden; Fotion argues that, with regard to terrorism that victimizes innocent people, it cannot be discharged. All direct victims of terrorism are treated as objects to be used—indeed, used up—by the terrorist. But

in being treated as an object, the innocent victim is worse off than the (alleged) guilty victim. Insofar as the latter is judged to have done a wrong, he is thought of as a human. […] For the terrorist the innocent victim is neither a human in this judgmental sense nor a human in the sense of simply having value as a human being. Of course the terrorist needs to pick a human being as a victim … because [that] brings about more terror … But this does not involve treating them as humans. Rather, they are victimized and thereby treated as objects because they are humans (Fotion 1981: 464).

In reply, terrorists can claim that they advisedly sacrifice valued human beings for a higher good. But for this claim to carry any conviction, they would have to show that they have no alternative. Yet, Fotion argues, they always have the alternative of taking on the opponent’s military establishment, and often also have the option of going after government officials responsible for the wrongs they object to, instead of attacking innocent persons. That kind of terrorism may sometimes be justified, whereas terrorism that targets innocent people never is.

2.3 Nonconsequentialism

Within a nonconsequentialist approach to morality, terrorism is considered wrong in itself, because of what it is, rather than only because (and insofar as) its consequences are bad on balance. But this is not to say that this approach leaves no room whatever for morally justifying certain acts or campaigns of terrorism. Indeed, nonconsequentialist discussions of terrorism also present a range of positions and arguments.

A nonconsequentialist might try to justify an act or campaign of terrorism in one of two ways. One might invoke some deontological considerations, such as justice or rights, in favor of resorting to terrorism under certain circumstances. Alternatively, one might argue that the obvious, and obviously very weighty, considerations of rights (of the victims of terrorism) and justice (which demands respect for those rights) may sometimes be overridden by extremely weighty considerations of consequences—an extremely high price that would be paid for not resorting to terrorism. For the rejection of consequentialism is of course not tantamount to denying that consequences of our actions, policies, and practices matter in their moral assessment; what is denied is the consequentialists’ claim that only consequences matter.

Virginia Held operates with a broad notion of terrorism, but her justification of terrorism is meant to apply to terrorism that targets common citizens. Her discussion of the subject focuses on the issue of rights. When rights of a person or group are not respected, what may we do in order to ensure that they are? On one view, known as consequentialism of rights, if the only way to ensure respect of a certain right of A and B is to infringe the same right of C , we shall be justified in doing so. Held does not hold that such trade-offs in rights with the aim of maximizing their respect in a society are appropriate. Yet rights sometimes come into conflict, whether directly or indirectly (as in the above example). When that happens, there is no way we can avoid comparing the rights involved as more or less stringent and making certain choices between them. That applies to the case of terrorism too. Terrorism obviously violates some human rights of its victims. But its advocates claim that in some circumstances a limited use of terrorism is the only way of bringing about a society where human rights of all will be respected.

Even when this claim is true, that is not enough to make resort to terrorism justified. But it will be justified if an additional condition is met: that of distributive justice. If there is a society where the human rights of a part of the population are respected, while the same rights of another part of the population are being violated; if the only way of changing that and ensuring that human rights of all are respected is a limited use of terrorism; finally, if terrorism is directed against members of the first group, which up to now has been privileged as far as respect of human rights is concerned—then terrorism will be morally justified. This is a justification in terms of distributive justice, applied to the problem of violations of human rights. It is more just to equalize the violations of human rights in a stage of transition to a society where the rights of all are respected, than to allow that the group which has already suffered large-scale violations of human rights suffer even more such violations (assuming that in both cases we are dealing with violations of the same, or equally stringent, human rights). The human rights of many are going to be violated in any case; it is more just, and therefore morally preferable, that their violations should be distributed in a more equitable way (Held 2008).

It might be objected that in calling for sacrificing such basic human rights as the right to life and to bodily security of individual victims of terrorism for the sake of a more just distribution of violations of the same rights within a group in the course of transition to a stage where these rights will be respected throughout that group, Held offends against the principles of separateness of persons and respect for persons (Primoratz 1997: 230–31). In response, Held argues that

to fail to achieve a more just distribution of violations of rights (through the use of terrorism if that is the only means available) is to fail to recognize that those whose rights are already not fairly respected are individuals in their own right, not merely members of a group … whose rights can be ignored.

An argument for achieving a just distribution of rights violations is not necessarily about groups; it can be an argument about the rights of individuals to fairness (Held 2008: 89–90). (For further objections to Held’s argument, see Steinhoff 2007: 125–30; Brooks 2010; Nath 2011.)

In Held’s justification of terrorism, it is justice that requires that inescapable violations of human rights be more evenly distributed. There is a different way of allowing for the use of terrorism under certain circumstances within a nonconsequentialist approach to the ethics of violence. It could be argued that, as far as justice and rights are concerned, terrorism (or, in Held’s terminology, the kind of terrorism that targets the innocent) is never justified. Furthermore, considerations of justice and rights carry much greater weight than considerations of good and bad consequences, and therefore normally trump the latter in cases of conflict. However, in exceptional circumstances considerations concerning consequences—the price of not resorting to terrorism—may be so extremely weighty as to override those of justice and rights.

Michael Walzer offers an argument along these lines in his discussion of “terror bombing” of German cities in World War II. In early 1942, it seemed that Britain would be defeated by Germany and that its military could not prevail while fighting in accordance with the rules of war. Britain was the only remaining obstacle to the subjugation of most of Europe by the Nazis. That was “an ultimate threat to everything decent in our lives, an ideology and a practice of domination so murderous, so degrading even to those who might survive, that the consequences of its final victory were literally beyond calculation, immeasurably awful” (Walzer 2000: 253). Thus Britain was facing a “supreme emergency”: an (a) imminent threat of (b) something utterly unthinkable from a moral point of view. In such an emergency—a case of the “dirty hands” predicament that so often plagues political action (see Walzer 1973)—one may breach a basic and weighty moral principle such as civilian immunity, if that is the only hope of fending off the threat. So for more than three years, the RAF, later joined by the USAAF, deliberately devastated many German cities, killed about 600,000 civilians and seriously injured another 800,000 in an attempt to terrorize the German people into forcing their leadership to halt the war and surrender unconditionally. By early 1943 it was clear that Germany was not going to win the war, and all subsequent terror bombing lacked moral justification. But in its first year, in Walzer’s view, the terror bombing of Germany was morally justified as a response to the supreme emergency Britain was facing. Walzer then expands the notion of supreme emergency to apply to a single political community facing the threat of extermination or enslavement, and eventually to a single political community whose “survival and freedom” are at stake. For “the survival and freedom of political communities—whose members share a way of life, developed by their ancestors, to be passed on to their children—are the highest values of international society” (Walzer 2000: 254).

Here we have two different conceptions of supreme emergency. The threat is imminent in both, but the nature of the threat differs: it is one thing to suffer the fate the Nazis had in store for peoples they considered racially inferior, and another to have one’s polity dismantled. By moving back and forth between these two types of supreme emergency under the ambiguous heading of threat to “the survival and freedom of a political community”, Walzer seeks to extend to the latter the moral response that might be appropriate to the former. Yet whereas genocide, expulsion, or enslavement of an entire people might be thought a moral disaster that may be fended off by any means, its loss of political independence is, at most, a political disaster. If a polity to be dismantled lacks moral legitimacy, its demise may well be a moral improvement. But even if a polity does have moral legitimacy, a threat to its “survival and freedom” falls short of “an ultimate threat to everything decent in our lives”. If so, its military cannot be justified in waging war on enemy civilians in order to defend it. (On supreme emergencies see, for instance, Statman 2006; Kaplan 2011.)

There is another, less permissive position constructed along similar lines, but based on a more austere view of what counts as a moral disaster that might justify resort to terrorism. Contrary to what many fighters against social or economic oppression, colonial rule, or foreign occupation believe, evils of such magnitude that they can justify indiscriminate killing and maiming of innocent people are extremely rare. Not every case of oppression, foreign rule, or occupation, however morally indefensible, amounts to a moral disaster in the relevant sense. Nor does every imminent threat to “the survival and freedom of a political community” qualify, contrary to what Walzer has argued. However, if an entire people is subjected to extermination, or to an attempt at “ethnically cleansing” it from its land, then it is facing a true moral disaster and may properly consider terrorism as a method of struggle against such a fate. In view of their enormity and finality, extermination and “ethnic cleansing” of an entire people constitute a category apart. To be sure, resorting to terrorism in such a case will be morally justified only if there are very good grounds for believing that terrorism will succeed where nothing else will: in preventing imminent extermination or “ethnic cleansing”, or stopping it if it is already under way. Cases where both conditions are met will be extremely rare. Indeed, history may not offer a single example. But that does not mean that no act or campaign of terrorism could ever satisfy these conditions and thus turn out to be justified. Accordingly, terrorism is almost absolutely wrong (Primoratz 2013: chapter 6).

Both the “supreme emergency” and the “moral disaster” view will justify a resort to terrorism only when that is the only way to deal with the emergency, or to prevent the disaster, respectively. Just how certain must we be that terrorism will indeed achieve the goal, while no other method will? One might argue that when in extremis , we cannot apply stringent epistemic standards in deciding how to cope—indeed, if we cannot really know what will work, we must take our chances with what might. This is Walzer’s view: in such a predicament, we must “wager” the crime of terrorism against the evil that is otherwise in store for us. “There is no option; the risk otherwise is too great” (Walzer 2000: 259–260). It may be objected that this position highlights the enormity of the threat, while failing to give due weight to the enormity of the means proposed for fending off the threat—the enormity of terrorism, of deliberately killing and maiming innocent people. When that is taken into account, the conclusion may rather be that even in extremis , if terrorism is to be justified, the reasons for believing that it will work and that nothing else will must be very strong indeed.

Some hold that terrorism is absolutely wrong. This position, too, comes in different versions. Some philosophers work with a wide definition of terrorism, and argue that under certain circumstances “selective” terrorism that targets only those seriously implicated in the wrongs at issue may be justified (Corlett 2003, Young 2004). This seems to suggest that terrorism which is not selective in this way—that is, terrorism in the narrow sense—is never justified. Yet this does not follow: there is still room for arguing that terrorism of the latter type can be justified by further considerations, such as those of “supreme emergency” or “moral disaster”.

Per Bauhn does not leave it at that. He attempts to show that terrorism that targets non-combatants or common citizens can never be justified by deploying a slightly amended version of Alan Gewirth’s ethical theory. Freedom and safety are fundamental prerequisites of action and therefore must be accorded paramount weight. The need to protect them generates a range of rights; the right pertinent here is “an absolute right not to be made the intended victims of a homicidal project” all innocent persons have (Gewirth 1981: 16). When the absolute status of this right is challenged by invoking supreme emergency or moral disaster, Bauhn argues that there is a moral difference between what we are positively and directly causally responsible for, and what we are causally responsible for only indirectly, by failing to prevent other persons from intentionally bringing it about. We are morally responsible for the former, but (except in certain special circumstances) not for the latter. If we refuse to resort to terrorism in order not to target innocent persons, and thus fail to prevent some other persons from perpetrating atrocities, it is only the perpetrators who will be morally responsible for those atrocities. Therefore we must refuse (Bauhn 1989: chapter 5).

Some philosophers base their absolute rejection of terrorism on the slippery slope argument, and argue that “the appeal to supreme emergency is too dangerous to be allowed as a publicly available vindication for terrorism, no matter how rare the circumstances are meant to be” (Coady 2021: 143–44).

Stephen Nathanson seeks to ground the absolute immunity of civilians or common citizens and the absolute prohibition of terrorism which it entails in a rule-consequentialist ethical theory (Nathanson 2010: 191–208). Adopting civilian immunity, rather than adopting any other rule regulating the matter or having no rule at all, is the best way to reduce the killing and destruction in armed conflict. Moreover, the best consequences will be achieved by adopting it as an absolute rule, rather than as a rule allowing for exceptions in supreme emergencies. The idea of supreme emergency is vague. The criteria for proffering supreme emergency exemptions are liable to be applied in arbitrary and subjective ways. Finally, there is the slippery slope argument: “permitting [departures from the rule of civilian immunity, including terrorism] even under the direst circumstances will lower the bar for justifying such acts … broadcast the message that such behavior may sometimes be justified and … thus lend its weight to increasing the use of such methods” (Nathanson 2010: 207).

However, one can adopt rule-consequentialism as one’s ethical theory and yet view the immunity of civilians or common citizens and the attendant prohibition of terrorism as very stringent, but not absolute moral rules. Thus Richard B. Brandt and Brad Hooker do not view this immunity as absolute. They argue that a set of moral rules selected because of the good consequences of their adoption should include a rule that allows and indeed requires one to prevent disaster even if that means breaking some other moral rule. Even such a stringent moral rule as the prohibition of deliberate use of violence against innocent people may be overridden, if the disaster that cannot be prevented in any other way is grave enough. (See Brandt 1992: 87–88, 150–51, 156–57; Hooker 2000: 98–99, 127–36). There is thus some convergence at the level of practical conclusions between their understanding of the immunity of civilians or common citizens and the “moral disaster” position outlined above (2.3.2).

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Credibility in the Global War on Terrorism

The perceived credibility of the United States government on the global stage has never been lower. This impedes its ability to fight, much less to win, the “war of ideas” that is so much a part of the global war on terrorism. Cultivating improved credibility is a long-term effort, but it stands to benefit from a large body of existing research. The concept of source credibility was developed by Aristotle in his classic text on effective communication, The Rhetoric. Formal efforts to manage U.S. credibility began in World War I. Modern social scientific research on the subject began during World War II and continues to the present day. More recent work has extended the concept to mass media and internet contexts.

This body of research indicates that there are three key dimensions of credibility: trustworthiness, competence, and goodwill. These three dimensions are not empirical realities but perceptions that can be created, managed, and cultivated. This requires a coordinated approach to message design, delivery, and—most importantly—adaptation to the given audience and current media situation.

Our analysis of the source credibility literature shows that we know the basic dimensions of credibility, how source characteristics impact persuasiveness, and how judgments of credibility can be affected by different media channels. However there is an urgent need to integrate findings of existing research and link those to a contingency model of source credibility. It is especially important that we validate and, if necessary, extend our understanding of credibility in strategic non-Western cultures, and better understand the functions of credibility in new media. Notwithstanding the need for further research, known principles of credibility point to four recommendations for deployment of messages and communication policy while longer term efforts to improve credibility proceed: (1) Recognize, accept, and adjust for low credibility in the short term, (2) involve sympathetic Muslims, especially those in the United States, in an effort to find more persuasive sources and messages, (3) concentrate on degrading the credibility of opponents, (4) when directly claiming ownership of a message, use lower level officers or trusted third-parties to convey it.

Paper Terrorism and Other Tactics

First Online: 24 July 2020

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Christine M. Sarteschi 2

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The original version of this chapter was revised. The correction to this chapter is available at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45851-5_8

Chapter four discusses paper terrorism, the term used to describe a common set of tactics used by sovereign citizens to retaliate against their perceived enemies. These tactics include the targeted harassment of public officials through the use of false liens, and other financially-oriented tactics, despite having no legal basis for doing so. A description of common schemes is presented below.

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19 december 2020.

Chapter 2 in: C. M. Sarteschi, Sovereign Citizens , SpringerBriefs in Psychology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45851-5_2

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Sarteschi, C.M. (2020). Paper Terrorism and Other Tactics. In: Sovereign Citizens. SpringerBriefs in Psychology(). Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45851-5_4

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Free Term Paper On Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

Terrorism is one of the biggest Global threats. Terrorists are born out of communal discord, financial instability, oppressive governments etc. The Jehadi Terrorists are communal terrorists who fight for their own interpretation of Islam. The ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is a Sunni extremist group, formerly known by the name of Al-Qaeda, renowned for its terrorist activities all over the globe.

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The security of maritime field plays a significant role in the economy. Every day, thousands of cargo containers from around the world in field of exchange benefit pass through the nation’s seaports carrying items, goods and, possibly some that are not so welcome, such as drugs, explosives and weapons. The industry of the container shipping industry is highly vulnerable to terrorist attacks. In the U.S. maritime system, there are over 300 sea ports and river ports with more than 3,700 passenger and cargo terminals.

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The causes of terrorism term papers example.

Terrorism is violence at large. Terrorists are motivated to believe at all times that their actions are just and their struggle to instill fear is the only way to assert their demands. However, such singular behavior requires strong causes to be formed in the first place. There can be many causes for terrorism. Some these causes may be instantaneous while others may be historical, some beginning from a certain group of people while others targeted specifically towards a group of people. This paper is discusses various causes of terrorism Keywords: Terrorism, causes, terrorists, rights

Causes of Terrorism

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Electronic or cyber crime is a criminal activity, committed through the use of information technologies. Economies worldwide, business and individuals are effected by electronic crime increasingly more often every year. According to Internet Crime Complaint Center, in 2008 the number of electronic crimes in the USA has increased from 207 to 275 thousand, and resulted in a total loss of 264.6 million dollars (Limbach, n.d.).

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The mission of the United States police force on terrorism and threats from countries in the Middle East such as Afghanistan is to foster peaceful coexistence within states and other nations. Their involvement in the provision of humanitarian support to the civilians in Libya during the military crackdown in 2011for instance was contributed to by the foreign policies that arose after the Second World War (Beasley, 2013).

There are international incidences that have involved operation of the United States police force in the past five years include:

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National Anti-Terrorism Day 2024: Date, origin, significance and all you need to know

National anti-terrorism day 2024 date, origin and significance: the day pays tribute to the sacrifices made by those who have lost their lives in the fight against terrorism, including rajiv gandhi, who was killed by a suicide bomber in 1991..

National Anti-Terrorism Day 2024 Date and History: National Anti-Terrorism Day in India is observed annually on May 21st to honour the legacy of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, the country’s sixth Prime Minister. Rajiv Gandhi tragically lost his life on May 21, 1991, in Sriperumbudur, near Chennai, due to an assassination carried out by a suicide bomber from the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam).

Anti-Terrorism Day in India is observed annually to commemorate the assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, serving as a reminder of the nation’s unwavering resolve to combat the scourge of terrorism and promote peace, unity, and security within its borders and globally. It encourages citizens to stand united against the forces that seek to divide and destabilise the country through acts of violence and hatred. Here is all you need to know about the day.

National Anti-Terrorism Day 2024: Date and Origin

Anti-Terrorism Day in India is commemorated annually on May 21 in remembrance of the tragic assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, India’s youngest Prime Minister, in 1991 by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). This year, it is being observed today, May 21, 2024, Tuesday.

Rajiv Gandhi assumed office as Prime Minister following the assassination of his mother, Indira Gandhi, on October 31, 1984, serving from 1984 to 1989. To restore peace in Sri Lanka, Gandhi deployed Indian peacekeeping forces in 1987. This action strained relations with the LTTE, potentially contributing to his assassination during an election rally in Sriperumbudur, Tamil Nadu .

The inception of Anti-Terrorism Day in India by the VP Singh government serves as a reminder of the need to raise awareness about the destructive impact of terrorism and violence on society and the nation as a whole and emphasises the importance of unity to promote peace and harmony across the nation. Here is all you need to know about the day.

National Anti-Terrorism Day 2024: Significance

National Anti-Terrorism Day aims to raise awareness about the serious consequences of terrorism and the importance of maintaining peace, unity, and security. The observance serves as a reminder of the sacrifices made by victims of terrorism and the ongoing need for vigilance against extremist activities.

On this day, government offices, public sector undertakings, and other public institutions across India take an anti-terrorism pledge, reaffirming their commitment to the nation’s struggle against terrorism. The pledge involves a collective vow to defend the country’s borders, promote national unity, and support victims of international terrorism

National Anti-Terrorism Day 2024: Quotes

Here are some inspiring quotes for National Anti-Terrorism Day:

Terrorism has no nationality or religion. – Vladimir Putin
We will not tire we will not falter and we will not fail. – George W. Bush
No cause justifies terrorism. – Manmohan Singh
We cannot and will not allow the actions of a few to overshadow the values and ideals that our nations represent. – Barack Obama
Peace cannot be kept by force it can only be achieved by understanding. – Albert Einstein
In the face of terrorism, we must not only protect our citizens but also defend the values that make our societies free and just. – Angela Merkel
Victory over terrorism requires the collective effort of all nations united by a common goal of peace. – Narendra Modi
In the fight against terrorism, we must uphold the principles of human rights and the rule of law. – António Guterres

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Oath Keepers founder Stewart Rhodes sentenced to 18 years for leading Jan. 6 seditious conspiracy

Judge Amit Mehta opted to enhance Rhodes' sentence for terrorism.

A federal judge sentenced Oath Keepers founder Stewart Rhodes to 18 years in prison Thursday and accepted the government's recommendation of an enhancement for terrorism for his role leading a seditious conspiracy to disrupt the certification of President Joe Biden's election victory that culminated in the violent assault on the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021 .

Rhodes' sentence is now the longest to date handed down to a defendant charged in connection with the Capitol assault.

For the first time in a Jan. 6 case, D.C. District Judge Amit Mehta accepted the government's recommendation to apply an enhancement for terrorism in Rhodes' sentencing. Mehta agreed with prosecutors that Rhodes "inspired the use of violence" in his followers to disrupt the certification and that his conduct met the legal definition of terrorism intended to influence the actions of government.

Mehta cited the stockpile of weapons the Oath Keepers had amassed just outside of Washington, D.C. on Jan. 6, as well as Rhodes' orders for members to delete incriminating messages after the Capitol assault.

"You, sir, present an ongoing threat and peril to this country," Mehta told Rhodes just before handing down his sentence.

Before his sentence was handed down, Rhodes opted to address Mehta in defiant remarks maintaining his innocence and describing himself as a "political prisoner."

"Like President Trump, my only crime is opposing those who are destroying our country," Rhodes said.

In his own remarks just before handing down his sentence, Mehta pushed back directly on Rhodes' claims of being a political prisoner, saying instead he poses an "ongoing threat to this country."

"For decades it is clear that you wanted the democracy in this country to devolve into violence," Mehta said. "You're not a political prisoner. You're here because 12 jurors in D.C. who acquitted you of multiple counts found you guilty of sedition."

"It could have been a far uglier day ... and people should not forget that," he said of Jan. 6.

After the sentence was handed down, Rhodes' attorneys said they did not agree with the sentence but also expected a much stronger one than Rhodes had received. They said this sentence speaks volumes to anyone who gets convicted of sedition.

Prior to Thursday, the harshest sentence for a defendant charged in connection with Jan. 6 was 170 months, or just over 14 years.

The Justice Department was seeking 25 years for Rhodes, with a prosecutor saying in court Thursday that a harsh sentence was critical "to ensure the respect for the rule of law that is essential to the survival of our democracy."

Assistant U.S. Attorney Kathryn Rakoczy said Rhodes "doggedly drilled in the minds of those on his chats, and those followers of the Oath Keepers the lie of the election fraud, and the false need to act like the Founding Fathers in order to save in his view, our Constitution and our country." She said it was "neither the first time nor the last time that he will seek to organize political violence in our country," and pointed to statements he made from jail just four days ago to a protest gathered outside where he said it would "take regime change" to fix the wrongs being done by the Biden Administration.

"It's not going to stop until its stopped," Rakoczy said, quoting Rhodes' remarks.

Rhodes was convicted of seditious conspiracy against the United States last November. A jury found he and other members of the group played a principal role in disrupting the certification of Joe Biden's 2020 election victory.

The decision marked the first successful seditious conspiracy conviction by a jury since 1995.

PHOTO: Oath Keepers militia founder Stewart Rhodes poses during an interview session in Eureka, Montana, U.S. June 20, 2016. REUTERS/Jim Urquhart/File Photo

MORE: DOJ seeks 25-year prison sentence for Oath Keepers founder Stewart Rhodes

Justice Department prosecutors sought 25 years for Rhodes, their highest recommendation yet for a defendant charged in connection with Jan. 6.

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In their sentencing recommendation to Mehta, they argued repeatedly that harsh sentences for all the Oath Keepers charged in the conspiracy were necessary in order to deter future potential attacks against democracy.

Juries in two separate trials returned convictions against Rhodes and eight of his associates on a variety of serious felony charges, though three from the group were acquitted of the most serious charge of seditious conspiracy.

Relying on a trove of messages between the group's members discussing "civil war" in the event of Biden taking office, prosecutors argued that Rhodes and his co-conspirators were willing to take any action necessary, including using force, to stop the certification.

PHOTO: Stewart Rhodes, founder of the Oath Keepers, speaks during a rally outside the White House in Washington, D.C., June 25, 2017.

MORE: Jury convicts Oath Keepers leader, 1 other of seditious conspiracy in Jan. 6 trial

Prosecutors also presented extensive evidence of the group's planning in advance of Jan. 6, showing how members stashed a massive cache of weapons at a hotel just outside city limits that the government argued would be transported into Washington in the event Trump invoked the Insurrection Act.

Stemming from unfounded claims of election fraud, the defendants railed against the government in private chats and social media posts.

Rhodes remained defiant in remarks before his sentence was ultimately handed down on Thursday.

PHOTO: This artist sketch depicts the trial of Oath Keepers leader Stewart Rhodes and four others charged with seditious conspiracy in the Jan. 6, 2021, Capitol attack, in Washington, D.C., Oct. 6, 2022.

On Wednesday, police officers who defended the Capitol and a Senate aide who carried the official 2020 election documents spoke in court to explain the continuing trauma they face more than two years after the riots.

"We were assaulted time and time again," D.C. police officer Christopher Owens told he court. He talked about the violent mob repeatedly grabbing at his police gear, even trying to take his weapon.

His voice heavy with emotion, Owens described coming home to his family and his wife sobbing after seeing his bruised and battered his body.

"We experienced physical trauma, emotional trauma and mental trauma," he said.

Mehta thanked each of the witnesses for their remarks and government service.

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Full article: Research on Terrorism, 2007-2016: A Review of Data
Not only were there relatively few terrorism scholars, but over 90% of papers published in the 1990s were the work of single authors and 83% of these papers were written by one-time contributors. ... together with authors who provide a relatively straightforward overview of the frequency with which a particular search-term appears on Google ...
(PDF) What causes terrorism?
1 Transnational terrorism refers to terrorism involving more than one country. By contrast, all terrorist acts By contrast, all terrorist acts without foreign involvement are considered domestic ...
Terrorism and counterterrorism: an overview
1. Introduction. Terrorism is the premeditated use or threat to use violence by individuals or subnational groups to obtain a political or social objective through the intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate noncombatant victims (Enders and Sandler, 2012, p.4).The two essential ingredients of terrorism are its violence and its political or social motive.
Terrorism, War, and Social Change: The Costs of Terror and Violence
Uses of the term terrorism, its objectives, and its very justifications - like that of contemporary terrorism ... We show in this paper that societies that suffer chronic terrorist attacks tend to undergo a variety of long-term sociopsychological and behavioral changes, as compared to societies that experience infrequent major terrorist ...
Terrorism as a Global Wave Phenomenon: An Overview
Introduction. Terrorism is violence for political purposes that goes beyond the legal rules established to regulate violence. Consequently, governments have difficulty treating captured terrorists as prisoners of war or criminals, a problem that affects different governments in various ways. 1 Terrorism confined to particular states has been an intermittent feature of history for a very long time.
Topics in terrorism research: reviewing trends and gaps, 2007-2016
The results presented in. Table 1. clearly show that al-Qaeda, jihadism more generally and Iraq were the most frequently researched topics overall in the 2007-2016 period. Several other topics, such as "United States", "Counterterrorism/War on Terror" and "Afghanistan" were also frequent top-5 contenders.
Fifty years of scholarly research on terrorism: Intellectual
Given that the term "terrorism" (and its variations) is a rather common term and may appear in the abstract of articles that may not be mainly focused on terrorism research per se, we excluded Abstract and Keyword Plus from the search domains. ... "Proceedings Papers" (12.1%), "Editorial Material" (6.25%), "Reviews" (2.2%) and ...
Psychology of terrorism: Introduction to the special issue.
Defining terrorism is a task no less overwhelming. There are hundreds of definitions (Schmid, 2011), but none dominate.We can at least say that terrorism is a special kind of strategy that uses public violence intended to effect social or political change, but for an act to be reliably categorized as terrorism or terroristic in nature, it must feature the proximate victimization of ...
(PDF) The Definition of Terrorism
While this concept is notoriously elusive and controversial (e.g. Schmid, 2011; Shanahan, 2016), for the purposes of this article, terrorism can be defined as a political strategy used by a non ...
PDF What Is Terrorism?
ion.4 Terrorism is a pejorative term. When people employ the term, they characterize their enemies' actions as something evil and lacking human compassion. Terrorism is consid-ered worse than war, torture, or murder. A pejorative term is a term that is fraught with negative and derogatory meanings. 5
(PDF) Globalization and International Terrorism: Its Implications on
The paper will interrogate the various ways in which globalization has contributed to the rise in international terrorism and the challenges it presents for global peace and security.
17 The Causes of Terrorism
In 1981, Martha Crenshaw, a well-known scholar of terrorism, wrote an important article titled "The Causes of Terrorism," published in the journal Comparative Politics. Crenshaw was interested in discovering the causes of "symbolic, low-level violence by conspiratorial organizations" (Crenshaw 1981, 379), which is one of the ways in ...
PDF Module 1 INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
The term "terrorism" was initially coined to describe the Reign of Terror, the period of the French Revolution from 5 September 1793 to 27 July 1794, during which the Revolutionary Government directed violence and harsh measures against citizens suspected of being enemies of the Revolution.
Three waves of critical terrorism studies: agenda-setting, elaboration
First wave: agenda setting. Although a small number of influential earlier works can be identified (Sluka Citation 2000; Zulaika and Douglass Citation 1996), critical terrorism studies as a coherent academic project came to prominence in the first decade of the twenty-first century.Richard Jackson (Citation 2016a, 1) - the field's most visible author - dates "serious discussions about ...
The New Terrorism Revisited: Some Remarks on Terrorism Evolution and
Importantly, however, as this paper has tried to demonstrate, to a relatively limited extent this has been the result of some profoundly revolutionary trends emerging in terrorism in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, and the resultant formation of an entirely new form of terrorism.
PDF International Terrorism: Definitions, Causes and Responses: Teaching Guide
Objectives of the Teaching Guide. To assist students in gaining an understanding of terrorism and its role in domestic and international politics. To make students aware of various definitions of terrorism. To acquaint students with different ways in which terrorism may be addressed. To provide teachers with lesson plans, bibliographic sources ...
Terrorism Definitions and Controversies Term Paper
The term "terrorism" is a very emotionally charged word, which creates certain difficulties whenever there are attempts at formulating a definition for it. Instead of an emotionally neutral connotation that is expected from a legal term, the word is commonly associated with unlawful violence. ... This term paper, "Terrorism Definitions and ...
Terrorism
Philosophical literature in English amounted to a few monographs and a single collection of papers devoted solely, or largely, to questions to do with terrorism. Articles on the subject in philosophy journals were few and far between; neither of the two major philosophy encyclopedias had an entry. ... The term "terrorism", however, is ...
Term Paper: Defining Terrorism
Term Paper. Pages: 15 (4573 words) · Bibliography Sources: 30 · File: .docx · Topic: Terrorism. Terrorism. Encyclopedias and dictionaries define terrorism in the easy to understand language but in reality it is a concept that is hard to grasp. In the last two decades terrorism caused more damage to the world then anything else.
Credibility in the Global War on Terrorism
The perceived credibility of the United States government on the global stage has never been lower. This impedes its ability to fight, much less to win, the "war of ideas" that is so much a part of the global war on terrorism. Cultivating improved credibility is a long-term effort, but it stands to benefit from a large body of existing research.
PDF Terrorism in India: A Major Challenge to National Integration
articles in research journals,news paper clippings and selected websites were of the source. Introduction: India has a long history of terrorism, but in recent years it has grown significantly more prevalent. Since gaining its independence in 1947, India has struggled with insurgency and terrorism in many regions of the nation.
Paper Terrorism and Other Tactics
A common form of paper terrorism involves filing liens. A lien (sometimes referred to as a commercial lien) is a legal claim on property for payment of a debt or obligation (Griffin and Runyon 2000, as cited in Chamberlain and Haider-Markel 2005).There are multiple types of liens, including the non-consensual, non-possessory which is a favorite among sovereign citizens.
Terrorism Term Paper Examples That Really Inspire
WowEssays.com paper writer service proudly presents to you an open-access database of Terrorism Term Papers intended to help struggling students tackle their writing challenges. In a practical sense, each Terrorism Term Paper sample presented here may be a guide that walks you through the crucial phases of the writing procedure and showcases how to develop an academic work that hits the mark.
PDF Terrorism paper topics
Terrorism paper topics 10,000 Ideas for Term Papers, Projects, Reports, and Speeches Modern Research Topics in Aerospace Propulsion The Blue Book of Grammar and Punctuation 501 Writing Prompts Fundamental Research and the Process of Education The Political Classroom How to Write a Great Research Paper Research Papers For
Anti-Money Laundering
Anti-Money Laundering. Singapore supports global efforts to combat money laundering, terrorism financing and proliferation financing. Maintaining a clean and trusted financial centre is important given our role as an international business hub. Find out more about MAS' regime to combat financial crime.
Stochastic terrorism
Stochastic terrorism is when a political or media figure publicly demonizes a person or group in a way that inspires supporters of the figure to commit a violent act against the target of the communication. Unlike incitement to terrorism, this is accomplished by using indirect, vague, or coded language that allows the instigator to plausibly disclaim responsibility for the resulting violence.
(PDF) An Introduction to Terrorism Research
In book: Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures (pp.1-29) Chapter: An Introduction to Terrorism Research; Publisher: Routledge
Hindu terrorism
"Hindu terrorism" and "Hindutva terrorism" According to Nikita Saxena writing for The Caravan, the term "Hindu terrorism" gained traction in the wake of the 2007 Samjhauta Express bombings and 2008 Malegaon blasts. [undue weight?- discuss] A prominent reference to "Hindu terrorism" was made by Indian National Congress (Congress) member Digvijaya Singh in a 2007 campaign.
National Anti-Terrorism Day 2024: Date, origin, significance and all
National Anti-Terrorism Day 2024 Date and History: National Anti-Terrorism Day in India is observed annually on May 21st to honour the legacy of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, the country's sixth Prime Minister. Rajiv Gandhi tragically lost his life on May 21, 1991, in Sriperumbudur, near Chennai, due to an assassination carried out by a suicide bomber from the LTTE (Liberation Tigers ...
Oath Keepers founder Stewart Rhodes sentenced to 18 years for leading
A federal judge sentenced Oath Keepers founder Stewart Rhodes to 18 years in prison Thursday and accepted the government's recommendation of an enhancement for terrorism for his role leading a ...

17 The Causes of Terrorism

Traditional Theories of Terrorism

The Radicalization Perspective

The Indirect-War Theory of Terrorism

Contrasting Case Studies: Al Qaeda and the ANC

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The New Terrorism Revisited: Some Remarks on Terrorism Evolution and Its Strategic Significance After 9/11

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Terrorism Definitions and Controversies Term Paper

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1.1.1 The reign of terror

1.1 “Terrorism” from the French Revolution to the early 21st century

1.2 Two core traits of terrorism and two types of definition

2. The moral issue

2.2 Consequentialism

2.3 Nonconsequentialism

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National Anti-Terrorism Day 2024: Date, origin, significance and all you need to know

National Anti-Terrorism Day 2024: Date and Origin

National Anti-Terrorism Day 2024: Significance

National Anti-Terrorism Day 2024: Quotes

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Oath Keepers founder Stewart Rhodes sentenced to 18 years for leading Jan. 6 seditious conspiracy

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