critical thinking vs religious

May 1, 2012

How Critical Thinkers Lose Their Faith in God

Religious belief drops when analytical thinking rises

By Daisy Grewal

Why are some people more religious than others? Answers to this question often focus on the role of culture or upbringing.  While these influences are important, new research suggests that whether we believe may also have to do with how much we rely on intuition versus analytical thinking. In 2011 Amitai Shenhav, David Rand and Joshua Greene of Harvard University published a paper showing that people who have a tendency to rely on their intuition are more likely to believe in God.  They also showed that encouraging people to think intuitively increased people’s belief in God. Building on these findings, in a recent paper published in Science , Will Gervais and Ara Norenzayan of the University of British Columbia found that encouraging people to think analytically reduced their tendency to believe in God. Together these findings suggest that belief may at least partly stem from our thinking styles.

Gervais and Norenzayan’s research is based on the idea that we possess two different ways of thinking that are distinct yet related. Understanding these two ways, which are often referred to as System 1 and System 2, may be important for understanding our tendency towards having religious faith. System 1 thinking relies on shortcuts and other rules-of-thumb while System 2 relies on analytic thinking and tends to be slower and require more effort. Solving logical and analytical problems may require that we override our System 1 thinking processes in order to engage System 2. Psychologists have developed a number of clever techniques that encourage us to do this. Using some of these techniques, Gervais and Norenzayan examined whether engaging System 2 leads people away from believing in God and religion.

For example, they had participants view images of artwork that are associated with reflective thinking (Rodin’s The Thinker) or more neutral images (Discobulus of Myron). Participants who viewed The Thinker reported weaker religious beliefs on a subsequent survey. However, Gervais and Norenzayan wondered if showing people artwork might have made the connection between thinking and religion too obvious. In their next two studies, they created a task that more subtly primed analytic thinking. Participants received sets of five randomly arranged words (e.g. “high winds the flies plane”) and were asked to drop one word and rearrange the others in order to create a more meaningful sentence (e.g. “the plane flies high”). Some of their participants were given scrambled sentences containing words associated with analytic thinking (e.g. “analyze,” “reason”) and other participants were given sentences that featured neutral words (e.g. “hammer,” “shoes”). After unscrambling the sentences, participants filled out a survey about their religious beliefs. In both studies, this subtle reminder of analytic thinking caused participants to express less belief in God and religion. The researchers found no relationship between participants’ prior religious beliefs and their performance in the study. Analytic thinking reduced religious belief regardless of how religious people were to begin with.

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In a final study, Gervais and Norenzayan used an even more subtle way of activating analytic thinking: by having participants fill out a survey measuring their religious beliefs that was printed in either clear font or font that was difficult to read. Prior research has shown that difficult-to-read font promotes analytic thinking by forcing participants to slow down and think more carefully about the meaning of what they are reading. The researchers found that participants who filled out a survey that was printed in unclear font expressed less belief as compared to those who filled out the same survey in the clear font.

These studies demonstrate yet another way in which our thinking tendencies, many of which may be innate, have contributed to religious faith. It may also help explain why the vast majority of Americans tend to believe in God. Since System 2 thinking requires a lot of effort , the majority of us tend to rely on our System 1 thinking processes when possible. Evidence suggests that the majority of us are more prone to believing than being skeptical. According to a 2005 poll by Gallup, 3 out of every 4 Americans hold at least one belief in the paranormal. The most popular of these beliefs are extrasensory perception (ESP), haunted houses, and ghosts. In addition, the results help explain why some of us are more prone to believe that others. Previous research has found that people differ in their tendency to see intentions and causes in the world. These differences in thinking styles could help explain why some of us are more likely to become believers.

Why and how might analytic thinking reduce religious belief? Although more research is needed to answer this question, Gervais and Norenzayan speculate on a few possibilities. For example, analytic thinking may inhibit our natural intuition to believe in supernatural agents that influence the world. Alternatively, analytic thinking may simply cause us to override our intuition to believe and pay less attention to it. It’s important to note that across studies, participants ranged widely in their religious affiliation, gender, and race. None of these variables were found to significantly relate to people’s behavior in the studies.

Gervais and Norenzayan point out that analytic thinking is just one reason out of many why people may or may not hold religious beliefs. In addition, these findings do not say anything about the inherent value or truth of religious beliefs—they simply speak to the psychology of when and why we are prone to believe. Most importantly, they provide evidence that rather than being static, our beliefs can change drastically from situation to situation, without us knowing exactly why.

Are you a scientist who specializes in neuroscience, cognitive science, or psychology? And have you read a recent peer-reviewed paper that you would like to write about? Please send suggestions to Mind Matters editor Gareth Cook, a Pulitzer prize-winning journalist at the Boston Globe. He can be reached at garethideas AT gmail.com or Twitter @garethideas .

Faith, Reason, and Critical Thinking

It is not unusual to hear discussions of the relationship between faith and reason, or science and religion, cast in terms of the blind acceptance of unquestionable propositions (religion) versus careful, skeptical, and critical rational reflection (science). Indeed, one of the hallmarks of religious faith, at least as commonly depicted in a great deal of our daily public discourse, is that it rests on claims that are “incontestable”—that is, impervious to skeptical scrutiny, empirical or logical analysis, or rational dispute. In contrast, scientific or secular knowledge claims are presumed to rest on “evidence” and the sure foundation of rational and/or empirical demonstration. As Suzanna Sherry (1996) has written, for example, someone operating under the epistemology of faith is “able to ignore contradictions, contrary evidence, and logical implications. Indeed, one test of faith is its capacity to resist the blandishments of rationality; the stronger the rational arguments against a belief, the more faith is needed to adhere to it” (p. 482). In contrast, “secular science and liberal politics, both committed to the primacy of reason, necessarily deny that any truth is incontestable” (p. 479).

Contrary to the naïve assumption that faith and reason must necessarily have a mutually allergic relationship, religious belief can often be strengthened and supported by critical, rational reflection. Indeed, as people of faith, we should always be willing to think critically about all of our beliefs. This does not mean we should approach intellectual questions about doctrines and beliefs with an attitude of scholarly aloofness or dismissive skepticism, nor does it mean that we should adopt a disparaging or fault-finding stance towards religious teachings. Good critical thinkers are not, as is sometimes uncritically assumed, relentless skeptics who—in Nietzsche’s (1967) memorable phrase—“worship the question mark itself as God” (p. 156). Being careful and reflective is not in any way incompatible with also being deeply optimistic and full of hope. Rather, thinking critically means that we look at our assumptions and contrast them with alternatives.

When we think critically, then, we question our basic assumptions in the light of competing or alternative assumptions. This does not necessarily mean we doubt or dismiss our assumptions—that is (again) the flawed fixation of the skeptic. Rather, it means we take them seriously by examining their origins and implications. For example, we might ask, “What does our belief system require of us that a contrasting belief system does not, and why?” Or, we might ask, “If this idea or belief is true, then where does it take me, both logically and practically, if I run with it all the way to its farthest implications?” Such questions are not full of skeptical and paralyzing doubt, but can rather reflect the attempt to more deeply understand (and live) our beliefs. It can also reflect a sincere desire to winnow out the chaff of sloppy thinking or incomplete understanding of our religious faith and spiritual commitments.

When we think critically in this way, we can better understand how our faith (and its assumptions about the world) differs from other perspectives and other beliefs, and what those differences might mean for us. Critical thinking can help us identify, and perhaps even reject, ideas that undermine the core assumptions of our faith. Conversely, it can help us be more open to ideas that do not contradict the core assumptions of our faith, but which at first glance may seem to do so. In short, by learning to think critically, coupled with the guiding influence of spiritual sensitivity, we can become more discerning and thoughtful religious believers. Remember, even Christ, the Son of God, amidst unimaginable suffering and agony upon the cross at Calvary, was willing to ask His Father a deep and troubling question:

And about the ninth hour Jesus cried with a loud voice, saying, Eli, Eli, lama sabachthani? that is to say, My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?” (Matt. 27:46).

Now, I assume it is possible that in that moment of utter extremity the Son of God, the Creator of the Universe, and the Savior of all mankind chose to abandon His faith and give in to the temptations of radical skepticism… but I doubt it. There is more than a little irony in Sherry’s claim that for the secularist committed to the primacy of reason no truth claim is incontestable, especially given that such a claim is itself an incontestable truth claim (see, Beckwith, 2015 for a more detailed discussion of this issue).

Beckwith, F. J. (2015). Taking rites seriously: Law, politics, and the reasonableness of faith. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Nietzsche, F. (1967). The genealogy of morals (W. Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale, Trans.). New York, NY: Random House.

Sherry, S. (1996). Enlightening the religious clauses. Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues, 7 (1), 473-495.

Is Religious Faith Compatible With Scientific Thinking?

Integrating faith-based and evidence-based beliefs in a mentally-healthy way..

Posted November 14, 2023 | Reviewed by Monica Vilhauer

• Faith is a normal process for dealing with uncertainty when answers to questions are lacking.
• Unlike scientific skepticism, denialism can often lead to non-evidence-based beliefs.
• Thinking scientifically is a learned skill rather than an innate trait.

A few years ago, a high school reader wrote in after reading my blogpost, " Flat Earthers: Belief, Skepticism, and Denialism " posing interesting questions about religious faith and denialism—that is, the refusal to acknowledge evidence or lack thereof, even when it's staring you in the face. In this blogpost, I'll revisit the discussion I had with him.

Religious Belief and Denialism

First, he asked whether those with strong religious beliefs were more prone to denialism. I answered as follows:

The tricky thing is that many of our beliefs are difficult, and sometimes impossible, to falsify. In other words, there are many unknowns that religious beliefs try to satisfy with answers. Is there a God? What happens when we die?

Faith—that is, choosing to believe something in the absence of evidence—is a normal process for dealing with uncertainty around those kinds of questions. In my opinion, there’s an optimal way to hold faith-based beliefs that acknowledges the possibility of being wrong and gives room for others to have different beliefs. We tend to get into trouble when we confuse faith with absolute truth and hold beliefs without cognitive flexibility. In my Flat Earth blogpost, I referred to H. H. Price’s distinction between “belief in” and “belief that.” 1 As I mentioned, faith is a kind of “belief in.”

Based on this conceptual framework, religious faith doesn't have to involve denialism. Several Catholic Popes have argued that faith and reason can be compatible (I refer to Pope John Paul II's insightful comments on this in my blogpost, " The Death of Facts: The Emperor's New Epistemology "). But of course, that often isn’t the case, as with fundamentalists who insist on the literal meaning and truth of a religious text. So, to answer the question, it’s not religion per se that facilitates denialism so much as a rigid cognitive style that lies at one end of a continuum of cognitive flexibility and is epitomized in religious fundamentalism.

Ignoring the Truth

Next, the reader asked what happens to denialists when the evidence doesn't support their beliefs. How is it that they can turn a blind eye when truth stares them in the face?

I answered that confirmation bias —the tendency to ignore or reject evidence and opinion that contradicts what we believe, while gravitating towards evidence that supports it—is a universal trait that we all have (even scientists!) in various degrees. For those who hold their personal beliefs strongly, disregarding evidence—or arguing with people against it—is often the default. These days, many of us can feel this tendency within our online interactions.

It’s sometimes claimed that science and religion are but two faith-based philosophical approaches to knowledge. I don’t agree with that characterization—science is the antithesis of faith-based knowledge and is inherently designed to be open to the reformulation of theories based on new data. But it is true that most of us hold scientific beliefs based not so much on faith as on the trust of experts. In my opinion, mistrust or loss of trust is a major root cause of those who embrace conspiracy theories. Once scientific evidence and expert consensus is rejected, it can lead us down the “rabbit hole” of misinformation, especially on the internet. Similarly, loss of trust—more so I think than denialism—explains how one can come to abandon evidence and shift beliefs in a different direction.

Thinking Scientifically

Finally, the student asked if there was a fundamental difference in the way that religious believers and scientific minds think and whether the former was related to gullibility.

In response, I cautioned against splitting styles of belief and people in general into black and white dichotomies. After all, many people have religious beliefs and still think scientifically. Many famous scientists, from Galileo to Francis Collins , were avowed theists.

Still, it may be that scientific and religious modes of thinking depend on some innate preferences (e.g. one might be genetically predisposed to prefer faith-based or evidence-based beliefs) that, in turn, influence what we believe. For example, it has been shown that religiosity can predict belief in some conspiracy theories that contradict scientific consensus. 2 Similar work has found that conspiracy thinking is related to “teleologic thinking,” defined as the attribution of purpose and causes to natural events or entities, as well as “need for certainty” and a relative lack of analytical thinking. 3,4

In my view however, a preference for how we develop beliefs is much better explained by how we’re taught as we grow up in the world, rather than there being any significant innate differences. “Scientific thinking”—that is, arriving at knowledge through experimentation and the scientific method—is not how we innately come to believe things. Rather, it’s a deliberate method that humans have devised to steer us away from the natural cognitive biases that often lead us to embrace false beliefs.

Science is grounded in a particular form of skepticism that holds that beliefs should be based on repeated observation and experimental controls—that is, evidence. As a result, when there’s no evidence, as with many religious questions, science tends to be either agnostic or nihilistic, which is not always appropriate (e.g., absence of evidence is not always evidence of absence, especially when research to test a hypothesis hasn’t been conducted). Note, however, that this kind of skepticism isn't the same as denialism. Denialism involves the rejection of evidence, which rather than leading to nihilism, often results in a tenacious conviction of non-evidence-based beliefs.

Thinking scientifically requires learning this method throughout one’s life. That happens in science class in elementary school and beyond, but needs to be reinforced outside of the classroom. Science class isn’t going to “stick” if it’s refuted within the broader culture or subculture that we live in. Within subcultures, there are many beliefs that may be idiosyncratic to the rest of the world that are reified within our in-group. When our group and individual identities are based on those same beliefs, it tends to bolster our conviction around those beliefs and, often, the need to defend them. Ironically, when we come to believe that giving up our beliefs threatens our very identity , that’s often when those beliefs can be the most destructive.

1. Price HH. Belief ‘in’ and belief ‘that.” Religious Studies 1965; 1:5-27.

2. Landrum AR, Olshansky A. The role of conspiracy mentality in denial of science and susceptibility to viral deception about science. Politics and the Life Sciences , 2019; 38:193-209.

3. Wagner-Egger P, Delouvée S, Gauvrit N, Dieguez S. Creationism and conspiracism share a common teleologic bias. Current Biology 2018; 28:R867-R868.

4. Swami V, Voracek M, Stieger S, Tran US, Furnham A. Analytic thinking reduces belief in conspiracy theories. Cognition 2014; 133, 572-585.

Joseph M. Pierre, M.D., is a Health Sciences Clinical Professor in the Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences at University of California, San Francisco and the Unit Chief of the Langley Porter Psychiatric Hospital Adult Inpatient Unit.

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Religion and Critical Thinking: How critical thinking impacts religion

The more critical thinking skills you have, the less religious beliefs you have. It has been found that those who think critically are far less religious than those who think intuitively.

This article discusses the connection between critical thinking and religion.

Rational thinking vs. intuition

Our brains have two modes of thinking: rational thinking and intuition. This is why intelligent people believe in concepts with no proof.

Encouraging people to think more intuitively causes people to become more faithful. Conversely, putting people in a critical thinking state of mind discourages faith.

Most people today are intuitive thinkers. That is why the majority of people still believe in God. The way of thinking we have is innate, carried down. It is much more difficult to slow down and think logically rather than rely on rules of thumb and instincts that have been a significant part of our upbringing and culture.

The connection between critical/rational thinking and faith

There is a strong connection between rational thinking and the lack of faith. The tendency to think rationally causes religious doubt. Studies have shown that when people are put in a critical/rational thinking state of mind, they will answer religious survey questions more doubtfully.

Critical thinking and faith are debated between science and religion because faith, or blind acceptance, is the direct opposite of critical reflection. There can never be reconciliation between these two concepts. Science relies on evidence and proof. Faith disregards these, does not allow questions, and ignores contrary evidence and contradictions.

Research on the brain has found that those with spiritual beliefs suppress their analytical thinking brain network to engage an empathetic thinking network. The opposite is true for non-religious people.

Does critical thinking make you lose faith?

From an analytical, rational point of view, the concept of faith is irrational and illogical. It is only by pushing aside this way of thinking that we can believe in supernatural concepts. Non-believers believe that our knowledge of the world and universe should not be told to us by religion. It is science’s job to inform us about the physical structure of our world and existence.

Becoming informed about religion

It has been found that atheists constitute the majority of those who are best informed about religion. This means that the more you learn about religion, the less faith you’ll have.

A US Religious Knowledge survey found that atheists and agnostics know more about the Bible than both Protestants and Catholics. This shows that it is not just critical/rational thinking that causes people to disregard faith. Becoming more knowledgeable about religion increases skepticism.

The fact that atheists and agnostics are more educated on religious matters than faithful believers indicates that people believe in religion for social reasons, not because they truly understand what they are taught to believe. It also shows that atheists are an effect of religious knowledge, not a lack of religious knowledge.

Faith vs. Proof

Overall, critical thinking negatively impacts faith. That is because faith teaches us that we should blindly accept religious concepts without question, while critical thinking teaches us to slow down and think rationally and logically.

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The Negative Relationship between Reasoning and Religiosity Is Underpinned by a Bias for Intuitive Responses Specifically When Intuition and Logic Are in Conflict

Associated data.

It is well established that religiosity correlates inversely with intelligence. A prominent hypothesis states that this correlation reflects behavioral biases toward intuitive problem solving, which causes errors when intuition conflicts with reasoning. We tested predictions of this hypothesis by analyzing data from two large-scale Internet-cohort studies (combined N = 63,235). We report that atheists surpass religious individuals in terms of reasoning but not working-memory performance. The religiosity effect is robust across sociodemographic factors including age, education and country of origin. It varies significantly across religions and this co-occurs with substantial cross-group differences in religious dogmatism. Critically, the religiosity effect is strongest for tasks that explicitly manipulate conflict; more specifically, atheists outperform the most dogmatic religious group by a substantial margin (0.6 standard deviations) during a color-word conflict task but not during a challenging matrix-reasoning task. These results support the hypothesis that behavioral biases rather than impaired general intelligence underlie the religiosity effect.

Introduction

The relationship between religiosity and intelligence has been an important topic amongst scientists and the public for some time (Harris, 2004 ; Dennett, 2006 ; Hitchens, 2007 ; Dawkins, 2008 ). Early evidence from the twentieth century suggested that religiosity and intelligence negatively correlated amongst college students (Howells, 1928 ; Sinclair, 1928 ). Subsequently, Argyle ( 1958 ) concluded that intelligent students are less likely to be religious. More recently, scientists have shown a striking paucity of religious belief (Ecklund et al., 2016 ), particularly within the elites of the National Academy of Sciences (Larson and Witham, 1998 ) and the Royal Society (Stirrat and Cornwell, 2013 ).

Psychometric population studies have now firmly established that religiosity influences cognitive style (Shenhav et al., 2012 ), and that religiosity and intelligence negatively correlate (Verhage, 1964 ; Pargament et al., 1998 ; Nyborg, 2009 ; Gervais and Norenzayan, 2012 ; Pennycook et al., 2013 , 2014 ; Razmyar and Reeve, 2013 ; Zuckerman et al., 2013 ). Furthermore, it has been reported that IQ and disbelief in God correlate at r = 0.60 across 137 countries (Lynn et al., 2009 ).

The cognitive sciences are establishing a mechanistic understanding of the religiosity effect. For example, it has been seen that religious background modulates visual attention (Colzato et al., 2008 ). Lesion studies have demonstrated that ventro-medial prefrontal cortex lesion patients have elevated scores of religious fundamentalism (Asp et al., 2012 ). Experimental studies have demsontrated that increases in religious fundamentalism relate to increases in memory recall accuracy and higher rates of false-positives in a memory task (Galen et al., 2009 ). Religious fundamentalism has also shown modest positive correlations with life satisfaction (Carlucci et al., 2015 ) and negative correlations with cognitive flexibility (Zhong et al., 2017 ) and openness (Saroglou, 2002 ; Carlucci et al., 2011 , 2015 ).

Dual-process models (Evans, 2008 ) assert that cognition is composed of intuitive and logical information processing. Individual differences in cognitive style have been related to the propensity to engage logical processes during problem solving (Stanovich and West, 1998 ). Meanwhile, recent experimental evidence has demonstrated a link between religiosity and cognitive style (Gervais and Norenzayan, 2012 ; Pennycook et al., 2014 ). From this, a prominent hypothesis has emerged which suggests that the religiosity effect is underpinned by cognitive-behavioral biases that cause poorer detection of situations in which intuition and logic are in conflict (Pennycook et al., 2014 ). Put simply, religious individuals are less likely to engage logical processes and be less efficient at detecting reasoning conflicts; therefore, they are more likely to take intuitive answers at face value and this impairs performance on intelligence tests. More broadly, from the perspective of this “dual-process” hypothesis, religious cognition is facilitated and hallmarked by intuitive decision making (Norenzayan and Gervais, 2013 ; Morgan, 2014 ; Oviedo, 2015 ).

It can be predicted from this hypothesis that the religiosity effect should be particularly disadvantageous for handling problems with counterintuitive answers; however, as a cognitive-behavioral bias, rather than reduced cognitive capacity per se , it follows that religiosity may not affect all tasks that involve reasoning. Reasoning tasks without intuitively obvious but logically correct answers may engage religious individual's latent ability to resolve complicated problems.

Here, we apply a novel combination of analyses to data from two Internet-cohort studies with detailed sociodemographic questionnaires and performance data from multiple cognitive tasks. Critically, these cohorts are large enough for the religiosity effect to be reliably examined in relation to, and while factoring out, a range of potentially confounding sociodemographic factors.

In study 1, we test four predictions of the dual-process hypothesis. (1) The religiosity effect should be greatest for reasoning latent variables as resolved via factor analysis. (2) The religiosity effect should be greatest for reasoning tasks designed to involve conflict resolution. (3) The religiosity effect should be in addition to, and not dependent on, other sociodemographic variables. (4) The pattern of the religiosity effect across tasks should differ qualitatively from those observed for other sociodemographic factors relating to latent reasoning ability.

In study 2, we replicate the findings of study 1 and test the further predictions that religious dogmatism mediates the religiosity-reasoning relationship at the levels of individuals (5) and religious groups (6). Finally, we test whether conversion to, or apostasy from, a religious group predicts cognitive performance (7).

Materials and methods

The cognitive tasks were all designed/adapted and programmed in Adobe Flex 3 for the Internet. The tasks were based on classical paradigms from the cognitive neuroscience literature to measure planning, reasoning, attention, and working memory abilities. The entire battery of tasks took ~30 min to complete, with each task calculating one outcome measure (Full descriptions of all task designs are reported in Supplementary Materials 2 ). The tasks were presented in fixed sequence on a custom Internet server. A detailed demographic assessment was conducted after completion of the task battery and this also was programmed using Adobe Flex. The server for study 1 was programmed in ASP. The server for study 2 was programmed in Ruby on Rails. The data for study 1 were collected via the Internet between September and December 2010. The experiment URL was originally advertised in a New Scientist feature, on the Discovery Channel website, in the Daily Telegraph , and on social networking websites including Facebook and Twitter (for further details please refer to Hampshire et al., 2012a ). Study 2 was run in a similar manner, but with a slightly different sub-set of tasks. Data were collected in the first 4 months of 2013 with advertisement through a press release associated with another article that was published with data from the first study. Ethical approval for the study protocol was awarded by the Cambridge Psychology Research Ethics Committes (2010.62) and the University of Western Ontario Health Sciences Research Ethics Board (103472) for study 1 and 2 respectively. All subjects gave informed consent in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki prior to being able to access the cognitive and demographic assessment stages.

Statistical analyses were conducted in Matlab (R2015b, www.mathworks.com ), unless otherwise stated. Data from both studies were preprocessed using the following steps. Participants with ages below 15 or above 90 and subjects with nonsensical responses to any questionnaire question were excluded case-wise (see Hampshire et al., 2012a for details). The cognitive data were standardized task-wise by subtracting the population mean to center scores around zero and division by the population standard deviation to ensure unit deviation. A wide filter of scores >5 SDs from the mean on any task were excluded case-wise to remove any machine errors. Sociodemographic confounds including Age, Level of Education and Country of Origin were controlled for by modeling them as main effects in a Generalized Linear Model and extracting the resulting residuals using the SPSS V22 (Supplementary Materials 1 ).

Study 1 included 44,780 individuals; 12,576 reported themselves to be religious (Mean age = 31.38, SD = 12.02), 14,018 agnostic (Mean age = 30.12, SD = 10.99) and 18,186 atheist (Mean age = 29.98, SD = 11.26). Study 2 included 18,455 individuals; 10,876 reported themselves to be religious (Mean age = 34.02, SD = 14.26), 2,612 agnostic (Mean age = 30.44, SD = 12.31) and 4,967 atheist (Mean age = 29.73, SD = 11.86). When analyzing the religious sub-groups, 3 groups were excluded due to low sample sizes (Religious Group 6 = 93, Religious Group 7 = 51, Religious Group 8 = 10). Sociodemographic variables are reported in detail in the Supplementary Materials (Supplementary Tables 1 – 3 , N.B. We have previously demonstrated that gender does not have a significant effect on cognitive performance in Owen et al., 2010 ; Hampshire et al., 2012a ).

Latent variables were estimated separately from the studies 1 and 2 performance data in a data-driven manner using principal component analysis (PCA). Following the Kaiser convention there were 3 significant components (Eigenvalue, EV ≥ 1) in both cases. In Study 1, the first three unrotated components explained ~45% of the population variance in performance (C1 = 27.733%, EV = 3.328, C2 = 9.359%, EV = 1.123, C3 = 8.355%, EV = 1.002). In study 2, the first three unrotated explained ~41% of the total variance (C1 = 24.469%, EV = 3.181, C2 = 8.812%, EV = 1.146, C3 = 7.934%, EV = 1.031) (Figure ​ (Figure1B). 1B ). When orthogonal rotation was applied using the varimax algorithm (Rotated variance explained: Study 1, C1 = 17.154, C2 = 16.245, C3 = 12.047; Study 2, C1 = 14.904, C2 = 13.170, C3 = 13.140), the resultant task-component loadings were simple and interpretable (Figure ​ (Figure1C, 1C , Supplementary Tables 7 , 8 ). They were also qualitatively similar across the two studies, despite differences in the exact composition of the batteries. For example, the Colour Word Remapping (CWR), a variant of the Stroop task) and Grammatical Reasoning loaded onto a Verbal Reasoning component, the Deductive Reasoning and Spatial Rotations tasks loaded onto a more general Reasoning component and the Paired Associate Learning (PAL), Spatial Span and Self-Ordered Search tasks loaded onto a Working Memory component. Notably, the Grammatical Reasoning and CWR tasks loaded more heavily onto the Reasoning component in study 1 and more heavily on the Verbal Reasoning component in study 2, which likely reflects differences in the exact compositions of the two testing batteries. A quantitative comparison of the 10 task-component loadings that were common across studies 1 and 2 showed extremely high correlation (Verbal Reasoning: r = 0.983, p < 0.001; Reasoning: r = 0.978, p < 0.001; Working Memory: r = 0.923, p < 0.001). It was suggested during the review process that an alternative dimensionality reduction technique, Principal Axis Factoring (PAF), be applied to the data instead of PCA. A comparison of PCA and PAF was conducted using the data from Study 1 (In both cases we followed the Kaiser convention and applied varimax rotation). This analysis demonstrated that PCA provided a much more interpretable latent structure (Supplementary Figure 1 ) and explained substantially more of the total variance (~45 and ~28%, respectively). From this comparison PCA was deemed as a more appropriate method for the present analysis.

(A) Age distributions plotted for each group in study 1 (Ai) and for study 2 (Aii,Aiii) . Yellow lines indicate the 25, 50, and 75th percentiles within each groups distributions (bottom-to-top). PCA produced 3-component solutions (eigenvalues >1) for both study's. Bi,Bii ) Scree plots with those components extracted for calculating individual factor scores highlighted in orange. Ci,Cii ) Absolute loadings calculated (Verbal Reasoning = red, Reasoning = blue, Working Memory = orange) using a Varimax rotation plotted for each task (ranked by Verbal Reasoning loading).

It is important to note that analyzing data with extremely large numbers of samples affords very high statistical power, which means that effects of negligible scale can have very low p -values; therefore, in studies of this type a better gauge of significance is effect size. Here, we conform to Cohen's notion of effect sizes, whereby an effect of ~0.2 standard deviations (SDs) is small, ~0.5 SDs is medium and ~0.8 SDs is large. All other statistical values from our analyses are reported in the Supplementary Tables and generally are p < 0.001 unless otherwise indicated.

There were negligibly scaled but statistically significant differences across the groups in terms of age (Figure ​ (Figure1A), 1A ), education level, and country of origin (Supplementary Tables 4 – 6 ); therefore, these variables were factored out of the performance data prior to the analyses reported below.

Determining the scale of the reasoning effect for different latent variables

Component scores were estimated for each individual by regressing task scores onto the rotated component matrix. An “Overall Mean” score was also estimated for each individual by averaging across the three component scores. In order to test prediction (1), these composite scores were analyzed in separate one-way ANOVAs with Religious Class (Religious, Agnostic, Atheist) as the between subject factor for both studies (Supplementary Table 9 ).

Confirming prediction (1), an analysis of effect size demonstrated that the religiosity effects was largest for reasoning latent variables. In study 1, the religious group was outperformed by the agnostic and atheist groups (Figure ​ (Figure2A, 2A , Supplementary Tables 9 – 12 ) in terms of Reasoning (Agnostic vs. Religious = 0.17 SDs, Atheist vs. Religious = 0.24 SDs), Verbal Reasoning (Agnostic vs. Religious = 0.13 SDs, Atheist vs. Religious = 0.15 SDs) and Overall Mean (Agnostic vs. Religious = 0.10 SDs, Atheist vs. Religious = 0.14 SDs) composite scores. The differences in Working Memory scores were of negligible scale (Agnostic vs. Religious = 0.001 SDs, Atheist vs. Religious = 0.015).

Reasoning (blue), Working Memory (orange), Verbal Reasoning (red) and Overall Mean (gray) component scores in Standard Deviation units (Mean = 0, SD = 1) compared across the Religious, Agnostic and Atheist groups for study 1 (A) and study 2 (B) . Superimposed Cohens-d values show the magnitude of differences between the Religious and Atheist groups.

A similar pattern of results was evident for study 2 (Figure ​ (Figure2B, 2B , Supplementary Tables 9 – 12 ): Reasoning (Agnostic vs. Religious = 0.12 SDs, Atheist vs. Religious = 0.13 SDs) Verbal Reasoning (Agnostic vs. Religious = 0.21 SDs, Atheist vs. Religious = 0.19 SDs) and Overall Mean (Agnostic vs. Religious = 0.23 SDs, Atheist vs. Religious = 0.27 SDs). The effect for Working Memory was again of negligible scale (Agnostic vs. Religious = 0.02 SDs, Atheist vs. Religious = 0.09 SDs). These results confirmed that the religiosity effect is largest for latent variables that underlie the performance of reasoning tasks.

Determining whether the religiosity effect is more pronounced for reasoning tasks that explicitly manipulate conflict

To test prediction (2), i.e., that the religiosity effect relates to conflict, analyses were conducted focused on performances of individual cognitive tasks. Specifically, several of the cognitive tasks loaded heavily on the reasoning latent variables and were explicitly designed to manipulate conflict. These were, the CWR Task, which in accordance with the classic Stroop paradigm (Stroop, 1935 ), places color and word mappings in direct conflict. Unlike the traditional Stroop, meaning must be remapped to color and word on every trial, which produces a more pronounced conflict effect (Hampshire et al., 2012a ). The Grammatical Reasoning Task involves a rapid sequence of trials that require the relationship as described between two objects (i.e., the square contains the circle) to be parsed and then in half of the trials inverted, i.e., due to inclusion of the word “not” (Baddeley, 1968 ; Hampshire et al., 2012a , b ). The Interlocking Polygons task involves determining whether a line figure presented alone matches another that is presented as part of an overlapping pair, a manipulation designed to cause perceptual conflict (Hampshire et al., 2012a ).

Notably, another of the tasks, Deductive Reasoning, also loads heavily onto the reasoning component. This task involves deriving complex relational rules between the colors, numbers and shapes of patterns that are presented in a 3 * 3 matrix; however, unlike CWR and grammatical reasoning, it has no explicit conflict manipulation because there are no intuitively obvious but erroneous answers (Owen et al., 2010 ; Hampshire et al., 2012a ). Some other tasks are not designed to involve reasoning or conflict, e.g., simple working memory tasks including Digit Span where sequences of numbers must be remembered, Spatial Span where sequences of locations must be remembered, and Monkey ladder where the locations of numbers must be remembered.

The performance data were standardized for each individual task and sociodemographic confounds factored out prior to cross-group analysis. Cognitive data from both studies were examined using a two-way ANOVA with Task as the within subject factor and Religious Class (Religious, Agnostic, Atheist) as the between subject factor. There were significant main effects of Religious Class and a significant interaction of Religious Class * Task (Supplementary Table 13 ).

Examining the task data showed a consistent trend whereby atheists on average performed numerically better than religious individuals for all tasks, with the agnostics tending to place in between the other two groups. However, the scale of the effect varied substantially across tasks. In support of prediction 2, the largest cross-group effect sizes were observed for tasks that were explicitly designed to manipulate conflict (Figure ​ (Figure3A, 3A , Supplementary Table 14 ). Specifically, in study 1 the largest religious-atheist group differences were for the Grammatical Reasoning (Agnostic vs. Religious = 0.14 SDs, Atheist vs. Religious = 0.17 SDs), CWR (Agnostic vs. Religious = 0.08 SDs, Atheist vs. Religious = 0.14 SDs) and Interlocking Polygons (Agnostic vs. Religious = 0.09 SDs, Atheist vs. religious = 0.13 SDs) tasks. A similar pattern of results was observed in study 2 for the CWR (Agnostic vs. Religious = 0.28 SDs, Atheist vs. Religious = 0.23 SDs) and Interlocking Polygons (Agnostic vs. Religious = 0.18 SDs, Atheist vs. Religious = 0.23 SDs) tasks.

The non-religious groups consistently outperforms the religious group across cognitive tasks in both studies 1 and 2 (Ai,Aii) . The largest group effects are seen during cognitive tasks with conflict between intuitive and logical processes (Religious, light gray; Agnostic, gray; Atheist, dark gray). We demonstrate that these effects are specific to religiosity by comparing tasks with high and low cognitive conlfict against alternate demographic variables Age (Bi,Bii) and Computer game use (Ci,Cii) . Performance scores for all cognitive tasks are in Standard Deviation units (Mean = 0, SD = 1).

For contrast, the Deductive Reasoning task (study 1: Agnostic vs. Religious = 0.00 SDs, Atheist vs. Religious = 0.02 SDs; study 2: Agnostic vs. Religious = 0.04 SDs, Atheist vs. Religious = 0.01 SDs) and Digit Span task (study 1: Agnostic vs. Religious = 0.03 SDs, Atheist vs. Religious = 0.06 SDs; study 2: Agnostic vs. Religious = 0.08 SDs, Atheist vs. Religious = 0.02 SDs) showed some of the smallest differences in scores between religious and non-religious classes. These findings provide evidence in support of the hypothesis that the religiosity effect relates to conflict as opposed to reasoning ability or intelligence more generally (Pennycook et al., 2014 ).

Is the conflict/non-conflict effect specific to religiosity?

One possibility was that the differences in religiosity effect sizes for reasoning tasks may have been generic, e.g., relating to test-retest reliabilities or some other factor that could lead to a general scaling of effect sizes. To rule out this possibility we examined how other demographic variables, which also correlated with the Reasoning latent variables, related to the performance of the individual tasks. These included age and frequency of computer game use. Both age and computer gaming showed similarly scaled relationships with the performance of the conflict (e.g., CWR) are non-conflict (e.g., Deductive Reasoning) tasks (Figures 3B,C ).

Is the religiosity effect contingent on other sociodemographic variables?

The analyses thus far factored out potentially confounding sociodemographic variables including age, country of origin and education level. Therefore, these variables did not underlie the religiosity effect. However, the religiosity effect might still have been contingent on those variables (e.g., being evident for older not younger adults). To examine this possibility, further analysis of the with component scores from the religious and non-religious groups were conducted across 6 age bins that covered the adult lifespan from 15 to 90 years. The stability of the Religious Class effects across ages was assessed for both studies using two-way ANOVAs with Overall Mean component score as the dependent variable, and with Religious Class (Religious, Agnostic, Atheist) and Age Group as between subject factors. There was a substantial effect of Age Group. The interaction between Age Group and Religious Class were statistically non-significant (Supplementary Table 15 , Figures 4Ai,Aii ) whereas the Religious Class main effect was robust and evident across all ages in both studies.

Religious group effects across the lifespan (Ai,Aii) , education (Bi,Bii) and Country of Origin (Ci,Cii) for both study's. These demonstrate how the religiosity effects are not contingent on other sociodemographic variables. Bars represent Overall Mean component score in Standard Deviation units (Mean = 0, SD = 1) for the religious (light gray), agnostic (gray), and Atheist (dark gray) groups.

Next, the stability of the religiosity effect was assessed across the Education factor using two-way ANOVAs with Overall Mean component score as the dependent variable and Religious Class (Religious, Agnostic, Atheist) and Level of Education as between subject factors. The interactions between the Religious class and Education factor was statistically non-significant. The main effect of Religious Class was robust and evident across all levels of education (Supplementary Table 15 , Figures 4Bi,Bii ) in both studies.

Finally, the stability of the religiosity effect was assessed across Country of Origin (i.e., country indivdiuals were born in aggregated by global region) using a two-way ANOVA with Overall Mean component score as the dependent variable and Religious Class (Religious, Agnostic, Atheist) and Country of Origin as between subject factors. The Religious Class main effect was robust and evident across all countries of origin. There was a statistically significant interaction (Supplementary Table 15 ) for both studies; however, the direction of the effect was evident for all countries of origin (Figures 4Ci,Cii ). Together, these analyses confirm that the religiosity effect is highly general, being evident across age group, education level and countries of origin.

Does religious dogmatism mediate the religiosity-reasoning effect?

Study 2 included questions designed to examine the religiosity construct in more detail. One question that was framed as a Likert scale asked the participant to rate the strength of their religious belief (e.g., 1 = Absolute Certainty, 5 = Atheist), and this was taken as a proxy measure of religious dogmatism. Component scores from study 2 were binned according to the 5-point self-assessment. Cognitive components scores were each modeled as dependent variables in separate one-way ANOVAs with Individual Dogma as the between subject factor for both studies. Statistically significant main effects of Individual Dogma were found for all cognitive components (Supplementary Tables 16 , 17 ). There was a clear pattern whereby cognitive performance increased as religious dogmatism decreased. Those with the greatest dogmatism were outperformed by those with the lowest dogmatism in Overall Mean (0.27 SDs) and Verbal Reasoning (0.19 SDs) scores (Figure ​ (Figure5A, 5A , Supplementary Table 12 ). Dogmatism showed a smaller relationship with Working Memory (0.11 SDs) and Reasoning (0.11 SDs) scores. Exemplifying the religious conflict effect, those with the greatest dogmatism were outperformed by those with the lowest dogmatism in tasks designed to manipulate conflict such as the CWR (0.20 SDs), Interlocking Polygons (0.24 SDs) and Grammatical Reasoning (0.23 SDs) (Figure ​ (Figure6A, 6A , Supplementary Table 18 ). Conversely, there were smaller differences in tasks that did not manipulate conflict; critically, this was the case for the Deductive Reasoning task (0.056 SDs).

Examining the effect of religious dogmatism at the individual and religious group level. (A) Cognitive component performance by Individual self-rated religious dogmatism. Individuals with the highest religious dogmatism (Absolute Certainty) show significantly poorer performance scores than those with the lowest religious dogmatism (Atheist) in Verbal Reasoning and Overall Mean performance. (Bi) Religious groups were ranked by their Group dogmatism score calculated by the difference in proportions of the extreme belief responses. (Bii) Distributions individual dogmatism within each religious group (1 = Absolute Certainty, 2 = Strong, 3 = Not Certain, 4 = Very Doubtful, 5 = Atheist). (Ci–Civ) Cognitive performance varies across religious groups. Groups with larger proportions of individuals with strong religious beliefs show poorer performance, particularly in the Verbal Reasoning domain. Reasoning (blue), Working Memory (orange), Verbal Reasoning (red), and Overall Mean (gray) performance scores are in Standard Deviation units (Mean = 0, SD = 1).

The interaction between task conflict and level of individual dogmatism (A) and group dogmatism (B) : The conflict task elicits pronounced group effects that is not observed in the non-conflict task. (C) Component scores compared between apostates (those from a religious family and are non-religious) and converters (those from a non-religious family and are religious). Reasoning (blue), Working Memory (orange), Verbal Reasoning (red), and Overall Mean (gray) performance scores are in Standard Deviation units (Mean = 0, SD = 1).

Examining the reasoning-religiosity relationship across religious groups

The questionnaire from study 2 also enabled religious individuals to be sub-divided according to religious groups (see Supplementary Table 1 for religious group sizes and age ranges. N.B. Those religious groups with N < 300 were dropped from our sample). We first assessed the effect of religious dogmatism on the religiosity-reasoning relationship at the group level. A “group dogmatism” score was calculated to rank the religious groups according to the difference in the proportion of low and high dogmatism individuals. Figure 5Bi reports how the distributions of individual dogmatism varied across the groups. The groups showed substantial differences in the average dogmatism scores of each religious group, with this effect spanning 0.87 SD units. This effect was reflected by correspondingly skewed cumulative distributions (Figure 5Bii ). For example, Religious Group 1 (R1) had an approximately Gaussian distribution in terms of strength of belief. R4 had a distribution that was heavily skewed toward weak belief. R1 had a distribution that was heavily skewed toward strong belief.

Analysing the performance measures showed that the religious groups also differed significantly and that this pattern of differences reflected the observed variability in dogmatism. Specifically, the religious group with the highest mean dogmatism score was significantly outperformed by the religious group with the lowest mean dogmatism score in Verbal Reasoning (0.32 SDs), Overall Mean (0.23 SDs). Working Memory (0.11 SDs) and Reasoning (0.11 SDs) scores showed smaller effects (Figure ​ (Figure5C, 5C , Supplementary Table 12 ). Comparing the high dogmatism group to the Atheism group showed the most pronounced effects (Reasoning = 0.22 SDs, Working Memory = 0.08 SDs, Verbal Reasoning = 0.33 SDs, Overall Mean = 0.43 SDs).

Conflict detection effects were also compared across the religious groups. The high dogmatism group was outperformed by the low dogmatism group in tasks involving conflict detection such as the CWR (0.60 SDs), Grammatical Reasoning (0.29 SDs) and Interlocking Polygons (0.17 SDs) (Figure ​ (Figure6B, 6B , Supplementary Table 19 ). In contrast the high and low dogmatism groups did not differ in tasks that did not manipulate conflict, such as the Deductive Reasoning (0.01 SDs). The magnitude of these effects was greatest when comparing the high dogmatism group to the atheist group CWR (0.61 SDs), Grammatical Reasoning (0.36 SDs) and Interlocking Polygons (0.49 SDs). In contrast there was little difference between the highest dogmatism and the atheist groups for tasks without conflict, such as the Deductive Reasoning (0.08 SDs).

Does religious conversion or apostasy relate to cognitive performance?

Finally, component scores were compared between those who have grown up in a religious family and are now non-religious (apostates) and those who have grown up in a non-religious family and are now religious (converters). The apostates showed greater component scores than the converters particularly within the Overall Mean (0.25 SDs) and Verbal Reasoning (0.18 SDs) and Reasoning (0.11 SDs) domains. A small difference was seen for Working Memory (0.08 SDs) (Figure ​ (Figure6C 6C ).

We tested multiple predictions regarding the cognitive mechanism underlying the relationship between religiosity and intelligence. The results accord well with the hypothesis that the religiosity effect reflects cognitive-behavioral biases that impair conflict detection (Gervais and Norenzayan, 2012 ; Pennycook et al., 2014 ), rather than general intelligence. These biases are most disadvantageous during tasks that are designed to introduce conflict between intuitive and logical answers.

Our analyses consistently confirmed that the non-religious groups have an advantage over religious groups in their overall mean performance of cognitive tasks. The scale of these effects was small but significant (Study 1 = 0.14 SDs; Study 2 = 0.27 SDs). This result accords with the ~2–4 IQ point differences previously reported between religious and atheist groups from large scale psychometric studies (Nyborg, 2009 ; Zuckerman et al., 2013 ). A qualitative comparison of the non-religious groups could lead to the interpretation that the atheist group outperforms the agnostic group both at the level of the latent variables and individual tasks. Despite this pattern being in accordance with the religious dogmatism's relationship to performance, a meaningful interpretation of this pattern is challenging due to the small effect size and the lack of consistency at the level of individual tasks across study 1 and 2.

Notably though, finer grained analyses of the data highlighted how comparing religious vs. non-religious groups in this manner underestimates the specificity and magnitude of the religiosity effect. Analysing religious dogmatism showed substantial differences across religions (0.87 SDs). This variability in dogmatism related significantly to the religiosity effect at the individual and the group level. The atheist group outperformed the most dogmatic group by 0.43 SDs in terms of overall mean score, which would be 6.45 IQ points. Previous studies demonstrated that individuals with low religious dogmatism score highly during analytic reasoning tasks (Gervais and Norenzayan, 2012 ; Shenhav et al., 2012 ) and on IQ (Lynn et al., 2009 ). Together, these consistent findings demonstrates failure to override incorrect intuitive responses correlates with religious dogmatism. Contrasting the relationships of religious dogmatism with performance between the levels of the individual differences and religious groups revealed an interesting pattern. The small scaled effects seen with Reasoning and Working Memory scores moved in opposing directions when elevated to the religious group level. Specifically, the Reasoning effect increased from a small to a medium scaled effect while the Working effect decreased from a small to a negligible effect. This pattern suggests that the relationship between religious dogmatism and the reasoning scores is more robust than with the Working Memory scores.

Our analyses extend the prior literature by demonstrating the highly robust and generalizable nature of the religiosity effect. The effect was reproducible across the two cohorts and evident after factoring out sociodemographic variables. Furthermore, the effect was not contingent on those variables, being robustly evident for all conditions of them. Critically, interactions between the religiosity effect and age or education level were statistically non-significant.

An interesting conclusion from this study is that the basis of the religiosity effect should be conceived of as a cognitive-behavioral bias, rather than impaired general intelligence. In examining the latent data structure, the religiosity effect showed a significantly scaled relationship with the reasoning components and little effect for the working memory component. This pattern could have reflected impaired reasoning ability in religious groups. However, not all tasks that loaded onto the reasoning latent variables showed a religiosity effect. The most striking example of this was the deductive reasoning task, a type of matrix reasoning task that we designed to have by far the most complex problems in our testing battery. This task requires that multiple rules, relating to different visual features (e.g., color and shape), be integrated as higher-order relational constructs. High dogmatism individuals and religious groups performed this task at a similar level to atheists.

Conversely, the CWR and grammatical reasoning tasks consistently showed some of the strongest religiosity effects. We intentionally designed these tasks to produce a conflict between alternative rule mappings. For example, the CWR is a challenging variant of the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935 ) that introduces a conflict between written to spoken word mappings and color naming. This variability in the magnitude of the religiosity effect across different reasoning-loaded tasks is most informative when compared with other sociodemographic variables. It is not the case that the matrix-reasoning task is unreliable or insensitive. Indeed, both age and computer game playing showed significantly scaled effects with both deductive reasoning and CWR task performance, suggesting that they relate to the ability that underlies this latent variable. Taken together, these results accord closely with the hypothesis that religious dogmatism correlates with a cognitive-behavioral tendency to forgo logical problem solving when an intuitive answer is available (Pennycook et al., 2014 ). In further support of this hypothesis we observed that religious apostates outperformed religious converts within the reasoning domains and that increased religious dogmatism relates to lower scores on the conflict, but not deductive reasoning, tasks at the individual and religious group levels. Comparing the highest dogma group to atheists showed a 0.61 SDs difference for the CWR task.

Our findings have significant implications for understanding the religiosity effects impact on higher cognition. From the dual-process perspective (Evans, 2008 ; Evans and Stanovich, 2013 ), failures in reasoning arise when fast intuitive processes are not overridden by slow logical processes. Individual differences in reasoning performance are therefore relative to an individuals cognitive capacity and style. Together, our findings suggest that the religiosity effect is not dependent on working memory laden logical processes but on the tendency to respond with an intuitive answer when intuitive and logical processes are in conflict.

Several limitations should be considered. Most notably, both of our cohorts were self-selecting populations of internet users which could have introduced sampling biases. However, the questionnaire data highlighted the wide variability and range of ages, education levels and countries of origin. This variability combined with the large cohort sizes allowed for these potential confounds to be factored out of the data prior to the analysis. Based on the robustness of the religiosity effect when accounting for other sociodemographic variables, it is highly unlikely that the religiosity effect has a basis in a confounding sociodemographic variable. Furthermore, when we took the largest and most heterogeneous religious group available, we observed that additionally factoring out race did not diminish the effect of religious dogmatism. Nonetheless, the non-random sampling method may have biased the distributions of dogmatism across religious groups; furthermore, religious groups likely vary in dogmatism dependent on region or sect. Consequently, it is important not to infer too strongly that the differences in religious dogmatism across groups extrapolate to the global population. Similarly, the small-to-medium group effects observed here mean that there is very substantial overlap across populations in terms of cognitive performances. It is therefore inappropriate to generalize these effects to specific individuals.

Finally, a limitation for any observational and cross-sectional study is that cause and effect cannot be directly inferred from correlational analyses. Future work may adopt interventional approaches to examine causal relationships. Indeed, if the religiosity effect is based on learnt cognitive-behavioral biases, then this holds some hope. Humans are exceedingly capable of resolving maladaptive cognition via training therapies. In contrast, the question of whether it is possible to train core abilities remains highly controversial (Owen et al., 2010 ; Simons et al., 2016 ). An interesting future study could determine whether cognitive training can ameliorate the religiosity effect by enabling individuals to apply their latent reasoning abilities, even when there appears to be intuitive answers. A previous study by Gervais and Norenzayan ( 2012 ) provides preliminary support for this view. They examined the causal relationship between religious dogmatism and reasoning by exposing individuals to exercises in analytical thinking. In the period post exercise, reductions in religious dogmatism were evident. A timely question, is whether repeat exercise might lead to lasting benefits in conflict detection, with consequently generalized improvements in cognitive task performance.

In conclusion, religiosity is associated with poorer reasoning performance during tasks that involve cognitive conflict. These effects may reflect learnt cognitive-behavioral biases toward intuitive decision making, rather than underlying abilities to understand complex logical rules or to maintain information in working memory. The effects are consistent in two large cohorts and robust across sociodemographic variables. Future work may focus on deconstructing the religiosity and dogmatism constructs in greater detail (Evans, 2001 ; Whitehouse, 2002 , 2004 ; Friedman and Rholes, 2007 ), determining how the impact of these on real-world achievement is mediated by cognitive behavior, and testing whether cognitive training may counter biases of the religious mind toward intuitive decision-making.

Author contributions

AH programmed the servers, adapted the cognitive tasks for the Internet and facilitated the data acquisition for both studies. AH curated the hypotheses of interest. RD preprocessed and analyzed the study data, and produced all figures and tables. Both RD and AH drafted the manuscript and approved the final version of the manuscript prior to submission.

Conflict of interest statement

The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

Funding. This work was supported by a European Commision Marie Curis Career Integration grant to AH and core funding from Imperial College.

Supplementary material

The Supplementary Material for this article can be found online at: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.02191/full#supplementary-material

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Study of the Day: Even the Religious Lose Faith When They Think Critically

New research in Science shows that, unlike intuitive thinking, activating the analytical cognitive system promotes religious skepticism.

PROBLEM : Previous research has uncovered a link between faith and intuitive thinking, a way of processing information that relies on mental shortcuts to yield fast and efficient responses. Can the opposite cognitive approach, analytical thinking, elicit the opposite religious response? That is, can critical thinking diminish a person's faith?

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METHODOLOGY : Researchers Will Gervais and Ara Norenzayan devised a series of experiments to test if analytic thinking may be a source of religious disbelief. In the first trial, the subjects answered questions designed to measure their cognitive state and completed three surveys to measure the strength of their faith. Then, to test for causation, the authors also conducted experiments where they first primed the participants into thinking more methodically with images of Rodin's The Thinker or a word-scrabble game with words like "think," "ponder," or "rational."

RESULTS : Regardless of their religious background, the subjects who were more likely to adopt an analytical stance tended to report less religiosity. Moreover, those who were prodded to think this way reported significantly reduced religious conviction compared with people who didn't receive the same cues.

CONCLUSION : Analytical thinking decreases religious belief and may undermine the intuitive support for faith, at least temporarily.

SOURCE : The full study, "Analytic Thinking Promotes Religious Disbelief," is published in the journal Science .

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Religious Educator Vol. 18 No. 3 · 2017

Critical thinking in religious education, shayne anderson.

Shayne Anderson, "Critical Thinking in Religious Education,"  Religious Educator  18, no. 3 (2018): 69–81.

Shayne Anderson ( [email protected] ) was an instructor at South Ogden Junior Seminary when this article was published.

A common argument in an increasingly secular world today is that religion poses a threat to world peace and human well-being. Concerning the field of religious education, Andrew Davis, an honorary research fellow at Durham University, argues that religious adherents tend to treat others who do not agree with them with disrespect and hostility and states that efforts to persuade them to behave otherwise would be “profoundly difficult to realize.” [1] Consequently, he believes that religious education should consist only of a moderate form of pluralism. Religious education classes, in his view, should not make claims of one religion having exclusive access to the truth.

Others argue that religious education should consist only of teaching about religion in order to promote more democratic ways of being. [2] Their perception is that religion is yet another distinguishing and divisive tool used by those who seek to discriminate against others, thus impeding the progress of pluralistic democracies. Further, those perceived as religious zealots, so the argument goes, are the least apt to give critical thought to either their own beliefs or the beliefs of others. [3] This reasoning, in which religion and critical thinking are viewed as antithetical, is especially prevalent in popular culture, outside the measured confines of peer-reviewed publishing.

Reasons for why religion and critical thinking might be viewed as incompatible are as varied as the authors who generate the theories. They include the following: religions often claim to contain some amount of absolute truth, an idea in itself that critical theorists oppose; individual religions generally do not teach alternate views, a requisite for critical thinking; and, in critical theory, truth is comprised of “premises all parties accept.” [4] Theorist Oduntan Jawoniyi reduces the argument down to the fact that religious claims of truth “are empirically unverified, unverifiable, and unfalsifiable metaphysical truths.” [5]

One explanation for variations in opinions concerning the place of critical thinking in religious education may be that no consistent definition exists for critical thinking, a concept that stretches across several fields of study. For instance, the field of philosophy has its own nuanced definition of critical thinking, as does the field of psychology. My first aim in this article is to survey a range of definitions in order to settle upon a functional definition that will allow for faith while still fulfilling the objectives of critical thinking, and my second aim is to explore how this definition can apply to religious education in The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.

Defining Critical Thinking

The first definition under consideration comes from a frequently cited website within the domain of critical thinking. Here critical theorists Michael Scriven and Richard Paul endeavor to encapsulate in one definition the wide expanse of critical thinking’s many definitions: “Critical thinking is the intellectually disciplined process of actively and skillfully conceptualizing, applying, analyzing, synthesizing, and/ or evaluating information gathered from, or generated by, observation, experience, reflection, reasoning, or communication, as a guide to belief and action. In its exemplary form, it is based on universal intellectual values that transcend subject matter divisions: clarity, accuracy, precision, consistency, relevance, sound evidence, good reasons, depth, breadth, and fairness.” [6]

Assessing the definition in parts will allow for a thorough examination, beginning with a look at critical thinking as being active and intellectually disciplined. Such admonitions are repeated often in the scriptures. The thirteenth article of faith teaches that members of the Church “seek after” anything that is “virtuous, lovely, or of good report or praiseworthy.” The Prophet Joseph Smith borrows terminology here from what he calls the “admonition of Paul”—from the book of Philippians, where Paul lists many of the same qualities and then suggests, “Think on these things” (Philippians 4:8).

Common scriptural words that suggest active, skillful, and disciplined thinking include inquiring , pondering , reasoning , and asking . Additional scriptures suggest such things as “study it out in your mind” (D&C 9:8) or “seek learning, even by study and also by faith” (D&C 88:118). Assuredly, the portion of the definition of critical thinking pertaining to intellectual discipline fits well within the objectives of the Church’s education program.

The next part of the definition given by Scriven and Paul includes “conceptualizing, applying, analyzing, synthesizing, and/ or evaluating information.” The Gospel Teaching and Learning handbook, used by teachers and leaders in the Seminaries and Institutes of Religion program of the Church, sets forth the “fundamentals of gospel teaching and learning.” [7] Included in these fundamentals are (a) identifying doctrines and principles, (b) understanding the meaning of those doctrines and principles, (c) feeling the truth and importance of those doctrines and principles, and (d) applying doctrines and principles. Comparing the definition for critical thinking to the fundamentals of gospel teaching and learning, one can argue that conceptualizing is akin to identifying and analyzing, both of which require the understanding sought for by the previously mentioned fundamentals. Synthesizing and evaluating can be a part of understanding and feeling the importance of a concept. Also, application is found in both the definition and the fundamentals of gospel teaching and learning. It is an integral part of critical thinking and effective religious education within the Church.

Finally, according to this definition, critical thinking assesses “information gathered from, or generated by, observation, experience, reflection, reasoning, or communication, as a guide to belief and action.” This portion of the definition seems equally suited for religious education. So much of religion is based on personal experience and reflection on those experiences. Owing to the personal nature of religious observations, experiences, reflections, and reasoning, adherents often find them difficult to fully explain. This personal experience may be compared to a baseball player who has mastered the art of batting. Intellectually, the player may understand perfectly what must be done, as he or she may have practiced it innumerable times, but when asked to explain it to someone else the player is unable to do so. Such a situation does not detract from the fact that the batter has mastered the art, yet the explanation remains difficult. Additionally, religious experiences are often very personal in nature. Due to the value attributed to those experiences, a person may not choose to share them frequently because of a fear that others will not understand or may even attempt to degrade and minimize those experiences and the feelings associated with them. Thus, even on the occasion when someone attempts to articulate such experiences, they remain unexplained.

In a religious setting, information derived from observation, experience, and communication may come from meeting with others who share religious beliefs. Moroni 6:5 touches on this idea. “And the church [members] did meet together oft, to fast and to pray, and to speak with one another concerning the welfare of their souls.” Congregating has long been a cornerstone of religious experience. Doing so provides members opportunities for observation, experience, reflection, and communication, all of which make up the delicate tapestry of religious belief and behavior.

Adding to the definition given by Scriven and Paul, college professor and author Tim John Moore asserts that another quality important in critical thought is skepticism, verging on agnosticism, toward knowledge—calling into question whether reality can be known for certain. [8] This skepticism carries with it immediate doubt prior to being presented with knowledge. Others have termed it as a “doubtful mentality.” [9] This definition does not seem able to coexist with faith-motivated critical thinking. Many scriptures teach about the importance of faith trumping doubt, the most recognizable among them likely being James 1:5–6: “If any of you lack wisdom, let him ask of God, that giveth to all men liberally, and upbraideth not; and it shall be given him. But let him ask in faith, nothing wavering. For he that wavereth is like a wave of the sea driven with the wind and tossed.”

Concerning the type of doubt that arises even before learning facts, Dieter F. Uchtdorf of the Church’s First Presidency said, “Doubt your doubts before you doubt your faith.” [10] This admonition indicates that there is an ultimate source of truth, and when our doubts loom large it is better to doubt those doubts instead of doubting God. The Doctrinal Mastery: Core Document , a part of the S&I curriculum introduced in the summer of 2016, states that “God . . . is the source of all truth. . . . He has not yet revealed all truth.” [11] Thus, doubt should be curbed at the point when we do not have all the evidence or answers we seek. Such is the case in the scientific method: a tested hypothesis leads to a theory, and confirmed theories lead to laws. Fortunately, neither hypotheses nor theories are abandoned for lack of proof or the existence of doubt concerning them.

Some within a religious community may be hesitant to apply critical thinking to their own religious beliefs, believing that doing so could weaken their faith. Psychologist Diane Halpern, however, suggests that critical thinking need not carry with it such negative connotations. “In critical thinking , the word critical is not meant to imply ‘finding fault,’ as it might be used in a pejorative way to describe someone who is always making negative comments. It is used instead in the sense of ‘critical’ that involves evaluation or judgement, ideally with the goal of providing useful and accurate feedback that serves to improve the thinking process.” [12] Applying critical thinking need not indicate a lack of faith by a believer—an important point to consider when applying critical thinking to religious education. Critically thinking Christian believers are adhering to the Savior’s commandment to “ask, and it shall be given you; seek, and ye shall find; knock, and it shall be opened unto you” (Matthew 7:7).

Religious believers may be concerned that other critical thinkers have reached an opinion different than theirs. This concern can be addressed by the way critical thinking is defined. Professor of philosophy Jennifer Mulnix writes that “critical thinking, as an intellectual virtue, is not directed at any specific moral ends.” [13] She further explains that critical thinkers do not have a set of beliefs that invariably lead to specific ends, suggesting that two critical thinkers who correctly apply the skills and attitudes of critical thinking to the same subject could hold opposing beliefs. Such critical thinking requires a sort of mental flexibility, a willingness to acknowledge that a person may not be in possession of all the facts. Including such flexibility when defining critical thinking does not disqualify its application to religious education. A religious person can hold beliefs and knowledge while remaining flexible, just as a mathematician holds firm beliefs and knowledge but is willing to accept more and consider alternatives in the light of additional information. In other words, being in possession of facts that a person is unwilling to relinquish does not mean that he or she is unwilling to accept additional facts.

Elder Dallin H. Oaks spoke about the idea of differing conclusions when addressing religious educators. “Because of our knowledge of [the] Plan and other truths that God has revealed, we start with different assumptions than those who do not share our knowledge. As a result, we reach different conclusions on many important subjects that others judge only in terms of their opinions about mortal life.” [14] Each person brings different life experience and knowledge, which they call upon to engage in critical thinking. While both are employing critical-thinking skills, they may be doing so with different facts and differing amounts of facts. All of the facts in consideration may be true, but because of the way those facts are understood, different conclusions are reached. Still, the thinking taking place can be correctly defined as critical.

Another belief included by some in a definition of critical thinking, though at odds with the edifying instruction presented in LDS religious education, is addressed by Rajeswari Mohan, who suggests that to teach using critical thinking would require “a re-understanding of the classroom.” [15] Generally, the understanding that currently exists of the classroom, both inside and outside of religious education, consists of creating an atmosphere of respect and trust, a safe place to learn and grow—something that Mohan calls “cosmopolitan instruction.” [16] In its place Mohan advocates that the classroom become “a site of contestation,” [17] which connotes controversy, argument, and divisiveness. Of course, it is possible to contest a belief, debate, and even disagree while still maintaining trust and respect, but such a teaching atmosphere is what Mohan considers cosmopolitan and, as such, it would require no re-understanding to accomplish it.

Elizabeth Ellsworth described her experience when attempting to employ the type of approach Mohan suggests in her own classroom. [18] In reflecting on the experience, she noted that it exacerbated disagreements between students rather than resolving or solving anything. She summarized what took place by saying, “Rational argument has operated in ways that set up as its opposite an irrational Other.” [19] Rather than having her class engage in discussion and learning, Ellsworth witnessed students who refused to talk because of the fear of retaliation or fear of embarrassment.

Such a situation does not align with D&C 42:14, “If ye receive not the Spirit ye shall not teach.” Additionally, this confrontational atmosphere in the learning environment seems to run counter to the doctrines taught by the Savior. Consider the words of Christ in 3 Nephi 11:29: “I say unto you, he that hath the spirit of contention is not of me, but is of the devil, who is the father of contention, and he stirreth up the hearts of men to contend with anger, one with another.”

Many authors who offer definitions of critical thinking discuss how critical thinking leads to action; one author states, “Criticality requires that one be moved to do something.” [20] President Thomas S. Monson, while a member of the Quorum of the Twelve Apostles, said, “The goal of gospel teaching . . . is not to ‘pour information’ into the minds of class members . . . . The aim is to inspire the individual to think about, feel about, and then do something about living gospel principles.” [21] This application is the foundation of the teachings of Jesus Christ, the very purpose of his Atonement, to allow for individuals to change. This change does not solely consist of stopping some behavior but also includes starting new behaviors. Elder Neal A. Maxwell, for example, suggested that many of us could make more spiritual progress “in the realm of the sins of omission . . . than in any other place.” [22]

Critical Thinking Exaggerated

President Boyd K. Packer taught that “tolerance is a virtue, but like all virtues, when exaggerated, it transforms itself into a vice.” [23] This facet of critical thinking whereby critical thinking prompts action must be explained carefully, as it can be exaggerated and transformed into a vice. Mohan described this aspect of critical thinking that moves individuals to action outside of the classroom as having a “goal of transformative political action” aimed at challenging, interrupting, and undercutting “regimes of knowledge.” [24] Pedagogy of the Oppressed author and political activist Paulo Freire taught that this action brought about the “conquest” [25] of an oppressed class in a society over its oppressors. Some would argue that if it does not lead to this kind of contending, transformative action, critical thinking is incomplete. [26]

Transformative action taken by individuals to change themselves is necessary. Yet the idea that one can effect change within the Church, for individuals or the organization itself, by compulsion or coercion in a spirit of conquest can lead to “the heavens [withdrawing] themselves; the Spirit of the Lord [being] grieved” (D&C 121:37). Critical thinking defined to include this contention does not have a place in religious education within the Church.

A balanced definition of critical thinking that allows for faith in things which are hoped for and yet unseen (see Alma 32:21) may look something like this: Critical thinking consists of persistent, effortful, ponderous, and reflective thought devoted to concepts held and introduced through various ways, including experience, inquiry, and reflection. That person then analyzes, evaluates, and attempts to understand how those concepts coincide and interact with existing knowledge, ready to abandon or employ ideas based upon their truthfulness. This contemplation then leads the person to consistent and appropriate actions.

Because of the benefits of critical thinking, some have taken its application to an extreme, allowing it to undermine faith. Addressing a group of college students in 1996, President Gordon B. Hinckley said, “This is such a marvelous season of your lives. It is a time not only of positive thinking but sometimes of critical thinking. Let me urge you to not let your critical thinking override your faith.” [27]

Examples in Doctrine

Despite a potential to undermine faith when applied incorrectly, critical thinking holds too much promise to be abandoned. This is particularly the case for religious education in The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Not only do questions and critical thought have an appropriate place in the Church, but as President Dieter F. Uchtdorf has pointed out, the Church would not exist without it. [28] He explains that the doctrinally loaded and foundational experience of the First Vision came as the result of Joseph Smith’s critical thought toward existing churches and a desire to know which he should join. Knowing for ourselves if the church that was restored through Joseph Smith’s efforts is truly the “only true and living church” (D&C 1:30) can be done only by following his lead and “ask[ing] of God” (James 1:5). “Asking questions,” President Uchtdorf said, “isn’t a sign of weakness; it’s a precursor of growth.” [29]

This concept of critically thinking while still acting in faith is illustrated in Alma 32:27–43, when Alma teaches a group of nonbelievers who nonetheless want to know the truth. Table 1 compares Alma’s words with concepts of critical thinking.

Figure 1. Alma and Critical Thinking.

The necessity of exercising faith is a major component of all religion. “For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways, saith the Lord. For as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways, and my thoughts than your thoughts” (Isaiah 55:8–9). “Now faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen” (Hebrews 11:1). “I was led by the Spirit, not knowing beforehand the things which I should do” (1 Nephi 4:6). “Look unto me in every thought; doubt not, fear not” (D&C 6:36). The skeptical critic of religion could assert that these statements amount to blind faith or towing the line without a rational or logical reason to do so. Applying critical thinking to such assertions may disclose, ironically, that such approaches are no different than using rational thought.

In Educating Reason , author Harvey Siegel responds to a criticism sometimes waged against critical thinking called the indoctrination objection. His argument provides a means for reconciling faith with logic. In short he observed that critical thinkers have traditionally been opposed to indoctrination of any kind. Over time much has been applied to the perception of, and even the definition of, indoctrination, which now carries with it highly negative connotations of teaching content that is either not true or is taught in such a way that the learner is not provided a way to measure the truthfulness of what is being taught. Yet the fundamental definition of indoctrination is simply to teach.

The indoctrination objection is based on the idea that critical thinkers want to reject all indoctrination, but they cannot do so because critical thinking itself must be taught (indoctrinated). The definition he gives to indoctrination is when students “are led to hold beliefs in such a way that they are prevented from critically inquiring into their legitimacy and the power of the evidence offered in their support; if they hold beliefs in such a way that the beliefs are not open to rational evaluation or assessment.” [32] Siegel delicately defines an indoctrinated belief as “a belief [that] is held non-evidentially.” [33]

It must be acknowledged that children are not born valuing rational thought and evidence; those values must be taught, or indoctrinated. According to Siegel, “If an educational process enhances rationality, on this view, that process is justified.” [34] He later adds that such teaching is not only defensible, but necessary. “We are agreed that such belief-inculcation is desirable and justifiable, and that some of it might have the effect of enhancing the child’s rationality. Should we call it indoctrination? This seems partly, at least, a verbal quibble.” [35]

A teacher is justified in teaching students and a learner is justified in studying if doing so will eventually enhance rationality and if students are allowed to evaluate for themselves what is being taught.

There may even be a period when rationality is put on hold, or the lack of rationality perpetuated, temporarily for the sake of increasing critical thought in the end. This concept of proceeding with learning without first having an established rationale for doing so is the very concept of faith. Just as “faith is not to have a perfect knowledge of things” (Alma 32:21), reasons may not always be understood at first, just as a rational understanding for accepting a teaching is not always given at first. The moment when a learner must accept a teaching without first having a sufficient reason for doing so is faith. Students who continue to engage in the learning process are acting in faith. If the things being taught are true, those things will eventually lead those students to increased rationality and expanded intellect. Such teaching should not detour the student from seeking his or her own personal confirmation. Teaching in a manner that discourages students from establishing their own roots deep into the ground is antithetical to both critical thinking and the purposes of LDS religious education.

Teaching in a way that encourages and invites students to think critically about doctrines reflects not only teaching practices encouraged in today’s religious education within the Church but also doctrines of the Church. The culture and doctrine of the Church seeks to avoid indoctrinating members in the negative or pejorative sense. On the Church’s official Newsroom website is an article explaining what constitutes the doctrines of the Church. Included in that list is this statement: “Individual members are encouraged to independently strive to receive their own spiritual confirmation of the truthfulness of Church doctrine. Moreover, the Church exhorts all people to approach the gospel not only intellectually but with the intellect and the spirit, a process in which reason and faith work together.” [36] More than solely a statement of doctrine on a newsroom website, this concept is bolstered by the words of canonized scripture: “Seek learning, even by study and also by faith” (D&C 88:118). “You have not understood; you have supposed that I would give it unto you, when you took no thought save it was to ask me. But you must study it out in your mind; then you must ask me” (D&C 9:7–8). And finally, from the admonition of Paul, who, after speaking of doctrines, counseled believers to “think on these things” (Philippians 4:8).

The Prophet Joseph Smith addressed the relationship between faith and intellect. “We consider,” he said, “that God has created man with a mind capable of instruction, and a faculty which may be enlarged in proportion to the heed and diligence given to the light communicated from heaven to the intellect; and that the nearer man approaches perfection, the clearer are his views.” [37] In other words, acting in faith, or giving heed and diligence to light communicated from heaven, can enlarge the intellectual faculty and clarify views. Diligence and heed are required in religious education, in which the content being taught is considered irrational by secular society. Amid ridicule by the irreligious, when the intellect is enlarged, the faithful recognize enhanced rationality and clearer views that are never realized by those who are ridiculing. This process continues until full rationality is achieved and the promise of God is fulfilled: “Nothing is secret, that shall not be made manifest; neither any thing hid, that shall not be known” (Luke 8:17). What a promise for a critical thinker!

Critical thinking has the potential to be a powerful tool for educators; that potential does not exclude its use by teachers within the Church. When used appropriately, critical thinking can help students more deeply understand and rely upon the teachings and Atonement of Jesus Christ. The testimony that comes as a result of critical thought can carry students through difficult times and serve as an anchor through crises of faith. As Elder M. Russell Ballard teaches,

Gone are the days when a student asked an honest question and a teacher responded, “Don’t worry about it!” Gone are the days when a student raised a sincere concern and a teacher bore his or her testimony as a response intended to avoid the issue. Gone are the days when students were protected from people who attacked the Church. Fortunately, the Lord provided this timely and timeless counsel to you teachers: “And as all have not faith, seek ye diligently and teach one another words of wisdom; yea, seek ye out of the best books words of wisdom; seek learning, even by study and also by faith.” [38]

Critical thought does not consist of setting aside faith, but rather faith is using critical thought to come to know truth for oneself.

[1] Andrew Davis, “Defending Religious Pluralism for Religious Education,” Ethics and Education 3, no. 5 (November 2010): 190.

[2] Oduntan Jawoniyi, “Religious Education, Critical Thinking, Rational Autonomy, and the Child’s Right to an Open Future,” Religion and Education 39, no. 1 (January 2015): 34–53; and Michael D. Waggoner, “Religion, Education, and Critical Thinking,” Religion and Education 39, no. 3 (September 2012): 233–34.

[3] Waggoner, “Religion, Education, and Critical Thinking,” 233–34.

[4] Duck-Joo Kwak, “Re‐Conceptualizing Critical Thinking for Moral Education in Culturally Plural Societies,” Educational Philosophy and Theory 39, no. 4 (August 2007): 464.

[5] Jawoniyi, “Religious Education,” 46.

[6] Michael Scriven and Richard Paul, quoted in “Defining Critical Thinking,” Foundation for Critical Thinking, http:// www.criticalthinking.org/ pages/ defining-critical-thinking/ 766.

[7] Gospel Teaching and Learning Handbook: A Handbook for Teachers and Leaders in Seminaries and Institutes of Religion (Salt Lake City: The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2012), 39.

[8] Tim John Moore, “Critical Thinking and Disciplinary Thinking: A Continuing Debate,” Higher Education Research & Development 30, no. 3 (June 2011): 261–74.

[9] Ali Mohammad Siahi Atabaki, Narges Keshtiaray, Mohammad Yarmohammadian, “Scrutiny of Critical Thinking Concept,” International Education Studies 8, no. 3 (February 2015): 100.

[10] Dieter F. Uchtdorf, “The Reflection in the Water” (CES fireside for young adults at Brigham Young University, 1 November 2009), https:// www.lds.org/ media-library/ video/ 2009-11-0050-the-reflection-in-the-water?lang=eng#d.

[11] Seminaries and Institutes of Religion, Doctrinal Mastery: Core Document (Salt Lake City: The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2016), 2.

[12] Diane F. Halpern, “Teaching Critical Thinking for Transfer across Domains,” The American Psychologist 53, no. 4 (April 1998): 451.

[13] Jennifer Wilson Mulnix, “Thinking Critically About Critical Thinking,” Educational Philosophy and Theory 44, no. 5 (July 2012): 466.

[14] Dallin H. Oaks, “As He Thinketh in His Heart” (evening with a General Authority, 8 February 2013), https:// www.lds.org/ prophets-and-apostles/ unto-all-the-world/ as-he-thinketh-in-his-heart-?lang=eng.

[15] Rajeswari Mohan, “Dodging the Crossfire: Questions for Postcolonial Pedagogy,” College Literature 19/ 20, vol. 3/ 1 (October 1992–February 1993): 30.

[16] Mohan, “Dodging the Crossfire,” 30.

[17] Mohan, “Dodging the Crossfire,” 30.

[18] Elizabeth Ellsworth, “Why Doesn’t This Feel Empowering? Working through the Repressive Myths of Critical Pedagogy,” Harvard Educational Review 59, no. 3 (September 1989): 297–325.

[19] Ellsworth, “Why Doesn’t This Feel Empowering?,” 301.

[20] Nicholas C. Burbules and Rupert Berk, “Critical Thinking and Critical Pedagogy: Relations, Differences, and Limits,” in Critical Theories in Education , ed. Thomas S. Popkewitz and Lynn Fendler (New York: Routledge, 1999), 45–66.

[21] Thomas S. Monson, in Conference Report, October 1970, 107.

[22] Neal A. Maxwell, “The Precious Promise,” Ensign , April 2004, 45, https:// www.lds.org/ ensign/ 2004/ 04/ the-precious-promise?lang=eng.

[23] Boyd K. Packer, “These Things I Know,” Ensign , May 2013, 8, https:// www.lds.org/ ensign/ 2013/ 05/ these-things-i-know?lang=eng.

[24] Mohan, “Dodging the Crossfire,” 30.

[25] Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed , trans. Myra Bergman Ramos (New York: Continuum International, 1970).

[26] Donaldo Macedo, introduction to Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed , 11–26.

[27] Gordon B. Hinckley, “Excerpts from Recent Addresses of President Gordon B. Hinckley,” Ensign , October 1996, https:// www.lds.org/ ensign/ 1996/ 10/ excerpts-from-recent-addresses-of-president-gordon-b-hinckley?lang=eng.

[28] Uchtdorf, “The Reflection in the Water.”

[29] Uchtdorf, “The Reflection in the Water.”

[30] Harvey Siegel, “Indoctrination Objection,” in Educating Reason: Rationality, Critical Thinking, and Education (New York: Routledge, 1988), 78–90.

[31] Halpern, “Teaching Critical Thinking for Transfer across Domains,” 451.

[32] Siegel, Educating Reason , 80.

[33] Siegel, Educating Reason , 80.

[34] Siegel, Educating Reason , 81.

[35] Siegel, Educating Reason , 82.

[36] “Approaching Mormon Doctrine,” 4 May 2007, http:// www.mormonnewsroom.org/ article/ approaching-mormon-doctrine.

[37] B. H. Roberts, A Comprehensive History of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints , 2nd ed. (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book, 1976), 2:8.

[38] M. Russell Ballard, “The Opportunities and Responsibilities of CES Teachers in the 21st Century” (address to CES religious educators, 26 February 2016), https:// www.lds.org/ broadcasts/ article/ evening-with-a-general-authority/ 2016/ 02/ the-opportunities-and-responsibilities-of-ces-teachers-in-the-21st-century?lang=eng&_r=1.

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Critical Thinking

Critical thinking is a widely accepted educational goal. Its definition is contested, but the competing definitions can be understood as differing conceptions of the same basic concept: careful thinking directed to a goal. Conceptions differ with respect to the scope of such thinking, the type of goal, the criteria and norms for thinking carefully, and the thinking components on which they focus. Its adoption as an educational goal has been recommended on the basis of respect for students’ autonomy and preparing students for success in life and for democratic citizenship. “Critical thinkers” have the dispositions and abilities that lead them to think critically when appropriate. The abilities can be identified directly; the dispositions indirectly, by considering what factors contribute to or impede exercise of the abilities. Standardized tests have been developed to assess the degree to which a person possesses such dispositions and abilities. Educational intervention has been shown experimentally to improve them, particularly when it includes dialogue, anchored instruction, and mentoring. Controversies have arisen over the generalizability of critical thinking across domains, over alleged bias in critical thinking theories and instruction, and over the relationship of critical thinking to other types of thinking.

2.1 Dewey’s Three Main Examples

2.2 dewey’s other examples, 2.3 further examples, 2.4 non-examples, 3. the definition of critical thinking, 4. its value, 5. the process of thinking critically, 6. components of the process, 7. contributory dispositions and abilities, 8.1 initiating dispositions, 8.2 internal dispositions, 9. critical thinking abilities, 10. required knowledge, 11. educational methods, 12.1 the generalizability of critical thinking, 12.2 bias in critical thinking theory and pedagogy, 12.3 relationship of critical thinking to other types of thinking, other internet resources, related entries.

Use of the term ‘critical thinking’ to describe an educational goal goes back to the American philosopher John Dewey (1910), who more commonly called it ‘reflective thinking’. He defined it as

active, persistent and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it, and the further conclusions to which it tends. (Dewey 1910: 6; 1933: 9)

and identified a habit of such consideration with a scientific attitude of mind. His lengthy quotations of Francis Bacon, John Locke, and John Stuart Mill indicate that he was not the first person to propose development of a scientific attitude of mind as an educational goal.

In the 1930s, many of the schools that participated in the Eight-Year Study of the Progressive Education Association (Aikin 1942) adopted critical thinking as an educational goal, for whose achievement the study’s Evaluation Staff developed tests (Smith, Tyler, & Evaluation Staff 1942). Glaser (1941) showed experimentally that it was possible to improve the critical thinking of high school students. Bloom’s influential taxonomy of cognitive educational objectives (Bloom et al. 1956) incorporated critical thinking abilities. Ennis (1962) proposed 12 aspects of critical thinking as a basis for research on the teaching and evaluation of critical thinking ability.

Since 1980, an annual international conference in California on critical thinking and educational reform has attracted tens of thousands of educators from all levels of education and from many parts of the world. Also since 1980, the state university system in California has required all undergraduate students to take a critical thinking course. Since 1983, the Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking has sponsored sessions in conjunction with the divisional meetings of the American Philosophical Association (APA). In 1987, the APA’s Committee on Pre-College Philosophy commissioned a consensus statement on critical thinking for purposes of educational assessment and instruction (Facione 1990a). Researchers have developed standardized tests of critical thinking abilities and dispositions; for details, see the Supplement on Assessment . Educational jurisdictions around the world now include critical thinking in guidelines for curriculum and assessment.

For details on this history, see the Supplement on History .

2. Examples and Non-Examples

Before considering the definition of critical thinking, it will be helpful to have in mind some examples of critical thinking, as well as some examples of kinds of thinking that would apparently not count as critical thinking.

Dewey (1910: 68–71; 1933: 91–94) takes as paradigms of reflective thinking three class papers of students in which they describe their thinking. The examples range from the everyday to the scientific.

Transit : “The other day, when I was down town on 16th Street, a clock caught my eye. I saw that the hands pointed to 12:20. This suggested that I had an engagement at 124th Street, at one o’clock. I reasoned that as it had taken me an hour to come down on a surface car, I should probably be twenty minutes late if I returned the same way. I might save twenty minutes by a subway express. But was there a station near? If not, I might lose more than twenty minutes in looking for one. Then I thought of the elevated, and I saw there was such a line within two blocks. But where was the station? If it were several blocks above or below the street I was on, I should lose time instead of gaining it. My mind went back to the subway express as quicker than the elevated; furthermore, I remembered that it went nearer than the elevated to the part of 124th Street I wished to reach, so that time would be saved at the end of the journey. I concluded in favor of the subway, and reached my destination by one o’clock.” (Dewey 1910: 68–69; 1933: 91–92)

Ferryboat : “Projecting nearly horizontally from the upper deck of the ferryboat on which I daily cross the river is a long white pole, having a gilded ball at its tip. It suggested a flagpole when I first saw it; its color, shape, and gilded ball agreed with this idea, and these reasons seemed to justify me in this belief. But soon difficulties presented themselves. The pole was nearly horizontal, an unusual position for a flagpole; in the next place, there was no pulley, ring, or cord by which to attach a flag; finally, there were elsewhere on the boat two vertical staffs from which flags were occasionally flown. It seemed probable that the pole was not there for flag-flying.

“I then tried to imagine all possible purposes of the pole, and to consider for which of these it was best suited: (a) Possibly it was an ornament. But as all the ferryboats and even the tugboats carried poles, this hypothesis was rejected. (b) Possibly it was the terminal of a wireless telegraph. But the same considerations made this improbable. Besides, the more natural place for such a terminal would be the highest part of the boat, on top of the pilot house. (c) Its purpose might be to point out the direction in which the boat is moving.

“In support of this conclusion, I discovered that the pole was lower than the pilot house, so that the steersman could easily see it. Moreover, the tip was enough higher than the base, so that, from the pilot’s position, it must appear to project far out in front of the boat. Moreover, the pilot being near the front of the boat, he would need some such guide as to its direction. Tugboats would also need poles for such a purpose. This hypothesis was so much more probable than the others that I accepted it. I formed the conclusion that the pole was set up for the purpose of showing the pilot the direction in which the boat pointed, to enable him to steer correctly.” (Dewey 1910: 69–70; 1933: 92–93)

Bubbles : “In washing tumblers in hot soapsuds and placing them mouth downward on a plate, bubbles appeared on the outside of the mouth of the tumblers and then went inside. Why? The presence of bubbles suggests air, which I note must come from inside the tumbler. I see that the soapy water on the plate prevents escape of the air save as it may be caught in bubbles. But why should air leave the tumbler? There was no substance entering to force it out. It must have expanded. It expands by increase of heat, or by decrease of pressure, or both. Could the air have become heated after the tumbler was taken from the hot suds? Clearly not the air that was already entangled in the water. If heated air was the cause, cold air must have entered in transferring the tumblers from the suds to the plate. I test to see if this supposition is true by taking several more tumblers out. Some I shake so as to make sure of entrapping cold air in them. Some I take out holding mouth downward in order to prevent cold air from entering. Bubbles appear on the outside of every one of the former and on none of the latter. I must be right in my inference. Air from the outside must have been expanded by the heat of the tumbler, which explains the appearance of the bubbles on the outside. But why do they then go inside? Cold contracts. The tumbler cooled and also the air inside it. Tension was removed, and hence bubbles appeared inside. To be sure of this, I test by placing a cup of ice on the tumbler while the bubbles are still forming outside. They soon reverse” (Dewey 1910: 70–71; 1933: 93–94).

Dewey (1910, 1933) sprinkles his book with other examples of critical thinking. We will refer to the following.

Weather : A man on a walk notices that it has suddenly become cool, thinks that it is probably going to rain, looks up and sees a dark cloud obscuring the sun, and quickens his steps (1910: 6–10; 1933: 9–13).

Disorder : A man finds his rooms on his return to them in disorder with his belongings thrown about, thinks at first of burglary as an explanation, then thinks of mischievous children as being an alternative explanation, then looks to see whether valuables are missing, and discovers that they are (1910: 82–83; 1933: 166–168).

Typhoid : A physician diagnosing a patient whose conspicuous symptoms suggest typhoid avoids drawing a conclusion until more data are gathered by questioning the patient and by making tests (1910: 85–86; 1933: 170).

Blur : A moving blur catches our eye in the distance, we ask ourselves whether it is a cloud of whirling dust or a tree moving its branches or a man signaling to us, we think of other traits that should be found on each of those possibilities, and we look and see if those traits are found (1910: 102, 108; 1933: 121, 133).

Suction pump : In thinking about the suction pump, the scientist first notes that it will draw water only to a maximum height of 33 feet at sea level and to a lesser maximum height at higher elevations, selects for attention the differing atmospheric pressure at these elevations, sets up experiments in which the air is removed from a vessel containing water (when suction no longer works) and in which the weight of air at various levels is calculated, compares the results of reasoning about the height to which a given weight of air will allow a suction pump to raise water with the observed maximum height at different elevations, and finally assimilates the suction pump to such apparently different phenomena as the siphon and the rising of a balloon (1910: 150–153; 1933: 195–198).

Diamond : A passenger in a car driving in a diamond lane reserved for vehicles with at least one passenger notices that the diamond marks on the pavement are far apart in some places and close together in others. Why? The driver suggests that the reason may be that the diamond marks are not needed where there is a solid double line separating the diamond lane from the adjoining lane, but are needed when there is a dotted single line permitting crossing into the diamond lane. Further observation confirms that the diamonds are close together when a dotted line separates the diamond lane from its neighbour, but otherwise far apart.

Rash : A woman suddenly develops a very itchy red rash on her throat and upper chest. She recently noticed a mark on the back of her right hand, but was not sure whether the mark was a rash or a scrape. She lies down in bed and thinks about what might be causing the rash and what to do about it. About two weeks before, she began taking blood pressure medication that contained a sulfa drug, and the pharmacist had warned her, in view of a previous allergic reaction to a medication containing a sulfa drug, to be on the alert for an allergic reaction; however, she had been taking the medication for two weeks with no such effect. The day before, she began using a new cream on her neck and upper chest; against the new cream as the cause was mark on the back of her hand, which had not been exposed to the cream. She began taking probiotics about a month before. She also recently started new eye drops, but she supposed that manufacturers of eye drops would be careful not to include allergy-causing components in the medication. The rash might be a heat rash, since she recently was sweating profusely from her upper body. Since she is about to go away on a short vacation, where she would not have access to her usual physician, she decides to keep taking the probiotics and using the new eye drops but to discontinue the blood pressure medication and to switch back to the old cream for her neck and upper chest. She forms a plan to consult her regular physician on her return about the blood pressure medication.

Candidate : Although Dewey included no examples of thinking directed at appraising the arguments of others, such thinking has come to be considered a kind of critical thinking. We find an example of such thinking in the performance task on the Collegiate Learning Assessment (CLA+), which its sponsoring organization describes as

a performance-based assessment that provides a measure of an institution’s contribution to the development of critical-thinking and written communication skills of its students. (Council for Aid to Education 2017)

A sample task posted on its website requires the test-taker to write a report for public distribution evaluating a fictional candidate’s policy proposals and their supporting arguments, using supplied background documents, with a recommendation on whether to endorse the candidate.

Immediate acceptance of an idea that suggests itself as a solution to a problem (e.g., a possible explanation of an event or phenomenon, an action that seems likely to produce a desired result) is “uncritical thinking, the minimum of reflection” (Dewey 1910: 13). On-going suspension of judgment in the light of doubt about a possible solution is not critical thinking (Dewey 1910: 108). Critique driven by a dogmatically held political or religious ideology is not critical thinking; thus Paulo Freire (1968 [1970]) is using the term (e.g., at 1970: 71, 81, 100, 146) in a more politically freighted sense that includes not only reflection but also revolutionary action against oppression. Derivation of a conclusion from given data using an algorithm is not critical thinking.

What is critical thinking? There are many definitions. Ennis (2016) lists 14 philosophically oriented scholarly definitions and three dictionary definitions. Following Rawls (1971), who distinguished his conception of justice from a utilitarian conception but regarded them as rival conceptions of the same concept, Ennis maintains that the 17 definitions are different conceptions of the same concept. Rawls articulated the shared concept of justice as

a characteristic set of principles for assigning basic rights and duties and for determining… the proper distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation. (Rawls 1971: 5)

Bailin et al. (1999b) claim that, if one considers what sorts of thinking an educator would take not to be critical thinking and what sorts to be critical thinking, one can conclude that educators typically understand critical thinking to have at least three features.

• It is done for the purpose of making up one’s mind about what to believe or do.
• The person engaging in the thinking is trying to fulfill standards of adequacy and accuracy appropriate to the thinking.
• The thinking fulfills the relevant standards to some threshold level.

One could sum up the core concept that involves these three features by saying that critical thinking is careful goal-directed thinking. This core concept seems to apply to all the examples of critical thinking described in the previous section. As for the non-examples, their exclusion depends on construing careful thinking as excluding jumping immediately to conclusions, suspending judgment no matter how strong the evidence, reasoning from an unquestioned ideological or religious perspective, and routinely using an algorithm to answer a question.

If the core of critical thinking is careful goal-directed thinking, conceptions of it can vary according to its presumed scope, its presumed goal, one’s criteria and threshold for being careful, and the thinking component on which one focuses. As to its scope, some conceptions (e.g., Dewey 1910, 1933) restrict it to constructive thinking on the basis of one’s own observations and experiments, others (e.g., Ennis 1962; Fisher & Scriven 1997; Johnson 1992) to appraisal of the products of such thinking. Ennis (1991) and Bailin et al. (1999b) take it to cover both construction and appraisal. As to its goal, some conceptions restrict it to forming a judgment (Dewey 1910, 1933; Lipman 1987; Facione 1990a). Others allow for actions as well as beliefs as the end point of a process of critical thinking (Ennis 1991; Bailin et al. 1999b). As to the criteria and threshold for being careful, definitions vary in the term used to indicate that critical thinking satisfies certain norms: “intellectually disciplined” (Scriven & Paul 1987), “reasonable” (Ennis 1991), “skillful” (Lipman 1987), “skilled” (Fisher & Scriven 1997), “careful” (Bailin & Battersby 2009). Some definitions specify these norms, referring variously to “consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it and the further conclusions to which it tends” (Dewey 1910, 1933); “the methods of logical inquiry and reasoning” (Glaser 1941); “conceptualizing, applying, analyzing, synthesizing, and/or evaluating information gathered from, or generated by, observation, experience, reflection, reasoning, or communication” (Scriven & Paul 1987); the requirement that “it is sensitive to context, relies on criteria, and is self-correcting” (Lipman 1987); “evidential, conceptual, methodological, criteriological, or contextual considerations” (Facione 1990a); and “plus-minus considerations of the product in terms of appropriate standards (or criteria)” (Johnson 1992). Stanovich and Stanovich (2010) propose to ground the concept of critical thinking in the concept of rationality, which they understand as combining epistemic rationality (fitting one’s beliefs to the world) and instrumental rationality (optimizing goal fulfillment); a critical thinker, in their view, is someone with “a propensity to override suboptimal responses from the autonomous mind” (2010: 227). These variant specifications of norms for critical thinking are not necessarily incompatible with one another, and in any case presuppose the core notion of thinking carefully. As to the thinking component singled out, some definitions focus on suspension of judgment during the thinking (Dewey 1910; McPeck 1981), others on inquiry while judgment is suspended (Bailin & Battersby 2009, 2021), others on the resulting judgment (Facione 1990a), and still others on responsiveness to reasons (Siegel 1988). Kuhn (2019) takes critical thinking to be more a dialogic practice of advancing and responding to arguments than an individual ability.

In educational contexts, a definition of critical thinking is a “programmatic definition” (Scheffler 1960: 19). It expresses a practical program for achieving an educational goal. For this purpose, a one-sentence formulaic definition is much less useful than articulation of a critical thinking process, with criteria and standards for the kinds of thinking that the process may involve. The real educational goal is recognition, adoption and implementation by students of those criteria and standards. That adoption and implementation in turn consists in acquiring the knowledge, abilities and dispositions of a critical thinker.

Conceptions of critical thinking generally do not include moral integrity as part of the concept. Dewey, for example, took critical thinking to be the ultimate intellectual goal of education, but distinguished it from the development of social cooperation among school children, which he took to be the central moral goal. Ennis (1996, 2011) added to his previous list of critical thinking dispositions a group of dispositions to care about the dignity and worth of every person, which he described as a “correlative” (1996) disposition without which critical thinking would be less valuable and perhaps harmful. An educational program that aimed at developing critical thinking but not the correlative disposition to care about the dignity and worth of every person, he asserted, “would be deficient and perhaps dangerous” (Ennis 1996: 172).

Dewey thought that education for reflective thinking would be of value to both the individual and society; recognition in educational practice of the kinship to the scientific attitude of children’s native curiosity, fertile imagination and love of experimental inquiry “would make for individual happiness and the reduction of social waste” (Dewey 1910: iii). Schools participating in the Eight-Year Study took development of the habit of reflective thinking and skill in solving problems as a means to leading young people to understand, appreciate and live the democratic way of life characteristic of the United States (Aikin 1942: 17–18, 81). Harvey Siegel (1988: 55–61) has offered four considerations in support of adopting critical thinking as an educational ideal. (1) Respect for persons requires that schools and teachers honour students’ demands for reasons and explanations, deal with students honestly, and recognize the need to confront students’ independent judgment; these requirements concern the manner in which teachers treat students. (2) Education has the task of preparing children to be successful adults, a task that requires development of their self-sufficiency. (3) Education should initiate children into the rational traditions in such fields as history, science and mathematics. (4) Education should prepare children to become democratic citizens, which requires reasoned procedures and critical talents and attitudes. To supplement these considerations, Siegel (1988: 62–90) responds to two objections: the ideology objection that adoption of any educational ideal requires a prior ideological commitment and the indoctrination objection that cultivation of critical thinking cannot escape being a form of indoctrination.

Despite the diversity of our 11 examples, one can recognize a common pattern. Dewey analyzed it as consisting of five phases:

• suggestions , in which the mind leaps forward to a possible solution;
• an intellectualization of the difficulty or perplexity into a problem to be solved, a question for which the answer must be sought;
• the use of one suggestion after another as a leading idea, or hypothesis , to initiate and guide observation and other operations in collection of factual material;
• the mental elaboration of the idea or supposition as an idea or supposition ( reasoning , in the sense on which reasoning is a part, not the whole, of inference); and
• testing the hypothesis by overt or imaginative action. (Dewey 1933: 106–107; italics in original)

The process of reflective thinking consisting of these phases would be preceded by a perplexed, troubled or confused situation and followed by a cleared-up, unified, resolved situation (Dewey 1933: 106). The term ‘phases’ replaced the term ‘steps’ (Dewey 1910: 72), thus removing the earlier suggestion of an invariant sequence. Variants of the above analysis appeared in (Dewey 1916: 177) and (Dewey 1938: 101–119).

The variant formulations indicate the difficulty of giving a single logical analysis of such a varied process. The process of critical thinking may have a spiral pattern, with the problem being redefined in the light of obstacles to solving it as originally formulated. For example, the person in Transit might have concluded that getting to the appointment at the scheduled time was impossible and have reformulated the problem as that of rescheduling the appointment for a mutually convenient time. Further, defining a problem does not always follow after or lead immediately to an idea of a suggested solution. Nor should it do so, as Dewey himself recognized in describing the physician in Typhoid as avoiding any strong preference for this or that conclusion before getting further information (Dewey 1910: 85; 1933: 170). People with a hypothesis in mind, even one to which they have a very weak commitment, have a so-called “confirmation bias” (Nickerson 1998): they are likely to pay attention to evidence that confirms the hypothesis and to ignore evidence that counts against it or for some competing hypothesis. Detectives, intelligence agencies, and investigators of airplane accidents are well advised to gather relevant evidence systematically and to postpone even tentative adoption of an explanatory hypothesis until the collected evidence rules out with the appropriate degree of certainty all but one explanation. Dewey’s analysis of the critical thinking process can be faulted as well for requiring acceptance or rejection of a possible solution to a defined problem, with no allowance for deciding in the light of the available evidence to suspend judgment. Further, given the great variety of kinds of problems for which reflection is appropriate, there is likely to be variation in its component events. Perhaps the best way to conceptualize the critical thinking process is as a checklist whose component events can occur in a variety of orders, selectively, and more than once. These component events might include (1) noticing a difficulty, (2) defining the problem, (3) dividing the problem into manageable sub-problems, (4) formulating a variety of possible solutions to the problem or sub-problem, (5) determining what evidence is relevant to deciding among possible solutions to the problem or sub-problem, (6) devising a plan of systematic observation or experiment that will uncover the relevant evidence, (7) carrying out the plan of systematic observation or experimentation, (8) noting the results of the systematic observation or experiment, (9) gathering relevant testimony and information from others, (10) judging the credibility of testimony and information gathered from others, (11) drawing conclusions from gathered evidence and accepted testimony, and (12) accepting a solution that the evidence adequately supports (cf. Hitchcock 2017: 485).

Checklist conceptions of the process of critical thinking are open to the objection that they are too mechanical and procedural to fit the multi-dimensional and emotionally charged issues for which critical thinking is urgently needed (Paul 1984). For such issues, a more dialectical process is advocated, in which competing relevant world views are identified, their implications explored, and some sort of creative synthesis attempted.

If one considers the critical thinking process illustrated by the 11 examples, one can identify distinct kinds of mental acts and mental states that form part of it. To distinguish, label and briefly characterize these components is a useful preliminary to identifying abilities, skills, dispositions, attitudes, habits and the like that contribute causally to thinking critically. Identifying such abilities and habits is in turn a useful preliminary to setting educational goals. Setting the goals is in its turn a useful preliminary to designing strategies for helping learners to achieve the goals and to designing ways of measuring the extent to which learners have done so. Such measures provide both feedback to learners on their achievement and a basis for experimental research on the effectiveness of various strategies for educating people to think critically. Let us begin, then, by distinguishing the kinds of mental acts and mental events that can occur in a critical thinking process.

• Observing : One notices something in one’s immediate environment (sudden cooling of temperature in Weather , bubbles forming outside a glass and then going inside in Bubbles , a moving blur in the distance in Blur , a rash in Rash ). Or one notes the results of an experiment or systematic observation (valuables missing in Disorder , no suction without air pressure in Suction pump )
• Feeling : One feels puzzled or uncertain about something (how to get to an appointment on time in Transit , why the diamonds vary in spacing in Diamond ). One wants to resolve this perplexity. One feels satisfaction once one has worked out an answer (to take the subway express in Transit , diamonds closer when needed as a warning in Diamond ).
• Wondering : One formulates a question to be addressed (why bubbles form outside a tumbler taken from hot water in Bubbles , how suction pumps work in Suction pump , what caused the rash in Rash ).
• Imagining : One thinks of possible answers (bus or subway or elevated in Transit , flagpole or ornament or wireless communication aid or direction indicator in Ferryboat , allergic reaction or heat rash in Rash ).
• Inferring : One works out what would be the case if a possible answer were assumed (valuables missing if there has been a burglary in Disorder , earlier start to the rash if it is an allergic reaction to a sulfa drug in Rash ). Or one draws a conclusion once sufficient relevant evidence is gathered (take the subway in Transit , burglary in Disorder , discontinue blood pressure medication and new cream in Rash ).
• Knowledge : One uses stored knowledge of the subject-matter to generate possible answers or to infer what would be expected on the assumption of a particular answer (knowledge of a city’s public transit system in Transit , of the requirements for a flagpole in Ferryboat , of Boyle’s law in Bubbles , of allergic reactions in Rash ).
• Experimenting : One designs and carries out an experiment or a systematic observation to find out whether the results deduced from a possible answer will occur (looking at the location of the flagpole in relation to the pilot’s position in Ferryboat , putting an ice cube on top of a tumbler taken from hot water in Bubbles , measuring the height to which a suction pump will draw water at different elevations in Suction pump , noticing the spacing of diamonds when movement to or from a diamond lane is allowed in Diamond ).
• Consulting : One finds a source of information, gets the information from the source, and makes a judgment on whether to accept it. None of our 11 examples include searching for sources of information. In this respect they are unrepresentative, since most people nowadays have almost instant access to information relevant to answering any question, including many of those illustrated by the examples. However, Candidate includes the activities of extracting information from sources and evaluating its credibility.
• Identifying and analyzing arguments : One notices an argument and works out its structure and content as a preliminary to evaluating its strength. This activity is central to Candidate . It is an important part of a critical thinking process in which one surveys arguments for various positions on an issue.
• Judging : One makes a judgment on the basis of accumulated evidence and reasoning, such as the judgment in Ferryboat that the purpose of the pole is to provide direction to the pilot.
• Deciding : One makes a decision on what to do or on what policy to adopt, as in the decision in Transit to take the subway.

By definition, a person who does something voluntarily is both willing and able to do that thing at that time. Both the willingness and the ability contribute causally to the person’s action, in the sense that the voluntary action would not occur if either (or both) of these were lacking. For example, suppose that one is standing with one’s arms at one’s sides and one voluntarily lifts one’s right arm to an extended horizontal position. One would not do so if one were unable to lift one’s arm, if for example one’s right side was paralyzed as the result of a stroke. Nor would one do so if one were unwilling to lift one’s arm, if for example one were participating in a street demonstration at which a white supremacist was urging the crowd to lift their right arm in a Nazi salute and one were unwilling to express support in this way for the racist Nazi ideology. The same analysis applies to a voluntary mental process of thinking critically. It requires both willingness and ability to think critically, including willingness and ability to perform each of the mental acts that compose the process and to coordinate those acts in a sequence that is directed at resolving the initiating perplexity.

Consider willingness first. We can identify causal contributors to willingness to think critically by considering factors that would cause a person who was able to think critically about an issue nevertheless not to do so (Hamby 2014). For each factor, the opposite condition thus contributes causally to willingness to think critically on a particular occasion. For example, people who habitually jump to conclusions without considering alternatives will not think critically about issues that arise, even if they have the required abilities. The contrary condition of willingness to suspend judgment is thus a causal contributor to thinking critically.

Now consider ability. In contrast to the ability to move one’s arm, which can be completely absent because a stroke has left the arm paralyzed, the ability to think critically is a developed ability, whose absence is not a complete absence of ability to think but absence of ability to think well. We can identify the ability to think well directly, in terms of the norms and standards for good thinking. In general, to be able do well the thinking activities that can be components of a critical thinking process, one needs to know the concepts and principles that characterize their good performance, to recognize in particular cases that the concepts and principles apply, and to apply them. The knowledge, recognition and application may be procedural rather than declarative. It may be domain-specific rather than widely applicable, and in either case may need subject-matter knowledge, sometimes of a deep kind.

Reflections of the sort illustrated by the previous two paragraphs have led scholars to identify the knowledge, abilities and dispositions of a “critical thinker”, i.e., someone who thinks critically whenever it is appropriate to do so. We turn now to these three types of causal contributors to thinking critically. We start with dispositions, since arguably these are the most powerful contributors to being a critical thinker, can be fostered at an early stage of a child’s development, and are susceptible to general improvement (Glaser 1941: 175)

8. Critical Thinking Dispositions

Educational researchers use the term ‘dispositions’ broadly for the habits of mind and attitudes that contribute causally to being a critical thinker. Some writers (e.g., Paul & Elder 2006; Hamby 2014; Bailin & Battersby 2016a) propose to use the term ‘virtues’ for this dimension of a critical thinker. The virtues in question, although they are virtues of character, concern the person’s ways of thinking rather than the person’s ways of behaving towards others. They are not moral virtues but intellectual virtues, of the sort articulated by Zagzebski (1996) and discussed by Turri, Alfano, and Greco (2017).

On a realistic conception, thinking dispositions or intellectual virtues are real properties of thinkers. They are general tendencies, propensities, or inclinations to think in particular ways in particular circumstances, and can be genuinely explanatory (Siegel 1999). Sceptics argue that there is no evidence for a specific mental basis for the habits of mind that contribute to thinking critically, and that it is pedagogically misleading to posit such a basis (Bailin et al. 1999a). Whatever their status, critical thinking dispositions need motivation for their initial formation in a child—motivation that may be external or internal. As children develop, the force of habit will gradually become important in sustaining the disposition (Nieto & Valenzuela 2012). Mere force of habit, however, is unlikely to sustain critical thinking dispositions. Critical thinkers must value and enjoy using their knowledge and abilities to think things through for themselves. They must be committed to, and lovers of, inquiry.

A person may have a critical thinking disposition with respect to only some kinds of issues. For example, one could be open-minded about scientific issues but not about religious issues. Similarly, one could be confident in one’s ability to reason about the theological implications of the existence of evil in the world but not in one’s ability to reason about the best design for a guided ballistic missile.

Facione (1990a: 25) divides “affective dispositions” of critical thinking into approaches to life and living in general and approaches to specific issues, questions or problems. Adapting this distinction, one can usefully divide critical thinking dispositions into initiating dispositions (those that contribute causally to starting to think critically about an issue) and internal dispositions (those that contribute causally to doing a good job of thinking critically once one has started). The two categories are not mutually exclusive. For example, open-mindedness, in the sense of willingness to consider alternative points of view to one’s own, is both an initiating and an internal disposition.

Using the strategy of considering factors that would block people with the ability to think critically from doing so, we can identify as initiating dispositions for thinking critically attentiveness, a habit of inquiry, self-confidence, courage, open-mindedness, willingness to suspend judgment, trust in reason, wanting evidence for one’s beliefs, and seeking the truth. We consider briefly what each of these dispositions amounts to, in each case citing sources that acknowledge them.

• Attentiveness : One will not think critically if one fails to recognize an issue that needs to be thought through. For example, the pedestrian in Weather would not have looked up if he had not noticed that the air was suddenly cooler. To be a critical thinker, then, one needs to be habitually attentive to one’s surroundings, noticing not only what one senses but also sources of perplexity in messages received and in one’s own beliefs and attitudes (Facione 1990a: 25; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001).
• Habit of inquiry : Inquiry is effortful, and one needs an internal push to engage in it. For example, the student in Bubbles could easily have stopped at idle wondering about the cause of the bubbles rather than reasoning to a hypothesis, then designing and executing an experiment to test it. Thus willingness to think critically needs mental energy and initiative. What can supply that energy? Love of inquiry, or perhaps just a habit of inquiry. Hamby (2015) has argued that willingness to inquire is the central critical thinking virtue, one that encompasses all the others. It is recognized as a critical thinking disposition by Dewey (1910: 29; 1933: 35), Glaser (1941: 5), Ennis (1987: 12; 1991: 8), Facione (1990a: 25), Bailin et al. (1999b: 294), Halpern (1998: 452), and Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo (2001).
• Self-confidence : Lack of confidence in one’s abilities can block critical thinking. For example, if the woman in Rash lacked confidence in her ability to figure things out for herself, she might just have assumed that the rash on her chest was the allergic reaction to her medication against which the pharmacist had warned her. Thus willingness to think critically requires confidence in one’s ability to inquire (Facione 1990a: 25; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001).
• Courage : Fear of thinking for oneself can stop one from doing it. Thus willingness to think critically requires intellectual courage (Paul & Elder 2006: 16).
• Open-mindedness : A dogmatic attitude will impede thinking critically. For example, a person who adheres rigidly to a “pro-choice” position on the issue of the legal status of induced abortion is likely to be unwilling to consider seriously the issue of when in its development an unborn child acquires a moral right to life. Thus willingness to think critically requires open-mindedness, in the sense of a willingness to examine questions to which one already accepts an answer but which further evidence or reasoning might cause one to answer differently (Dewey 1933; Facione 1990a; Ennis 1991; Bailin et al. 1999b; Halpern 1998, Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001). Paul (1981) emphasizes open-mindedness about alternative world-views, and recommends a dialectical approach to integrating such views as central to what he calls “strong sense” critical thinking. In three studies, Haran, Ritov, & Mellers (2013) found that actively open-minded thinking, including “the tendency to weigh new evidence against a favored belief, to spend sufficient time on a problem before giving up, and to consider carefully the opinions of others in forming one’s own”, led study participants to acquire information and thus to make accurate estimations.
• Willingness to suspend judgment : Premature closure on an initial solution will block critical thinking. Thus willingness to think critically requires a willingness to suspend judgment while alternatives are explored (Facione 1990a; Ennis 1991; Halpern 1998).
• Trust in reason : Since distrust in the processes of reasoned inquiry will dissuade one from engaging in it, trust in them is an initiating critical thinking disposition (Facione 1990a, 25; Bailin et al. 1999b: 294; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001; Paul & Elder 2006). In reaction to an allegedly exclusive emphasis on reason in critical thinking theory and pedagogy, Thayer-Bacon (2000) argues that intuition, imagination, and emotion have important roles to play in an adequate conception of critical thinking that she calls “constructive thinking”. From her point of view, critical thinking requires trust not only in reason but also in intuition, imagination, and emotion.
• Seeking the truth : If one does not care about the truth but is content to stick with one’s initial bias on an issue, then one will not think critically about it. Seeking the truth is thus an initiating critical thinking disposition (Bailin et al. 1999b: 294; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001). A disposition to seek the truth is implicit in more specific critical thinking dispositions, such as trying to be well-informed, considering seriously points of view other than one’s own, looking for alternatives, suspending judgment when the evidence is insufficient, and adopting a position when the evidence supporting it is sufficient.

Some of the initiating dispositions, such as open-mindedness and willingness to suspend judgment, are also internal critical thinking dispositions, in the sense of mental habits or attitudes that contribute causally to doing a good job of critical thinking once one starts the process. But there are many other internal critical thinking dispositions. Some of them are parasitic on one’s conception of good thinking. For example, it is constitutive of good thinking about an issue to formulate the issue clearly and to maintain focus on it. For this purpose, one needs not only the corresponding ability but also the corresponding disposition. Ennis (1991: 8) describes it as the disposition “to determine and maintain focus on the conclusion or question”, Facione (1990a: 25) as “clarity in stating the question or concern”. Other internal dispositions are motivators to continue or adjust the critical thinking process, such as willingness to persist in a complex task and willingness to abandon nonproductive strategies in an attempt to self-correct (Halpern 1998: 452). For a list of identified internal critical thinking dispositions, see the Supplement on Internal Critical Thinking Dispositions .

Some theorists postulate skills, i.e., acquired abilities, as operative in critical thinking. It is not obvious, however, that a good mental act is the exercise of a generic acquired skill. Inferring an expected time of arrival, as in Transit , has some generic components but also uses non-generic subject-matter knowledge. Bailin et al. (1999a) argue against viewing critical thinking skills as generic and discrete, on the ground that skilled performance at a critical thinking task cannot be separated from knowledge of concepts and from domain-specific principles of good thinking. Talk of skills, they concede, is unproblematic if it means merely that a person with critical thinking skills is capable of intelligent performance.

Despite such scepticism, theorists of critical thinking have listed as general contributors to critical thinking what they variously call abilities (Glaser 1941; Ennis 1962, 1991), skills (Facione 1990a; Halpern 1998) or competencies (Fisher & Scriven 1997). Amalgamating these lists would produce a confusing and chaotic cornucopia of more than 50 possible educational objectives, with only partial overlap among them. It makes sense instead to try to understand the reasons for the multiplicity and diversity, and to make a selection according to one’s own reasons for singling out abilities to be developed in a critical thinking curriculum. Two reasons for diversity among lists of critical thinking abilities are the underlying conception of critical thinking and the envisaged educational level. Appraisal-only conceptions, for example, involve a different suite of abilities than constructive-only conceptions. Some lists, such as those in (Glaser 1941), are put forward as educational objectives for secondary school students, whereas others are proposed as objectives for college students (e.g., Facione 1990a).

The abilities described in the remaining paragraphs of this section emerge from reflection on the general abilities needed to do well the thinking activities identified in section 6 as components of the critical thinking process described in section 5 . The derivation of each collection of abilities is accompanied by citation of sources that list such abilities and of standardized tests that claim to test them.

Observational abilities : Careful and accurate observation sometimes requires specialist expertise and practice, as in the case of observing birds and observing accident scenes. However, there are general abilities of noticing what one’s senses are picking up from one’s environment and of being able to articulate clearly and accurately to oneself and others what one has observed. It helps in exercising them to be able to recognize and take into account factors that make one’s observation less trustworthy, such as prior framing of the situation, inadequate time, deficient senses, poor observation conditions, and the like. It helps as well to be skilled at taking steps to make one’s observation more trustworthy, such as moving closer to get a better look, measuring something three times and taking the average, and checking what one thinks one is observing with someone else who is in a good position to observe it. It also helps to be skilled at recognizing respects in which one’s report of one’s observation involves inference rather than direct observation, so that one can then consider whether the inference is justified. These abilities come into play as well when one thinks about whether and with what degree of confidence to accept an observation report, for example in the study of history or in a criminal investigation or in assessing news reports. Observational abilities show up in some lists of critical thinking abilities (Ennis 1962: 90; Facione 1990a: 16; Ennis 1991: 9). There are items testing a person’s ability to judge the credibility of observation reports in the Cornell Critical Thinking Tests, Levels X and Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005). Norris and King (1983, 1985, 1990a, 1990b) is a test of ability to appraise observation reports.

Emotional abilities : The emotions that drive a critical thinking process are perplexity or puzzlement, a wish to resolve it, and satisfaction at achieving the desired resolution. Children experience these emotions at an early age, without being trained to do so. Education that takes critical thinking as a goal needs only to channel these emotions and to make sure not to stifle them. Collaborative critical thinking benefits from ability to recognize one’s own and others’ emotional commitments and reactions.

Questioning abilities : A critical thinking process needs transformation of an inchoate sense of perplexity into a clear question. Formulating a question well requires not building in questionable assumptions, not prejudging the issue, and using language that in context is unambiguous and precise enough (Ennis 1962: 97; 1991: 9).

Imaginative abilities : Thinking directed at finding the correct causal explanation of a general phenomenon or particular event requires an ability to imagine possible explanations. Thinking about what policy or plan of action to adopt requires generation of options and consideration of possible consequences of each option. Domain knowledge is required for such creative activity, but a general ability to imagine alternatives is helpful and can be nurtured so as to become easier, quicker, more extensive, and deeper (Dewey 1910: 34–39; 1933: 40–47). Facione (1990a) and Halpern (1998) include the ability to imagine alternatives as a critical thinking ability.

Inferential abilities : The ability to draw conclusions from given information, and to recognize with what degree of certainty one’s own or others’ conclusions follow, is universally recognized as a general critical thinking ability. All 11 examples in section 2 of this article include inferences, some from hypotheses or options (as in Transit , Ferryboat and Disorder ), others from something observed (as in Weather and Rash ). None of these inferences is formally valid. Rather, they are licensed by general, sometimes qualified substantive rules of inference (Toulmin 1958) that rest on domain knowledge—that a bus trip takes about the same time in each direction, that the terminal of a wireless telegraph would be located on the highest possible place, that sudden cooling is often followed by rain, that an allergic reaction to a sulfa drug generally shows up soon after one starts taking it. It is a matter of controversy to what extent the specialized ability to deduce conclusions from premisses using formal rules of inference is needed for critical thinking. Dewey (1933) locates logical forms in setting out the products of reflection rather than in the process of reflection. Ennis (1981a), on the other hand, maintains that a liberally-educated person should have the following abilities: to translate natural-language statements into statements using the standard logical operators, to use appropriately the language of necessary and sufficient conditions, to deal with argument forms and arguments containing symbols, to determine whether in virtue of an argument’s form its conclusion follows necessarily from its premisses, to reason with logically complex propositions, and to apply the rules and procedures of deductive logic. Inferential abilities are recognized as critical thinking abilities by Glaser (1941: 6), Facione (1990a: 9), Ennis (1991: 9), Fisher & Scriven (1997: 99, 111), and Halpern (1998: 452). Items testing inferential abilities constitute two of the five subtests of the Watson Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal (Watson & Glaser 1980a, 1980b, 1994), two of the four sections in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level X (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005), three of the seven sections in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005), 11 of the 34 items on Forms A and B of the California Critical Thinking Skills Test (Facione 1990b, 1992), and a high but variable proportion of the 25 selected-response questions in the Collegiate Learning Assessment (Council for Aid to Education 2017).

Experimenting abilities : Knowing how to design and execute an experiment is important not just in scientific research but also in everyday life, as in Rash . Dewey devoted a whole chapter of his How We Think (1910: 145–156; 1933: 190–202) to the superiority of experimentation over observation in advancing knowledge. Experimenting abilities come into play at one remove in appraising reports of scientific studies. Skill in designing and executing experiments includes the acknowledged abilities to appraise evidence (Glaser 1941: 6), to carry out experiments and to apply appropriate statistical inference techniques (Facione 1990a: 9), to judge inductions to an explanatory hypothesis (Ennis 1991: 9), and to recognize the need for an adequately large sample size (Halpern 1998). The Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005) includes four items (out of 52) on experimental design. The Collegiate Learning Assessment (Council for Aid to Education 2017) makes room for appraisal of study design in both its performance task and its selected-response questions.

Consulting abilities : Skill at consulting sources of information comes into play when one seeks information to help resolve a problem, as in Candidate . Ability to find and appraise information includes ability to gather and marshal pertinent information (Glaser 1941: 6), to judge whether a statement made by an alleged authority is acceptable (Ennis 1962: 84), to plan a search for desired information (Facione 1990a: 9), and to judge the credibility of a source (Ennis 1991: 9). Ability to judge the credibility of statements is tested by 24 items (out of 76) in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level X (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005) and by four items (out of 52) in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005). The College Learning Assessment’s performance task requires evaluation of whether information in documents is credible or unreliable (Council for Aid to Education 2017).

Argument analysis abilities : The ability to identify and analyze arguments contributes to the process of surveying arguments on an issue in order to form one’s own reasoned judgment, as in Candidate . The ability to detect and analyze arguments is recognized as a critical thinking skill by Facione (1990a: 7–8), Ennis (1991: 9) and Halpern (1998). Five items (out of 34) on the California Critical Thinking Skills Test (Facione 1990b, 1992) test skill at argument analysis. The College Learning Assessment (Council for Aid to Education 2017) incorporates argument analysis in its selected-response tests of critical reading and evaluation and of critiquing an argument.

Judging skills and deciding skills : Skill at judging and deciding is skill at recognizing what judgment or decision the available evidence and argument supports, and with what degree of confidence. It is thus a component of the inferential skills already discussed.

Lists and tests of critical thinking abilities often include two more abilities: identifying assumptions and constructing and evaluating definitions.

In addition to dispositions and abilities, critical thinking needs knowledge: of critical thinking concepts, of critical thinking principles, and of the subject-matter of the thinking.

We can derive a short list of concepts whose understanding contributes to critical thinking from the critical thinking abilities described in the preceding section. Observational abilities require an understanding of the difference between observation and inference. Questioning abilities require an understanding of the concepts of ambiguity and vagueness. Inferential abilities require an understanding of the difference between conclusive and defeasible inference (traditionally, between deduction and induction), as well as of the difference between necessary and sufficient conditions. Experimenting abilities require an understanding of the concepts of hypothesis, null hypothesis, assumption and prediction, as well as of the concept of statistical significance and of its difference from importance. They also require an understanding of the difference between an experiment and an observational study, and in particular of the difference between a randomized controlled trial, a prospective correlational study and a retrospective (case-control) study. Argument analysis abilities require an understanding of the concepts of argument, premiss, assumption, conclusion and counter-consideration. Additional critical thinking concepts are proposed by Bailin et al. (1999b: 293), Fisher & Scriven (1997: 105–106), Black (2012), and Blair (2021).

According to Glaser (1941: 25), ability to think critically requires knowledge of the methods of logical inquiry and reasoning. If we review the list of abilities in the preceding section, however, we can see that some of them can be acquired and exercised merely through practice, possibly guided in an educational setting, followed by feedback. Searching intelligently for a causal explanation of some phenomenon or event requires that one consider a full range of possible causal contributors, but it seems more important that one implements this principle in one’s practice than that one is able to articulate it. What is important is “operational knowledge” of the standards and principles of good thinking (Bailin et al. 1999b: 291–293). But the development of such critical thinking abilities as designing an experiment or constructing an operational definition can benefit from learning their underlying theory. Further, explicit knowledge of quirks of human thinking seems useful as a cautionary guide. Human memory is not just fallible about details, as people learn from their own experiences of misremembering, but is so malleable that a detailed, clear and vivid recollection of an event can be a total fabrication (Loftus 2017). People seek or interpret evidence in ways that are partial to their existing beliefs and expectations, often unconscious of their “confirmation bias” (Nickerson 1998). Not only are people subject to this and other cognitive biases (Kahneman 2011), of which they are typically unaware, but it may be counter-productive for one to make oneself aware of them and try consciously to counteract them or to counteract social biases such as racial or sexual stereotypes (Kenyon & Beaulac 2014). It is helpful to be aware of these facts and of the superior effectiveness of blocking the operation of biases—for example, by making an immediate record of one’s observations, refraining from forming a preliminary explanatory hypothesis, blind refereeing, double-blind randomized trials, and blind grading of students’ work. It is also helpful to be aware of the prevalence of “noise” (unwanted unsystematic variability of judgments), of how to detect noise (through a noise audit), and of how to reduce noise: make accuracy the goal, think statistically, break a process of arriving at a judgment into independent tasks, resist premature intuitions, in a group get independent judgments first, favour comparative judgments and scales (Kahneman, Sibony, & Sunstein 2021). It is helpful as well to be aware of the concept of “bounded rationality” in decision-making and of the related distinction between “satisficing” and optimizing (Simon 1956; Gigerenzer 2001).

Critical thinking about an issue requires substantive knowledge of the domain to which the issue belongs. Critical thinking abilities are not a magic elixir that can be applied to any issue whatever by somebody who has no knowledge of the facts relevant to exploring that issue. For example, the student in Bubbles needed to know that gases do not penetrate solid objects like a glass, that air expands when heated, that the volume of an enclosed gas varies directly with its temperature and inversely with its pressure, and that hot objects will spontaneously cool down to the ambient temperature of their surroundings unless kept hot by insulation or a source of heat. Critical thinkers thus need a rich fund of subject-matter knowledge relevant to the variety of situations they encounter. This fact is recognized in the inclusion among critical thinking dispositions of a concern to become and remain generally well informed.

Experimental educational interventions, with control groups, have shown that education can improve critical thinking skills and dispositions, as measured by standardized tests. For information about these tests, see the Supplement on Assessment .

What educational methods are most effective at developing the dispositions, abilities and knowledge of a critical thinker? In a comprehensive meta-analysis of experimental and quasi-experimental studies of strategies for teaching students to think critically, Abrami et al. (2015) found that dialogue, anchored instruction, and mentoring each increased the effectiveness of the educational intervention, and that they were most effective when combined. They also found that in these studies a combination of separate instruction in critical thinking with subject-matter instruction in which students are encouraged to think critically was more effective than either by itself. However, the difference was not statistically significant; that is, it might have arisen by chance.

Most of these studies lack the longitudinal follow-up required to determine whether the observed differential improvements in critical thinking abilities or dispositions continue over time, for example until high school or college graduation. For details on studies of methods of developing critical thinking skills and dispositions, see the Supplement on Educational Methods .

12. Controversies

Scholars have denied the generalizability of critical thinking abilities across subject domains, have alleged bias in critical thinking theory and pedagogy, and have investigated the relationship of critical thinking to other kinds of thinking.

McPeck (1981) attacked the thinking skills movement of the 1970s, including the critical thinking movement. He argued that there are no general thinking skills, since thinking is always thinking about some subject-matter. It is futile, he claimed, for schools and colleges to teach thinking as if it were a separate subject. Rather, teachers should lead their pupils to become autonomous thinkers by teaching school subjects in a way that brings out their cognitive structure and that encourages and rewards discussion and argument. As some of his critics (e.g., Paul 1985; Siegel 1985) pointed out, McPeck’s central argument needs elaboration, since it has obvious counter-examples in writing and speaking, for which (up to a certain level of complexity) there are teachable general abilities even though they are always about some subject-matter. To make his argument convincing, McPeck needs to explain how thinking differs from writing and speaking in a way that does not permit useful abstraction of its components from the subject-matters with which it deals. He has not done so. Nevertheless, his position that the dispositions and abilities of a critical thinker are best developed in the context of subject-matter instruction is shared by many theorists of critical thinking, including Dewey (1910, 1933), Glaser (1941), Passmore (1980), Weinstein (1990), Bailin et al. (1999b), and Willingham (2019).

McPeck’s challenge prompted reflection on the extent to which critical thinking is subject-specific. McPeck argued for a strong subject-specificity thesis, according to which it is a conceptual truth that all critical thinking abilities are specific to a subject. (He did not however extend his subject-specificity thesis to critical thinking dispositions. In particular, he took the disposition to suspend judgment in situations of cognitive dissonance to be a general disposition.) Conceptual subject-specificity is subject to obvious counter-examples, such as the general ability to recognize confusion of necessary and sufficient conditions. A more modest thesis, also endorsed by McPeck, is epistemological subject-specificity, according to which the norms of good thinking vary from one field to another. Epistemological subject-specificity clearly holds to a certain extent; for example, the principles in accordance with which one solves a differential equation are quite different from the principles in accordance with which one determines whether a painting is a genuine Picasso. But the thesis suffers, as Ennis (1989) points out, from vagueness of the concept of a field or subject and from the obvious existence of inter-field principles, however broadly the concept of a field is construed. For example, the principles of hypothetico-deductive reasoning hold for all the varied fields in which such reasoning occurs. A third kind of subject-specificity is empirical subject-specificity, according to which as a matter of empirically observable fact a person with the abilities and dispositions of a critical thinker in one area of investigation will not necessarily have them in another area of investigation.

The thesis of empirical subject-specificity raises the general problem of transfer. If critical thinking abilities and dispositions have to be developed independently in each school subject, how are they of any use in dealing with the problems of everyday life and the political and social issues of contemporary society, most of which do not fit into the framework of a traditional school subject? Proponents of empirical subject-specificity tend to argue that transfer is more likely to occur if there is critical thinking instruction in a variety of domains, with explicit attention to dispositions and abilities that cut across domains. But evidence for this claim is scanty. There is a need for well-designed empirical studies that investigate the conditions that make transfer more likely.

It is common ground in debates about the generality or subject-specificity of critical thinking dispositions and abilities that critical thinking about any topic requires background knowledge about the topic. For example, the most sophisticated understanding of the principles of hypothetico-deductive reasoning is of no help unless accompanied by some knowledge of what might be plausible explanations of some phenomenon under investigation.

Critics have objected to bias in the theory, pedagogy and practice of critical thinking. Commentators (e.g., Alston 1995; Ennis 1998) have noted that anyone who takes a position has a bias in the neutral sense of being inclined in one direction rather than others. The critics, however, are objecting to bias in the pejorative sense of an unjustified favoring of certain ways of knowing over others, frequently alleging that the unjustly favoured ways are those of a dominant sex or culture (Bailin 1995). These ways favour:

• reinforcement of egocentric and sociocentric biases over dialectical engagement with opposing world-views (Paul 1981, 1984; Warren 1998)
• distancing from the object of inquiry over closeness to it (Martin 1992; Thayer-Bacon 1992)
• indifference to the situation of others over care for them (Martin 1992)
• orientation to thought over orientation to action (Martin 1992)
• being reasonable over caring to understand people’s ideas (Thayer-Bacon 1993)
• being neutral and objective over being embodied and situated (Thayer-Bacon 1995a)
• doubting over believing (Thayer-Bacon 1995b)
• reason over emotion, imagination and intuition (Thayer-Bacon 2000)
• solitary thinking over collaborative thinking (Thayer-Bacon 2000)
• written and spoken assignments over other forms of expression (Alston 2001)
• attention to written and spoken communications over attention to human problems (Alston 2001)
• winning debates in the public sphere over making and understanding meaning (Alston 2001)

A common thread in this smorgasbord of accusations is dissatisfaction with focusing on the logical analysis and evaluation of reasoning and arguments. While these authors acknowledge that such analysis and evaluation is part of critical thinking and should be part of its conceptualization and pedagogy, they insist that it is only a part. Paul (1981), for example, bemoans the tendency of atomistic teaching of methods of analyzing and evaluating arguments to turn students into more able sophists, adept at finding fault with positions and arguments with which they disagree but even more entrenched in the egocentric and sociocentric biases with which they began. Martin (1992) and Thayer-Bacon (1992) cite with approval the self-reported intimacy with their subject-matter of leading researchers in biology and medicine, an intimacy that conflicts with the distancing allegedly recommended in standard conceptions and pedagogy of critical thinking. Thayer-Bacon (2000) contrasts the embodied and socially embedded learning of her elementary school students in a Montessori school, who used their imagination, intuition and emotions as well as their reason, with conceptions of critical thinking as

thinking that is used to critique arguments, offer justifications, and make judgments about what are the good reasons, or the right answers. (Thayer-Bacon 2000: 127–128)

Alston (2001) reports that her students in a women’s studies class were able to see the flaws in the Cinderella myth that pervades much romantic fiction but in their own romantic relationships still acted as if all failures were the woman’s fault and still accepted the notions of love at first sight and living happily ever after. Students, she writes, should

be able to connect their intellectual critique to a more affective, somatic, and ethical account of making risky choices that have sexist, racist, classist, familial, sexual, or other consequences for themselves and those both near and far… critical thinking that reads arguments, texts, or practices merely on the surface without connections to feeling/desiring/doing or action lacks an ethical depth that should infuse the difference between mere cognitive activity and something we want to call critical thinking. (Alston 2001: 34)

Some critics portray such biases as unfair to women. Thayer-Bacon (1992), for example, has charged modern critical thinking theory with being sexist, on the ground that it separates the self from the object and causes one to lose touch with one’s inner voice, and thus stigmatizes women, who (she asserts) link self to object and listen to their inner voice. Her charge does not imply that women as a group are on average less able than men to analyze and evaluate arguments. Facione (1990c) found no difference by sex in performance on his California Critical Thinking Skills Test. Kuhn (1991: 280–281) found no difference by sex in either the disposition or the competence to engage in argumentative thinking.

The critics propose a variety of remedies for the biases that they allege. In general, they do not propose to eliminate or downplay critical thinking as an educational goal. Rather, they propose to conceptualize critical thinking differently and to change its pedagogy accordingly. Their pedagogical proposals arise logically from their objections. They can be summarized as follows:

• Focus on argument networks with dialectical exchanges reflecting contesting points of view rather than on atomic arguments, so as to develop “strong sense” critical thinking that transcends egocentric and sociocentric biases (Paul 1981, 1984).
• Foster closeness to the subject-matter and feeling connected to others in order to inform a humane democracy (Martin 1992).
• Develop “constructive thinking” as a social activity in a community of physically embodied and socially embedded inquirers with personal voices who value not only reason but also imagination, intuition and emotion (Thayer-Bacon 2000).
• In developing critical thinking in school subjects, treat as important neither skills nor dispositions but opening worlds of meaning (Alston 2001).
• Attend to the development of critical thinking dispositions as well as skills, and adopt the “critical pedagogy” practised and advocated by Freire (1968 [1970]) and hooks (1994) (Dalgleish, Girard, & Davies 2017).

A common thread in these proposals is treatment of critical thinking as a social, interactive, personally engaged activity like that of a quilting bee or a barn-raising (Thayer-Bacon 2000) rather than as an individual, solitary, distanced activity symbolized by Rodin’s The Thinker . One can get a vivid description of education with the former type of goal from the writings of bell hooks (1994, 2010). Critical thinking for her is open-minded dialectical exchange across opposing standpoints and from multiple perspectives, a conception similar to Paul’s “strong sense” critical thinking (Paul 1981). She abandons the structure of domination in the traditional classroom. In an introductory course on black women writers, for example, she assigns students to write an autobiographical paragraph about an early racial memory, then to read it aloud as the others listen, thus affirming the uniqueness and value of each voice and creating a communal awareness of the diversity of the group’s experiences (hooks 1994: 84). Her “engaged pedagogy” is thus similar to the “freedom under guidance” implemented in John Dewey’s Laboratory School of Chicago in the late 1890s and early 1900s. It incorporates the dialogue, anchored instruction, and mentoring that Abrami (2015) found to be most effective in improving critical thinking skills and dispositions.

What is the relationship of critical thinking to problem solving, decision-making, higher-order thinking, creative thinking, and other recognized types of thinking? One’s answer to this question obviously depends on how one defines the terms used in the question. If critical thinking is conceived broadly to cover any careful thinking about any topic for any purpose, then problem solving and decision making will be kinds of critical thinking, if they are done carefully. Historically, ‘critical thinking’ and ‘problem solving’ were two names for the same thing. If critical thinking is conceived more narrowly as consisting solely of appraisal of intellectual products, then it will be disjoint with problem solving and decision making, which are constructive.

Bloom’s taxonomy of educational objectives used the phrase “intellectual abilities and skills” for what had been labeled “critical thinking” by some, “reflective thinking” by Dewey and others, and “problem solving” by still others (Bloom et al. 1956: 38). Thus, the so-called “higher-order thinking skills” at the taxonomy’s top levels of analysis, synthesis and evaluation are just critical thinking skills, although they do not come with general criteria for their assessment (Ennis 1981b). The revised version of Bloom’s taxonomy (Anderson et al. 2001) likewise treats critical thinking as cutting across those types of cognitive process that involve more than remembering (Anderson et al. 2001: 269–270). For details, see the Supplement on History .

As to creative thinking, it overlaps with critical thinking (Bailin 1987, 1988). Thinking about the explanation of some phenomenon or event, as in Ferryboat , requires creative imagination in constructing plausible explanatory hypotheses. Likewise, thinking about a policy question, as in Candidate , requires creativity in coming up with options. Conversely, creativity in any field needs to be balanced by critical appraisal of the draft painting or novel or mathematical theory.

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Current events confirm the need to understand religious ideas and institutions critically, yet radical doubts have been raised about how to proceed and about the ideal of critical thought itself. Meanwhile, some prominent scholars have urged that we view modern society as the object of criticism and a religious tradition as the basis for critique. Cambridge Studies in Religion and Critical Thought intends to address the interaction of critical thinking and religious traditions in this context of uncertainty and conflicting claims. The views offered, while varied, will uniformly constitute distinguished, philosophically-informed, and critical analyses of particular religious topics.

• General Editors: Wayne Proudfoot , Columbia University , Jeffrey L. Stout , Nicholas Wolterstorff

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5 results in Cambridge Studies in Religion and Critical Thought

Kierkegaard and the Treachery of Love

• Amy Laura Hall
• Published online: 22 September 2009 Print publication: 01 August 2002
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• View description This is a major study of Kierkegaard and love. Amy Laura Hall explores Kierkegaard's description of love's treachery, difficulty, and hope, reading his Works of Love as a text that both deciphers and complicates the central books in his pseudonymous canon: Fear and Trembling, Repetition, Either/Or, and Stages on Life's Way. In all of these works, the characters are, as in real life, complex and incomplete, and the conclusions are perplexing. Hall argues that a spiritual void brings each text into being, and her interpretation is as much about faith as about love. In a style that is both scholarly and lyrical, she intimates answers to some of the puzzles, making a poetic contribution to ethics and the philosophy of religion.

Edward Said and the Religious Effects of Culture

• William D. Hart
• Published online: 22 September 2009 Print publication: 13 April 2000
• View description This book provides a distinctive account of Edward Said's critique of modern culture by highlighting the religion-secularism distinction on which it is predicated. This distinction is both literal and figurative. It refers, on the one hand, to religious traditions and to secular traditions and, on the other hand, to tropes that extend the meaning and reference of religion and secularism in indeterminate ways. The author takes these tropes as the best way of organizing Said's heterogeneous corpus - from Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography, his first book, to Orientalism, his most influential book, to his recent writings on the Palestinian question. The religion-secularism distinction, as an act of imagination and narrative continuity, lies behind Said's cultural criticism, his notion of intellectual responsibility, and his public controversy with Michael Walzer about the meaning and the uses of the Exodus story and about the question of Palestine.

William James and the Metaphysics of Experience

• David C. Lamberth
• Published online: 22 October 2009 Print publication: 20 May 1999
• View description William James is frequently considered one of America's most important philosophers, as well as a foundational thinker for the study of religion. Despite his reputation as the founder of pragmatism, he is rarely considered a serious philosopher or religious thinker. In this new interpretation David Lamberth argues that James's major contribution was to develop a systematic metaphysics of experience integrally related to his developing pluralistic and social religious ideas. Lamberth systematically interprets James's radically empiricist world-view and argues for an early dating (1895) for his commitment to the metaphysics of radical empiricism. He offers a close reading of Varieties of Religious Experience; and concludes by connecting James's ideas about experience, pluralism and truth to current debates in philosophy, the philosophy of religion, and theology, suggesting James's functional, experiential metaphysics as a conceptual aid in bridging the social and interpretive with the immediate and concrete while avoiding naive realism.

Freud and the Legacy of Moses

• Richard J. Bernstein
• Published online: 15 December 2009 Print publication: 08 October 1998
• View description Freud's last book, Moses and Monotheism, was published in 1939 during one of the darkest periods in Jewish history. This difficult book has frequently been vilified and dismissed because Freud claims that Moses was not a Hebrew but an Egyptian, and that the Jews murdered Moses in the wilderness. Richard Bernstein argues that a close reading of Moses and Monotheism reveals an underlying powerful coherence in which Freud seeks to specify the distinctive character and contribution of the Jewish people. It is this character that has enabled the Jewish people to survive despite persecution and virulent anti-Semitism, and Freud proudly identifies himself with it. In his analysis of Freud's often misunderstood last work, Bernstein goes on to shows how Freud expands and deepens our understanding of a religious tradition by revealing its unconscious dynamics.

John Locke and the Ethics of Belief

• Nicholas Wolterstorff
• Published online: 05 July 2011 Print publication: 26 January 1996
• View description Nicholas Wolterstorff discusses the ethics of belief which Locke developed in Book IV of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, where Locke finally argued his overarching aim: how we ought to govern our belief, especially on matters of religion and morality. Wolterstorff shows that this concern was instigated by the collapse, in Locke's day, of a once-unified moral and religious tradition in Europe into warring factions. His was thus a culturally and socially engaged epistemology. This view of Locke invites a new interpretation of the origins of modern philosophy. He maintained that instead of following tradition we ought to let 'reason be our guide.' Accordingly, after discussing Hume's powerful attack on Locke's recommended practice, Wolterstorff argues for Locke's originality and emphasizes his contribution to the 'modernity' of post-sixteenth-century philosophy.

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