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Lessons learned: Restricted visibility caused collision incident
Credit: Swedish club
In its latest published Casebook containing safety lessons learned from maritime incidents, the Swedish Club focuses on a collision incident resulted by restricted visibility.
The incident
Vessel A, a 1000 TEU container vessel, was approaching the pilot station at 17 knots. The vessel was in manual steering mode and was on a course of 280°. That afternoon visibility was restricted to approximately 0.1 NM due to fog.
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The Bosun was on deck preparing the pilot ladder after which he would go to the forecastle to act as a lookout.
The Master, the Second Officer and the AB were on the bridge. The Master had the conn, the Second Officer was monitoring, and the AB was on the wheel.
Two ARPA radars were used alternatively on ranges between 6 NM, 3 NM and 1.5 NM. Both the Master and OOW were monitoring the vessel’s progress on the radars.
The Master saw a target on the radar and acquired it on the ARPA as vessel B. The target was 10° on the port bow, 4 NM away with a CPA of 0.2 NM. Vessel A was overtaking vessel B.
It could be seen that if vessel A maintained this course, it could hit vessel B on the starboard side. Vessel B was also on a course of about 280° and making a speed of 6 knots. The Master started the fog signal.
C -15 minutes: Vessel B was on course of 293° and the CPA was 0.14 NM. Vessel A was maintaining its course and speed.
C -10 minutes: Vessel B’s course was 285°, CPA 0.04 NM and distant 1.4 NM.
C -5 minutes: Vessel B’s course was 289°, CPA 0.03 NM and distant 0.65 NM.
C -2 minutes: Vessel B’s course was 304° and CPA 0.01 NM and distant 0.3 NM. Vessel B was still on the port bow of vessel A. At this point the Master on vessel A realised that vessel B was very close and ordered hard to starboard and stop engines.
Collision: It was too late to avoid the collision and vessel A struck vessel B on its starboard side about midships. The Master saw that vessel B was a small tanker. Shortly afterwards vessel B began to list heavily to starboard and the crew were forced to deploy the life rafts and abandon ship. They were all rescued by vessel A.
Lessons learned
- The bridge team on vessel A acquired vessel B on the ARPA at about C -15 minutes. The CPA was 0.14 NM. With such a small CPA this should be considered a close quarter situation. At this point the bridge team had time to make an alteration to ensure the collision was avoided but no action was taken on vessel A.
- When sailing in restricted visibility all vessels have a responsibility to stay clear of each other. All vessels also have a responsibility to proceed at a safe speed which ensures that they can stop quickly. Maintaining full speed in restricted visibility under these navigational circumstances could be considered proceeding at an unsafe speed. Vessel A was approaching a pilot station in restricted visibility which meant there was also an increased risk of encountering a greater concentration of different types of vessels.
- In restricted visibility both vessels have an obligation to stay clear of each other. However, we do not know why vessel B altered to starboard. It is possible vessel B altered course in accordance with their passage plan. Vessel A was overtaking vessel B which required vessel A to stay well clear of vessel B.
- It is important that the officers understand the rules and increased risks when sailing in restricted visibility. It is also important to understand the limitations of the navigation equipment. It appears that the bridge team on vessel A considered a CPA of 0.14 NM to be an acceptable margin. To ensure situational awareness is maintained, the bridge team should discuss all plotted targets, what risks they pose and take appropriate action.
Explore Swedish’s club casebook here
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Real life incident: collision of ships occur due to fog, one vessel sinks.
A loaded bulk carrier, vessel A, was heading 022° in very restricted visibility. The Master and Chief Officer (CO) were in the wheelhouse with a helmsman and lookout. The engine was put on stand-by and the vessel speed was reduced from 13 to about 11 knots. The bridge team noticed a vessel (B) on the radar at a distance of about six nm on a near reciprocal course approaching at a speed of six knots.
The Master ordered a course alteration from 022° to 050°. The distance to vessel B was now 3 nm with a CPA of only 490m. Once on a heading of 050° the Master ordered ‘Steady’.
Related Read: 10 Important Points Ship’s Officer On Watch Should Consider During Restricted Visibility
About this time the CO called vessel B on VHF radio and agreed to a port-to-port meeting, although the communication was hampered by language difficulties and ambiguous statements. Soon after the Master of vessel, A ordered a course of 060°.
A few minutes later vessel B started turning to port, instead of turning to starboard as was expected for a port-to-port passing. The Master on vessel A ordered 070° and then 080°. Shortly thereafter a green light was spotted ahead and they felt the vibration of an impact. The engine was stopped and the alarm sounded. Once the vessels disengaged, vessel B sank while vessel A had water ingress into its forepeak tank.
Related Read: What is Crash Manoeuvring of Ship in Emergency Situation and what’s its Procedure?
Since the vessels were close to shore the local coast guard rendered assistance to the crew of vessel B who had abandoned into a life raft.
Lessons learned
- As per the Colregs, in restricted visibility (Rule 19) avoid altering course to port when there is a vessel forward of the beam.
- Use clear and unambiguous communication when making meeting arrangements with other vessels, especially in restricted visibility.
Related Read: Two Incidents That Prove Improper Communication Leads To Accidents At Sea
- When altering course for collision avoidance use bold course alterations instead of a series of relatively small course changes. This will make your actions more apparent to the other vessel’s bridge team.
Reference: nautinst.org
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