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Friendship, as understood here, is a distinctively personal relationship that is grounded in a concern on the part of each friend for the welfare of the other, for the other’s sake, and that involves some degree of intimacy. As such, friendship is undoubtedly central to our lives, in part because the special concern we have for our friends must have a place within a broader set of concerns, including moral concerns, and in part because our friends can help shape who we are as persons. Given this centrality, important questions arise concerning the justification of friendship and, in this context, whether it is permissible to “trade up” when someone new comes along, as well as concerning the possibility of reconciling the demands of friendship with the demands of morality in cases in which the two seem to conflict.

1.1 Mutual Caring

1.2 intimacy, 1.3 shared activity, 2.1 individual value, 2.2 social value, 3. friendship and moral theory, other internet resources, related entries, 1. the nature of friendship.

Friendship essentially involves a distinctive kind of concern for your friend, a concern which might reasonably be understood as a kind of love. Nonetheless, it is important not to misconstrue the sort of love friendship involves. Ancient Greek had three words that might reasonably be translated as love: agape , eros , and philia . Of these, agape through the Christian tradition has come to mean a kind of love that does not respond to the antecedent value of its object but instead is thought to create value in its object, as with the sort of love God has for us persons as well as, by extension, our love for God and our love for humankind in general. By contrast, eros and philia have come to be generally understood as responsive to the merits of their objects—to the beloved’s properties, such as his goodness or beauty. The difference is that eros is a kind of passionate desire for an object, typically sexual in nature, whereas ‘ philia ’ originally meant a kind of affectionate regard or friendly feeling towards not just one’s friends but also possibly towards family members, business partners, and one’s country at large (Liddell et al., 1940; Cooper, 1977a). Given this classification of kinds of love, philia seems to be that which is most clearly relevant to friendship (though just what philia amounts to needs to be clarified in more detail).

For this reason, love and friendship often get lumped together as a single topic; nonetheless, there are significant differences between them. As understood here, love is an evaluative attitude directed at particular persons as such, an attitude which we might take towards someone whether or not that love is reciprocated and whether or not we have an established relationship with her. [ 1 ] Friendship, by contrast, is essentially a kind of relationship grounded in a particular kind of special concern each has for the other as the person she is; and whereas we must make conceptual room for the idea of unrequited love, unrequited friendship is senseless. Consequently, accounts of friendship tend to understand it not merely as a case of reciprocal love of some form (together with mutual acknowledgment of this love), but as essentially involving significant interactions between the friends—as being in this sense a certain kind of relationship.

Nonetheless, questions can be raised about precisely how to distinguish romantic relationships, grounded in eros , from relationships of friendship, grounded in philia , insofar as each involves significant interactions between the involved parties that stem from a kind of reciprocal love that is responsive to merit. Clearly the two differ insofar as romantic love normally has a kind of sexual involvement that friendship lacks; yet, as Thomas (1989) asks, is that enough to explain the real differences between them? Badhwar (2003, 65–66) seems to think so, claiming that the sexual involvement enters into romantic love in part through a passion and yearning for physical union, whereas friendship involves instead a desire for a more psychological identification. Yet it is not clear exactly how to understand this: precisely what kind of “psychological identification” or intimacy is characteristic of friendship? (For further discussion, see Section 1.2 .)

In philosophical discussions of friendship, it is common to follow Aristotle ( Nicomachean Ethics , Book VIII) in distinguishing three kinds of friendship: friendships of pleasure, of utility, and of virtue. Although it is a bit unclear how to understand these distinctions, the basic idea seems to be that pleasure, utility, and virtue are the reasons we have in these various kinds of relationships for loving our friend. That is, I may love my friend because of the pleasure I get out of her, or because of the ways in which she is useful to me, or because I find her to have a virtuous character. Given the involvement of love in each case, all three kinds of friendship seem to involve a concern for your friend for his sake and not for your own.

There is an apparent tension here between the idea that friendship essentially involves being concerned for your friend for his sake and the idea of pleasure and utility friendships: how can you be concerned for him for his sake if you do that only because of the pleasure or utility you get out of it? If you benefit your friend because, ultimately, of the benefits you receive, it would seem that you do not properly love your friend for his sake, and so your relationship is not fully one of friendship after all. So it looks like pleasure and utility friendships are at best deficient modes of friendship; by contrast, virtue friendships, because they are motivated by the excellences of your friend’s character, are genuine, non-deficient friendships. For this reason, most contemporary accounts, by focusing their attention on the non-deficient forms of friendship, ignore pleasure and utility friendships. [ 2 ]

As mentioned in the first paragraph of this section, philia seems to be the kind of concern for other persons that is most relevant to friendship, and the word, ‘ philia ,’ sometimes gets translated as friendship; yet philia is in some ways importantly different from what we ordinarily think of as friendship. Thus , ‘ philia ’ extends not just to friends but also to family members, business associates, and one’s country at large. Contemporary accounts of friendship differ on whether family members, in particular one’s children before they become adults, can be friends. Most philosophers think not, understanding friendship to be essentially a relationship among equals; yet some philosophers (such as Friedman 1989; Rorty 1986/1993; Badhwar 1987) explicitly intend their accounts of friendship to include parent-child relationships, perhaps through the influence of the historical notion of philia . Nonetheless, there do seem to be significant differences between, on the one hand, parental love and the relationships it generates and, on the other hand, the love of one’s friends and the relationships it generates; the focus here will be on friendship more narrowly construed.

In philosophical accounts of friendship, several themes recur consistently, although various accounts differ in precisely how they spell these out. These themes are: mutual caring (or love), intimacy, and shared activity; these will be considered in turn.

A necessary condition of friendship, according to just about every view (Telfer 1970–71; Annas 1988, 1977; Annis 1987; Badhwar 1987; Millgram 1987; Sherman 1987; Thomas 1987, 1989, 1993; Friedman 1993, 1989; Whiting 1991; Hoffman 1997; Cocking & Kennett 1998; and White 1999a, 1999b, 2001) is that the friends each care about the other, and do so for her sake; in effect, this is to say that the friends must each love the other. Although many accounts of friendship do not analyze such mutual caring any further, among those that do there is considerable variability as to how we should understand the kind of caring involved in friendship. Nonetheless, there is widespread agreement that caring about someone for his sake involves both sympathy and action on the friend’s behalf. That is, friends must be moved by what happens to their friends to feel the appropriate emotions: joy in their friends’ successes, frustration and disappointment in their friends’ failures (as opposed to disappointment in the friends themselves), etc. Moreover, in part as an expression of their caring for each other, friends must normally be disposed to promote the other’s good for her sake and not out of any ulterior motive. (However, see Velleman 1999 for a dissenting view.)

To care about something is generally to find it worthwhile or valuable in some way; caring about one’s friend is no exception. A central difference among the various accounts of mutual caring is the way in which these accounts understand the kind of evaluation implicit therein. Most accounts understand that evaluation to be a matter of appraisal: we care about our friends at least in part because of the good qualities of their characters that we discover them to have (Annas 1977; Sherman 1987; Whiting 1991); this is in line with the understanding of love as philia or eros given in the first paragraph of Section 1 above. For this reason, many authors argue that to be friends with bad people reveals a potentially morally condemnable evaluative defect (see, e.g., Isserow 2018). Other accounts, however, understand caring as in part a matter of bestowing value on your beloved: in caring about a friend, we thereby project a kind of intrinsic value onto him; this is in line with the understanding of love as agape given above.

Friedman (1989, 6) argues for bestowal, saying that if we were to base our friendship on positive appraisals of our friend’s excellences, “to that extent our commitment to that person is subordinate to our commitment to the relevant [evaluative] standards and is not intrinsically a commitment to that person.” However, this is too quick, for to appeal to an appraisal of the good qualities of your friend’s character in order to justify your friendship is not on its own to subordinate your friendship to that appraisal. Rather, through the friendship, and through changes in your friend over time, you may come to change your evaluative outlook, thereby in effect subordinating your commitment to certain values to your commitment to your friend. Of course, within friendship the influence need not go only one direction: friends influence each other’s conceptions of value and how to live. Indeed, that friends have a reciprocal effect on each other is a part of the concern for equality many find essential to friendship, and it is central to the discussion of intimacy in Section 1.2 .

(For more on the notion of caring about another for her sake and the variety of philosophical accounts of it, see the entry on love .)

The relationship of friendship differs from other interpersonal relationships, even those characterized by mutual caring, such as relationships among colleagues: friendships are, intuitively, “deeper,” more intimate relationships. The question facing any philosophical account is how that characteristic intimacy of friendship is to be understood.

On this point, there is considerable variation in the literature—so much that it raises the question whether differing accounts aim at elucidating the same object. For it seems as though when the analysis of intimacy is relatively weak, the aim is to elucidate what might be called “acquaintance friendships”; as the analysis of intimacy gets stronger, the aim seems to tend towards closer friendships and even to a kind of ideal of maximally close friendship. It might be asked whether one or another of these types of friendship ought to take priority in the analysis, such that, for example, cases of close friendship can be understood to be an enhanced version of acquaintance friendship, or whether acquaintance friendship should be understood as being deficient in various ways relative to ideal friendship. Nonetheless, in what follows, views will be presented roughly in order from weaker to stronger accounts of intimacy.

To begin, Thomas (1987; 1989; 1993; 2013) claims that we should understand what is here called the intimacy of friendship in terms of mutual self-disclosure: I tell my friends things about myself that I would not dream of telling others, and I expect them to make me privy to intimate details of their lives. The point of such mutual self-disclosure, Thomas argues, is to create the “bond of trust” essential to friendship, for through such self-disclosure we simultaneously make ourselves vulnerable to each other and acknowledge the goodwill the other has for us. Such a bond of trust is what institutes the kind of intimacy characteristic of friendship. (Similar ideas can be found in Annis 1987.)

Cocking & Kennett (1998) caricature this as “the secrets view,” arguing:

It is not the sharing of private information nor even of very personal information, as such, that contributes to the bonds of trust and intimacy between companion friends. At best it is the sharing of what friends care about that is relevant here. [518]

Their point is that the secrets view underestimates the kind of trust at issue in friendship, conceiving of it largely as a matter of discretion. Given the way friendship essentially involves each caring about the other’s good for the other’s sake and so acting on behalf of the other’s good, entering into and sustaining a relationship of friendship will normally involve considerable trust in your friend’s goodwill towards you generally, and not just concerning your secrets. Moreover, friendship will normally involve trust in your friend’s judgment concerning what is in your best interests, for when your friend sees you harming yourself, she ought, other things being equal, to intervene, and through the friendship you can come to rely on her to do so. (See also Alfano, 2016, who emphasizes not just trust but trustworthiness to make similar points.)

Such enhanced trust can lead to “shared interests or enthusiasms or views … [or] a similar style of mind or way of thinking which makes for a high degree of empathy” (Telfer 1970–71, 227). Telfer finds such shared interests central to the “sense of a bond” friends have, an idea similar to the “solidarity”—the sharing of values and a sense of what’s important—that White (2001) advocates as central to friendship. For trusting my friend’s assessments of my good in this way seemingly involves trusting not only that she understands who I am and that I find certain things valuable and important in life but also and centrally that she understands the value of these things that are so meaningful to me. That in turn seems to be grounded in the empathy we have for each other—the shared sense of what’s important. So Telfer and White, in appealing to such shared sense of value, are offering a somewhat richer sense of the sort of intimacy essential to friendship than Thomas and Annis.

An important question to ask, however, is what precisely is meant by the “sharing” of a sense of value. Once again there are weaker and stronger versions. On the weak side, a sense of value is shared in the sense that a coincidence of interests and values is a necessary condition of developing and sustaining a friendship; when that happy coincidence dissipates, so too does the friendship. It is possible to read Annas’s summary of Aristotle’s view of friendship this way (1988, 1):

A friend, then, is one who (1) wishes and does good (or apparently good) things to a friend, for the friend’s sake, (2) wishes the friend to exist and live, for his own sake, (3) spends time with his friend, (4) makes the same choices as his friend and (5) finds the same things pleasant and painful as his friend.

(4) and (5) are the important claims for present purposes: making the same choices as your friend, if done consistently, depends on having a similar outlook on what reasons there are so to choose, and this point is reinforced in (5) given Aristotle’s understanding of pleasure and pain as evaluative and so as revealing what is (apparently) good and bad. The message might be that merely having coincidence in evaluative outlook is enough to satisfy (4) and (5).

Of course, Aristotle (and Annas) would reject this reading: friends do not merely have such similarities antecedent to their friendship as a necessary condition of friendship. Rather, friends can influence and shape each other’s evaluative outlook, so that the sharing of a sense of value is reinforced through the dynamics of their relationship. One way to make sense of this is through the Aristotelian idea that friends function as a kind of mirror of each other: insofar as friendship rests on similarity of character, and insofar as I can have only imperfect direct knowledge about my own character, I can best come to know myself—both the strengths and weaknesses of my character—by knowing a friend who reflects my qualities of character. Minor differences between friends, as when my friend on occasion makes a choice I would not have made, can lead me to reflect on whether this difference reveals a flaw in my own character that might need to be fixed, thereby reinforcing the similarity of my and my friend’s evaluative outlooks. On this reading of the mirroring view, my friend plays an entirely passive role: just by being himself, he enables me to come to understand my own character better (cf. Badhwar 2003). [ 3 ]

Cocking & Kennett (1998) argue against such a mirroring view in two ways. First, they claim that this view places too much emphasis on similarity as motivating and sustaining the friendship. Friends can be very different from each other, and although within a friendship there is a tendency for the friends to become more and more alike, this should be understood as an effect of friendship, not something constitutive of it. Second, they argue that the appeal to the friend’s role as a mirror to explain the increasing similarity involves assigning too much passivity to the friend. Our friends, they argue, play a more active role in shaping us, and the mirroring view fails to acknowledge this. (Cocking & Kennett’s views will be discussed further below. Lynch (2005) provides further criticisms of the mirroring view, arguing that the differences between friends can be central and important to their friendship.)

In an interesting twist on standard accounts of the sense in which (according to Aristotle, at least) a friend is a mirror, Millgram (1987) claims that in mirroring my friend I am causally responsible for my friend coming to have and sustain the virtues he has. Consequently, I am in a sense my friend’s “procreator,” and I therefore find myself actualized in my friend. For this reason, Millgram claims, I come to love my friend in the same way I love myself, and this explains (a) Aristotle’s otherwise puzzling claim that a friend is “another self,” (b) why it is that friends are not fungible, given my role as procreator only of this particular person, and (c) why friendships of pleasure and utility, which do not involve such procreation, fail to be genuine friendships. (For more on the problem of fungibility, see Section 2.1 .) However, in offering this account, Millgram may seem to confound my being causally necessary for my friend’s virtues with my being responsible for those virtues—to confound my passive role as a mirror with that of a “procreator,” a seemingly active role. Millgram’s understanding of mirroring does not, therefore, escape Cocking & Kennett’s criticism of mirroring views as assigning too much passivity to the friend as mirror.

Friedman (1989) offers another way to make sense of the influence my friend has on my sense of value by appealing to the notion of bestowal. According to Friedman, the intimacy of friendship takes the form of a commitment friends have to each other as unique persons, a commitment in which the

friend’s successes become occasions for joy; her judgments may provoke reflection or even deference; her behavior may encourage emulation; and the causes which she champions may inspire devotion …. One’s behavior toward the friend takes its appropriateness, at least in part, from her goals and aspirations, her needs, her character—all of which one feels prima facie invited to acknowledge as worthwhile just because they are hers. [4]

As noted in the 3rd paragraph of Section 1.1 , Friedman thinks my commitment to my friend cannot be grounded in appraisals of her, and so my acknowledgment of the worth of her goals, etc., is a matter of my bestowing value on these: her ends become valuable to me, and so suitable for motivating my actions, “just because they are hers.” That is, such a commitment involves taking my friend seriously, where this means something like finding her values, interests, reasons, etc. provide me with pro tanto reasons for me to value and think similarly. [ 4 ] In this way, the dynamics of the friendship relation involves friends mutually influencing each other’s sense of value, which thereby comes to be shared in a way that underwrites significant intimacy.

In part, Friedman’s point is that sharing an evaluative perspective in the way that constitutes the intimacy of friendship involves coming to adopt her values as parts of my own sense of value. Whiting (1991) argues that such an approach fails properly to make sense of the idea that I love my friend for her sake. For to require that my friend’s values be my own is to blur the distinction between valuing these things for her sake and valuing them for my own. Moreover, Whiting (1986) argues, to understand my concern for her for her sake in terms of my concern for things for my sake raises the question of how to understand this latter concern. However, Whiting thinks the latter is at least as unclear as the former, as is revealed when we think about the long-term and my connection and responsibility to my “future selves.” The solution, she claims, is to understand the value of my ends (or yours) to be independent of the fact that they are mine (or yours): these ends are intrinsically valuable, and that’s why I should care about them, no matter whose ends they are. Consequently, the reason I have to care for myself, including my future selves, for my sake is the same as the reason I have to care about my friend for her sake: because I recognize the intrinsic value of the (excellent) character she or I have (Whiting 1991, 10; for a similar view, see Keller 2000). Whiting therefore advocates what she calls an “impersonal” conception of friendship: There are potentially many people exhibiting (what I would consider to be) excellences of character, and these are my impersonal friends insofar as they are all “equally worthy of my concern”; what explains but does not justify my “differential and apparently personal concern for only some … [is] largely a function of historical and psychological accident” (1991, 23).

It should be clear that Whiting does not merely claim that friends share values only in that these values happen to coincide; if that were the case, her conception of friendship would be vulnerable to the charge that the friends really are not concerned for each other but merely for the intrinsically valuable properties that each exemplifies. Rather, Whiting thinks that part of what makes my concern for my friend be for her sake is my being committed to remind her of what’s really valuable in life and to foster within her a commitment to these values so as to prevent her from going astray. Such a commitment on my part is clearly a commitment to her, and a relationship characterized by such a commitment on both sides is one that consistently and non-accidentally reinforces the sharing of these values.

Brink (1999) criticizes Whiting’s account of friendship as too impersonal because it fails to understand the relationship of friendship itself to be intrinsically valuable. (For similar criticisms, see Jeske 1997.) In part, the complaint is the same as that which Friedman (1989) offered against any conception of friendship that bases that friendship on appraisals of the friend’s properties (cf. the 3rd paragraph of Section 1.1 above): such a conception of friendship subordinates our concern for the friend to our concern for the values, thereby neglecting what makes friendship a distinctively personal relationship. Given Whiting’s understanding of the sense in which friends share values in terms of their appeal to the intrinsic and impersonal worth of those values, it seems that she cannot make much of the rebuttal to Friedman offered above: that I can subordinate my concern for certain values to my concern for my friend, thereby changing my values in part out of concern for my friend. Nonetheless, Brink’s criticism goes deeper:

Unless our account of love and friendship attaches intrinsic significance to the historical relationship between friends, it seems unable to justify concern for the friend qua friend. [1999, 270]

It is only in terms of the significance of the historical relationship, Brink argues, that we can make sense of the reasons for friendship and for the concern and activity friendship demands as being agent-relative (and so in this way personal) rather than agent-neutral (or impersonal, as for Whiting). [ 5 ]

Cocking & Kennett (1998), in what might be a development of Rorty (1986/1993), offer an account of close friendship in part in terms of the friends playing a more active role in transforming each other’s evaluative outlook: in friendship, they claim, we are “receptive” to having our friends “direct” and “interpret” us and thereby change our interests. To be directed by your friend is to allow her interests, values, etc. to shape your own; thus, your friend may suggest that you go to the opera together, and you may agree to go, even though you have no antecedent interest in the opera. Through his interest, enthusiasm, and suggestion (“Didn’t you just love the concluding duet of Act III?”), you may be moved directly by him to acquire an interest in opera only because he’s your friend. To be interpreted by your friend is to allow your understanding of yourself, in particular of your strengths and weaknesses, to be shaped by your friend’s interpretations of you. Thus, your friend may admire your tenacity (a trait you did not realize you had), or be amused by your excessive concern for fairness, and you may come as a result to develop a new understanding of yourself, and potentially change yourself, in direct response to his interpretation of you. Hence, Cocking & Kennett claim, “the self my friend sees is, at least in part, a product of the friendship” (505). (Nehamas 2010 offers a similar account of the importance of the interpretation of one’s friends in determining who one is, though Nehamas emphasizes in a way that Cocking & Kennett do not that your interpretation of your friend can reveal possible valuable ways to be that you yourself “could never have even imagined beforehand” (287).)

It is a bit unclear what your role is in being thus directed and interpreted by your friend. Is it a matter of merely passively accepting the direction and interpretation? This is suggested by Cocking & Kennett’s understanding of friendship in terms of a receptivity to being drawn by your friend and by their apparent understanding of this receptivity in dispositional terms. Yet this would seem to be a matter of ceding your autonomy to your friend, and that is surely not what they intend. Rather, it seems, we are at least selective in the ways in which we allow our friends to direct and interpret us, and we can resist other directions and interpretations. However, this raises the question of why we allow any such direction and interpretation. One answer would be because we recognize the independent value of the interests of our friends, or that we recognize the truth of their interpretations of us. But this would not explain the role of friendship in such direction and interpretation, for we might just as easily accept such direction and interpretation from a mentor or possibly even a stranger. This shortcoming might push us to understanding our receptivity to direction and interpretation not in dispositional terms but rather in normative terms: other things being equal, we ought to accept direction and interpretation from our friends precisely because they are our friends. And this might push us to a still stronger conception of intimacy, of the sharing of values, in terms of which we can understand why friendship grounds these norms.

Such a stronger conception of intimacy is provided in Sherman’s interpretation of Aristotle’s account of friends as sharing a life together (Sherman 1987; see also Moore & Frederick 2017, which argues that friends must share a life together partly through the mutual acknowledgment of their shared activity in the form of a joint narrative that interprets these activities as meaningful). According to Sherman’s Aristotle, an important component of friendship is that friends identify with each other in the sense that they exhibit a “singleness of mind.” This includes, first, a kind of sympathy, whereby I feel on my friend’s behalf the same emotions he does. Unlike similar accounts, Sherman explicitly includes pride and shame as emotions I sympathetically feel on behalf of my friend—a significant addition because of the role pride and shame have in constituting our sense of ourselves and even our identities (Taylor 1985). In part for this reason, Sherman claims that “through the sense of belonging and attachment” we attain because of such sympathetic pride and shame, “we identify with and share their [our friends’] good” (600). [ 6 ]

Second, and more important, Sherman’s Aristotle understands the singleness of mind that friends have in terms of shared processes of deliberation. Thus, as she summarizes a passage in Aristotle (1170b11–12):

character friends live together, not in the way animals do, by sharing the same pasture, but “by sharing in argument and thought.” [598]

The point is that the friends “share” a conception of values not merely in that there is significant overlap between the values of the one friend and those of the other, and not merely in that this overlap is maintained through the influence that the friends have on each other. Rather, the values are shared in the sense that they are most fundamentally their values, at which they jointly arrive by deliberating together.

[Friends have] the project of a shared conception of eudaimonia [i.e., of how best to live]. Through mutual decisions about specific practical matters, friends begin to express that shared commitment …. Any happiness or disappointment that follows from these actions belongs to both persons, for the decision to so act was joint and the responsibility is thus shared. [598]

The intent of this account, in which what gets shared is, we might say, an identity that the friends have in common, is not to be descriptively accurate of particular friendships; it is rather to provide a kind of ideal that actual friendships at best only approximate. Such a strong notion of sharing is reminiscent of the union view of (primarily erotic) love, according to which love consists in the formation of some significant kind of union, a “we” (see the entry on love , the section on love as union ). Like the union view of love, this account of friendship raises worries about autonomy. Thus, it seems as though Sherman’s Aristotle does away with any clear distinction between the interests and even agency of the two friends, thereby undermining the kind of independence and freedom of self-development that characterizes autonomy. If autonomy is a part of the individual’s good, then Sherman’s Aristotle might be forced to conclude that friendship is to this extent bad; the conclusion might be, therefore, that we ought to reject this strong conception of the intimacy of friendship.

It is unclear from Sherman’s interpretation of Aristotle whether there are principled reasons to limit the extent to which we share our identities with our friends; perhaps an appeal to something like Friedman’s federation model (1998) can help resolve these difficulties. Friedman’s idea is that we should understand romantic love (but the idea could also be applied to friendship) not in terms of the union of the two individuals, in which their identities get subsumed by that union, but rather in terms of the federation of the individuals—the creation of a third entity that presupposes some degree of independence of the individuals that make it up. Even so, much would need to be done to spell out this view satisfactorily. (For more on Friedman’s account, see the entry on love , the section on love as union .)

In each of these accounts of the kind of intimacy and commitment that are characteristic of friendship, we might ask about the conditions under which friendship can properly be dissolved. Thus, insofar as friendship involves some such commitment, we cannot just give up on our friends for no reason at all; nor, it seems, should our commitment be unconditional, binding on us come what may. Understanding more clearly when it is proper to break off a friendship, or allow it to lapse, may well shed light on the kind of commitment and intimacy that is characteristic of friendship; nonetheless, this issue gets scant attention in the literature.

A final common thread in philosophical accounts of friendship is shared activity. The background intuition is this: never to share activity with someone and in this way to interact with him is not to have the kind of relationship with him that could be called friendship, even if you each care for the other for his sake. Rather, friends engage in joint pursuits, in part motivated by the friendship itself. These joint pursuits can include not only such things as making something together, playing together, and talking together, but also pursuits that essentially involve shared experiences, such as going to the opera together. Yet for these pursuits to be properly shared in the relevant sense of “share,” they cannot involve activities motivated simply by self interest: by, for example, the thought that I’ll help you build your fence today if you later help me paint my house. Rather, the activity must be pursued in part for the purpose of doing it together with my friend, and this is the point of saying that the shared activity must be motivated, at least in part, by the friendship itself.

This raises the following questions: in what sense can such activity be said to be “shared,” and what is it about friendship that makes shared activity so central to it? The common answer to this second question (which helps pin down an answer to the first) is that shared activity is important because friends normally have shared interests as a part of the intimacy that is characteristic of friendship as such, and the “shared” pursuit of such shared interests is therefore an important part of friendship. Consequently, the account of shared activity within a particular theory ought to depend at least in part on that theory’s understanding of the kind of intimacy relevant to friendship. And this generally seems to be the case: for example, Thomas (1987, 1989, 1993, 2013), who argues for a weak conception of intimacy in terms of mutual self-disclosure, has little place for shared activity in his account of friendship, whereas Sherman (1987), who argues for a strong conception of intimacy in terms of shared values, deliberation, and thought, provides within friendship a central place not just to isolated shared activities but, more significantly, to a shared life.

Nonetheless, within the literature on friendship the notion of shared or joint activity is largely taken for granted: not much thought has been given to articulating clearly the sense in which friends share their activity. This is surprising and unfortunate, especially insofar as the understanding of the sense in which such activities are “shared” is closely related to the understanding of intimacy that is so central to any account of friendship; indeed, a clear account of the sort of shared activity characteristic of friendship may in turn shed light on the sort of intimacy it involves. This means in part that a particular theory of friendship might be criticized in terms of the way in which its account of the intimacy of friendship yields a poor account of the sense in which activity is shared. For example, one might think that we must distinguish between activity we engage in together in part out of my concern for someone I love, and activity we share insofar as we engage in it at least partly for the sake of sharing it; only the latter, it might be argued, is the sort of shared activity constitutive of the relationship of friendship as opposed to that constitutive merely of my concern for him (see Nozick 1989). Consequently, according to this line of thought, any account of the intimacy of friendship that fails to understand the sharing of interests in such a way as to make sense of this distinction ought to be rejected.

Helm (2008) develops an account of shared activity and shared valuing at least partly with an eye to understanding friendship. He argues that the sense in which friends share activity is not the sort of shared intention and plural subjecthood discussed in literature on shared intention within social philosophy (on which, see Tuomela 1995, 2007; Gilbert 1996, 2000, 2006; Searle 1990; and Bratman 1999), for such sharing of intentions does not involve the requisite intimacy of friendship. Rather, the intimacy of friendship should be understood partly in terms of the friends forming a “plural agent”: a group of people who have joint cares—a joint evaluative perspective—which he analyzes primarily in terms of a pattern of interpersonally connected emotions, desires, judgments, and (shared) actions. Friendships emerge, Helm claims, when the friends form a plural agent that cares positively about their relationship, and the variety of kinds of friendships there can be, including friendships of pleasure, utility, and virtue, are to be understood in terms of the particular way in which they jointly understand their relationship to be something they care about—as tennis buddies or as life partners, for example.

2. Value and Justification of Friendship

Friendship clearly plays an important role in our lives; to a large extent, the various accounts of friendship aim at identifying and clarifying that role. In this context, it is important to understand not only why friendship can be valuable, but also what justifies particular friendships.

One way to construe the question of the value of friendship is in terms of the individual considering whether to be (or continue to be) engaged in a friendship: why should I invest considerable time, energy, and resources in a friend rather than in myself? What makes friendship worthwhile for me, and so how ought I to evaluate whether particular friendships I have are good friendships or not?

One sort of answer is that friendship is instrumentally good. Thus, Telfer (1970–71) claims that friendship is “ life enhancing ” in that it makes us “feel more alive”—it enhances our activities by intensifying our absorption in them and hence the pleasure we get out of them (239–40). Moreover, she claims, friendship is pleasant in itself as well as useful to the friends. Annis (1987) adds that it helps promote self-esteem, which is good both instrumentally and for its own sake.

Yet friendship is not merely instrumentally valuable, as is hinted at by Annis’ claim that “our lives would be significantly less full given the universal demise of friendship” (1987, 351). Cooper (1977b), interpreting Aristotle, provides two arguments for why this might be so. First, Cooper’s Aristotle claims, living well requires that one know the goodness of one’s own life; however, given the perpetual possibility of self-deception, one is able accurately to evaluate one’s own life only through friendship, in which one’s friend acts as a kind of mirror of one’s self. Hence, a flourishing life is possible only through the epistemic access friendship provides. Second, Cooper’s Aristotle claims that the sort of shared activity characteristic of friendship is essential to one’s being able to engage in the sort of activities characteristic of living well “continuously” and “with pleasure and interest” (310). Such activities include moral and intellectual activities, activities in which it is often difficult to sustain interest without being tempted to act otherwise. Friendship, and the shared values and shared activities it essentially involves, is needed to reinforce our intellectual and practical understanding of such activities as worthwhile in spite of their difficulty and the ever present possibility that our interest in pursuing them will flag. Consequently, Cooper concludes, the shared activity of friendship is partly constitutive of human flourishing. Similarly, Biss (2019) argues along Kantian lines that friendship and the sort of trust friendship involves, are a central and necessary part of the pursuit of moral self-perfection.

So far these are attempts to understand the value of friendship to the individual in terms of the way friendship contributes, instrumentally or constitutively, to something else that is valuable to the individual. Yet one might also think that friendship is valuable for its own sake. Schoeman (1985), partly in response to the individualism of other accounts of the value of friendship, claims that in friendship the friends “become a unique community with a being and value of its own” (280): the intimacy of friendship results in “a way of being and acting in virtue of being united with another” (281). Although this claim has intuitive appeal, Schoeman does not clearly explain what the value of that “unique community” is or why it should have that value. Indeed, we ought to expect that fleshing out this claim would involve a substantive proposal concerning the nature of that community and how it can have a separate (federated?—cf. Friedman 1998) existence and value. Once again, the literature on shared intention and plural subjecthood is relevant here; see, for example, Gilbert 1989, 1996, 2000; Tuomela 1984, 1995; Searle 1990; and Bratman 1999.

A question closely related to this question of the value of friendship is that of what justifies my being friends with this person rather than with someone else or no one at all. To a certain extent, answers to the question of the value of friendship might seem to provide answers to the question of the justification of friendship. After all, if the value of friendship in general lies in the way it contributes (either instrumentally or constitutively) to a flourishing life for me, then it might seem that I can justify particular friendships in light of the extent to which they contribute to my flourishing. Nonetheless, this seems unacceptable because it suggests—what is surely false—that friends are fungible . (To be fungible is to be replaceable by a relevantly similar object without any loss of value.) That is, if my friend has certain properties (including, perhaps, relational properties) in virtue of which I am justified in having her as my friend (because it is in virtue of those properties that she contributes to my flourishing), then on this view I would be equally justified in being friends with anyone else having relevantly similar properties, and so I would have no reason not to replace my current friend with someone else of this sort. Indeed, it might even be that I ought to “trade up” when someone other than my current friend exhibits the relevant friendship-justifying properties to a greater degree than my friend does. This is surely objectionable as an understanding of friendship.

In solving this problem of fungibility, philosophers have typically focused on features of the historical relationship of friendship (cf. Brink 1999, quoted above). One approach might be found in Sherman’s 1987 union account of friendship discussed above (this type of view might be suggested by the account of the value of friendship in Schoeman 1985). If my friend and I form a kind of union in virtue of our having a shared conception of how to live that is forged and maintained through a particular history of interaction and sharing of our lives, and if my sense of my values and identity therefore depends on these being most fundamentally our values and identity, then it is simply not possible to substitute another person for my friend without loss. For this other person could not possibly share the relevant properties of my friend, namely her historical relationship with me. However, the price of this solution to the problem of fungibility, as it arises both for friendship and for love, is the worry about autonomy raised towards the end of Section 1.2 above.

An alternative solution is to understand these historical, relational properties of my friend to be more directly relevant to the justification of our friendship. Thus, Whiting (1991) distinguishes the reasons we have for initiating a friendship (which are, she thinks, impersonal in a way that allows for fungibility) from the reasons we have for sustaining a friendship; the latter, she suggests, are to be found in the history of concern we have for each other. However, it is unclear how the historical-relational properties can provide any additional justification for friendship beyond that provided by thinking about the value of friendship in general, which does not solve the fungibility problem. For the mere fact that this is my friend does not seem to justify my continued friendship: when we imagine that my friend is going through a rough time so that he loses those virtues justifying my initial friendship with him, why shouldn’t I just dump him and strike up a new friendship with someone who has those virtues? It is not clear how the appeal to historical properties of my friend or our friendship can provide an answer.

In part the trouble here arises from tacit preconceptions concerning the nature of justification. If we attempt to justify continued friendship in terms of the friend’s being this particular person, with a particular historical relationship to me, then it seems like we are appealing to merely idiosyncratic and subjective properties, which might explain but cannot justify that friendship. This seems to imply that justification in general requires the appeal to the friend’s being a type of person, having general, objective properties that others might share; this leads to the problem of fungibility. Solving the problem, it might therefore seem, requires somehow overcoming this preconception concerning justification—a task which no one has attempted in the literature on friendship.

(For further discussion of this problem of fungibility as it arises in the context of love, as well as discussion of a related problem concerning whether the object (rather than the grounds) of love is a particular person or a type of person, see Section 6 of the entry on love .)

Another way to construe the question of the value of friendship is in more social terms: what is the good to society of having its members engaged in relationships of friendship? Telfer (1970–71, 238) answers that friendship promotes the general good “by providing a degree and kind of consideration for others’ welfare which cannot exist outside it.” Blum (1980) concurs, arguing that friendship is an important source of moral excellence precisely because it essentially involves acting for the sake of your friend, a kind of action that can have considerable moral worth. (For similar claims, see Annis 1987.)

Cocking & Kennett (2000) argue against this view that friendly acts per se are morally good, claiming that “I might be a perfectly good friend. I might just not be a perfectly moral one” (287). They support this conclusion, within their account of friendship as involving being directed and interpreted by one’s friend, by claiming that “I am just as likely to be directed by your interest in gambling at the casino as by your interest in ballet” (286). However, Cocking & Kennett seem to be insufficiently sensitive to the idea, which they accept (cf. 284), that friends care about promoting each other’s well-being. For if I am concerned with your well-being and find you to be about to embark on an immoral course of action, I ought not, contrary to what Cocking & Kennett suggest, blindly allow you to draw me into joining you; rather, I ought to try to stop you or at least get you to question whether you are doing the right thing—as a matter of my directing and interpreting you. In this context, Koltonski (2016) argues that one ought to ensure that one’s friend is properly engaging in moral deliberation, but then defer to one’s friend’s judgment about what to do, even when one disagrees with the moral conclusion, for such deference is a matter of properly respecting the friend’s moral agency.

These answers to the social value of friendship seem to apply equally well to love: insofar as love essentially involves both a concern for your beloved for his sake and, consequently, action on his behalf for his sake, love will exhibit the same social value. Friedman (1989), however, argues that friendship itself is socially valuable in a way that love is not. Understanding the intimacy of friendship in terms of the sharing of values, Friedman notes that friendship can involve the mutual support of, in particular, unconventional values, which can be an important stimulus to moral progress within a community. For “our commitments to particular persons are, in practice, necessary counterbalances to our commitments to abstract moral guidelines, and may, at times, take precedence over them” (6). Consequently, the institution of friendship is valuable not just to the individuals but also to the community as a whole. On the other hand, however, we might worry that friendship can have negative consequences for society as a whole. As Thomas (1999) and Lintott (2015) argue, we tend to privilege in our loves and friendships “people like us”, which can give rise to biases in favor of certain social identities like race, class, and sexual orientation that can perpetuate inequalities among these groups, reinforce epistemic injustices, and limit our moral development.

A growing body of research since the mid-1970s questions the relationship between the phenomenon of friendship and particular moral theories. Thus, many (Stocker 1976, 1981; Blum 1980, 1993; Wilcox 1987; Friedman 1989, 1993; Badhwar 1991; Cocking & Oakley 1995) have criticized consequentialist and deontological moral theories on the grounds that they are somehow incompatible with friendship and the kind of reasons and motives that friendship provides. Often, the appeal to friendship is intended to bypass traditional disputes among major types of moral theories (consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics), and so the “friendship critique” may seem especially important and interesting. [ 7 ]

At the root of these questions concerning the relationship between friendship and morality is the idea that friendship involves special duties : duties for specific people that arise out of the relationship of friendship. Thus, it seems that we have obligations to aid and support our friends that go well beyond those we have to help strangers because they are our friends, much like we parents have special duties to aid and support our children because they are our children. Indeed, Annis (1987) suggests, such duties “are constitutive of the relationship” of friendship (352; but see Bernstein (2007) for an argument that friendship does not involve any requirement of partiality). Given this, the question arises as to what the relationship is between such special duties of friendship and other duties, in particular moral duties: can our obligations to our friends sometimes trump our moral duties, or must we always subordinate our personal relationships to morality in order to be properly impartial (as, it might be thought, morality demands)?

One concern in this neighborhood, articulated by Stocker (1976), is that the phenomenon of friendship reveals that consequentialist and deontological moral theories, by offering accounts of what it is right to do irrespective of the motives we have, promote a kind of “ moral schizophrenia ”: a split between our moral reasons on the one hand and our motives on the other. Such moral schizophrenia, Stocker argues, prevents us in general from harmonizing our moral reasons and our motives, and it does so in a way that destroys the very possibility of our having and sustaining friendships with others. Given the manifest value of friendship in our lives, this is clearly a serious problem with these moral theories.

What is it about friendship that generates these problems? One concern arises out of the teleological conception of action , implicit in consequentialism, according to which actions are understood in terms of their ends or purposes. The trouble is, Stocker (1981) argues, the characteristic actions of friendship cannot be understood in this way. To be a friend is at least sometimes to be motivated to act out of a concern for your friend as this individual (cf. Section 1.1 ). Although actions done out of friendship may have ends, what characterizes these as “friendly acts,” as we might call them, is not that they are done for any particular purpose:

If acting out of friendship is composed of purposes, dispositions to have purposes, and the like, where these are purposes properly so-called, and thus not essentially described by the phrase ‘out of friendship’, there seems … no guarantee that the person cares about and likes, has friendship for, the ‘friend’. [Stocker 1981, 756–57]

That is, actions done out of friendship are essentially actions motivated by a special sort of concern—a concern for this particular person—which is in part a matter of having settled habits of response to the friend. This, Stocker concludes, is a kind of motivation for action that a teleological conception of action cannot countenance, resulting in moral schizophrenia. (Jeske (2008) argues for a somewhat different conclusion: that in order to heal this apparent split between impartial moral obligations and the partial obligations of friendship, we must abandon the distinction between moral and nonmoral obligations.)

Stocker (1976) raises another, more general concern for consequentialism and deontology arising out of a conception of friendship. Thus, although act consequentialists —those who justify each particular act by appeal to the goodness of the consequences of that act, impersonally conceived (see the entry on consequentialism )—could justify friendly acts, they “cannot embody their reason in their motive” (1976, 70), for to be motivated teleologically by the concern to maximize goodness is not to be motivated out of friendship. Consequently, either act consequentialists must exhibit moral schizophrenia, or, to avoid it, they must understand consequentialist reasons for action to be our motives. However, because such consequentialist reasons are impersonal, taking this latter tack would be to leave out the kind of reasons and motives that are central to friendship, thereby undermining the very institution of friendship. (Cf. the discussion of impersonal justification of friendship and the problem of fungibility in Section 2.1 .)

The same is true, Stocker argues, of rule consequentialism (the view that actions are right if they follow principles or rules that tend to result in the most good overall, impersonally conceived—see the entry on rule-consequentialism ) and on deontology (the view that actions are right just in case they are in accordance with certain rules or principles that are binding on all moral agents). For even if rule consequentialism and deontology can provide moral reasons for friendly actions in terms of the rule that one must benefit one’s friends, for example, such reasons would be impersonal, giving no special consideration to our particular friends at all. If we are to avoid moral schizophrenia and embody this reason in our motives for action, we could not, then, act out of friendship—out of a concern for our friends for their sakes. This means that any rule consequentialist or deontologist that avoids moral schizophrenia can act so as to benefit her friends, but such actions would be merely as if friendly, not genuinely friendly, and she could not therefore have and sustain genuine friendships. The only alternative is to split her moral reasons and her motives for friendly acts, thereby becoming schizophrenic. (For some discussion about whether such moral schizophrenia really is as bad as Stocker thinks, see Woodcock 2010. For concerns similar to Stocker’s about impartial moral theories and motivation for action arising out of a consideration of personal relationships like friendship, see Williams 1981.)

Blum (1980) (portions of which are reprinted with slight modifications in Blum 1993) and Friedman (1993), pick up on this contrast between the impartiality of consequentialism and deontology and the inherent partiality of friendship, and argue more directly for a rejection of such moral theories. Consequentialists and deontologists must think that relationships like friendship essentially involve a kind of special concern for the friend and that such relationships therefore demand that one’s actions exhibit a kind of partiality towards the friend. Consequently, they argue, these impartialist moral theories must understand friendship to be inherently biased and therefore not to be inherently moral. Rather, such moral theories can only claim that to care for another “in a fully morally appropriate manner” requires caring for him “simply as a human being, i.e., independent of any special connection or attachment one has with him” (Blum 1993, 206). It is this claim that Blum and Friedman deny: although such universalist concern surely has a place in moral theory, the value—indeed the moral value (cf. Section 2.2 )—of friendship cannot properly be appreciated except as involving a concern for another for his sake and as the particular person he is. Thus, they claim, insofar as consequentialism and deontology are unable to acknowledge the moral value of friendship, they cannot be adequate moral theories and ought to be rejected in favor of some alternative.

In reply, Railton (1984) distinguishes between subjective and objective consequentialism, arguing that this “friendship critique” of Stocker and Blum (as well as Friedman) succeeds only against subjective consequentialism. (See Mason (1998) for further elaborations of this argument, and see Sadler (2006) for an alternative response.) Subjective consequentialism is the view that whenever we face a choice of actions, we should both morally justify a particular course of action and be motivated to act accordingly directly by the relevant consequentialist principle (whether what that principle assesses are particular actions or rules for action). That is, in acting as one ought, one’s subjective motivations ought to come from those very moral reasons: because this action promotes the most good (or is in accordance with the rule that tends to promote the most good). Clearly, Stocker, Blum, and Friedman are right to think that subjective consequentialism cannot properly accommodate the motives of friendship.

By contrast, Railton argues, objective consequentialism denies that there is such a tight connection between the objective justification of a state of affairs in terms of its consequences and the agent’s motives in acting: the moral justification of a particular action is one thing (and to be undertaken in consequentialist terms), but the motives for that action may be entirely separate. This means that the objective consequentialist can properly acknowledge that sometimes the best states of affairs result not just from undertaking certain behaviors, but from undertaking them with certain motives, including motives that are essentially personal. In particular, Railton argues, the world would be a better place if each of us had dispositions to act so as to benefit our friends out of a concern for their good (and not the general good). So, on consequentialist grounds each of us has moral reasons to inculcate such a disposition to friendliness, and when the moment arrives that disposition will be engaged, so that we are motivated to act out of a concern for our friends rather than out of an impersonal, impartial concern for the greater good. [ 8 ] Moreover, there is no split between our moral reasons for action and our motives because such reasons may in some cases (such as that of a friendly act) require that in acting we act out of the appropriate sort of motive. So the friendship critique of Stocker, Blum, and Friedman fails. [ 9 ]

Badhwar (1991) thinks even Railton’s more sophisticated consequentialism ultimately fails to accommodate the phenomenon of friendship, and that the moral schizophrenia remains. For, she argues, a sophisticated consequentialist must both value the friend for the friend’s sake (in order to be a friend at all) and value the friend only so long as doing so is consistent with promoting the most good overall (in order to be a consequentialist).

As a non-schizophrenic, un-self-deceived consequentialist friend, however, she must put the two thoughts together. And the two thoughts are logically incompatible. To be consistent she must think, “As a consequentialist friend, I place special value on you so long, but only so long, as valuing you thus promotes the overall good.” … Her motivational structure, in other words, is instrumental, and so logically incompatible with the logical structure required for end friendship. [493]

Badhwar is here alluding to a case of Railton’s in which, through no fault of yours or your friend’s, the right action according to consequentialism is to sacrifice your friendship for the greater good. In such a case, the sophisticated consequentialist must in arriving at this conclusion “evaluate intrinsic goods [of friendship] and their virtues by reference to a standard external to them”—i.e., by reference to the overall good as this is conceived from an impersonal point of view (496). However, Badhwar argues, the value of friendship is something we can appreciate only from a personal point of view, so that the moral rightness of friendly actions must be assessed only by appeal to an essentially personal relationship in which we act for the sake of our friends and not for the sake of producing the most good in general and in indifference to this particular personal relationship. Therefore, sophisticated consequentialism, because of its impersonal nature, blinds us to the value of particular friendships and the moral reasons they provide for acting out of friendship, all of which can be properly appreciated only from the personal point of view. In so doing, sophisticated consequentialism undermines what is distinctive about friendship as such. The trouble once again is a split between consequentialist reasons and friendly motivations: a kind of moral schizophrenia.

At this point it might seem that the proper consequentialist reply to this line of criticism is to refuse to accept the claim that a moral justification of the value of friendship and friendly actions must be personal: the good of friendship and the good that friendly actions promote, a consequentialist should say, are things we must be able to understand in impersonal terms or they would not enter into a properly moral justification of the rightness of action. Because sophisticated consequentialists agree that motivation out of friendship must be personal, they must reject the idea that the ultimate moral reasons for acting in these cases are your motives, thereby rejecting the relatively weak motivational internalism that is implicit in the friendship critique (for weak motivational internalism, see the entry on moral cognitivism vs. non-cognitivism , and in particular the section on motivational internalism and the action-guiding character of moral judgements ). Indeed, this seems to be Railton’s strategy in articulating his objective consequentialism: to be a good person is to act in the morally right ways (justified by consequentialism) and so to have, on balance, motivations that tend to produce right action, even though in certain cases (including those of friendship) these motivations need not—indeed cannot—have the consequentialist justification in view. (For further elaborations of this strategy in direct response to Badhwar 1991, see Conee 2001 and Card 2004; for a defense of Railton in opposition to Card’s elaboration of sophisticated consequentialism, see Tedesco 2006.)

This means that the debate at issue in the friendship critique of consequentialism needs to be carried on in part at the level of a discussion of the nature of motivation and the connection between moral reasons and motives. Indeed, such a discussion has implications for how we should construe the sort of mutual caring that is central to friendship. For the sophisticated consequentialist would presumably try to spell out that mutual caring in terms of friendly dispositions (motives divorced from consequentialist reasons), an attempt which advocates of the friendship critique would say involves insufficient attention to the particular person one cares about, insofar as the caring would not be justified by who she is (motives informed by personal reasons).

The discussion of friendship and moral theories has so far concentrated on the nature of practical reason. A similar debate focuses on the nature of value. Scanlon (1998) uses friendship to argue against what he calls teleological conceptions of values presupposed by consequentialism. The teleological view understands states of affairs to have intrinsic value, and our recognition of such value provides us with reasons to bring such states of affairs into existence and to sustain and promote them. Scanlon argues that friendship involves kinds of reasons—of loyalty, for example—are not teleological in this way, and so the value of friendship does not fit into the teleological conception and so cannot be properly recognized by consequentialism. In responding to this argument, Hurka (2006) argues that this argument presupposes a conception of the value of friendship (as something we ought to respect as well as to promote) that is at odds with the teleological conception of value and so with teleological conceptions of friendship. Consequently, the debate must shift to the more general question about the nature of value and cannot be carried out simply by attending to friendship.

These conclusions that we must turn to broader issues if we are to settle the place friendship has in morality reveal that in one sense the friendship critique has failed: it has not succeeded in making an end run around traditional debates between consequentialists, deontologists, and virtue theorists. Yet in a larger sense it has succeeded: it has forced these moral theories to take personal relationships seriously and consequently to refine and complicate their accounts in the process.

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How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics , Translated by W. D. Ross.
Moseley, A., ‘ Philosophy of Love ’, in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy .
Doyle, M. E. and Smith, M. K., 2002, ‘ Friendship: Theory and Experience ’, in The Encyclopaedia of Informal Education , hosted by Informal Education and Lifelong Learning.

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What Jacques Derrida Understood About Friendship

Stories about love offer models for how you might commit your life to another person. Stories about friendship are usually about how you might commit to life itself. There’s a moment in Maxine Hong Kingston’s “Tripmaster Monkey,” one of my favorite novels, when the protagonist, a passionate young artist named Wittman Ah Sing, salutes the “winners of the party”—the stragglers at an all-night acid trip who make it to the other side to toast the morning. “It’s very good sitting here, among friends, coffee cup warm in hands, cigarette,” he thinks to himself. “Good show, gods.” It’s an ode to the everyday texture of holding friends dear, the presence and the silence of it. Having someone to tug on the shoulder and see what you are seeing.

In the late nineteen-eighties, the philosopher Jacques Derrida delivered a series of seminar lectures on the subject of friendship. He was, at that point, one of the most famous philosophers in the world, having become more or less synonymous with the idea of deconstruction. Derrida wanted to disrupt our drive to generate meaning through dichotomies—speech versus writing, reason versus passion, masculinity versus femininity. These seeming opposites were mutually constitutive, he pointed out: just because one concept prevailed over the other didn’t mean that either was stable or self-defined. Straightness exists only by continually marginalizing queerness. His methods required a closer examination of what was being lost or suppressed—in doing so, he and his acolytes argued, we would come to recognize that concepts that seem natural to us are full of contradictions and anxieties. Perhaps accepting this messiness would lead us to a more conscious and intelligent way of living.

By the time that he delivered his lectures on friendship, Derrida had become entranced with a line attributed to Aristotle, o philoi, oudeis philos . The line is often translated as, “O my friends, there is no friend”—a strange sentiment, at once an acknowledgment and a negation. Some speculate that Aristotle was expressing something simpler, closer to “He who has many friends, has no friend.” But Derrida was drawn to the seeming contradiction in the version he favored. He thought that figuring out what Aristotle meant could point us toward a future of new alliances and possibilities.

In 1994, Derrida published the lectures as a book, “ The Politics of Friendship .” Each of its chapters opens with a recitation of Aristotle or a consideration of his influence on other philosophers, including Nietzsche, Kant, and the political theorist Carl Schmitt. As usual with Derrida, what’s at stake is the questionable stability of oppositional couplings that we take for granted—the friend and the enemy, private life and public life, the living and the “phantom.” One chapter hones in on the distinction between individual amity and collective “fraternity.” Another scrutinizes the role that secrets play in friendship, and in society.

Modern life, theorists say, is full of atomized individuals, casting about for a center and questioning the engine of their lives. As a practical matter, friendship is voluntary and vague, a relationship that easily slides into the background of life. For some, friendship is enduring and rhythmic; for others, it’s a sporadic intimacy of resuming conversations that were left years prior. There are people we only talk to about serious things, others who only make sense to us in the merriment of drunken nights. Some friends seem to complete us; others complicate us.

The intimacy of friendship, Derrida writes, lies in the sensation of recognizing oneself in the eyes of another. We continue to know our friend, even when they are no longer present to look back at us. From the moment we befriend someone, he argues, we are already preparing for the possibility that we might outlive them, or they us. Of the many desires we attach to friendship, then, “none is comparable to this unequalled hope, to this ecstasy towards a future which will go beyond death.”

Derrida’s writing is famously knotty and dense, full of citations and arcane terminology. But reflecting on his own relationships tended to give his thinking and writing a more desperate and immediate quality. “The Politics of Friendship” often feels haunted; Derrida insists that the narrative of friendship requires us to constantly imagine how we may someday pay our friends eulogistic tribute. This aspect of his argument evokes “The Work of Mourning,” a collection of Derrida’s eulogies and tributes and letters to widows that was published in 2001. In these shorter pieces, Derrida shows how engaging with the ideas of others could be one of the ultimate expressions of friendship. He struggles with what it means to truly pay homage to another; the genre of eulogy always focusses attention back on the survivor and his grief. Writing in the wake of Jean-François Lyotard’s death, he wonders, “How to leave him alone without abandoning him?”

By the time that “The Politics of Friendship” was published, Derrida was well into middle age, and he had outlived many of his intellectual peers. (He died in 2004, at the age of seventy-four.) The book keeps circling back to the figure of one friend mourning another. While the writing can be complex—as when Derrida discusses “the production of omnitemporality, of intemporality qua omnitemporality,” for instance—it contains moments of simple beauty and awe. “I live in the present speaking of myself in the mouths of my friends,” he writes, “I already hear them speaking on the edge of my tomb… Already, yet when I will no longer be. As though pretending to say to me, in my very own voice: rise again.”

It’s taken me years to read “The Politics of Friendship.” As I’ve inched my way through it, lines here and there have sent me to Derrida’s other writings, or have spurred my mind to chase random memories. I fix on the parts that sing, and I try to catch the gist of the parts that are too complicated for me. The book’s main appeal is the opportunity it provides to follow along as someone grapples with an ephemeral part of human experience. Doing so has come to feel more and more poignant as I have made my slow progress. At times, it seems as though Derrida is describing a bygone way of being, one racked with less anxiety about the bonds that tie us together. In an era of social media and fluid, proliferating channels of communication and exchange, the idea of friendship seems almost quaint, and possibly imperiled. In the face of abundant, tenuous connections, the instinct to sort people according to a more rigid logic than that of mere friendship seems greater than ever.

In 1993, after he’d delivered the lectures that became “The Politics of Friendship” but before he had collected them, Derrida released another book, “Specters of Marx,” which Derrida scholars—and, in case it wasn’t clear, I am not one—mark as a turning point in his career. In it, he engages directly with the post-Cold War political order, and tries to dispel the triumphalist air then sweeping through the West. “Capitalist societies,” he writes, “can always heave a sigh of relief and say to themselves: communism is finished since the collapse of the totalitarianisms of the twentieth century and not only is it finished, but it did not take place, it was only a ghost.” But, he adds, “a ghost never dies, it remains always to come and to come-back.” Here, then, he describes a different kind of voice rising from the tomb. Perhaps this one might know the way to a better tomorrow.

“The Politics of Friendship” is, as the title suggests, in keeping with the so-called political turn in Derrida’s work. It is ultimately a book about social bonds, and our capacity to envision a collective future that surpasses the dire possibilities of the present. “For to love friendship,” Derrida writes, “it is not enough to know how to bear the other in mourning; one must love the future.”

Perhaps friendship could offer a model for politics, or a vision of what politics could become. As friends, we volunteer for one another, we choose to keep each other’s secrets. Perhaps friendship is what makes politics possible in the first place, for how else would we understand what it means to call someone an enemy? “The possibility, the meaning and the phenomenon of friendship would never appear unless the figure of the enemy had already called them up in advance, had indeed put to them the question or the objection of the friend, a wounding question, a question of wound,” Derrida writes. “No friend without the possibility of wound.” As with all seemingly natural binaries, one half contains the seed of the other, and the capacity to self-destruct.

In a world without enemies, whatever it is that we call politics would lose its boundaries and purpose, Derrida argues, toward the end of the book. “For democracy remains to come,” he concludes—and, possibly, it never will. He also suggests, more hopefully, that a radical and just form of friendship could help us imagine a new “experience of freedom and equality.” Finally, he ends by adjusting the quote attributed to Aristotle so that it refers to “my democratic friends.” But, at this point in the book, I could barely keep pace; I felt incapable of fully grasping the meaning of the words, and what they might have meant thirty years ago. My mind drifted toward more banal thoughts, such as whether modern politics is suspicious or unaccommodating of friendship, of the commitment to strangers that we assume as citizens. And then I thought about all the intimacies, shared over cigarettes and alcohol, on the edge of a tomb, which I had once tried to forget. Wounds of a different sort, the ecstasy of having once felt known.

Books & Fiction

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By Alex Ross

By Louis Menand

By Jerome Groopman

A friend is a person with whom I may be sincere.

Emerson writes a poem about old friendships and about friendships lost.

A ruddy drop of manly blood The surging sea outweighs, The world uncertain comes and goes, The lover rooted stays. I fancied he was fled, And, after many a year, Glowed unexhausted kindliness Like daily sunrise there. My careful heart was free again, — O friend, my bosom said, Through thee alone the sky is arched, Through thee the rose is red, All things through thee take nobler form, And look beyond the earth, And is the mill-round of our fate A sun-path in thy worth. Me too thy nobleness has taught To master my despair; The fountains of my hidden life Are through thy friendship fair.

W e have a great deal more kindness than is ever spoken. Maugre all the selfishness that chills like east winds the world, the whole human family is bathed with an element of love like a fine ether. How many persons we meet in houses, whom we scarcely speak to, whom yet we honor, and who honor us! How many we see in the street, or sit with in church, whom, though silently, we warmly rejoice to be with! Read the language of these wandering eye-beams. The heart knoweth.

The effect of the indulgence of this human affection is a certain cordial exhilaration. In poetry, and in common speech, the emotions of benevolence and complacency which are felt towards others are likened to the material effects of fire; so swift, or much more swift, more active, more cheering, are these fine inward irradiations. From the highest degree of passionate love, to the lowest degree of good-will, they make the sweetness of life.

Our intellectual and active powers increase with our affection. The scholar sits down to write, and all his years of meditation do not furnish him with one good thought or happy expression; but it is necessary to write a letter to a friend, — and, forthwith, troops of gentle thoughts invest themselves, on every hand, with chosen words. See, in any house where virtue and self-respect abide, the palpitation which the approach of a stranger causes. A commended stranger is expected and announced, and an uneasiness betwixt pleasure and pain invades all the hearts of a household. His arrival almost brings fear to the good hearts that would welcome him. The house is dusted, all things fly into their places, the old coat is exchanged for the new, and they must get up a dinner if they can. Of a commended stranger, only the good report is told by others, only the good and new is heard by us. He stands to us for humanity. He is what we wish. Having imagined and invested him, we ask how we should stand related in conversation and action with such a man, and are uneasy with fear. The same idea exalts conversation with him. We talk better than we are wont. We have the nimblest fancy, a richer memory, and our dumb devil has taken leave for the time. For long hours we can continue a series of sincere, graceful, rich communications, drawn from the oldest, secretest experience, so that they who sit by, of our own kinsfolk and acquaintance, shall feel a lively surprise at our unusual powers. But as soon as the stranger begins to intrude his partialities, his definitions, his defects, into the conversation, it is all over. He has heard the first, the last and best he will ever hear from us. He is no stranger now. Vulgarity, ignorance, misapprehension are old acquaintances. Now, when he comes, he may get the order, the dress, and the dinner, — but the throbbing of the heart, and the communications of the soul, no more.

It is one of the blessings of old friends that you can afford to be stupid with them.

What is so pleasant as these jets of affection which make a young world for me again? What so delicious as a just and firm encounter of two, in a thought, in a feeling? How beautiful, on their approach to this beating heart, the steps and forms of the gifted and the true! The moment we indulge our affections, the earth is metamorphosed; there is no winter, and no night; all tragedies, all ennuis, vanish, — all duties even; nothing fills the proceeding eternity but the forms all radiant of beloved persons. Let the soul be assured that somewhere in the universe it should rejoin its friend, and it would be content and cheerful alone for a thousand years.

I awoke this morning with devout thanksgiving for my friends, the old and the new. Shall I not call God the Beautiful, who daily showeth himself so to me in his gifts? I chide society, I embrace solitude, and yet I am not so ungrateful as not to see the wise, the lovely, and the noble-minded, as from time to time they pass my gate. Who hears me, who understands me, becomes mine, — a possession for all time. Nor is nature so poor but she gives me this joy several times, and thus we weave social threads of our own, a new web of relations; and, as many thoughts in succession substantiate themselves, we shall by and by stand in a new world of our own creation, and no longer strangers and pilgrims in a traditionary globe. My friends have come to me unsought. The great God gave them to me. By oldest right, by the divine affinity of virtue with itself, I find them, or rather not I, but the Deity in me and in them derides and cancels the thick walls of individual character, relation, age, sex, circumstance, at which he usually connives, and now makes many one. High thanks I owe you, excellent lovers, who carry out the world for me to new and noble depths, and enlarge the meaning of all my thoughts. These are new poetry of the first Bard, — poetry without stop, — hymn, ode, and epic, poetry still flowing, Apollo and the Muses chanting still. Will these, too, separate themselves from me again, or some of them? I know not, but I fear it not; for my relation to them is so pure, that we hold by simple affinity, and the Genius of my life being thus social, the same affinity will exert its energy on whomsoever is as noble as these men and women, wherever I may be.

I confess to an extreme tenderness of nature on this point. It is almost dangerous to me to "crush the sweet poison of misused wine" of the affections. A new person is to me a great event, and hinders me from sleep. I have often had fine fancies about persons which have given me delicious hours; but the joy ends in the day; it yields no fruit. Thought is not born of it; my action is very little modified. I must feel pride in my friend's accomplishments as if they were mine, — and a property in his virtues. I feel as warmly when he is praised, as the lover when he hears applause of his engaged maiden. We over-estimate the conscience of our friend. His goodness seems better than our goodness, his nature finer, his temptations less. Every thing that is his, — his name, his form, his dress, books, and instruments, — fancy enhances. Our own thought sounds new and larger from his mouth.

Yet the systole and diastole of the heart are not without their analogy in the ebb and flow of love. Friendship, like the immortality of the soul, is too good to be believed. The lover, beholding his maiden, half knows that she is not verily that which he worships; and in the golden hour of friendship, we are surprised with shades of suspicion and unbelief. We doubt that we bestow on our hero the virtues in which he shines, and afterwards worship the form to which we have ascribed this divine inhabitation. In strictness, the soul does not respect men as it respects itself. In strict science all persons underlie the same condition of an infinite remoteness. Shall we fear to cool our love by mining for the metaphysical foundation of this Elysian temple? Shall I not be as real as the things I see? If I am, I shall not fear to know them for what they are. Their essence is not less beautiful than their appearance, though it needs finer organs for its apprehension. The root of the plant is not unsightly to science, though for chaplets and festoons we cut the stem short. And I must hazard the production of the bald fact amidst these pleasing reveries, though it should prove an Egyptian skull at our banquet. A man who stands united with his thought conceives magnificently of himself. He is conscious of a universal success, even though bought by uniform particular failures. No advantages, no powers, no gold or force, can be any match for him. I cannot choose but rely on my own poverty more than on your wealth. I cannot make your consciousness tantamount to mine. Only the star dazzles; the planet has a faint, moon-like ray. I hear what you say of the admirable parts and tried temper of the party you praise, but I see well that for all his purple cloaks I shall not like him, unless he is at last a poor Greek like me. I cannot deny it, O friend, that the vast shadow of the Phenomenal includes thee also in its pied and painted immensity, — thee, also, compared with whom all else is shadow. Thou art not Being, as Truth is, as Justice is, — thou art not my soul, but a picture and effigy of that. Thou hast come to me lately, and already thou art seizing thy hat and cloak. Is it not that the soul puts forth friends as the tree puts forth leaves, and presently, by the germination of new buds, extrudes the old leaf? The law of nature is alternation for evermore. Each electrical state superinduces the opposite. The soul environs itself with friends, that it may enter into a grander self-acquaintance or solitude; and it goes alone for a season, that it may exalt its conversation or society. This method betrays itself along the whole history of our personal relations. The instinct of affection revives the hope of union with our mates, and the returning sense of insulation recalls us from the chase. Thus every man passes his life in the search after friendship, and if he should record his true sentiment, he might write a letter like this to each new candidate for his love.

The only way to have a friend is to be one.

DEAR FRIEND: —

If I was sure of thee, sure of thy capacity, sure to match my mood with thine, I should never think again of trifles in relation to thy comings and goings. I am not very wise; my moods are quite attainable; and I respect thy genius; it is to me as yet unfathomed; yet dare I not presume in thee a perfect intelligence of me, and so thou art to me a delicious torment. Thine ever, or never.

Yet these uneasy pleasures and fine pains are for curiosity, and not for life. They are not to be indulged. This is to weave cobweb, and not cloth. Our friendships hurry to short and poor conclusions, because we have made them a texture of wine and dreams, instead of the tough fibre of the human heart. The laws of friendship are austere and eternal, of one web with the laws of nature and of morals. But we have aimed at a swift and petty benefit, to suck a sudden sweetness. We snatch at the slowest fruit in the whole garden of God, which many summers and many winters must ripen. We seek our friend not sacredly, but with an adulterate passion which would appropriate him to ourselves. In vain. We are armed all over with subtle antagonisms, which, as soon as we meet, begin to play, and translate all poetry into stale prose. Almost all people descend to meet. All association must be a compromise, and, what is worst, the very flower and aroma of the flower of each of the beautiful natures disappears as they approach each other. What a perpetual disappointment is actual society, even of the virtuous and gifted! After interviews have been compassed with long foresight, we must be tormented presently by baffled blows, by sudden, unseasonable apathies, by epilepsies of wit and of animal spirits, in the heyday of friendship and thought. Our faculties do not play us true, and both parties are relieved by solitude.

I ought to be equal to every relation. It makes no difference how many friends I have, and what content I can find in conversing with each, if there be one to whom I am not equal. If I have shrunk unequal from one contest, the joy I find in all the rest becomes mean and cowardly. I should hate myself, if then I made my other friends my asylum.

The valiant warrior famoused for fight, After a hundred victories, once foiled, Is from the book of honor razed quite, And all the rest forgot for which he toiled."

Our impatience is thus sharply rebuked. Bashfulness and apathy are a tough husk, in which a delicate organization is protected from premature ripening. It would be lost if it knew itself before any of the best souls were yet ripe enough to know and own it. Respect the naturlangsamkeit which hardens the ruby in a million years, and works in duration, in which Alps and Andes come and go as rainbows. The good spirit of our life has no heaven which is the price of rashness. Love, which is the essence of God, is not for levity, but for the total worth of man. Let us not have this childish luxury in our regards, but the austerest worth; let us approach our friend with an audacious trust in the truth of his heart, in the breadth, impossible to be overturned, of his foundations.

The attractions of this subject are not to be resisted, and I leave, for the time, all account of subordinate social benefit, to speak of that select and sacred relation which is a kind of absolute, and which even leaves the language of love suspicious and common, so much is this purer, and nothing is so much divine.

I do not wish to treat friendships daintily, but with roughest courage. When they are real, they are not glass threads or frostwork, but the solidest thing we know. For now, after so many ages of experience, what do we know of nature, or of ourselves? Not one step has man taken toward the solution of the problem of his destiny. In one condemnation of folly stand the whole universe of men. But the sweet sincerity of joy and peace, which I draw from this alliance with my brother's soul, is the nut itself, whereof all nature and all thought is but the husk and shell. Happy is the house that shelters a friend! It might well be built, like a festal bower or arch, to entertain him a single day. Happier, if he know the solemnity of that relation, and honor its law! He who offers himself a candidate for that covenant comes up, like an Olympian, to the great games, where the first-born of the world are the competitors. He proposes himself for contests where Time, Want, Danger, are in the lists, and he alone is victor who has truth enough in his constitution to preserve the delicacy of his beauty from the wear and tear of all these. The gifts of fortune may be present or absent, but all the speed in that contest depends on intrinsic nobleness, and the contempt of trifles. There are two elements that go to the composition of friendship, each so sovereign that I can detect no superiority in either, no reason why either should be first named. One is Truth. A friend is a person with whom I may be sincere. Before him I may think aloud. I am arrived at last in the presence of a man so real and equal, that I may drop even those undermost garments of dissimulation, courtesy, and second thought, which men never put off, and may deal with him with the simplicity and wholeness with which one chemical atom meets another. Sincerity is the luxury allowed, like diadems and authority, only to the highest rank, that being permitted to speak truth, as having none above it to court or conform unto. Every man alone is sincere. At the entrance of a second person, hypocrisy begins. We parry and fend the approach of our fellow-man by compliments, by gossip, by amusements, by affairs. We cover up our thought from him under a hundred folds. I knew a man, who, under a certain religious frenzy, cast off this drapery, and, omitting all compliment and commonplace, spoke to the conscience of every person he encountered, and that with great insight and beauty. At first he was resisted, and all men agreed he was mad. But persisting, as indeed he could not help doing, for some time in this course, he attained to the advantage of bringing every man of his acquaintance into true relations with him. No man would think of speaking falsely with him, or of putting him off with any chat of markets or reading-rooms. But every man was constrained by so much sincerity to the like plaindealing, and what love of nature, what poetry, what symbol of truth he had, he did certainly show him. But to most of us society shows not its face and eye, but its side and its back. To stand in true relations with men in a false age is worth a fit of insanity, is it not? We can seldom go erect. Almost every man we meet requires some civility, — requires to be humored; he has some fame, some talent, some whim of religion or philanthropy in his head that is not to be questioned, and which spoils all conversation with him. But a friend is a sane man who exercises not my ingenuity, but me. My friend gives me entertainment without requiring any stipulation on my part. A friend, therefore, is a sort of paradox in nature. I who alone am, I who see nothing in nature whose existence I can affirm with equal evidence to my own, behold now the semblance of my being, in all its height, variety, and curiosity, reiterated in a foreign form; so that a friend may well be reckoned the masterpiece of nature.

The other element of friendship is tenderness. We are holden to men by every sort of tie, by blood, by pride, by fear, by hope, by lucre, by lust, by hate, by admiration, by every circumstance and badge and trifle, but we can scarce believe that so much character can subsist in another as to draw us by love. Can another be so blessed, and we so pure, that we can offer him tenderness? When a man becomes dear to me, I have touched the goal of fortune. I find very little written directly to the heart of this matter in books. And yet I have one text which I cannot choose but remember. My author says, — "I offer myself faintly and bluntly to those whose I effectually am, and tender myself least to him to whom I am the most devoted." I wish that friendship should have feet, as well as eyes and eloquence. It must plant itself on the ground, before it vaults over the moon. I wish it to be a little of a citizen, before it is quite a cherub. We chide the citizen because he makes love a commodity. It is an exchange of gifts, of useful loans; it is good neighbourhood; it watches with the sick; it holds the pall at the funeral; and quite loses sight of the delicacies and nobility of the relation. But though we cannot find the god under this disguise of a sutler, yet, on the other hand, we cannot forgive the poet if he spins his thread too fine , and does not substantiate his romance by the municipal virtues of justice, punctuality, fidelity, and pity. I hate the prostitution of the name of friendship to signify modish and worldly alliances. I much prefer the company of ploughboys and tin-peddlers, to the silken and perfumed amity which celebrates its days of encounter by a frivolous display, by rides in a curricle, and dinners at the best taverns. The end of friendship is a commerce the most strict and homely that can be joined; more strict than any of which we have experience. It is for aid and comfort through all the relations and passages of life and death. It is fit for serene days, and graceful gifts, and country rambles, but also for rough roads and hard fare, shipwreck, poverty, and persecution. It keeps company with the sallies of the wit and the trances of religion. We are to dignify to each other the daily needs and offices of man's life, and embellish it by courage, wisdom, and unity. It should never fall into something usual and settled, but should be alert and inventive, and add rhyme and reason to what was drudgery.

Friendship may be said to require natures so rare and costly, each so well tempered and so happily adapted, and withal so circumstanced, (for even in that particular, a poet says, love demands that the parties be altogether paired,) that its satisfaction can very seldom be assured. It cannot subsist in its perfection, say some of those who are learned in this warm lore of the heart, betwixt more than two. I am not quite so strict in my terms, perhaps because I have never known so high a fellowship as others. I please my imagination more with a circle of godlike men and women variously related to each other, and between whom subsists a lofty intelligence. But I find this law of one to one peremptory for conversation, which is the practice and consummation of friendship. Do not mix waters too much. The best mix as ill as good and bad. You shall have very useful and cheering discourse at several times with two several men, but let all three of you come together, and you shall not have one new and hearty word. Two may talk and one may hear, but three cannot take part in a conversation of the most sincere and searching sort. In good company there is never such discourse between two, across the table, as takes place when you leave them alone. In good company, the individuals merge their egotism into a social soul exactly co-extensive with the several consciousnesses there present. No partialities of friend to friend, no fondnesses of brother to sister, of wife to husband, are there pertinent, but quite otherwise. Only he may then speak who can sail on the common thought of the party, and not poorly limited to his own. Now this convention, which good sense demands, destroys the high freedom of great conversation, which requires an absolute running of two souls into one.

No two men but, being left alone with each other, enter into simpler relations. Yet it is affinity that determines which two shall converse. Unrelated men give little joy to each other; will never suspect the latent powers of each. We talk sometimes of a great talent for conversation, as if it were a permanent property in some individuals. Conversation is an evanescent relation, — no more. A man is reputed to have thought and eloquence; he cannot, for all that, say a word to his cousin or his uncle. They accuse his silence with as much reason as they would blame the insignificance of a dial in the shade. In the sun it will mark the hour. Among those who enjoy his thought, he will regain his tongue.

Friendship requires that rare mean betwixt likeness and unlikeness, that piques each with the presence of power and of consent in the other party. Let me be alone to the end of the world, rather than that my friend should overstep, by a word or a look, his real sympathy. I am equally balked by antagonism and by compliance. Let him not cease an instant to be himself. The only joy I have in his being mine, is that the not mine is mine . I hate, where I looked for a manly furtherance, or at least a manly resistance, to find a mush of concession. Better be a nettle in the side of your friend than his echo. The condition which high friendship demands is ability to do without it. That high office requires great and sublime parts. There must be very two, before there can be very one. Let it be an alliance of two large, formidable natures, mutually beheld, mutually feared, before yet they recognize the deep identity which beneath these disparities unites them.

He only is fit for this society who is magnanimous; who is sure that greatness and goodness are always economy; who is not swift to intermeddle with his fortunes. Let him not intermeddle with this. Leave to the diamond its ages to grow, nor expect to accelerate the births of the eternal. Friendship demands a religious treatment. We talk of choosing our friends, but friends are self-elected. Reverence is a great part of it. Treat your friend as a spectacle. Of course he has merits that are not yours, and that you cannot honor, if you must needs hold him close to your person. Stand aside; give those merits room; let them mount and expand. Are you the friend of your friend's buttons, or of his thought? To a great heart he will still be a stranger in a thousand particulars, that he may come near in the holiest ground. Leave it to girls and boys to regard a friend as property, and to suck a short and all-confounding pleasure, instead of the noblest benefit.

Let us buy our entrance to this guild by a long probation. Why should we desecrate noble and beautiful souls by intruding on them? Why insist on rash personal relations with your friend? Why go to his house, or know his mother and brother and sisters? Why be visited by him at your own? Are these things material to our covenant? Leave this touching and clawing. Let him be to me a spirit. A message, a thought, a sincerity, a glance from him, I want, but not news, nor pottage. I can get politics, and chat, and neighbourly conveniences from cheaper companions. Should not the society of my friend be to me poetic, pure, universal, and great as nature itself? Ought I to feel that our tie is profane in comparison with yonder bar of cloud that sleeps on the horizon, or that clump of waving grass that divides the brook? Let us not vilify, but raise it to that standard. That great, defying eye, that scornful beauty of his mien and action, do not pique yourself on reducing, but rather fortify and enhance. Worship his superiorities; wish him not less by a thought, but hoard and tell them all. Guard him as thy counterpart. Let him be to thee for ever a sort of beautiful enemy, untamable, devoutly revered, and not a trivial conveniency to be soon outgrown and cast aside. The hues of the opal, the light of the diamond, are not to be seen, if the eye is too near. To my friend I write a letter, and from him I receive a letter. That seems to you a little. It suffices me. It is a spiritual gift worthy of him to give, and of me to receive. It profanes nobody. In these warm lines the heart will trust itself, as it will not to the tongue, and pour out the prophecy of a godlier existence than all the annals of heroism have yet made good.

Respect so far the holy laws of this fellowship as not to prejudice its perfect flower by your impatience for its opening. We must be our own before we can be another's. There is at least this satisfaction in crime, according to the Latin proverb; — you can speak to your accomplice on even terms. Crimen quos inquinat, aequat . To those whom we admire and love, at first we cannot. Yet the least defect of self-possession vitiates, in my judgment, the entire relation. There can never be deep peace between two spirits, never mutual respect, until, in their dialogue, each stands for the whole world.

What is so great as friendship, let us carry with what grandeur of spirit we can. Let us be silent, — so we may hear the whisper of the gods. Let us not interfere. Who set you to cast about what you should say to the select souls, or how to say any thing to such? No matter how ingenious, no matter how graceful and bland. There are innumerable degrees of folly and wisdom, and for you to say aught is to be frivolous. Wait, and thy heart shall speak. Wait until the necessary and everlasting overpowers you, until day and night avail themselves of your lips. The only reward of virtue is virtue; the only way to have a friend is to be one. You shall not come nearer a man by getting into his house. If unlike, his soul only flees the faster from you, and you shall never catch a true glance of his eye. We see the noble afar off, and they repel us; why should we intrude? Late, — very late, — we perceive that no arrangements, no introductions, no consuetudes or habits of society, would be of any avail to establish us in such relations with them as we desire, — but solely the uprise of nature in us to the same degree it is in them; then shall we meet as water with water; and if we should not meet them then, we shall not want them, for we are already they. In the last analysis, love is only the reflection of a man's own worthiness from other men. Men have sometimes exchanged names with their friends, as if they would signify that in their friend each loved his own soul.

Do not follow where the path may lead - Ralph Waldo Emerson

The higher the style we demand of friendship, of course the less easy to establish it with flesh and blood. We walk alone in the world. Friends, such as we desire, are dreams and fables. But a sublime hope cheers ever the faithful heart, that elsewhere, in other regions of the universal power, souls are now acting, enduring, and daring, which can love us, and which we can love. We may congratulate ourselves that the period of nonage, of follies, of blunders, and of shame, is passed in solitude, and when we are finished men, we shall grasp heroic hands in heroic hands. Only be admonished by what you already see, not to strike leagues of friendship with cheap persons, where no friendship can be. Our impatience betrays us into rash and foolish alliances which no God attends. By persisting in your path, though you forfeit the little you gain the great. You demonstrate yourself, so as to put yourself out of the reach of false relations, and you draw to you the first-born of the world, — those rare pilgrims whereof only one or two wander in nature at once, and before whom the vulgar great show as spectres and shadows merely.

It is foolish to be afraid of making our ties too spiritual, as if so we could lose any genuine love. Whatever correction of our popular views we make from insight, nature will be sure to bear us out in, and though it seem to rob us of some joy, will repay us with a greater. Let us feel, if we will, the absolute insulation of man. We are sure that we have all in us. We go to Europe, or we pursue persons, or we read books, in the instinctive faith that these will call it out and reveal us to ourselves. Beggars all. The persons are such as we; the Europe an old faded garment of dead persons; the books their ghosts. Let us drop this idolatry. Let us give over this mendicancy. Let us even bid our dearest friends farewell, and defy them, saying, 'Who are you? Unhand me: I will be dependent no more.' Ah! seest thou not, O brother, that thus we part only to meet again on a higher platform, and only be more each other's, because we are more our own? A friend is Janus-faced: he looks to the past and the future. He is the child of all my foregoing hours, the prophet of those to come, and the harbinger of a greater friend.

I do then with my friends as I do with my books. I would have them where I can find them, but I seldom use them. We must have society on our own terms, and admit or exclude it on the slightest cause. I cannot afford to speak much with my friend. If he is great, he makes me so great that I cannot descend to converse. In the great days, presentiments hover before me in the firmament. I ought then to dedicate myself to them. I go in that I may seize them, I go out that I may seize them. I fear only that I may lose them receding into the sky in which now they are only a patch of brighter light. Then, though I prize my friends, I cannot afford to talk with them and study their visions, lest I lose my own. It would indeed give me a certain household joy to quit this lofty seeking, this spiritual astronomy, or search of stars, and come down to warm sympathies with you; but then I know well I shall mourn always the vanishing of my mighty gods. It is true, next week I shall have languid moods, when I can well afford to occupy myself with foreign objects; then I shall regret the lost literature of your mind, and wish you were by my side again. But if you come, perhaps you will fill my mind only with new visions, not with yourself but with your lustres, and I shall not be able any more than now to converse with you. So I will owe to my friends this evanescent intercourse. I will receive from them, not what they have, but what they are. They shall give me that which properly they cannot give, but which emanates from them. But they shall not hold me by any relations less subtile and pure. We will meet as though we met not, and part as though we parted not.

It has seemed to me lately more possible than I knew, to carry a friendship greatly, on one side, without due correspondence on the other. Why should I cumber myself with regrets that the receiver is not capacious? It never troubles the sun that some of his rays fall wide and vain into ungrateful space, and only a small part on the reflecting planet. Let your greatness educate the crude and cold companion. If he is unequal, he will presently pass away; but thou art enlarged by thy own shining, and, no longer a mate for frogs and worms, dost soar and burn with the gods of the empyrean. It is thought a disgrace to love unrequited. But the great will see that true love cannot be unrequited. True love transcends the unworthy object, and dwells and broods on the eternal, and when the poor interposed mask crumbles, it is not sad, but feels rid of so much earth, and feels its independency the surer. Yet these things may hardly be said without a sort of treachery to the relation. The essence of friendship is entireness, a total magnanimity and trust. It must not surmise or provide for infirmity. It treats its object as a god, that it may deify both.

Ralph Waldo Emerson left the ministry to pursue a career in writing and public speaking. Emerson became one of America's best known and best-loved 19th-century figures. More About Emerson

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"Every man has his own courage, and is betrayed because he seeks in himself the courage of other persons." – Ralph Waldo Emerson

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The True Meaning of Friendship

What is it that makes a true friend.

Posted December 15, 2013 | Reviewed by Jessica Schrader

Time and distance do nothing to diminish the bond we have in the deepest kinds of friendship.
What draws people together as friends may include common interests, history, common values, and equality.
To attract true friends, be a true friend to yourself and be the friend you want to have.

The Japanese have a term, kenzoku , which translated literally means "family." The connotation suggests a bond between people who've made a similar commitment and who possibly therefore share a similar destiny. It implies the presence of the deepest connection of friendship , of lives lived as comrades from the distant past.

Many of us have people in our lives with whom we feel the bond described by the word kenzoku. They may be family members, a mother, a brother, a daughter, a cousin. Or a friend from grammar school with whom we haven't talked in decades. Time and distance do nothing to diminish the bond we have with these kinds of friends.

The question then arises: why do we have the kind of chemistry encapsulated by the word kenzoku with only a few people we know and not scores of others? The closer we look for the answer the more elusive it becomes. It may not in fact be possible to know, but the characteristics that define a kenzoku relationship most certainly are.

What draws people together as friends?

Common interests . This probably ties us closer to our friends than many would like to admit. When our interests diverge and we can find nothing to enjoy jointly, time spent together tends to rapidly diminish. Not that we can't still care deeply about friends with whom we no longer share common interests, but it's probably uncommon for such friends to interact on a regular basis.
History . Nothing ties people together, even people with little in common, than having gone through the same difficult experience. As the sole glue to keep friendships whole in the long run, however, it often dries, cracks, and ultimately fails.
Common values . Though not necessarily enough to create a friendship, if values are too divergent, it's difficult for a friendship to thrive.
Equality . If one friend needs the support of the other on a consistent basis such that the person depended upon receives no benefit other than the opportunity to support and encourage, while the relationship may be significant and valuable, it can't be said to define a true friendship .

What makes a friend worthy of the name?

A commitment to your happiness . A true friend is consistently willing to put your happiness before your friendship. It's said that "good advice grates on the ear," but a true friend won't refrain from telling you something you don't want to hear, something that may even risk fracturing the friendship, if hearing it lies in your best interest. A true friend will not lack the mercy to correct you when you're wrong. A true friend will confront you with your drinking problem as quickly as inform you about a malignant-looking skin lesion on your back that you can't see yourself.
Not asking you to place the friendship before your principles . A true friend won't ask you to compromise your principles in the name of your friendship or anything else. Ever.
A good influence . A true friend inspires you to live up to your best potential, not to indulge your basest drives.

Of course, we may have friends who fit all these criteria and still don't quite feel kenzoku. There still seems to be an extra factor, an attraction similar to that which draws people together romantically, that cements friends together irrevocably, often immediately, for no reason either person can identify. But when you find these people, these kenzoku, they're like priceless gems. They're like finding home.

How to attract true friends

This one is easy, at least on paper: become a true friend yourself. One of my favorite quotations comes from Gandhi: "Be the change you wish to see in the world." Be the friend you want to have. We all tend to attract people into our lives whose character mirrors our own. You don't have to make yourself into what you think others would find attractive. No matter what your areas of interest, others share them somewhere. Simply make yourself a big target. Join social clubs organized around activities you enjoy. Leverage the Internet to find people of like mind. Take action.

As I thought about it, there are four people in my life I consider kenzoku . How many do you?

My book, The Undefeated Mind: On the Science of Constructing an Indestructible Self, is available now; read the sample chapter and visit Amazon or Barnes & Noble to order your copy.

Alex Lickerman, M.D. , is a general internist and former Director of Primary Care at the University of Chicago and has been a practicing Buddhist since 1989.

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Friendship is a term which is used to denote co-operative and supportive behavior between two or more people. It can be taken to mean a supportive relationship which involves mutual knowledge, esteem, and affection.

Arranged alphabetically by author or source: A · B · C · D · E · F · G · H · I · J · K · L · M · N · O · P · Q · R · S · T · U · V · W · X · Y · Z · Respectfully Quoted: A Dictionary of Quotations · Hoyt's New Cyclopedia Of Practical Quotations · Dictionary of Burning Words of Brilliant Writers · See also · External links

Henry Adams , The Education of Henry Adams (1907), Ch. VII.
Henry Adams , The Education of Henry Adams (1907), Ch. XX.
Joseph Addison , Cato, A Tragedy (1713), Act III, scene 1.
Amos Bronson Alcott , Concord Days (1872), p. 124.
This quote is often misattributed to Alcott's daughter Louisa May Alcott .
Ali , A Hundred Sayings .
A friend is he whose absence also proves the friendship.
If you intend to cut yourself off from a friend leave some scope for him from your side by which he may resume friendship if it occurs to him some day.
Ali , Nahj al-Balagha , Letter 31: Advice to one of his sons after returning from the Battle of Siffin , at the Ahlul Bayt Digital Islamic Library Project .
Ali , Nahj al-Balagha , Hadith n. 295 , at the Ahlul Bayt Digital Islamic Library Project .
Aristotle , from Braude's Second Encyclopedia of stories, quotations, and anecdotes .
Aristotle , Eudemian Ethics Book VII, 1238.a20.
Aristotle , Nicomachean Ethics (c. 325 BC), Book I, 1096.a16.
Aristotle , Nicomachean Ethics (c. 325 BC), Book VIII, 1155.a5.
Aristotle , Nicomachean Ethics (c. 325 BC), Book VIII, 1155.a26.
Aristotle , Nicomachean Ethics (c. 325 BC), Book IX, 1168.b1
Variants: My best friend is the man who in wishing me well wishes it for my sake. The best friend is the man who in wishing me well wishes it for my sake.
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk , Address to the American Ambassador to Turkey in 1927. As quoted in: Under Secretary Eugene V. Rostow (April 4, 1968): The United States and Turkey, Partners in World Security. Address made before the American-Turkish Society Inc., at New York, N.Y. on April 4, 1968. Source: United States Department of State (April 20, 1968): The Department of State Bulletin, Volume 58, page 559. Archived from the original on November 4, 2023. See also Google Books PDF-Page of aforementioned source, which was archived from the original on November 4, 2023.
Aung San Suu Kyi , Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought Acceptance Speech by Aung San Suu Kyi, Strasbourg, 22 October 2013 .
Richard Bach , Illusions, The Adventures of a Reluctant Messiah (1977).
Francis Bacon , Apothegms , No. 97
The Beatles , With a Little Help from My Friends .
Beaumont and Fletcher , The Faithful Friends (c. 1608), Act III, scene 3, line 50.
Hilaire Belloc , "Dedicatory Ode," Sonnets and Verse (1923), p. 70, stanza 3.
Hilaire Belloc , "Dedicatory Ode," Sonnets and Verse (1923), p. 74, stanza 22.
Hilaire Belloc , "Dedicatory Ode," Sonnets and Verse (1923), p. 76, stanza 36. Republicans was the name of the friends' club.
E. C. Bentley and H. Warner Allen, Trent's Own Case (1936), Chapter XV.
Ambrose Bierce , The Cynic's Word Book (1906); republished as The Devil's Dictionary (1911).
Ambrose Bierce , The Cynic's Word Book (1906), republished as The Devil's Dictionary (1911) with modification:
FRIENDSHIP, n. A ship big enough to carry two in fair weather, but only one in foul.
Nicht aus dem schweren Boden der Erde,
Dietrich Bonhoeffer , Der Freund , published in Widerstand und Ergebung, Briefe und Aufzeichnungen aus der Haft (1952), p. 269
James Boswell , Life of Samuel Johnson (1791), "19 September 1777".
Sir Thomas Browne , Religio Medici (1642), Part II, Section V.
Gautama Buddha , Dhammapada , (verse 202), translator: Narada Maha Thera
Edward Bulwer-Lytton , What Will He Do With It? (1858), Book II, Chapter XIV.
Gelett Burgess , A Gage of Youth: Lyrics from The Lark and Other Poems (1901), "Willy and the Lady", p. 46.
Rosario Castellanos "In Praise of Friendship" (1964) In Another Way to Be: Selected Works of Rosario Castellanos translated from Spanish by Myralyn Allgood
We are not born, we do not live for ourselves alone; our country, our friends, have a share in us.
Cicero , De Officiis Book I, section 22.
Cicero , De Amicitia - On Friendship (44 B.C.).
A friend is, as it were, a second self.
Cicero , De Amicitia , XXI. 80. (Adapted).
Samuel Taylor Coleridge , Youth and Age , st. 2 (1823-1832) and Duty Surviving Self-Love (1826).
Charles Caleb Colton , Lacon (1820).
Glen Cook , Severed Heads, in Marion Zimmer Bradley (ed.) Sword and Sorceress (1984), p. 49
Francis Ford Coppola and Mario Puzo , The Godfather Part II (1974), (character of " Michael Corleone "); this has often become attributed to Sun Tzu and sometimes to Niccolò Machiavelli or Petrarch , but there are no published sources yet found which predate its use in the second Godfather film, where Corleone states: My father taught me many things here — he taught me in this room. He taught me — keep your friends close but your enemies closer.

I'll be at your side There's no need to worry Together, we'll survive Through the haste & hurry I'll be at your side, if you feel like you're alone And you've nowhere to turn I'll be at your side

If life's standing still, and your soul's confused And you cannot find what road to choose [...] I will turn around And you know that I 'll be at your side

The Corrs , At Your Side .
William Cowper , The Task (1785), Book VI, line 560.
William Cowper , The Task (1785), Book II, line 642.
Dinah Craik , A Life for a Life (1859); since the 1930s this has also been published in many paraphrased forms, often uncredited to Craik, including: A friend is one To whom one may pour out all The contents of one's heart Chaff and grain, together, Knowing that the gentlest of hands Will take and sift it, Keep what's worth keeping And blow the rest away.
DaBaby , in "Enemies" , by Post Malone , Hollywood's Bleeding (2019), New York: Republic Records
Psalm 119:63
Fate chooses our relatives, we choose our friends.
Jacques Delille , Malheur at Pitié (1803), Canto I
Giovanni Della Casa , Galateo: Or, A Treatise on Politeness and Delicacy of Manners , pp. 42-43
Diogenes of Sinope Stobaeus , iii. 13. 44
There are very few honest friends—the demand is not particularly great.
Marie von Ebner-Eschenbach , Aphorisms , D. Scrase and W. Mieder, trans. (Riverside, California: 1994), p. 71
Ecclesiastes 4:9-10.
Ecclesiastes 37:2.
George Eliot , The Spanish Gypsy (1868), Book III.
George Eliot , The Spanish Gypsy (1868), Book IV.
Ralph Waldo Emerson , in "Friendship" in Essays (1841), First series.
Ralph Waldo Emerson , Essays (1841), Of Experience .
Ralph Waldo Emerson , Essays (1841), Of Friendship .
Ralph Waldo Emerson , Society and Solitude (1870), Ch. V: "Domestic Life".
Ralph Waldo Emerson , Journal entry December 26, 1839, Journals (1911), Volume 5, p. 360-361, also in “Politics,” The Early Lectures of Ralph Waldo Emerson (Harvard: 1972), p. 243
Epicurus , Number 28 of the 40 "Sovran Maxims" (or "Sovereign Maxims), or "Principal Doctrines" as translated by Robert Drew Hicks
Benjamin Franklin , Poor Richard's Almanack (1734).
Benjamin Franklin , Poor Richard's Almanack (1739).
Benjamin Franklin , Poor Richard's Almanack (1751).
Mellin de Saint-Gelais , Oeuvres poétiques .
Genesis Rabbah 22 , Tales and Maxims from the Midrash by Rev. Samuel Rapaport, (1907), p. 72
Kahlil Gibran , The Prophet (1923).
Oliver Goldsmith , She Stoops to Conquer (1771), Act I, reported in Bartlett's Familiar Quotations , 10th edition (1919).
Oliver Goldsmith , Retaliation (1774), line 107.
Make your friends your teachers and blend the usefulness of learning with the pleasure of conversation.
Baltasar Gracián , Oráculo Manual y Arte de Prudencia , § 11 (Christopher Maurer trans.)
Francesco Guicciardini , Counsels and Reflections , 324.
Jean Hérault, sieur de Gourville as quoted in Considérations sur l'esprit et les moeurs (1788) by Gabriel Sénac de Meilhan ; a similar remark "May God defend me from my friends; I can defend myself from my enemies." has become attributed to Voltaire , since at least 1908, but without sourcing
Robert A. Heinlein , The Cat Who Walks Through Walls (1985), Chapter 1
Sir Arthur Helps , in 'Unreasonable Claims in Social Affections and Relations', Chapter IX, Friends in Council (First Series) (1847).
Friends . . old friends. . .
Henry Home, Lord Kames , in "Friendship", Introduction to the Art of Thinking (1761).
This quote is often misattributed to Homer .
Elbert Hubbard , in 'Exclusive Friendships', Love, Life & Work (1906).
Elbert Hubbard , The Motto Book (1907).
Elbert Hubbard , The Note Book (1927).
Thomas Hughes , in Katherine Frances Jelf, George Edward Jelf: A Memoir (London: Skeffington & Son, 1909), p. 10.
Aldous Huxley , Brave New World (1932).
Helen Keller
A man without friends is like a body without a soul.
Italian Proverb, in Cassell's Book of Quotations , p. 884
Massimo Introvigne , "Friendships and the Tai Ji Men Case: An International Webinar" , Bitter Winter (August 4, 2021)
Henry James , Confidence (1879), Ch. II.
William James , Talks to Teachers on Psychology and to Students on Some of Life's Ideals (1911).
Jesus , in John 15:13.
Sarah Orne Jewett , The Country of the Pointed Firs (1896), Ch. 12.
Franklin P. Jones, in Saturday Evening Post (29 November 1953).
Michael Jones , "Still Tippin'" (2005), Who Is Mike Jones? (2005).
Julian , Myth at the end of Julian's oration to the cynic Heracleios, as translated in The Emperor Julian : Paganism and Christianity (1879) by Gerald Henry Rendall , Ch. VI : Julian's Personal Religion, p. 138.
John Kerry , Kerry Blasts Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu — (December 2016)
Søren Kierkegaard Either/Or Part II , Hong p. 319 (1843).
Søren Kierkegaard , Stages on Life's Way , Hong p. 245.
Étienne de la Boétie , Discourse of Voluntary Servitude , Part 3
Mikhail Lermontov , A Hero of Our Time .
C. S. Lewis , The Four Loves (1960)
Anne Morrow Lindbergh , Gift from the Sea .
Henry Wadsworth Longfellow , Christus (1872), Part II, The Golden Legend , I.
Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, Christus (1872), Part II, The Golden Legend , I.
Henry Wadsworth Longfellow , The Courtship of Miles Standish (1858), Part VI, Priscilla , line 22.
Henry Wadsworth Longfellow , The Courtship of Miles Standish (1858), Part VI, Priscilla , line 72.
Jacques Lusseyran , And There Was Light: The Extraordinary Memoir of a Blind Hero of the French Resistance in World War II (1998), p. 216.
Scott Lynch , A Year and a Day in Old Theradane, in George R. R. Martin & Gardner Dozois (eds.) Rogues (2014), p. 258
Niccolò Machiavelli , The Prince (1513), Ch. 17, as translated by Luigi Ricci (1903)
Variant translations of portions of this passage:
From this arises the question whether it is better to be loved rather than feared, or feared rather than loved. It might perhaps be answered that we should wish to be both: but since love and fear can hardly exist together, if we must choose between them, it is far safer to be feared than loved.
He ought to be slow to believe and to act, nor should he himself show fear, but proceed in a temperate manner with prudence and humanity, so that too much confidence may not make him incautious and too much distrust render him intolerable.
The prince who relies upon their words, without having otherwise provided for his security, is ruined; for friendships that are won by awards, and not by greatness and nobility of soul, although deserved, yet are not real, and cannot be depended upon in time of adversity.
Shackerley Marmionin The Antiquary , reported in Bartlett's Familiar Quotations , 10th edition (1919).
Nelson Mandela on friendship, From his unpublished autobiographical manuscript written in 1975. Source: From Nelson Mandela By Himself: The Authorised Book of Quotations © 2010 by Nelson R. Mandela and The Nelson Mandela Foundation
Jessica R. Methot, Jeffery A. Lepine, Nathan P. Podaskoff, Jessica Siegel, "Are Workplace Friendships a Mixed Blesing? Exploring Tradeofffs of Multiplex Relationships and Their Associations With Job Perofrmance" , Personnel Psychology 2016, 69, p. 312.
Jessica R. Methot, Jeffery A. Lepine, Nathan P. Podaskoff, Jessica Siegel, "Are Workplace Friendships a Mixed Blesing? Exploring Tradeofffs of Multiplex Relationships and Their Associations With Job Perofrmance" , Personnel Psychology 2016, 69, pp. 316-317.
Jessica R. Methot, Jeffery A. Lepine, Nathan P. Podaskoff, Jessica Siegel, "Are Workplace Friendships a Mixed Blesing? Exploring Tradeofffs of Multiplex Relationships and Their Associations With Job Perofrmance" , Personnel Psychology 2016, 69, p. 327-328.
Jessica R. Methot, Jeffery A. Lepine, Nathan P. Podaskoff, Jessica Siegel, "Are Workplace Friendships a Mixed Blesing? Exploring Tradeofffs of Multiplex Relationships and Their Associations With Job Perofrmance" , Personnel Psychology 2016, 69, p. 338.
Abigail Sullivan Moore, “The Science of Roommates” , The New York Times , (July 23, 2010)
A. A. Milne , The House at Pooh Corner (1928), Chapter 10.
Mahatma Gandhi , “An Autobiography” '
John Newton, Ph.D., Complete Conduct Principles for the 21st Century (2000), p. 138. ISBN 0967370574 .
John Newton, Ph.D., Complete Conduct Principles for the 21st Century (2000), p. 45. ISBN 0967370574 .
Friedrich Nietzsche , Human, All-too Human , § 499
Anaïs Nin , Diary entry (March 1937).
Henri Nouwen , Out of Solitude (1996).
Eiichiro Oda , "Mr. 2 Bon Clay" in One Piece .
Cesare Pavese , The Beach .
Charles Péguy , "The Search for Truth", Basic Verities (1943), trans. Anne and Julien Green .
Everything for a friend, not even justice for an enemy.
Juan Domingo Perón , as quoted in Dictatorship, Democracy, and Globalization: Argentina and the Cost of Paralysis, 1973-2001 (2009) by Klaus Friedrich Veigel
Pillemer, Julianna; Rothbard, Nancy (2018-02-15). "Friends Without Benefits: Understanding the Dark Sides of Workplace Friendship". Academy of Management Review: amr.2016.0309. doi:10.5465/amr.2016.0309. ISSN 0363-7425.
Robert Pollok , The Course of Time (1827), Book V, line 336.
Robert Pollok , The Course of Time (1827), Book V, line 315.
Alexander Pope , Dunciad (1728 to 1743), Book III, line 173.
Alexander Pope , An Essay on Criticism (1709), line 214.
Alexander Pope , Moral Essays (1731-35), Epistle II, line 248.
James Rachels , The Elements of Moral Philosophy (1999), p. 183.
Ayn Rand , Anthem (1937).
Robert Reed , Hatch (2007) in Gardner Dozois & Jonathan Strahan (eds.) The New Space Opera (mass market paperback edition, ISBN 978-0-06-135041-2 ), p. 59
Nick Rumens, “Researching workplace friendships: Drawing insights from the sociology of friendship” , Journal of Social and Personal Relationships , Volume: 34 issue: 8, page(s): 1149-1167, (September 22, 2016).
Scots proverb, as published in Beauties of Allan Ramsay: Being a Selection of the Most Admired Pieces of that Celebrated Author, viz. The Gentle Shepherd; Christ's Kirk on the Green; The Monk, and the Miller's Wife; with his valuable collection of Scots Proverbs (1815), "Scots Proverbs" Ch. 1; also quoted in Pure Morning , a song by Placebo
John Selden , in "Friends" in Table Talk (1689).
Seneca , Letters , 9 (Robin Campbell trans.)
Sarah Schulman , Conflict Is Not Abuse: Overstating Harm, Community Responsibility, and the Duty of Repair . Arsenal Pulp Press . 2016. ISBN 9781551526447 .
William Shakespeare , All's Well That Ends Well (1600s), Act I, scene 1, line 75.
William Shakespeare , As You Like It (c.1599-1600), Act I, scene 3, line 75.
William Shakespeare , As You Like It (c.1599-1600), Song, Act II, scene 7, line 181.
William Shakespeare , Hamlet (1600-02), Act I, scene 3, line 59.
William Shakespeare , Hamlet (1600-02), Act III, scene 2, line 217.
William Shakespeare , Henry IV , Part I (c. 1597), Act I, scene 3, line 208.
William Shakespeare , Henry IV , Part I (c. 1597), Act II, scene 4, line 165.
William Shakespeare , Henry VIII ( c. 1613 ), Act II, scene 1, line 126.
William Shakespeare , Julius Cæsar (1599), Act II, scene 1, line 290.
William Shakespeare , Julius Cæsar (1599), Act IV, scene 3, line 86.
William Shakespeare , Love's Labour's Lost (c. 1595-6), Act V, scene 2, line 759.
William Shakespeare , The Merchant of Venice (late 1590s), Act I, scene 3, line 134.
William Shakespeare , The Merchant of Venice (late 1590s), Act I, scene 3, line 139.
William Shakespeare , A Midsummer Night's Dream (c. 1595-96), Act III, scene 2, line 211.
William Shakespeare , Much Ado About Nothing (1598-99), Act II, scene 1, line 182.
Attributed to William Shakespeare , Passionate Pilgrim . In Notes and Queries, June, 1918, p. 174, it is suggested that the lines are by Barnfield, being a piracy from Jaggard's publication (1599), a volume containing little of Shakespeare, the majority being pieces by Marlowe, Raleigh, Barnfield, and others.
William Shakespeare , Timon of Athens (date uncertain, published 1623), Act I, scene 1, line 100.
William Shakespeare , Timon of Athens (date uncertain, published 1623), Act I, scene 2, line 240.
William Shakespeare , Timon of Athens (date uncertain, published 1623), Act II, scene 2, line 191.
William Shakespeare , Troilus and Cressida (c. 1602), Act II, scene 3, line 110.
Spoken by Jean-Luc Picard , in Star Trek: The Next Generation episode " Pen Pals " (1 May 1989) by Hannah Louise Shearer
Sigismund, Holy Roman Emperor , reported in The Sociable Story-Teller (Boston: James French, 1846), p. 15.
This quote is often misattributed to Abraham Lincoln .
Sirach 6:14-15 ( New American Bible ).
Ben Sirach , Ecclesiasticus : Wisdom of Sirach 27:16-21
Proverbs 17:17 (NRSV).
Proverbs 18:24 (New International Version).
Proverbs 27:6 (NASB).
John Lancaster Spalding , Aphorisms and Reflections (1901), p. 22
John Lancaster Spalding , Aphorisms and Reflections (1901), p. 89
Stone Temple Pilots in "Still Remains" on Purple (1994).
Sumerian proverb , Collection XI at The Electronic Text Corpus of Sumerian Literature , 3rd millennium BCE .
Publilius Syrus Maxim 34
Terence , Eunuchus , Act V, scene 2, 34, line 873.
Terence , Adelphoe ( The Brothers ), Act V, scene 3, line 18 (803).
Tiruvalluvar , Tirukkural: 784 .

Donald Trump , An Interview with Rona Barrett (1980)
Vauvenargues , Reflections and Maxims , E. Lee, trans. (1903), p. 175
The wicked have only accomplices, the voluptuous have only companions in debauchery; self-seekers have only associates; politicians have only their factions; the generality of idle men has only connections; princes have only courtiers; virtuous men alone possess friends.
Voltaire , Dictionnaire philosophique , “Amitié”
Horace Walpole , in a letter from Strawberry Hill , May 27, 1776, to Sir Horace Mann, 1st Baronet , as quoted in Greenwood, Alice Drayton, ed (1914). Select Letters of Horace Walpole . London: G. Bell & Sons. p. 320.
George Washington , Letter to Bushrod Washington (15 January 1783).
Oscar Wilde , The Picture of Dorian Gray (1891), Ch. 1.
Oscar Wilde , The Soul of Man under Socialism (1891).
Virginia Woolf , The Waves (1931), Ch. 7.
Others because you did not keep
William Butler Yeats , “A Deep-sworn Vow”
William Butler Yeats , The Municipal Gallery Re-Visited .
Edward Young , Love of Fame (1725-28), Satire I.
Edward Young , Night Thoughts (1742-1745), Night II, line 571.
Edward Young , Night Thoughts (1742-1745), Night VIII, line 704.
Roger Zelazny , Lord of Light (1967).
Zig Ziglar as quoted in The Power of Respect : Benefit from the Most Forgotten Element of Success (2009) by Deborah Norville, p. 65

Respectfully Quoted: A Dictionary of Quotations (1989) [ edit ]

Esther M. Clark , "A Plea," lines 1 and 2, Verses by a Commonplace Person (1906).
Anne S. Eaton , "The Business of Friendship," lines 1–4. Seth Parker, Fireside Poems, p. 34 (1933).
Elbert Hubbard , The Note Book of Elbert Hubbard, opposite p. 176 (1927).
Thomas Jefferson , letter to Maria Cosway, October 12, 1786. The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Julian P. Boyd, vol. 10, p. 449–50 (1954).
Abraham Lincoln , speech delivered at the close of the Republican state convention, which named him the candidate for the United States Senate, Springfield, Illinois, June 16, 1858. The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, ed. Roy P. Basler, vol. 2, p. 468–69 (1953).
Attributed to Abraham Lincoln . Reported as unverified in Respectfully Quoted: A Dictionary of Quotations (1989).
William Butler Yeats , "The Municipal Gallery Revisited," lines 54–55, The Variorum Edition of the Poems of W. B. Yeats, ed. Peter Allt and Russell K. Alspach, p. 604 (1957). Senator George McGovern quoted these words of Yeats's in his concession speech following the 1972 presidential election.

Hoyt's New Cyclopedia Of Practical Quotations [ edit ]

Joseph Addison , The Campaign , line 102.
George Bancroft , History of the United States , William Penn's Treaty with the Indians .
Beowulf , VII.
Arthur Benson , The Gift .
Robert Blair , The Grave , line 87.
Robert Browning , Paracelsus , scene 5.
Robert Browning , Saul , Stanza 7.
Robert Burns , Auld Lang Syne .
Robert Burns , Auld Lang Syne . Burns refers to these words as an old folk song. Early version in James Watson's Collection of Scottish Songs (1711).
From an old poem by Robert Ayton of Kincaldie
Allan Ramsay's Version. See his Tea-Table Miscellany (1724). Transferred after to Johnson's Musical Museum. See S. J. A. Fitzgerald's Stories of Famous Songs.
Robert Burns , Tam o' Shanter .
Lord Byron , Bride of Abydos (1813), Canto I, Stanza 11.
Lord Byron , L'Amitié est l'Amour sans Ailes , Stanza 1.
Lord Byron , lines addressed to the Rev. J. T. Becher, Stanza 7.
Thomas Campbell , Gertrude of Wyoming , Part III, Stanza 33.
George Canning , The New Morality .
Lady Carew , Marian .
Charles Churchill , The Apology , line 19.
Charles Churchill , Conference , line 297.
Cicero , De Finibus . Yonge's translation.
Friendship makes prosperity brighter, while it lightens adversity by sharing its griefs and anxieties.
Cicero , De Amicitia , VI.
It is a common saying that many pecks of salt must be eaten before the duties of friendship can be discharged.
Cicero , De Amicitia , XIX.
Samuel Taylor Coleridge , Youth and Age .
Charles Caleb Colton , Lacon , p. 80.
Let us be friends, Cinna, it is I who invite you to be so.
Pierre Corneille , Cinna , V. 3.
William Cowper , On Friendship , 169.
Dinah Craik , Thirty Years , A Christmas Blessing .
Simon Dach , Annie of Tharaw . Longfellow's trans, line 7.
Chance makes our parents, but choice makes our friends.
Jacques Delille , Pitié
Friends, those relations that one makes for one's self.
Eustache Deschamps , L'Ami .
Charles Dickens , Dombey and Son , Volume I, Chapter XV.
Charles Dickens, Old Curiosity Shop , Chapter II.
Charles Dickens, Old Curiosity Shop , Chapter VII.
Charles Dickens , The Life and Adventures of Nicholas Nickleby (1838–1839), Chapter 3.
John Dryden , The Hind and the Panther (1687), Part III, line 47.
John Dryden , Epistle to Congreve , line 72.
Helen Blackwood, Baroness Dufferin and Claneboye , Lament of the Irish Emigrant .
Ecclesiasticus, IX. 10.
Richard Edwards , The Paradise of Dainty Devices , No. 42, Stanza 1.
George Eliot , Mr. Gilfil's Love-Story , Chapter VII.
George Eliot, Daniel Deronda (1876), Book IV, Chapter XXXII.
George Eliot , Spanish Gypsy .
Sarah Stickney Ellis , Pictures of Private Life , Second Series, The Pains of Pleasing , Chapter IV.
Ralph Waldo Emerson , Considerations by the Way .
Ralph Waldo Emerson , Essays , Behavior.
Ralph Waldo Emerson , Essays , Of Friendship
John H. Frere , The Rovers , Act I.
John Gay , The Hare with Many Friends .
John Gay , Old Woman and Her Cats .
John Gay , Old Woman and Her Cats , Part I.
John Gay , Shepherd's Dog and the Wolf , line 33.
He who does not see the whole world in his friends, does not deserve that the world should hear of him.
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe , Torquato Tasso , I. 3. 68.
Oliver Goldsmith , Edwin and Angelina, or The Hermit , Stanza 19.
Thomas Gray , The Bard , Stanza 3.
Thomas Gray , On a Favourite Cat Drowned , Stanza 6.
J. C. and A. W. Hare, Guesses at Truth .
J. M. Harvey , On a Friend .
George Herbert , Jacula Prudentum (1651).
George Stillman Hillard , On Death of Motley .
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr. , Songs of Many Seasons , Our Classmate, F. W. C. , 1864.
Homer , The Iliad , Book IX, line 725. Pope's translation.
Homer , The Iliad , Book XVI, line 267. Pope's translation.
To have a great man for an intimate friend seems pleasant to those who have never tried it; those who have, fear it.
Horace , Epistles , I. 18. 86.
Horace , Of the Art of Poetry , line 486. Wentworth Dillon's translation.
Helen Hunt Jackson , My New Friend .
Samuel Johnson , reported in James Boswell , Life of Johnson (1755).
Samuel Johnson , Friendship , An Ode .
Samuel Johnson , Rasselas , Chapter XLVI.
Samuel Johnson , Life of Samuel Johnson (1791), Vol IV. March 20, 1782.
Ben Jonson , Cynthia's Revels, Act III, scene 2.
John Keble , Burial of the Dead , Stanza 11.
Jean de La Bruyère , The Characters or Manners of the Present Age (1688), Chapter V.
Charles Lamb , The Old Familiar Faces .
Abraham Lincoln , Letter to Joseph Gillespie (13 July 1849).
Abraham Lincoln , Reply to Missouri Committee of Seventy (1864).
Henry Wadsworth Longfellow , Judas Maccabæus , Act IV, scene 3, line 32.
Henry Wadsworth Longfellow , Masque of Pandora , Tower of Prometheus on Mount Caucasus , Part III, line 74.
Henry Wadsworth Longfellow , New England Tragedies ; John Endicott , Act IV, scene 1.
He who advises you to be reserved to your friends wishes to betray you without witnesses.
Juan Manuel, Prince of Villena in Tales of Count Lucanor (1575).
There is no friendship between those associated in power; he who rules will always be impatient of an associate.
Marcus Annaeus Lucanus , Pharsalia. I. 92.
John Lyly , Euphues .
George Lyttelton, 1st Baron Lyttelton , Advice to a Lady , Stanza 2.
George MacDonald , The Marquis of Lossie (1877).
Claude Mermet , Epigram on Friends .
Molière , Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme, Act IV, scene 1.
F. Frankfort Moore , A Trial Marriage , p. 9
Thomas Moore , Oh, call it by some better Name.
William Morris , Dream of John Ball , Chapter IV.
Caroline E. S. Norton We Have Been Friends .
The vulgar herd estimate friendship by its advantages.
Ovid , Epistolæ Ex Ponto , II. 3. 8.
As the yellow gold is tried in fire, so the faith of friendship must be seen in adversity.
Ovid , Tristium , I. 5. 25.
The rest of the crowd were friends of my fortune, not of me.
Ovid , Tristium , I. 5. 34.
Idea found in Plautus , Stich , IV. 1. 16. Ovid , Epigram ex Ponto , II. 3. 23. Ovid , Trist. I. 9. 5. Ennius , Cic. Amicit , Chapter XVII. Metastasio , Olimpiade , III. 3. Johann Gottfried Herder , Denksprüche . Pedro Calderón de la Barca , Secret in Words , Act III, scene 3. Menander , Ex Incest. Comoed , p. 272. Aristotle , Ethics VIII. 4. Euripides , Hecuba , line 1226.
What is thine is mine, and all mine is thine.
Plautus , Trinummus , II. 2. 47.
Alexander Pope , reported in Johnson's Lives of the Poets ; Life of Pope .
Alexander Pope, Epistle to Robert, Earl of Oxford .
Proverbs, XVIII. 24.
Proverbs, XXVII. 6.
Proverbs, XXVII. 17.
Psalms. XLI. 9.
James Rachels , The Elements of Moral Philosophy , 1986.
Roxburghe Ballads. The Bride's Good-Morrow . Ed. by John Payne Collier.
To desire the same things and to reject the same things, constitutes true friendship.
Sallust , Catilina , XX. From Catiline's Oration to his Associates.
2 Samuel. 1:23.
Friedrich Schiller , Votive Tablets , Friend and Foe .
Friendship always benefits; love sometimes injures.
Seneca the Younger , Epistolæ Ad Lucilium , XXXV.
Sir Philip Sidney , Friend's Passion for his Astrophel . Attributed also to Spenser and Roydon.
Sydney Smith , in Lady Holland's Memoir (1855) , p. 257; "Let us swear an eternal friendship. Poetry of the Anti-Jacobin. The Rovers".
Sydney Smith , Lady Holland's Memoir (1855), "Of Friendship".
Sophocles , Œdipus Tyrannis . Oxford translation. Revised by Buckley.
Sophocles , Philoctetes . Oxford translation. Revised by Buckley.
Thomas Southerne , To Mr. Congreve on the Old Bachelor , last lines.
Robert Louis Stevenson , Underwoods , It's an Owercome Sooth .
Jonathan Swift , Polite Conversation (c. 1738), Dialogue II.
Unless you bear with the faults of a friend you betray your own.
Syrus , Maxims .
A friend must not be injured, even in jest.
Reprove your friends in secret, praise them openly.
Jeremy Taylor , A Discourse of the Nature, Measures, and Offices of Friendship .
Alfred Tennyson , In Memoriam A.H.H. (1849), LXXXV.
Alfred Tennyson, The Princess (1847), IV, line 279.
Of my friends I am the only one I have left.
Terence , Phormio , IV. 1. 21.
Faithful Achates (companion of Æneas).
Virgil , Æneid (29-19 BC), VI. 158.
Attributed to Claude Louis Hector de Villars on taking leave of Louis XIV
George Washington , Social Maxims , Friendship .
George Washington , Social Maxims , Friendship , Actions, not Words .
John Greenleaf Whittier , Lucy Hooper .
William Wycherley , The Plain Dealer , Prologue.
Edward Young , Night Thoughts (1742-1745), Night II, line 582.

Dictionary of Burning Words of Brilliant Writers (1895) [ edit ]

Dr. Thomas Arnold , p. 254.
Robert Hall , p. 254.
M. Hulburd, p. 255.
Charles Mildway, p. 255.
Jeremy Taylor , p. 254.

How Friendship Helps Us Transcend Ourselves

With good friends, as with great art, our sense of the world is challenged and transformed.

By Megan O’Grady

STORIES OF FRIENDSHIPS between artists are often told as love stories: the chance meeting, the electric first encounter, the mysterious mutual recognition that would change everything. That summer day in 1967 when Robert Mapplethorpe ran into Patti Smith in a New York City bookstore, both 20-year-olds craving beauty and immortality — “I thought to myself that he contained an entire universe I just had to know,” Smith wrote in her 2010 memoir, “ Just Kids .” The afternoon in 1940 when a teenage James Baldwin knocked on the door of Beauford Delaney’s Greenwich Village studio (“the first walking, living proof, for me, that a Black man could be an artist,” Baldwin wrote in his 1985 essay “ The Price of a Ticket ” of meeting the painter). But lightning doesn’t always strike on initial acquaintance. In a 1917 diary entry, a 35-year-old Virginia Woolf didn’t mince words in her impression of the New Zealand-born Modernist writer Katherine Mansfield at a dinner party: “She stinks like a … civet cat that had taken to streetwalking.” Despite Mansfield’s shocking “commonness,” Woolf went on, “when this diminishes, she is so intelligent and inscrutable that she repays friendship.”

Woolf couldn’t have known then how quickly that seed of admiration for Mansfield, who was younger and, at the time, a more established writer, would grow, and how much she would cherish their conversations and letters, passionately intellectual exchanges in which they hashed out their literary ideals. In 1918, Woolf’s own Hogarth Press published “ Prelude ,” Mansfield’s masterpiece about an uprooted New Zealand family, in which the point of view floats between the characters’ consciousnesses. And so it pained Woolf when Mansfield fell silent, and even more so when her erstwhile friend authored a tepid review of Woolf’s second novel, “ Night and Day ,” in 1919. Mansfield wrote that a new world order put new demands on authors, obliging them to forge “new expressions new molds for our new thoughts and feelings” — implying that Woolf had failed to do just that. To Woolf’s credit, once the sting had faded, she sought an explanation from her friend. Her next novel, “ Jacob’s Room ” (1922), marked her transition to the fragmented, interior style she’s become known for, followed by “ Mrs. Dalloway ” (1925) and “ To the Lighthous e” (1927): novels in which World War I looms perceptibly, the violence off-page finding its echoes within the characters.

I’ve come to believe that friendship — not the Facebook kind, but the real kind — is a kind of romance, and that its resilience to such unadorned truths is its test of strength. (“Better be a nettle in the side of your friend, than his echo,” as Ralph Waldo Emerson put it.) At the same time, a real friend can also be counted on to tenderly shelter our idealism in a transactional world: That person who might help us believe, against all odds, in our own consequence as we go about the delicate business of composing a self — an act of imagination in large part, after all. The moral anxiety of any creative practice — standing, as it does, uncredentialed and fiscally insecure, in dubious relation to necessity — can be acute, and it does something to you when someone else believes in you. I think of Margery Williams’s 1922 children’s book, “ The Velveteen Rabbit ,” in which a young boy’s devotion makes the titular stuffed animal believe itself to be real — despite what the rabbits in the forest, the kind that hop nimbly about on their hind legs, might say. We all know the pain of having our dreams dispelled by things like pedestrian day jobs, student loans, family obligations and amiable philistines. An artist’s self-conception depends on the durability of our private mythologies, our sense of the possible ignited by those who believe in it, and in us.

According to Smith, her connection with Mapplethorpe felt destined, rooted in their sense of themselves as outsiders — and their mutual determination to forge alternative lives in art. (Smith and Mapplethorpe were lovers, too, even while the latter was coming to terms with being gay; their friendship flourished long after its erotic aspect ended.) “By his example,” Smith wrote in her memoir, published nearly two decades after Mapplethorpe’s death, “I understood that what matters is the work: the string of words propelled by God becoming a poem, the weave of color and graphite scrawled upon the sheet that magnifies his motion. To achieve within the work a perfect balance of faith and execution.” That faith and discipline got them through the lean years: the cockroaches in their shared apartment, the stale bread for dinner. In my favorite passage in the book, Smith recalls how they’d take turns seeing museum exhibitions, saving up for a single ticket. “One day we’ll go in together, and the work will be ours,” he told her. It was Mapplethorpe, of course, who shot the cover of her 1975 debut album, “ Horses ,” on which Smith appears, instantly iconic, in a crisp white shirt with the French cuffs cut off (“Make sure it’s clean,” he’d told her).

Baldwin, the stepson of a preacher, found in Delaney an alternative father figure and model of perseverance and integrity, not to mention courage; Baldwin, in turn, inspired Delaney with his social conscience and commitment to civil rights causes — and perhaps, in later years, when Delaney’s mental health began to fray, a steadying hand. In an oft-quoted passage from a 1984 interview in “The Paris Review,” Baldwin recalled standing on a street corner in the Village with Delaney, waiting for the light to change: “He pointed down and said, ‘Look.’ I looked and all I saw was water. And he said, ‘Look again,’ which I did, and I saw oil on the water and the city reflected in the puddle. It was a great revelation to me. I can’t explain it. He taught me how to see, and how to trust what I saw. Painters have often taught writers how to see. And once you’ve had that experience, you see differently.”

To think of the people who have taught me to see the world in a way less filtered — that is, to trust what I see rather than altering my view to appease or cater to expectation — is to think of the people I’ve come to depend on most to level with me. To be unlocked from the prison of one’s subjectivity is surely rare, mimicking our best encounters with art itself: the shock of recognition in another’s thoughts, turns of phrase, perspectives. Stories like these make me believe that genuine creative communion between people is possible. Think of Cy Twombly and Sally Mann , artists of different generations and genre who found a common pull in their hometown, Lexington, Va., far from urban art circles. Or Man Ray and Marcel Duchamp , initially lacking a common language but recognizing at once their shared passion for mischief. Sometimes, such a bond can be literally lifesaving: In 1967, Robert Rauschenberg flew to the Denver hospital where his friend and collaborator the dance visionary Yvonne Rainer was recovering from emergency bowel surgery. When she was finally released, he put Rainer up for her long convalescence. Where health insurance failed, friendship stepped in.

THE MYTH OF the solitary creative genius dies hard, and yet the story of Western art and letters is largely told in schools, groups and movements. From the Impressionists to the Harlem Renaissance, Fluxus to the Hairy Who, the L.A. Rebellion to Act Up , our aesthetic history is founded on shared sensibilities and inside jokes, on heated debates over dinner parties, on the common desire to burn down the house of our elders. We read their letters and diaries and manifestoes, observing the hand they had in the creation of their own legacies, and they become as real to us as the characters in their novels or plays or films. Even Emerson, of all people, known for his championing of self-reliance and solitary contemplation, believed that “our intellectual and active powers increase with our affection,” as he declared in his 1841 essay “Friendship.” “The scholar sits down to write, and all his years of meditation do not furnish him with one good thought or happy expression, but it is necessary to write a letter to a friend, and, forthwith, troops of gentle thoughts invest themselves, on every hand, with chosen words.” It’s hard to imagine Emerson existing in literary history in quite the same way without Henry David Thoreau, his friend, fellow Transcendentalist, and disciple; in the same way, it’s hard to imagine Romy without Michele, Frog without Toad, Charlie Brown without Linus van Pelt or Thelma without Louise.

I think of Emerson’s words whenever I find myself on deadline, dashing off an email to a friend rather than getting down to business. Art, like a conversation with a friend, opens a space for a certain kind of reflection, in which we might draw a line between the world and ourselves. And while the legendary bromances are justifiable in their fame — Willem de Kooning and Jackson Pollock or Andy Warhol and Jean-Michel Basquiat; the rivalrous intellectual exchange seemingly crucial to the other’s great leap forward — it’s the friendships between those people no one expected to become artists in the first place that move me most. I like to imagine the poets Maxine Kumin and Anne Sexton , who met in a writing class in Boston in 1957, casting off their duties as midcentury suburban moms for a few hours while the kids were at school, workshopping the morning’s first drafts on the secret second phone line they’d had installed. That phone line was a lifeline; the voice on the other end an essential affirmation. Friendship, like art, afforded them a powerful opportunity to move margins to the center. It still does: Just read Cathy Park Hong ’s 2020 essay “ An Education ,” about two close friends at Oberlin — all three were the aspiring artist daughters of Asian immigrants, young women intent on making creative work that wasn’t an echo of established white taste. “We were the only ones who demanded that we be artists first,” Hong writes. The essay captures the vertiginous stakes of such alliances, which can feel nothing less than existential.

Stories of friendships between artists are often told as love stories: the chance meeting, the first encounter, the mutual recognition that would change everything.

In the case of Audre Lorde and Pat Parker , poets and public intellectuals, a friendship to a great extent epistolary flourished despite the geographical distance — Lorde was in New York City, Parker in California. In 15 years’ worth of letters, they traded advice, discussed writings and readings (but also things like money and their health) and their sense of purpose as Black, queer feminists, committed in equal measure to lyricism and activism. “We’re both very vulnerable women, Pat,” Lorde wrote to Parker in February 1988, a year before Parker’s death, at 45, of the breast cancer they each were battling. “The fact that we used our vulnerabilities to make our greatest strengths makes us powerful women, not failures. I love you.” At this point, her sentences breaks into verse: “And in case you have ever tried / To reach me / And I could not hear you / These words are in place / Of the dead air / Still / Between us.”

Filled as they are with references to other writer friends and lovers, their letters suggest a truth about friendship that highly crafted memoirs do not: that it operates for most of us as part of a shifting universe of relationships, rather than as a single fixed star. Forget “You are the wind beneath my wings”: The friend who comes over with bags of groceries in a snowstorm after you’ve just delivered a baby isn’t necessarily the same friend who will give you notes on your screenplay; the friend who tells you that you might want to rethink your outfit may not be the one who reminds you who you are after your grant application is rejected. As life as we know it is torn asunder by a pandemic and rampant inequities, as the desperate and disconnected fall prey to rage or to conspiracy theories, we’ve come to depend on each other more than ever.

Another thought: We don’t always appreciate the symbolic position we occupy in each other’s lives until the moment all of that shared history and intimacy come knocking on our doors. This is why we look up old childhood friends to see where the arc of the plot has led. This is why we often experience a close friend’s losses almost as if they were our own: When we bear witness to another life to a degree that they come to feel like an alternate self, a moral responsibility comes attached. This means having to level with your friend when she asks you if you think that her partner, hospitalized with a rare form of brain cancer, is going to make it. It means you listen to them and mourn with them and make the necessary arrangements with them, because sometimes knowing you’re not alone in your grief is the only solace available. Here you are, and you wouldn’t be anyplace else, because it’s entirely possible that the shoe might have been on the other foot, such are the contingencies of fate.

WHILE FRIENDSHIP HAS become a big theme in fiction (this trend is largely credited to Elena Ferrante’s 2012-15 Neapolitan Quartet, though Toni Morrison’s 1973 novel, “ Sula ,” got there first), the subject has long belonged to television. Shows like “Laverne & Shirley” (1977-83), “Will & Grace” (1998-2006), “Living Single” (1993-98) and “Sex and the City” (1998-2004) prepared us for what in the 21st century would be a given: that life was not a sitcom centered around the nuclear family, but that our formative experiences, safety nets, frames of reference and so forth, would be shaped by friends and neighbors and roommates, former classmates and the people with whom we work. Friendship, which creates its own benchmarks, suits the serial quality of television. It goes on for many seasons in different contexts and tones. It doesn’t end in a wedding. “Although only rarely do friends consciously imagine themselves, as lovers regularly do, instruments of one another’s salvation, unconsciously they share a longing that comes pretty close,” Vivian Gornick wrote in a 2008 article for Poetry magazine. Intimacies fail, TV shows are canceled, but something of that other person’s belief in us remains in our rewired emotional DNA.

That so many stories of friendship between artists are written posthumously by the surviving friend, bequeathed with all of those shared memories, accounts for their elegiac tone. If you’re like me, you read them and wonder to what extent our friends really can save us, stepping in where our families and cultures fall short. At a time at which it can feel as though the embers of creativity have been tamped down, or beauty has been gated off by the very wealthy, can art redeem us? The extraordinary body of work left behind by Lorde, Delaney, Woolf, Mapplethorpe, Sexton and so many others who left us sooner than we might have wished suggests that the answer is yes — for a time, with a little help from our friends. The truth is, none of us do it on our own. Transcendence requires human scaffolding; immortality, a benevolent witness: that fellow traveler holding a lantern in a dark wood, telling us like we are.

A Guide to Building and Nurturing Friendships

Friendships are an essential ingredient in a happy life. here’s how to give them the care and attention they deserve..

How does one make meaningful friendships as an adult? Here are some suggestions , useful tools and tips from an expert .

If you are an introvert, it can be hard to reconcile the need for close connections with the urge to cancel social plans. Here is how to find your comfort zone .

A friendship with a sibling can be a lifelong gift. Whether you’ve always been close, or wish you got along better, here’s how to bolster your connection .

All relationships require some work. For your friendships to thrive , focus on your listening skills, compassion and communication. And make sure to spend time together .

American men are in a “friendship recession,” but experts say a few simple strategies can help. One tip? Practice being more vulnerable with your pals .

It’s quite common for people to feel jealousy or envy toward their friends. Luckily, there are ways to turn those emotions into an opportunity for growth.

Being a good friend means offering your support in times of need. Just remember: Sometimes less is better than more .

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17 Conclusion: Friendship: An Echo, a Hurrah, and Other Reflections

Published: November 2016
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This chapter discusses the challenge of finding a single definition of friendship, suggesting that scholars take a prototype approach to defining it. Friendships are often beneficial to well-being but can also painfully undermine it. In trying to answer the question of when friendships are beneficial and when they are detrimental, a perspective is needed that takes into account four categories of factors: individual, dyadic, network, and contextual/environmental. Since the 1960s shifts have occurred in the dominant theoretical perspectives used for studying friendship. Looking ahead, research should study more diverse populations, examine the interplay between friendships and technology, and enhance the methods used to study friendships. The chapter suggests the value of having a broad theory for understanding friendship, possibly focusing on two developmental directions: (1) the arc of friendship from initiation to decline and (2) friendship across the life span.

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Importance of Friends in our Life for Students and Children

500+ words essay importance of friends in our life.

When we are born, we get associated with our family by blood relation. However, there is a relation, which we choose ourselves. That relation is a friend. Friends make our life beautiful. The adventure of life becomes beautiful when good friends surround us. We all belong to a family, where we have our parents, grandparents, siblings, cousins, etc. We get immense love, care, attention and guidance from our family. However, our entire life does not revolve around our family members only. We all have our own purpose in life. Some members of our family go to school, some go to college, and our parents go to work. We all have a life outside our family. No journey of life seems interesting when traveled alone. We tend to make friends outside our family boundaries as that makes all life activities enjoyable.

Friends are Essential in Every Sphere of Life

We connect very quickly with people with whom our interests match. Infants are playful by nature. They always look for the company with whom the can play and explore their curious nature. Hence, when they meet any other infant of their age they connect easily over their common interest of playing.

In school, we make friends over our common interests. For example, students who like playing sports like cricket connect quickly and they become friends. Friends meet and discuss their common interests and nurture their interests together. Friends in school help each other in understanding the class activities, and homework. They often exchange notes and reference materials among themselves.

During our college life, we get independence in taking many decisions on our own. Also, many live in a hostel and are hence away from their family. Studying together, staying together, nurturing interest together, adjusting to conflicts with each other, helping each other all these makes the bond of friendship stronger.

A friend highlights mistakes and guides us in many ways. They also motivate us to realize our full potential. Also, we can easily discuss and share such issues and thoughts with our friends which we cannot share with our parents.

In our professional life also, friends also help us handle failure positively and multiply our joy of success. During midlife, we have huge responsibilities for family, job, etc. Discussing professional and personal stress with our friends makes us feel relaxed. They are our mental support and when we are in crisis, a good friend joins hand and helps in solving the problem.

Because of the nuclear family structure of the current society in old age, people mostly stay alone. Friends hang out and travel together to explore various places and enjoy several hobbies together. Friends thus eliminate boredom and loneliness from life. They add color to life. They become big support for any help needed.

Get the huge list of more than 500 Essay Topics and Ideas

Famous Friendship stories

In history, we get examples of many friendship stories, which shows the importance of friend in life. From the stories of Lord Krishna and Arjun, Ram and Sugreev, Lord Krishna and Sudama, Duryodhan and Karn it shows that friends have always been a person who helps and supports us. They help us come out of distress and grow in life.

Friendship is not only between two people. We become friends with animals around us. Hence, we tend to keep pets. Pets eliminate boredom and stress from our life. Spending time with pets give us immense joy.

Animals also become friends among themselves. They also help and support each other in the process of survival and existence. The biggest example of the need of friend among animals is there in the story Lion and the Mouse where they both help each other come out of difficult situations.

In our lifetime we choose our own friends. The journey of life becomes memorable because of friends. Friendship is a lovely relation without which life seems dull. It is the relationship with our friends that teaches us to share, love, care and most importantly helps us to fight odds and be successful. Having true friends acts as a boon. Friends increase the sense of belongingness and generate a feel-good factor. We all thrive and look for at least one that friend who at times criticizes and appreciates too. Emotional and psychological attachments are important and can only be experienced with friends.

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Sharing the human spirit through friendship

Our world faces many challenges, crises and forces of division — such as poverty, violence, and human rights abuses — among many others — that undermine peace, security, development and social harmony among the world's peoples.

To confront those crises and challenges, their root causes must be addressed by promoting and defending a shared spirit of human solidarity that takes many forms — the simplest of which is friendship.

Through friendship — by accumulating bonds of camaraderie and developing strong ties of trust — we can contribute to the fundamental shifts that are urgently needed to achieve lasting stability, weave a safety net that will protect us all, and generate passion for a better world where all are united for the greater good.

The International Day of Friendship was proclaimed in 2011 by the UN General Assembly with the idea that friendship between peoples, countries, cultures and individuals can inspire peace efforts and build bridges between communities.

The resolution places emphasis on involving young people, as future leaders, in community activities that include different cultures and promote international understanding and respect for diversity.

To mark the International Day of Friendship the UN encourages governments, international organizations and civil society groups to hold events, activities and initiatives that contribute to the efforts of the international community towards promoting a dialogue among civilizations, solidarity, mutual understanding and reconciliation.

The International Day of Friendship is an initiative that follows on the proposal made by UNESCO defining the Culture of Peace as a set of values, attitudes and behaviours that reject violence and endeavour to prevent conflicts by addressing their root causes with a view to solving problems. It was then adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1997.

quote goes here… Secretary-General's Message

Actions to Promote a Culture of Peace

foster a culture of peace through education;
promote sustainable economic and social development;
promote respect for all human rights;
ensure equality between women and men;
foster democratic participation;
advance understanding, tolerance and solidarity;
support participatory communication and the free flow of information and knowledge;
promote international peace and security.

BTS 💜 show the power of love and kindness

©United Nations/Political and Peacebuilding Affairs

Essential Readings

International Day of Friendship (General Assembly resolution)
Culture of Peace (General Assembly resolution)
Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace
International Day of Peace (General Assembly resolution)
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief
UNESCO : Culture of Peace and Non-violence
UNICEF : Friendship: Something to Remember

Related Observances

World Day of Social Justice
International Day of Happiness
International Day of Conscience
International Day of Families
International Day of Living Together in Peace
World Day for Cultural Diversity for Dialogue and Development
International Day of Peace
International Day for Tolerance
International Human Solidarity Day

an abstract illustration of people engaged in an event

Why do we mark International Days?

International days and weeks are occasions to educate the public on issues of concern, to mobilize political will and resources to address global problems, and to celebrate and reinforce achievements of humanity. The existence of international days predates the establishment of the United Nations, but the UN has embraced them as a powerful advocacy tool. We also mark other UN observances .

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Friendship is a term used to denote co-operative and supportive behavior between two or more people. In this sense, the term connotes a relationship which involves mutual knowledge , esteem , and affection and respect along with a degree of rendering service to friends in times of need or crisis. Friends will welcome each other's company and exhibit loyalty towards each other, often to the point of altruism . Their tastes will usually be similar and may converge, and they will share enjoyable activities. They will also engage in mutually helping behavior , such as exchange of advice and the sharing of hardship. A friend is someone who may often demonstrate reciprocating and reflective behaviors . Yet for many, friendship is nothing more than the trust that someone or something will not harm them.

Value that is found in friendships is often the result of a friend demonstrating the following on a consistent basis:

the tendency to desire what is best for the other ,
sympathy and empathy ,
honesty , perhaps in situations where it may be difficult for others to speak the truth , especially in terms of pointing out the perceived faults of one's counterpart,
mutual understanding .

In a comparison of personal relationships , friendship is considered to be closer than association, although there is a range of degrees of intimacy in both friendships and associations. Friendship and association can be thought of as spanning across the same continuum. The study of friendship is included in sociology , anthropology , philosophy , and zoology . Various theories of friendship have been proposed, among which are social psychology , social exchange theory , equity theory , relational dialectics , and attachment styles . See Interpersonal relationships

[ edit ] Friendship in history

Friendship is considered one of the central human experiences, and has been sanctified by all major religions. The Epic of Gilgamesh , a Babylonian poem that is among the earliest known literary works in history, chronicles in great depth the friendship between Gilgamesh and Enkidu . The Greco-Roman had, as paramount examples, the friendship of Orestes and Pylades , and, in Virgil 's Aeneid , the friendship of Euryalus and Nisus . The Abrahamic faiths have the story of David and Jonathan . Friendship played an important role in German Romanticism . A good example for this is Schiller's Die Bürgschaft . The Christian Gospels state that Jesus Christ declared, "Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends."(John 15:13).

In philosophy, Aristotle is known for his discussion (in the Nicomachean Ethics ) of philia , which is usually (somewhat misleadingly) translated as "friendship," and certainly includes friendship, though is a much broader concept.

[ edit ] Cultural variations

A group of friends consists of two or more people who are in a mutually pleasing relationship engendering a sentiment of camaraderie, exclusivity, and mutual trust. There are varying degrees of "closeness" between friends. Hence, some people choose to differentiate and categorize friendships based on this sentiment.

[ edit ] Rome

Cicero had his own beliefs on friendship. Cicero believed that in order to have a true friendship with someone there must be all honesty and truth. If there isn’t, then this isn’t a true friendship. In that case, friends must be one hundred percent honest with each other and put one hundred percent of their trust in the other person. Cicero also believed that for people to be friends with another person, they must do things without the expectation that their friend will have to repay them. He also believes that if a friend is about to do something wrong, and something that goes against your morals, you shouldn’t compromise your morals. You must explain why what they are going to do is wrong, and help them to see what the right thing to do is, because Cicero believes that ignorance is the cause of evil. Finally the last thing that Cicero believed was that the reason that a friendship comes to an end is because one person in that friendship has become bad. (On Friendship, Cicero)

[ edit ] Russia

The relationship is constructed differently in different cultures. In Russia , for example, one typically accords very few people the status of "friend". These friendships, however, make up in intensity what they lack in number. Friends are entitled to call each other by their first names alone, and to use diminutives . A norm of polite behaviour is addressing "acquaintances" by full first name plus patronymic . These could include relationships which elsewhere would be qualified as real friendships, such as workplace relationships of long standing, neighbors with whom one shares an occasional meal and visit, and so on. Physical contact between friends was expected, and friends, whether or not of the same sex, would embrace, sometimes kiss and walk in public with their arms around each other, or arm-in-arm, or hand-in-hand.

[ edit ] Asia

In the Middle East and Central Asia , male friendships, while less restricted than in Russia, tend also to be reserved and respectable in nature. They may use nick names and diminutive forms of their first names.

[ edit ] Modern west

In the Western world , intimate physical contact has been sexualized in the public mind over the last one hundred years and is considered almost taboo in friendship, especially between two males. However, stylized hugging or kissing may be considered acceptable, depending on the context (see, for example, the kiss the tramp gives the kid in The Kid ). In Spain and other Mediterranean countries, men may embrace each other in public and kiss each other on the cheek. This is not limited solely to older generations but rather is present throughout all generations. In young children throughout the modern Western world, friendship, usually of a homosocial nature, typically exhibits elements of a closeness and intimacy suppressed later in life in order to conform to societal standards.

[ edit ] Decline of friendships in the U.S.

According to a 2006 study documented in the journal the American Sociological Review , Americans are thought to be suffering a loss in the quality and quantity of close friendships since at least 1985. [ 1 ] The study states 25% of Americans have no close confidants, and the average total number of confidants per citizen has dropped from four to two.

According to the study:

Americans' dependence on family as a safety net went up from 57% to 80%
Americans' dependence on a partner or spouse went up from 5% to 9%
Research has found a link between fewer friendships (especially in quality) and psychological and physiological regression

In recent times, it is postulated modern American friendships have lost the force and importance they had in antiquity. C. S. Lewis for example, in his The Four Loves , writes:

Likewise, Paul Halsall claims that:

Mark McLelland, writing in the Western Buddhist Review under his Buddhist name of Dharmachari Jñanavira (Article), more directly points to homophobia being at the root of a modern decline in the western tradition of friendship:

Hence, in our cultural context where homosexual desire has for centuries been considered sinful, unnatural and a great evil, the experience of homoerotic desire can be very traumatic for some individuals and severely limit the potential for same-sex friendship. The Danish sociologist Henning Bech, for instance, writes of the anxiety which often accompanies developing intimacy between male friends:

Their opinion that fear of being, or being seen as, homosexual has killed off western man's ability to form close friendships with other men is shared by Japanese psychologist Doi Takeo, who claims that male friendships in American society are fraught with homosexual anxiety and thus homophobia is a limiting factor stopping men from establishing deep friendships with other men.

The suggestion that friendship contains an ineluctable element of erotic desire is not new, but has been advanced by students of friendship ever since the time of the ancient Greeks, where it comes up in the writings of Plato. More recently, the Austrian philosopher Otto Weininger claimed that:

Recent western scholarship in gender theory and feminism concurs, as reflected in the writings of Eve Sedgwick in her The Epistemology of the Closet, and Jonathan Dollimore in his Sexual Dissidence and Cultural Change: Augustine to Wilde, Freud to Foucault.

[ edit ] Developmental issues

In the sequence of the emotional development of the individual, friendships come after parental bonding and before the pair bonding engaged in at the approach of maturity. In the intervening period between the end of early childhood and the onset of full adulthood, friendships are often the most important relationships in the emotional life of the adolescent , and are often more intense than relationships later in life [ citation needed ] . However making friends seems to trouble lots of people [ citation needed ] ; having no friends can be emotionally damaging in some cases [ citation needed ] . Sometimes going years without a single friend can lead to suicide [ citation needed ] , however, this affects men more then women. Friendships do not play key role in suicidal thoughts of boys. [ 2 ] A long time of friendship may also result in marriage; too much friendship is followed by a compromise [ citation needed ] .

A study by researchers from Purdue University found that post secondary education (e.g. university) friendships last longer than the friendships before it. [ citation needed ]

[ edit ] Types of friendships

Best friend (or close friend ): a person(s) with whom someone shares extremely strong interpersonal ties with as a friend.

Acquaintance : a friend, but sharing of emotional ties isn't present. An example would be a coworker with whom you enjoy eating lunch, but would not look to for emotional support.

Soulmate : the name given to someone who is considered the ultimate, true, and eternal half of the other's soul, in which the two are now and forever meant to be together.

Pen pal : people who have a relationship via postal correspondence. They may or may not have met each other in person and may share either love, friendship, or simply an acquaintance between each other.

Internet friendship : a form of friendship or romance which takes place over the Internet .

Comrade : means "ally", "friend", or "colleague" in a military or (usually) left-wing political connotation. This is the feeling of affinity that draws people together in time of war or when people have a mutual enemy or even a common goal. Friendship can be mistaken for comradeship. Former New York Times war correspondent Chris Hedges wrote:

As a war ends, or a common enemy recedes, many comrades return to being strangers, who lack friendship and have little in common.

Casual relationship or "Friends with benefits" : the sexual or near-sexual and emotional relationship between two people who don't expect or demand to share a formal romantic relationship. In the U.S., this is considered "a fling".

Boston marriage : a term used in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to denote two women that lived together in the same household independent of male support. Relationships were not necessarily sexual. It was used to quell fears of lesbians after World War I .

Blood brother or blood sister : may refer to people related by birth, or a circle of friends who swear loyalty by mingling the blood of each member together.

Open relationship : a relationship, usually between two people, that agree each partner is free to have sexual intercourse with others outside the relationship. When this agreement is made between a married couple, it's called an open marriage .

Roommate : a person who shares a room or apartment (flat) with another person and do not share a familial or romantic relationship.

Imaginary friend : a non-physical friend created by a child. It may be seen as bad behavior or even taboo (some religious parents even consider their child to be possessed by an evil spirit), but is most commonly regarded as harmless, typical childhood behavior. The friend may or may not be human, and commonly serves a protective purpose.

Spiritual friendship : the old buddhist ideal of kalyana-mitra, that is a relationship between friends with a common interest, though one person may have more knowledge and experience than the other. The relationship is the responsibility of both friends and both bring something to it.

[ edit ] Love

[ edit ] Non-personal friendships

Although the term initially described relations between individuals, it is at times used for political purposes to describe relations between states or peoples ("the Franco-German friendship", for example), indicating in this case an affinity or mutuality of purpose between the two nations.

Regarding this aspect of international relations , Lord Palmerston said:

This is often paraphrased as: "Nations have no permanent friends and no permanent enemies. Only permanent interests."

The word "friendship" can be used in political speeches as an emotive modifier.Friendship in international relationships often refers to the quality of historical, existing, or anticipated bilateral relationships.

[ edit ] Interspecies friendship and animal friendship

Friendship as a type of interpersonal relationship is found also among animals with high intelligence [ citation needed ] , such as the higher mammals and some birds. Cross-species friendships are common between humans and domestic animals [ citation needed ] . Less common but noteworthy are friendships between an animal and another animal of a different species [ who? ] , such as a dog and cat.

[ edit ] Bibliography

Aristotle , Nicomachean Ethics
Cicero , Laelius de Amicitia
David Hein, "Farrer on Friendship, Sainthood, and the Will of God" (in Captured by the Crucified: The Practical Theology of Austin Farrer , edited by David Hein and Edward Hugh Henderson. New York and London: Continuum/T. & T. Clark, 2004. 119–48)
John von Heyking and Richard Avramenko (eds.), Friendship and Politics: Essays in Political Thought . Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2008.

[ edit ] See also

Social contact
Friendship network
Human behavior

[ edit ] References

^ USATODAY.com - Study: 25% of Americans have no one to confide in
^ http://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2004-01/osu-fpk010604.php
^ Hedges, Chris ( 2003 - 05-21 ). "Text of the Rockford College graduation speech" . Rockford Register Star . http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/0520-13.htm . Retrieved on 2008-10-25 .
^ Speech to the House of Commons, Hansard (1 March 1848)

[ edit ] Further reading

Strogatz, Steven Henry , "The Calculus of Friendship : what a teacher and a student learned about life while corresponding about math", Princeton : Princeton University Press, 2009. ISBN 9780691134932

[ edit ] External links

BBC Radio 4 series "In Our Time", on Friendship , 2 March 2006
The study of friendships in adolescent development.
Friendship by Paramhansa Yogananda
Worldwide Friendship Network.
Friendship at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
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