case study of project governance

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Case study in project governance

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Project governance is essential for any project's success. In this case study, you'll see how a large enterprise faced several challenges in its Dynamics 365 implementation project and how it improved its project governance to overcome them.

The situation

The enterprise used legacy home-grown applications to manage its sales and customer service processes. It wanted to switch to a new cloud solution, Dynamics 365. This was a complex and mission-critical project for the company, and its first cloud deployment in a traditional IT landscape. The company needed to deliver a minimum viable product (MVP) in six months and then roll out the solution gradually to its users.

The implementation team aligned the scope with the business priorities and agreed on clear project goals. But it didn't define clear processes for some key aspects of the project. It didn't have realistic timelines for the planned activities or an understanding of the technical and business complexity. It didn't have a well-defined project organization structure or adequate and qualified resources. And it didn't provide effective project updates for the steering group or fully understand the product capabilities and requirements.

The challenges

As soon as the project started, complexities emerged early on. But the team didn't review and adjust their activities accordingly. This led to negative impacts such as poor quality of deliverables, misunderstanding of requirements between customer and partner, a high number of defects during initial testing cycles, and incomplete implementation of requirements due to lack of skilled resources on the project. The final go-live date changed constantly, resulting in a delay of six to eight months. Worse, customer and partner had a complete lack of trust.

After many discussions between customer and partner stakeholders, the enterprise decided to change its approach. The team defined a clear project organization structure and set up processes to monitor and manage the project effectively.

The solutions

The team implemented several activities as part of their project governance processes. They identified training needs for both the customer's business and IT teams so they could understand the cloud and Dynamics 365 capabilities. They established an architecture board that reviewed architectural decisions and gap analysis. For any gaps identified, the board provided input to the change control board to ensure that changes were managed without affecting timelines. They assigned industry and product architects to the project to avoid domain knowledge gaps and perform a clear fit gap analysis.

The steering committee had senior management support to make relevant and necessary decisions throughout the project. They outsourced some activities such as performance testing and vulnerabilities testing so that the existing team could focus on their core functional scope.

These controls and processes helped the team redefine their project timelines and go live within that timeframe. They also applied and tailored these learnings to other projects to avoid similar high-cost impacts.

The takeaway

Project governance isn't an afterthought. It's a flexible backbone for the entire project. You need to set it up from the beginning and adjust it as needed.

This is one of many case studies that show how project governance is the most critical factor for a successful project.

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What is Project Governance? Structure, Examples, Tips

Effective and timely decision-making is one of the pillars of a successful project. Decisions form an essential part of the day-to-day running of any project. Every success and failure in an organization is traceable to a decision that someone made or failed to make.

To ensure that your projects are running smoothly and heading towards success, you need to implement effective project governance.

In this article, you will learn everything you need to know about project governance including why it is crucial to the success of your project.

Let’s get started.

What is Project Governance?

Project governance is the project management framework that overlooks how an organization makes project decisions. According to A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK Guide), project governance is an “oversight function that is aligned with the organization’s governance model and encompasses the project life cycle.”

In simpler terms, project governance acts as a guide to the decision-making process. It provides a detailed method of controlling the project while ensuring the project’s success.

Project governance helps an organization have a structured approach in conducting its day-to-day activities. The role of project governance is to help a project exist within the framework of the organization's overall structure while ensuring it applies to the entire time the project is running through carefully taken steps and protocols.

Effective project governance helps keep essential projects running smoothly within the specific time frame within the constraint of a budget. It ensures client satisfaction which is the main goal of every successful project embarked on.

3 Pillars of Project Governance

Every successful project governance strategy rests on a stable foundation. There are essential pillars that hold this foundation. The decision-making process of any organization depends on these three pillars of project governance.

• Information: For an effective project governance model, open communication is critical. Regular reporting is important to ensure project success. Every project is likely to fail if there is no consistent information sharing. Information acts as a guide to decision-makers.
• People: Successful project governance involves having the right people in the right places. The people make up the most critical aspect as they are the decision-makers. Investing in getting the right people is essential. Also, assign roles and make them as clear and achievable as possible.
• Structure: The structure of any project is the supportive leg that holds the project. This does not entail the project team alone but includes the company as a whole. The structure is divided into various committees that work specifically in their assigned area of specialization to ensure the successful completion of the project.

Roles in a Project Governance Framework

Roles serve as guidelines for each member of a project team. You need to define different roles within a project governance system. They all work hand in hand to ensure effective management and overlook the day-to-day running of each project.

• Project Sponsors: At the project initiation stage of every project, you need the project sponsor to help kickstart the project. The project sponsor is an individual or a team of individuals tasked with the responsibility of the project's success. He or she often sits on the board as the chair of the project.
• Project Manager: The project manager is the second in command concerning management and reports directly to the project sponsor. He or she is responsible for the daily tasks, duties, and management carried out on the project. The project manager gets clarity from the project sponsor about business proposals, strategies, and issues when they arise.
• Project Stakeholders: These are the group of people who are directly at the receiving end of the project deliverables. Project stakeholders are not part of the everyday running of the project. They are at the receiving end of the outcome of the project.

Core Project Governance Principles

Project governance systems depend on essential principles which are important to the effective running of the project. There are four core project governance principles.

1. Accountability

One of the most vital factors for project success is accountability. Lack of accountability leads to no clear leadership of the program structure. There has to be at least one person at the center leading the charge to proper solutions to various issues as they arrive.

Accountability also helps to fasten the decision-making process as it is easier to make decisions with a sense of direction and insight. It is an important principle in effective project governance. The choice of who is to account for what and who to be accountable to is pivotal to the success of the project.

2. Independence of Project Ownership

This involves promoting the allocation of the role of the project owner to the asset owner to provide certainty that the project will meet the project sponsor's fundamental needs of a successful project.

There is a need for exceptional skill sets for project ownership in order not to place the project decision-making process at risk. Also, there is always the danger of operational needs prevailing which ends up placing the project at risk of negligence.

Allocating project ownership to a professional that is not a member of the project team is the best practice for ensuring a project meets customers' and stakeholders' needs simultaneously.

3. Separation of Stakeholder’s Management from Decision-making Process

Large committees fail to make timely decisions and often end up making wrong decisions. You can attribute this to the numbers at play. The decision-making process is often congested as everyone wants to make an input and the time frame is just not enough.

Also, all stakeholders present will not have the same level of understanding of the issues being deliberated on. Therefore, the scarce resource in time is further wasted trying to find an amicable understanding that works for everyone.

Distinguishing the roles of the project decision-making process from the project management is vital to the success of the project. Members of the decision-making process need to be reduced to the barest minimum to give room for efficient decision-making that would be pivotal to the success of the project.

While deciding on the right stakeholder management system to use, the needs of all project stakeholders should be put into consideration.

4. Separation of Project Governance from Organizational Governance Structures

In a situation where you observe that an organization lacks the necessary structure in place to see a project through to completion, there is a need to establish a project governance system. Adaptability and timely decision-making are key to a project’s success. Unfortunately, many organizations’ structures do not have the framework in place to achieve this.

Project governance structures overcome this by isolating a separate class of key decision-makers out of the organization structure. These key decision-makers drawn out of the organization’s structure are responsible for making decisions without the regularities of the hierarchies.

While deciding on the right project governance framework to implement, note that it needs to be independent of the organization's already put in place structure. Also, it has to be independent of any pending issues to avoid occurrences where the decisions of any of the project committees need approval by a board outside of that project decision-making forum.

The steering committee or project board is in charge of project approval, progress reviews, and delivering the project outcomes and benefits. You need to carry along the steering committee or project board in the decision-making processes.

Power to make decisions without needing to ratify them from someone else should be granted to this committee. This principle will help reduce too many hiccups in the decision-making and ensure you do it promptly.

Why Is Project Governance Critical to the Success of a Project?

Project governance often involves the need for a large chunk of investment to be sacrificed when embarking on a new project. There is always a big issue arising on what to expect upon investing in a new project governance system.

1. Ensures Accountability

Accountability is one of the backbones of a good project governance framework. The primary aim of accountability is to deliver on the project's laid down and well-detailed objectives.

2. Improves Decision-Making

Project governance helps in improving decision-making by clearly defining roles and assigning tasks to various individuals involved in the project framework. This is important as everyone knows clearly what their impact is on the project.

Also, if a risk is encountered, only the persons involved are directly affected and not the entire project. The persons affected now face the responsibility of finding quick and effective solutions to the impending issue at hand.

3. Issue Management

The project governance framework provides carefully detailed guidelines on who is affected by an issue and the way forward in countering the issue as it arises.

4. Gathering and Dispersing of Information

Project governance helps in the gathering and dispersing of information to all members of the project team by ensuring the existence of a detailed communication plan.

Project Governance Components

Project governance components are essentially the core parts that make up a good project. This entails all the factors that you need to take into consideration to have a successful project outcome. There are eight project governance components you need to know.

1. Governance Models

While deciding on an adequate governance model, the project manager needs to define the project framework and timeline. The absence of project governance causes apathy in the decision process.

An overzealous governance model can also breed frustration among stakeholders, especially if you set lofty goals. The project manager needs to pick the best governance model while putting the interest of the stakeholders as well as the sponsor at heart.

2. Accountability and Responsibilities

Defining who and to whom is accountable and the responsibility each stakeholder has to perform is a project manager’s task. Holding the wrong people accountable and conferring responsibilities on the wrong people directly affect the project's success.

Although defining who is accountable at all phases of the project management life cycle is a daunting task, it is important in the successful running of the project.

3. Stakeholder Engagement

Identifying all stakeholders involved in the project is one of the first steps you need to undertake. The importance of one stakeholder should not be undermined. Carry all stakeholders along as the project progresses.

Proper identification of all the stakeholders is critical. Assigning the duties each stakeholder involved in a project has to perform is the work of the project manager. Correct understanding of a project and all its components forms the groundwork for a good framework of a good governance plan.

4. Stakeholder Communication

Upon identifying all the necessary and important members of a project, their interests and what you expect of them needs to be explained in detail. A good communication plan ensures efficient and accurate dissemination of information to all stakeholders involved in the project.

5. Meeting and Reporting

The project manager ensures there is a perfect working balance between meeting and reporting while defining the communication plan. It is important to define the communication plan for every member of the project to ensure there is an understanding of the communication plan. Communication has to be as short and straight to the point as possible.

6. Risk and Issue Management

Projects are usually associated with uncertain and unpredictable risks and issues. Lack of preparation puts the project at risk, and although these risks are tough to predict, they should be factored into the project process. Lack of preparation puts you at risk of falling behind the project’s schedule.

The project team needs to be conscious at the start of the project on how to identify and prioritize the risks as they pop up. How they react to risks is more important than the risk itself.

7. Assurance

Project assurance ensures that you successfully manage and deal with risks and issues effectively for the sole aim of ensuring the project’s success . A major component of a project is providing means of ensuring visibility into the project performance.

8. Project Management Control Process

Project management control process is the most difficult project governance component to execute. This is not carried out on a single-time assessment. The project manager measures the performance regularly and if need be, he or she takes actions on any deviations.

How Project Management Software Helps With Project Governance

Project management software such as Monday.com, ClickUp, Wrike, Teamwork, and Smartsheet help with project governance thanks to its wealth of rich features.

1. Application of Project Governance Strategies

Project management software allows separate individuals to build custom workflow apps and track each process involved in the project including their daily tasks. These software tools equip you with the wherewithal to apply various project governance strategies to ensure successful project completion.

2. Decision-Making

You also enjoy flexibility when setting up the decision-making process or making the decision itself. Project management software tools help you select the efficient and most efficient procedure for carrying out project governance to get the desired result.

3. Team Management and External Collaboration

Project governance is the backbone of any effective project management tool. Project governance is essential to limit the team's micromanagement and empower employees. This also provides you with ample opportunity to invite external partners to contribute to the project.

4. Simplifies Project Governance’s Processes

Applying project management software to help with carrying out the technicalities that are associated with project governance is a welcome development in the quest to help simplify the project governance process. With the aid of the project management software, project governance processes are now easier to implement. The software allows for flexibility in choosing the best project governance strategy for the specific project at hand.

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Anastasia belyh.

Anastasia has been a professional blogger and researcher since 2014. She loves to perform in-depth software reviews to help software buyers make informed decisions when choosing project management software, CRM tools, website builders, and everything around growing a startup business.

Anastasia worked in management consulting and tech startups, so she has lots of experience in helping professionals choosing the right business software.

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12 Project Governance

Ralf Müller is Associate Professor at Umeå University in Sweden and Adjunct Professor at the Norwegian School of Management BI and at SKEMA Business School in France. He lectures and researches in project leadership, project governance, and research methodologies. Prior to his academic career he was worldwide Director of Project Management at NCR Corporation's Teradata Business Unit.

• Published: 02 May 2011
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This article focuses on governance and its related subset project governance. The complementary perspectives of transaction cost economics (TCE), agency theory, and organizational control are taken to develop an overview of governance in organizations, which is subsequently extended into the realm of projects and their management. Research in governance theory is reviewed, starting from the organizational level and developing towards project specific governance models. Finally an attempt is made to identify the boundaries and issues of project governance, which should be of interest for the project management-focused research community.

This chapter focuses on governance and its related subset project governance. The complementary perspectives of transaction cost economics (TCE), agency theory, and organizational control are taken to develop an overview of governance in organizations, which is subsequently extended into the realm of projects and their management. Research in governance theory is reviewed, starting from the organizational level and developing towards project specific governance models. Finally an attempt is made to identify the boundaries and issues of project governance, which should be of interest for the project management-focused research community.

The word governance derived from the Latin word “gubernare” meaning “to steer.” Governance as a function originated from policy research in political science, but has outgrown this area substantially. Originally aimed at “steering” countries, it is nowadays also synonymous for “steering,” for example, corporations, their operations, transactions, and projects.

These projects are either internal to an organization or as transactions with other organizations. The latter can take the form of dyadic buyer–seller relationships or networks of organizations with a joint project objective. No matter the complexity of this transaction, from internal projects to networked projects, agreements are made beforehand on the nature of the parties' transaction and its governance, typically in the form of contracts. These agreements must be acceptable for each of the parties, thus they must be in conformance with each party's individual corporate governance policy, otherwise they would not be signed by the responsible corporate managers. Agreements or contracts as governance structures between several organizations represent the common denominator of the individual corporate governance structures of the participating organizations. Corporate governance sets thereby the boundaries for project governance, most simply in companies' internal projects, more complex and potentially further restrained in projects with external parties. The boundaries for project governance are thereby set at the level of corporate governance. Among the large number of definitions of corporate governance, the one by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD 2004 ) is most often referred to:

Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company's management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are determined.

Governance aims for shaping the “conduct of conduct” in organizations. Using a self-regulation approach, governance steers indirectly through subtle forces (Lemke 2001 ). Examples are the team members in a project consisting of networked companies. Each participating company is responsible for its own resources, but jointly they are governed through the combination of agreed-upon contracts. The contracts define the forces which steer the undertaking indirectly, voiced through a representative, such as a steering committee. This committee is accountable for project results, but not responsible for the team members in the project. Through that governance provides contextual frameworks which shape, but do not necessarily determine the actions of individuals, for example, in projects (Clegg 1994 ; Clegg et al. 2002 ). Therefore “Governance is ultimately concerned with creating the conditions for ordered rule and collective action” (Stoker 1998 : 155).

Corporate governance

Governance as a corporate-level subject originated from the work of Coase ( 1937 ) with his work on The Nature of the Firm and the subsequent antitrust research and policies in the middle of the twentieth century. It was further developed by Williamson (e.g. 1975 , 1985 ), who developed an economic perspective of governance through his transaction cost economics (TCE). This perspective was subsequently complemented by agency theory (e.g. Jensen and Meckling 1976 ; Jensen 2000 ), which adds a structural perspective and addresses the link and information imbalance between the owner and the manager of a governed organization, thus the governed organization and its context. Subsequently organization theorists, such as Ouchi (e.g. 1980 ) and others, developed theories on the link between structure, governance, and the related control mechanisms in organizations, thereby providing a perspective internal to the governed organization. These three perspectives constitute the most popular theoretical base of governance (Williamson 1999a ), and complement each other in a way that makes them the most relevant governance perspectives for the study of project governance. Complementarities are hereby achieved through the rationalism of the economic perspective of TCE, complemented by opportunism and human subjectivity described through agency theory. Organizational control allows for interaction between TCE and agency theory by balancing the level of governance rationality through objective (output) and subjective (behavior) controls. Together the three perspectives provide a comprehensive multidimensional view of governance.

Agency theory: the information perspective of governance

The importance of agency theory, as a contributor to organization theory, especially when coupled with complementary perspectives, was suggested by Eisenhardt ( 1989 ).

Jensen and Meckling ( 1976 ) define an agency relationship where one party, the principal, engages another, the agent, to perform some service on his or her behalf. This involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent. If the aim of both parties is to maximize their economic position, then there is good reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal. Thus agency theory explains the potential for conflict of interest that arises between the manager and owner of a firm, stemming from the fact that only owner-managed firms are effectively managed economically. Dividing ownership from management of the firm (as in the case of shareholder-owned companies) will cause inefficiencies because managers (as agents) will not act in the interest of others (their principals or owners) to the exclusion of their own preferences (Jensen and Meckling 1976 ; Jensen 2000 ).

The relationship between principal and agent is problematic because (Barney and Hesterly 1996 ; Jensen 2000 ):

the interest of principal and agent will typically diverge if both are utility maximizers

the principal cannot perfectly and costlessly monitor the actions of the agent

the principal cannot perfectly and costlessly monitor and acquire the information available to or possessed by the agent.

Moe and Williamson ( 1995 ) summarize this in the two agency problems:

The adverse selection problem: has the principal chosen the right agent?

The moral hazard problem: will the agent always act in the best interest of the owner?

Both problems are grounded in an ex ante (adverse selection) and ex post (moral hazard) information imbalance between principal and agent.

The interests of principal and agent are realigned through contracts (and associated control structures), which yield the highest pay-off for the agent for behavior regarded as most appropriate by the principal (Bergen, Dutta, and Walker 1992 ). Where objectives cannot be defined precisely, behavior-based contracts dominate. Contrarily, clear objectives on the side of the principal lead to outcome-based contracts (Hendry 2002 ).

Four agency costs are associated with those structures and incentives (Jensen 2000 ):

the costs of creating and structuring contracts between principal and agent;

the monitoring expenditures by the principal;

the bonding expenditures by the agent;

the residual loss arising from the manager's self-interest, opportunistic behavior, or bounded rationality.

However, contracts, and especially contracts in complex projects, are always incomplete (Turner 2004 ; Williamson 1995 ), and an opportunity for agents to take advantage of a situation arises frequently. Multi-tasking environments, such as projects, provide opportunities for undiscovered low performance when performance is insufficiently measured (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991 ). As empirically shown by Harrison and Harrel ( 1993 ), the presence of a situation of adverse selection can lead to decisions that are rational in the eyes of the agent, but irrational in the eyes of the principal. Agents may be inclined to continue projects that support their personal interests. Information imbalance with the principal enables presumably rational decisions on the continuation, even though the project should be terminated from a sponsor perspective. Examples include externally hired project managers, who are paid on time and material basis. The longer they stay in a project, the more they earn. In such cases a negative trend or a failing project are continued instead of terminated.

Underlying agency theory is the assumption of a homo economicus, that is, actors are individualistic, opportunistic, and self-serving in the sense of Jensen and Meckling ( 1994 ).

A somewhat different perspective towards the relationship between principal and his or her representative is taken by stewardship theory. Here individuals in organizations are assumed to be stewards whose behavior is ordered such that pro-organizational, collectivistic behaviors have a higher utility than individualistic, self-serving behaviors. Here a high level of identification with the organization creates a principal–steward relationship, which is mutually supportive, instead of mutually distrusting such as a principal–agent relationship. This impacts economic outcomes through differences in collaboration and control structures. Researchers in this stream define situations in which motives of managers are aligned with the objectives of their principals (Davies, Schoorman, and Donaldson 1997 ).

Literature tends to refer to stewardship theory only in the context of agency theory, but not vice versa. The relationship between the two varies contingent on industry sectors with the stewardship theory being a subset, and at best a complementary to the agency theory. A literature analysis of agency and stewardship theory by Cares et al. ( 2006 ) indicated widespread use and acceptance of agency theory in for-profit organizations, but lack of clearness as to its appropriateness for the non-profit sector. They suggest stewardship theory as a subset of agency theory, and potentially appropriate for organizations in the non-profit sector. A more integrative picture is provided by Sundaramurthy and Lewis ( 2003 ) who hypothesize the need for both control structures (as suggested by agency theory) and collaborative structures (as suggested by stewardship theory) simultaneously in modern enterprises. In particular they hypothesize that the continuation of an organization's history is influenced by the preference for control or collaboration. They conceptualize that successful organizations applying a control focus will remain stable within their strategy, whereas less successful organizations applying the same focus will enter into a self-reinforcing downward circle. Within a context of diversity and shareholder involvement they suggest balancing collaboration and control by encouraging trust in human capabilities, distrust in human limitations, and task-related cognitive conflict among governance actors (Sundaramurthy and Lewis 2003 ).

Summarizing the above paragraphs for the domain of projects suggests an agency perspective for successful projects and a balance between agency and stewardship perspective for projects starting to compromise their objectives.

The studies on agency theory addressed in this section vary in their unit of analysis. Earlier studies used either the contract between principal and agent or financial results as unit of analysis, whereas later studies included the level and nature of trust. In hindsight the former approaches defined input and output through the ex ante conditions and the ex post results, whereas the later approaches took more psychological and experience factors into account. Taken together the unit of analysis develops towards the collaboration between principal and agent.

Transaction cost economics: the economic perspective of governance

Transaction costs arise from running the economic system, which are different from production costs and can be perceived as the economic equivalent to friction in physical systems (Williamson 1985 ). They stem from the complexity of the relationship of actors within and among organizations and the impossibility of developing and agreeing on contracts comprehensive enough to structure the relationship in an all-comprehensive manner. TCE explains the different means to reduce these costs in different types of transaction. To do this TCE perceives an organization as a balanced network of contracts (e.g. between buyer and supplier, employee and company, etc.), where each contract constitutes the governance structure of a relationship. An organization is thereby viewed as a governance structure and the underlying unit of analysis is the transaction (Williamson 1985 , 1999a ).

TCE positions itself against the orthodox theories of companies as production functions (e.g. Coase 1937 ) or as capabilities-based routine operations (e.g. Penrose 1959 ), who have production and knowledge as respective units of analysis. TCE applies the transaction as the unit of analysis of choice for research, by referring to “John R. Commons' prescient statement of the economic problem: ‘the ultimate unit of activity…must contain in itself the three principles of conflict, mutuality, and order. This unit is the transaction’ ( 1932 , p. 4)” (Williamson 2002 : 2).

TCE is more microanalytic and adopts an economic perspective, whereas competence is more composite (focusing on routines) and is more concerned with processes (especially learning) and the lessons learned from it. However, Williamson concludes that TCE should not be the only perspective and that the lens of contracts is less of a substitute for than a complement to the orthodox lens of choice (Williamson 1999a ).

“(T)ransaction occurs when a good or service is transferred between technologically separable stages” (Williamson 1999a : 1089). The three attributes of TCE are “the frequency with which transactions recur, the uncertainty (disturbances) to which transactions are subject, and the degree to which transactions are supported by transaction specific assets” (Williamson 1999a : 1089). We can assume projects to be a particular type of transaction.

Depending on the complexity of the transaction different more or less complex governance structures are needed in order to economize transaction costs. “Transaction costs are economized by assigning transactions (which differ in their attributes) to governance structures (the adaptive capacities and associated costs of which differ) in a discriminating way” (Williamson 1985 : 18).

TCE proposes that firms adapt their governance structures to achieve the lowest expected transaction costs. To economize on transaction costs TCE proposes that high levels of asset specificity, uncertainty, and contract incompleteness lead to “make” decisions within an organization's hierarchy, whereas low levels lead to “buy” decisions in the market, if not hybrids of both. Each of these approaches requires different governance structures (Adler et al. 1998 ). Governance structures are adapted to the nature of the contract in a way that governance costs are economized at the minimum level of control structures needed for a transaction's balance of asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency.

Even though TCE is criticized for its crudeness in the form of primitive models, underdeveloped trade-offs, severe measurement problems, and too many degrees of freedom (Williamson 1985 ), it is frequently used to address research issues and explain marketing phenomena. An example includes the investigation of the question of what governs the adaptability of organizations, where Williamson ( 1994 ) conceptually concluded that companies know better than the market what goes on, and their internal dispute leads them to adaptation, which is by outsiders viewed as the invisible hand (in the sense of Adam Smith). This view was recently expanded by O'Reilly and Tushman ( 2004 ) who identified that dynamic capability (the ability to reconfigure assets and existing capabilities) plus ambidexterity (the ability to simultaneously explore and exploit) allows for adaptation of firms to markets.

In an attempt to broaden its scope, TCE was applied to public enterprises, country studies, and other institutions. Results helped to identify the particular circumstances under which these institutions' transactions are performed economically, and those that need improvement (Williamson 1999b , 2003 ).

Trust and control: the organizational perspective of governance

Researchers in organization theory built on TCE and agency theory and complemented it by addressing questions of trust and control as critical features for organizations' governance.

A conceptual examination of the impact of trust on organizational performance showed that different relationships between governance and trust may coexist: (a) trust may enhance the impact of governance on performance, (b) governance may reduce the level of trust between exchange partners, (c) ex ante trust in projects may influence the level of governance complexity (Puranam and Vanneste 2009 ).

The interaction between structural (contract) and relational (trust) dimensions in the governance of organizational alliances was investigated by Faems et al. ( 2008 ). Their qualitative multiple-case study showed a process relationship between contracts and trust, where goodwill trust is a condition that determines how contracts are applied, the contracting process is an incremental learning process that is sensitive to changes in relative bargaining power of the organizations, and mutual interdependence and competence trust are crucial conditions for subsequent transactions.

Most influential for the understanding of control in organizations is the work by Ouchi, who started in 1975 with the quantitative identification of the conditions that govern the use of output control or behavior control by managers. While output control steadily increases when going up the corporate hierarchy, behavior control decreases. Behavior control is preferred by managers when the means–ends relationships between tasks are well understood, as well as in small, less hierarchical firms. Output control is applied by managers in larger organizations with specialized departments, where simple measures of performance are needed which are easily understandable for all employees, or in cases where legitimate evidence of performance is asked for. Counter-intuitively the two control approaches are not substitutes for each other (Ouchi and Maguire 1975 ; Ouchi 1977 ). Addressing the question of whether behavior and output control pervade the organization in a similar way, Ouchi found that behavior control diminishes through the hierarchy, while output control stays. He concluded ( 1978 : 189) that:

high performers are distinguished by the fact that the use of behavior control is influenced by task interdependence, which can be reasonably assumed to affect the need for control, and it is influenced by the expertise of the manager, with more knowledgeable managers applying more behavior control, while less knowledgeable managers apparently leave well enough alone and apply little behavior control. In low performing departments, however, those considerations are unimportant, and the use of behavior control is tied to the manager's free time and his freedom from control from above. In such low performers, the manager with more time on his hands and greater autonomy will apply more behavior control, a condition which suggests the creation of feudal despots within the organization.

The further work of Ouchi and his colleagues introduced the concept of clans and their role in control in organizations. It showed that output and behavior measures of control were incomplete and had to be complemented by psychological ways of control. This concept was subsequently integrated with TCE and agency theory as the third perspective of governance. A clan is defined as a culturally homogeneous organization, with a shared set of values or objectives, together with beliefs about how to coordinate the organization's effort in order to reach common objectives. The clan socializes the organization's members to the extent that the individual's and organization's goals merge, so that selfish behavior increasingly supports organizational goals (Ouchi and Price 1978 ).

In designing a control system for loosely coupled organizations, Ouchi ( 1979 ) extended TCE using clan theory. Here TCE describes the simpler control systems in terms of markets and bureaucracies, and clan theory extends these perspectives through a psychological dimension:

Markets act as the simplest control system through norms of reciprocity for social behavior and the price as information carrier,

Bureaucracies act as a more complex control structure, because they require, in addition to the norms of reciprocity of the market, also the legitimate authority of leaders, plus the acceptance of hierarchy by the organizational members. Information is mainly carried by rules.

Clans are the most complex control structure: they require not only norms of reciprocity and legitimate authority, but also social agreement on a broad range of values and beliefs. Information is carried through traditions within the organization.

Economic organization and a balance of control mechanisms is achieved through the combinations of these three approaches to control.

In projects trust and control are often referred to as two different mechanisms for sponsors to become comfortable with the information about a project. Here trust satisfies the subjective control needs, thus the feeling of comfortableness in placing the right manager into a project. Control then satisfies the rational and often quantitative control needs, thus the feeling of exercising control by measuring key metrics (Turner and Müller 2004 ).

The review above showed the complementary nature of the three perspectives toward governance, namely economical through TCE, human through agency theory, and organizational through trust and control. At this point the question of what the limits of governance are is indicated.

Limitations of governance

The review of literature above showed that governance provides a mental framework for decision-making and behavior within a society's cultural, ethical, and moral standard. The authority exercised by governance institutions ranges from consultative only to governmental policy and law-making. Within this continuum the responsibility for action is delegated to the actor in a governed organization.

Several limitations spring from that and are valid at both the organizational and the project level. Decisions by actors are subject to interpretation of the framework within an organization's or project's context and the situation at hand, leading to a range of possible decisions and behaviors in the face of uncertainty and ambiguity of information, and the subjectivity of the interpretation of the situation and its context. Thus, governance does not anticipate actors' decisions and behavior, but sets the stage for actors to decide on it.

Despite the clear philosophical positioning of governance through Foucault's (1926–84) philosophy of neo-liberalism, the related ontological and epistemological basis of research on governance is less clearly articulated and left to the different research streams and its constituent perspectives. These streams are approached using objective, subjective, and conceptual approaches. However, suggestions on possible research epistemologies at the level of governance (not its constituent parts) are lacking. Stoker ( 1998 ) identified the idiosyncrasies of governance theory as:

Actors are taken from within and outside the governed institution;

Actors work in autonomous self-governing networks;

Boundaries and responsibilities to tackle social problems are blurred;

Power dependencies in collective actions are hidden and need to be identified;

The capacity to get things done does not rest on the power of the governance institution to command or the use of its authority.

It shows that a variety of epistemological stances is indicated for future research, thus going beyond the current prevalence for conceptual and case studies.

Positioning TCE from a contract lens (the firm as governance structure) in relation to orthodoxy lens, as defined by Williamson ( 2002 ) (the firm as technology production system, focused on proper resource allocation), he concluded that as asset specificity and disturbance increase, partners become more dependent on each other, because failure has increasingly large consequences. Further research is indicated on the relevance of the unit of analysis, possibly integrating current viewpoints into new perspectives beyond the traditional ones of production, contract, or competence. The combined use of game theory, organization theory, and TCE could allow the development of more comprehensive models in the future. Further, contract science needs to be better understood and more dynamically applied in reality (Williamson 2002 ).

Project governance

Project governance is the application of the principles of governance to projects. The aim of project governance is to ensure a consistent and predictable delivery of projects within the limitations set by corporate governance or its agreed upon subset in contracts with external partners. Governance, as it applies to portfolios, programs, projects, and project management, “coexists within the corporate governance framework. It comprises the value system, responsibilities, processes and policies that allow projects to achieve organizational objectives and foster implementation that is in the best interest of all the stakeholders, internal and external, and the corporation itself” (Müller 2009 : 4).

Institutions for the governance of projects

The earlier part of this chapter introduced the principal governance tasks as setting goals, providing the means to achieve these goals, and controlling progress. This is done at every node in an organizational hierarchy. To that end, governance is executed at all layers of the organizational hierarchy or in hierarchical relationships in organizational networks, per the following.

Board of directors

The board of directors should define the objectives of the business and the role of projects in achieving these objectives. This influences decisions on, for example, the establishment of steering groups, project sponsors, and Project Management Offices (PMOs) as governance institutions. Along with that the board of directors may decide on the possible roles and responsibilities of these institutions at, for example, stage gate reviews where decisions on project continuation, change, or suspension are made; or reviews/audits where the project and its management is assessed in order to assure appropriate project delivery within the constraints set by the project's governance institutions. Thus the board of directors determine the level of governance exercised over projects.

Steering groups and sponsors

For each project the sponsor sets up the particular governance infrastructure, which links the project with its parent company or contract. This includes the project governance processes, the means of controlling projects, and the roles, responsibilities, and approval requirements. Together with the steering group (or its functional equivalent) the sponsor should govern the project through the project manager in terms of managing the transaction (using a TCE perspective) and structuring the relationships between them and the project manager and its team (using an agency perspective), within the control framework set by them (balance of behavior versus outcome control).

Research by Crawford et al. ( 2008 ) on steering groups' work showed that they typically execute two different functions: governance and support of the project. In their governance role they appoint the project manager, set the project's constraints in terms of budget, time, success criteria, and define the goals to be achieved within these limits. Governance is executed by providing resources, controlling project milestones, deliverables, and change control, and acceptance at project completion. Advice and guidance is given to the project manager on an ad hoc basis when needed. In their support function role, steering groups facilitate preparation within the project's parent organization for the use of the project's deliverables, remove obstacles, help the project team to obtain required approvals from the parent organization, and help manage or influence project stakeholders. Depending on the particular circumstances a project may have a higher or lower need for governance or support. A higher need for governance is typically required where the project is business-critical or where there are rapidly changing markets. Higher need for support is indicated when resource bottlenecks occur or users of the project outcome resist acceptance (Crawford et al. 2008 ).

Project Management Offices (PMOs)

PMOs are organizational entities, resourced with project management experts. Their role in the governance of projects is often described as being tactical, strategic, or a combination thereof. The particular charter of a PMO is dependent on an organization's particular situation. Tactical PMOs typically focus on the improvement of project results through the provision of guidance to project managers in ensuring compliance with corporate project management standards. Governance is hereby achieved through behavior control, supported through training and the development of communities-of-practice. This resembles the establishment of clans, as outlined by Ouchi and Price ( 1978 ). The PMO homogenizes the community of project managers towards shared values or objectives, and the related coordination mechanisms needed to reach common objectives.

PMOs with more strategic roles engage in stewardship of portfolios of projects. They prepare the information for decisions to be taken by portfolio managers, thus contributing to the outcome control of governance.

Program and portfolio management

Where projects sit under programs, the programs and their processes and structures set the context for the governance of individual projects. In these cases, the program manager acts as the owner or sponsor of the projects in a program. He or she takes on the governance roles of sponsor or steering group as described above.

Portfolio managers govern the relative priority and the associated resourcing and visibility of projects. They may impact indirectly time and cost planning, milestone-setting and achievement, as well as delivery of project outcomes by prioritizing and providing the required resources.

Governance frameworks

Recent research on governance frameworks for projects can be categorized into:

General project governance frameworks

Project-specific governance models

These are described below.

Research in the governance of projects started in the 1990s with the identification of the need for different governance approaches contingent on different attributes of projects, such as the (low or high) level of clearness of project goals and the (low or high) level of clearness in methods to achieve these goals. This identified four different governance types, which varied in methodology choice and project manager's management style in the project (Turner and Cochrane 1993 ).

Recently the focus moved from individual projects towards projects-in-context. Söderlund ( 2004 ), while referring to this developing trend, implied different governance structures depending on single- versus multi-project structures in single- versus multi-firm settings, spanning governance from single project management to entire project ecologies with multi-firm and multi-project dependencies.

Turner and Keegan ( 2001 ) researched the different governance structures in organizations along the dimensions of few to many projects, and of few to many customers for these projects. They identified generic governance roles for multi-project organizations, described as the Broker and Steward model, where the Broker maintains the interface with the client and acquires new business opportunities (often done by a program manager), whereas the Steward manages the resource pool for all or a subset of all projects and decides on the acceptance of new opportunities (often done by a project portfolio manager).

Research on the relationship between governance type and organizational performance showed that governance in multi-project organizations is typically implemented in one of four possible situations:

multi-project organizations, with isolated projects and without synergies across objectives or resources needed for these projects;

Program-driven organizations, seeking synergies among project objectives;

Portfolio-driven organizations, seeking synergies in resource and skills allocation;

Hybrid organizations, combining and balancing program and portfolio approaches.

Organizational-wide performance varies greatly among the four approaches. Hybrid organizations are significantly more successful than companies using one of the other three approaches to governance (Blomquist and Müller 2006 ). In line with other studies (e.g. Müller, Martinsuo, and Blomquist 2008 ) the same researchers found that differences in contextual characteristics, such as industry, geography, and market dynamics, have a moderating effect on project performance and need to be considered for the particular governance of projects and their portfolio-level aggregations. This includes perception of success, for example, importance of Key Performance Indicators or other measures of performance as they vary by geography, age, and project type. These variations need to be taken into account in designing or assessing project governance structures in national and international contexts (Müller and Turner 2007 ).

More recent work has looked at paradigms for project governance from the perspective of governance theory and organization theory. Four governance paradigms were identified by overlaying the shareholder versus stakeholder orientation of an organization (Clarke 2004 ), with its level of outcome control versus behavior control (Brown and Eisenhardt 1997 ; Ouchi and Maguire 1975 ). Table 12.1 shows the related paradigms.

In this matrix, organizations enforcing compliance with project management processes are behavior focused in their approach to control. Contrarily, organizations focusing on the fit between project deliverables and existing expectations are more outcome oriented. These organizations give more autonomy to their projects and project managers than behavior-oriented organizations. Typically, their projects are managed by dedicated project managers, who possess a wider spectrum of project management-related skills (Müller 2009 ).

The Conformist paradigm (Table 12.1 ) utilizes strict compliance with existing processes, rules, and policies in an attempt to ensure the lowest project costs in environments having a relatively homogeneous set of projects. The Flexible Economist paradigm aims for low project costs through a well-informed selection of project management methodologies which ensure economic delivery by only marginally compromising other success criteria. Well-educated and experienced project managers identify the most economic processes for a given project and save costs through professional management. These skilled, educated, flexible, and experienced project managers work on a heterogeneous portfolio of projects. The Versatile Arti st paradigm maximizes benefits by balancing the diverse set of requirements arising from a number of different stakeholders and their particular needs and desires. Project managers are expected to develop new or tailor existing methodologies, processes, or tools to economically balance the diversity of requirements. Organizations using this governance paradigm posses a very heterogeneous set of projects in high-technology or high-risk environments. Finally, the Agile Pragmatist paradigm aims for maximization of technical usability, often through a time-phased approach to the development and product release of functionality over a period of time. Products developed under this paradigm grow from a core functionality, which is developed first, to ever-increasing features, which although of a lesser and lesser importance to the core functionality, enhance the product in flexibility, sophistication, and ease of use. These projects often use Agile/Scrum methods, with the sponsor prioritizing deliverables by business value over a given timeframe (Müller 2009 ).

Enterprises apply different governance paradigms in different parts of their organization, contingent on their idiosyncratic objectives, knowledge of the means–ends relationship of the organization's tasks, preferences of the leaders, market demands, and the level of project management maturity. The governance function can then be executed by looking at the project from a TCE perspective and trying to economize the associated administrative costs, but also looking at the project from an agency theory perspective in setting up the required structures to avoid opportunism on the side of the project manager and team, and instilling appropriate control measures to ensure plan accomplishment through behavior or outcome control (or both). All these functions are performed within the limits set by the corporate governance framework and the legitimacy of actions within the social context (Müller 2009 ).

Source : Müller ( 2009 ).

Project-specific governance frameworks

Other research in project governance has focused more on industry and project type, mainly with the aim of developing governance frameworks for construction, engineering, IT, and public projects. This stream of literature is dominated by work done in the construction industry. However, the studies show the variety of governance approaches appropriate for the different project types.

The appropriateness of TCE for understanding construction projects and their context was shown by Winch ( 1989 ), who suggested lifting the focus from the individual project to the level of the firm and applying TCE to the internal and external relationships of a firm within a project. Using this perspective he subsequently investigated the different transactions over the life cycle of construction projects (Winch 2001 ), by looking at projects as processes. He showed that the three TCE dimensions of asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency do not pose a threat to a project when considered individually or if their relationship is static. However, once dynamics sets in the existing governance structure becomes imbalanced and adaptation is needed. In line with Stinchcombe's ( 1959 ) concepts and findings, Winch ( 2003 ) assessed the differences between mass production (e.g. automotive) and the construction industries, and found the mass production governance approach inappropriate for the construction industry. Instead, he proposed models of manufacturing derived from complex systems industries and project management.

A comprehensive description of the governance approach in building the facilities for the Sydney Olympics has been provided by Clegg et al. ( 2002 ). This ethnographic study addressed the “governmentality” of the project as a task, and compared the idiosyncratic governance practices at the Sydney Olympics with the governance practices in the construction industry more generally and the associated elements of TCE. By taking into account the temporality of projects the authors combined the theoretical perspectives of Foucault, Schutz, and Williamson to derive the limits of project governance. Their multi-level analysis identified variances in the clearness of the governance culture, depending on position in the hierarchy or in the network of firms. This showed problem areas that need to be addressed for continuous improvement of the project governance through corporate stakeholder management in a constantly changing context.

Coalition-building in the governance of construction projects was investigated by Pryke ( 2005 ) using Social Network Analysis (SNA). His study showed the appropriateness of SNA for investigating relationships in governance and identified, among others, the changing role of procurement officers in governance. Using this framework, Pryke and Pearson ( 2006 ) subsequently investigated the impact of different types of contractual incentives on the roles in governance of European construction projects. They showed that different forms of pain/gain-share contracts lead to inappropriate cluster building or centralization among firms in projects, and found that Guaranteed Maximum Price contracts are an effective means of transferring risks to the client associated with post-contract design development, by instilling a strong customer focus and high efficiency.

In their investigation on the design criteria of governance structures for large capital mega-projects Miller and Hobbs ( 2005 ) showed that these projects differ in their governance in terms of higher dynamics in governance structures than in smaller projects and more network relationships rather than binary buyer–seller relationships. Taken together, they bring forward the need for more self-organizing and flexible governance regimes to appropriately govern these types of projects. Similarly Klakegg et al. (2008) found that governance of public projects varies by national government. Their investigation of governance frameworks for large public projects showed a “top-down” versus a “bottom-up” preference in different countries. Some governments, for example Norway's, prefer top-down approaches for their public projects, which focus on project outcomes (as opposed to methodology compliance), and base their governance approach on guidelines such as those from the Association for Project Management (APM 2004 ), which take a corporate-wide view and define responsibilities, rather than roles. Other governments, for example the UK's, prefer bottom-up approaches using a control and compliance perspective, for example by applying governance standards developed on top of existing project management methodologies like PRINCE2 (Office of Government Commerce 2008 ).

In developing a framework for project management at NASA, Shenhar et al. ( 2005 ) applied the four-dimensional grid of novelty, pace, technology, and complexity to profile four types of projects. From this they developed different risk profiles for these types of projects, which then guides the selection of contracts for suppliers and other contributing organizations, thus determining the governance structure of the different types of projects.

Research on the governance of IT projects, through the lens of agency theory and related communication, showed that successful projects are linked to governance attributes of:

The highest level of collaboration operationalized as the extent the project objectives are clear and the project manager and the steering group are interested in working together;

A medium level of structure, measured as the level of bureaucracy imposed onto the project manager by the steering group and the clearness of the methods to be used in the project.

While clearness of objectives has long been known as being important for success in projects (e.g. Morris and Hough 1987 ), this study showed that governance institutions like steering groups must allow sufficient freedom for the project manager to manage day-to-day work autonomously, so that the resolving of issues to the higher-level governance structures is only done in exceptional cases (Turner and Müller 2004 ). This level of structure is, however, influenced by the contract type existing between the project owner and supplier, with fixed-price contracts leading to governance structures with too little structure and cost-reimbursement contracts to too rigid structures for the project manager to manage the daily business, the contract underlying the governance structure thereby becoming a risk in the project which needs to be managed through appropriate communication (Müller and Turner 2005 ).

Quantitative and conceptual studies on trust in the context of project governance showed a non-linear negative relationship between trust and control, thus permitting a substitution of one by the other, within limits. Here too much governance reduces trust, which impacts project results negatively (Turner and Müller 2004 ; Müller and Turner 2005 ). This is supported by Hartman ( 2002 ), who identified trust as an antecedent for project success, however with differences in meaning of trust contingent on contractor or owner role in projects. Among these two roles trust varies in its impact on satisfaction with relationships in projects and positive project outcomes (Pinto, Slevin, and English 2009 ).

Summary of research on project governance

The landscape of research on project governance is diverse. From day-to-day work in projects to strategic levels, such as portfolio management, strategic PMOs, or the board of directors, the level of analysis varies significantly. This is shown in Table 12.2 for some of the above-mentioned studies. The research is dominated by the TCE perspective, especially in construction projects, whereas others, like IT, are investigated using either TCE or agency theory perspectives. Some of the governance studies are more explorative and apply neither of these theories. In conclusion it can be said that a pluralism of theoretical perspectives, research methods, and levels of analysis emerges, which contributes to understanding the multidimensional phenomenon of project governance. To that end, more studies like those on project governance in the construction industry and those on governance of multi-project work are needed in different industries and locales.

Towards a research agenda for the future

The review showed a number of shortcomings of current concepts and theories. Most obvious is the use of TCE, which was developed for the context of permanent organizations, and its application to temporary and dynamic project settings. Questions arise as to the appropriateness of the underlying dimensions for the temporary context of projects and their specific governance methods like program and portfolio management. More research is needed to investigate the impact of inherent discontinuities of temporary organizations on the explanatory power of the three governance theories addressed herein. Examples may include:

TCE's first mover advantage in the context of project alliances in networks of firms in competition,

the stability of relationships as outlined in Eccles's ( 1981 ) quasifirm and its relevance for contemporary organizational structures, such as Open Source development projects.

From an agency theory perspective the assumptions of a homo economicus underlying Agency Theory (or the opposite underlying Stewardship Theory) can be questioned. Are these perspectives still relevant in the dynamics of current project contexts? Examples include Free Libre Open Source Software (FLOSS) development projects in global networks, where regulatory elements such as price and contracts (even psychological contracts) are absent in a global market and hierarchy-like control structures are used in market-like environments.

How will socio-cultural changes impact governance forms, including the changing value system of the generation following the baby-boomers, that is, those born 1983–97? While baby-boomers value fun in life, the now emerging Net-generation values what one knows and has to say and not where one comes from (Tapscott 1998 ). Correspondingly, are the concepts of behavior and outcome control still relevant in newer forms of organizing (e.g. in FLOSS) in light of extreme temporality and abundance of work opportunities for individuals in global networks? In other words: will the relative static concepts of today's governance theories retain their explanatory power in the near future?

One possible way of approaching this is by researching the substitution of older theories, like agency theory, with their migrated and contemporary successors, like prospect theory, which values gains and losses in decisions rather than final assets, and replaces probabilities with decision weights (Kahneman and Tversky 1979 ).

Notwithstanding these global challenges, the particularities of project governance need to be better understood. Examples include the impact of owners simply seeking to increase the return on their ownership rights, compared with others who are motivated for different reasons, including non-profit organizations. That leads to research questions, for example on:

Governance differences between complex private sector-owned projects and equivalently complex public sector projects;

Governance differences in projects with ex ante stated (multiple) aims and objectives and those which develop them over the course of the project;

The role of the project governance function in setting and monitoring the incentives for the various project parties and their resource providers, in order to achieve project success;

The critical differences in the project boards' composition, remit, and mode of operation that separate project governance from its equivalent in corporate governance;

Learning from comparing the recent history of project failure to that of corporate failure for the development of a corresponding set of recommendations to improve the governance of projects.

More case studies are needed to understand these idiosyncrasies of project governance. However, time may also be ripe to move beyond the prevalent social constructivist epistemology towards more post-modernist studies to develop a more holistic understanding of the subject.

Acknowledgement

The author is grateful to Andrew Edkins and his contributions to an earlier version of this chapter.

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IT Governance Project Review

Over two months working with a financial services firm, we worked to analyze the business and deliver project methodology that was enforced without bureaucratic overhead, and an it management team that was fully engaged in projects. this resulted in the organization’s ability to deliver on-time, on-budget projects., project background.

With an increasing diversity of projects in a growing IT organization comprised of various groups, the management team was concerned with staying “on top” of key projects with broad business impact, large budgetary commitments, and dependencies on other projects or business events. A key driver was to ensure this was collaborative rather than oppressive.

The Strategy

A weekly meeting (called “Project Review”) was created where project managers would present status to the CIO and his management team. The meeting was chaired by the PMO, who also supplied some simple project metrics. Project managers would supply a two-page document summarizing what we called the “6 Ds”: Dates, Doers, Dollars, Deliverables, Dangers, Dependencies.

A Project Review was created to ensure the success of a project. Committee members were supportive, and presenters were open about issues and risks.

Proven Results

• 98% of projects were delivered on-time and on-budget.
• Issues were surfaced quickly and mitigated through the inclusion of IT department heads on the Committee.
• Project Managers learned to structure their projects and project reporting around the needs of the Project Review Committee.
• Project discipline was achieved without the traditional PMO bureaucratic overhead.

More Successful Projects

IT Assessment - Non-Profit Organization

IT Assessment - Risk Mitigation

IT Assessment - Budget Planning

Uncover opportunities for it excellence.

Terra Gaines, Senior Account Manager for Harvard Partners has been in the Staffing Industry for 17 years, supporting multiple industry verticals and market segments including: IT, Cybersecurity, Semi-Conductor, Tech Integrators, Finance & Medical to name a few. Her personal and professional passions have always been people centric and she’s extremely proud of providing white glove service to each client and manager that she serves.

Jill Gearhart, Director Client Services, has over 20 years of Account Management experience in technology service areas across IT Consulting & Staffing, Cloud, Datacenter, Networking & Communications. Jill’s focus is in Client Engagement, proposing and ensuring the successful delivery of services from the Harvard Partners Portfolio tailored to attain each Client’s desired business outcomes, including the Staffing of essential resources.

Prior to joining Harvard Partners in 2014, she held a high-level Account Management position at a global technology company now known as Lumen (formerly CenturyLink), where she was appointed to multiple Excellence Advisory boards in several Enterprise product areas, domestic and abroad, over the span of 11 years. Notably, after the Qwest-CenturyLink Merger in 2010, and the acquisition of Savvis thereafter, she was instrumental in the integration between organizations in the effort to build a seamless customer experience. Through continual engagement with Enterprise client organizations throughout her tenure, she has had the privilege of collaborating on solutions and individual resources needed to answer numerous business objectives, whether expanding into new markets or advancing operational efficiency and resiliency.

Education: Bachelor’s of Science, Business Administration, Bryant University, Cum Laude

Chris Callaghan is the Director of Architecture Services and is responsible for overseeing the architectural services arm of Harvard Partners. This includes everything from to architecture approach strategy, to candidate selection & vetting, to engagement leadership. Chris has years of technology architecture consulting experience ranging from boutique architectural services companies to larger, established consulting companies. He’s played multiple roles, from individual contribution to client and consultant management.

Prior to joining Harvard Partners, he was the Engagement Lead and Consultant Manager at Systems Flow, Inc. where he was responsible for client engagement management, consultant management, architectural services, SOW negotiation/creation/signing, training, etc. Prior to that, he worked as an Enterprise Solutions Architect for a large reinsurance firm under Fairfax Holdings.

Gary Gardner is the Managing Director of Harvard Partners and an Information Technology executive with over 30 years of global Investment Management experience. He has a broad range of knowledge of Investment Management systems including investment research, portfolio management, trading, compliance, back office, CRM, and client reporting. Gary has expertise with technical infrastructure, operational risk, business continuity, SOX compliance, SSAE16 certification, vendor management, and cloud services.

Prior to joining Harvard Partners, he was the Chief Technology Officer at Batterymarch Financial Management, Inc. and GMO LLC where he was responsible for IT leadership and technical strategy for high computational and data-intensive quantitative asset management environments. Gary also held senior technology positions at Santander Global Advisors and Baring Asset Management.

Education: Gary studied Management Information Systems at Northeastern University.

Steve Walsh is a Managing Partner at Harvard Partners. Steve has been a career business leader for companies such as Hewlett Packard, EMC, Centerstone Manhattan Software, ClearEdge Partners, and Alliance Consulting.

Prior to joining Harvard Partners Steve was the worldwide leader for the Storage Consulting practice at Hewlett Packard. In this role, Steve was responsible for more than 500 employees encompassing sales, pursuit, portfolio, and delivery. Under Steve’s stewardship Storage Consulting built offerings to help clients assess and design complex storage infrastructures and develop state-of-the-art backup, recovery, and business continuance strategies. Steve grew the Storage Consulting Practice at HP by over 200% and introduced 20 new value-added offerings.

In addition to Hewlett Packard Steve has worked for companies both large and small. At ClearEdge Partners Steve advised C-level Fortune 500eExecutives on their IT purchasing and supply chain strategies, saving his clients millions over his tenure. Steve also has been a business leader at Alliance Consulting, where he built a practice to more than 200 consultants and 10 strategic offerings. Steve started his career at EMC Corporation from 1986 to 1998.

Education: Boston College School of Management, Computer Science

Matt Ferm is a F ounder and Managing Partner of Harvard Partners. Matt’s focus is on IT Assessments, IT Governance, and Program Management. Prior to Harvard Partners, Matt spent 17 years with Wellington Management Company, LLP. As an Associate Partner and Director of Enterprise Technologies, Matt was responsible for managing the global physical computing infrastructure of this financial services firm. This includes data centers, servers, voice and data networks, desktops, laptops, audio/video hardware, messaging (email, IM, etc.), security administration, disaster recovery, production control, monitoring, market data services, storage systems, and capacity planning.

During his career at Wellington, Matt managed the Operational Resilience, Resource Management, Systems Engineering, IT Client Services, and IT Strategic Development groups, chaired the firm’s Year 2000 efforts and was a member of the firms IS Priorities Committee, Project Review Committee (Chair), Systems Architecture Committee (Chair), Year 2000 Committee (Chair), Operational Resilience Committee, Incident Review Committee and Web Oversight Committee.

Prior to joining Wellington Management in 1992, Matt served as Director of Financial Services Markets for Apollo Computer, Hewlett-Packard, and Oki Electric where he managed the marketing of Unix workstations to the Financial Services industry. In 1985, Matt was Manager, New Business Development for Gregg Corporation (now IDD/Dow Jones/SunGard), a small investment database software company. Matt got his start in 1981 on Wall Street, working in the Custody Department of Bankers Trust and the MIS department of E.F. Hutton. Matt received his BA in Economics from Queens College, the City University of New York in 1982, and is a member of the Society for Information Management.

Education: Queens College, City University of New York – BA in Economics

Jason Young is a Senior Technical Recruiter at Harvard Partners and has more than 13 years of experience in recruiting and talent acquisition. Jason’s focus is on leading recruiting efforts and ensuring expectations are met or exceeded between our client’s needs and our candidate’s experience to deliver. Throughout his career, he’s filled immediate needs with high-level IT and business professionals. He also developed sourcing strategies and built strong relationships with IT specialists, leaders, and executives in a variety of industries.

Prior to joining Harvard Partners in 2018, Jason had a successful career with Advantage Technical Resourcing, (formerly TAC Worldwide Companies). He began his career in IT Staffing with Advantage as a Sourcing Recruiter, finding top-tier candidates for the Sr. Recruiters. He quickly advanced to be the sole recruiter of a national high-volume staffing program. His accomplishments with this program led to him being an MSA recruiter for a large global enterprise client. He provided them with a wide range of talent for more than five years.

Education: Bachelor’s of Arts, Psychology, Framingham State University

Lisa Brody is the Talent Operations Manager at Harvard Partners and her focus is on managing the recruiting practice. Lisa has over 30 years of experience in recruiting and talent acquisition. She has successfully brought top-tier Information Technology and Business Professionals to our clients, with a purpose, to fill immediate needs as well as, create an ongoing strategy to find IT specialists, leaders, and executives in a variety of industries.

Prior to joining Harvard Partners in 2016, Lisa reveled in an accomplished career with Advantage Technical Resourcing, (formerly TAC Worldwide Companies) from the rise of the organization, serving in several specialized recruiting and talent management roles. She was a lead MSA recruiter for large global enterprise clients for over a decade, providing a wide range of talent. Throughout her advancement, she has consistently, cultivated a strong reputation among candidates and clients for competency, professionalism, and results.

Education: Massachusetts Bay Community College, Wellesley, MA Associate of Science, Retail Management

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Artificial intelligence in strategy

Can machines automate strategy development? The short answer is no. However, there are numerous aspects of strategists’ work where AI and advanced analytics tools can already bring enormous value. Yuval Atsmon is a senior partner who leads the new McKinsey Center for Strategy Innovation, which studies ways new technologies can augment the timeless principles of strategy. In this episode of the Inside the Strategy Room podcast, he explains how artificial intelligence is already transforming strategy and what’s on the horizon. This is an edited transcript of the discussion. For more conversations on the strategy issues that matter, follow the series on your preferred podcast platform .

Joanna Pachner: What does artificial intelligence mean in the context of strategy?

Yuval Atsmon: When people talk about artificial intelligence, they include everything to do with analytics, automation, and data analysis. Marvin Minsky, the pioneer of artificial intelligence research in the 1960s, talked about AI as a “suitcase word”—a term into which you can stuff whatever you want—and that still seems to be the case. We are comfortable with that because we think companies should use all the capabilities of more traditional analysis while increasing automation in strategy that can free up management or analyst time and, gradually, introducing tools that can augment human thinking.

Joanna Pachner: AI has been embraced by many business functions, but strategy seems to be largely immune to its charms. Why do you think that is?

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Yuval Atsmon: You’re right about the limited adoption. Only 7 percent of respondents to our survey about the use of AI say they use it in strategy or even financial planning, whereas in areas like marketing, supply chain, and service operations, it’s 25 or 30 percent. One reason adoption is lagging is that strategy is one of the most integrative conceptual practices. When executives think about strategy automation, many are looking too far ahead—at AI capabilities that would decide, in place of the business leader, what the right strategy is. They are missing opportunities to use AI in the building blocks of strategy that could significantly improve outcomes.

I like to use the analogy to virtual assistants. Many of us use Alexa or Siri but very few people use these tools to do more than dictate a text message or shut off the lights. We don’t feel comfortable with the technology’s ability to understand the context in more sophisticated applications. AI in strategy is similar: it’s hard for AI to know everything an executive knows, but it can help executives with certain tasks.

When executives think about strategy automation, many are looking too far ahead—at AI deciding the right strategy. They are missing opportunities to use AI in the building blocks of strategy.

Joanna Pachner: What kind of tasks can AI help strategists execute today?

Yuval Atsmon: We talk about six stages of AI development. The earliest is simple analytics, which we refer to as descriptive intelligence. Companies use dashboards for competitive analysis or to study performance in different parts of the business that are automatically updated. Some have interactive capabilities for refinement and testing.

The second level is diagnostic intelligence, which is the ability to look backward at the business and understand root causes and drivers of performance. The level after that is predictive intelligence: being able to anticipate certain scenarios or options and the value of things in the future based on momentum from the past as well as signals picked in the market. Both diagnostics and prediction are areas that AI can greatly improve today. The tools can augment executives’ analysis and become areas where you develop capabilities. For example, on diagnostic intelligence, you can organize your portfolio into segments to understand granularly where performance is coming from and do it in a much more continuous way than analysts could. You can try 20 different ways in an hour versus deploying one hundred analysts to tackle the problem.

Predictive AI is both more difficult and more risky. Executives shouldn’t fully rely on predictive AI, but it provides another systematic viewpoint in the room. Because strategic decisions have significant consequences, a key consideration is to use AI transparently in the sense of understanding why it is making a certain prediction and what extrapolations it is making from which information. You can then assess if you trust the prediction or not. You can even use AI to track the evolution of the assumptions for that prediction.

Those are the levels available today. The next three levels will take time to develop. There are some early examples of AI advising actions for executives’ consideration that would be value-creating based on the analysis. From there, you go to delegating certain decision authority to AI, with constraints and supervision. Eventually, there is the point where fully autonomous AI analyzes and decides with no human interaction.

Because strategic decisions have significant consequences, you need to understand why AI is making a certain prediction and what extrapolations it’s making from which information.

Joanna Pachner: What kind of businesses or industries could gain the greatest benefits from embracing AI at its current level of sophistication?

Yuval Atsmon: Every business probably has some opportunity to use AI more than it does today. The first thing to look at is the availability of data. Do you have performance data that can be organized in a systematic way? Companies that have deep data on their portfolios down to business line, SKU, inventory, and raw ingredients have the biggest opportunities to use machines to gain granular insights that humans could not.

Companies whose strategies rely on a few big decisions with limited data would get less from AI. Likewise, those facing a lot of volatility and vulnerability to external events would benefit less than companies with controlled and systematic portfolios, although they could deploy AI to better predict those external events and identify what they can and cannot control.

Third, the velocity of decisions matters. Most companies develop strategies every three to five years, which then become annual budgets. If you think about strategy in that way, the role of AI is relatively limited other than potentially accelerating analyses that are inputs into the strategy. However, some companies regularly revisit big decisions they made based on assumptions about the world that may have since changed, affecting the projected ROI of initiatives. Such shifts would affect how you deploy talent and executive time, how you spend money and focus sales efforts, and AI can be valuable in guiding that. The value of AI is even bigger when you can make decisions close to the time of deploying resources, because AI can signal that your previous assumptions have changed from when you made your plan.

Joanna Pachner: Can you provide any examples of companies employing AI to address specific strategic challenges?

Yuval Atsmon: Some of the most innovative users of AI, not coincidentally, are AI- and digital-native companies. Some of these companies have seen massive benefits from AI and have increased its usage in other areas of the business. One mobility player adjusts its financial planning based on pricing patterns it observes in the market. Its business has relatively high flexibility to demand but less so to supply, so the company uses AI to continuously signal back when pricing dynamics are trending in a way that would affect profitability or where demand is rising. This allows the company to quickly react to create more capacity because its profitability is highly sensitive to keeping demand and supply in equilibrium.

Joanna Pachner: Given how quickly things change today, doesn’t AI seem to be more a tactical than a strategic tool, providing time-sensitive input on isolated elements of strategy?

Yuval Atsmon: It’s interesting that you make the distinction between strategic and tactical. Of course, every decision can be broken down into smaller ones, and where AI can be affordably used in strategy today is for building blocks of the strategy. It might feel tactical, but it can make a massive difference. One of the world’s leading investment firms, for example, has started to use AI to scan for certain patterns rather than scanning individual companies directly. AI looks for consumer mobile usage that suggests a company’s technology is catching on quickly, giving the firm an opportunity to invest in that company before others do. That created a significant strategic edge for them, even though the tool itself may be relatively tactical.

Joanna Pachner: McKinsey has written a lot about cognitive biases  and social dynamics that can skew decision making. Can AI help with these challenges?

Yuval Atsmon: When we talk to executives about using AI in strategy development, the first reaction we get is, “Those are really big decisions; what if AI gets them wrong?” The first answer is that humans also get them wrong—a lot. [Amos] Tversky, [Daniel] Kahneman, and others have proven that some of those errors are systemic, observable, and predictable. The first thing AI can do is spot situations likely to give rise to biases. For example, imagine that AI is listening in on a strategy session where the CEO proposes something and everyone says “Aye” without debate and discussion. AI could inform the room, “We might have a sunflower bias here,” which could trigger more conversation and remind the CEO that it’s in their own interest to encourage some devil’s advocacy.

We also often see confirmation bias, where people focus their analysis on proving the wisdom of what they already want to do, as opposed to looking for a fact-based reality. Just having AI perform a default analysis that doesn’t aim to satisfy the boss is useful, and the team can then try to understand why that is different than the management hypothesis, triggering a much richer debate.

In terms of social dynamics, agency problems can create conflicts of interest. Every business unit [BU] leader thinks that their BU should get the most resources and will deliver the most value, or at least they feel they should advocate for their business. AI provides a neutral way based on systematic data to manage those debates. It’s also useful for executives with decision authority, since we all know that short-term pressures and the need to make the quarterly and annual numbers lead people to make different decisions on the 31st of December than they do on January 1st or October 1st. Like the story of Ulysses and the sirens, you can use AI to remind you that you wanted something different three months earlier. The CEO still decides; AI can just provide that extra nudge.

Joanna Pachner: It’s like you have Spock next to you, who is dispassionate and purely analytical.

Yuval Atsmon: That is not a bad analogy—for Star Trek fans anyway.

Joanna Pachner: Do you have a favorite application of AI in strategy?

Yuval Atsmon: I have worked a lot on resource allocation, and one of the challenges, which we call the hockey stick phenomenon, is that executives are always overly optimistic about what will happen. They know that resource allocation will inevitably be defined by what you believe about the future, not necessarily by past performance. AI can provide an objective prediction of performance starting from a default momentum case: based on everything that happened in the past and some indicators about the future, what is the forecast of performance if we do nothing? This is before we say, “But I will hire these people and develop this new product and improve my marketing”— things that every executive thinks will help them overdeliver relative to the past. The neutral momentum case, which AI can calculate in a cold, Spock-like manner, can change the dynamics of the resource allocation discussion. It’s a form of predictive intelligence accessible today and while it’s not meant to be definitive, it provides a basis for better decisions.

Joanna Pachner: Do you see access to technology talent as one of the obstacles to the adoption of AI in strategy, especially at large companies?

Yuval Atsmon: I would make a distinction. If you mean machine-learning and data science talent or software engineers who build the digital tools, they are definitely not easy to get. However, companies can increasingly use platforms that provide access to AI tools and require less from individual companies. Also, this domain of strategy is exciting—it’s cutting-edge, so it’s probably easier to get technology talent for that than it might be for manufacturing work.

The bigger challenge, ironically, is finding strategists or people with business expertise to contribute to the effort. You will not solve strategy problems with AI without the involvement of people who understand the customer experience and what you are trying to achieve. Those who know best, like senior executives, don’t have time to be product managers for the AI team. An even bigger constraint is that, in some cases, you are asking people to get involved in an initiative that may make their jobs less important. There could be plenty of opportunities for incorpo­rating AI into existing jobs, but it’s something companies need to reflect on. The best approach may be to create a digital factory where a different team tests and builds AI applications, with oversight from senior stakeholders.

The big challenge is finding strategists to contribute to the AI effort. You are asking people to get involved in an initiative that may make their jobs less important.

Joanna Pachner: Do you think this worry about job security and the potential that AI will automate strategy is realistic?

Yuval Atsmon: The question of whether AI will replace human judgment and put humanity out of its job is a big one that I would leave for other experts.

The pertinent question is shorter-term automation. Because of its complexity, strategy would be one of the later domains to be affected by automation, but we are seeing it in many other domains. However, the trend for more than two hundred years has been that automation creates new jobs, although ones requiring different skills. That doesn’t take away the fear some people have of a machine exposing their mistakes or doing their job better than they do it.

Joanna Pachner: We recently published an article about strategic courage in an age of volatility  that talked about three types of edge business leaders need to develop. One of them is an edge in insights. Do you think AI has a role to play in furnishing a proprietary insight edge?

Yuval Atsmon: One of the challenges most strategists face is the overwhelming complexity of the world we operate in—the number of unknowns, the information overload. At one level, it may seem that AI will provide another layer of complexity. In reality, it can be a sharp knife that cuts through some of the clutter. The question to ask is, Can AI simplify my life by giving me sharper, more timely insights more easily?

Joanna Pachner: You have been working in strategy for a long time. What sparked your interest in exploring this intersection of strategy and new technology?

Yuval Atsmon: I have always been intrigued by things at the boundaries of what seems possible. Science fiction writer Arthur C. Clarke’s second law is that to discover the limits of the possible, you have to venture a little past them into the impossible, and I find that particularly alluring in this arena.

AI in strategy is in very nascent stages but could be very consequential for companies and for the profession. For a top executive, strategic decisions are the biggest way to influence the business, other than maybe building the top team, and it is amazing how little technology is leveraged in that process today. It’s conceivable that competitive advantage will increasingly rest in having executives who know how to apply AI well. In some domains, like investment, that is already happening, and the difference in returns can be staggering. I find helping companies be part of that evolution very exciting.

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Two phds in innovation/global governance for earth and space sustainability.

We are looking for two PhD Researchers to join the cutting-edge research project ‘Planetary Stewardship in view of Earth-Space Sustainability’ (PLANETSTEWARDS).

The Copernicus Institute of Sustainable Development at Utrecht University has opened two, fully funded, four-year PhD research positions to join the cutting-edge research project ‘Planetary Stewardship in view of Earth-Space Sustainability’ (PLANETSTEWARDS). This research project is led by  Assistant Prof. Xiao-Shan Yap , and funded for five years (2024-2029) through a 1.5 million euro ‘Starting Grant’ from the European Research Council (ERC).

Activities in outer space have grown exponentially in recent years, led by an increasing variety of actors from technologically advanced states to billionaire companies and small ventures. While space-based infrastructures such as satellites are essential for basic operations on Earth, space technologies are also presented as the frontier of opportunities and solutions for addressing sustainability crises: global accessibility to the Internet with thousands of satellites, giant solar power stations in Earth’s orbit, resources near and on the Moon, and billionaires’ vision of building space settlements such as on Mars to prevent the extinction of human species. These developments impact sustainability on Earth and in space in various ways. Not only are there rising concerns over space congestion and debris in Earth’s orbit, technological and resource competition on other celestial bodies can cause environmental degradation on those objects, intensify political polarization, fragment sustainability narratives, and perpetuate global inequality. The relations between Earth and space sustainability problems have, therefore, become more intertwined than ever. The fundamental values, beliefs, and institutions that guide stewardship for sustainability require a paradigmatic shift towards simultaneously caring for Earth and space.

You will be part of an ambitious ERC-funded project – PLANETSTEWARDS – that aims to address these pressing earth-space sustainability challenges. Together, we will analyse and compare different stewardship approaches – as led by the government, market actors, scientists and engineers, or communities – to understand how they impact earth-space sustainability with implications on a planetary scale. The project offers you freedom to choose a set of case studies based on your interest while in line with the aim and objectives of the project: be it space activities in Earth’s orbit or further out in space such as on the Moon, Mars, and/or other celestial bodies. Using a novel mixed-method framework, the project will formulate integrative strategies for future earth-space sustainability.

The PLANETSTEWARDS project consists of the following interrelated objectives:

• Analyze the different approaches of planetary stewardship taking into consideration actors, values, and institutions;
• Compare the different approaches and unfold the intricate dynamics of their co-existence;
• Explain how the approaches lead to positive and negative impacts on Earth and in space in terms of environmental and social dimensions;
• Specify the criteria for earth-space sustainability and propose transformative policy actions. 

Your responsibilities include:

• Analyse the core factors that shape current and future space activities in the form of technologies, infrastructures, and/or missions as a whole;
• Combine and analyze different datasets including news articles, policy documents, as well as interview transcripts;
• Be part of the PLANETSTEWARDS project team and contribute to the overall aim, objectives, and strategy of the project, including primary and secondary data gathering, empirical analyses, methodological innovation, and theoretical development;
• Complete a dissertation within four years;
• Write and publish (as lead author) four research papers with the Principal Investigator (PI) in fulfilment of the PhD requirements, potentially involving other project team members;
• Present your research at (inter)national conferences, workshops, and seminars;
• Contribute to organising impact activities around the project, such as communications, workshops, conferences, as well as policy and/or public engagements.

Your supervisor will be the project PI, Dr Xiao-Shan Yap and you will receive support and guidance from the project team. The team includes Professor Frank Biermann (as PhD promotor), Dr Rakhyun E. Kim , a postdoctoral researcher, along with an international network of prominent scientists and practitioners on the project’s Advisory Board. The PhD researchers will also receive systematic training from the Graduate School of Geosciences through various research-related courses and mentoring.

Your qualities

We expect the PhD researchers to have a strong interest in topics related to the development of human activities in outer space. They should have expertise in sustainability-related research, as evidenced by a relevant Bachelor’s and Master’s degree in Social Sciences. We welcome applicants from diverse disciplinary backgrounds, including innovation studies, science and technology studies (STS), sustainability transitions, philosophy, anthropology, human geography, development studies, political sciences, global governance, earth system governance, space governance, and international relations. In line with the research design of PLANETSTEWARDS, we are looking for candidates with: 

• a strong interest in the sustainability challenges of space activities;
• a strong interest in theoretical and methodological innovation, especially through interdisciplinary approaches;
• an affinity to, and experience with, conducting qualitative research;
• an interest in learning or experience with semi-quantitative research methods, e.g., network analysis.

In addition, the PhD researchers should have excellent communication skills, to be good team players, and to have a strong affinity with working in an interdisciplinary and multicultural research environment. Excellent English-language skills are required, as the working language of the project is English. Good data analytical skills is considered an added advantage.

Since you are to become an active member of the department’s intellectual community and work closely together with the project team, you are expected to live in the Netherlands (preferably in the vicinity of Utrecht).

• a position for one year, with an extension to a total of four years upon a successful assessment in the first year, and with the specific intent that it results in a doctorate within this period;
• a gross monthly salary between €2,770 and €3,539 in the case of full-time employment (salary scale P under the Collective Labour Agreement for Dutch Universities (CAO NU)); 
• 8% holiday pay and 8.3% year-end bonus; 
• a pension scheme, partially paid parental leave and flexible terms of employment based on the CAO NU. 

In addition to the  terms of employment  laid down in the CAO NU, Utrecht University has a number of schemes and facilities of its own for employees. This includes schemes facilitating  professional development , leave schemes and schemes for  sports and cultural activities , as well as discounts on software and other IT products. We also offer access to additional employee benefits through our Terms of Employment Options Model. In this way, we encourage our employees to continue to invest in their growth. For more information, please visit  Working at Utrecht University .

A better future for everyone. This ambition motivates our scientists in executing their leading research and inspiring teaching. At  Utrecht University , the various disciplines collaborate intensively towards major  strategic themes . Our focus is on Dynamics of Youth, Institutions for Open Societies, Life Sciences and Pathways to Sustainability.  Sharing science, shaping tomorrow .

Utrecht University’s Faculty of Geosciences studies the Earth: from the Earth’s core to its surface, including man’s spatial and material utilisation of the Earth – always with a focus on sustainability and innovation. With 3,400 students (BSc and MSc) and 720 staff, the faculty is a strong and challenging organisation. The Faculty of Geosciences is organised in four Departments: Earth Sciences, Human Geography & Spatial Planning, Physical Geography, and Sustainable Development.

More information

For more information, please contact  Dr Xiao-Shan Yap via  [email protected] . 

Candidates for this vacancy will be recruited by Utrecht University.

As Utrecht University, we want to be a  home  for everyone. We value staff with diverse backgrounds, perspectives and identities, including cultural, religious or ethnic background, gender, sexual orientation, disability or age. We strive to create a safe and inclusive environment in which everyone can flourish and contribute.

The application should be submitted via the application button   below and please attach:

• your letter of application that describes your motivation and qualifications in relation to the positions above;
• your Curriculum Vitae (CV), including appendixes with grade transcripts for your Bachelor’s and Master’s programme;
• an executive summary (max 2 pages) of your Master's thesis, in English, highlighting the theories used and key findings;
• the names and contact details of two referees.  

The first round of interviews will be held in the week of July 15, 2024, whereas the second round of interviews will be held between July 25 – 30, 2024.

The application deadline is 30 June 2024.

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4 Common Types of Team Conflict — and How to Resolve Them

• Randall S. Peterson,
• Priti Pradhan Shah,
• Amanda J. Ferguson,
• Stephen L. Jones

Advice backed by three decades of research into thousands of team conflicts around the world.

Managers spend 20% of their time on average managing team conflict. Over the past three decades, the authors have studied thousands of team conflicts around the world and have identified four common patterns of team conflict. The first occurs when conflict revolves around a single member of a team (20-25% of team conflicts). The second is when two members of a team disagree (the most common team conflict at 35%). The third is when two subgroups in a team are at odds (20-25%). The fourth is when all members of a team are disagreeing in a whole-team conflict (less than 15%). The authors suggest strategies to tailor a conflict resolution approach for each type, so that managers can address conflict as close to its origin as possible.

If you have ever managed a team or worked on one, you know that conflict within a team is as inevitable as it is distracting. Many managers avoid dealing with conflict in their team where possible, hoping reasonable people can work it out. Despite this, research shows that managers spend upwards of 20% of their time on average managing conflict.

• Randall S. Peterson is the academic director of the Leadership Institute and a professor of organizational behavior at London Business School. He teaches leadership on the School’s Senior Executive and Accelerated Development Program.
• PS Priti Pradhan Shah is a professor in the Department of Work and Organization at the Carlson School of Management at the University of Minnesota. She teaches negotiation in the School’s Executive Education and MBA Programs.
• AF Amanda J. Ferguson  is an associate professor of Management at Northern Illinois University. She teaches Organizational Behavior and Leading Teams in the School’s MBA programs.
• SJ Stephen L. Jones is an associate professor of Management at the University of Washington Bothell. He teaches Organizational and Strategic Management at the MBA level.

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Housing | Santa Cruz County a case study on pandemic…

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Housing | sf giants’ jung hoo lee to undergo season-ending surgery, housing | santa cruz county a case study on pandemic project roomkey.

The two-year statewide assessment of Project Roomkey’s outcomes was commissioned jointly by the nonprofit philanthropy organization California Health Care Foundation and the family philanthropic trust of Conrad N. Hilton Foundation, via Abt Associates and was released May 6.

The assessment comes little more than a month after Santa Cruz County’s Housing for Health Division released its second three-year strategic homeless framework as part of a late-March study session with the Santa Cruz County Board of Supervisors.

According to the “ Project Roomkey Evaluation Final Report ,” the state-funded Project Roomkey was created in response to the coronavirus outbreak and initially was designed to move medically vulnerable individuals with complex needs off the streets and into their own rooms, with meals and laundry service.

The program offered an alternative to traditional “congregate” shelters, which typically grouped individuals in the same rooms, dorm-style. Before its conclusion, the program’s mission expanded to move sheltered individuals into more permanent housing.

During its operations, Santa Cruz County set up six Project Roomkey shelters at local motels — four in Santa Cruz and two in Watsonville — and 257 rooms with the help of three rounds of state program funds, according to the report. Initially, county employees were repurposed as “Disaster Service Workers” to staff the sites, roles later filled out with new community hires. Some 1,385 individuals were housed during the program’s more than two-year run, according to the report. The outcomes of another 44 individuals were unaccounted for in the report.

Of the Roomkey participants, about 27% exited to permanent housing and nearly 6% to temporary housing, according to the report. About 25% entered congregate shelters and 15% to an unsheltered location. More than 5% went into short- or long-term institutional settings and 18% departed to unknown or “other” locations.

“PRK (Project Roomkey) staff reported closing sites before all participants had been connected to housing was difficult, knowing that some participants would return to homelessness,” the report noted.

The report highlighted some of the county’s struggles in meeting program participants’ behavioral health needs and those with acute health conditions called for a higher level of care that neither the available public health nurses nor hotel staff were able to regularly provide.

Those interviewed for the case study, however, generally gave high ratings to the accommodations, basic services and staffing, according to the report.

“When reflecting on their time in the program, most participants reported feeling positively about the experience,” the study. noted. “Many appreciated the privacy and safety in comparison to a more traditional shelter.”

Santa Cruz County’s new three-year framework , retroactive to January, aims to: lower the average time spent homeless by 10% each year; reduce the number of people returning to homelessness each year by 20%; ensure community partners are collecting outcome and community needs data; and increase outreach and access to services countywide.

The initial three-year framework, in effect from January 2021 to January 2024, called for a 25% reduction in households experiencing homelessness and a 50% drop in households living outside and in their vehicles.

During that period, Santa Cruz County supported the successful applications for three state-funded Project Homekey applications, saw a single-year homeless count reduction of 21.5%, the lowest annual point-in-time count tally since its local inception in 2007, and counted 911 people who moved from homelessness to permanent housing between July 2022 and June 2023. Last year, the Housing for Health Partnership also launched a redesigned Coordinated Entry System, tracking relevant data regarding county homelessness, and considered a factor — along with increased Housing Authority vouchers — in the number of housing placements.

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Housing | Single-family house sells in Fremont for $1.7 million

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Analyst/Associate, APAC Project Finance

Position Purpose: 

Analyst role within the Project Finance-LSF department, to support the origination and execution of project finance opportunities. 

LSF originates loans from plain vanilla to complex/ structured transactions (including project finance loans, syndicated corporate loans, corporate acquisition loans, leveraged loans, bridge loans, share financings). Within LSF, the Project Finance team originates, executes and manages cashflow based financings (with or without recourse) and financial advisory mandates across power and renewables, Oil & gas,  infrastructure and other sectors in Asia-Pacific (excluding Australia). 

Responsibilities Direct Responsibilities

• Origination: Support LSF senior originators (VPs, Directors and Managing Directors) in the origination of loans across Asia-Pacific, including idea generation, prospect identification, initial debt sizing (incl. financial modelling) and pitch book preparation, in coordination with various internal teams
• Execution of financing and advisory mandates:  - Draft initial screening memos, credit applications and other internal papers on the transactions, running of pricing models under the supervision of senior team members - Undertake detailed financial modelling and assist in preparation of information memorandum and bankability studies for advisory and arranging transactions - Support in loan structuring, term sheet drafting/ negotiations and financing documentation reviews/negotiations. - Responsible for and coordinate all closing and funding related tasks and liaise with other internal teams e.g. KYC on boarding and Coverage/RM’s on completing the internal administrative process for credit application/approval and procedures for funding
• Monitoring: Lead and support transaction monitoring including preparing annual reviews and process waiver requests working with the senior members of the team
• Ensure compliance with Bank’s policies/procedures and regulatory requirements, in particular with regard to the KYC responsibilities and duties, as per relevant policies and procedures
• Assist the team in preparation of annual budgets and periodic reporting 
• Other tasks as required or defined from time to time. 

Contributing responsibilities:

• Liaison with clients/ external parties and other CMG teams /Corporate Coverage as and when required
• Support on cross selling other banking services to client
• Contribute to maintain up to date and accurate data bases, systems, portfolio, pipeline, meeting and other reports as well as financial/income forecasts, budget preparation, etc
• Contribute directly/indirectly to the achievement of PF and LSF’s yearly budget
• Contribute to strict compliance of LSF will all compliance, conduct and other policies
• Support other teams within LSF, on a selective basis (as determined by the manager) incl. Energy and Natural Resources, Loan Capital Markets and other industries (incl. TMT).

Technical & Behavioral Competencies

• Strong presentation and communication skills
• Strong proficiency in financial modeling incl. knowledge of accounting
• Strong work ethic with good team / interpersonal skills
• Analytical approach to problem solving
• Strong commitment, ability to work flexible hours and travel
• Attention to detail with ability to take responsibility for certain aspects of the transaction including monitoring of allocated portfolio as required by the team

Specific Qualifications (if required)

• 3-5 years of experience in project finance/ corporate finance, preferably with exposure to transactions in the Power, Renewable, Oil and Gas and Infrastructure sectors;
• University educated with strong academic background
• Strong financial modeling and analytical skills

Discover the different professions within BNP Paribas: Sales and Client relations

Working in Sales and Client Relations at BNP Paribas is all about helping clients on a daily basis, and supporting them at important times in their personal and professional lives.

Why should I apply?

Basically, why would you want to join BNP Paribas over any other company?

BECAUSE YOU'RE THE KIND OF PERSON WHO WANTS...

Interesting assignments.

What if we told you that working in our Group isn’t quite what you might think? At BNP Paribas, we do a multitude of different jobs that are constantly evolving to meet the expectations of our clients and society as a whole. Whether through everyday tasks or major projects, doing one of our jobs means making a personal commitment to taking sustainable action.

To feel good about the job you do

Feeling good about your job means bringing your whole self to work and being who you are. It’s also about having the resources you need to achieve a healthy work-life balance. Both of these are major commitments at BNP Paribas.

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At BNP Paribas, developing your skills is as important to us as it is to you. And the skills you learn with us will help you through the rest of your working life.

Offers you may be interested in

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