global climate justice essay

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Climate justice.

Some countries and populations have benefited more than others from the industries and technologies that are causing climate change. And at the same time, the countries that have benefited the least are more likely to be suffering first and worst because of climate change.

Climate justice is the principle that the benefits reaped from activities that cause climate change and the burdens of climate change impacts should be distributed fairly. Climate justice means that countries that became wealthy through unrestricted climate pollution have the greatest responsibility to not only stop warming the planet, but also to help other countries adapt to climate change and develop economically with nonpolluting technologies.

Climate justice also calls for fairness in environmental decision-making. The principle supports centering populations that are least responsible for, and most vulnerable to, the climate crisis as decision makers in global and regional plans to address the crisis. It also means acknowledging that climate change threatens basic human rights principles, which hold that all people are born with equal dignity and rights, including to food , water , and other resources needed to support health. Calling for climate justice, rather than climate action, has implications for policymaking, diplomacy, academic study and activism, by bringing attention to how different responses to climate change distribute harms and benefits, and who gets a role in forming those responses.

The unequal causes and effects of climate change

Wealthy, industrialized nations have released most of the greenhouse gas pollution to date — meaning they’ve played an outsized role in causing climate change. 4 Climate justice calls for these countries, along with multinational corporations that have become wealthy through polluting industries, to pay their “climate debt” to the rest of the world. In this view, stopping their greenhouse gas emissions, while hugely important, is not enough to fully pay the debt from over a century of pollution; these actors also have a responsibility to share wealth, technology, and other benefits of industrialization with the countries least responsible for the climate crisis, to help them cope with the effects of climate change and build clean energy systems and industries.

A climate justice perspective also brings attention to inequalities within countries. Within high and low income countries, wealthier people are more likely to enjoy energy-intensive homes, private cars, leisure travel, and other comforts that both exacerbate climate change and buffer them from impacts like extreme heat . Climate change also worsens pre-existing social inequalities stemming from structural racism, socioeconomic marginalization, and other forms of social exclusion. In the U.S., for example, communities of color and immigrant communities are more likely to be located in places where climate risks are more severe, such as in flood zones or urban heat islands . 5

The unequal impacts of taking action on climate change

Reducing climate pollution greatly benefits everyone. Yet the way we achieve these reductions could either improve or worsen current patterns of inequity for marginalized groups. For example, a carbon tax that makes it expensive to emit greenhouse gases is a part of many climate proposals; climate justice would additionally demand that these taxes be structured in a way that protects low-income people who are already struggling to pay for gasoline, home heating and cooling , and other basic energy needs. 6  

Additionally, the principle of a “just transition” considers the economic and labor impacts of a transition to a nonpolluting economy. This incorporates the needs of workers employed in—and the communities supported by—the fossil fuel industry and other industries that contribute to climate change. 7 For example, the U.S. federal government offers over $180 billion in funding to assist coal field and power plant communities in economic diversification, infrastructure and workforce development as the coal industry declines. 8

Climate justice as a movement

Calls for climate justice grew out of a larger “environmental justice” movement, which is concerned with the ways pollution, land degradation, and other environmental problems harm already vulnerable people and communities who have contributed the least to, but suffer the most from, environmental problems. Global South nations, Black, Indigenous, and other people of the global majority and women—who have been historically excluded from decision making—have led the push for climate justice, arguing that climate change endangers their health and livelihoods. In recent years, younger people have also been leading the call for just climate action, observing that they will bear the heaviest burden from the climate change that past generations have contributed to, and demanding immediate action from those in positions of power.

Published March 14, 2022.

1  King, Andrew D., and Luke J. Harrington. “The Inequality of Climate Change From 1.5 to 2°C of Global Warming.” Geophysical Research Letters, vol. 45, no. 10, 28 May 2018, doi:10.1029/2018GL078430. 

2  Martin, Richard. “ Climate Change: Why the Tropical Poor Will Suffer Most. ” MIT Technology Review, 17 June 2015. 

3 Diffenbaugh, Noah S., and Marshall Burke. “ Global Warming Has Increased Global Economic Inequality .” PNAS, vol. 116, no. 20, 14 May 2019, doi:10.1073/pnas.1816020116.

4  Ritchie, Hannah. “ Who Has Contributed Most to Global CO2 Emissions? ” Our World in Data, 1 Oct. 2019. 

5  Gamble, J.L., et al. “ Ch. 9: Populations of Concern. ” The Impacts of Climate Change on Human Health in the United States: A Scientific Assessment, U.S. Global Change Research Program, 4 Apr. 2016. 

6  Fremstad, Anders, and Mark Paul. “ The Impact of a Carbon Tax on Inequality .” Ecological Economics, vol. 163, 29 May 2019, doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2019.04.016.

7  Smith, Samantha. Just Transition Centre, 2017, Just Transition: A Report for the OECD . 

8   Interagency Working Group on Coal & Power Plant Communities & Economic Revitalization , 25 Feb 2022.

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Climate Justice in the Anthropocene: An Introductory Reading List

Justice discourse in the Anthropocene has shown us that perhaps we aren’t as homogeneous of an “Anthros” as we’d expect.

As the alarm bells have made it urgently clear—humanity has breached planetary boundaries —causing anthropogenic climate change and environmental disaster across the world. By burning fossil fuels, overconsuming material resources, and creating endless waste, we have disrupted Earth’s ecosystems, exacerbating natural hazards with effects lasting longer than human lifetimes. But who is the “we” being referred to here? The climate crisis is no longer a simple issue of “objective” science but an issue of political discourse and pop culture. Across the globe, the effects of anthropogenic climate change are experienced unevenly, disproportionately so for vulnerable communities within and between nations. We should be critical in our efforts to mitigate, adapt to, and be transformative in the face of climate change, ensuring that we are not weaponizing emergency in the process and ignoring issues of environmental justice and equity .

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Climate justice, a movement emerging from the US environmental justice movement in the 1960s, attempts to re-center communities most vulnerable to the climate crisis in decision-making. Rather than viewing the climate crisis as a result of a homogenous humanity that has degraded the planet, climate justice assigns responsibility to oppressive systems and actors that have fueled the crisis. This reading list provides an introduction to climate justice and seeks to unsettle some of the familiar, dominant discourses of climate change.

Mike Hulme, “ Geographical Work at the Boundaries of Climate Change ,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 33, no. 1 (2008): 5–11.

To define climate change is a political act. Hulme explores key discourse, questions, issues, and framings around the anthropogenic climate crisis. He most notably unpacks the universalization of the climate crisis, the boundary-setting of global warming at 2° Celsius by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and the exclusion of certain forms of knowledge generation. Hulme helps to set the scene for a critical climate justice, understanding how space, place, power, and culture form a normative understanding of the climate crisis.

Arvind Jasrotia, “ Fighting 2° Celsius: The Quest for Climate Justice ,” Journal of the Indian Law Institute 58, no. 1 (2016): 55–82.

The IPCC in the fifth assessment report concluded that for humanity to avoid catastrophic impacts from anthropogenic climate change, warming since pre-industrial times must remain under 2° Celsius. Jasrotia unpacks the way the IPCC, alongside other climate organizations, negotiated this target, and its disparate impacts on developing countries. Pointing out that “climate change presents the largest (re)distributive dilemma of human history,” Jasrotia considers the atmosphere as a global common, questioning how best to equitably distribute the carbon budget. He then takes the reader through critical junctures in the history of international climate negotiations and explores how different forms of power pervade these spaces.

Elizabeth A. Povinelli, “ The Rhetorics of Recognition in Geontopower ,” Philosophy & Rhetoric 48, no. 4 (2015): 428–42.

“Geontopower”—at the center of climate justice—challenges how we come to understand what’s considered life and non-life, and therefore, create structures of governance that rule over what we have come to understand as “non-life.” Povinelli challenges this distinction, as Indigenous communities across the world have done for centuries. It’s possible to blow up a mountain and extract its minerals because it’s considered non-life; as Povinelli notes, “we cannot take away a soul they [mountains] do not have.” Povinelli grounds the creation of geontopower in the history of colonialism and Indigenous erasure, providing context to how and why non-life (nature) is governed in an environmentally destructive way.

Rikard Warlenius, “ Decolonizing the Atmosphere: The Climate Justice Movement on Climate Debt ,” The Journal of Environment & Development 27, no. 2 (2018): 131–55.

A core tenet of the climate justice movement is the concept of climate debt: those historically and disproportionately responsible for the climate crisis must pay those who are on the frontlines of disaster. Warlenius explores this concept through the notion of “decolonizing the atmosphere,” or the idea that the colonial powers have not only subjugated peoples and lands but also have taken up disproportionately more atmospheric “space” by overshooting the global carbon budget. As developing countries begin to industrialize, there is little room for their fossil emissions in the atmosphere. Warlenius argues that this is unfair and unjust and that paying climate debt is one avenue where one can “simply ask those who made the mess to clean it up.”

Federico Demaria, François Schneider, Filka Sekulova, and Joan Martinez-Alier, “ What Is Degrowth? From an Activist Slogan to a Social Movement ,” Environmental Values 22, no. 2 (2013): 191–215.

A popular call from activists, scientists, and academics alike is for degrowth discourse to be embedded in environmental policy. What is degrowth? “Degrowth” is a social movement that calls for the reduction of consumption (materialized as Gross Domestic Product) in developed nations while encouraging investment in social services and the care economy. As Demaria et al. explains, the term degrowth has re-politicized environmental issues, with the term and the movement both being oversimplified, co-opted, and simply misunderstood. This paper traces the idea of degrowth throughout history and geographies, attempting to capture the complexity and nuance of it as a call moving towards climate justice.

Kyle Powys Whyte, “ Indigenous Women, Climate Change Impacts, and Collective Action ,” Hypatia 29, no. 3 (2014): 599–616.

Indigenous communities are vital social actors in the fight against the anthropogenic climate crisis; as they steward approximately one-quarter of world’s land area and 40 percent of the world’s protected areas. For Indigenous communities especially, the anthropogenic climate crisis has the potential to completely disrupt what Whyte refers to as collective continuance , which captures Indigenous relationships with nature, secure Indigenous identities, and intergenerational sustainability of communal ties. Additionally, Whyte sheds light on the intersectional experiences of Indigenous women in the face of anthropogenic climate change.

Farhana Sultana, “ Suffering for Water, Suffering from Water: Emotional Geographies of Resource Access, Control, and Conflict ,” Geoforum 42, no. 2 (March 2011): 163–172.

Conflicts over safe water for consumption, agriculture, and production are often mediated by material and social relations.  Drawing upon political ecology scholarship, Sultana explores how this critical resource is even more troubled by emotional relations, that is, the relations between the home, individual body, space, and feelings. Her discussion helps clarify the connections between gender and natural resource management in moving towards climate justice. Using a case study from Bangladesh, she explores how issues of disparate access and use of water impact water, society, and gender relations.

Filomina Chioma Steady, “ Women, Climate Change and Liberation in Africa ,” Race, Gender & Class 21, no. 1/2 (2014): 312–33.

The impacts of climate crisis have been seen and felt by African women, who provide the bulk of labor for agriculture, water procurement, fuel, animal husbandry, and natural resource stewardship on that continent. Steady uses an ecofeminist lens to highlight the positions of African women in climate concerns, including the degradation of forests, water insecurity, agricultural yield variation, and mitigation of and adaptation to natural hazards. She also provides context to explain how neo-colonialism and globalization are key drivers of the continued maldevelopment of the African continent and the unique impact experienced by African women as a result.

Adelle Thomas, April Baptiste, Rosanne Martyr-Koller, Patrick Pringle, and Kevon Rhiney, “ Climate Change and Small Island Developing States ,” Annual Review of Environment and Resources 45 (October 2020): 1–27.

Small Island Developing States (SIDs) have been identified by the United Nations as especially vulnerable to the anthropogenic climate crisis, primarily due to unpredicted sea level rise and the increased frequency and intensity of natural hazards. The Association of Small Island Developing States drove the 1.5° Celsius global temperature target at the 2015 Paris Climate Negotiations, bringing it down from 2° Celsius target in prior years. Thomas et al. notes that while SIDs have had a negligible impact on greenhouse gas emissions, they face disproportionately more risk, vulnerability, and exposure to natural hazards. The centering of SIDs in climate justice discourse has highlighted the need for climate reparations, loss and damage funding, and climate migration planning.

Avner de Shalit, “ Climate Change Refugees, Compensation, and Rectification ,” The Monist 94, no. 3 (2011): 310–28.

Who is pathologized as a result of climate change? De Shalit focuses on the evacuation and the destruction of homes due to natural hazards as “environmental displacement[s]” and explores how people become environmental refugees because of anthropogenic climate change. Solutions, such as loss and damage compensation, have been proposed to rectify the loss of space and place experienced by vulnerable communities. De Shalit challenges the notion of monetary compensation as an acceptable form of reparations for environmental refugees, arguing that not only does such compensation place a monetary value on a landscape that is incommensurable, but it gives license for polluters to continue worsening anthropogenic climate change—as they can simply pay for it later.

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• What is Climate Justice? And what can we do achieve it?

Recap and reflections from UNICEF's Climate Justice Roundtable

• Ideas and articles

16 August 2022

7 minute read

Young people have historically led the charge against environmental, social and racial injustice. However, in the last several years, they have mobilized like never before on the issue of climate justice. Spurred on by the speeches and marches of Greta Thunberg, millions of children and young people globally voiced their concerns and demanded that their governments take action on climate change. Their voices have demonstrated the urgency they are feeling that time is running out and that they, as the younger generation, will suffer the consequences of climate change more greatly than their parents and grandparents.

According to the World Bank, by the time many of the teenage climate activists of today are in their late 20s, climate change could force an additional 100 million people into extreme poverty. In addition, by 2050, the International Food Policy Research institute estimates a 20% increase in malnourished children compared to what we would see without climate change.

In order to better understand the youth perspective of climate justice, UNICEF gathered a small group of experts and activists for a roundtable discussion about the following questions:

• What do we know about climate justice? What does it mean to children and young people? What are they asking for?
• What are the elements needed and what are the gaps and barriers to achieving climate justice for and with children and young people? How does it relate to racial and social justice?
• How can UNICEF and others support and help bridge these gaps, including knowledge gaps and translate it to effective policy?

 What do we mean by climate justice?

Linking human rights with development and climate action.

Development cannot be delinked from climate action and vice versa. Throughout, a human rights base approach is necessary. For example, with the rapid pace of urbanization, a rights-based approach is crucial for addressing water, sanitation and health, challenges which are exacerbated by climate change in the formalizing of informal settlements.

Having a people-centered approach to climate action

This entails ensuring representation, inclusion, and protection of the rights of those most vulnerable to the effects of climate change. Solutions must promote equity, assure access to basic resources, and ensure that young people can live, learn, play and work in healthy and clean environments.

Understanding that not everyone has contributed to climate change in the same way

While everyone must do their part to address climate change, the burden should not be borne by those that have contributed the least. The world’s richest 10% are responsible for 50% of GHG emissions and the poorest 50% are only responsible for 10% despite population and energy consumption increasing.

Combatting social injustice, gender injustice, economic injustice, intergenerational injustice and environmental injustice

The intersectionality of these challenges must be acknowledged in order to address them holistically. For example, some climate projects inadvertently create climate injustices when local communities are displaced for a conservation or renewable energy initiative.

Requires a systems transformation

The climate crisis is the result of a system which prioritizes profit over sustainability. As such, solutions will require a transformative systems lens and approach. Approaches that address the unequal burdens in certain communities and which realigns the economy with natural systems. The new green learning agenda proposes such an approach for an education system that develops and nurtures sustainable mindsets, as well as green skills in order to achieve this transformation.

What do young people want?

Participation – a seat at the table.

Representation is crucial for getting concerns heard and addressed. Youth and civil society need to be given a seat at the decision-making table so that those asking for climate justice can influence decisions around climate policies and programming, including climate finance flows. Unfortunately, decision making processes are currently dominated by northern and corporate interests. Youth representation, when included, is perceived by young people to be tokenistic and used as a public relations exercise, and young people’s voices are not considered and taken into account when decisions are made. While representation at official conferences is important, climate talks are not the only forums to influence decisions and processes related to climate (in)action. Other avenues for participation may be even more powerful, for example, influencing international trade agreements. The World Trade Organization (WTO) has far more legally binding power over countries than the United Nations Framework Climate Change Convention (UNFCCC), as they affect and potentially often prevent the right of countries to pursue low carbon development, through their trade agreements.

Decent jobs and sustainable livelihoods

Marginalized and poor communities are disproportionately exposed to and affected by climate change impacts, but often face structural barriers to participating in the fight for climate justice. When people are unable to meet their basic needs for income, food and other necessities, it is difficult to get involved in climate action. Therefore, it is important to focus on education, livelihood and employment opportunities while working with marginalized and poor communities and these need to be tackled at the policy level.

"It is well acknowledged that across the globe, people who have the least role in causing the climate crisis are bearing the brunt of it, and unfortunately, climate justice is not talked about enough." Eric Njuguna, Youth Climate Justice Organizer

What do young people need?

Capacity and skills building: supporting skills development and addressing structural constraints are key to empowering children and youth to claim their seat at the table.

Support can include sharing knowledge and resources including information that donors/programming entities develop, so that grantees can succeed in their own initiatives. Knowledge exchange and knowledge transfer are important and accessibility of information for everyone is key. In addition, it is important to highlight the work of climate justice organizations, especially young organizations, to support their fundraising efforts and track history. In order for their seat at the table to be effective, children and youth need to be supported to develop skills, knowledge and competencies to have the ability to meaningfully advocate for and provide solutions on climate justice. Support can be provided through capacity and skills building (technical competencies, as well as soft skills) and by addressing structural barriers to participation (job creation, meeting of basic livelihood needs). In addition, young people can be supported to use and challenge national laws in the countries where they live and work. There has been a marked increase in climate litigation over the last 10 years and this trend is set to increase over the next few years.

Financing: Consistent and reliable financing for operational and programmatic expenses are instrumental for allowing young climate activists to achieve their vision.

Supporting youth is an investment that achieves more than short-term results. In the long run, it is investment in leadership and action on initiatives for climate equity and justice. Consistent and reliable funding is indispensable for supporting the climate justice movement, and for allowing young climate justice organizations to build their organizational and leadership capacities. To this end, longer-term operational funding which provides ongoing financial backing and security for climate justice activists, groups and their organizations needs to increase.

Young people also need support to gain knowledge on how to apply for funding and benefit from the available climate funding sources. Obtaining funding is a highly competitive process, and crucial to the ability to develop initiatives for climate justice activism. Young people often lack the know-how on developing successful grant application.

Partnerships: Non-monetary forms of support are equally important for helping climate justice action to flourish

Donors and programming entities can do more than just provide or enable the transfer of money. They can facilitate connections, networking opportunities, provide spaces to meet, share lessons and experiences, and discuss ideas, so that youth and their organizations can accumulate expertise and establish partnerships to develop and successfully implement their projects and plans. Programming entities should also respect the expertise and lived experiences of the youth grantees and see them as equal partners. Funders should support and trust the vision and ideas of the youth activists and their understanding of the policy landscape. This trust means allowing grantees to work in the way they judge best for developing their ideas and initiatives.

What can UNICEF and others do?

Acknowledge children and young people’s quest for climate justice; support their meaningful participation and facilitate partnership opportunities.

Utilizing a climate justice approach for UNICEF would include integrating children’s perspective and rights into actions, recognizing children as the most vulnerable group in the face of climate change, and reducing their vulnerability to the climate crisis. It would mean supporting full participation of young people and children to seek equity across and contribute to decisions on climate policies. UNICEF and others’ youth engagements strategies should include youth participants who represent marginalized and most vulnerable communities affected by the climate crisis. Additionally, facilitating networking opportunities and capacity building workshops to share knowledge and opportunities for collaboration.

Support and facilitate access to funding for youth-led climate justice action

UNICEF as a programming entity could act as an intermediary between donors and grantees to minimize inequalities. They can lessen constraints to funding and absorb some of the burden that comes with managing funds. UNICEF could play an important role in lessening the burden of accountability for grantees to donors, by providing support in monitoring and evaluation. In addition, UNICEF could support youth in developing effective, bankable proposals as well as including them in funding decision-making processes.

Support children and youth as they confront climate change impacts and climate (in)justice

Effort should be made to prevent children’s health, well-being and rights from being impacted by climate (in)actions that create injustices. While there is consensus and acknowledgment on how not addressing climate change impacts on children’s rights, there is less attention paid to how some activities meant to alleviate climate change, can create injustices. For example, particular issues of concern around unjust climate actions include renewable energy projects which impact on indigenous people’s land rights, use of child labor in mining minerals (e.g. cobalt) for renewable batteries, etc. A reflection of the toll that the climate change crisis is causing, eco-anxiety (a chronic fear that climate destruction is inevitable) is becoming more common among youth and is an issue worth focusing on. As part of its mental health work, UNICEF could explore ways to navigate this anxiety among children and youth.

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Editor-in-Chief: William Shutkin

The Journal of Climate Resilience & Climate Justice (CRCJ) , is an online, open access resource providing research reports, case studies, essays, and opinions from the working edge of the climate resilience and climate justice fields written in a non-technical, digestible, and educational style for a broad audience.

This is an open access journal with no author publishing fees, made possible through the generous support of the Nell Newman Foundation and the Dean Witter Foundation.

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• Published: 26 July 2023

Assessing climate justice awareness among climate neutral-to-be cities

• Nives Della Valle   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0001-8241-4677 1 ,
• Giulia Ulpiani 1 &
• Nadja Vetters 2  

Humanities and Social Sciences Communications volume  10 , Article number:  440 ( 2023 ) Cite this article

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• Social policy

This paper sheds light on the importance of evaluating climate justice concerns when forging climate-neutral strategies at the city level. Climate justice can be a useful policy lever to develop measures that promote simultaneously greenhouse gas emissions reductions and their social justice dimension, thus reducing the risk of adverse impacts. As a result, evaluating policymakers’ awareness of (i) recognition (ii) distributive (iii) procedural, and (iv) intergenerational issues about the transition to climate neutrality might help identify where to intervene to ensure that decisions towards more sustainable urban futures are born justly and equitably. This study uses data from the European Mission on 100 Climate Neutral and Smart Cities by 2030 and a principal component analysis to build an index of climate justice awareness. It then identifies control factors behind different levels of climate justice awareness. The empirical analysis suggests that the more cities are engaged in climate efforts, the more they implement these efforts considering also the social justice dimension. It also reveals that the geographical location and the relationship with higher levels of governance contribute to shape the heterogeneity in a just-considerate climate action by virtue of different governance structures, historical legacies, and economic, cultural, and political characteristics. Overall, the analysis unveils that the availability of governmental support in capacity building and financial advisory services, and the breadth of the city’s legal powers across different fields of action are positively related to justice awareness. Conversely, the perception of favourable geo-climatic conditions is negatively correlated. These relationships can be read as assistance needs that cities perceive in their pathway to just climate neutrality and highlight where future efforts in research and policy-making should focus in the following years to pave the way to a just transition.

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Introduction.

Since before the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was established in 1992, climate change discussions have included justice concerns. However, it is only in recent years that the concept of climate justice has become prominent in climate academic and policy debates. We can now clearly understand climate justice as justice in relation to (i) the responsibility for climate change and its impacts, or (ii) the effects of responses to climate change (Newell et al., 2021 ). We can also link it to the ‘triple injustices’ of climate change (i.e., uneven distribution of impacts, uneven responsibility for climate change, and uneven costs associated with mitigation and adaptation (Roberts & Parks, 2015 ), wherein those who are the least responsible for greenhouse gas emissions are also those who are most vulnerable to their impacts and most disadvantaged by responses to climate change (Krause, 2021 ). In this study, we understand climate justice in relation to the effects of responses to climate change.

Despite the academic interest in climate justice has increasingly gained momentum, several scholars have debated on its operational value, as it might remain only normative and theoretical (Hughes & Hoffmann, 2020 ; Schlosberg & Collins, 2014 ). As an example, Brisley et al. ( 2012 ) emphasise that there are no specific metrics available to assess the inclusion of justice dimensions in climate policies. In this study, we aim to uncover the operational value of climate justice by evaluating justice concerns in climate decision-making processes. In particular, we build on the proposal advanced by Sovacool et al. ( 2017 ) that justice frameworks can serve as decision-making tools that can assist planners in making policy choices capable to address both the climate change and the social justice goals. In this case, planners and regulators are “justice aware”. However, assessing justice concerns is a challenging task, as there might be heterogeneity in how these are conceived and addressed, depending on the context and the governance level (Chu & Cannon, 2021 ). Indeed, embedded in the very definition of climate justice are the pillars of territorial cohesion and multi-level governance, with national, regional, and local actors all called upon.

In this study, we focus on the local, notably urban, level. Cities are locations where developing measures against climate change is highly urgent (Nevens & Roorda, 2014 ) and where opportunities for co-creation with the civil society are abundant. In particular, urban areas in the developed world account for more than 70% of energy-related global greenhouse gases from the supply side (Bellucci et al., 2012 ), and the share would be even higher in terms of consumption (Hoornweg et al., 2011 ). Additionally, the majority of the global population lives in cities (United Nations, 2019 ). At the same time, there is an increasing consensus on the key role that cities can play as agents of change in addressing global climate change (van der Heijden et al., 2019 ). During the late 2000s, cities began to emerge as alternative hubs for political leadership, technological advancement, and financial support in advancing climate action (Bulkeley, 2010 ). They are exposed to activities, processes, or patterns, which make them the perfect loci to implement mitigation and adaptation efforts (Diana Reckien et al., 2015 ). In fact, cities can be seen as “natural” sites for innovative and experimental climate action in a progressive direction (Evans et al., 2016 ). Municipalities themselves recognised their key role in global climate mitigation and adaption, and committed to take concrete steps to combat the climate crisis, as announced by over 100 cities at the end of the UN’s Climate Action Summit in 2019 (Salvia et al., 2021 ). Further, a number of city-dedicated initiatives to deliver on the European Green Deal have been promoted to catalyse a capillary reaction to climate change at the sub-national level, including the Covenant of Mayors—that gathers 10,000+ signatories committed to climate change mitigation and adaptation—and the European Mission on 100 Climate-Neutral and Smart Cities (hereinafter, the Cities Mission), through which cities will pursue climate neutrality by 2030 and will thereby design and implement ambitious climate mitigation plans while elaborating on the green, digital, and just attributes of the transition.

Although these ambitious cities are ideal contexts where both environmental and social justice goals can be achieved, due to the relatively short distance between municipalities and citizens, compared to other governance levels (Evans, 2011 ), they can be hot spots of injustices, which manifest in multiple ways, including displacement, destructive redevelopments or uneven investments that may exacerbate inequalities (Phillips et al., 2022 ). That is why, to express their full potential as agents of change in addressing global climate change (Bouzarovski & Haarstad, 2019 ), cities need to be able to recognise the link between the planned climate efforts and their multiple implications to avoid generating or exacerbating forms of injustice (Hughes & Hoffmann, 2020 ). In short, cities need to be justice-aware when developing climate action and the degree of awareness should become an indicator and a lever to guide and course-correct climate policy so that truly resilient and future-proof urban decisions can be taken.

This study aims to uncover the operational value of climate justice by providing a quantitative, ex-ante assessment of climate justice considerations in urban climate action planning. The proposed methodology overcomes the uncertainties in terms of robustness, comparability, and interpretability of results that come with the conceptual approaches and/or limited city samples that characterise the existing literature on the topic. Instead of qualitatively analysing a set of climate plans, we leverage the newly collected Cities Mission dataset as an unprecedented portray of where hundreds of European cities stand in terms of climate mitigation against the background of a common and well-defined framework and climate ambition. The dataset connects scientific and technological aspects to policy-making, risk anticipation and cross-sectoral integration to social equity, as co-ingredients of a robust and just climate neutrality strategy, across multiple dimensions and highly diverse urban contexts. Relying on data that are elicited through a homogenous procedure (i.e., survey), descriptive of a significant sample of respondents, and related to a well-defined climate action programme, enables us to develop a scientifically sturdy European index of climate justice awareness. The index and its analysis are instrumental not just to compare cities and determine a Europe-wide baseline, but also to identify predictors and to delineate the opportunity space for enhanced justice awareness.

Indeed, even among the most ambitious cities in climate mitigation and adaptation, there might be considerable heterogeneity in climate action, due to city-specific factors (Diana Reckien et al., 2015 ). As an example, when cities are prosperous (high GDP per capita) and populous, or when they have the financial capacity and the know-how to implement climate action, they may engage more in climate action (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2015 ; Diana Reckien et al., 2015 ). In contrast, when they are constrained in their powers and boundaries, due to, e.g., regulatory limitations, cities may not express their full potential in exerting climate efforts (van der Heijden et al., 2019 ). At the same time, city-specific factors might limit climate justice considerations. For instance, when cities are limited in an operational capacity, they might concentrate their efforts towards “profitable” climate initiatives for which quantifiable emissions reductions can be demonstrated and investors can be lured, at the expenses of more socially attentive initiatives whose benefits are less conventionally tangible (Castán Broto & Westman, 2020 ).

In this study, we investigate these potential mechanisms and empirically address how climate engagement, as measured by a combination of metrics of engagement, preparedness, and ambition in climate action, is related to climate justice awareness in policy-making across the procedural, distributive, recognition, and intergenerational pillars, and which city-specific factors (such as climate, population, GDP) may serve as predictors of climate justice considerations. To this aim, through principal component analysis (PCA), we create an index for climate action that reflects cities’ efforts in climate mitigation and adaptation strategies and initiatives, as well as their GHG emissions reduction targets. The index is then used as an explanatory variable for a second index aimed at quantifying the level of climate justice awareness that equally accounts for the consideration of the four justice pillars. Finally, by adopting a regression approach, we study the relationship between climate justice awareness and climate engagement, including a set of control variables to account for local specificities and influential factors that could contribute to the different manifestations of just climate action across European cities.

Theoretical framework

Cities are ideal contexts where both environmental and social justice goals can be achieved, due to the relatively short distance between municipalities and citizens, compared to other governance levels (Evans, 2011 ). Despite this potential, there is evidence that, so far, city climate plans have commonly failed in embedding social justice, resulting in an increased social divide and in disproportionate vulnerabilities to weather extremes, air pollution, and social marginalisation (Reckien et al., 2023 ; Wachsmuth et al., 2016 ). There is a general lack of accountability for the various adverse impacts that may be triggered by climate action, notably (i) beyond wealthy districts, (ii) at the periurban or rural fringes, and (iii) at the metropolitan/regional level (e.g., in functional urban areas). This suggests not only that the climate action at the city level needs to be attentive to more global processes to avoid a mere displacement of injustices and unsustainable practices (Angelo & Wachsmuth, 2015 , 2020 ), but also that cities should adopt a more holistic approach than that based only on technical perspectives (Chu & Cannon, 2021 ).

Against this backdrop, a body of academic work has emerged to criticise technocratic approaches, which often prioritise regulatory, financial, and engineered interventions, while neglecting the social, cultural, and economic inequities (Meerow & Newell, 2019 ; Shi et al., 2016 ). These critiques are particularly relevant within urban environments that are already marked by high levels of inequality, characterised by contentious issues like the marginalisation of the vulnerable (Chu & Cannon, 2021 ). In this regard, scholars have observed that public policies and plans have played a key role in reinforcing systemic injustices, both directly and indirectly (Brand and Miller, 2020 ). As an example, some cities that initiated measures to promote adaptation started safeguarding economically significant land from anticipated risks, implementing exclusionary zoning and land use policies to preserve property values, and prioritising the enhancement of infrastructure and public services in affluent neighbourhoods (Long & Rice, 2019 ). Consequently, scholars began to raise concerns about how these plans were contributing to displacement, perpetuating poverty, and, in certain instances, exacerbating vulnerability to climate effects in historically marginalised communities (Anguelovski et al., 2016 ).

A stream of research has thus emerged, to address these critiques by looking at operationalising justice frameworks to enable climate action policy choices to address both the climate change and the social justice goals (Sovacool et al., 2017 ). This stream of literature posits that when planners and regulators take into account justice dimensions from the very start of the decision-making process, then also the implementation of strategies and plans is more likely to be able to address both the climate change and the social justice goals (Juhola et al., 2022 ). Practically, this calls for a need to evaluate the degree of justice awareness in climate action planning.

Despite the conceptual advancement in climate justice, however, there continues to be limited empirical evidence on how justice dimensions are actually integrated into urban climate planning. The few exceptions, like the studies by Chu and Cannon ( 2021 ) and Juhola et al. ( 2022 ), assess the inclusion of justice dimensions in climate action plans of a limited sample of cities by deriving interpretative justice indicators. However, this methodology and the availability of limited city samples can make it hard to extract comparable results for large regions, like those that characterise Europe, and to derive quantitative relationships to inform decision-making.

This study enriches this stream of research aiming to uncover the operational value of climate justice by evaluating how justice concerns are taken on board in urban climate action planning. To this aim, we refer to the framework of climate justice, which is based on environmental justice (Schlosberg & Collins, 2014 ). Over time, the framework of environmental justice has undergone a gradual transformation, leading to the recognition that an inequitable distribution of environmental burdens and benefits is not inherently predetermined, but rather has underlying causes. Consequently, four dimensions crucial to achieving justice in the context of mitigating and adapting to climate change have been commonly identified and recognised as interconnected: recognitional, distributive, procedural, and intergenerational (Newell et al., 2021 ).

Recognitional justice manifests in understanding differences while guaranteeing equal rights for all (Newell et al., 2021 ). It translates into acknowledging the diverse needs of different societal groups in order to minimise social costs associated with climate action. This is because vulnerabilities to climate risks are situation-dependent (Fitzgibbons & Mitchell, 2019 ). Understanding the significance of underlying social structures is essential for identifying the factors that contribute to social injustices within societies, as these contribute to determine the way the most vulnerable will experience the impacts of climate change and climate action (Schlosberg, 2004 ). Therefore, including recognitional justice in climate action means not only to assess whether climate action recognises and addresses varying needs across different segments of society, but also whether it acknowledges the influence of societal structures on disadvantaged communities (Juhola et al., 2022 ).

Equity is often understood as coterminous with distributive justice. It refers to a state where resources, opportunities, and protection from climate hazards or risks are distributed in an equal and fair manner, regardless of the background or identity of individuals or groups (Chu & Cannon, 2021 ). Climate action itself might be associated with an unequal distribution costs and benefits, and this inequality might occur both locally and nationally (Colenbrander et al., 2018 ). As an example, developing a flood defence in one area may increase flood risk in downstream populations (Eriksen et al., 2021 ). This implies that addressing distributive justice in climate action translates not only in estimating the climate hazards and risks, but also how these are distributed across the different social groups (Fiack et al., 2021 ). Additionally, it translates in assessing which costs and benefits climate action will generate, and how these will be distributed across the social groups (Juhola et al., 2022 ).

Procedural justice refers to fair, accountable, and transparent processes that aim to engage all stakeholders in a non-discriminatory way (Sovacool & Dworkin, 2014 ). Notably, transparent, accountable, and inclusive decision-making processes and procedures become just when they incorporate a variety of voices, values, and perspectives (Mundaca et al., 2018 ). This implies that cities address procedural justice in climate action when they strive to make a variety of groups represented in as many different phases of planning process as possible, and take on board different ideas even when this implies substantial changes (Juhola et al., 2022 ).

Finally, climate change and climate action present a significant challenge to account for considerations of notions of intergenerational justice. If left unchecked, it would result in an unjust burden caused by climate change (or failed climate action) placed upon future generations by those in the present (Gonzalez-Ricoy & Rey, 2019 ). Intergenerational justice has renewed traction owing to the Fridays for Future movement, yet it dates back—at least—to the report Our Common Future (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987 ). This report conceived sustainable development as the ability of current generations to meet their needs without compromising that same ability of future generations (Newell et al., 2021 ). Therefore, urban climate action accounts for intergenerational justice concerns when future interests are explicitly represented and taken on board (Lawrence & Köhler, 2017 ).

Data and methods

Against this theoretical framework, this study focuses on a group of particularly ambitious cities in climate action; those that expressed interest in the Cities Mission. The Cities Mission aims to promote the transition to climate neutrality in 100+ cities by 2030. The definition of climate neutrality standing within the Cities Mission framework requires reaching (net) zero emissions across i) all highest emitting sectors (e.g., energy, transport, waste, industry, agriculture), ii) all emissions scopes (direct and indirect emissions within the city boundary and out-of-boundary emissions related to the disposal and treatment of waste/wastewater generated within the city boundary), and iii) seven greenhouse gases (CO 2 , CH 4 , N 2 O, HFCs, PFCs, SF 6 , and NF 3 ). In total, 112 cities were selected for this ambitious programme from the 362 that participated in the call for Expression of Interest (EOI) closed on 31 January 2022. The EOI took the form of an all-encompassing questionnaire of 374 questions designed to provide:

a systematic and complete assessment of the city’s starting point (preparedness) and demonstrated engagement in climate action (engagement);

an evaluation of the consistency, plausibility, and credibility of the commitment and capacity to reach climate neutrality by 2030 (ambition);

and a preliminary assessment of the familiarity with integrated approaches and holistic thinking in climate action through co-benefits analysis, barriers identification, and risk anticipation.

The EOI questionnaire and the data collection were entirely designed and managed by the European Commission. Cities were given a link to access the online questionnaire. The link could be shared by the city administration to anybody in the (best) position to answer the questions to ensure a compelling candidature.

The analysis is based on data from all the 362 cities that answered the EOI questionnaire and thus expressed the ambition to go emission-free in less than a decade (see Fig. 1 ). The sample includes cities from 35 countries encompassing all EU Member States with varied sizes, from large and medium cities (above 50,000 inhabitants, up to 15 million inhabitants) to smaller ones (down to around 10,000 inhabitants). The starting point in climate action is also significantly diverse across cities, with different baseline emissions, trends, and familiarity with dedicated policies and strategies (Ulpiani et al., 2023 ).

The colour code in the map is used to distinguish different groups by population density (population divided).

To enable the evaluation of climate justice awareness (CJA) and climate engagement (CE), we relied on a set of selected EOI questions (see Table 1 and for more details on the questions’ description in Table A.1 in the Supplementary Appendix), including both multiple and single choice questions.

The questions that were used to develop the climate justice awareness index were designed and selected based on the four main pillars of climate justice (Newell et al., 2021 ).

As procedural justice concerns the various processes and elements of climate decision-making that might involve the regulation of the distribution of goods (Walker & Day, 2012 ), it translates in providing access to relevant information, or legal procedures to enable to claim participation rights, recognising and acting upon unjust procedures, and striving to address biases on the side of project proponents and/or decision-makers (Mundaca et al., 2018 ). Therefore, the selected questions tried to capture whether the various key groups are usually engaged in climate planning and how.

Distributive justice concerns the inequalities in access to social goods and ills, like energy, water, pollution, or food (McCauley et al., 2013 ; Sovacool & Dworkin, 2015 ; Walker & Day, 2012 ). In particular, one of the key aspects of distributive justice is the identification of how goods and ills are distributed across the society (Newell et al., 2021 ). Hence, the selected questions capture whether cities estimate costs and benefits associated with climate action and climate change, and whether social redistribution is considered to mitigate costs.

Recognitional justice is closely linked to procedural and distributive justice, being concerned with the capacity to acknowledge the existence of different needs (energy, water, health, etc.) across the society (Walker & Day, 2012 ), notably the needs of the socially and politically marginalised, including the energy poor (Della Valle & Czako, 2022 ). Therefore, the selected questions tried to capture whether cities acknowledge the existence of different (structurally shaped) needs (energy, water, health, etc.) across the society.

Finally, as intergenerational justice concerns protecting future generations from harm, providing them with the same resources current generations are enjoying, and with means to express their voice in climate change discussions (Sanson & Burke, 2020 ), the selected questions tried to capture whether future generations’ interests are considered or represented by younger generations.

Following the selection of the questions developed to reflect each of the four pillars, as many indexes were created: (i) recognition (RJ) (ii) distributive (DJ) (iii) procedural (PJ), and (iv) intergenerational justice (IJ). Notably, the replies to the sets of questions (as shown in Table 1 ) were used individually to develop each of the RJ, DJ, PJ, and IJ indexes through the PCA. The answers are transformed, according to the following rules:

in case of multiple-choice questions, a value is assigned that is equal to the total number of selected answer options. However, if the interest is in a specific answer option, 1 or 0 are assigned when the option is or is not ticked by the city (i.e., dummy variable);

in case of single-choice questions, each answer option is weighted according to its value in terms of climate mitigation or justice awareness (i.e., it is transformed into a numeric categorical variable). However, when only one answer option is relevant to the formulation of the corresponding index, 1 or 0 are assigned when the option is or is not ticked by the city (i.e., dummy variable). Finally, when the answer is a number (e.g., the number of climate mitigation plans), no transformation is applied.

Table A.1 recalls the rules on a question-by-question basis and provides the original EOI questions.

The PCA was deemed as an appropriate method as it enables to (i) condense multiple variables that measure similar constructs into a smaller set of uncorrelated composite indexes, (ii) provide us with a concise set of indexes that allow for a more straightforward explanation of the relationships between the predictors (e.g., CE) and the outcome variable (i.e., CJA) while minimising information losses, and (iii) to handle multicollinearity, which can pose challenges in regression analysis (Shrestha, 2021 ). Therefore, the PCA fits well our study as we can derive indexes from multiple survey items and investigate the relationships between these indexes and other factors, while accounting for the potential challenges that might be encountered when condensing information (i.e., loss of information) and interpreting results (i.e., multicollinearity). This approach has also been used in previous similar studies that developed indexes related to engagement and awareness of energy issues (Martins et al., 2020 ).

Once derived the four justice indexes, we calculated the CJA index as a simple average of the four indexes, as we assumed that awareness of each of the four justice pillars has an equal weight in terms of contribution to the overall climate justice awareness. Therefore,

The sixth index—the climate engagement (CE) index—was developed via PCA to capture cities’ efforts in climate action. The selected questions to develop this index tried to capture the effort in sector-specific climate mitigation strategies and initiatives, as well as in their GHG emissions reduction targets.

After creating all the indexes, a simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regression was conducted to measure the explanatory power of the CE index and city-specific factors (population density, GDP per capita, favourable conditions, legal powers, barriers identified, and government support) on CJA (for more details on the city-specific factors, see Table A.2 in the Supplementary Appendix). As we are analysing survey data and aim to investigate quantitative relationships, the OLS regression model was deemed as the appropriate method, since it allows for the examination of the magnitude and direction of the relationships between the CJA (dependent variable) and the predictor variables (CE and city-specific factors). Additionally, by enabling quantitative estimates of these relationships, it allows for numerical comparisons and for policy recommendations (Wooldridge, 2015 ).

All analyses were performed using Stata 15.

As described in the methods, the four justice pillar indexes and the CE index were developed via PCA (see Table A.3 in the Supplementary Appendix for details on the PCA output, such as communalities, total variance explained, and component matrix). The quality of the produced indexes is inferred by applying two well-established tests (Shrestha, 2021 ): the Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin (KMO) Measure of Sampling Adequacy and the Bartlett’s test. The first test returns the proportion of variance in the variables that might be caused by underlying factors. When KMO values are higher than 0.5, the sample is deemed acceptable (Martins et al., 2020 ). The second test checks the hypothesis that the correlation matrix is an identity matrix, and indicates whether the variables are unrelated and not suitable for structure detection. When the output is less than 0.05, the available data is deemed suitable to apply the factor analysis.

The Bartlett’s test reveals that the indexes are adequate, as all output values are below 0.05. The KMO corroborates the result, with all values higher than 0.5 (see Table 2 ). These results confirm that the developed indexes are suitable for the analysis.

Overall, across the 362 cities, the RJ index ranges within (−1.59, 6.17) with mean −1.96 (s.d. 2.17); the PJ index ranges within (−5.98, 5.27) with mean 2.36 (s.d. 2.32); the DJ ranges within (−2.41–8.78) with mean −2.54 (s.d. 2.99); and the IJ index ranges within (−1.20, 2.82) with mean 2.38 (s.d. 1.23). The CJA index across the 362 cities ranges within (−2.79, 5.76) with mean −6.02 (s.d. 1.88). The distribution can be visualised in Fig. 2 . As shown in Fig. 2 , this index seems to vary significantly across countries, on average.

Mean CJA index by country and statistical distribution of CJA and all its compositional indexes.

To exclude issues of multicollinearity between the independent variables and the developed CJA index that we will use in the regression analysis, we assess the Pearson’ correlation.

Table 3 shows that the values are not high enough to be concerned with multicollinearity, as all independent variables have an absolute value of Pearson correlation coefficient that is less than 0.5 (Young, 2018 ). This result is further corroborated by a second test for multicollinearity using the variance inflation factor , developed post-regression.

Table 3 also suggests the existence of a significant and strong correlation between CJA and:

Log GDP per capita Footnote 1 (+),

financial government support (+),

reporting government support (+),

coordination government support (+),

technical government support (+),

tools and skills access government support (+),

dissemination government support (+),

capacity government support (+),

regulation government support (+),

financial advisory government support (+),

perceived favourable economy (+),

perceived favourable authorisation process (+),

perceived favourable financing (+),

perceived favourable communication (+),

number of fields with legal power (+),

and number of identified barriers (+).

CJA is also mildly correlated with population density (+). The regression analysis is used to confirm the strength of such relationships.

Figure 3 shows the positive relationship suggested by the Pearson’s correlation between climate engagement and climate awareness. It also shows that the average of the two indexes differs quite substantially across countries. Therefore, we first conduct the analysis using the whole dataset.

Some country names have been replaced with their official codes (Eurostat, 2023 ) for better visibility.

To ensure that we consider the relationships between cities within a country and take into account the shared characteristics among cities, we used cluster-robust standard errors. This method allows for a more comprehensive understanding of the correlation structure among cities within the same country and, thus, a more valid and robust approach than standard errors that assume independence among observations (in traditional statistical models that do not consider clustering, standard errors are assumed to be independent across all observations). However, in the context of cities within a country, this assumption may not hold true due to similarities arising from various factors such as geographical proximity, cultural influences, or policy interventions. Hence, we treat countries as clusters, recognising that cities within a country may have similar unobservable factors (Angrist & Pischke, 2008 ).

Second, to absorb any country effect and allow the estimates of the coefficients on city-level characteristics to differ across countries, we would ideally run a separate regression model for each country (Bryan & Jenkins, 2021 ). However, given that countries are unevenly represented in the pool of 362 Mission cities, we resort to the category-based approach in which regressions are computed separately on three country categories based on geographical attributes:

Eastern : Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania, Kosovo, Croatia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, and Slovakia.

North-Western Footnote 2 : Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, France, Austria, Switzerland, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Ireland, and the UK.

Southern : Spain, Portugal, Malta, Italy, Greece, Cyprus, Turkey, and Israel.

Table 4 and Fig. 4 show the general model considering the whole sample of cities and a category-based approach in which regressions are conducted based on countries’ categories. Results confirm a positive correlation between climate engagement and climate justice awareness.

Coefficients estimates and confidence intervals from regression models analysing i) all cities (blue) ii) North-Western cities (red), iii) Southern cities (green), and iv) Eastern cities (yellow).

Across all models, we find that high climate engagement seems to have a positive influence on the potential that climate decisions are made in a justice-aware way, as the two indexes result correlated regardless of the country group.

When looking at the general model, we also find that the justice-awareness potential is positively influenced by the availability of governmental support in capacity building and in financial advisory services, and by the breadth of the fields over which the city has legal power to act/make policy decisions. Conversely, it is negatively influenced by the perception that the city geo-climatic conditions are favourable (e.g., proximity to water bodies, moderate occurrence of climate extremes).

In North-western cities, justice awareness is positively influenced by the availability of government support in coordination and by the density of population, whereas in Southern cities, by the extent of the city legal powers and by the availability of governmental support in financial advisory services, resource mobilisation and reporting. In Eastern cities, higher justice awareness comes with the availability of governmental support in capacity building and in financial support, and project development/implementation. Conversely, it is negatively influenced by the perception of a favourable climate and financial situation.

Overall, all models seem to be satisfactory in explaining variability, as all R 2 are above 0.5, and in avoiding multicollinearity, as the mean VIF is always between 1 and 5, indicating moderate correlation between the other explanatory variables in the model, but not severe enough to require attention.

Correlation analysis was conducted to examine the associations between CJA and potential drivers and barriers affecting just climate action development in a large sample of European cities. At this stage, the focus was on identifying general influences. Out of the 18 factors tested, 17 were found to be significantly related to both climate engagement and city-specific factors.

CE exhibits a strong positive correlation ( p  < 0.01). This result suggests that the more cities exert efforts in addressing climate change goals, the more they are likely to take climate justice concerns on board when designing and implementing climate efforts. The following city-specific institutional and socio-economic factors were identified as the most influential drivers of justice-awareness potential, exhibiting strong positive correlations ( p  < 0.01):

GDP per capita and degree of city legal powers;

government (i) financial support, (ii) reporting support, (iii) coordination support, (iv) technical assistance, (v) skill support, (vi) dissemination assistance, (vii) capacity building assistance, (viii) policy regulation assistance, (ix) financial advisory services;

perceptions of a favourable (i) economy, (ii) financial situation, (iii) communication, and

identified barriers to climate action.

These results suggest that wealthier cities could more likely attain social justice goals when planning and implementing climate action. Cities that consider their economic, financing, and communication strategies as favourable city-specific features are also more likely to be climate justice aware. Results also suggest that cities that receive cross-sectoral support from higher governance levels are more likely to take into account justice dimensions. Two key drivers of CJA are also the breadth of cities legal power and the ability to identify more barriers to climate action. Population size exhibits only a mild positive correlation ( p  < 0.10). This suggests that being a populous city might not necessarily lead to more justice considerations when developing climate action. Finally, perceiving climate as a favourable city-specific feature does not seem to be a motivating factor for cities to take into account justice dimensions in climate efforts.

The above correlation results are only partially confirmed by the regression analysis conducted on the whole sample of cities. Using all factors analysed in the correlation matrix yields a model of moderate good fit. In particular, the R 2 of 0.529 indicates that the model explains a substantial portion of the variability in the CJA index. For CJA, CE and receiving government financial support are important factors with a strongly significant ( p  < 0.01) contribution to the model. Notably, the coefficient of 0.420 suggests a positive and statistically significant relationship between CE and CJA, wherein a one-unit increase in CE is associated with an estimated increase of 0.420 units in CJA, assuming all other variables in the model are held constant. This implies that cities that are more engaged in climate action tend to show higher levels of CJA. The coefficient of 0.405 suggests a positive and statistically significant relationship between CJA and government financial support, wherein a one-unit increase in government financial support is associated with an estimated increase of 0.405 units in CJA, ceteris paribus. This implies that cities that receive more financial support from higher governance levels tend to show higher levels of CJA. The breadth of legal power and perceiving climate as a city-specific favourable condition are also important influencing factors of CJA, but with a lesser significance extent ( p  < 0.05). The coefficient of 0.0541 suggests a positive and statistically significant relationship between number of fields with legal power and CJA, wherein a one-unit increase in the number of fields with legal power is associated with an estimated increase of 0.0541 units in CJA, ceteris paribus. This implies that cities that have the power to take decisions on a breadth of climate-related fields tend to show higher levels of CJA. The coefficient of −0.164 suggests a negative and statistically significant relationship between favourable climate perceptions and CJA, wherein a one-unit increase in favourable climate perceptions is associated with an estimated decrease of 0.164 units in CJA, ceteris paribus. This implies that cities that do not perceive the urgency to act on their local climate tend to show lower levels of CJA. Finally, receiving financial advisory services from the government only mildly explains CJA. The coefficient of 0.297 suggests a positive and statistically significant ( p  < 0.10) relationship between financial advisory services and CJA, wherein a one-unit increase in available financial advisory services is associated with an estimated increase of 0.297 units in CJA, assuming all other variables in the model are held constant. This implies that cities that are equipped with more government financial advisory services tend to show higher levels of CJA.

Overall, results from the general regression model suggest that CE has a positive impact on cities' climate justice awareness, irrespective of their geographical classification. They also suggest that the availability of governmental support in capacity building and financial advisory services, and the extent of the city legal powers across different fields of action are positively related to justice awareness. This suggests that when cities have the means and freedom to decide how to plan and implement climate efforts, they can also pursue objectives that are not immediately related to emission reduction, but embrace a broader dimension sensitive to social justice. At the same time, results suggest that the perception of favourable geo-climatic conditions is negatively related to climate justice awareness. This insight further echoes the positive relationship between CE and CJA, as a favourable climate might reduce the perceived urgency of climate action and the consideration of the social issues associated with it.

The results from the regression analyses run on specific geographic groups highlight that when country effects are taken into account, the relationships with CJA estimated with the general model are not always confirmed. Additionally, they unveil relationships with new dimensions. This suggests that aggregating data can make certain relationships only apparently strong (Wooldridge, 2015 ), and that the fact that cities within the same geographic region might share similar governance structures, historical legacies, and economic, cultural, and political characteristics (Breil et al., 2018 ) needs to be accounted in the analysis.

For all geographical groups, the regression model yields a moderate good fit since the R 2 (0.524 for North-Western cities, 0.537 for Southern cities, and 0.609 for Eastern cities) indicates that the model explains a substantial portion of the variability in the CJA index. As observed in the general model, we find that for CJA, CE is a key factor with a strongly significant ( p  < 0.01) contribution to the model, with the following territorial nuances. The coefficients (0.526, 0.350, and 0.413 for the three groups respectively) suggest a positive and statistically significant relationship between CE and CJA, wherein a one-unit increase in CE is associated with an estimated increase of 0.526, 0.350, and 0.413 units in CJA (and thus 0.106 more or 0.07 and 0.007 units less than estimated in the general model, respectively).

When it comes to North-Western cities in particular, differently from the general model we find that population density and receiving coordination support from the government moderately ( p  < 0.05) explain CJA. Notably, the coefficient of 0.0000880 suggests a positive and statistically significant relationship between population density and CJA, wherein a one-unit increase in population density is associated with an estimated increase of 0.0000880 units in CJA. This implies that densely populated North-Western cities tend to show higher levels of CJA. Further, the coefficient of 0.662 suggests a positive and statistically significant relationship between receiving coordination support from the government and CJA, wherein a one-unit increase in government coordination support is associated with an estimated increase of 0.662 units in CJA. This entails that North-Western cities that receive higher coordination support from the government tend to show higher levels of CJA. Overall, the regression analysis for North-western cities reveals that CJA is positively influenced by the availability of governmental support in coordination and by population density. This suggests that the provision of support in coordination can be a key way to address the potential high structural complexity (level of alignment and interaction across different governance and low population density) undermining the attention North-western cities can devote to social objectives when planning and implementing climate action. This finding aligns with existing evidence on the higher emissions mitigation ambition demonstrated by Northern and Western Europe cities (Reckien et al., 2018 ; Reckien et al., 2015 ; Salvia et al., 2021 ) and with the significant correlation between such ambition and national incentives, characteristics, and climate policies (Hsu et al., 2020 ; Salvia et al., 2021 ).

Similar to the general model, among Southern cities, receiving financial advisory services from the government and the breadth of legal power explain CJA, and these relationships are stronger ( p  < 0.01) than for the general model. The coefficient of 0.642 suggests that a one-unit increase in available financial advisory services is associated with an estimated increase of 0.642 units in CJA, ceteris paribus. This implies that Southern cities that are equipped with more government financial advisory services tend to show higher levels of CJA. The coefficient of 0.112 suggests that a one-unit increase in the number of fields with legal power is associated with an estimated increase of 0.112 units in CJA, ceteris paribus. This implies that the more Southern cities have the power to decide where to exert their climate effort, the more they tend to show higher levels of CJA. Finally, differently from the general model, we find that receiving government support on reporting moderately ( p  < 0.10) explains CJA. Notably, the coefficient of 0.521 suggests a positive and statistically significant relationship between government support on reporting and CJA, wherein a one-unit increase in government support on reporting is associated with an estimated increase of 0.521 units in CJA. This entails that Southern cities that are equipped with tools that ease coordination tend to show higher levels of CJA. Overall, for Southern cities, results highlight that CJA is positively influenced by the breadth of the city legal powers and by the availability of governmental support in financial advice and resource mobilisation, and mildly in reporting. This suggests that providing more legitimacy and advice on how to get resources for climate action by higher-level governments can be a key way to make Southern cities more considerate of social objectives in their climate efforts.

Finally, for Eastern cities and in agreement with the general model, we find that perceiving own climate as a favourable local feature explains CJA, and this relationship is stronger ( p  < 0.05) than for the general model. The coefficient of −0.183 suggests that a one-unit increase in perceptions of a favourable climate is associated with an estimated decrease of 0.183 units in CJA, ceteris paribus. This implies that Eastern cities that perceive a lesser urgency to act on their local climate tend to show lower levels of CJA. Further, differently from the general model, we find that receiving government financial support strongly ( p  < 0.01) explains CJA, and perceiving financial conditions as favourable local features moderately ( p  < 0.10) does so. The coefficient of 0.637 suggests that a one-unit increase in government financial support is associated with an estimated increase of 0.637 units in CJA, ceteris paribus. This entails that Eastern cities that receive financial support are more prone to consider justice dimensions. The coefficient of −0.340 suggests that a one-unit increase in perceptions of favourable financial conditions is associated with an estimated decrease of 0.340 units in CJA, ceteris paribus. This complements the previous result, suggesting that cities that are eligible for financial support are more prone to consider justice dimensions. Overall, the regression analysis on Eastern cities reveals that climate justice awareness is positively influenced by the availability of governmental support in capacity building, financial support, and project development/implementation, while it is negatively influenced by the perception of a favourable climate and mildly, financial situation. This suggests that equipping Eastern cities with additional means and resources can be a key way to ease the consideration of justice dimensions. Conversely, the result that cities get socially detached when feeling secure (in terms of climate and financial risks) points to a need to address security misperceptions and empowerment. Indeed, there is evidence that Southern and Eastern cities—particularly those ranking low in terms of capacity/GDP—tend to be less ambitious in climate mitigation and to rely on exogenous systems (international climate networks, national government) to steer their climate action (Salvia et al., 2021 ). This may entail that for these cities, external forces define their capacity to co-tackle climate justice.

With respect to policy implications, in Northern cities, where economic development and low population density might increase the complexity of decision-making, support in coordination might ease the consideration of social objectives in climate action. Being more advanced in their adaptation policies, and having a longer tradition of citizen engagement (Breil et al., 2018 ), most North-western cities are focused on abating the hardest emissions (i.e., the last percentage points), hence a high degree of coordination needs to be in place to remove residual barriers (e.g., complex jurisdictions, unfavourable regulations). Southern cities, which are at higher risks from negative social and environmental consequences of climate change (Mavromatidi et al., 2018 ), reveal a good potential to implement a social just climate action, but this needs to be unlocked through empowerment measures. In Eastern cities, where paths defined by institutional and historical legacies might still dictate an infrastructural and economic divide (Ürge-Vorsatz et al., 2018 ), more immediate objectives might take over the consideration of social objectives, unless cities receive dedicated external support.

Conclusions

Cities can be key agents of change in addressing global climate change, being “natural” sites for innovative and experimental climate action in a progressive direction. Cities themselves acknowledged this role in Europe, as testified by the European Mission on 100 Climate-Neutral and Smart Cities, where 100+ cities committed to pursue climate neutrality by 2030. However, even among the most ambitious cities in climate mitigation, there might be considerable heterogeneity in the scope of climate action. In particular, cities can be loci of injustices, if they are not able to recognise how planned climate efforts might generate or exacerbate forms of injustice in their specific contexts. That is why, cities need to be justice-aware when developing climate action.

Climate justice has increasingly gained momentum in the academic and policy debates on climate change; however, many have also debated its operational value. The few investigations on the topic are based on a limited number of cities and interpretative indicators. The main contribution of this study lies in empirically uncovering the operational value of climate justice in urban climate action, by evaluating climate justice concerns in urban climate decision-making processes and by identifying key areas that could lead to better consideration of justice dimensions across European cities. We demonstrate, via econometric analysis, a way to homogenously evaluate the degree of justice awareness in climate action planning, and to use this measure as a lever to guide and course-correct city-level climate policy to simultaneously pursue the climate change and social justice goals.

Drawing from the climate justice framework and a unique dataset comprising responses homogenously elicited through a survey, we created an indicator for climate justice awareness and assessed how this can be predicted by climate engagement and a set of city-specific factors. In particular, we used the data from 362 cities who expressed interest in the Cities Mission, and used a PCA approach to develop a climate justice awareness index inclusive of the procedural, distributive, recognition, and intergenerational justice pillars.

Correlation and regression results reveal that, regardless of the geographical categorisation, cities’ climate justice awareness is positively influenced by climate engagement. This empirical evidence, new to the current literature, provides some implications for practice, as it shows that cities that are more engaged in addressing climate change goals tend to design and implement their efforts by co-targeting social justice goals. Moreover, our results offer additional novel insights into how some city-specific factors might act as drivers and barriers to justice-considerate climate action.

Overall and for the first time to the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study sheds light on the positive relationship that exists between engagement in climate action at the city level and awareness of its social justice aspects, evaluated across its recognitional, distributive, procedural, and intergenerational dimensions. Embedding justice considerations into climate action planning implies additional challenges and a higher degree of integration and holism in urban planning and policy-making. This is mirrored in the predictors for higher justice awareness levels and is nuanced according to specific national characteristics. The insights gathered through this analysis constitute a solid baseline to improve our understanding of the drivers and barriers to a just climate transition. They can legitimate and inform ongoing climate mitigation frameworks at an international and European scale, such as the UN-backed Race to Zero campaign, that rally non-State actors to take rigorous and immediate action to reduce global emissions and deliver a healthier, fairer zero-carbon world in time. As engagement in climate efforts tends to co-stimulate social justice goals, ongoing and future climate agendas could capitalise on the results here presented to maximise the synergistic effect and to leverage the territorial, economic, and socio-political predictors.

However, it is important to note that correlation and regression analysis alone cannot establish causal relationships. Therefore, an avenue for future research is to undertake comprehensive analyses to delve deeper into the associations uncovered in this study. Future research could also involve exploring how each of the four climate justice pillars are understood by urban decision-makers and citizens by engaging in interviews with them. Such efforts would contribute to the development of comprehensive climate justice awareness indices that incorporate better the characteristics of cities. Finally, we analysed a particular subgroup of ambitious cities in climate action, at the stage of formulating a vision to climate neutrality in the short haul. Future studies should investigate the planned and implemented efforts of the 100+ selected cities, by assessing how climate justice is factually integrated in their actions. Furthermore, as the Cities Mission proceeds in its implementation phase, new knowledge and experience will be generated on how to deliver just transformations within and beyond the city boundary. A fully fledged just transition builds on values of territorial cohesion and multi-level governance to legitimise the target and multiply the benefits. Hence, best practices in multi-scale action and in tackling Scope 3/consumption-based emissions will be collected and guidelines will be disseminated through the Mission in the attempt to eradicate “low-carbon illusions” and establish a paradigm of full climate responsibility. As cities acknowledged in the EOI that non-compliance with the principle of equal opportunities on all levels throughout the transition will undermine its achievement, it is expected that the Mission will catalyse the conceptualisation, testing, and spread of new transition models to expand the frontiers of climate justice across local-to-global networks of production, consumption, and distribution.

Data availability

The datasets generated and analysed during the current study are not publicly available due to confidentiality agreements.

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The views expressed here are purely those of the authors and may not, under any circumstances, be regarded as an official position of the European Commission. The authors warmly than Pietro Florio (Joint Research Centre, European Commission) for extracting georeferenced GDP data used to characterise the cities.

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Della Valle, N., Ulpiani, G. & Vetters, N. Assessing climate justice awareness among climate neutral-to-be cities. Humanit Soc Sci Commun 10 , 440 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-023-01953-y

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Book Reviews

Greta thunberg's 'the climate book' urges world to keep climate justice out front.

Barbara J. King

Swedish climate campaigner Greta Thunberg waits in Erkelenz, Germany, to take part in a demonstration at a nearby a coal mine on Jan. 14. Michael Probst/AP hide caption

Swedish climate campaigner Greta Thunberg waits in Erkelenz, Germany, to take part in a demonstration at a nearby a coal mine on Jan. 14.

Climate activist Greta Thunberg who, at age 15, led school strikes every Friday in her home country of Sweden — a practice that caught on globally — has now, at 20, managed to bring together more than 100 scientists, environmental activists, journalists and writers to lay out exactly how and why it's clear that the climate crisis is happening.

Impressively, in The Climate Book, Thunberg and team — which includes well-known names like Margaret Atwood, George Monbiot, Bill McKibben and Robin Wall Kimmerer -- explain and offer action items in 84 compelling, bite-size chapters.

Most critically, they — and Thunberg herself in numerous brief essays of her own — explain what steps need to be taken without delay if the world is to have a reasonable chance of limiting global temperature rise as stated in the 2015 Paris Agreement. The document aims to keep the temperature rise to below 2 degrees Celsius (and better yet below 1.5 degrees Celsius).

The essays also explain why climate justice must be at the center of these efforts.

Reading The Climate Book at a deliberate pace over some weeks (it's a lot to absorb), the cumulative impact on my understanding of the crisis through its data, cross-cultural reflections, and paths for step-by-step change became mesmerizing.

If you think the rich nations of the world are making real progress towards achieving limits on global warming, think again. In one essay, Kevin Anderson, professor of energy and climate change at the Universities of Manchester, Uppsala and Bergen, puts it this way: "Wealthy nations must eliminate their use of fossils fuels by around 2030 for a likely chance of 1.5C, extending only around 2035 to 2040 for 2C... We are where we are precisely because for thirty years we've favoured make-believe over real mitigation."

What does Anderson mean by "make-believe"? In her own chapter, journalist Alexandra Urisman Otto describes her investigation into Swedish climate policy, specifically its net zero target for 2045. She discovered a discrepancy between the official number of greenhouse gases emitted each year — 50 million tons — and the real figure, 150 million tons. That lower, official figure leaves out "emissions from consumption and the burning of biomass," which means the target is way off, she writes. If all countries were off by that much, the world would be heading straight for a catastrophic increase of 2.5 to 3C.

What does that mean, emissions from consumption and the burning of biomass? John Barrett, professor of energy and climate policy at the University of Leeds, and Alice Garvey, sustainability researcher at the same university, explain that "emissions from consumption" means emissions are allocated to the country of the consumer, not the producer. Because industrial production is often outsourced to developing economies, in a world where climate justice were front and center, the consumer country (in this example, Sweden) would take the burden of lessening the emissions from consumption.

As for biomass, that refers to burning wood for energy, and sometimes other materials like kelp. Burning wood for energy causes more emissions per unit of energy than fossil fuels, explain Karl-Heinz Erb and Simone Gingrich, both social ecology professors at Vienna's University of Natural Resources and Life Sciences.

Alice Larkin, professor of climate science and energy policy at the University of Manchester, adds "a highly significant complication" to this disturbing picture: international aviation and shipping aren't typically accounted for in national emission targets, policies, and carbon budgets, either.

This under-reporting situation, I would wager, isn't known even by many climate-literate citizens. It certainly wasn't to me.

One urgent goal, then, is transparency in climate-emission figures. Beyond that, Thunberg says, distribution of climate budgets fairly across countries of the world must be a priority. Without climate justice, policies are unlikely to succeed. An especially effective subsection of the book, "We are not all in the same boat," brings this point to life.

Saleemul Huq, director of a Bangladeshi international center for climate change, puts the point squarely: The communities most devastated by climate change "are overwhelmingly poor people of colour." But Bangladeshi citizens shouldn't be thought of as passive victims, Huq emphasizes. Communities work together to prepare for the effects of climate disasters in ways not often seen in the global north. For example, "An elderly widow living alone will have two children from the high school assigned to go and pick her up" in case of hurricane or other emergency.

Globally, then, what to do? First, we can hold industrial and corporate interests accountable and push back on their messages placing the burden solely on the individual, a tactic that allows the worst of the status quo carbon-emissions activities to continue.

Beyond this, it's not enough "to become vegetarian for one day a week, offset our holiday trips to Thailand or switch our diesel SUV for an electric car," as Thunberg puts it. Participating in recycling may lead to feel-good moments, but in fact, in the words of Greenpeace activist Nina Schrank, it's "perhaps the greatest example of greenwashing on the planet today." Even the 9% of plastic that does get recycled ends up (after one or two cycles) dumped or burned.

Thunberg herself has given up flying. In the book she writes, "Frequent flying is by far the most climate-destructive individual activity you can engage in." Though she writes that lowering her personal carbon footprint isn't her specific goal in sailing (instead of flying) across the Atlantic — she hopes to convey the need for urgent, collective behavioral change. "If we do not see anyone else behaving as if we are in a crisis, then very few will understand that we actually are in a crisis," she writes.

We can join Thunberg in giving up- or at least reducing- a flying habit if we have one. Three further steps, out of many offered in the book, are these: Switch to plant-based diets. Support natural climate solutions, by protecting forests, salt marshes, mangroves, the oceans, and all the animal and plant life in these habitats. Pressure the media to go beyond the latest story on a heat wave or collapsing glacier to focus on root causes, time urgency, and solutions. Thunberg writes that "No entity other than the media has the opportunity to create the necessary transformation of our global society."

Social norms can and do change, Thunberg emphasizes. That's our greatest source of hope — but only if we keep climate justice front and center at every step.

Barbara J. King is a biological anthropologist emerita at William & Mary. Animals' Best Friends: Putting Compassion to Work for Animals in Captivity is her seventh book. Find her on Twitter @bjkingape

Justice and fairness in global climate action

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Kumi naidoo , kumi naidoo human rights activist, south africa, former executive director - greenpeace @kuminaidoo mirosław proppé , mirosław proppé chief executive officer - wwf poland @miroslawproppe daniel yergin , and daniel yergin vice chairman - ihs, inc., trustee - the brookings institution samantha gross samantha gross director - energy security and climate initiative , fellow - foreign policy , energy security and climate initiative @samanthaenergy.

November 23, 2022

In this episode of “Climate Sense,” Samantha Gross explores the issue of justice and fairness in global climate action. Many of the world’s poorest countries have contributed the least to existing greenhouse gases but are on the front lines of the changing climate. It is not enough to have science, knowledge, and resources. What is essential to climate justice is making sure that climate change is not an excuse to let the developing world shoulder the work and costs of reducing emissions.

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Climate change is a justice issue – these 6 charts show why

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Climate change has hit home around the world in 2021 with record heat waves , droughts , wildfires and extreme storms . Often, the people suffering most from the effects of climate change are those who have done the least to cause it.

To reduce climate change and protect those who are most vulnerable, it’s important to understand where emissions come from, who climate change is harming and how both of these patterns intersect with other forms of injustice.

I study the justice dilemmas presented by climate change and climate policies, and have been involved in international climate negotiations as an observer since 2009. Here are six charts that help explain the challenges.

Where emissions come from

One common way to think about a country’s responsibility for climate change is to look at its greenhouse gas emissions per capita, or per person.

For example, China is currently the single largest greenhouse gas emitter by country. However, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the U.S., Australia and Canada all have more than twice the per capita emissions of China. And they each have more than 100 times the per capita emissions of several countries in Africa.

These differences are very important from a justice perspective.

The majority of greenhouse gas emissions come from the burning of fossil fuels to power industries, stores, homes and schools and produce goods and services, including food, transportation and infrastructure, to name just a few.

As a country’s emissions get higher, they are less tied to essentials for human well-being. Measures of human well-being increase very rapidly with relatively small increases in emissions, but then level off . That means high-emitting countries could reduce their emissions significantly without reducing the well-being of their populations, while lower-income, lower-emitting countries cannot.

Low-income countries have been arguing for years that, in a context in which global emissions must be dramatically reduced in the next half-century , it would be unjust to require them to cut essential investments in areas that richer countries already have invested in, such as access to electricity, education and basic health care, while those in richer countries continue to enjoy lifestyles with high consumption of energy and consumer goods.

Responsibility for decades of emissions

Looking at current emissions alone misses another important aspect of climate injustice: Greenhouse gas emissions accumulate over time.

Carbon dioxide stays in the atmosphere for hundreds of years , and this accumulation drives climate change. Carbon dioxide traps heat , warming the planet. Some countries and regions bear vastly more responsibility for cumulative emissions than others.

For instance, the United States has emitted over a quarter of all greenhouse gases since the 1750s, while the entire continent of Africa has emitted only about 3% .

People today continue to benefit from wealth and infrastructure that was generated with energy linked to these emissions decades ago.

Emissions differences within countries

The benefits of fossil fuels have been uneven within countries, as well.

From this perspective, thinking about climate justice requires attention to patterns of wealth . A study by the Stockholm Environment Institute and Oxfam found that 5% of the world’s population was responsible for 36% of the greenhouse gases from 1990-2015. The poorest half of the population was responsible for less than 6%.

These patterns are directly connected to the lack of access to energy by the poorest half of the world’s population and the high consumption of the wealthiest through things like luxury air travel, second homes and personal transportation. They also show how actions by a few high emitters could reduce a region’s climate impact.

Similarly, over one-third of global carbon emissions from fossil fuels and cement over the past half-century can be directly traced to 20 companies , primarily producers of oil and gas. This draws attention to the need to develop policies capable of holding large corporations accountable for their role in climate change.

Who will be harmed by climate change?

Understanding where emissions come from is only part of the climate justice dilemma. Poor countries and regions often also face greater risks from climate change.

Some small island countries, such as Tuvalu and the Marshall Islands , face threats to their very survival as sea levels rise. Parts of sub-Saharan Africa , the Arctic and mountain regions face much more rapid climate change than other parts of the world. In parts of Africa, changes in temperature and precipitation are contributing to food security concerns .

Many of these countries and communities bear little responsibility for the cumulative greenhouse gas emissions driving climate change. At the same time, they have the fewest resources available to protect themselves.

Climate impacts – such as droughts, floods or storms – affect people differently depending on their wealth and access to resources and on their involvement in decision making. Processes that marginalize people, such as racial injustice and colonialism, mean that some people in a country or community are more likely than others to be able to protect themselves from climate harms.

Strategies for a just climate agreement

All of these justice issues are central to negotiations at the United Nations’ Glasgow climate conference and beyond.

Many discussions will focus on who should reduce emissions and how poor countries’ reductions should be supported. Investing in renewable energy, for example, can avoid future emissions, but low-income countries need financial help.

Wealthy countries have been slow to meet their commitment to provide US$100 billion a year to help developing countries adapt to the changing climate, and the costs of adaptation continue to rise.

Some leaders are also asking hard questions about what to do in the face of losses that cannot be undone . How should the global community support people losing their homelands and ways of life?

Some of the most important issues from a justice perspective must be dealt with locally and within countries. Systemic racism cannot be dealt with at the international level. Creating local and national plans for protecting the most vulnerable people, and laws and other tools to hold corporations accountable, will also need to happen within countries.

These discussions will continue long after the Glasgow conference ends.

This story is part of The Conversation’s coverage of COP26, the Glasgow climate conference, by experts from around the world. Amid a rising tide of climate news and stories, The Conversation is here to clear the air and make sure you get information you can trust. Read more of our U.S. and global coverage .

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Climate change is a matter of justice – here’s why

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What is climate justice and why does it matter?

Climate justice means putting equity and human rights at the core of decision-making and action on climate change.

The concept has been widely used to refer to the unequal historical responsibility that countries and communities bear in relation to the climate crisis. It suggests that the countries, industries, businesses, and people that have become wealthy from emitting large amounts of greenhouse gases have a responsibility to help those affected by climate change, particularly the most vulnerable countries and communities, who often are the ones that have contributed the least to the crisis.

There are many facets to climate justice. Below, we provide an overview of a few of them.

• Structural inequalities : Even within the same country, the impacts of climate change may be felt unevenly due to structural inequalities based on race, ethnicity, gender, and socioeconomic status.  Women are more severely affected by climate change impacts , because they have access to fewer resources to adapt and cope with abrupt changes. People with disabilities are at increased risk of the adverse impacts of climate change, including threats to their health, food security, access to water energy, and sanitation, and livelihoods, particularly in developing countries. Indigenous Peoples , who protect 80 percent of the world’s biodiversity, are facing increasing threats and risks to their lives, livelihoods, and traditional knowledge.   
• Socioeconomic inequalities : The impacts of climate change and the resources needed to address climate change impacts are distributed unequally around the world. Low-income countries, and vulnerable populations within those countries, are more susceptible to climate-induced loss and damage. Globally, the 10 percent of households with the highest per capita emissions contribute 34–45 percent of global household greenhouse gas emissions, while the bottom 50 percent contribute 13–15 percent.  
• Intergenerational inequity : Children and young people today have not contributed to the climate crisis in a significant way but will bear the full force of climate change impacts as they advance through life . Because their human rights are threatened by the decisions of previous generations, their rights must be centred in all climate decision-making and action.

Why is climate justice important?

Climate change is a human rights issue. All people should have the agency to live life with dignity. However, the climate crisis is causing loss of lives, livelihoods, language, and culture, putting many at risk of food and water shortages, and triggering displacement and conflict.

The climate crisis impedes the right to good health as well. Rising temperatures, increased frequency of extreme weather events, polluted air and water contribute to significant health impacts, including heat stress, disease outbreaks, malnutrition, and trauma from having lived through disasters.

The impacts are more severe for vulnerable populations who have limited means to adapt to climate change impacts. Between 2010 and 2020, human mortality from floods, droughts, and storms was 15 times higher in highly vulnerable regions , compared to regions with very low vulnerability.

The climate crisis also has impacts on a country’s education system. When temperatures are too high or extreme weather events hit, for example, it can damage infrastructure and damage educational institutions, threaten the ability of parents to send their children to school, impacting the futures of young generations.

Climate justice is also an important aspect of just transition toward a sustainable future. Local communities, especially informal workers and other vulnerable and marginalized populations can be harmed in this transition if not protected and consulted. For example, there are increasing concerns around human rights violations related to mining for minerals needed to produce batteries for electric vehicles.

Currently, those who have least contributed to the climate crisis are being disproportionately affected by it. Climate justice suggests that the responsibilities in addressing climate change should be divided according to who is contributing most to the problem , while addressing systemic, socioeconomic, and intergenerational inequalities.

Photo credit: Markus Spiske/Pexels

Photo credit: Tuvalu Ministry of Justice/Facebook

What are the obstacles to achieving climate justice?

There are many challenges that countries and communities face on the road to achieving climate justice.

One obstacle is lack of transparency and inclusion in climate negotiations and plans . The voices of women, youth, Indigenous Peoples, and marginalized groups are integral to the future of our planet, and it is essential that they have access to platforms where they can participate in decision-making and implementation of policies and plans. However, underrepresented voices may also be victims of ‘tokenism,’ meaning that they are sometimes included with the intention of appearing inclusive but having only marginal roles or lacking empowerment.

Another obstacle is lack of access to education and resources on the environment, climate change, and human rights . This prevents people, often those most affected by the problem, from making the necessary connections and participating in the relevant policy discussions. Language barriers can often pose a challenge as well, especially for local communities and Indigenous Peoples participating in decision-making and negotiations.

In many countries, environmental activists and defenders face dangerous consequences for demanding environmental rights and justice . They may be jailed, threatened, or subjected to violence, forced disappearances, or even murder. This creates an unsafe environment for defenders to come forward and demand justice .

At the global level, more vulnerable countries have been advocating for more financial and technical support from rich countries for decades. While there has been some recent progress on potential finance for loss and damage, many estimates have concluded that rich countries have yet to reach the $100 billion annual climate finance political commitment , which was agreed in 2009 and expected to start in 2020. Countries are already working on coming up with a new negotiated annual goal as the existing target is not adequate or science-based and more finance is needed annually to address increasing global warming.

How is UNDP supporting countries to tackle climate justice issues?

UNDP has a long history of working with countries on rule of law, human rights and access to justice, including issues of environmental and climate justice , such as constitutional reform, the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment, and other environment-related human rights. UNDP has also supported the development and implementation of environmental and climate change laws and policies; and the access to information, public participation, and justice on environmental matters.

More and more countries are recognizing human rights in their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) . Through the Climate Promise initiative, UNDP works to make the revision of the NDCs under the Paris Agreement a more inclusive and rights-based process. This includes guidance to work with youth in a meaningful way and advance gender equality in climate action plans . UNDP is working to also ensure Indigenous Peoples are also included in the NDC process.

Many countries are taking action to bring justice to the centre of environmental and climate issues.

Here are some examples of progress around the world:

Viet Nam is working with the business sector to implement the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.

In Latin America and the Caribbean, Panama and Argentina are working on access to information and justice and public participation in the public and policy dialogue on the environment, including their engagement with the Escazú Agreement –the world’s first binding treaty to address environmental human rights– which recently entered into force.

UNDP in Lebanon is strengthening the capacity of the Ministry of Environment on environmental policy development in terms of laws, regulations and other policy mechanisms.

Türkiye is providing training to young lawyers on climate justice to educate them on how to protect the rights of individuals and communities that are threatened by climate change and how to induce governments and companies to adopt more climate-friendly policies and practices.

What is the future of climate justice?

The voices and demands of vulnerable communities and groups are being increasingly acknowledged on the international agenda. Activists are taking to the streets around the world to demand change. Young climate leaders have been a powerful force in driving attention to issues of intergenerational climate justice.

In 2022, the UN General Assembly declared that access to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment is a universal human right . The declaration recognizes that the impact of climate change, the unsustainable management and use of natural resources, the pollution of air, land and water, the unsound management of chemicals and waste, and the resulting loss in biodiversity interfere with the effective enjoyment of all human rights. It is expected to be a catalyst for action and to empower ordinary people to hold their governments accountable.

Acknowledging the call of children and young people around the world, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child emphasized children’s right to a healthy environment with a special focus on climate change. Over 16,000 children were consulted in the drafting process, and the final document clarified the obligations of countries and the business sector.

Small Island Developing States have also been at the forefront of climate justice advocacy in negotiations. In March 2023, the UN General Assembly adopted a historical resolution requesting the International Court of Justice to provide an advisory opinion on countries’ obligations towards climate change . Stemming from an idea of students in the Pacific, the resolution was put forward by the Pacific Island state of Vanuatu, and supported by a core group of 17 countries. It asks the Court to give an opinion on the obligations of countries under international law to ensure the protection of the “planet’s climate system”. The resolution also requests an opinion on the legal consequences of causing significant harm to the climate system, in particular for small island states and people of present and future generations.

Climate litigation more broadly is also on the rise . Citizens, youth, and communities are increasingly taking governments and companies to court to address the climate and environment-related harms and injustices they are facing.

At COP27, an  historic decision for new funding arrangements, including a new fund, was established to help particularly vulnerable countries and communities respond to climate-induced loss and damage. This will help to provide new and additional finance specifically for addressing loss and damage for those most impacted.

It is clear the push for climate justice will only gain momentum as time goes on and the impacts of climate change become more pronounced.

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It’s time to address the devastating injustice of loss and damage.

A month after Cyclone Pam struck Tuvalu in 2015, the main square of Nui Island was still under water. Photo: Silke von Brockhausen/UNDP

In pictures: How climate change is causing loss and damage around the world

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What is ‘climate justice’?

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Climate change, an inherently social issue, can upset anyone’s daily life in countless ways. But not all climate impacts are created equal, or distributed equally. From extreme weather to rising sea levels, the effects of climate change often have disproportionate effects on historically marginalized or underserved communities.

“Climate justice” is a term, and more than that a movement, that acknowledges climate change can have disproportionately harmful social, economic, and public health impacts on disinvested populations. Advocates for climate justice are striving to have these inequities addressed head-on through long-term mitigation and adaptation strategies.

The following are key factors to consider in thinking about climate justice:

1) Climate justice begins with recognizing key groups are differently affected by climate change.

From the United Nations and the IPCC to the NAACP , many organizations are connecting the dots between civil rights and climate change.

As a UN blog describes it: “The impacts of climate change will not be borne equally or fairly, between rich and poor, women and men, and older and younger generations.”

“Climate change is happening now and to all of us. No country or community is immune,” according to UN Secretary-General António Guterres. “And, as is always the case, the poor and vulnerable are the first to suffer and the worst hit.”

Generally, many victims of climate change also have disproportionately low responsibility for causing the emissions responsible for climate change in the first place – particularly youth or people of any age living in developing countries that produce fewer emissions per capita than is the case in the major polluting countries.

2) Climate impacts can exacerbate inequitable social conditions.

Low-income communities, people of color, indigenous people, people with disabilities, older or very young people, women – all can be more susceptible to risks posed by climate impacts like raging storms and floods, increasing wildfire, severe heat, poor air quality, access to food and water, and disappearing shorelines.

Here are a few examples of how some communities may be more affected by these impacts than others – and may have fewer resources to handle those impacts, too:

• Communities of color are often more at risk from air pollution, according to both the NAACP , the American Lung Association, and countless research papers.
• Seniors, people with disabilities , and people with chronic illnesses may have a harder time living through periods of severe heat, or being able to quickly and safely evacuate from major storms or fire.
• People with limited income may live in subsidized housing, which too often is located in a flood plain . Their housing options may also have inadequate insulation, mold problems, or air conditioning to effectively combat severe heat or cope with strong storms. Economically challenged people may also be hard-pressed to afford flood or fire insurance, rebuild homes, or pay for steep medical bills after catastrophe strikes.
• Language barriers can make it difficult for immigrant communities to get early information about incoming storms or weather disasters or wildfires, or to communicate effectively with first responders in the midst of an evacuation order.
• Some indigenous communities are already seeing their homes and livelihoods lost to rising sea levels or drought. For example, the Biloxi-Chitimacha-Choctaw tribe has lost nearly all of its land and is relocating to higher ground.
• Prolonged drought and flooding can affect food supply or distribution, making it harder for people to access affordable, healthy food.
• Today’s youth and future generations will experience more profound impacts of climate change as it worsens over time, from direct adverse health impacts to the financial implications of needing to shore-up infrastructure and other adaptation and mitigation needs.

3) Momentum is building for climate justice solutions.

Organizations like the Climate Justice Alliance are working to bring race, gender, and class considerations to the center of the climate action discussion. The NAACP is also advocating for efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and advance clean energy while promoting food justice, transportation equity, and civil rights in emergency planning. And the UN and IPCC each continue to place greater emphasis on these issues.

In a June 29, 2020, Washington Post column headlined “ Climate Change is also a racial justice problem ,” reporter Sarah Kaplan wrote, “You can’t build a just and equitable society on a planet that’s been destabilized by human activities. Nor can you stop the world from warming without the experience and the expertise of those most affected by it.”

One indicator of the growing momentum of climate justice as a social issue is Democratic presidential hopeful Joe Biden’s campaign support for a “plan to secure environmental justice and equitable economic opportunity in a clean energy future…. Addressing environmental and climate justice is a core tenet.”

In the end, there is no single way to define, let alone champion, climate justice. But in combination with other current social justice movements – perhaps epitomized and including, but not limited to, the Black Lives Matter movement – many experts see climate justice becoming an increasingly significant component of overall concerns raised by climate change.

Also see: How inequality grows in the aftermath of hurricanes

Daisy Simmons

Daisy Simmons, assistant editor at Yale Climate Connections, is a creative, research-driven storyteller with 25 years of professional editorial experience. With a purposeful focus on covering solutions... More by Daisy Simmons

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In-depth Q&A: What is ‘climate justice’?

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When hurricanes, floods or droughts strike, all too often those hit hardest are poor and marginalised communities who bear little responsibility for climate change.

This is the central argument of “climate justice” – a reshaping of climate action from a technical effort to cut emissions into an approach that also addresses human rights and social inequality. 

As industrialised nations and corporations have amassed wealth by burning fossil fuels, many also argue that a “just” outcome would involve them redistributing more of this wealth towards those having to deal with the consequences. 

Pioneered by activists from the global south in response to the threats facing their homelands, today the term “climate justice” is widely used by researchers, NGOs and politicians seeking to address related injustices throughout society.

In this Q&A, Carbon Brief explores the history of climate justice, examining why the impacts of global warming are not borne equally and how the concept has influenced international politics, activism and courtrooms in recent years.

How has the concept of climate justice been developed?

• “Fair shares” of emissions

Climate debt and climate finance

• No “false solutions”

Just transition

• Fossil fuels and “corporate capture”

How does climate change affect people unequally?

How has climate justice shaped international negotiations, how has it influenced climate activism and politics, how has it influenced climate litigation.

Climate justice has emerged from the idea that historical responsibility for climate change lies with wealthy and powerful people – and yet it disproportionately impacts the poorest and most vulnerable.

• Analysis: Which countries are historically responsible for climate change?
• Analysis: The lack of diversity in climate-science research
• Climate justice: The challenge of achieving a ‘just transition’ in agriculture
• Experts: Why does ‘climate justice’ matter?
• Researchers: The barriers to climate science in the global south
• Guest post: An Indigenous peoples’ approach to climate justice

It has primarily been used to frame the contrast between industrialised nations that have been burning large volumes of fossil fuels freely for centuries and the poorer regions that are most susceptible to rising temperature.

Besides nations or governments, the term has also been employed to target the fossil fuel companies themselves, which have generated large profits while actively downplaying the impact of greenhouse gas emissions and blocking climate action .

However, the scope of climate justice is broad and, since its popularisation in the 1990s, the term has come to encompass the unequal distribution of impacts on a variety of groups, including Indigenous people , people of colour , women and disabled people .

It has also been used to describe the intergenerational injustice of older generations benefiting from fossil fuels and leaving young people to deal with the consequences .

Some refer to the “ triple injustice ” of climate change, with those affected the most, but contributing the least, sometimes also facing an additional burden from responses to global warming that worsen their situations further.

According to Asad Rehman , executive director of anti-poverty NGO War on Want , the concept of climate justice has largely been developed by activists from the global south who have argued that:

“Fixing the climate is only possible if we also fix all of the other inequalities that exist because not only does climate reinforce all those things, but it also amplifies them – and it’s an expression of those things.”

Mohamed Adow from thinktank Power Shift Africa tells Carbon Brief that climate justice is “an extension of the struggles of [global] southern, Indigenous and local communities for land, resources, sovereignty and anticolonialism”. 

Today, the message can be heard from the waves of climate protesters who take to streets around the world chanting : “What do we want? Climate justice. When do we want it? Now!” The timeline below lays out some of the key moments in the ascent of climate justice as a political idea and a rallying cry for activists.

A UN Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) paper describes the “global climate justice movement” as a loose merger between three entities: the environmental justice movement, the global justice or anti-globalisation movement, and a group of radical international NGOs involved in United Nations (UN) climate talks.

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The concept of “environmental justice” is often traced to the early 1980s in the US, when black protesters opposed the dumping of toxic chemicals in their communities, although its roots stretch back further to the civil rights activism of the 1960s.

This movement was led by people of colour outside of the predominantly white environmental establishment in the US who wanted to draw attention to the fact that their communities were being hit hardest by pollution. 

Such “environmental racism” has been summarised by “ father of environmental justice ” Dr Robert Bullard of Texas Southern University :

“Whether by conscious design or institutional neglect, communities of colour in urban ghettos, in rural ‘poverty pockets’, or on economically impoverished Native-American reservations face some of the worst environmental devastation in the nation.”

These concerns were formalised at the First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit in 1991, where attendees set out 17 principles of environmental justice.

They reflected Indigenous perceptions of the environment, with a first principle to affirm “the sacredness of Mother Earth, ecological unity and the interdependence of all species, and the right to be free from ecological destruction”. However, there was no mention of climate change.

In the years that followed, organisations with an anticapitalist, global justice perspective on issues such as debt, trade and globalisation began taking a greater interest in climate change. Their work in this area helped reframe the issue as something affecting people rather than simply an “environmental” problem. 

The environmental justice movement came from communities that historically bore the brunt of hosting waste sites. When a predominantly black county in NC (Warren County) protested a toxic waste landfill, it galvanized the nation to talk about environmental racism. pic.twitter.com/HYBQwN0dHS — NC DNCR (@ncculture) December 18, 2020

Meanwhile, some civil society groups and global south nations involved in UN international climate negotiations started calling for richer countries to shoulder their historical responsibility for climate change and repay their “climate debts” to the global south.

In 1999, the NGO CorpWatch released a report titled, “ Greenhouse Gangsters vs. Climate Justice ”, an early use of the term, which took aim at the fossil fuel industry and stated that climate change “may well be the largest environmental justice issue of all time”.

The world’s first-ever Climate Justice Summit came soon after in 2000, organised by CorpWatch and held at the same time as the COP6 negotiations in The Hague. The summit resulted in an action statement saying: 

“We affirm that climate change is a rights issue. It affects our livelihoods, our health, our children and our natural resources. We will build alliances across states and borders to oppose climate change inducing patterns and advocate for and practice sustainable development.”

Two years later, an international coalition of social and environmental organisations released the 27 Bali Principles of Climate Justice to “redefine climate change from a human rights and environmental justice perspective”. These global principles used the US-centred environmental justice principles as a blueprint.

All of this came to a head at the COP15 climate summit in Copenhagen in 2009, which saw a mass mobilisation of climate justice activists and calls from global south leaders for recognition of wealthy nations’ responsibility for climate change. (See: How has climate justice shaped international negotiations? )

The chart below shows how mentions of “climate justice” in the global media had an initial surge in the year of COP15 and have more than doubled in volume since 2018.

As these ideas have become more widespread, “elite” NGOs , such as the Mary Robinson Foundation , have tried to bridge the gap between the political establishment and the more radical demands of grassroots activists.

Robinson herself, a former UN high commissioner for human rights, has described climate change as “probably the greatest human rights challenge of the 21st century”.

Meanwhile, climate-justice ideas have also been developed by academics – although, according to Dr Michael Mikulewicz , a critical geographer at the Centre for Climate Justice at Glasgow Caledonian University , this has largely taken place in isolation from activism.

He tells Carbon Brief that early work in this area was largely theoretical and philosophical, focusing on “climate ethics” and who was responsible for global warming.

However, over the past 15 years the field has “grown exponentially”, with geographers, economists, anthropologists and sociologists all getting involved, he adds.

This growth can be seen in the chart below, which shows academic publications mentioning “climate justice” captured on the Web of Science database since 2000.

In contrast to the many global south-led climate justice movements, the “theoretical foundations of climate justice are quite northern-led,” according to Dr Shilpi Srivastava from the Institute of Development Studies . Of the 968 papers referencing “climate justice” Carbon Brief found on Web of Science, just 148 featured contributions from global south institutions.

The first mention of climate justice in academic literature has been identified as a 1989 book on intergenerational inequality by US environmental lawyer Dr Edith Brown Weiss of Georgetown University . 

In fact, the text in question originally came from a paper Weiss had presented at a conference on “developing policies for responding to future climatic change” in 1987. In its introduction, she stated:

“Global climate change induced partly by human activities raises serious issues of justice between the present generation and future generations, and between communities within future generations. In using the planet’s resources for our own benefit, we may pass many of the costs to future generations in the form of climate change and the need to adapt to such change.”

However, as Weiss tells Carbon Brief, the ideas underpinning this work go back even further, with her own studies of the international legal and political implications of climate modification dating back to 1973.

Concerns about intergenerational injustices, demonstrated more recently by the Fridays for Future protests, are one of the “four pillars of climate justice” identified by Srivastava and her colleagues in a recent paper. The others are:

• Distributional – how the costs and benefits of climate change and action are shared.
• Procedural – ensuring the processes for making decisions about the impacts of and responses to climate change are fair, accountable and transparent.
• Recognition – Recognising differences between groups in how they experience climate change and their right to express these differences.

Srivastava tells Carbon Brief that while the distributive aspects of climate justice have gained some traction – for example, the idea that vulnerable nations should be helped to adapt to climate change – other aspects, such as inclusivity, have been less prominent:

“Whose voices are dominating the agenda and ‘solutions’?…There is a risk that climate justice might be (mis)appropriated as a trope unless we remain vigilant and take concrete steps towards including the voices of those who are most vulnerable to climate change impacts.”

There are also concerns in the activist community that, as climate-justice discourse has proliferated, the concept has been stripped of its core demands for economic overhaul and redistribution of wealth, captured in the slogan “system change, not climate change”.

However, Dr Saleemul Huq , director of the International Centre for Climate Change and Development (ICCCAD) in Dhaka, Bangladesh, says that, in his view, the world is entering a “third age” of climate change response in which it is viewed predominantly as a moral problem:

“It’s a matter of manifest injustice and that’s easily recognisable by everyone all over the world, including school kids who come out every Friday…They don’t really need to understand greenhouse gases, they don’t need to understand UNFCCC [UN Framework Convention on Climate Change] and IPCC [Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change] and all that stuff, they can understand the fundamental inhumanity of causing damage to poor people by their lifestyle”.”

What does the climate justice movement want?

There has been considerable debate about what constitutes a “just” approach to climate action, reflecting the diversity of the people and groups involved.

Over the years, dozens of declarations and manifestos have laid out the priorities of various climate justice groups, one recent example being the “ people’s demands ” of the Global Campaign to Demand Climate Justice .

Many common themes have emerged from these documents, including a focus on Indigenous rights, women’s rights and the rights of future generations.

Below, Carbon Brief unpacks some of the central concepts that have solidified over the years and what they mean for international climate politics.

‘Fair shares’ of emissions

Fossil fuel use and greenhouse gas emissions have been skewed over the course of history towards a small number of relatively wealthy nations.

The geographical inequality of emissions can be seen in the chart below, with the “high-income” countries identified by the World Bank shown in blue. 

In total, these countries are responsible for 44% of cumulative CO2 emissions from fossil fuels, land use and forestry since pre-industrial times, as the blue area on the chart below shows. This is particularly notable given they are home to just 14% of the global population today.

A key demand of the climate justice movement is for rich countries to recognise their historical responsibility for emissions and respond with dramatic cuts to limit warming to 1.5C, in line with the most ambitious target of the Paris Agreement.

This demand is also made in light of the greater capacity such nations have to spend money on decarbonising.

The “ carbon budget ” – the remaining emissions that can be released before any given temperature is breached – has emerged as a central concept in climate science and policy over the past decade. 

There is only around 460bn tonnes of carbon dioxide (GtCO2) – or 11.5 years of 2020-level emissions – of the global carbon budget remaining beyond 1 January 2021 before being committed to 1.5C of warming.

Dividing the carbon budget up “fairly” is seen as an issue of climate justice. However, as Prof Niklas Höhne of the NewClimate Institute tells Carbon Brief, “ there are wide differences in the interpretation of what’s fair.”

Poorer nations, such as India , have argued that they should be allowed to use more of the remaining “ atmospheric space ” or “carbon space” – essentially the remaining budget – to help them develop, as rich nations have used more than their fair share. (Others argue that cheap low-carbon technologies mean such nations could “ leapfrog ” fossil-fuelled development in favour of technologies such as renewables power.)

These debates have been complicated by the rapid growth of some nations, particularly China, where emissions have risen significantly in the three decades since the UNFCCC divided the world into industrialised or “economies in transition” Annex I and “mostly developing” non-Annex I nations.

Despite their significant contribution today, these countries have argued that they do not share the same responsibility as nations that have maintained high emissions for centuries.

For India, in particular, its high emissions today mask the fact that its per-capita emissions remain low and millions still live below the poverty line.

This position was outlined at the COP15 summit in 2009 by Chinese diplomat Su Wei, who criticised the commitments made by the US, EU and Japan, while pointing to developing countries’ lack of historical responsibility. 

The opposing view was voiced by US diplomat Todd Stern, who told reporters : “Emissions are emissions. You’ve just got to do the math. It’s not a matter of politics or morality.”

While the UNFCCC has always recognised nations’ “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” to address climate change, some have argued that this principle has been “ watered down ” under pressure from richer nations. (See: How has climate justice shaped international negotiations? ).

The Paris Agreement sidesteps the contentious issue of what makes a “fair share”, but nevertheless all parties under it must come forward with climate pledges and justify why they are fair and reflect their “‘highest possible ambition”. 

As it stands, these nationally determined contributions (NDCs) – even if met in full – are set collectively to breach the Paris temperature targets and result in warming of an estimated 2.4C.

One issue is that, as a recent paper puts it, “diverse perspectives on fairness have resulted in a wide range of self-serving calculations”. Prof Lavanya Rajamani , an international environmental law expert at the University of Oxford , who led the study, tells Carbon Brief:

“If every country had to extrapolate from their criteria what it would mean if they were extended to the rest of the world, the unfairness of their fair share would become very clear.”

The analysis concluded that many fairness justifications used in NDCs, such as allocating emissions cuts where it is cheapest to do so, relied on arguments that were not supported by principles of international law. Sticking to these legal principles would tend to require deeper cuts from developed countries, the paper found.

Many groups calling for climate justice have argued that rich nations should be the ones bridging the gap to meet Paris Agreement targets.

Responding to a perceived lack of equity analysis within the UN system, in 2015 a large group of NGOs set up the Civil Society Review , which has produced a series of reports highlighting the gaps between “fair shares” and actual commitments.

In its 2018 report, the review stated that the “rhetorical insistence that ‘we all have to do more’” would not be enough to achieve the Paris targets:

“This misleading – or, at best, incomplete – framing of the situation is part of the problem…It is overwhelmingly wealthy industrialised countries which are failing to make their fair share of the global effort. And that fact carries profound political implications.”

This assessment was based on work by the Climate Equity Reference Project (CERP), which was set up by thinktanks EcoEquity and the Stockholm Environment Institute to define “fair shares” based on “core equity principles of the UNFCCC”. 

Using the same methodology, which prioritises nations’ historical responsibility and financial capacity to act, the US branch of Climate Action Network (CAN) has called for a “fair share” target of cutting US emissions by 195% below 2005 levels by 2030. NGOs in the UK have called for a similar reduction target of 200% below 1990 levels. 

The current domestic targets for the US and the UK are 50-52% and 68% , respectively.

In both cases, national “fair shares” far exceed their emissions today, meaning that to achieve equitable outcomes the countries would be required to contribute significant financial support to ensure cuts in other countries. (See: Climate debt and climate finance .)

By contrast, as the chart below from 2018 shows, the CERP approach suggests that the global south, including large emerging economies, have been taking on their fair shares. (The black horizontal lines show the amount of emissions reductions per capita in 2030, as implied by the nation’s NDC at the time, compared to the coloured lines which show “fair” reductions under different equity settings.)

The Civil Society Review notes that despite China and India meeting its definition of fair shares, they would still need to undertake far greater emissions cuts in the future, supported by international finance, or the 1.5C goal will be “quite impossible”.

However, it notes that it is “hard to see how this could possibly happen while the richer countries continue to expect a free ride”.

Other attempts to calculate “fair shares” place greater responsibility on global south nations. 

For example, in its most recent update, Climate Action Tracker (CAT) – an independent analysis of climate pledges produced by two research organisations – deemed both India and China’s commitments to be “highly insufficient” based on their “fair shares”.

CAT has developed its own methodology based on a review of dozens of papers examining “fair shares”, which gives equal weight to equity considerations beyond historical responsibility and capacity, such as the relative cost-effectiveness of climate action.

Höhne, who leads CAT, tells Carbon Brief that while it is “super clear” that industrialised countries need to support other nations financially:

“…the closer we come to the 1.5C limit, the less relevant is the question of what is a fair share because we simply have to reduce emissions drastically. Everybody has to do it.”

Some climate activists, including Greta Thunberg , have suggested that a fairer way of assessing emissions would be to look at consumption rather than territorial emissions. 

They argue that, otherwise, wealthy nations get a free pass for using emissions-intensive products that are made in countries such as China. 

On the other hand, some argue in favour of handing responsibility for emissions to those that produce the fossil fuel that created them – for example, oil companies or exporters, such as Australia .

While the international reporting system is based on territorial emissions, even splitting up emissions by country could be viewed as an imperfect way of deciding fairness, given the large financial and emissions-related inequality that exists in many societies.

Dr Saleemul Huq, who is based at ICCCAD, says this “rich people vs. poor people” framing is important when discussing climate justice.

“Those of us who produce more than our fair share of emissions – and I include myself in that group – we owe something to the victims of our pollution.”

This is recognised in the Bali Principles of Climate Justice , developed by NGOs in 2002, which note that “unsustainable consumption exists primarily in the north, but also among elites within the south”. Indian journalist Praful Bidwai has described the focus on national per capita emissions as “a shield that enables India’s elite to hide behind the poor”.

The UNEP chart below shows the vast inequality in emissions output between the world’s rich and poor. Its analysis suggests that a top 1% earner – someone earning over $109,000 (£80,000) per year – will need to cut their personal emissions by 97% to reach a “fair share” level by 2030, in line with the 1.5C target, indicated by the purple line.

Analysis conducted for Oxfam found that, in 2015, around half the emissions of the richest 10% – with an income of over $38,000 (£28,000) – were associated with people in the EU and the US. Around a fifth of these emissions were produced by people in China and India. 

The charity has called for policies to curb the emissions of the wealthy, including higher taxes and bans on carbon-intensive luxury items and activities, such as frequent flights.

On an individual level, research suggests that the perceived fairness of a climate policy plays a big role in deciding whether people support it or not. However, once again, people can have very different perceptions of what “fair” outcomes would be.

Is fairness really that basic a value? Dependent on one’s value dispositions, people define it as ‘equality’, ‘proportionality’ (not cheating or taking more than you worked for), or both. Here’s some recent data: pic.twitter.com/Q7Xg1MPKVw — Kris De Meyer (@kris8dm) September 24, 2021

Significant costs are likely to fall on nations that lack funds to spend on, say, erecting wind turbines or building flood defences. Much of the climate-justice narrative centres around the need for wealthy countries to pay for these things.   

An early rallying point for the climate-justice movement was the idea that industrialised nations – as well as high-polluting corporations – owed the global south a “ climate debt ”.

This was an extension of the concept of “ecological debt”, an idea that emerged in the early 1990s and was described by Ecuadorian NGO Accion Ecologica as:

“The debt accumulated by the northern industrial countries towards the countries and peoples of the south on account of resource plundering, environmental damages, and the free occupation of environmental space to deposit wastes, such as greenhouse gases.”

In climate negotiations this concept was initially pushed by global south nations as well as NGOs, with a group led by Bolivia submitting a document at the COP15 summit in 2009 stating that:

“The scale and timing of emission reductions by Annex I [industrialised] countries must be sufficient to ensure that developed countries’ historical debt for their excessive past consumption of environmental space, and their continuing excessive per-capita emissions, is fully repaid to developing countries.”

At the talks, Bolivian negotiator Angelica Navarro made it clear that in practice this meant both significant emissions cuts and also a transfer of finance and technology from richer countries to poorer ones. She told Democracy Now :

“What we are asking is repayment…We are not begging for aid. We want developed countries to comply with their obligation and pay their debt.”

In short, this would require massive redistribution of wealth between countries to fund both climate mitigation and adaptation. Some academics and politicians have framed it as “climate reparations”, emphasising the links to histories of colonialism, slavery and exploitation.

From the outset, industrialised nations have resisted efforts to characterise their historical responsibility in this way. Their position was summarised at the COP15 by the US chief climate negotiator Todd Stern:

“I actually completely reject the notion of a debt or reparations or anything of the like…Let’s just be mindful of the fact [that] for most of the 200 years since the Industrial Revolution, people were blissfully ignorant of the fact that emissions cause the greenhouse effect. It’s a relatively recent phenomenon. It’s the wrong way to look at this. We absolutely recognise our historical role in putting emissions in the atmosphere that are there now. But the sense of guilt or culpability or reparations, I categorically reject that.”

This does not mean that money is off the table in climate talks. Climate finance has always been part of negotiations, albeit framed in a way that is more palatable for wealthier nations. 

In 2009, industrialised – or Annex II – countries agreed to provide funds rising to $100bn per year by 2020 to support climate action in poorer nations. The target was reportedly devised by Hillary Clinton, then secretary of state to US president Barack Obama, in the heat of COP15. 

Since then, the figure has become a touchpoint in climate justice conversations, with campaigners urging governments to honour their commitments.

The chart below shows the most recent available climate finance figures from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), suggesting the total reached around $80bn in 2019. While a figure for 2020 is not yet included, an independent analysis for the UN at the end of 2020 concluded that “the only realistic scenarios are those in which the $100bn target is not reached this year”.

This is a problem for the future of climate negotiations, according to Dr Saleemul Huq of ICCCAD. He tells Carbon Brief:

“If they don’t cough up the money, COP26 is already a failure…If you make a pledge and don’t meet it, that makes the discussion one in bad faith.”

Despite the importance of this target, many have pointed out that $100bn does not match the true needs of the global south .  

Dr Keston Perry , a political economist and assistant professor of Africana studies at Williams College , tells Carbon Brief that the $100bn target was agreed in the context of “uneven power dynamics at the UN”:

“It’s not really a scientific amount, it came about as a result of negotiations in which the industrialised countries are really pulling the strings.”

There is also the question about the form that climate finance takes. Climate justice campaigners would like to see money and technology provided with “ no strings attached ”, outside of institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and development aid programmes, where wealthy countries can influence how it is distributed.

The Green Climate Fund , established to help deliver the $100bn target, was seen as a relatively equitable way of distributing finance, as its board includes equal representation from “developed” and “developing” countries, climate justice campaigners tell Carbon Brief. However, only a fraction of total climate finance flows through the fund.

Much of the money provided as climate finance falls short of climate justice campaigners’ hopes, as Dr Michael Mikulewicz of Glasgow Caledonian University tells Carbon Brief:

“A lot of development aid has been relabelled as climate aid and in many cases double counted as both, so there is no additional money in many cases…there really isn’t much appetite for anything like a direct transfer of wealth to the global south.”

Most climate finance also comes in the form of loans, with the share of total money distributed in this way to different groups of nations indicated by the blue bars in the chart below. This is “making countries that are most marginalised more indebted to global north countries,” says Perry.

Oxfam estimates that of the roughly $60bn in public climate finance reported by developed countries in 2017-2018, the “ true value ” is closer to $19-22.5bn per year once loan repayments, interest and “other forms of overreporting” are discounted.

Angelique Pouponneau , a former adviser for small island states on climate finance who runs the Seychelles’ Conservation and Climate Adaptation Trust , says that more radical demands for compensation or reparations simply do not attract consensus agreement in UN negotiations:

“This leaves countries with financing options that are in the form of development aid or loans and, if you ask me if that is fair, I would say, no, it is not. However, I think the thinking about climate justice and its link to climate finance have to go further than the criticism that it is not fair.”

Instead, she asks if other avenues, such as climate litigation, could yield more desirable outcomes in international arenas.

There are also justice-based critiques of how and where climate finance is spent. Many countries will need to spend huge sums of money on adapting to climate impacts, yet, as it stands, the majority of climate finance goes towards mitigation – indicated by the purple bars below.

For the first decade of climate negotiations, there was little discussion of adaptation finance at COPs, with talks focusing largely on cutting emissions.

There were references to such funding in the text of the UNFCCC, the world’s first climate treaty, in 1992. However, acknowledging it was seen as an “implicit acceptance of responsibility for causing climate change,” according to one paper , which adds that vulnerable nations reportedly did not want to derail mitigation talks with conversations about adaptation.

However, this began to change in the early 2000s as warnings from the IPCC about the inevitable need to adapt became starker.

With the UNEP adaptation gap report suggesting that adaptation costs “in developing countries alone” could reach $140-300bn in 2030, there are widespread calls for at least half of climate finance to go towards adaptation. This echoes language in the Paris Agreement urging a “balance between adaptation and mitigation” finance.

Finally, while it is generally understood that the poorest nations will be most in need of support to tackle climate change, they are far from the main recipients of finance, as the chart below shows.

Moreover, according to Oxfam, only around 3% of funds from 2017-2018 went to small island developing states (SIDS). This is disproportionate to their size, given that SIDS are home to less than 1% of the global population, but the charity notes that these nations “face the gravest threat from climate change and have the fewest resources to cope”.

“By this measure alone, there is a disconnect between the global north’s rhetoric and their actual support to SIDS,” Dr Janine Felson , climate justice lead negotiator for the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) tells Carbon Brief.

Pouponneau says this is, in part, because many of these nations are classed as upper-middle or high-income countries, making them less eligible for overseas development assistance despite their high vulnerability to climate change. 

Separately, the concept of “ loss and damage ” has been developed in a bid to generate support for unavoidable or unpredictable climate impacts that cannot be adapted to. 

Poorer nations in the UNFCCC process have continued to advocate for some kind of compensation fund for victims of climate change, despite the Paris Agreement explicitly stating it “does not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation”.

Richer nations, notably the US, have blocked these efforts and largely restricted the talks to discussions of insurance schemes.

While there has been some progress in discussions on this topic over the past decade, what is lacking is a new pot of funding. Civil society estimates have placed the costs of loss and damage at $300-700bn by 2030, rising to $1.2tn per year by 2060.

Harjeet Singh , a senior adviser on climate impacts at CAN International , tells Carbon Brief that it is clear why wealthy nations want to avoid admitting responsibility:

“The numbers are massive and rich countries and corporations know that they are going to be blamed and that’s why they have always been scared of recognising loss and damage and the related compensation and liability provision.”

No ‘false solutions’

Climate-justice activists oppose what they see as “false solutions” to climate change, namely technologies and policies that may cut emissions, but run counter to the wider cause of justice.

This is outlined in the Bali Principles of Climate Justice which state that “market-based mechanisms and technological ‘fixes’ currently being promoted by transnational corporations are false solutions and are exacerbating the problem”.

Prof Olúfẹ́mi Táíwò , a philosopher at Georgetown University who has addressed issues of environmental justice, says that, in his view, this is born out of a realistic understanding of the limits of technological innovation:

“I take it that the ‘false solutions’ rhetoric is an attempt to get us to take our problems seriously. We’re not going to ‘one weird trick’ our way out of the climate crisis because it isn’t made of one simple, isolable problem.”

The controversial concept of geoengineering is among these “false solutions”, but widely used technologies have also been given the label , including nuclear power, large hydropower dams and biofuels. Critiques of these energy sources tend to focus on the resulting waste and land-rights disputes, as well as  their impact on communities.

There are also concerns that the injustice of climate change could take on another dimension if the costs of addressing it predominantly harm poor and vulnerable people.

A key battleground over the years has been the push for carbon markets , a measure supported by many large, global north NGOs, but generally opposed by grassroots movements.

“We don’t believe in carbon markets. We think that is a dangerous distraction,” Meena Raman, legal adviser and senior researcher at Third World Network in Malaysia, tells Carbon Brief.

Climate justice groups say that carbon trading allows nations and companies in the global north to continue producing greenhouse gases while relying on the global south to offset their emissions.

An example is the UN’s Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) programme, which Indigenous groups say threatens the land rights of forest-dependent communities, while adding little climate benefit.

Criticisms were levelled at the Kyoto Protocol after the US pushed for the inclusion of a carbon market in the agreement. 

The protocol contains a Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which aimed to finance emissions reductions in the global south, but has been accused of generating “hot air” – cuts that would have happened anyway. 

Critics have also linked CDM projects with human-rights violations, particularly involving Indigenous people, owing to their impact on land and livelihoods.

Similar debates are still ongoing around the much-delayed Article 6 rules of the Paris Agreement. So far, nations have been unable to reach an agreement on these rules.

In 2004, academics and NGOs signed the Durban Declaration on Carbon Trading , which criticised the way in which markets turned “the earth’s carbon-cycling capacity into property to be bought or sold in a global market”. This became a key foundational text for climate justice groups.

Such concerns are linked to wider criticisms of carbon removal – whether using carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology or mass tree-planting – as Dr Wim Carton , who researches the politics of climate mitigation at Lund University , tells Carbon Brief:

“Carbon removal is uncomfortably compatible with the interests of the fossil fuel industry and the political and economic status quo, which, given the history of delay and denial from these actors, doesn’t inspire a lot of trust.”

The broad scientific consensus, as outlined by the IPCC, is that achieving the 1.5C or 2C goals of the Paris Agreement will require billions of tonnes of CO2 to be removed from the atmosphere. Even scientists exploring “degrowth” scenarios see a significant role for carbon removal.

Nevertheless, many are sceptical about both the feasibility of some negative-emissions technologies and the actors – for example, fossil fuel companies – pushing them. This can be seen recently in the debates around the use of blue hydrogen derived from natural gas.

Climate justice groups and some scientists have also been critical of the net-zero targets being set by governments and businesses, including countries responsible for 61% of global emissions, as well as fossil fuel firms such as Shell and BP . 

They have accused such targets of “disguising inaction”, labelling them “polluter-driven greenwashing schemes” and referring to net-zero as “ the big con ”. 

This may seem counterintuitive given the central demand of the Paris Agreement that nations “achieve a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases”.

Moreover, the IPCC’s recent sixth assessment report says explicitly that reaching net-zero CO2 emissions is a prerequisite to stop further warming of the Earth system.

However, once again the pushback is largely based on the extent to which these targets rely on offsets and carbon removals at the perceived expense of emissions cuts, particularly if the effort is shifted to the global south in acts of “ carbon colonialism ”.

While some groups and individuals entirely reject the use of net-zero targets – despite the scientific imperative behind them – others take a more nuanced approach, focusing on the way such goals are defined and how they are implemented.

In the UK, the Climate Change Committee has advised that the nation should meet its net-zero target domestically, “without relying on international carbon units”. Raman says, in principle, this is not a problem:

“If you do domestically whatever you want to do in terms of balancing the emissions and the sinks that would be fine provided it does not displace communities…But advancing this net-zero as…a panacea for the climate crisis is misleading.”

Indeed, as Dr Steve Smith , executive director of Oxford Net Zero , tells Carbon Brief:

“Lots of people are making net-zero pledges, but there is just a lot of ambiguity around how they intend to achieve those…The great majority of pledges are just unclear about whether and how they intend to use offsetting.”

Analysis conducted by Smith’s team found that across more than 4,000 net-zero targets, only 20% met a “set of basic robustness criteria”. The brown and grey areas of the chart below show the lack of clarity around offsets.

According to a report released in 2020 by a coalition of NGOs, there is “simply not enough available land on the planet to accommodate all of the combined corporate and government ‘net-zero’ plans for offsets and bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) tree plantations”.

Nevertheless, with removals of some form required to meet international climate targets, scientists have attempted to establish an equitable way of allocating “fair shares” of carbon removals between nations, based on historical responsibility. As Prof Lavanya Rajamani of the University of Oxford notes:

“The closer we get to 1.5C…the question becomes less about fair shares in terms of greenhouse gas mitigation and more about fair shares in terms of CO2 removal as well.”

One study found that most European countries would be unable to meet their removal targets domestically, meaning they would have to rely on climate finance or offsetting schemes to support removals abroad.

In Carton’s view, a “ just approach ” to emissions removal will require “democratic institutions taking much larger responsibility in defining the kinds and amounts of removal that we want”:

“You for example can’t leave it up to corporations to define what part of their emissions are ‘unavoidable’ [and] hence needs to be compensated for by removals – there’s an obvious conflict of interest there.”

Instead of “false solutions”, climate justice activists want to see solutions to climate change that not only effectively cut emissions but also ensure that no communities are left behind. 

This makes a “ just transition ”, in which workers and their communities are supported in the shift to a low-carbon economy, central to the idea of climate justice. 

The concept of just transition, which originated in US labour unions who forged alliances with environmental justice groups in the 1990s, has since become a key part of international climate discussions. The Paris Agreement itself recognises “the imperatives of a just transition of the workforce”.

It has also been embraced at a high level by the likes of the European Commission, which included a just transition fund in its “green deal”, and US president Joe Biden, who has pledged to create 10m “well-paying” clean energy jobs.

( Carbon Brief has a detailed explainer article examining the history of “just transition” – plus case studies of it in action.)

For many, a just future includes a need to provide a clean energy supply for everyone in a world where 13% of the population – nearly all of them in Africa – lack reliable access to electricity. 

Some appraisals of “ energy justice ” argue that a low-carbon transition will not necessarily solve wider issues of social justice and marginalisation. 

As one study puts it, the “transition to lower-carbon sources of energy will inevitably produce and, in many cases, perpetuate pre-existing sets of winners and losers”. Examples include land-rights disputes over wind power projects and the potential harm caused by mineral extraction to make solar panels.

One climate-justice response to this is to emphasise a just transition that includes distributed renewable energy and “non-corporate, community-led climate solutions” that recognise the traditional knowledge of Indigenous peoples and local communities.

Besides affecting communities, a similar “winners and losers” dynamic could also play out in how different nations benefit from the clean energy industry.

Dr Stanley Semelane , a senior researcher at the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) in South Africa, a nation with a large coal industry and one of the highest unemployment rates in the world, says he is worried that for many “the energy transition is more important than a just energy transition”. He tells Carbon Brief:

“This means that most countries that have ratified the Paris Agreement…will forge ahead with the adoption of low-carbon technologies, even in circumstances where there are no plans that will guarantee a just energy transition.”

According to Semalane, besides just-transition funds to protect former fossil fuel workers, technology transfer is important to allow local manufacturing of low-carbon technologies in global south nations. Such transfers are often discussed alongside finance during UNFCCC negotiations.

Fossil fuels and “corporate interference”

At the heart of many climate-justice manifestos – from the Bali principles in 2002 to the people’s demands in 2019 – is a simple call to “keep fossil fuels in the ground”.

According to the last UNEP production gap report, nations are currently aiming to produce 120% and 50% more fossil fuels by 2030 than would be consistent with the Paris Agreement’s 1.5C and 2C goals, respectively.

After Covid-19 took a heavy toll on the fossil-fuel industry, the report’s lead author noted that many governments were “ doubling down ” on the fuels instead of letting struggling projects “die”.

Many have argued that to shift fossil fuel demand in line with climate targets, governments should accelerate the process by prioritising supply-side measures , such as getting rid of fossil fuel subsidies and stopping new extraction permits .

Climate-justice campaigners have also criticised global north countries and the World Bank for their continued financing of fossil-fuel projects, often based in global south nations, even as their own fossil fuel usage declines.

This is why carbon border adjustments of the variety being proposed by the EU, which place taxes on imported goods based on the emissions associated with their production, have been criticised and even labelled a form of “ economic imperialism ”.

Dr Arvind Ravikumar , director of the sustainable energy development lab at Harrisburg University of Science and Technology , wrote in MIT Technology Review : “To actively promote such fossil-fuel development and then punish developing countries for emissions through carbon border adjustments is, at best, hypocritical. It’s also unjust.”

Campaigners have also criticised the involvement of corporations in the UN climate negotiations and called for accountability for their “decades of misinformation and political interference in climate policy”.

A report from NGO Corporate Accountability in 2017, for example, detailed the ways in which high-emitting industries were seen to be influencing negotiations. 

These included shifting the talks towards carbon markets, encouraging private companies’ involvement in the Green Climate Fund and the promotion of “greenwashing” climate-smart agriculture .

Activist groups have called for an end to this “corporate interference” and the introduction of a conflict-of-interest policy that would prevent businesses from influencing COP negotiations.

The negative impacts of climate change are unequally distributed around the world. A recent study found that low-income countries are the most vulnerable to natural disasters. This is because they face some of the most frequent extremes, have the least resources to adapt to the changes and generally have the most rapidly expanding population.

The study also emphasises the issues of “ intergenerational climate justice ” – that younger generations are not responsible for the majority of historical emissions, but will face the worst impacts from climate change.

The map below shows the difference in the number of climate-linked extremes that a child born in 2020 will face, compared to the number that someone born in 1960 will face, over their respective lifetimes, under two different emission scenarios.

The charity Save the Children has published a report focused on the results of this study, entitled: “Born into the climate crisis: Why we must act now to secure our children’s rights.” It states in its executive summary:

“The children of these low- and middle-income countries will be burdened with the most dangerous impacts of the climate crisis. They have inherited a problem not of their own making.”

The difference in climate impacts between countries can lead to what one paper describes as “a vicious cycle [that] keeps some countries stuck in a disasters-inequality trap”, holding back their development.

While this effect is most obvious when comparing countries to one another, it is also often clear when comparing different socioeconomic groups within countries.

Possibly the most direct impact of climate change on people is heat stress. As average global temperatures rise, heatwaves are intensifying – and a recent study found that over one-third of heat-related deaths are driven by climate change.

Extreme heat is often exacerbated by increasing humidity . Researchers have found that if a region’s “ wet bulb temperature ” – a measure incorporating both temperature and humidity – exceeds 35C, the human body is unable to cool itself down through sweating. As such, this threshold is often called the “ limit for human adaptability ”.

However, warming is not uniform across the planet. Countries near the equator, such as parts of the Middle East and Africa, are at greater risk of exceeding this limit. The extreme heat is made worse by the fact that many countries do not have the infrastructure to deal with extreme temperatures.

For example, in June of this year, the city of Jacobabad in Pakistan reached 52C, pushing it over the 35C wet bulb temperature limit. This made the city one of only two places on earth to have officially passed the threshold. The Daily Telegraph reported that the extreme heat was exacerbated by the lack of wealth and resources in the region:

“Few have any air conditioning, and blackouts mean often there is no mains electricity. The hospital fills with heatstroke cases from those whose livelihoods mean they must venture out. Stretches of the town’s bazaar are dedicated to keeping cool. Shops sell electric fans and low-tech washing machine-sized coolers that emit a refreshing mist. Electric solutions are undermined by frequent power cuts however. In the city centre, residents often lose power for three or four hours, while in more distant areas the gaps are longer.”

In one study , authors used 16 climatic metrics – based on mean daily surface air temperature, relative humidity, solar radiation and wind speed – to determine a global threshold beyond which temperature and humidity becomes “deadly” to humans.

The map below shows the number of days that regions were exposed to deadly heat conditions, as defined by the paper, between 1995 and 2005. It also projects how many days a country is likely to cross the threshold under low (RCP2.6), mid (RCP4.5) and high (RCP8.5) emission scenarios by 2090-2100 – showing that the global south is likely to be more severely impacted by extreme heat in the future than the global north.

Even when heat does not reach deadly levels, high temperatures can have a range of impacts on human performance – ranging from heat exhaustion to lowering people’s mental health and increasing their aggression levels.

Another study found that warming will drive inequality in economic activity. The optimal average daily temperature for economic activity is 13C , according to the study. The authors found that as the climate warms, countries in the Northern hemisphere will approach this limit, becoming more productive, while those in the South will exceed this limit and become less productive.

Furthermore, geography is not the only factor that determines heat exposure. Studies have shown that the “ urban heat island effect ” – high temperatures driven by a combination of less vegetation and denser populations, with closely set buildings and lots of dark surfaces – is more prevalent in poorer areas of the US with fewer white residents .

One study finds that in more than 70% of US counties, “neighborhoods with lower-income and higher shares of non-white residents experience significantly more extreme surface urban heat than their wealthier, whiter counterparts”. Another study has found that black people are 52% more likely than white people to live in areas of unnatural “heat risk-related land cover”. Asian people are 32% more likely and Hispanics 21%.

This issue was highlighted recently after the heatwave that struck the US and Canada in 2021 , in a Nature news feature entitled: “ Racism is magnifying the deadly impact of rising city heat .”

Floods and storms

As the climate warms and sea levels rise, low-lying land is expected to flood more frequently. A recent study found that regions near the tropics will be particularly affected by sea level rise (SLR), concluding that “the burden of current coastal flood risk and future SLR falls disproportionately on tropical regions, especially in Asia”.

The study notes that even if global sea levels rise by only one meter by the end of the century, and population number and distribution do not change in this time, the number of people at risk of flooding will rise from 267 million to 410 million people. It adds that 72% of these people will be in the tropics, with 59% in tropical Asia alone.

The map below shows the number of people who would be at risk from 2m sea level rise, assuming that populations continue to grow and migrate.

When combining the impacts of various extreme weather events, the tropical region shown in a box in the map above is often highlighted as an area of particular vulnerability.

Every year, non-profit group Germanwatch produces a “Global Climate Risk Index”, analysing to what extent regions have been affected by impacts of weather-related loss events, such as storms, floods and heat waves. The index “quantifies impacts of extreme weather events”, taking fatalities and economic losses into consideration.

The map below shows the results of their most recent study ( pdf ). “Climate risk index” is mapped for most countries in the world – where a lower score and darker colouring indicates that the country has greater exposure and vulnerability to extremes.

The report highlights the Top 10 most vulnerable and exposed countries, as shown in the table above. It states that the three highest-risk countries – as well as some others further down – are vulnerable mainly due to hurricanes, cyclones and typhoons.

It highlights that, although some countries in the western world are also hit by extreme weather, they generally have more resources to deal with the damage:

“The relative economic losses and the fatalities are usually relatively minor compared to the countries’ populations and economic power due to their coping capacity.”

Migration and conflict

As the climate warms and more regions of the world become inhospitable, impacts including heatwaves, floods and droughts can cause additional stresses, such as water scarcity and food insecurity. In many regions, these changes are already forcing people to leave their homes .

While climate migration can be a problem in both rich and poor countries, poverty is a major driver of people’s vulnerability to climate-related shocks and stressors. As such, climate-related migration is less common in industrialised, urbanised countries than it is in low-income countries with large rural populations.

Science magazine recently ran a special issue on the topic of climate-induced migration , including an editorial that opened with the statement: “Climate-forced population displacement is among the greatest human rights issues of our time.”

A policy forum piece in the special issue focused on Bangladesh as an example. It finds that  4.1 million people were displaced as a result of climate disasters in 2019 – amounting to 2.5% of the total population. Meanwhile, it added that “13.3 million people could be displaced by climate change by 2050, and 18% of its coastland will remain inundated by 2080”.

Migration can be international or internal, meaning migrants who are displaced within their own country. A 2018 World Bank report finds that climate change could drive more than 140 million internal climate migrants by 2050.

However, climate migration is not just an issue in developing countries. One study into coastal migration in the US concluded that “unmitigated sea level rise is expected to reshape the US population distribution, potentially stressing landlocked areas unprepared to accommodate this wave of coastal migrants”.

This also has implications for global security. The United Nations Environment Programme ’s website explains that climate change is a “threat multiplier” and can drive increasing conflict . It says:

“Where institutions and governments are unable to manage the stress or absorb the shocks of a changing climate, the risks to the stability of states and societies will increase. Climate change is the ultimate ‘threat multiplier’ aggravating already fragile situations and potentially contributing to further social tensions and upheaval.”

The struggle for “just” outcomes has played a critical role in shaping international climate negotiations over the past three decades.

When the UNFCCC – the world’s first climate change treaty – was established in 1992, climate-justice principles were at its core, albeit not explicitly described in such terms. 

The convention includes a “ polluter pays ” principle, indicating that richer nations should “take the lead” on climate action. Its opening section (below) also alludes to their “historical and current” responsibility for emissions. 

It also refers to “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” (CBDR-RC) when it comes to tackling climate change.

CBDR-RC appears in the first paragraph of Article 3 (below), which sets out the “principles” that are meant to guide implementation of the convention. This principle, which enshrines the idea of different responses to climate change from different nations, has provided guidance – and driven disputes – in UN climate talks ever since.

The convention also references providing developing countries with “funding, insurance and the transfer of technology” where necessary. 

“The convention was actually a very good starting point,” Meena Raman from Third World Network tells Carbon Brief.

However, as talks progressed towards assigning percentage targets for emissions cuts within set timeframes, climate justice advocates such as Raman felt that the talks were drifting further away from the original vision of the UNFCCC. As Power Shift Africa’s Mohamed Adow tells Carbon Brief:

“We haven’t had a solution which is actually effectively operationalising those principles, where we share effort based on equity, based on historical responsibility, based on the differentiated capability of different countries. That never came about.”

One key issue is that the convention divides nations into clear groups . Annex I consists of industrialised nations that were members of the OECD in 1992, plus countries with “economies in transition”, such as Russia and eastern European states. Annex II only contains the OECD nations, which must provide finance and technology transfer to others.

The least developed countries (LDCs) are given special consideration due to their “limited capacity” to address climate change. Non-Annex I countries are a broad church of “mostly developing” countries, from China to Tuvalu, that are “especially vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change”.

This division, which reflects nations as they were in the early 1990s, regardless of their subsequent growth, has been described as the UNFCCC’s “greatest weakness”. Disputes over which members of which groups should be cutting emissions have shaped COPs ever since.

The first major agreement following the convention was the Kyoto Protocol , agreed in 1997, which – in line with the UNFCCC – only required Annex I nations to stick to emissions targets , amounting to a 5% cut in their total emissions between 1990-2012.

Despite the focus on industrialised Annex I nations, Raman says that climate-justice groups were “disappointed” by the Kyoto outcome, given its focus on market-based solutions and the “very low target” set overall for these countries:

“We knew how that was generated: by sitting around a table and just [coming up with] numbers, it wasn’t based on any science really…in terms of what is fair.”

The US ended up refusing to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, due to the lack of binding targets for big emitters, such as China and India. Ultimately, Canada, Japan and Russia did not take part in the protocol’s second commitment period.

As the climate-justice movement grew in the intervening years, there was hope that the COP15 summit in Copenhagen in 2009 would result in a successor agreement to Kyoto that would be fair and equitable for poorer nations.

As demonstrators clashed with police in the streets outside the conference, key groupings of nations were emerging and making their presence felt in the talks, motivated in part by climate-justice principles.

Members of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA) – which includes Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Venezuela – had begun pushing for a more human rights-based, anticapitalist vision within the climate negotiations.

Meanwhile, amid growing calls – including from poorer developing countries – for the “large developing countries” to cut emissions, China, India, Brazil and South Africa came together to form the BASIC group.

This unexpected alliance has been attributed to shared concerns about a shrinking carbon budget making development harder and a sense that they should not take on the same historical responsibility as industrialised countries.

In the end, the talks were widely seen as a failure after a small group of 25 world leaders led by the US and BASIC nations agreed on a non-binding “ Copenhagen accord ”, with little input from most of the poorer countries.

This text, ultimately backed by 114 parties, invited all countries – not just the richest – to commit to “nationally appropriate mitigation actions” of their choosing, with Annex I parties required to enhance their Kyoto targets by an unspecified amount. 

Despite introducing the idea of a specific 2C warming limit for the first time , the accord was generally seen as step backwards, particularly for the most climate-vulnerable nations, as Bolivian ambassador Pablo Solón Romero wrote in the Guardian at the time:

“Whereas before, under the Kyoto protocol, developed countries were legally bound to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by a certain percentage, now countries can submit whatever targets they want without a binding commitment.”

According to War on Want’s Rehman, the climate-justice movement working alongside sympathetic nations, such as those in the ALBA group, helped to stop this accord from being formally passed, despite mounting pressure from the international community to take action of any kind. 

“Without the climate-justice groups we would have had the Copenhagen accord, there is no doubt about it,” he tells Carbon Brief. (As it is, while the accord was backed by many nations it was not formally agreed under the UNFCCC.)

A 2C limit for global warming was not included formally in international climate policy until the Cancun COP in 2010, but by that point it had been discussed for decades and was “recognis[ed]” in the Copenhagen accord text. 

Many saw 2C as a “ guardrail ” to prevent “dangerous” climate change described in the UNFCCC text. However, this was not the case among climate-justice advocates, who for many years had been pushing for a 1C warming limit.  In Copenhagen, Sudanese ambassador Lumumba Di-Aping, chair of the G77 group of developing countries, said that 2C would mean “certain death for Africa”, stating that the deal being offered was a “suicide pact”.

Di-Aping suggested “one Africa, one degree” as a rallying cry. Meanwhile, Tuvalu caused a stir at the event by refusing to engage with talks until a 1.5C target was considered. With the planet passing 1C of warming in 2015, the 1.5C target – which had already been pushed for years by small island nations – became the focus.

Following the disappointment of Copenhagen, then-Bolivian president Evo Morales announced an alternative COP in 2010, dubbed the World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth , or Cochabamba Conference.

The “ people’s agreement ” that resulted from this meeting of civil society, Indigenous groups and government representatives has been described as “by far the most comprehensive exposition on rights to be submitted” to the UNFCCC process, with calls for developed countries to provide both financial compensation and restorative justice.

According to one paper : “The ‘people’s agreement’ was all but ignored by the other participants in the UNFCCC. But it did enable the climate-justice movement to formulate key demands and positions.”

At the Durban COP in 2011, nations agreed to forge ahead with a new deal that, unlike Kyoto, would be “applicable to all” nations, both “developing” and “developed”. The EU’s lead negotiator, Elina Bardram, said it “must reflect today’s reality and evolve as the world does”, while US lead negotiator Todd Stern stated their position plainly: “If equity is in, we are out.”

The deadline for a new climate agreement came at COP21 in Paris in 2015. A sign of at least token recognition of justice came in the summit’s opening speech by French president Francois Hollande, who told delegates : “It is in the name of climate justice that we must take action.”

The Paris Agreement that emerged from the summit also included language in its preamble (below) that spoke to the concerns of the climate-justice movement. However, the details of the agreement were more nuanced.

A shift towards a 1.5C target emerged in the lead up to COP21 as higher resolution modelling made the expected impacts on global south nations clearer than before and a “ structured expert dialogue ” laid out the differences between 1.5C and 2C targets. 

Ultimately, advocacy by small island states, “progressive developed and developing nations” in the “ high ambition coalition ” and supporting civil society groups , saw the 1.5C limit make it into the Paris Agreement as a stretch goal alongside the 2C target. 

However, Rehman says there was a “heavy price to pay” for the target, noting the negotiations between US secretary of state John Kerry and small island leaders that saw the removal of language about richer nations providing compensation for loss and damage.

A key contentious point for many observers was the introduction of nationally determined contributions (NDCs), replacing the top-down emissions targets of Kyoto with a bottom-up system where every country sets their own targets, which are not legally binding.

The agreement stresses that these targets would be based on each nation’s “highest possible ambition, reflecting its common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities”, then continues: “in the light of different national circumstances”. 

This addition, as well as references to “developed” and “developing” countries rather than the Annexes, emphasises that countries’ responsibilities could evolve over time.

This expectation that all nations – both Annex I and non-Annex I – must come forward with their own climate targets, was seen as a move to “wipe out historical responsibility” so that everybody was at “the same starting point”, according to Raman. 

Harjeet Singh from CAN International tells Carbon Brief that, in his view, “NDCs are [the] antithesis [of] climate justice”. He says:

“When you are responding to a global problem, how can you say ‘nationally determined’? You should have been given a quota using science and equity as principles.”

The inclusion of every nation and the lack of legally binding targets were regarded as concessions to ensure US participation. “They didn’t want to go back to their citizens and say ‘you know what, yes, India and China need to reduce their emissions, but we also need to look at our historical responsibility’,” says Singh.

Supporters of the Paris Agreement argue that such concessions were necessary to produce a successful deal. Moreover, former US climate negotiator Todd Stern has written in Brookings that legally binding targets, “paradoxically, can yield weaker action as some countries low-ball their targets for fear of legal liability”.

However, for climate-justice advocates, NDCs have made it even harder to achieve a just outcome from the UNFCCC process. “Using every opportunity to kill common but differentiated responsibility has delayed action,” says Singh.

While climate justice can mean different things to different people, its fingerprints can be seen across the shifting climate change discourse in recent years.

Climate-justice campaigners tell Carbon Brief that for years much of the climate narrative both inside and outside the UNFCCC negotiations was dominated by a focus on melting ice and polar bears . 

There was relatively little discussion of who was being affected and who was responsible, they say. 

Asad Rehman of War on Want, who was previously head of international climate at Friends of the Earth, says that the overriding narrative among NGOs was that if governments were provided with enough information on climate change they “would act rationally and take action”:

“Climate justice groups were saying: hold on, that’s just not true, because if that was true we would also have solved inequality, poverty and all of these things. You are failing to understand that this is not an environmental issue, it’s fundamentally an economic and political issue.”

Attention shifted more to the people affected by climate change around the turn of the millennium, as the need for adaptation finance rose up the agenda.

Climate justice groups were critical of global north NGOs – organised in the UNFCCC process under the CAN International grouping – for their closeness to developed country governments and particularly their support for market-based solutions to climate change. 

Harjeet Singh, currently with CAN International and formerly the climate lead at ActionAid, says global south countries with high emissions such as India and China were used as “punching bags” in climate messaging: 

“Organisations from the global north did not show empathy or sympathy with the challenges that developing countries were facing.”

These differences came to a head at COP13 in Bali, when Friends of the Earth International split from CAN and joined with global south organisations to form Climate Justice Now! . 

This has since given rise to the Global Campaign to Demand Climate justice , which now forms the other part of the environmental NGO presence at COPs, alongside CAN.

Over the past decade, particularly since the mobilisation around climate justice at COP15 and its failure to secure an agreement, global north NGOs have adopted more justice-oriented messaging. This shift became apparent at COP19 in Warsaw when hundreds of civil society members from around the world staged a mass walkout.

Meanwhile, other groups involved in the climate justice movement have expressed frustration with the UNFCCC process and its ability to achieve “fair” solutions. Some groups, including those protesting oilfields in Nigeria and coal plants in the UK, have turned to direct action “under the loose banner” of climate justice, according to one paper.

Newer protest groups, such as Extinction Rebellion and Fridays for Future , have received criticism from some pre-existing climate-justice campaigners, but have also begun placing climate justice at the heart of their messaging.

The framing of climate justice as a “left-wing” project, which stems from the anticapitalist organisations involved in developing it , has faced backlash. 

Upon taking up her post as UK climate minister in 2015, Conservative politician Amber Rudd said she understood why many saw climate action as “cover for anti-growth, anti-capitalist, proto-socialism”.

While some right-wing politicians, in the US and Australia , for example, have used the “socialist” criticism to try and block climate action altogether, figures such as Rudd have instead advocated for their own vision, based on market-based solutions and private industry boosting clean technologies .

Others have argued that tackling climate change cannot be based on socialist perspectives alone and must instead bring in people from across the political spectrum. To this end, Extinction Rebellion has announced it is “not a socialist movement”.

Nevertheless, some elements of climate justice have made their way into mainstream politics, even in staunchly capitalist governments. Notably, for example, climate advocates on the left were credited with pushing US president Joe Biden to adopt a strong focus on ”environmental justice” in his presidential campaign .

Calls for “ green new deals ”, “ just transition ” and “ green jobs ” have all been influential in global north governments in recent years. “This is the language that the movement has been using for a long time,” says Rehman.

While such rhetoric is not necessarily playing out in government actions, Dr Saleemul Huq of ICCCAD says this shift is “a good start”. He adds:

“It’s not enough – but lip service means you have won the argument.”

The legal system is increasingly being used as a mechanism to seek climate justice. 

In recent years, courts have provided a venue for climate migrants, young people and Indigenous groups to challenge corporations and governments, forcing them to take responsibility for their emissions and take on their “fair share” of climate action.

Dr Joana Setzer , a legal specialist at the London School of Economics and Political Science who monitors global progress in climate change litigation, explains its appeal to Carbon Brief:

“Courts have the mandate to consider how action or inaction on climate change affects legally protected interests, such as human rights. In some cases, bringing a court proceeding can allow activists and others to force a debate on how legal obligations to protect those interests should be implemented, even in the face of stagnation or opposition in the political process.”

An early, high-profile piece of climate litigation came in 2005 when Inuit people launched – but ultimately lost – a human rights case against the US, in response to its withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol.

As the chart below shows, climate-related case numbers have grown considerably since then, with the total more than doubling over the past five years. Most have aimed to enhance climate action, although there have also been a smaller number of “anti-climate” cases.

The vast majority are still in the US and other parts of the global north, but case numbers are also growing in the global south. 

According to UNEP , the number of cases will likely keep rising in response to failures by corporations to report climate risks accurately and governments to prepare for climate change.

During the first wave of climate cases in the 2000s, which were mainly based on tort and public nuisance actions, plaintiffs struggled to adequately demonstrate why they had a right to bring the case and how they were being affected by climate change.

Increasingly robust climate science, combined with the emerging field of extreme weather attribution , have given litigation a boost in recent years, Lydia Omuko-Jung , a climate change lawyer and research fellow at the University of Graz , tells Carbon Brief.

Another key development has been the so-called “ rights turn ” in climate litigation. In 2015, a judge in the Lahore High Court, Pakistan, became the first ever to find that the government’s delay in implementing its climate policies violated citizens’ fundamental rights.

More than 100 cases have now been initiated on the basis of climate change breaching human rights and, according to Omuko-Jung, this is a significant development:

“Invoking fundamental human rights and the state’s duty to protect is one of the strategies being used in climate litigation to overcome or get around the restrictive legal standards that have created a challenge in the first wave of climate cases.”

There is evidence that this strategy is working. Both the Netherlands and Pakistan made tangible policy changes as a result of the 2015 rulings. Similar suits have since been filed in nations from Belgium to Brazil .

Moreover, Setzer’s most recent analysis found that of all the cases that had concluded, in a database maintained by the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment , 58% had outcomes they deemed “favourable” to climate action.

There have been a handful of particularly noteworthy cases in recent years, including Neubauer et al vs Germany , in which young people from Germany, Bangladesh and Nepal raised the issue of intergenerational justice. 

They argued that the German climate law was insufficient and would result in unfair constraints on young people’s lives, an argument with which the court essentially agreed . The government has since tightened its climate law in accordance with the ruling.

The German case, along with the successful Urgenda vs Netherlands case against the Dutch government and a handful of others have all relied on the idea that nations are not cutting their “fair share” of global emissions and aimed to force them into doing so.

Another recent success for climate justice campaigners was Milieudefensie vs Shell , in which a court ordered the fossil fuel company to significantly reduce its emissions. Setzer explains.

“The court accepted that this would affect Shell’s finances, essentially forcing the company to bear a fair share of the costs of mitigating climate change, to which it has been a major contributor, rather than forcing individuals to bear the costs of ever more severe climate impacts.”

Despite these successes, experts say courts are still not always equipped to address some of the unjust outcomes of climate change.

“Our legal systems are incredibly ill-equipped to deal with climate-induced migration,” Ama Francis , a climate displacement project strategist at the International Refugee Assistance Project tells Carbon Brief.

She notes that there are currently no multilateral treaties or national laws that solely address this issue:

“We need to update our laws in light of the fact that climate change is a defining challenge of the 21st century.”

Some progress was seen in the case of Teitiota vs New Zealand in which Ioane Teitiota, a Pacific Islander from Kiribati, argued, following his denial of refugee status, that climate change had forced him to leave his home.

While the UN Human Rights Committee upheld New Zealand’s decision on grounds that Teitiota was not at imminent risk, it “ nonetheless determined that people who flee the effects of climate change and natural disasters should not be returned to their country of origin if essential human rights would be at risk on return”.

Litigation could also develop into a tool for vulnerable states to hold the nations and companies they deem responsible for climate change to account. In 2018, Vanuatu foreign minister Ralph Regenvanu revealed his island nation was considering suing fossil fuel companies.

Omuko-Jung says based on the history of international environmental litigation, such cases filed by nations are unlikely to become prevalent, although it is likely that global south citizens and NGOs will continue the emerging trend of taking big polluters to court. 

“Courts are now prepared to take decisions in a way that they may have shied away from a few years ago,” she says.

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Global Justice

On common accounts, we have a state of justice when everyone has their due. The study of justice has been concerned with what we owe one another, what obligations we might have to treat each other fairly in a range of domains, including over distributive and recognitional matters. Contemporary political philosophers had focused their theorizing about justice almost exclusively within the state, but the last twenty-five years or so has seen a marked extension to the global sphere, with a huge expansion in the array of topics covered. While some, such as matters of just conduct in war, have long been of concern, others are more recent and arise especially in the context of contemporary phenomena like intensified globalization, economic integration, and potentially catastrophic pandemics and anthropogenic climate change.

John Rawls’s seminal book The Law of Peoples initiated many debates about global justice (Rawls 1999). Several questions soon became prominent in discussions including: What principles should guide international action? What responsibilities do we have to the global poor? Should global inequality be morally troubling? Are there types of non-liberal people who should be tolerated? What kind of foreign policy is consistent with liberal values? Is a “realistic utopia” possible in the global domain? How might we transition effectively towards a less unjust world?

Contemporary events also played an enormous role in prompting philosophical inquiries. Prominent cases of genocide, ethnic cleansing, forms of terrorism uncommon prior to 2001, intensified interest in immigration to affluent countries, increased dependence on the labor of those from low-income countries, and enormous threats to well-being, security and the environment became common catalysts for further work. Philosophers began to reflect on questions such as: Is it ever permissible to engage in coercive military action for humanitarian purposes, such as to halt genocide or prevent large-scale violations of human rights? Can terrorism ever be justified? Should affluent countries open their borders more generously than they currently do to those from low-income countries who would like to immigrate to them? Are our current global economic arrangements fair ones and if not, how should they be transformed? What responsibilities do we have to one another in a globalized, post-Westphalian world order? How should we allocate responsibilities for reducing global injustice in our world, such as in the case of distributing costs associated with addressing climate change?

Increased interest concerning issues of global justice also coincided with enhanced interest in the place and value of nationalism. These explorations tracked events such as nationalist clashes which spilled over into widespread suffering (notably in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda), increased calls for national self-determination to carry considerable weight, such as in state recognition for Palestinians or Tibetans, and also in the case of secession (prominently, Quebec). In this area global justice theorists have been concerned with a range of important questions such as: Under what conditions should claims to national self-determination be granted substantial weight? When should self-determination yield to concern for protecting human rights? Are commitments to nationalism and global justice compatible? Is genuine democracy only possible at the state level or are there robust forms of democracy that are possible in more international fora? How are ideals of democracy best incorporated into defensible global institutional arrangements? Is world justice possible without a world state? In recent years reflection on existential threats like climate change, war, and pandemics and how perspectives of the oppressed might inform the future of the sub-discipline, have contributed new dimensions to answering core questions along with adding central questions within the field.

The primary purpose of this article is to give an orientation to the enormous and rapidly expanding field of global justice. There are several entries in this encyclopedia that already cover some of the core topics well and these will be cross-referenced. But there are still many important gaps, along with some missing context as to how some topics fit together. This entry aims primarily to address these needs.

1.1 Global and International Justice

1.2 what is a theory of global justice, 1.3 when is a problem a global justice problem, 2.1 the influence of rawls’s law of peoples, 2.2 what global duties do we have, 2.3 cosmopolitanism, duties to non-compatriots, and compatriots, 2.4 human rights fulfillment, 3.1 war and just conduct, 3.2 humanitarian intervention, 3.3 terrorism, 4. global economic injustice, 5. global gender justice, 6. race and global justice, 7. immigration, 8. global environmental issues, 9. global health issues, 10.1 natural resources and global justice, 10.2 allocating responsibilities for global problems, 10.3 authority in the global domain: do we need a world state to secure global justice, 11. the contribution to public policy, interdisciplinary engagement, and new methods, other internet resources, related entries, 1. some definitional issues.

A distinction is often drawn between global and international justice. The key point of difference between these two notions involves clarifying the entities among which justice is sought. In international justice the nation or state is taken as the central entity of concern and justice among nations or states is the focus. In the domain of global justice, by contrast, theorists do not seek primarily to define justice between states or nations. Rather they drill down through the state shell and inquire about what justice requires among human beings. Global justice inquiries take individual human beings as of primary concern and seek to give an account of what fairness among such agents involves. There are several types of actions that cut across states or involve different agents, relationships, and structures that might be invisible in an inquiry seeking justice among states exclusively. Many different kinds of interactions are not circumscribed by state membership and yet can importantly affect human beings’ most fundamental interests, so asking the question about what individual human beings owe one another often uncovers significant neglected features of relationships and structures that are of normative concern. Global justice analyses are not precluded from yielding state-level obligations; indeed, they typically do. However, they consider a wider array of possible agents and organizations that might have duties as well.

There are advantages associated with both types of inquiries. An important advantage of asking what states owe one another is that much international law presupposes the states system and requires states to perform various actions to promote justice. In this way, responsibilities often appear to be clearly allocated to particular parties thus making it quite precise who ought to do what in our actual world. One advantage of global justice inquiries is that we are not forced to take states as a fixed constraint and we can therefore consider a range of relevant relationships, capacities and roles that also structure our interactions and might be relevant to how we ought to conceptualize global responsibilities. While asking about what individuals owe each other may well have implications for states and their obligations, a range of other agents and institutions may also have relevant justice obligations. These responsibilities can become more visible when we explore what individuals owe each other. The two approaches have different strengths and can complement each other, but in contemporary debate they are often taken as rivals competing to provide the most plausible framework.

For further discussion of international justice, see the entry on international distributive justice .

In general, a theory of global justice aims to give us an account of what justice on a global scale consists in and this often includes discussion of the following components:

• identifying what should count as important problems of global justice
• positing solutions to each identified problem
• identifying who might have responsibilities in addressing the target problem
• arguing for positions about what particular agents (or collections of agents) ought to do in connection with solving each problem and
• providing a normative view which grounds (1)–(4).

Theories of global justice aim to help us understand our world better and what our responsibilities are in it. While some theorists aim purely at theoretical understanding, others hope also to provide an analysis that can be useful in practical policy making concerning global justice matters.

Problems of global justice arise when one (or more) of the following conditions obtain:

• Actions stemming from an agent, institution, practice, activity (and so on) that can be traced to one (or more) states negatively affect residents in another state.
• Institutions, practices, policies, activities (and so on) in one (or more) states could bring about a benefit or reduce harm to those resident in another state.
• There are normative considerations that require agents in one state to take certain actions with respect to agents or entities in another. Such actions might be mediated through institutions, policies, or norms.
• We cannot solve a problem that affects residents of one or more states without co-operation from other states.

So, in general, a problem is one of global justice when the problem either affects agents resident in more than one state or the problem is unresolvable without their co-operation. For the problem to be considered genuinely global rather than regional it should affect more than one regional area.

2. Principles to Guide Behavior in International and Global Matters

What sorts of duties of justice, if any, exist among human beings who do not reside in the same country? If there are such duties, what grounds them? Some argue that John Rawls’s principles developed for the case of domestic justice, notably, the Fair Equality of Opportunity Principle or the Difference Principle, should apply globally (Beitz 1999; Caney 2005a; Moellendorf 2002). Others maintain that the content of our duties to one another is best explored by examining alternative concepts not featured in the Rawlsian corpus, such as capabilities or human rights (Nussbaum 2006; Pogge 2008; Nussbaum 2015).

Much discussion about what we owe one another in the global context is influenced by the work of John Rawls, so a short synopsis is needed to situate debates. Since discussion of these issues is amply covered in the entries on international distributive justice and John Rawls , this will be a compressed summary focusing only on the most central aspects of the debate that have a bearing on core topics of global justice.

In The Law of Peoples , John Rawls argues for eight principles that he believes should regulate international interactions of peoples. For Rawls, a “people” is constituted by a group of persons who have in common sufficient characteristics such as culture, history, tradition, or sentiment. Rawls uses the term “people” in ways that relevantly correspond with how many use the term “nation”. In addition, Rawls often assumes that, for the most part, each people has a state.

The eight principles Rawls endorses acknowledge peoples’ independence and equality, that peoples have the right to self-determination along with having duties of non-intervention, that they ought to observe treaties, honor a particular list of human rights, should conduct themselves in certain appropriate ways if they engage in warfare, and that they have duties to assist other peoples in establishing institutions to enable people’s self-determination. He also advocates for international institutions governing trade, borrowing, and other international matters that are characteristically dealt with by the United Nations.

Several claims have been the subject of much debate between critics and defenders of Rawls’s position. In particular, Rawls believes that so long as all peoples have a set of institutions that enable citizens to lead decent lives, any global inequality that might remain is not morally troubling. Critics draw attention to the ways in which global inequality – perhaps in levels of power or affluence – can convert into opportunities for deprivation and disadvantage. For instance, the global advantaged can use their superior position to influence the rules that govern international institutions – such as trade practices – which can facilitate further opportunities for increased advantage and so they can indeed threaten the abilities of others in distant lands to lead decent lives (Pogge 2008). [ 1 ]

Another important issue that underlies debate between Rawls and his critics concerns different views about the nature and origins of prosperity. Rawls gives a particularly strong statement of what he takes the causes of prosperity to be. He claims that the causes of the wealth of a people can be traced to the domestic political culture, the virtues and vices of leaders, and the quality of domestic institutions. He says:

I believe that the causes of the wealth of a people and the forms it takes lie in their political culture and in the religious, philosophical, and moral traditions that support the basic structure of their political and social institutions, as well as in the industriousness and cooperative talents of its members … The crucial elements that make the difference are the political culture, the political virtues and civic society of the country (Rawls 1999, 108).

Critics observe that in addition to local factors, there are also international ones which play an important role in prospects for well-being. Thomas Pogge prominently helps bring some of these into view. The international borrowing and resource privileges, are good examples of the ways in which international practices can have profound effects on domestic factors which undeniably also play a role in promoting prosperity. According to the international borrowing privilege, governments may borrow amounts of money on behalf of the country and the country thereby incurs an obligation to repay the debt. The international resource privilege refers to a government’s ability to do what it likes with resources, including selling them to whomever it chooses to and at what price. Any group that exercises effective power in a state is internationally recognized as the legitimate government of that territory and enjoys the two privileges. But, Pogge argues, this sets up undesirable incentives that hamper developing countries’ abilities to flourish (Pogge 2008). These include incentivizing those strongly motivated to hold office for material gain to take power by force or exercise it in ways that help reinforce oppressive governments’ abilities to retain control. The global advantaged benefit greatly from these privileges and so have little incentive to reform them. But, according to Pogge, reforms are sorely needed. If only sufficiently legitimate governments are able to enjoy these privileges, the international community would remove one important obstacle developing countries currently face.

Defenders of Rawls’s views argue that his position is more complex than is commonly acknowledged and allows for both a principled stance on some fundamental values along with appropriate openness to alternative ways in which legitimate and decent peoples might organize their collective lives (Reidy 2004; Freeman 2006). They argue that Rawls’s position shows great sensitivity to a number of factors that must be weighed in considering right conduct in international affairs. For instance, when Rawls makes his bold claims about the causes of wealth it is useful to bear in mind the context in which he is arguing. Against an assumption that resources are enormously important for a society’s ability to flourish, Rawls emphasizes the importance of strong institutions, political culture and other local factors, in sustaining decent lives for citizens. Rawls also reflects on the difficulty of changing political culture, noting that simply transferring resources will not help. Interestingly, in a little discussed passage, Rawls ventures that an “emphasis on human rights may work to change ineffective regimes and the conduct of rulers who have been callous about the well-being of their own people” (Rawls 1999, 109). For more on whether Rawls provides us with a cogent model that can provide sage guidance in international matters see the entries on on international distributive justice and John Rawls . See also Martin and Reidy (2006). For the purposes of this entry we need only summarize some key questions that were influential in setting the terms of discussion about global justice for some time.

Some key questions are:

• What principles should govern interactions among peoples at the global level?
• What are the causes of prosperity and are they traceable entirely to domestic factors or are international considerations relevant?
• What should count as the kind of prosperity or well-being that we are aiming to promote?
• Do we have an obligation to ensure people have their basic needs met and can otherwise lead “decent” lives, or should we be more concerned with global socio-economic equality?
• What duties do we have to those peoples who do not yet have what they need for self-determination or prosperity?
• If human rights serve an important role in world affairs, which rights should be on our list of those to endorse? What duties arise from such commitment?
• Can we properly hold nations to be entirely responsible for the well-being of their people and if so, in what kinds of conditions might this make sense? How do we encourage nations to take responsibility for their people’s well-being?
• When we consider what we owe one another, do compatriots deserve special consideration?

We trace some of the influential positions that have shaped answers to these questions next.

One of the most visible and large-scale contemporary global justice problems we face is that of global poverty. What ought we to do for the 1 billion or so people who currently live in poverty? This is a huge area nicely canvassed in the entry on international distributive justice . A few seminal arguments deserve mention here as well, however. In a classic argument Peter Singer describes a so-called easy rescue case in which an infant is drowning in a shallow pond. You happen by and can save the child with minimal effort and inconvenience on your part. Singer argues that you would be obligated to assist using the principle that when it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening without sacrificing anything significant or comparable, it is wrong not to prevent the bad from occurring. So, Singer argues that we have extensive duties to assist needy others, whether they be geographically proximate or not. We have extensive duties to assist the global poor who, with equally minimal effort on our part, can be saved from dire circumstances, since the same principle applies in both cases (Singer 1972). (For more treatment see Unger 1996 and for criticism see Lichtenberg 2013).

Thomas Pogge offers another influential contribution in World Poverty and Human Rights . He argues that since developed countries impose a coercive global order on the poor that foreseeably and avoidably causes great harm, they have important responsibilities to reform the global order such that it ceases to do so and instead better secures human rights (Pogge 2002, 2008, 2010). We harm the global poor when we collaborate in imposing an unjust global institutional order on them and, moreover, that order is unjust when it foreseeably perpetuates large-scale human rights deficits that can reasonably be avoided were we to make quite feasible institutional modifications (Pogge 2002, 2008, 2010). We also harm the poor when we deprive them of their resources and through a shared and violent history (Pogge 2008). While Singer emphasizes our capacity to assist with need satisfaction, Pogge emphasizes instead our contributions to the problem as grounding our duties.

When discussing our duties to one another there is also vigorous debate about what the content and target of our duties should be, along with discussion about what are the best ways to discharge these. Traditional dominant economic approaches to promoting prosperity have focused on raising income levels or increasing Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Railing against such approaches, Amartya Sen suggested that the capabilities approach provides an improved measure of well-being and constitutes a better way to capture changes in people’s condition over time (Sen 1980). Exploring what people are able to do and be provides a more appropriate standard by which to evaluate whether their condition has improved rather than focusing exclusively on their incomes or per capita GDP. Martha Nussbaum develops this approach and argues for a list of ten capabilities that should be secured for all people in all places. This universal list can provide an important tool in persuading governments to make reforms conducive to their citizens’ flourishing. (See the entry on the capability approach for more.) Another important discourse for discussing duties is that of human rights which is discussed in Section 2.4 below. Before we continue it is important to mention that there are many possible ways to understand the content of our duties to one another. (For more see entries on egalitarianism , equality , sufficiency , capability theory , well-being , and needs in moral and political philosophy ). The issue of our duties to one another is a vast topic and we continue to discuss it throughout this entry. This section serves only as an introduction.

When considering what we owe one another, are compatriots special? Do we have the same duties to non-compatriots as we have to compatriots or is there some principled way in which these two sets of duties ought to differ?

Nationalists argue that we belong to national communities and any account of our global responsibilities that ignores this omits an important aspect of how we relate – and ought to relate – to one another. They argue that nations can provide a valuable grounding for social attachment, identity and meaning in life, and can ground special obligations to strengthen national life and assist co-nationals (Miller 1995; Tamir 1993; Lenard 2012). Others defend the value of nationalism on instrumental grounds; there is nothing inherently special about our co-national relationships but state boundaries are useful in assigning important duties to particular agents (Goodin 1998). In a world of great unmet need, paying special attention to one’s co-nationals can be justified (Goodin 1998; Lenard 2012). [ 2 ]

In the words of Diogenes, widely credited as the first person to propound cosmopolitan views, cosmopolitans see themselves as “citizens of the world”. Contemporary cosmopolitans typically hold that every human being has standing as an ultimate unit of moral concern and is entitled to equal consideration of her interests no matter what other affiliations, especially national affiliations, she might have. Drawing on the idea that we all have equal moral worth, cosmopolitans seek to broaden our moral horizons so that we do not forget about the responsibilities we have to others beyond state borders, even when we have local responsibilities as well.

Prominent cosmopolitans frequently offer accounts that feature different elements. Martha Nussbaum emphasizes that, as human beings, we belong to a global community of human persons (Nussbaum 1996). Nussbaum argues that while love for one’s country might have a legitimate place in people’s conceptions of a good life, we should not overlook the many other relationships we are in which connect us to others in the world. We need to draw the global community in closer to the local one, and, more generally, aim to see ourselves as members of overlapping communities which also have important claims on us.

By contrast, Thomas Pogge focuses on the implications of cosmopolitanism for the global institutional order. We need to ensure that global institutional structures give equal consideration to everyone’s interests. He says, “Insofar as human agents are involved in the design or administration of global rules, practices, or organizations, they ought to disregard their private and local, including national, commitments and loyalties to give equal consideration to the needs and interests of every human being on this planet” (Pogge 2013, 298). This equal-consideration-of-interests requirement only applies to such contexts. While such impartiality norms are perfectly familiar within the state, for instance, when judges operate in law courts, we have yet to realize the requirement at the global level.

It is often assumed that cosmopolitanism must necessarily be in tension with more local attachments to friends, family or compatriots. Some cosmopolitans believe such conflict is inevitable, unproblematic and a necessary part of understanding what cosmopolitanism entails (Ypi 2013a). Others argue for different ways in which the apparent tensions could be resolved (Pogge 2013; Tan 2004; Appiah 2007; Cabrera 2020). As we see above, Pogge emphasizes the clear separation of spheres in which equal consideration of people’s interests applies. Kok-Chor Tan offers a similar argument. His strategy is to show that cosmopolitan principles should govern global institutional structures that ensure people are treated as equals in their entitlements (Tan 2004). When this is the case there can be a legitimate role for patriotism that operates within such constraints. Partiality to co-nationals need not conflict with cosmopolitan obligations. Another notable strategy is to argue that we cannot achieve justice at a national level unless we attend to justice at a global level. On this view, we have at least instrumental reasons to care about global justice, even if we care deeply about social justice in our nation (Banai; Ronzoni and Schemmel 2011; Ronzoni 2013).

There is an important debate among egalitarian theorists about whether our concern with equality should be confined to members of the same state or whether it should extend to all globally. Some theorists argue that careful consideration of notions such as reciprocity, coercion, or fair terms of co-operation mandate that we give special weighting to the interests of compatriots (Blake 2013). Others, by contrast, argue that these concerns, when properly understood, point in the direction of equally strong duties to non-compatriots. One form of the argument that we have special duties to compatriots that are not shared with non-compatriots, draws on the coercive legal structure that applies within states and claims that such coercive structures do not apply outside of them (R. Miller 1998; Blake 2001). Another highly influential version claims that there is a difference in the authority to enforce justice within and outside the state (Nagel 2005). There are many important challenges to such positions. One important line of argument maintains that coercion is indeed relevant in triggering duties of egalitarian justice, but since this is rampant at the global level it activates global not just national egalitarian duties (Cohen and Sabel 2006; Abizadeh 2007; Valentini 2012). So, the same ingredients Nagel identifies as crucial in generating state authority exist at the global level as well (Cohen and Sabel 2006). Nicole Hassoun argues that there are many coercive international institutions and that, to be legitimate, these institutions must ensure that everyone they subject to coercive rules can secure what they need to consent or object to these rules. This requires adequate food, water, shelter, education, healthcare and the social and emotional support they require for sufficient autonomy (Hassoun 2012). Laura Valentini suggests coercion requires freedom as independence (non-domination) but this does not require egalitarianism in the global sphere. Rather, a just global order would be inclusive, not oppressive (Tan 2013, 25). Others provide novel ways of defending cosmopolitan egalitarian theories or combining them with statist commitments. Pablo Gilabert articulates a contractualist theory of egalitarian justice that generates positive obligations to eradicate severe poverty globally even without robust international institutions or cosmopolitan solidarity (2012). Similarly, Lea Ypi defends a statist cosmopolitanism that stresses the importance of political obligations to support cosmopolitan ends. She suggests a significant degree of equality is important for helping everyone secure a basic minimum and cultural resources, a sense of justice, and education can help promote this equality (Ypi 2012; on education and global justice, in particular, see Culp 2020a). Ypi sees fostering the commitment to cosmopolitan ideals as a political, as well as moral, task (Ypi 2013a).

Once again, these are vast topics and more treatment can be found elsewhere in this encyclopedia, such as the entry on international distributive justice . For comprehensive treatment of nationalism and cosmopolitanism see the entries on nationalism and cosmopolitanism , respectively.

Discussion of global justice matters often invokes concern for human rights. In fact, for all their differences, both nationalists and cosmopolitans frequently agree that a good way to think about some of our duties to one another is via human rights. Human rights can and do therefore serve as an important discourse for furthering discussion about our global responsibilities.

Respecting human rights is an important requirement in much international law and can be a key criterion in evaluating whether governments are considered legitimate by the international community. The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a highly influential account of all human beings’ basic entitlements and this document often plays an important role in real world debates about justice matters. See the comprehensive entry on human rights for more detail. Here we have space to discuss only two issues that have been prominent in debates about global justice.

The first concerns the kinds of duties we have in relation to human rights. Against a conventional view widespread before 1980, Henry Shue argues that if rights to physical security are basic, so are rights to subsistence (Shue 1980). A careful analysis of the duties associated with human rights indicates that the commonly held distinction between positive and negative duties cannot be maintained. All rights have a range of both positive and negative duties associated with them.

The second prominent issue concerns whether our failures in relation to fulfilling human rights amount to rights violations. Thomas Pogge (2008) offers an influential account of duties with respect to human rights. Our current global order perpetuates global poverty on a massive scale, but since feasible reforms to that order could avert this harm, our failure to make reforms not only implicates us in the misery but also in the violation of the rights of the poor. [ 3 ] We therefore have extensive obligations to reform our global order so that the rights of the poor can be fulfilled.

Many theorists have done important work on a range of issues concerning human rights and international obligations (Buchanan 2004; Hessler 2005; Nickel 2007; Beitz 2009; Holder and Reidy 2013; Song 2019). Theorists have also focused attention on particular rights, prominently the right to health (Wolff 2013). Some important questions include: What are human rights’ grounds or can they be defined by their functions? Are human rights properly moral or political/legal? Does respect for rights conflict with community obligations or respect for culture? What is the proper role of human rights in morality, law, and policy? How should we best understand the normative implications of our contemporary human rights practice? (Wolff 2013; Cruft, Liao, and Renzo 2015; Gilabert 2019; Etinson 2018; O’Neill 2005; Beitz 2009; Brock 2023).

For more treatment of issues, especially concerning what human rights are, which rights are rightly construed as human rights, and how human rights function in international law, see the entry on human rights .

3. The Proper Use of Force, Military Intervention, and its Aftermath

Within the field of global justice, issues concerning war have one of the longest histories. The just war framework has been influential in setting the terms of much debate about the proper use of force in international affairs. Aristotle, Cicero, Augustine and Thomas Aquinas offered some of the earliest accounts of the criteria that should be met for war to be justified. Two areas have been especially thoroughly studied: (1) the conditions under which entry into the war is justified (Jus Ad Bellum) and (2) the conditions for fair conduct within the war (Jus In Bello). While having a just cause is standardly held to be a necessary condition for a war to be justified, it is not sufficient. Theorists often disagree about which additional conditions must be satisfied for a war to be characterized as a just war. The most common additional conditions proposed are that the war should be undertaken by a proper authority, with the right intentions, when the war would follow requirements of proportionality (the ends to be secured would warrant going to war), only as a last resort, and when there are reasonable prospects of success. On traditional accounts of just war theory all conditions must be met, while several theorists challenge whether they are all necessary (Mellow 2006; Moellendorf 2002; Walzer 1983).

Once the fighting begins two central principles guide evaluation of whether the war is being conducted fairly: one which respects the distinction between combatants and noncombatants (The Principle of Non-Combatant Immunity) and another that governs what counts as the proportional use of force (Proportionality). On the first, it is not legitimate to use force against civilians and, even though some collateral civilian damage may occur, it is wrong to deliberately target non-combatants. On the second, combatants may only use the force necessary to achieve their ends – the force used must be proportional to the ends that are to be secured in conducting the war. There are further requirements governing fairness, such as requirements to comply with international laws and treat prisoners fairly, but the two featured principles are the most commonly invoked in normative analyses of Jus In Bello .

The third part of just war theory ( Jus Post Bellum ) concerns how the war concludes and the transition back to a situation of peace (Bass 2004, Rodin 2008). It deals with issues such as compensation, punishment, and reform (Ohlin 2014). A fourth component has been suggested especially in light of engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan in the years 2001–2011, namely, justice in exiting the war ( Jus Ex Bello ), which concerns when it is appropriate to end a war (Moellendorf 2008; Rodin 2008).

There are many contemporary global justice issues concerning the appropriate use of force (and its aftermath) that currently command attention including: Is drone warfare (or any kind of warfare) permissible? Can terrorism ever be justified? Are “targeted assassinations” (where leaders who are primarily responsible for decisions to go to war are targeted for assassination) justifiable? May we engage in a war in order to prevent an anticipated “worse war”? Is torture to contain major global threats permissible? Is the attempt to contain nuclear weapons development by those who have them already fraught with hypocrisy? How should we deal best with societies in a state of transitional justice? Is there a place for “Truth and Reconciliation Committees” (Walker 2006)? When are political apologies for historic injustice in warfare appropriate? Some suggest that the changing nature of combat has fundamentally altered the ethics of war, for instance emphasizing how individuals can be held morally accountable for their participation and actions contributing to unjust wars (Ryan 1983; McMahan 2009; Pfaffe 2020; Ohlin 2014; Reitan 2018). Scholars also consider different ways to engage in defensible non-militaristic international reform interventions (Rafanelli 2021).

Here we consider very briefly only two further issues that continue to attract widespread current interest in the global justice literature: Humanitarian Intervention and Terrorism. See the entry on terrorism for an extended analysis of such questions. See the entry on war for a comprehensive overview of issues concerning justice in war.

Under what conditions, if any, may we engage in military intervention aimed at stopping genocide? In recent years this issue has become salient as large-scale human rights violations and suffering unfolded in Rwanda, the Sudan, the former Yugoslavia, and Libya. Against the traditional understanding that respecting state sovereignty requires non-interference, successful arguments were marshaled that there are important responsibilities to protect the vulnerable (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001). Leaning heavily on the conventional conditions contained in the just war framework, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty argued that we may engage in war aimed at protecting those who suffer at the hands of governments unwilling or unable to stop large-scale human rights abuses. The commission produced an influential report “The Responsibility to Protect” which was accepted by the United Nations in 2005, and the principles contained in the report have guided decisions about cases, such as Libya in 2011 and Syria in 2012. One frequently voiced concern about humanitarian interventions is whether they are just another form of imperialism. How will interveners be held accountable for their actions? Taking such concerns seriously Allen Buchanan and Robert Keohane advocate for a series of innovative mechanisms of accountability, both before and after the proposed intervention takes place, to allay fears about abuse (Buchanan and Keohane 2004).

What kinds of violence count as terrorism? Is there a difference between state terrorism and that perpetrated by insurgent organizations? Might terrorism be justified under certain circumstances? Terrorism centrally involves either using or threatening to use violence against people, commonly taken to be innocent, in order to produce results that would not otherwise occur (Coady and O’Keefe 2002; Primoratz 2013). Some challenge that the targets are innocent. As terrorists often point out about citizen complicity in atrocities, citizens pay taxes and vote, and their governments undertake actions that they can be said to sanction and from which they benefit, so it is coherent to hold citizens responsible for their governments’ actions. On this argument, citizens can be legitimate targets of violence. In addition, there is relevant precedent from governments targeting civilians when they perceive the situation to be one of a “supreme emergency”, as happened in the case of Britain targeting German civilians in the Second World War. So when governments judge that some moral disaster is sufficiently likely, it can be repelled using unorthodox and otherwise repugnant means.

Do global economic arrangements – especially economic globalization – give rise to important responsibilities? Globalization is a complex phenomenon, characterized by the faster movement of people, goods, and ideas across borders but with many facets. For our purposes we need to note only some of its characteristic central features. These include (i) an increasingly globally integrated economy, (ii) dominated by transnational corporations engaged in activities (such as production and distribution) that span multiple countries, (iii) increasing regulation of economic matters by supranational institutions (such as the World Trade Organization), (iv) general commitment to removal of barriers to “free trade,” and (v) higher levels of economic interdependence. While there is much debate about the long-term effects of globalization and whether they are on balance good or bad, at this stage, the effects of globalization have been mixed. For some, globalization has brought improvements, while it has worsened the position of others (Singer 2002; Hassoun 2008; Risse 2012a; Risse and Wollner 2019).

Philosophers have been concerned with answers to a range of questions such as: What kinds of economic arrangements are just? Should our international institutions be reformed to better reflect fair terms of co-operation in our globalized world? Can globalization be better managed so that it works to assist the global poor more effectively? Are protectionist policies in trade justified or, rather, is free trade required by considerations of justice? Should poor working conditions in developing countries be a matter of concern for citizens and consumers in affluent, developed countries? If so, how might harmful employment conditions be effectively improved?

While Thomas Pogge argues that globalization has harmed the poor on a massive scale, Mathias Risse argues that this is not at all clear (Pogge 2010; Risse 2005). Risse argues that in many ways the global order must be credited with benefiting the global poor as well. He challenges Pogge’s claim that there are feasible alternatives to our global order that could be easily implemented and would avert the harm to which Pogge draws attention.

The World Trade Organization (WTO) has been an important focal point for discussion about global economic justice. In particular, critics argue that some of its policies, such as those that generally advocate free trade but allow protectionism in affluent developed countries, involve grave hypocrisy and unfairness to some of the world’s most vulnerable people, while others defend some key WTO provisions (Risse and Wollner 2019; Pogge 2001; Moellendorf 2002; Hassoun 2009a, 2011; James 2012). For further reading see: de Bres 2016. There are also large disparities in the resources at the disposal of various parties such that weaker parties often suffer huge disadvantages in being able to negotiate agreements that work well for them. In these sorts of ways agents in developed countries (such as governments, citizens or firms) can take unfair advantage of those in developing countries (R. Miller 2010; Barry and Reddy 2008).

More generally, there are concerns related to the extraordinary power of multinationals and the undue influence they are able to exercise in negotiating deals favorable to them at the expense of the interests of the most vulnerable. So-called sweatshops (in which workers typically labor under harsh and hazardous conditions) are also a frequently raised example of how western consumers are implicated in far away suffering, given the high level of dependence in high-income countries on labor from low-income ones. When we purchase products manufactured in sweatshops are we guilty of contributing to exploitation and if so, what ought we to do to mitigate these unfairnesses? Christian Barry and Sanjay Reddy offer an innovative proposal to incentivize improvements in labor standards and wage levels in poor developing countries (Barry and Reddy 2008). This “Just Linkage” proposal offers some additional desirable opportunities for enhanced international trade to those who meet higher standards.

In this domain, philosophers have also examined a range of other issues including obligations to forgive odious debt and whether micro-finance is to be welcomed as a positive force for the global poor (Barry, Herman and Tomitova 2007; Khader 2014; Sorell and Cabrera 2015; Hassoun 2019).

Several philosophers have considered individuals’ obligations to promote economic justice through ethical consumption. There is an important debate on whether ethical consumption is helpful and required (Risse 2005; Walton 2014). Some argue that ethical consumption is only permissible when appropriately democratic (Hussain 2012; Barry and MacDonald 2018). Others argue that ethical consumption is permissible as long as it promotes positive change (Hassoun 2018; Berkey 2021; Budolfson 2015).

Other more general concerns about exploitation and economic justice can be found at the entries on exploitation and normative economics and economic justice . See also the entry on globalization .

The effects of poverty do not fall equally on men and women, nor on boys and girls. In general, poverty makes the lives of women and girls harder than their male counterparts, as cultural expectations often dictate that women and girls do more care and domestic work or go without (or much less) when resources are scarce. This can significantly thwart women and girls’ well-being, as education, health care, and food are routinely withheld in favor of distribution to men and boys.

Cultural perceptions of gender roles can often lead to practices highly damaging to the most fundamental interests of women and girls. These include “honor killings” (where it is believed culturally permissible to kill a girl or woman who is perceived to have brought shame to the family), genital mutilation, infanticide, forced prostitution, arranged marriage, and legal recognition of property and inheritance rights that significantly disadvantage women and girls. Poverty can exacerbate such vulnerabilities so we have further reasons to address it as a matter of urgency (Jaggar 2009, 2013, 2014). Martha Nussbaum has argued for a list of ten capabilities that all human persons, no matter what their gender, ought to be positioned to exercise. She argues that this approach offers a powerful tool for persuasion in cases where girls and women are denied these opportunities by local actors in different cultures.

Alison Jaggar prominently argues that various structures create and recreate transnational gendered vulnerabilities and she illustrates with practices common in domestic work and the sex industry (Jaggar 2009, 2014). Anca Gheaus has argued that patterns of international immigration – where women typically provide an international market for care work – constitute a kind of care drain. This work is not fully voluntary occurring against a background of unjust options, and amounts to a major issue for women and their families as well as countries and global justice more broadly (Gheaus 2013; Eckenwiler 2009). Others focus on how universal values can inform feminist approaches and discuss how concrete issues like globalization affect women (Khader 2014, 2018; Parekh and Wilcox 2018). (For more see also the entry on feminist perspectives on globalization ).

Some important policies have influenced international discourse in combating gender injustice. The Millennium Development Goals (MGDs) includes as a third goal the promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of women (for discussion of the MGDs, see: Pogge and Sengupta 2020). The 1995 Beijing Platform for Action set the stage for several International Covenants and before that the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women afforded some important protection for women’s human rights. Some theorists are suspicious of human rights language and are inclined to reject what they perceive as a masculine or neocolonial discourse that trumpets individual autonomy in a way that fails to acknowledge, adequately, our fundamental human interdependence and history of oppression (Jaggar 2020). While there certainly is a place for discussion of these important themes, others argue that we should not lose sight of the important victories human rights have also been able to secure, despite still having a long way to go (United Nations n.d.). The rhetoric of human rights has enabled substantial gains for promoting gender equality and protection of women’s fundamental interests, so it has at least strategic value.

For a good survey of recent work on global gender justice, see Jaggar 2020. For more on solutions to often discussed problems, such as adaptive preferences, see Khader 2011, 2018. For more see the entries on feminist perspectives on globalization and feminist perspectives on power .

Discussion of how histories of imperialism and racial discrimination have shaped current patterns of global injustice have become more prominent in Anglo-American discussions of global justice. In particular, concerns arise about how colonial histories affect continued oppression and exploitation of racial minority groups on a global scale (Mills 1997; Bell 2019; Boxill 2009; Okeja 2019; Buckinx, Trejo-Mathys, and Waligore 2015a; Lu 2017). Shining a light on how colonialists often embraced beliefs about racial inferiority and superiority, theorists argue that white supremacy has played an important role in structuring ways of thinking about global justice. Key questions that emerge from such analysis include: Have debates about global justice been inclined to ignore imperial histories (especially of racial domination) and if so, how should that be taken into account now? Are egalitarian cosmopolitan accounts effectively trying to promote liberal imperialism or can such discourse effectively combat it? What alternative resources can we find in other traditions of political thought and practice for theorizing global justice in insightful ways? While some argue that liberalism and imperialism are inextricable (Mehta 1999), others are more optimistic about liberalism’s prospects. Yet others believe that sometimes imperial-like solutions are necessary to solve especially challenging problems (Ignatieff 2003). (For a good range of views see Bell 2019).

Reflecting on the philosophical field of global justice, it is notable that until more recently, race is often absent from some of the most prominent discussions of global justice. Charles Mills was an especially important figure in drawing attention to these omissions. In his view, this means that theoretical debates have largely ignored or misunderstood “some of the principal sources and sites of injustice” (2019). These omissions can often be traced to dominant methods in Anglo-American philosophy in which ideal theorizing (in a Rawlsian fashion in particular) brackets out certain issues in a conscious way. But putting to the side issues of (say) racial domination means we will be blind to core histories and practices, such as slavery, imperialism, and racism that structure our contemporary world.

Discussion of race and empire have not been completely ignored by global justice theorists. For instance, there is an important literature on historical injustice and reparations (Butt 2008; Tan 2007; Lu 2016; Barry and Goodin 2009), and another on trying to identify how to describe the wrongs of colonialism (Ypi 2013b; Stilz 2015; Valentini 2015). Margaret Moore draws attention to the ways in which the dispossession of land and racial domination are particularly important features in identifying the wrongs of settler colonialism (2016). And yet, the concerns Mills raises still resonate. What would global justice theorizing look like if it placed histories and contemporary practices of racial domination at its core? How can we better integrate histories of colonialism and racial domination into our thinking about current problems of global justice?

For some, this means we must reject theoretical frameworks and vocabularies currently on offer by most political philosophers; others do not believe wholesale rejection is needed. (For a good review of positions see Bell 2019). Charles Mills exemplifies the first approach. For Mills, global justice theorists have failed to take seriously global white supremacy and its legacy and this is especially noteworthy given its role in understanding current patterns of global inequality, poverty and violence (1997, 2019). We need to consider this history and make race a central site of investigation for global justice theorizing, which requires rejecting Rawlsian-style ideal theorizing. It would also involve giving a more prominent role to issues of corrective justice and seeking compensation for the wide-scale massive injustices perpetrated through structures of global white supremacy. Similar views can be found in the work of Olúfẹ́mi Táíwò who writes: “Injustice and oppression are global in scale… [b]ecause Trans-Atlantic slavery and colonialism built the world we live in, and slavery and colonialism were unjust and oppressive”, reparations require remaking the “world system” (Táíwò 2022, 1). On his account, reparations require, among other things, reconciliation and eliminating institutional racism (Táíwò 2022, 4).

Another very important literature has emerged concerning the many alternative understandings of justice that can be found in places formerly dominated by colonial occupation. Indigenous philosophies have many important insights to offer (Lauer 2017; Metz 2017; Watene 2022). In particular, scholars often consider the prospects for indigenous perspectives to promote global environmental justice (Whyte 2014; Watene 2022). Locally embedded frameworks often support, but also provide new alternatives to, traditional approaches to human needs, rights, international development and justice issues more generally (Lauer 2017; Menkiti 2017; Metz 2017).

Ines Valdez (2019) argues we should substitute discourse centered on obligations and duties with one centered on power, coalition-building and contestation. Kimberley Hutchings (2019) emphasizes that in decolonizing our theorizing about global justice, we have to change the way we see the practice of global justice theorizing. We need to think of the latter less as a way to arrive at answers to global justice questions and more as a way to live with others without subsuming them into a particular world. Rather, opening up the conversation to sharing different perspectives we embark on a collaborative approach to experiments in living and being with others. It is not about finding new answers to what we mean by justice but rather “about finding new ways of relating to ourselves and to each other in our pursuit of whatever we may think of as justice” (2019, 121). Adopting such perspectives may reduce some noted tensions in being part of a world community and others that are smaller, drawn along racial, ethnic or other identity lines (Appiah 2007).

For more on these topics see the entries on colonialism , race , black reparations , reconciliation , transitional justice , and critical philosophy of race .

There are many issues debated in the global justice literature concerning migration, whether temporary, permanent, legally sanctioned or undocumented. These include: Should states have the right to control their borders? Even if they have such a right, should states be more generous in admitting would-be migrants, especially considering the facts about global disparities in life prospects? When affluent developed states refuse to open their borders to the economically disadvantaged, is this equivalent to members of the aristocracy unjustly protecting their privilege, as was the case in feudal times? What responsibilities are there to refugees? Can undocumented immigration be justified under certain contemporary circumstances? What sorts of criteria may affluent developed countries use when selecting migrants from the pool of applicants for citizenship? May they legitimately consider how prospective migrants would fit in with current citizens, favoring certain religious, linguistic, or ethnic affiliations to manage compatibility? When making migrant selection decisions, should they consider the effects on those who remain in countries of origin and if so, is this fair to the would-be migrants who would be excluded on grounds of alleged negative impacts for home country citizens? If states admit migrant workers, are there moral constraints on how they should be treated? Would admitting temporary workers without simultaneously allowing them a pathway to citizenship be unjust? What responsibilities do we have in relation to human trafficking?

There are several now classic defenses of state’s rights to control borders. David Miller (Miller 2005, 2007), Michael Walzer (Walzer 1981) and Christopher Wellman (Wellman and Cole 2011) have been particularly important. Prominent proponents of the alternative “Open Borders” position include Joseph Carens (Carens 1987, 2013), Philip Cole (Cole 2000; Wellman and Cole 2011), Chandran Kukathas (2021) and Alex Sager (2018). While many theorists discuss the responsibilities to refugees and guest workers, Walzer’s treatment is particularly influential, especially in arguing for his view that guest worker programs are only justified when they offer such “guests” a proper pathway to full and equal citizenship (Walzer 1981). See also: Owen 2020 and Miller 2020. Within the global justice literature, there is considerable discussion of the ethics of recruiting migrants away from poor countries. Whether brain drain issues should be salient for migration decisions has been a focal point for some discussion (Carens 2013; Oberman 2013; Brock and Blake 2015; Bertram 2018). More generally, much recent discussion concerns justice in state admission policies and the kinds of factors that may or should be included in deciding who to admit and exclude (Wellman and Cole 2011; Lister 2010; Oberman, Fine and Ypi 2016; Blake 2019; Sager 2018; Song 2018; Brock 2020; Morgan 2020; Wilcox 2021; Hidalgo 2021; Buckinx 2019; Jaggar 2020; Vasanthakumar 2022). There has been considerable discussion of appropriate treatment for refugees (see especially Serena Parekh 2017, 2020 and Brock 2020). And discussion has also focused on duties for those who leave their countries of origin (Vasanthakumar 2022; Brock and Blake 2015). For more detailed coverage of issues concerning migration matters, see the entry on immigration .

Patterns of human behavior that destroy habitats, accelerate species extinction, exacerbate toxic levels of pollution, degrade the oceans, contribute to ozone layer destruction, or increase population levels are all issues of global environmental concern (Armstrong 2022; Gardiner 2011; Gardiner, Caney, Jamieson, Shue, and Pachauri 2010). However, although there are many global environmental topics that are rightly concerns of global justice, there is one that dominates discussion and that concerns our responsibilities with respect to climate change. Here we focus exclusively on this issue.

Among the scientific community it is no longer controversial that anthropogenic climate change is real and a significant threat to the well-being of both current and future generations. But it is also widely acknowledged that human development is an important way to address high levels of global poverty, that such development is energy intensive, and the cheapest sources of energy available are not likely to be clean energy types. These considerations significantly affect efforts to deal with problems presented by climate change. There is much discussion about the principles that should inform a fair treaty aimed at dealing with addressing climate change that also gives appropriate weight to concerns for human development (Shue 2014; Athanasiou et al. 2022). Some of the main contenders include principles that recognize causal responsibility for high emission levels, principles that are sensitive to ability to pay, and ones according to which those who have benefited from emissions should now be expected to absorb more costs.

We have not all contributed equally to the problems created by emissions; industrialized nations have contributed historically at much higher levels than those that are still developing. And so we should endorse the guidelines that those who have polluted more should pay more to help redress current problems (The Polluter Pays Principle). However critics argue that this principle unfairly holds some responsible when they did not know they were causing harm, since it was not widely known that greenhouse gases could result in climate change prior to 1990. So on this view, responsibility for emissions prior to 1990 should not conform with the Polluter Pays Principle, even if it is used to allocate costs after 1990. Others reply that countries can still be liable for causing harm even if they lack moral responsibility for doing so (Shue 2014). A second principle that is often discussed is The Beneficiary Pays Principle. Those who live in industrialized countries have typically benefited greatly from high levels of emissions so it is not unfair if they are expected to pay a higher proportion of costs. Critics object that a history of benefiting is an insufficiently strong consideration for assigning responsibilities now: in many cases whether or not people benefit is largely outside of their control. According to a third popular principle, The Ability to Pay Principle, the capacity of agents to pay for costs associated with mitigating climate change should be relevant. Again, some object that the ability to pay is a poor principle for assigning responsibility.

More recently, philosophers have evaluated different proposals for not only mitigating and distributing the costs of climate change but also adaptation to its diverse effects (Gosseries 2004; Vanderheiden 2008; Gardiner, Caney, Jamieson, Shue, and Pachauri 2010; Blomfield 2019; Shue 2014, 2021; Brooks 2020). Moreover, they have considered how we can mobilize hope in the face of the seemingly tragic consequences of our failures to both address the challenges of climate change and human development in a timely manner (Moellendorf 2022; Cripps 2022; Malm 2021; Mckinnon 2022). Some of this work connects to important debates about feasibility and institutional mechanisms for addressing climate change fairly (Caney 2020; Gheaus 2013; Gilabert and Lawford-Smith 2012). For more on climate justice see the entries on climate justice and climate science (Parker 2018; Caney 2022). Comprehensive treatment of climate justice requires addressing the issue of responsibilities to future generations (Meyer and Gossieries 2009). For important treatment of our responsibilities to other generations see the entry on intergenerational justice .

One striking feature of the state of global health is that there are large inequalities in health outcomes and opportunities for health. Consider that life expectancy can vary a great deal. A person born in Sierra Leone can expect to live about 40 years whereas one born in Japan can expect to live for 80 years. Malaria has been almost entirely eradicated in high-income countries, but it still kills about a million people in developing countries per year (United Nations 2009). A woman in Niger has a 1 in 7 chance of dying in childbirth, whereas this is 1 in 11 000 for women in Canada (Benatar and Brock 2011, 2021). The global burden of disease is by no means evenly spread nor does workforce capability correspond with areas of highest need. In fact many of the countries that suffer from the greatest burdens of disease have the fewest skilled healthcare workers. In addition, pharmaceutical companies do not spend their research and development budgets in ways that match where the needs are greatest. Rather, seeking the most profitable ventures, they are much more likely to spend resources developing drugs for lucrative markets where the payoffs are greatest, even when the marginal benefits to consumers are small. One example is the research and development resources pharmaceutical companies frequently spend on developing drugs that are similar to others already available, rather than developing treatments for diseases for which there are no cures. Historically, it is estimated that drug companies spent approximately 90% of their research and development resources in seeking treatment for about 10% of diseases and some argue that justice requires reorienting incentives for new research and development to better align with the global disease burden (Drugs for Neglected Diseases Working Group 2001; Flory and Kitcher 2004).

The poor in developing countries are also often more vulnerable to disease and less able to resist disease because of poor living conditions related to poverty. Lack of clean water, clean energy sources, inadequate nutrition, and other social determinants of health play a key role in explaining this increased vulnerability. Living in overcrowded houses can facilitate the spread of infectious diseases, such as tuberculosis. So, a number of issues that sustain poverty or exacerbate people’s vulnerability to disease as a result of poverty should be of concern (Benatar and Brock 2021). As Norman Daniels argues, health inequalities among different social groups can be considered unjust when they result from unjust distribution in factors that are socially controllable that affect population health (Daniels 2011, 101). On this view many health inequalities that exist are ones that ought to be of concern as they meet this criterion. How should responsibilities for improving this situation be allocated? In many ways, but here we pick out just a few that have received considerable attention in the philosophical literature.

The current system of intellectual property rights is one troubling area. The World Trade Organization grants product patents for a twenty year period which effectively renders many new medicines unaffordable for the vast majority of the world’s population and those in greatest need. There are a number of innovative proposals aimed at addressing these issues. One prominent example is the Health Impact Fund proposal developed by Thomas Pogge, which offers alternative ways to reward pharmaceutical companies, notably by how much impact they have on actually curing diseases (Pogge 2008). The greater their impact, the larger the share of the rewards they would receive from the Health Impact Fund. Nicole Hassoun proposes a “Global Health Impact” certification program for rating pharmaceutical companies’ contributions to the global poor (Hassoun 2020). Companies would compete for the gold star rankings which could significantly affect consumption choices and thereby expected profits. In both cases the aim is to create important incentives for key agents to care about how their products affect the global poor.

There are many other issues that concern philosophers in the domain of global health. There are worrying practices of experimentation on disadvantaged subjects in developing countries (Emanuel et al. 2004). Increasingly, clinical research has been outsourced to poor, developing countries with populations that are often highly vulnerable. We might wonder about whether these populations are being exploited and whether the participants have compromised abilities to consent to drug trials. In many cases the trials bring considerable health benefits that would not come their way were it not in the interests of pharmaceutical companies to do clinical research in those locations. If sufficient benefits accrue for local populations, some argue that these cases need not be of concern, while others disagree (Emanuel et al. 2004; London 2011).

New infectious diseases and the threat of pandemics are creating further questions about our responsibilities. Often the case is made that national interests in public health in developed countries mandate concern for infectious diseases that originate in developing countries. When resources for addressing these threats are limited, some argue it is acceptable for states to prioritize their populations, while others disagree (Hassoun 2021; Ferguson and Caplan 2021; Savulescu 2020). There are also important debates about how to distribute vaccines across borders and about whether other public health policies – e.g. immunity passports – violate individual rights or are justified for protecting public health (Emanuel et al. 2020; Emanuel et al. 2021; Herlitz et al. 2021; Liu, Salwi, and Drolet 2020; Persad and Emanuel 2020; Voigt 2022; Jecker 2022; Bramble 2020; Baylis and Kofler 2020a, 2020b; Jecker, Wightman, and Diekema, forthcoming). Some argue that global justice – solidarity and respect for human rights – demands addressing diseases that are not as transmissible as COVID-19 and may not pose as significant threats to many people in developed countries (Daniels 2007; Atuire and Hassoun 2023; Gould 2018; Lenard and Straehle 2012; Benatar and Brock 2021; Herlitz et al. 2021). There is also significant concern for fair procedures in addressing health crises globally.

For more see also public health ethics , and justice, inequality, and health .

10. Some Issues that Cut Across Several Themes

Discussion of natural resources often figures prominently in several topics of global justice. Some relevant questions include: Are national communities entitled to the resources they find on their territories? Should principles of global justice apply to our arrangements for justly distributing natural resources? Charles Beitz was an early proponent of a resource distribution principle, according to which natural resources should be allocated such that each society is able to provide adequately for its population (Beitz 1975). We saw in Section 2 that Rawls believes that resources are not important to prosperity in the ways many imagine. Rather, institutional resilience matters more. By contrast, Thomas Pogge highlights the ways in which international practices concerning the distribution of resources create considerable obstacles for prosperity in developing countries. In short, these practices create incentives for the wrong kinds of people to take power through illegitimate means and to focus on retaining power at the expense of other goals governments should have, such as trying to improve the well-being of their citizens. We need to modify these international practices so they do not create such an unfavorable environment. In addition, Pogge proposes a Global Resources Dividend as one measure by which practices concerning natural resource distribution would work in some small way to the benefit of the global poor. On this Global Resources Dividend proposal there would be a small tax on resource extraction, payable by the consumers of resources, and available for projects that would assist in helping everyone to be able to meet their basic needs with dignity (Pogge 2008).

Leif Wenar is also concerned with prevailing practices governing the sale of natural resources and their products (Wenar 2010, 2016). When consumers in wealthy states buy goods from developing countries, this is often similar to consciously receiving stolen goods. Legitimate resource sales require general agreement from citizens. Evidence of agreement requires that: (i) owners must be informed about sales, (ii) owners must be able to express dissent freely should they have doubts about sales, and (iii) owners should be able to stop resource sales without fearing grave consequences such as violence and intimidation. Wenar aims to outlaw dispossession of citizens’ resources by promoting various practices that would satisfy these conditions and promote clean trade (Wenar 2016).

For various reasons (including strategic ones) Thomas Pogge and Leif Wenar do not directly challenge the right of nations to own resources on their territories. Policy recommendations, are much more likely to be effective if they can fit within the main structures of international conventions. However, other theorists do take up this issue including Hillel Steiner (2005), Tim Hayward (2005) and Mathias Risse (2005, 2012b). Steiner argues that all inhabitants of the world are entitled to an equal share in the value of all land and he advocates for the “Global Fund” which aims to ensure that equal share entitlements can be secured. The Global Fund would constitute a clearing house for payments and disbursements (Steiner 2005).

Appealing to accounts of ownership of resources, some philosophers draw out important implications for diverse global justice debates. Mathias Risse argues that we all, collectively, own the resources of the earth and this has profound implications for a range of global justice issues, including immigration. When people are under-utilizing their “rightful shares” of territory, they cannot complain when co-owners would like to occupy some of it. Some theorists concerned with environmental issues also discuss our rights with respect to natural resources. Some argue that we have equal rights to access the earth’s resources. Tim Hayward, for instance, argues that we have equal rights to ecological space (Hayward 2005). This is often appealed to when there is a perception that we have exceeded our share, such as in levels of carbon emissions and consumption more generally.

Accounts according to which we have equal rights to resources, land, ecological space and so on, are often accused of suffering from an important common problem. It is difficult to defend a clear and compelling account of the value of resources as these can vary considerably in different social, cultural and technological contexts. But we need to be able to quantify resource values to some plausible extent, if we are to determine whether people are enjoying or exceeding their equal shares (Armstrong 2017).

Others defend territorial sovereignty for other reasons. Some, like Cara Nine argue that collectives have a right to territory when they “establish legitimate, minimal conditions for justice within a geographical region” (Nine 2012, 2022). While Anna Stilz argues that states allow people to associate in specific geographical locations and realize economic, social, and cultural values free from interference as long as they respect others’ rights to associate as well (Stilz 2019). She defends collective self-determination that represents subjects’ political will and ensures self-directed agency and non-alienation where this is compatible with global justice. Stilz maintains that actual states only have a legitimate right to territory if they have rightful occupancy, implement a system of basic justice, and represent the shared will of most inhabitants. But, even when they do not, she thinks states can be justified in ruling a territory if they are the only available way of providing decent rule or changing their boundaries will jeopardize urgent interests or come with high costs (Stilz 2019).

Others argue against territorial sovereignty or for reconceiving sovereignty in a way that encourages respect for human rights and can limit our tendency towards war, coercion, inequality and collective action problems (Chatterjee 2011; Held 1995). Some maintain that all who are affected by states’ actions should have a say in their rules while others reject this conclusion. For discussion, see Buchanan and Keohane 2011. For other important work on territory, see the entry on territorial rights and territorial justice .

There are a number of global justice problems that need to be addressed, and this raises the issue of how to allocate responsibilities fairly. Who should do what to reduce global injustices? Several different agents, groups, organizations and institutions could play a role. Which responsibilities should devolve to corporations, governments, consumers, citizens, international organizations or social movements? Some frequently discussed proposals focus on agents’ contributions to a problem, their patterns of benefit from the problem, and their capacity to take constructive action now. Two influential frameworks deserve more extended treatment, notably that of Iris Marion Young concerning a social connection model for allocating responsibilities for structural injustice and that of David Miller concerning remedial responsibility (Young 2011; Miller 2007).

In contrast to the idea of responsibility as involving finding fault and individual liability, Iris Marion Young develops a forward-looking model which she argues is more appropriate. She draws on the idea that participation via institutions sometimes produces injustice, so we have particular responsibilities to address injustice. We share responsibility for addressing injustice but we may have different degrees and kinds of responsibility. She offers different parameters of reasoning that can help individuals and organizations decide what might make the most sense for them to do in efforts to remedy injustice, given that there are so many injustices, whereas time and resources are limited. Using the case study of the global apparel industry she illustrates how the fact that we are positioned differently can entail varying but important responsibilities for all who participate in activities that sustain sweatshops. There are at least four parameters that agents can use in their reasoning:

• Power: we have different levels of influence and capacities to change processes. We should focus on those areas where we have greater capacities to change worrisome structural processes. This might mean focusing on a few key players who have both greater capacity to make changes themselves and to influence others.
• Privilege: some people have more privilege than others in relation to structures. So middle-class clothing consumers have more discretionary income, choice and ability to absorb costs – they can change their clothing purchasing practices more easily than those who earn minimum wage, have little discretionary income, and little ability to absorb further costs.
• Interest: All who have an interest in changing oppressive structures have responsibilities in connection with remedying these. This entails that “victims” too have important responsibilities since they have a great interest in eliminating oppression. In a nuanced analysis she argues that they might have responsibilities in certain contexts, such as to speak out about the harsh conditions in which they work. They must take some responsibility for resisting and challenging the structures. Without their participation the need for reforms may be rationalized away or reforms may not take the required form. These obligations may not always exist, especially when the costs of resistance would require extraordinary sacrifices.
• Collective ability: In some cases we already have collective organization capacities and resources that are well established. Sometimes it just makes good practical sense to draw on these. So, for instance, sometimes student associations, faith-based organizations, unions, or stockholder groups already exercise significant power in being able to coordinate like-minded members who are willing to take certain actions. She encourages us to harness organizational resources where doing so would prove effective.

In summary, Young encourages us to think about how we can best take responsibility for reducing structural injustice by reflecting on these four parameters – different positions of power, privilege, interest and collective ability. (For comprehensive review of the merits of Young’s approach see McKeown 2018, 2021.)

David Miller offers a tremendously influential connection theory of responsibility that also discusses our remedial responsibilities. There are six ways in which we can be connected to someone, P, who needs help and so be held remedially responsible for assisting. These connections give rise to six ways in which remedial responsibility can be identified. We might be morally responsible for P’s condition; we might be outcome or causally responsible for P’s condition; we might have had no causal role in their condition but have benefited from it; we might have capacity to assist P; or we might be connected to P through ties of community. [ 4 ]

There is a huge literature on taking responsibility for remedying or preventing future global injustice, including discussing the merits of these two dominant approaches. For some other innovative contributions see, for instance, Barry and Overland 2016, Dahan, Lerner and Milman-Sivan 2023, 2016, McKeown 2018, 2021, Brock 2023.

More recently attention has focused on what those on the receiving end of injustice may permissibly do. Alejandra Mancilla (2016) argues that the needy can take what they need and use material resources for self preservation even if that requires taking from others. In doing so she expands on James Sterba’s earlier arguments against libertarians for similar conclusions (Sterba 2008, 1996). Also see (Cabrera 2004). Others like Cecil Fabre, Johan Olsthoorn, and Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen argue that sometimes poor states may wage war on the affluent for subsistence (Lipper-Rasmussen 2013; Fabre 2016; Olsthoorn 2021). [Some, like Peter Unger and Gerhart Øverland argue that it is acceptable to force others to assist in poverty-alleviation under at least some circumstances (Unger 1996; Øverland 2009)].

In the global justice literature, there are also important concerns about the distribution of responsibilities among collective and individual agents. Prominently, can we hold nations responsible for global injustices or remedying such injustices? This raises important questions about collective responsibility that are well treated elsewhere in this encyclopedia (see the entry on collective responsibility ).

Is it possible to have global justice in the absence of a world state? Hobbes argues that this is not possible since there is no global authority that can secure and enforce the requirements of justice. He presents the classic so-called realist case, which is highly influential in international politics, such that there is a state of nature in the international realm. All states compete in pursuing their own advantage and since there is no global authority there can be no justice in international affairs. Also for an overview of some key work on realism in political philosophy, see the entry on political realism in international relations and Rossi and Sleat 2014.

Others are more optimistic. Since we already have a high level of interaction among states, organizations and other agents, this has generated various norms and expectations about appropriate conduct that guides behavior in the international sphere (Beitz 1999). Moreover, we have a strong interest in co-operation when this is necessary to deal practically with a range of problems that have global reach. Global governance is concerned with how we manage interests affecting the residents of more than one state in the absence of a world state. There is already a high level of co-operation among a variety of networks, organizations and other groups of interested parties at the sub-state level, and this is powerfully influencing the redesign of best practice norms in particular domains (Slaughter 2004). Some argue for a global state or democratic system – often with subsidiarity or some kind of poly-centric political order, and others argue for more limited forms of legitimate global governance (Cabrera 2018; Gould 2004, 2014; Held 2004; Kuper 2004; Buchanan and Keohane 2006).

Other change agents that can and have exercised considerable reform pressures include global social movements, such as the anti-sweatshop movement, the fair trade movement, and other ethical consumption movements. Global activism has been an important source of incremental change. These simple examples show that much more is possible in the absence of a world state than realists acknowledge.

For more on issues of world government, see the entry on world government , which provides extended treatment of this issue.

Philosophers are contributing in important ways to discussions of global justice policy issues. As illustrations, in this entry we have canvassed several institutional reform proposals for addressing global injustices which have enjoyed widespread attention, both within the academy and beyond. These include Thomas Pogge’s Health Impact Fund and Nicole Hassoun’s Global Health Impact proposals ( Section 9 ) along with Pogge’s proposal for a Global Resources Dividend ( Section 10.1 ), Christian Barry and Sanjay Reddy’s Just Linkage Proposal to help improve working conditions ( Section 4 ), Allan Buchanan and Robert Keohane’s institutional innovations to secure accountability in the use of military force ( Section 3.2 ), and the innovative work of Leif Wenar concerning proposals for clean trade ( Section 10.1 ).

In addition to those illustrations already highlighted in this article, philosophers are having an impact on policy discussions in a wide range of areas including climate change and contributing ideas to the Human Development Reports (United Nations Development Programme 2020, United Nations Development Programme 2022). They have contributed to influential international multi-disciplinary projects that seek alternative ways to measure quality of health, life or poverty (Nussbaum and Sen 1993, Esposito and Hassoun 2017, Wisor et al. 2014). Philosophers have also discussed rampant abusive tax practices by corporations and wealthy individuals and how this deprives developing countries of much-needed income for human development in developing countries (Brock 2009). There are also important discussions of global income taxes, carbon taxes, financial transaction taxes and Tobin Taxes (Moellendorf 2009; Caney 2005b; Brock 2009). The pervasive problems associated with corruption have been attracting increased attention (Wenar 2016; Brock 2023). So, philosophers continue to make an important contribution to policy debates and this is also likely to be an area in which important future work on global justice will concentrate.

Philosophers are also engaging in more interdisciplinary research and global justice theorists sometimes do experimental or more broadly empirical philosophy (Miller 2001; Appiah 2007; Hassoun 2009b, 2014; Lindauer 2020; Lindauer et al. 2023; Buckland et al. 2022; Pölzler and Hannikainen 2022). Furthermore, there is some sophisticated work in related disciplines and there is significant room for fruitful interdisciplinary future research (Cappelen, Fest, Sørensen and Tungodden 2020).

Philosophers also play central roles in methodological innovation, which can in turn play an important role in informing debates about theory and public policy. As one prominent example of the contributions of new global justice methodologies, it is worth noting the emergence of “Engaged Theorizing” (see website listed under internet resources), especially in the global justice context (Ackerly 2018; Deveaux 2015, 2021; Cabrera 2010; Lu 2017; Rafanelli 2021; Reed-Sandoval 2020). Such approaches take lived experience, social action campaigns, and justice movements as the central important starting point for normative theorizing. Using interpretive, qualitative, and normative analysis, engaged political theorists try to align political philosophy with the questions, goals, and needs of communities seeking social justice. In these ways there have been important new attempts to bring philosophy to bear on our contemporary global realities, with significant progress made in bridging the divisions between theory and practice.

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The Fight for Reparations Cannot Ignore Climate Change

Olúfẹ́mi o. táíwò.

• January 10, 2022

Reparations have seen a resurgence of interest in recent years, stemming from a variety of sources. Perhaps most familiarly, Ta-Nehisi Coates’s influential 2014 essay in the Atlantic , “ The Case for Reparations ,” set off a firestorm of reactions across the political spectrum, culminating years later in a “historic” Congressional hearing in 2019. In the wake of George Floyd’s murder and the rebellions of 2020, reparations programs task forces have launched in the city of Detroit and state of California while a housing payment program launched in Evanston . And last year, House Resolution 40—introduced every year in Congress since John Conyers Jr. first introduced it in 1989, and calling for a commission to study reparations for slavery—finally passed through the Judiciary Committee for full consideration on the House floor.

But what exactly does the call for reparations demand, and what kind of political movement does it entail? The label has been applied to a vast array of different programs and policies, from direct cash payments to African Americans to symbolic apologies, creations of museums and sites of spiritual recognition, and academic studies about the nature of systemic racism. In a 2016 essay, political scientist Adolph Reed, Jr., took aim at this feature of the call for reparations, describing it as a blend of “material, symbolic, and psychological components.” Reed thinks this ambiguity is a liability, since elites can exploit the demand by choosing the version of reparations that is cheapest for them: the symbolic. More important, Reed contends, overinvestment in symbolic reparations could detract energy and resources from an alternative, preferable political project: “building broad solidarity across race, gender, and other identities around shared concerns of daily life” like “access to quality health care, the right to a decent and dignified livelihood, affordable housing, quality education for all.” Reed thus warns that the call for reparations for some distracts from a more worthy political project that would provide justice for all—an objection also voiced during the 2019 House hearing.

This essay is featured in Repair .

But what if the project for reparations was the project for “safer neighborhoods and better schools,” for a “less punitive justice system,” for “the right to a decent and dignified livelihood”? Responding to Reed in Dissent in 2019, African American studies scholar Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor pointed out that the struggle to build a just social system can’t be won solely through “universal” programs addressing common problems. Taylor gives the example of the large disparity rate in maternal mortality between Black mothers and white mothers: the accumulated history of disparate and discriminatory treatment and policy means that not all of the relevant social problems are, in fact, common to both. To build a just health care system, we would have to address both lack of access due to unjust economic structures and lack of access due to unfair gender- and race-based discrimination. From the point of view of building a just health care system, these goals aren’t substitutes for each other; they are complementary.

Though it is less well elaborated in today’s popular debates, this understanding of reparations—one that sees it as central to the expansive project of building a more just world, not just as a material or symbolic mechanism of redress for past harms—has a long legacy. This vision is worth recovering and integrating with other important political movements today, above all the global struggle for climate justice.

There is ample footing, both in theory and in practice, for widening the scope of our conversations about reparations in this way. In his historical study of the Black radical imagination, Freedom Dreams (2002), historian Robin D. G. Kelley notes that the demand for reparations “was never entirely, or even primarily, about money.” Instead, it was

about social justice, reconciliation, reconstructing the internal life of black America, and eliminating institutional racism. This is why reparations proposals from black radical movements focus less on individual payments than on securing funds to build autonomous black institutions, improving community life, and in some cases establishing a homeland that will enable African Americans to develop a political economy geared more toward collective needs than toward accumulation.

This view—constructive in outlook and global in ambition—has a particularly useful antecedent in midcentury struggles for independence. As historian Adom Getachew shows in her recent book Worldmaking after Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination (2019), the wave of decolonization movements that crested toward the end of World War II forced new political questions onto the world stage. Prominent figures in the growing global anticolonial movement demanded the institutionalization of self-determination as a political principle of the United Nations, worked to form regional political blocs for mutual aid and uplift, and demanded a New International Economic Order with a different set of rules than the set that had emerged from the interaction of colonial domination and the capitalist economy that emerged from it: what I call “global racial empire.” They imagined new institutions, different relationships between countries, and also, crucially, the most recognizable aspect of reparations politics: redistribution of global wealth, from the First World (back) to the Third World.

These activists weren’t just fighting against the structures of colonial domination and racial apartheid; they were also trying to build a more just world on a planetary scale. Unfortunately, they did not succeed: the end of the Cold War, the disciplining of the newly independent states, and the corresponding defeat of radical politics around the globe produced struggles for justice that often set their sights much lower. But any politically serious reparations project—at least one fitting the goals and ethos of the constructive view—should build on this long and worthy tradition of “worldmaking.” It must include two elements, in particular.

First, it must be global in scope. This is not to deny the importance of national or regional struggles for reparations, from the United States to Caribbean nations’ CARICOM Reparations Commission , reparations projects formed on the African continent, and demands from Indigenous groups who have collaborated across their nations to push for redress of grievances. But slavery, colonialism, and the political structure they produced are global phenomena, and we need a global theoretical perspective on what could (and does) unite these separate political projects.

Second, and perhaps less obviously, a politically serious reparations project must focus on climate change. The connection between climate crisis, slavery, and colonialism flows from distributions of wealth and vulnerability created by centuries of global politics and its ecological consequences, layered with more recent histories of pollution in the Global North and corporate fossil fuel interests. As climate impacts accelerate, we can expect their burdens to fall disproportionately on those who have been rendered most vulnerable through the accumulated weight of such histories. Our response to climate crisis thus deeply constrains the possibilities for justice.

The historical connections between the climate crisis and our present systems of injustice help explain why a just future depends on reparations. Before the rise of global racial empire, different regions of the globe evolved in a fair degree of ecological isolation: ecological connections were constrained by the size and scope of relatively local human economic trade. The newly formed global racial empire exploded in the 1500s and stretched that trade across the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific oceans, comprising what some scholars call the “Columbian exchange”: a historically unprecedented flow of plants, animals, and pathogens into environments that had never dealt with them before. The results were immediate and world-changing. The introduction of European pathogens alongside forms of colonial domination, especially the extensive slave trade in Indigenous populations , led to 56 million deaths in the Americas over the sixteenth century—so many that some scientists estimate that this “Great Dying” cooled the Earth. This was the first anthropogenic global climate event, setting the political stage for the Industrial Revolution. In addition to the unfathomable suffering and loss of life, this catastrophic depopulation of the Americas likely enabled the success of the European campaigns of imperial conquest.

When the Industrial Revolution followed centuries later, human production for the first time outpaced the natural constraints on growth. The British empire, where this process started, was already dominating key parts of the world, including much of the Indian subcontinent. These regimes of exploitation coincided with a crucial bit of geological luck: England had more available coal on its islands than competitors in Europe or South Asia. British industrialists developed techniques to extract and use coal energy to compete with the Indian producers, which lead to new forms of iron production and thus mechanization, crucially in the textile industry that converted cotton from the American South into clothing for the entire world. Coal-powered, mechanized production revolutionized British manufacture and the economic world, helping to complete its dominance as a colonial power. And this aspect of the global racial empire—industrialism—would transform the ecological world.

Although coal was overtaken by oil after the 1950s, the use of oil, coal, and other fossil fuels since the onset of the Industrial Revolution has sent billions of tons of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. The ecological ramifications of these carbon emissions are tremendous. If present trends continue, an estimated one in three humans will—as soon as 2070—be pushed out of the climate niche that our species has inhabited for millennia. In the Global South, sea level rise poses existential threat to the Pacific islands, Bangladesh, and the Nile delta, while drought and agricultural failure leave sub-Saharan Africa on a knife’s edge.

To be sure, some aspects of the distribution of climate impacts are purely geographical. Whether or not a family is affected by a hurricane or sea-level rise, for example, depends on how close they live to the ocean. But what matters for our commitment to justice is how these ecological phenomena affect people’s capabilities—the lives that they are or are not empowered to live. In some cases, these geographical variables are themselves deeply shaped by centuries of injustice rather than by personal choices. In other cases, differential distributions of wealth and power today will only exacerbate inequality in the future. Some people who retreat from a coastline will have access to money or credit to manage the financial costs of relocation, a passport or citizenship status that will widen their legal relocation options, and a social status that will make their new communities likely to welcome them. Many others will lack some or all of these advantages: they will be cash-poor and indebted, have a citizenship status that radically curtails their mobility, or a social status that draws stigma and violence. These outcomes aren’t purely geographical; they are shaped by our social and political arrangements.

We know that the costs and burdens of environmental catastrophe will be distributed in ways that echo the history of global racial empire because it is already happening. Researchers studying New York City have found that heatwave deaths and even the temperature itself was racially distributed: residents in areas with a larger proportion of white people were wealthier and benefited from the natural cooling of more vegetation as well as the artificial cooling of air conditioners. Meanwhile, what scientists call the “urban heat island effect” put inner-city residents at risk.

Climate crisis is also likely to lead to new social divisions between those advantaged enough to buy or coerce security from climate impacts and those who cannot. Researchers link recent violence between neighbors in Mali and Nigeria to resource conflicts exacerbated by climate-related desertification and other impacts. At a community, local, and national scale, we can expect police to protect the rich and socially well-positioned, often leaving vulnerable those on the business end of nightsticks or behind cell walls. We can also expect the balance of power between nation states and Indigenous communities to be shaped increasingly by forces of the same kind: the climate crisis is likely to shuffle increasing power and control into the hands of those in command of wealth, coercive force, or strategic resources.

Putting all this together, the lesson is clear: to understand how the climate crisis will interact with global racial empire’s distribution of advantages and disadvantages, we need to explore the distribution of specifically environmental risk and vulnerability. Various contested economic theories suggest mechanisms for why vulnerabilities are high in the formerly colonized parts of the world, but the distribution of environmental risk and vulnerability can be explained simply in terms of patterns of accumulation.

Accumulation is the result of distribution over time. If you and I both save ten cents of every dollar we earn over our working lives, we will both end up with accumulated savings by the time we retire. At small scales, the element of choice and responsibility matter: if we both make around the same amount of money from our jobs and have access to similarly consistent hours, then in the end the person with the most retirement funds will be the thriftiest or hardest working of the two of us. However, if I make minimum wage and you make seven figures a year, spending habits or willingness to tack on overtime shifts can never explain the difference between our retirement savings. The distribution of income in our working years, not our work habits, explains the different levels of accumulation we have when we retire. What we can do in our retirement age, how we are cared for, and what we leave to our heirs, likewise, are primarily determined by this distribution. The environmental risk and vulnerability facing countries and populations today emerges from several overlapping strands of political, cultural, and economic accumulation, which were largely set in motion generations ago.

In 2005, climate change researchers at the University of East Anglia created an index of eleven key indicators for vulnerability to climate change impacts: percentage of the population with access to sanitation, three measures of literacy rate (by different age groups and by gender), maternal mortality rate, typical caloric intake, civil liberties, political rights, government effectiveness, life expectancy at birth, and a measure of access to justice termed “voice and accountability.”

Such measures of climate vulnerability are a useful tool for the constructive view of reparations: what matters about the economy are the actual lives people are empowered to lead. And the measures clearly reveal that the colonizing parts of the world are now much less vulnerable to climate change than the regions they colonized. The measures thus reflect a simple lesson about how yesterday’s distribution affects tomorrow’s reality: heightened vulnerability to the incoming aspects of climate change correlates directly with greater deprivation in the status quo. In short, the rich get richer and the poor get poorer. It is not that every aspect of today’s global racial empire is rooted in the impacts of climate change—but every aspect of tomorrow’s global racial empire will be. Climate change will redistribute social advantages in a way that compounds and locks in the distributional injustices we have inherited from history.

In the face of these links, what should be done? We don’t have to agree on every aspect of the new world we are building to agree on ways to improve the justice of our current arrangements. At the same time, even in times of immense po­litical opportunity, the possibilities for change are profoundly constrained by the balance of power we inherit from centuries past. As Frederick Douglass noted, “power concedes nothing without a demand.” It is thus imperative to issue clear demands. Here are some places we might start.

Unconditional Cash Transfers Contemporary demands for reparations have rightly kept focus on this tactic. In stark contrast to the byzantine social support systems that have come to characterize modern social democracies, social scientists are beginning to embrace “unconditional cash transfers”—simply giving people money directly. These kinds of transfers will intervene directly in the patterns of accumulation, one of our most adaptable forms of social advantages. It also avoids the problems with other welfare programs: the sprawling (and questionably efficacious) overhead, the paternalistic attempts to further shape people’s incentives, and the “poverty traps” caused by aid withdrawal once a recipient crosses some threshold of income or welfare. Furthermore, the ethos of the unconditional cash transfer matches self-determination as a goal for reparations policies, which is part and parcel of the constructive view.

In their recent book From Here to Equality: Reparations for Black Americans in the Twenty-First Century (2020), economist William A. Darity, Jr., and scholar A. Kirsten Mullen endorse a strategy rooted in direct payments to African Americans descended from those enslaved in the United States, disbursed over time rather than all at once (to prevent inflation) and via trust funds and endowments. Moreover, it would be governed by a National Reparations Board that enlists its recipients in research about and decisions over the funds, further bolstering a commitment to an outcome of self-determination. Scholar and organizer Dorian Warren of the Economic Security Project has suggested that we adopt a strategy rooted in “targeted universalism”—a universal basic income for all, plus an additional amount for African Americans to account for the owed reparations. These proposals have been discussed in the context of U.S. politics, but others have suggested a global universal basic income, which could be weighted in the targeted way that Warren suggests. Both of these are exactly the kind of demands we should want to win.

Global Climate Funding Cash transfers directly redistribute social advantages in a powerful way, but they do not directly redistribute disadvantages: including the vulnerability to environmental harm and the burden of climate policy.

The Climate Equity Reference Frame is an effort-sharing framework that calculates “fair shares” of the global climate transition effort to individual countries based on their “responsibility” for global emissions and capacity to mobilize resources for reductions in greenhouse emissions given its economic and development needs. Across a variety of ways of calculating “fair share,” poorer countries pledged emissions reductions that greatly exceed their share of climate work while rich counties pledged far less than their share. In fact, poor countries have pledged 50 percent more in reductions than rich countries.

Part of the reason that richer countries’ reduction pledges lag behind their fair share is because achieving the needed scale of change in a reasonable time frame is technologically difficult. Another approach would be for a richer country to bear the costs of reducing emissions where there are more opportunities for faster emissions reduction.

The Green Climate Fund, managed under the existing United Nations Framework on Climate Change, could facilitate such inter-country transfers and provide other support. The rich nations and associated institutions have pledged to raise $100 billion for developing nations’ green development, a step in the right direction. However, Dr. Mariama Williams of the South Centre, an intergovernmental organization supported and staffed by developing countries, claims that this “does not even come close” to what is needed to make significant inroads into the climate crisis. Moreover, the rich countries have failed to follow through on their pledges; the fund stood at a fraction of its goal in early 2020. Both the funding target and the follow-through by richer coun­tries must increase substantially.

Funding the technology to reduce emissions is crucial, but how do we pay for crises and impacts when they arrive? The United Nations and other intergovern­mental organization typically refer to crises—such as those stemming from natural disasters like hurricanes—as “loss and damage.” The question of who should pay for the loss and damage of climate change raises familiar problems in distributive justice: Should rich countries pay be­cause they are richer or because they have emitted more? We can add another: or because they’ve inherited more of the liabilities from global racial empire?

No matter how we settle this issue, today’s mechanisms for loss and damage funding shows us what to avoid. Beyond the problem of consistent underfunding, the substantial flow of loans to Third World countries in crisis saddles recipients with debt rather than relief. Debt jubilee could free up vast amounts of public spending in Third World countries toward increasing climate security. Failing that, debt relief for climate finance swaps could re­verse this: converting sovereign debt into fuel for climate relief for Third World nations whose money is better spent on climate adapta­tion than debt service.

Torch the Tax Havens Financing the proposals above will require revamping the financial system locally and globally to prevent elites from hiding and hoarding the world’s wealth, and a crucial component of such a program must involve confronting “tax havens”—sites for the accumulation of wealth, often ill-gotten, which shield wealth holders from taxes. In his book The Hidden Wealth of Nations: The Scourge of Tax Heavens (2015), economist Gabriel Zucman estimates that at least $7.6 trillion of the world’s wealth was held in these offshore accounts. This is surely a low-ball estimate, Zucman notes, since his calculation excludes wealth tied up in real assets (e.g., yachts, jewelry) and circulating in cash, where much of the wealth from drug and other illegal trades is stored. To understand the scale of this mammoth figure, consider that in 2019, the budget for United States’ entire military apparatus—including the Department of Defense, all 17 of its intelligence agencies, its war budget for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, its nuclear weapons program, and veterans affairs expenses—was estimated at $1.25 tril­lion, less than a fifth of the value of the wealth horded in the world’s tax havens.

While tax havens appear in both the Global North and Global South (Switzerland, Luxembourg, the Cayman Islands, and Ireland, Panama), the overall effect of their distribution has worked out to impoverish Global South countries. Zucman estimates that at least 22 percent of Latin American wealth and 30 percent of African wealth is held off­shore, representing tens of billions of dollars of lost tax revenue that could be put to the service of crucial green infrastructure development, just housing, or other pivotal worldbuilding uses. As one advocate of greater control over financial flows reminds us: “For every country losing money illicitly, there is another country absorbing it. Illicit financial outflows are facilitated by finan­cial opacity in tax havens and in Western economies like the United States.” Implementing transparency measures to curtail tax haven secrecy and anonymous shell companies is crucial to curtailing illicit flows.

Divest-Invest, from Fossil Fuels to Communities Fossil fuel divestment campaigns often aim to move cap­ital from problematic fossil fuel corporations to more “climate re­sponsible investments.” On the view of climate justice developed here, green investments in Black and Indigenous communities are climate- responsible investments. We ought to think of fossil fuel companies like we think of police, as generators of insecurity, and make similar efforts to divert resources from them back into looted communities. The divest–invest framework in both of these divestment campaigns ought to aim for this same pattern of redistribution.

Some might be skeptical: divestment campaigns don’t seem to work. . . . until they do. When they reach a tipping “threshold,” they can have sudden and dramatic effects. Each institution that divests poses limited financial risks for investors, but each additional divesting corporation increases the difficult-to-quantify reputational risks that could trigger wider scale (and more consequential) market movement. A group consisting of fewer than ten percent of investors, according to simulations, could trigger a systemwide redistribution of social resources away from fossil fuels.

Social movements can also be “tipped” in this way. In 2014 youth runners went on hundred- or even thousand-mile runs, spreading news of an incoming pipeline by word of mouth. Hundreds, then thousands, answered the call and camped around the Standing Rock Indian Reservation to defend the Indigenous territory from the con­struction of the Dakota Access Pipeline being attempted the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Standing Rock was one battle in a larger confrontation; sim­ilar campaigns were being waged at the same time and continue around the world now—from residents in Appalachia opposing Dominion Energy’s pipelines through their communities to the Kenyan environ­mental activists mobilized against construction of a Chinese-financed coal-fired energy plant on the island of Lamu.

Anyone within a stone’s throw of an institution that is invested in fossil fuels—a state or national government, a university, even a company—can start or join a divestment movement, or op­pose the construction or expansion of environmentally and socially harmful production. You can also demand that the divested social re­sources be invested in and by Black, Indigenous, and other colonized communities.

Deciding Together A question that is equally pressing for grassroots struggle and the formal halls of power is how to debate, prioritize, and act on these and other proposals. In much of the world today, representative democracy is plagued by elite capture : the manipulation of public institutions and resources by the most advantaged and well-positioned, often to the detriment of everyone else. As if that’s not bad enough, many of the approaches to combating this very kind of injustice, including valorization of and organizing around marginalized identities, are likewise vulnerable to elite capture .

A better alternative than reliance on representative institutions is to emphasize the distribution of power it­self. Energy researcher Johanna Bozuwa provides a helpful example in her summary of the work of many activists and community organizations, which she calls “energy democracy.” Community control over the generation, transporta­tion, and distribution of energy would shift the incentives governing how those important social advantages—as well as the as­sociated disadvantages, such as pollution—are controlled and managed. Publicly owned utilities are no radical pipedream, even in the United States: they already serve small cities like Hammond, Wisconsin, and big ones like Los Angeles, California, and Nashville, Tennessee. But beyond public ownership of energy, pro­tection from elite capture is key to the pursuit of climate justice. Community-level decision making and control of public utilities must be the goal.

It is not enough to say that we should listen to the voices of marginalized peoples in making decisions and controlling climate initiatives. Each of us will have to decide, after all, which spe­cific perspectives of many we want to support. We shouldn’t expect that process to be easy or without controversy. Groups including Indigenous-led Red Nation , Cooperation Jackson in predominantly Black Mississippi, and the Pan African Climate Justice Alliance have each issued carefully developed statements offering broad direction as to what climate justice looks like in action. But the devil is often in the details.

Identity issues further complicate an equally fundamental problem: the formal structures we have to work with are not well suited to respond to global problems. Environmental policy professor Michael Méndez details how a policy proposal for California to purchase “carbon offsets” split Indigenous groups in Brazil, with representatives from larger groups with legally recognized land like the Yawanawa speaking in favor of the proposal, and representatives from forest communities like the Apurina and Jaminawa speaking against. Whatever decisions lawmakers make, none of these people, who live in Brazil, voted for the California legislators, and none of them are in a position to vote them out. As Méndez argues, we may need new “trans-local” ways of acting and thinking across largely different geographic and political contexts, ways that emphasize the importance of community-level decision making and impacts.

Some might worry about the scope of this constructive view of reparations. They might think that a global focus on reparations as “worldmaking,” linked with international struggles against climate injustice, could distract from more specific campaigns. But it is no coincidence that the civil rights movement and the decolonization of more than 100 nations all occurred simultaneously in the decades following World War II: each of these struggles made the others more likely to succeed, not less. Attempting to prevent rather than join up with other group’s efforts stems from understandable motivations but is ultimately self-defeating.

Others could worry about the content of a constructive reparations program rather than its scope: that such a way of thinking about reparations will distract us from bread-and-butter reparations demands, like direct transfers of money to individuals and families or reconciliation processes. But this worry is misguided. The constructive view is all-encompassing: it would unequivocally support cash transfers to African Americans, for example, and reforms to education to facilitate more honest teaching and relationships around the history of slavery and colonialism. The constructive view is not a replacement for these, but a particular understanding of what they aim to accomplish: changing our social environment for the better. This framework simply identifies opportunities for reconstruction that include and go beyond these, linking the important need for cash and memorials to equally important issues, from addressing the destructive role of prisons and pollutants to building food and energy systems that protect us all. And indeed, in a world increasingly ravaged by climate catastrophe, the time is long overdue to forge a political movement equal to the scope of that planetary challenge. The colonizers of the world have never been confused about the scale of their ambitions; it is time they met their match.

Editors’ Note : This essay is adapted from   Reconsidering Reparations .  Copyright  © 2022  by  Olúfẹ́mi O. Táíwò  and published by Oxford University Press .  All rights reserved.

Olúfẹ́mi O. Táíwò is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Georgetown University. His books include Elite Capture and Reconsidering Reparations .

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Jamaica, the Dominican Republic and Guyana shine at Caribbean Climate Justice Journalism Awards

Feature image via Canva Pro .

In the face of the escalating climate crisis, the Caribbean region is at a pivotal juncture, where the need for informed discourse and impactful journalism has never been more critical. It is against this backdrop the non-profit Climate Tracker (CT), which aims to support, train and incentivise climate journalism globally, launched its inaugural Caribbean Climate Journalism Awards.

Believing in the power of journalism to affect positive change in climate and environmental policy, CT’s Caribbean team has trained and supported close to 100 journalists from 15+ Caribbean countries with one-on-one mentoring and intensive thematic learning. The more than 220 climate stories those journalists have published over the past two years have covered a multitude of pressing topics, from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’s Conference of Parties (COP), to climate justice and energy transition.

The Awards, however, went beyond solely Climate Tracker Fellows . Instead, it was an open, regional call that sought to recognise, celebrate, and honour the dedicated efforts of journalists committed to unravelling the complexities of climate change and its multifaceted impacts on the Caribbean.

The judging panel consisted of two journalists, Jamaica-based Global Voices contributor Emma Lewis , who is passionate about the environment and climate justice, and Trinidadian journalist Tyrell Gittens , project coordinator for the Cari-Bois Environmental News Network , one of Global Voices’ publishing partners; as well as technical expert Rianna Gonzales , who is a water resources management professional in Trinidad and Tobago, and a champion of both youth and environmental advocacy.

Speaking at the virtual awards ceremony , Lewis emphasised the need for climate stories in the region: “Journalism plays an important role in explaining and illustrating climate impacts. It is important in the Caribbean because citizens know and feel the practical impacts of the lack of justice. Through storytelling, we help raise awareness and are able to humanise climate change.”

“At the heart of it,” she continued, “is people. Climate justice goes hand in hand with human rights. For a single parent, it might be struggling to provide for a family when there is just a trickle of water in the tap or no water at all; for a person living with a disability, it might be that mobility is taken away; for fisherfolk, it might be more extreme swings between drought and floods. These are rights that we often take for granted but we must consider [how they are being dealt with in our respective countries] when they are being whittled away by climate impacts.”

As a judge, Lewis expressed how pleased she was to discover stories that had rarely, if ever, been told: “What of the young students struggling in airless classrooms? What of the plight of people who work outside? That story about the dire situation of firefighters in the Dominican Republic; that story from Suriname that remarkably wove in advocacy and holding those in power accountable. Climate justice stories are crying out to be told in the Caribbean. ”

Offering advice to the young journalists in attendance, she added, “Continue offering hope and resilience. You are all inspiring. I encourage you to push harder, reflect, and dig deeper. May the conversations continue.”

Award winners included two reporters from the Dominican Republic — Rubí Morillo, a 23-year-old journalist and video editor known for her ability to create compelling audiovisual content, picked up the prize for Best Youth Climate Reporter after she did a deep dive into the world of fashion, and Laura Castillo's story on transforming sargassum copped the prize for Best Solutions-Oriented Climate Reporting.

The English-speaking Caribbean also fared well. Guyana's Vishani Ragobeer won Best Investigative Climate Journalism for a story about people who help turtles that are losing their homes. The Award for Best Climate Justice Story went to two regional journalists — Guyana's Neil Marks for a piece on the rights of Indigenous people, and Jamaica's Candice Stewart, whose piece on period poverty was published on Global Voices in September 2023.

In a tear-jerking acceptance speech, Stewart admitted, “Looking into period poverty experiences almost did not happen for me” because of an environment that did not support her goals as a climate journalist. “It got to a point where this story — a story I believed in, a story worth examining and telling — was trampled upon and dismissed under patriarchy and sexism. After two days of anxiety-ridden but careful consideration, I made what felt like a radical decision to leave — in protest, and in protecting myself. From there, I focused on the [Climate Tracker] Fellowship and the amazing stories I would write. Fast forward to today, the same story that was trampled upon in an environment set on making me feel small, is the same story I'm being awarded for today.”

Indeed, Caribbean journalists often face funding, training, and technology challenges, hindering their ability to conduct in-depth investigations and produce high-quality reporting on climate change. Additionally, a lack of institutional support and protection can leave journalists vulnerable to intimidation, censorship, and even physical harm when covering sensitive environmental issues.

Despite these obstacles, however, this inaugural group of awardees has not only demonstrated remarkable resilience, creativity, and determination in their pursuit of climate justice journalism but also shown commitment to amplifying the voices of marginalised communities, shedding light on environmental injustices, and holding those in power accountable for their actions.

The winning stories will be published on Global Voices in the coming weeks.

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