utilitarian analysis essay

Utilitarianism

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“Utilitarianism” is a philosophical essay written by English philosopher John Stuart Mill in 1863. In this long essay, Mill seeks to provide a definition for the moral philosophy of utilitarianism , which was originally developed by the philosopher Jeremy Bentham . As a philosophy, utilitarianism argues that a desire for happiness lies at the heart of all moral considerations. Mill’s essay expanded on the philosophical ideas initially proposed by Bentham and specifically sought to respond to common criticisms or misunderstandings of utilitarianism. This guide follows the version of “Utilitarianism” collected in the 2015 edition of the Oxford University Press anthology of Mill’s writings, titled On Liberty, Utilitarianism, and Other Essays . The essay “Utilitarianism” is divided into five chapters.

In the first chapter, Mill describes some of the general questions that concern any moral philosopher. Mill believes that the field of moral philosophy has not significantly developed since the time of the Ancient Greek philosophers; the general and first principles upon which morality is based remain unknown. Most moral philosophers prior to Mill belong to two different schools of thought concerning ethics, intuitive ethics and inductive ethics; these schools of thought differ on the question of whether morality is inherent in human nature or learned through experience. While both forms of ethics agree that morality must be based upon foundational principles, neither have succeeded in outlining what those principles are. “Utilitarianism” fills this gap by arguing that all moral questions are based upon what Mill calls the Utility Principle , which holds that morality is based on the desire to increase happiness (or pleasure) and avoid pain. 

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Chapter 2 focuses on the meaning of utilitarianism and the Utility Principle. Throughout the chapter, Mill responds to a series of common misconceptions about utilitarianism. Mill explains that utilitarianism seeks to increase pleasure in people’s lives, not avoid or prevent it. Mill also clarifies the definition of pleasure; he does not mean pleasure in the form of satisfying animalistic desires, but the higher forms of pleasure that only humans are able to appreciate. Mill also explains that the Utility Principle is concerned less with actions that improve individual happiness than with actions that improve the general happiness of society as a whole.

In Chapter 3, Mill describes the sanction by which society is obligated to follow the ideas of utilitarianism. Mill argues that the sanction for any moral philosophy, including utilitarianism, is an individual’s conscience, which creates a feeling of pain or remorse whenever an individual commits actions that break the moral code. Utilitarianism has a special sanction, however, due to its connection to humanity’s natural inclination to exist as social beings. Because humans have an inherent desire to be a part of a community, they are inclined to follow the code of utilitarianism as their social desires lead them to seek the betterment of society as a whole.

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Chapter 4 contains Mill’s outline of what he believes is the proof of utilitarianism. Mill argues that it is impossible to prove that happiness is desirable beyond the fact that experience shows that people desire to increase their happiness. For Mill, this fact demonstrates that the goal of an individual’s actions is that individual’s own happiness or pleasure, which, he argues, proves the Utility Principle.

The final chapter of “Utilitarianism” examines the relationship between utility and justice. Mill notes that many people believe that a desire for justice is the basis for morality, rather than a desire for happiness or pleasure. Throughout this chapter, Mill attempts to prove that the desire for justice is a subcategory of the desire for happiness. Mill investigates the ideal of justice, which, he argues, is a feeling connected to people’s legal rights; the notion of justice includes laws that do exist and laws that should exist. Mill contends that justice is a feeling based in an individual’s animal instinct for self-preservation, and this instinct applies to entire communities through humankind’s sympathetic nature. As such, Mill argues that justice is analogous to the utility principle, as it is ultimately concerned with the happiness and good of society as a whole. 

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In This Article Expand or collapse the "in this article" section Utilitarianism

Introduction, general overviews.

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• Peter Singer
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Utilitarianism by Ben Eggleston LAST REVIEWED: 29 November 2022 LAST MODIFIED: 29 November 2022 DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780195396577-0431

Utilitarianism is a moral theory that judges actions based on their consequences—specifically, based on their effects on well-being. Most utilitarians take well-being to be constituted largely by happiness, and historically utilitarianism has been known by the phrase “the greatest happiness for the greatest number.” As the second part of this phrase suggests, utilitarianism is concerned with the well-being of all people, not just the person who performs an action or the people most directly affected; in fact, because nonhuman animals can also experience pleasure and pain, their well-being also counts in the moral assessment of actions, according to most utilitarians. Thus, a simple statement of the utilitarian view is that an action is right if and only if it brings about at least as much overall well-being as any action the agent could have performed instead. Controversially, this means that, according to utilitarianism, in principle, any type of action—such as lying, stealing, or even killing someone—could conceivably be condoned by utilitarianism if, in the particular circumstances, it would produce at least as much overall well-being as anything else the agent could have done. Utilitarians tend to condemn such actions because they tend to reduce overall well-being, but they hold that the impact on well-being is what makes such actions wrong—not their being prohibited by conventionally accepted moral rules, the commands of a deity, principles of human rights, or other considerations that can conflict with the fundamental moral goal of maximizing overall well-being. In addition to the straightforward form of utilitarianism summarized above, there are other forms of the view, such as ones that judge acts not in terms of their direct effects on overall well-being, but in terms of their compliance with rules whose general acceptance tends to promote well-being. All forms of the view, however, hold that the moral assessment of acts derives directly or indirectly from the fundamental utilitarian moral criterion of the maximization of overall well-being.

For most readers, de Lazari-Radek and Singer 2017 is the best work to start with. They will then be well-situated to enjoy the debate between Smart 1973 and Williams 1973 . They can then turn to Brink 2006 to appreciate the place of utilitarianism within consequentialism and several issues that arise there.

Brink, David O. “Some Forms and Limits of Consequentialism.” In The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory . Edited by David Copp, 380–423. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195325911.003.0015

An overview of the general consequentialist approach to ethics, situating utilitarianism within that approach. The chapter is divided into twenty sections, providing clarity of organization and enabling the reader to home in on topics of particular interest. The introduction and sections 1–8 (pp. 380–398) are especially important and accessible.

de Lazari-Radek, Katarzyna, and Peter Singer. Utilitarianism: A Very Short Introduction . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.

DOI: 10.1093/actrade/9780198728795.001.0001

A brief and accessible introduction to utilitarianism, by two leading contemporary utilitarian theorists, covering the historical roots of the view, arguments in support of it, objections, different varieties of the view, and its contemporary relevance. Probably the best choice for most readers looking for a brief but substantial introduction presupposing no prior philosophical background.

Smart, J. J. C. “An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics.” In Utilitarianism: For and Against . Edited by J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, 3–74. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1973.

One of the classic defenses of utilitarianism, emphasizing act utilitarianism in particular, and a hedonistic theory of well-being. Brief, direct, and uncompromising. Some aspects of Smart’s view have been superseded by subsequent developments in utilitarian thought, but Smart’s essay is still well worth the time required to read it. Best read just before Williams 1973 .

Williams, Bernard. “A Critique of Utilitarianism.” In Utilitarianism: For and Against . Edited by J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, 77–150. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1973.

One of the classic critiques of utilitarianism, by one of the most influential ethicists of the twentieth century, written with his customary verve. The essay’s examples and arguments on two topics—negative responsibility and what has come to be called the integrity objection—have become mainstays of the critical literature on utilitarianism. Even proponents of utilitarianism who consider Williams’s objections misguided generally acknowledge his critique as seminal. Best read just after Smart 1973 .

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5 Utilitarianism: Theory and Applications

• Published: October 2002
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Utilitarianism is a comprehensive doctrine claiming that the greatest amount of happiness is an end that should exclusively guide all actions of both government and individuals. The fact that people value the happiness of those close to them more than that of strangers makes utilitarianism personally unacceptable to many, but it may still be a proper principle for government, given some overriding respect for individual rights. There are, however, basic problems concerning the value of life, and the treatment of future people and foreigners. The conventional discounting of future incomes does not imply that the utility of future people is discounted. The state's primary responsibility is to its own citizens, but it should not treat aliens as mere instruments for the welfare of citizens.

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Consequentialism

Consequentialism, as its name suggests, is simply the view that normative properties depend only on consequences. This historically important and still popular theory embodies the basic intuition that what is best or right is whatever makes the world best in the future, because we cannot change the past, so worrying about the past is no more useful than crying over spilled milk. This general approach can be applied at different levels to different normative properties of different kinds of things, but the most prominent example is probably consequentialism about the moral rightness of acts, which holds that whether an act is morally right depends only on the consequences of that act or of something related to that act, such as the motive behind the act or a general rule requiring acts of the same kind.

1. Classic Utilitarianism

2. what is consequentialism, 3. what is good hedonistic vs. pluralistic consequentialisms, 4. which consequences actual vs. expected consequentialisms, 5. consequences of what rights, relativity, and rules, 6. consequences for whom limiting the demands of morality, 7. arguments for consequentialism, other internet resources, related entries.

The paradigm case of consequentialism is utilitarianism, whose classic proponents were Jeremy Bentham (1789), John Stuart Mill (1861), and Henry Sidgwick (1907). (For predecessors, see Schneewind 1997, 2002.) Classic utilitarians held hedonistic act consequentialism. Act consequentialism is the claim that an act is morally right if and only if that act maximizes the good, that is, if and only if the total amount of good for all minus the total amount of bad for all is greater than this net amount for any incompatible act available to the agent on that occasion. (Cf. Moore 1912, chs. 1–2.) Hedonism then claims that pleasure is the only intrinsic good and that pain is the only intrinsic bad.

These claims are often summarized in the slogan that an act is right if and only if it causes “the greatest happiness for the greatest number.” This slogan is misleading, however. An act can increase happiness for most (the greatest number of) people but still fail to maximize the net good in the world if the smaller number of people whose happiness is not increased lose much more than the greater number gains. The principle of utility would not allow that kind of sacrifice of the smaller number to the greater number unless the net good overall is increased more than any alternative.

Classic utilitarianism is consequentialist as opposed to deontological because of what it denies. It denies that moral rightness depends directly on anything other than consequences, such as whether the agent promised in the past to do the act now. Of course, the fact that the agent promised to do the act might indirectly affect the act’s consequences if breaking the promise will make other people unhappy. Nonetheless, according to classic utilitarianism, what makes it morally wrong to break the promise is its future effects on those other people rather than the fact that the agent promised in the past (Sinnott-Armstrong 2009).

Since classic utilitarianism reduces all morally relevant factors (Kagan 1998, 17–22) to consequences, it might appear simple. However, classic utilitarianism is actually a complex combination of many distinct claims, including the following claims about the moral rightness of acts:

Consequentialism = whether an act is morally right depends only on consequences (as opposed to the circumstances or the intrinsic nature of the act or anything that happens before the act). Actual Consequentialism = whether an act is morally right depends only on the actual consequences (as opposed to foreseen, foreseeable, intended, or likely consequences). Direct Consequentialism = whether an act is morally right depends only on the consequences of that act itself (as opposed to the consequences of the agent’s motive, of a rule or practice that covers other acts of the same kind, and so on). Evaluative Consequentialism = moral rightness depends only on the value of the consequences (as opposed to non-evaluative features of the consequences). Hedonism = the value of the consequences depends only on the pleasures and pains in the consequences (as opposed to other supposed goods, such as freedom, knowledge, life, and so on). Maximizing Consequentialism = moral rightness depends only on which consequences are best (as opposed to merely satisfactory or an improvement over the status quo). Aggregative Consequentialism = which consequences are best is some function of the values of parts of those consequences (as opposed to rankings of whole worlds or sets of consequences). Total Consequentialism = moral rightness depends only on the total net good in the consequences (as opposed to the average net good per person). Universal Consequentialism = moral rightness depends on the consequences for all people or sentient beings (as opposed to only the individual agent, members of the individual’s society, present people, or any other limited group). Equal Consideration = in determining moral rightness, benefits to one person matter just as much as similar benefits to any other person (as opposed to putting more weight on the worse or worst off). Agent-neutrality = whether some consequences are better than others does not depend on whether the consequences are evaluated from the perspective of the agent (as opposed to an observer).

These claims could be clarified, supplemented, and subdivided further. What matters here is just that most pairs of these claims are logically independent, so a moral theorist could consistently accept some of them without accepting others. Yet classic utilitarians accepted them all. That fact makes classic utilitarianism a more complex theory than it might appear at first sight.

It also makes classic utilitarianism subject to attack from many angles. Persistent opponents posed plenty of problems for classic utilitarianism. Each objection led some utilitarians to give up some of the original claims of classic utilitarianism. By dropping one or more of those claims, descendants of utilitarianism can construct a wide variety of moral theories. Advocates of these theories often call them consequentialism rather than utilitarianism so that their theories will not be subject to refutation by association with the classic utilitarian theory.

This array of alternatives raises the question of which moral theories count as consequentialist (as opposed to deontological) and why. In actual usage, the term “consequentialism” seems to be used as a family resemblance term to refer to any descendant of classic utilitarianism that remains close enough to its ancestor in the important respects. Of course, different philosophers see different respects as the important ones (Portmore 2020). Hence, there is no agreement on which theories count as consequentialist under this definition.

To resolve this vagueness, we need to determine which of the various claims of classic utilitarianism are essential to consequentialism. One claim seems clearly necessary. Any consequentialist theory must accept the claim that I labeled “consequentialism”, namely, that certain normative properties depend only on consequences. If that claim is dropped, the theory ceases to be consequentialist.

It is less clear whether that claim by itself is sufficient to make a theory consequentialist. Several philosophers assert that a moral theory should not be classified as consequentialist unless it is agent-neutral (McNaughton and Rawling 1991, Howard-Snyder 1994, Pettit 1997). This narrower definition is motivated by the fact that many self-styled critics of consequentialism argue against agent-neutrality.

Other philosophers prefer a broader definition that does not require a moral theory to be agent-neutral in order to be consequentialist (Bennett 1989; Broome 1991, 5–6; and Skorupski 1995). Criticisms of agent-neutrality can then be understood as directed against one part of classic utilitarianism that need not be adopted by every moral theory that is consequentialist. Moreover, according to those who prefer a broader definition of consequentialism, the narrower definition conflates independent claims and obscures a crucial commonality between agent-neutral consequentialism and other moral theories that focus exclusively on consequences, such as moral egoism and recent self-styled consequentialists who allow agent-relativity into their theories of value (Sen 1982, Broome 1991, Portmore 2001, 2003, 2011).

A definition solely in terms of consequences might seem too broad, because it includes absurd theories such as the theory that an act is morally right if it increases the number of goats in Texas. Of course, such theories are implausible. Still, it is not implausible to call them consequentialist, since they do look only at consequences. The implausibility of one version of consequentialism does not make consequentialism implausible in general, since other versions of consequentialism still might be plausible.

Besides, anyone who wants to pick out a smaller set of moral theories that excludes this absurd theory may talk about evaluative consequentialism, which is the claim that moral rightness depends only on the value of the consequences. Then those who want to talk about the even smaller group of moral theories that accepts both evaluative consequentialism and agent-neutrality may describe them as agent-neutral evaluative consequentialism. If anyone still insists on calling these smaller groups of theories by the simple name, ‘consequentialism’, this narrower word usage will not affect any substantive issue.

Still, if the definition of consequentialism becomes too broad, it might seem to lose force. Some philosophers have argued that any moral theory, or at least any plausible moral theory, could be represented as a version of consequentialism (Sosa 1993, Portmore 2009, Dreier 1993 and 2011; but see Brown 2011). If so, then it means little to label a theory as consequentialist. The real content comes only by contrasting theories that are not consequentialist.

In the end, what matters is only that we get clear about which theories a particular commentator counts as consequentialist or not and which claims are supposed to make them consequentialist or not. Only then can we know which claims are at stake when this commentator supports or criticizes what they call “consequentialism”. Then we can ask whether each objection really refutes that particular claim.

Some moral theorists seek a single simple basic principle because they assume that simplicity is needed in order to decide what is right when less basic principles or reasons conflict. This assumption seems to make hedonism attractive. Unfortunately, however, hedonism is not as simple as they assume, because hedonists count both pleasures and pains. Pleasure is distinct from the absence of pain, and pain is distinct from the absence of pleasure, since sometimes people feel neither pleasure nor pain, and sometimes they feel both at once. Nonetheless, hedonism was adopted partly because it seemed simpler than competing views.

The simplicity of hedonism was also a source of opposition. From the start, the hedonism in classic utilitarianism was treated with contempt. Some contemporaries of Bentham and Mill argued that hedonism lowers the value of human life to the level of animals, because it implies that, as Bentham said, an unsophisticated game (such as push-pin) is as good as highly intellectual poetry if the game creates as much pleasure (Bentham 1843). Quantitative hedonists sometimes respond that great poetry almost always creates more pleasure than trivial games (or sex and drugs and rock-and-roll), because the pleasures of poetry are more certain (or probable), durable (or lasting), fecund (likely to lead to other pleasures), pure (unlikely to lead to pains), and so on.

Mill used a different strategy to avoid calling push-pin as good as poetry. He distinguished higher and lower qualities of pleasures according to the preferences of people who have experienced both kinds (Mill 1861, 56; compare Plato 1993 and Hutcheson 1755, 421–23). This qualitative hedonism has been subjected to much criticism, including charges that it is incoherent and does not count as hedonism (Moore 1903, 80–81; cf. Feldman 1997, 106–24).

Even if qualitative hedonism is coherent and is a kind of hedonism, it still might not seem plausible. Some critics argue that not all pleasures are valuable, since, for example, there is no value in the pleasures that a sadist gets from whipping a victim or that an addict gets from drugs. Other opponents object that not only pleasures are intrinsically valuable, because other things are valuable independently of whether they lead to pleasure or avoid pain. For example, my love for my wife does not seem to become less valuable when I get less pleasure from her because she contracts some horrible disease. Similarly, freedom seems valuable even when it creates anxiety, and even when it is freedom to do something (such as leave one’s country) that one does not want to do. Again, many people value knowledge of distant galaxies regardless of whether this knowledge will create pleasure or avoid pain.

These points against hedonism are often supplemented with the story of the experience machine found in Nozick 1974 (42–45; cf. De Brigard 2010) and the movie, The Matrix . People on this machine believe they are spending time with their friends, winning Olympic gold medals and Nobel prizes, having sex with their favorite lovers, or doing whatever gives them the greatest balance of pleasure over pain. Although they have no real friends or lovers and actually accomplish nothing, people on the experience machine get just as much pleasure as if their beliefs were true. Moreover, they feel no (or little) pain. Assuming that the machine is reliable, it would seem irrational not to hook oneself up to this machine if pleasure and pain were all that mattered, as hedonists claim. Since it does not seem irrational to refuse to hook oneself up to this machine, hedonism seems inadequate. The reason is that hedonism overlooks the value of real friendship, knowledge, freedom, and achievements, all of which are lacking for deluded people on the experience machine.

Some hedonists claim that this objection rests on a misinterpretation of hedonism. If hedonists see pleasure and pain as sensations , then a machine might be able to reproduce those sensations. However, we can also say that a mother is pleased that her daughter gets good grades. Such propositional pleasure occurs only when the state of affairs in which the person takes pleasure exists (that is, when the daughter actually gets good grades). But the relevant states of affairs would not really exist if one were hooked up to the experience machine. Hence, hedonists who value propositional pleasure rather than or in addition to sensational pleasure can deny that more pleasure is achieved by hooking oneself up to such an experience machine (Feldman 1997, 79–105; see also Tännsjö 1998 and Feldman 2004 for more on hedonism).

A related position rests on the claim that what is good is desire satisfaction or the fulfillment of preferences; and what is bad is the frustration of desires or preferences. What is desired or preferred is usually not a sensation but is, rather, a state of affairs, such as having a friend or accomplishing a goal. If a person desires or prefers to have true friends and true accomplishments and not to be deluded, then hooking this person up to the experience machine need not maximize desire satisfaction. Utilitarians who adopt this theory of value can then claim that an agent morally ought to do an act if and only if that act maximizes desire satisfaction or preference fulfillment (that is, the degree to which the act achieves whatever is desired or preferred). What maximizes desire satisfaction or preference fulfillment need not maximize sensations of pleasure when what is desired or preferred is not a sensation of pleasure. This position is usually described as preference utilitarianism .

One problem for preference utilitarianism concerns how to make interpersonal comparisons (though this problem also arises for several other theories of value). If we want to know what one person prefers, we can ask what that person would choose in conflicts. We cannot, however, use the same method to determine whether one person’s preference is stronger or weaker than another person’s preference, since these different people might choose differently in the decisive conflicts. We need to settle which preference (or pleasure) is stronger because we may know that Jones prefers A’s being done to A’s not being done (and Jones would receive more pleasure from A’s being done than from A’s not being done), whereas Smith prefers A’s not being done (and Smith would receive more pleasure from A’s not being done than from A’s being done). To determine whether it is right to do A or not to do A, we must be able to compare the strengths of Jones’s and Smith’s preferences (or the amounts of pleasure each would receive in her preferred outcome) in order to determine whether doing A or not doing A would be better overall. Utilitarians and consequentialists have proposed many ways to solve this problem of interpersonal comparison, and each attempt has received criticisms. Debates about this problem still rage. (For a recent discussion with references, see Coakley 2015.)

Preference utilitarianism is also often criticized on the grounds that some preferences are misinformed, crazy, horrendous, or trivial. I might prefer to drink the liquid in a glass because I think that it is beer, though it really is strong acid. Or I might prefer to die merely because I am clinically depressed. Or I might prefer to torture children. Or I might prefer to spend my life learning to write as small as possible. In all such cases, opponents of preference utilitarianism can deny that what I prefer is really good. Preference utilitarians can respond by limiting the preferences that make something good, such as by referring to informed desires that do not disappear after therapy (Brandt 1979). However, it is not clear that such qualifications can solve all of the problems for a preference theory of value without making the theory circular by depending on substantive assumptions about which preferences are for good things.

Many consequentialists deny that all values can be reduced to any single ground, such as pleasure or desire satisfaction, so they instead adopt a pluralistic theory of value. Moore’s ideal utilitarianism , for example, takes into account the values of beauty and truth (or knowledge) in addition to pleasure (Moore 1903, 83–85, 194; 1912). Other consequentialists add the intrinsic values of friendship or love, freedom or ability, justice or fairness, desert, life, virtue, and so on.

If the recognized values all concern individual welfare, then the theory of value can be called welfarist (Sen 1979). When a welfarist theory of value is combined with the other elements of classic utilitarianism, the resulting theory can be called welfarist consequentialism .

One non-welfarist theory of value is perfectionism , which claims that certain states make a person’s life good without necessarily being good for the person in any way that increases that person’s welfare (Hurka 1993, esp. 17). If this theory of value is combined with other elements of classic utilitarianism, the resulting theory can be called perfectionist consequentialism or, in deference to its Aristotelian roots, eudaemonistic consequentialism .

Similarly, some consequentialists hold that an act is right if and only if it maximizes some function of both happiness and capabilities (Sen 1985, Nussbaum 2000). Disabilities are then seen as bad regardless of whether they are accompanied by pain or loss of pleasure.

Or one could hold that an act is right if it maximizes fulfillment (or minimizes violation) of certain specified moral rights. Such theories are sometimes described as a utilitarianism of rights . This approach could be built into total consequentialism with rights weighed against happiness and other values or, alternatively, the disvalue of rights violations could be lexically ranked prior to any other kind of loss or harm (cf. Rawls 1971, 42). Such a lexical ranking within a consequentialist moral theory would yield the result that nobody is ever justified in violating rights for the sake of happiness or any value other than rights, although it would still allow some rights violations in order to avoid or prevent other rights violations.

When consequentialists incorporate a variety of values, they need to rank or weigh each value against the others. This is often difficult. Some consequentialists even hold that certain values are incommensurable or incomparable in that no comparison of their values is possible (Griffin 1986 and Chang 1997). This position allows consequentialists to recognize the possibility of irresolvable moral dilemmas (Sinnott-Armstrong 1988, 81; Railton 2003, 249–91).

Pluralism about values also enables consequentialists to handle many of the problems that plague hedonistic utilitarianism. For example, opponents often charge that classical utilitarians cannot explain our obligations to keep promises and not to lie when no pain is caused or pleasure is lost. Whether or not hedonists can meet this challenge, pluralists can hold that knowledge is intrinsically good and/or that false belief is intrinsically bad. Then, if deception causes false beliefs, deception is instrumentally bad, and agents ought not to lie without a good reason, even when lying causes no pain or loss of pleasure. Since lying is an attempt to deceive, to lie is to attempt to do what is morally wrong (in the absence of defeating factors). Similarly, if a promise to do an act is an attempt to make an audience believe that the promiser will do the act, then to break a promise is for a promiser to make false a belief that the promiser created or tried to create. Although there is more tale to tell, the disvalue of false belief can be part of a consequentialist story about why it is morally wrong to break promises.

When such pluralist versions of consequentialism are not welfarist, some philosophers would not call them utilitarian . However, this usage is not uniform, since even non-welfarist views are sometimes called utilitarian. Whatever you call them, the important point is that consequentialism and the other elements of classical utilitarianism are compatible with many different theories about which things are good or valuable.

Instead of turning pluralist, some consequentialists foreswear the aggregation of values. Classic utilitarianism added up the values within each part of the consequences to determine which total set of consequences has the most value in it. One could, instead, aggregate goods for each individual but not aggregate goods of separate individuals (Roberts 2002). Alternatively, one could give up all aggregation, including aggregation for individuals, and instead rank the complete worlds or sets of consequences caused by acts without adding up the values of the parts of those worlds or consequences. One motive for this move is Moore’s principle of organic unity (Moore 1903, 27–36), which claims that the value of a combination or “organic unity” of two or more things cannot be calculated simply by adding the values of the things that are combined or unified. For example, even if punishment of a criminal causes pain, a consequentialist can hold that a world with both the crime and the punishment is better than a world with the crime but not the punishment, perhaps because the former contains more justice, without adding the value of this justice to the negative value of the pain of the punishment. Similarly, a world might seem better when people do not get pleasures that they do not deserve, even if this judgment is not reached by adding the values of these pleasures to other values to calculate any total. Cases like these lead some consequentialists to deny that moral rightness is any aggregative function of the values of particular effects of acts. Instead, they compare the whole world that results from an action with the whole world that results from not doing that action. If the former is better, then the action is morally right (J.J.C. Smart 1973, 32; Feldman 1997, 17–35). This approach can be called holistic consequentialism or world utilitarianism .

Another way to incorporate relations among values is to consider distribution . Compare one outcome where most people are destitute but a few lucky people have extremely large amounts of goods with another outcome that contains slightly less total goods but where every person has nearly the same amount of goods. Egalitarian critics of classical utilitarianism argue that the latter outcome is better, so more than the total amount of good matters. Traditional hedonistic utilitarians who prefer the latter outcome often try to justify egalitarian distributions of goods by appealing to a principle of diminishing marginal utility. Other consequentialists, however, incorporate a more robust commitment to equality. Early on, Sidgwick (1907, 417) responded to such objections by allowing distribution to break ties between other values. More recently, some consequentialists have added some notion of fairness (Broome 1991, 192–200) or desert (Feldman 1997, 154–74) to their test of which outcome is best. (See also Kagan 1998, 48–59.) Others turn to prioritarianism, which puts more weight on people who are worse off (Adler and Norheim 2022, Arneson 2022). Such consequentialists do not simply add up values; they look at patterns.

A related issue arises from population change. Imagine that a government considers whether to provide free contraceptives to curb a rise in population. Without free contraceptives, overcrowding will bring hunger, disease, and pain, so each person will be worse off. Still, each new person will have enough pleasure and other goods that the total net utility will increase with the population. Classic utilitarianism focuses on total utility, so it seems to imply that this government should not provide free contraceptives. That seems implausible to many utilitarians. To avoid this result, some utilitarians claim that an act is morally wrong if and only if its consequences contain more pain (or other disvalues) than an alternative, regardless of positive values (cf. R. N. Smart 1958). This negative utilitarianism implies that the government should provide contraceptives, since that program reduces pain (and other disvalues), even though it also decreases total net pleasure (or good). Unfortunately, negative utilitarianism also seems to imply that the government should painlessly kill everyone it can, since dead people feel no pain (and have no false beliefs, diseases, or disabilities – though killing them does cause loss of ability). A more popular response is average utilitarianism, which says that the best consequences are those with the highest average utility (cf. Rawls 1971, 161–75). The average utility would be higher with the contraceptive program than without it, so average utilitarianism yields the more plausible result—that the government should adopt the contraceptive program. Critics sometimes charge that the average utility could also be increased by killing the worst off, but this claim is not at all clear, because such killing would put everyone in danger (since, after the worst off are killed, another group becomes the worst off, and then they might be killed next). Still, average utilitarianism faces problems of its own (such as “the mere addition paradox” in Parfit 1984, chap. 19). In any case, all maximizing consequentialists, whether or not they are pluralists, must decide whether moral rightness depends on maximizing total good or average good.

A final challenge to consequentialists’ accounts of value derives from Geach 1956 and has been pressed by Thomson 2001. Thomson argues that “A is a good X” (such as a good poison) does not entail “A is good”, so the term “good” is an attributive adjective and cannot legitimately be used without qualification. On this view, it is senseless to call something good unless this means that it is good for someone or in some respect or for some use or at some activity or as an instance of some kind. Consequentialists are supposed to violate this restriction when they say that the total or average consequences or the world as a whole is good without any such qualification. However, consequentialists can respond either that the term “good” has predicative uses in addition to its attributive uses or that when they call a world or total set of consequences good, they are calling it good for consequences or for a world (Sinnott-Armstrong 2003a). If so, the fact that “good” is often used attributively creates no problem for consequentialists.

A second set of problems for classic utilitarianism is epistemological. Classic utilitarianism seems to require that agents calculate all consequences of each act for every person for all time. That’s impossible.

This objection rests on a misinterpretation. These critics assume that the principle of utility is supposed to be used as a decision procedure or guide , that is, as a method that agents consciously apply to acts in advance to help them make decisions. However, most classic and contemporary utilitarians and consequentialists do not propose their principles as decision procedures. (Bales 1971) Bentham wrote, “It is not to be expected that this process [his hedonic calculus] should be strictly pursued previously to every moral judgment.” (1789, Chap. IV, Sec. VI) Mill agreed, “it is a misapprehension of the utilitarian mode of thought to conceive it as implying that people should fix their minds upon so wide a generality as the world, or society at large.” (1861, Chap. II, Par. 19) Sidgwick added, “It is not necessary that the end which gives the criterion of rightness should always be the end at which we consciously aim.” (1907, 413)

Instead, most consequentialists claim that overall utility is the criterion or standard of what is morally right or morally ought to be done. Their theories are intended to spell out the necessary and sufficient conditions for an act to be morally right, regardless of whether the agent can tell in advance whether those conditions are met. Just as the laws of physics govern golf ball flight, but golfers need not calculate physical forces while planning shots; so overall utility can determine which decisions are morally right, even if agents need not calculate utilities while making decisions. If the principle of utility is used as a criterion of the right rather than as a decision procedure, then classical utilitarianism does not require that anyone know the total consequences of anything before making a decision.

Furthermore, a utilitarian criterion of right implies that it would not be morally right to use the principle of utility as a decision procedure in cases where it would not maximize utility to try to calculate utilities before acting. Utilitarians regularly argue that most people in most circumstances ought not to try to calculate utilities, because they are too likely to make serious miscalculations that will lead them to perform actions that reduce utility. It is even possible to hold that most agents usually ought to follow their moral intuitions, because these intuitions evolved to lead us to perform acts that maximize utility, at least in likely circumstances (Hare 1981, 46–47). Some utilitarians (Sidgwick 1907, 489–90) suggest that a utilitarian decision procedure may be adopted as an esoteric morality by an elite group that is better at calculating utilities, but utilitarians can, instead, hold that nobody should use the principle of utility as a decision procedure.

This move is supposed to make consequentialism self-refuting, according to some opponents. However, there is nothing incoherent about proposing a decision procedure that is separate from one’s criterion of the right. Similar distinctions apply in other normative realms. The criterion of a good stock investment is its total return, but the best decision procedure still might be to reduce risk by buying an index fund or blue-chip stocks. Criteria can, thus, be self-effacing without being self-refuting (Parfit 1984, chs. 1 and 4).

Others object that this move takes the force out of consequentialism, because it leads agents to ignore consequentialism when they make real decisions. However, a criterion of the right can be useful at a higher level by helping us choose among available decision procedures and refine our decision procedures as circumstances change and we gain more experience and knowledge. Hence, most consequentialists do not mind giving up consequentialism as a direct decision procedure as long as consequences remain the criterion of rightness (but see Chappell 2001).

If overall utility is the criterion of moral rightness, then it might seem that nobody could know what is morally right. If so, classical utilitarianism leads to moral skepticism. However, utilitarians insist that we can have strong reasons to believe that certain acts reduce utility, even if we have not yet inspected or predicted every consequence of those acts. For example, in normal circumstances, if someone were to torture and kill his children, it is possible that this would maximize utility, but that is very unlikely. Maybe they would have grown up to be mass murders, but it is at least as likely that they would grow up to cure serious diseases or do other great things, and it is much more likely that they would have led normally happy (or at least not destructive) lives. So observers as well as agents have adequate reasons to believe that such acts are morally wrong, according to act utilitarianism. In many other cases, it will still be hard to tell whether an act will maximize utility, but that shows only that there are severe limits to our knowledge of what is morally right. That should be neither surprising nor problematic for utilitarians.

If utilitarians want their theory to allow more moral knowledge, they can make a different kind of move by turning from actual consequences to expected or expectable consequences. Suppose that Alice finds a runaway teenager who asks for money to get home. Alice wants to help and reasonably believes that buying a bus ticket home for this runaway will help, so she buys a bus ticket and puts the runaway on the bus. Unfortunately, the bus is involved in a freak accident, and the runaway is killed. If actual consequences are what determine moral wrongness, then it was morally wrong for Alice to buy the bus ticket for this runaway. Opponents claim that this result is absurd enough to refute classic utilitarianism.

Some utilitarians bite the bullet and say that Alice’s act was morally wrong, but it was blameless wrongdoing, because her motives were good, and she was not responsible, given that she could not have foreseen that her act would cause harm. Since this theory makes actual consequences determine moral rightness, it can be called actual consequentialism .

Other responses claim that moral rightness depends on foreseen, foreseeable, intended, or likely consequences, rather than actual ones. Imagine that Bob does not in fact foresee a bad consequence that would make his act wrong if he did foresee it, but that Bob could easily have foreseen this bad consequence if he had been paying attention. Maybe he does not notice the rot on the hamburger he feeds to his kids which makes them sick. If foreseen consequences are what matter, then Bob’s act is not morally wrong. If foreseeable consequences are what matter, then Bob’s act is morally wrong, because the bad consequences were foreseeable. Now consider Bob’s wife, Carol, who notices that the meat is rotten but does not want to have to buy more, so she feeds it to her children anyway, hoping that it will not make them sick; but it does. Carol’s act is morally wrong if foreseen or foreseeable consequences are what matter, but not if what matter are intended consequences, because she does not intend to make her children sick. Finally, consider Bob and Carol’s son Don, who does not know enough about food to be able to know that eating rotten meat can make people sick. If Don feeds the rotten meat to his little sister, and it makes her sick, then the bad consequences are not intended, foreseen, or even foreseeable by Don, but those bad results are still objectively likely or probable , unlike the case of Alice. Some philosophers deny that probability can be fully objective, but at least the consequences here are foreseeable by others who are more informed than Don can be at the time. For Don to feed the rotten meat to his sister is, therefore, morally wrong if likely consequences are what matter, but not morally wrong if what matter are foreseen or foreseeable or intended consequences.

Consequentialist moral theories that focus on actual or objectively probable consequences are often described as objective consequentialism (Railton 1984). In contrast, consequentialist moral theories that focus on intended or foreseen consequences are usually described as subjective consequentialism . Consequentialist moral theories that focus on reasonably foreseeable consequences are then not subjective insofar as they do not depend on anything inside the actual subject’s mind, but they are subjective insofar as they do depend on which consequences this particular subject would foresee if he or she were better informed or more rational.

One final solution to these epistemological problems deploys the legal notion of proximate cause. If consequentialists define consequences in terms of what is caused (unlike Sosa 1993), then which future events count as consequences is affected by which notion of causation is used to define consequences. Suppose I give a set of steak knives to a friend. Unforeseeably, when she opens my present, the decorative pattern on the knives somehow reminds her of something horrible that her husband did. This memory makes her so angry that she voluntarily stabs and kills him with one of the knives. She would not have killed her husband if I had given her spoons instead of knives. Did my decision or my act of giving her knives cause her husband’s death? Most people (and the law) would say that the cause was her act, not mine. Why? One explanation is that her voluntary act intervened in the causal chain between my act and her husband’s death. Moreover, even if she did not voluntarily kill him, but instead she slipped and fell on the knives, thereby killing herself, my gift would still not be a cause of her death, because the coincidence of her falling intervened between my act and her death. The point is that, when voluntary acts and coincidences intervene in certain causal chains, then the results are not seen as caused by the acts further back in the chain of necessary conditions (Hart and Honoré 1985). Now, if we assume that an act must be such a proximate cause of a harm in order for that harm to be a consequence of that act, then consequentialists can claim that the moral rightness of that act is determined only by such proximate consequences. This position, which might be called proximate consequentialism , makes it much easier for agents and observers to justify moral judgments of acts because it obviates the need to predict non-proximate consequences in distant times and places. Hence, this move is worth considering, even though it has never been developed as far as I know and deviates far from traditional consequentialism, which counts not only proximate consequences but all upshots — that is, everything for which the act is a causally necessary condition.

Another problem for utilitarianism is that it seems to overlook justice and rights. One common illustration is called Transplant. Imagine that each of five patients in a hospital will die without an organ transplant. The patient in Room 1 needs a heart, the patient in Room 2 needs a liver, the patient in Room 3 needs a kidney, and so on. The person in Room 6 is in the hospital for routine tests. Luckily (for them, not for him!), his tissue is compatible with the other five patients, and a specialist is available to transplant his organs into the other five. This operation would save all five of their lives, while killing the “donor”. There is no other way to save any of the other five patients (Foot 1966, Thomson 1976; compare related cases in Carritt 1947 and McCloskey 1965).

We need to add that the organ recipients will emerge healthy, the source of the organs will remain secret, the doctor won’t be caught or punished for cutting up the “donor”, and the doctor knows all of this to a high degree of probability (despite the fact that many others will help in the operation). Still, with the right details filled in (no matter how unrealistic), it looks as if cutting up the “donor” will maximize utility, since five lives have more utility than one life (assuming that the five lives do not contribute too much to overpopulation). If so, then classical utilitarianism implies that it would not be morally wrong for the doctor to perform the transplant and even that it would be morally wrong for the doctor not to perform the transplant. Most people find this result abominable. They take this example to show how bad it can be when utilitarians overlook individual rights, such as the unwilling donor’s right to life.

Utilitarians can bite the bullet, again. They can deny that it is morally wrong to cut up the “donor” in these circumstances. Of course, doctors still should not cut up their patients in anything close to normal circumstances, but this example is so abnormal and unrealistic that we should not expect our normal moral rules to apply, and we should not trust our moral intuitions, which evolved to fit normal situations (Sprigge 1965). Many utilitarians are happy to reject common moral intuitions in this case, like many others (cf. Singer 1974, Unger 1996, Norcross 1997).

Most utilitarians lack such strong stomachs (or teeth), so they modify utilitarianism to bring it in line with common moral intuitions, including the intuition that doctors should not cut up innocent patients. One attempt claims that a killing is worse than a death. The doctor would have to kill the “donor” in order to prevent the deaths of the five patients, but nobody is killed if the five patients die. If one killing is worse than five deaths that do not involve killing, then the world that results from the doctor performing the transplant is worse than the world that results from the doctor not performing the transplant. With this new theory of value, consequentialists can agree with others that it is morally wrong for the doctor to cut up the “donor” in this example.

A modified example still seems problematic. Just suppose that the five patients need a kidney, a lung, a heart, and so forth because they were all victims of murder attempts. Then the world will contain the five killings of them if they die, but not if they do not die. Thus, even if killings are worse than deaths that are not killings, the world will still be better overall (because it will contain fewer killings as well as fewer deaths) if the doctor cuts up the “donor” to save the five other patients. But most people still think it would be morally wrong for the doctor to kill the one to prevent the five killings. The reason is that it is not the doctor who kills the five, and the doctor’s duty seems to be to reduce the amount of killing that she herself does. In this view, the doctor is not required to promote life or decrease death or even decrease killing by other people. The doctor is, instead, required to honor the value of life by not causing loss of life (cf. Pettit 1997).

This kind of case leads some consequentialists to introduce agent-relativity into their theory of value (Sen 1982, Broome 1991, Portmore 2001, 2003, 2011). To apply a consequentialist moral theory, we need to compare the world with the transplant to the world without the transplant. If this comparative evaluation must be agent-neutral, then, if an observer judges that the world with the transplant is better, the agent must make the same judgment, or else one of them is mistaken. However, if such evaluations can be agent-relative, then it could be legitimate for an observer to judge that the world with the transplant is better (since it contains fewer killings by anyone), while it is also legitimate for the doctor as agent to judge that the world with the transplant is worse (because it includes a killing by him ). In other cases, such as competitions, it might maximize the good from an agent’s perspective to do an act, while maximizing the good from an observer’s perspective to stop the agent from doing that very act. If such agent-relative value makes sense, then it can be built into consequentialism to produce the claim that an act is morally wrong if and only if the act’s consequences include less overall value from the perspective of the agent. This agent-relative consequentialism , plus the claim that the world with the transplant is worse from the perspective of the doctor, could justify the doctor’s judgment that it would be morally wrong for him to perform the transplant. A key move here is to adopt the agent’s perspective in judging the agent’s act. Agent-neutral consequentialists judge all acts from the observer’s perspective, so they would judge the doctor’s act to be wrong, since the world with the transplant is better from an observer’s perspective. In contrast, an agent-relative approach requires observers to adopt the doctor’s perspective in judging whether it would be morally wrong for the doctor to perform the transplant. This kind of agent-relative consequentialism is then supposed to capture commonsense moral intuitions in such cases (Portmore 2011).

Agent-relativity is also supposed to solve other problems. W. D. Ross (1930, 34–35) argued that, if breaking a promise created only slightly more happiness overall than keeping the promise, then the agent morally ought to break the promise according to classic utilitarianism. This supposed counterexample cannot be avoided simply by claiming that keeping promises has agent-neutral value, since keeping one promise might prevent someone else from keeping another promise. Still, agent-relative consequentialists can respond that keeping a promise has great value from the perspective of the agent who made the promise and chooses whether or not to keep it, so the world where a promise is kept is better from the agent’s perspective than another world where the promise is not kept, unless enough other values override the value of keeping the promise. In this way, agent-relative consequentialists can explain why agents morally ought not to break their promises in just the kind of case that Ross raised.

Similarly, critics of utilitarianism often argue that utilitarians cannot be good friends, because a good friend places more weight on the welfare of his or her friends than on the welfare of strangers, but utilitarianism requires impartiality among all people. However, agent-relative consequentialists can assign more weight to the welfare of a friend of an agent when assessing the value of the consequences of that agent’s acts. In this way, consequentialists try to capture common moral intuitions about the duties of friendship (see also Jackson 1991).

One final variation still causes trouble. Imagine that the doctor herself wounded the five people who need organs. If the doctor does not save their lives, then she will have killed them herself. In this case, even if the doctor can disvalue killings by herself more than killings by other people, the world still seems better from her own perspective if she performs the transplant. Critics will object that it is, nonetheless, morally wrong for the doctor to perform the transplant. Many people will not find this intuition as clear as in the other cases, but consequentialists who do find it immoral for the doctor to perform the transplant even in this case will need to modify consequentialism in some other way in order to yield the desired judgment.

This problem cannot be solved by building rights or fairness or desert into the theory of value. The five do not deserve to die, and they do deserve their lives, just as much as the one does. Each option violates someone’s right not to be killed and is unfair to someone. So consequentialists need more than just new values if they want to avoid endorsing this transplant.

One option is to go indirect. A direct consequentialist holds that the moral qualities of something depend only on the consequences of that very thing. Thus, a direct consequentialist about motives holds that the moral qualities of a motive depend on the consequences of that motive. A direct consequentialist about virtues holds that the moral qualities of a character trait (such as whether or not it is a moral virtue) depend on the consequences of that trait (Driver 2001a, Hurka 2001, Jamieson 2005, Bradley 2005). A direct consequentialist about acts holds that the moral qualities of an act depend on the consequences of that act. Someone who adopts direct consequentialism about everything is a global direct consequentialist (Pettit and Smith 2000, Driver 2012).

In contrast, an indirect consequentialist holds that the moral qualities of something depend on the consequences of something else. One indirect version of consequentialism is motive consequentialism , which claims that the moral qualities of an act depend on the consequences of the motive of that act (compare Adams 1976 and Sverdlik 2011). Another indirect version is virtue consequentialism , which holds that whether an act is morally right depends on whether it stems from or expresses a state of character that maximizes good consequences and, hence, is a virtue.

The most common indirect consequentialism is rule consequentialism , which makes the moral rightness of an act depend on the consequences of a rule (Singer 1961). Since a rule is an abstract entity, a rule by itself strictly has no consequences. Still, obedience rule consequentialists can ask what would happen if everybody obeyed a rule or what would happen if everybody violated a rule. They might argue, for example, that theft is morally wrong because it would be disastrous if everybody broke a rule against theft. Often, however, it does not seem morally wrong to break a rule even though it would cause disaster if everybody broke it. For example, if everybody broke the rule “Have some children”, then our species would die out, but that hardly shows it is morally wrong not to have any children. Luckily, our species will not die out if everyone is permitted not to have children, since enough people want to have children. Thus, instead of asking, “What would happen if everybody did that?”, rule consequentialists should ask, “What would happen if everybody were permitted to do that?” People are permitted to do what violates no accepted rule, so asking what would happen if everybody were permitted to do an act is just the flip side of asking what would happen if people accepted a rule that forbids that act. Such acceptance rule consequentialists then claim that an act is morally wrong if and only if it violates a rule whose acceptance has better consequences than the acceptance of any incompatible rule. In some accounts, a rule is accepted when it is built into individual consciences (Brandt 1992). Other rule utilitarians, however, require that moral rules be publicly known (Gert 2005; cf. Sinnott-Armstrong 2003b) or built into public institutions (Rawls 1955). Then they hold what can be called public acceptance rule consequentialism : an act is morally wrong if and only if it violates a rule whose public acceptance maximizes the good.

The indirectness of such rule utilitarianism provides a way to remain consequentialist and yet capture the common moral intuition that it is immoral to perform the transplant in the above situation. Suppose people generally accepted a rule that allows a doctor to transplant organs from a healthy person without consent when the doctor believes that this transplant will maximize utility. Widely accepting this rule would lead to many transplants that do not maximize utility, since doctors (like most people) are prone to errors in predicting consequences and weighing utilities. Moreover, if the rule is publicly known, then patients will fear that they might be used as organ sources, so they would be less likely to go to a doctor when they need one. The medical profession depends on trust that this public rule would undermine. For such reasons, some rule utilitarians conclude that it would not maximize utility for people generally to accept a rule that allows doctors to transplant organs from unwilling donors. If this claim is correct, then rule utilitarianism implies that it is morally wrong for a particular doctor to use an unwilling donor, even for a particular transplant that would have better consequences than any alternative even from the doctor’s own perspective. Common moral intuition is thereby preserved.

Rule utilitarianism faces several potential counterexamples (such as whether public rules allowing slavery could sometimes maximize utility) and needs to be formulated more precisely (particularly in order to avoid collapsing into act-utilitarianism; cf. Lyons 1965). Such details are discussed in another entry in this encyclopedia (see Hooker on rule-consequentialism). Here I will just point out that direct consequentialists find it convoluted and implausible to judge a particular act by the consequences of something else (Smart 1956). Why should mistakes by other doctors in other cases make this doctor’s act morally wrong, when this doctor knows for sure that he is not mistaken in this case? Rule consequentialists can respond that we should not claim special rights or permissions that we are not willing to grant to every other person, and that it is arrogant to think we are less prone to mistakes than other people are. However, this doctor can reply that he is willing to give everyone the right to violate the usual rules in the rare cases when they do know for sure that violating those rules really maximizes utility. Anyway, even if rule utilitarianism accords with some common substantive moral intuitions, it still seems counterintuitive in other ways. This makes it worthwhile to consider how direct consequentialists can bring their views in line with common moral intuitions, and whether they need to do so.

Another popular charge is that classic utilitarianism demands too much, because it requires us to do acts that are or should be moral options (neither obligatory nor forbidden). (Scheffler 1982) For example, imagine that my old shoes are serviceable but dirty, so I want a new pair of shoes that costs $100. I could wear my old shoes and give the $100 to a charity that will use my money to save someone else’s life. It would seem to maximize utility for me to give the $100 to the charity. If it is morally wrong to do anything other than what maximizes utility, then it is morally wrong for me to buy the shoes. But buying the shoes does not seem morally wrong. It might be morally better to give the money to charity, but such contributions seem supererogatory, that is, above and beyond the call of duty. Of course, there are many more cases like this. When I watch television, I always (or almost always) could do more good by helping others, but it does not seem morally wrong to watch television. When I choose to teach philosophy rather than working for CARE or the Peace Corps, my choice probably fails to maximize utility overall. If we were required to maximize utility, then we would have to make very different choices in many areas of our lives. The requirement to maximize utility, thus, strikes many people as too demanding because it interferes with the personal decisions that most of us feel should be left up to the individual.

Some utilitarians respond by arguing that we really are morally required to change our lives so as to do a lot more to increase overall utility (see Kagan 1989, P. Singer 1993, and Unger 1996). Such hard-liners claim that most of what most people do is morally wrong, because most people rarely maximize utility. Some such wrongdoing might be blameless when agents act from innocent or even desirable motives, but it is still supposed to be moral wrongdoing. Opponents of utilitarianism find this claim implausible, but it is not obvious that their counter-utilitarian intuitions are reliable or well-grounded (Murphy 2000, chs. 1–4; cf. Mulgan 2001, Singer 2005, Greene 2013).

Other utilitarians blunt the force of the demandingness objection by limiting direct utilitarianism to what people morally ought to do. Even if we morally ought to maximize utility, it need not be morally wrong to fail to maximize utility. John Stuart Mill, for example, argued that an act is morally wrong only when both it fails to maximize utility and its agent is liable to punishment for the failure (Mill 1861). It does not always maximize utility to punish people for failing to maximize utility. Thus, on this view, it is not always morally wrong to fail to do what one morally ought to do. If Mill is correct about this, then utilitarians can say that we ought to give much more to charity, but we are not required or obliged to do so, and failing to do so is not morally wrong (cf. Sinnott-Armstrong 2005).

Many utilitarians still want to avoid the claim that we morally ought to give so much to charity. One way around this claim uses a rule-utilitarian theory of what we morally ought to do. If it costs too much to internalize rules implying that we ought to give so much to charity, then, according to such rule-utilitarianism, it is not true that we ought to give so much to charity (Hooker 2000, ch. 8).

Another route follows an agent-relative theory of value. If there is more value in benefiting oneself or one’s family and friends than there is disvalue in letting strangers die (without killing them), then spending resources on oneself or one’s family and friends would maximize the good. A problem is that such consequentialism would seem to imply that we morally ought not to contribute those resources to charity, although such contributions seem at least permissible.

More personal leeway could also be allowed by deploying the legal notion of proximate causation. When a starving stranger would stay alive if and only if one contributed to a charity, contributing to the charity still need not be the proximate cause of the stranger’s life, and failing to contribute need not be the proximate cause of his or her death. Thus, if an act is morally right when it includes the most net good in its proximate consequences, then it might not be morally wrong either to contribute to the charity or to fail to do so. This potential position, as mentioned above, has not yet been developed, as far as I know.

Yet another way to reach this conclusion is to give up maximization and to hold instead that we morally ought to do what creates enough utility. This position is often described as satisficing consequentialism (Slote 1984). According to satisficing consequentialism, it is not morally wrong to fail to contribute to a charity if one contributes enough to other charities and if the money or time that one could contribute does create enough good, so it is not just wasted. (For criticisms, see Bradley 2006.) A related position is progressive consequentialism , which holds that we morally ought to improve the world or make it better than it would be if we did nothing, but we don’t have to improve it as much as we can (Elliot and Jamieson, 2009). Both satisficing and progressive consequentialism allow us to devote some of our time and money to personal projects that do not maximize overall good.

A more radical set of proposals confines consequentialism to judgements about how good an act is on a scale (Norcross 2006, 2020) or to degrees of wrongness and rightness (Sinhababu 2018). This positions are usually described as scalar consequentialism . A scalar consequentialist can refuse to say whether it is absolutely right or wrong to give $1000 to charity, for example, but still say that giving $1000 to charity is better and more right than giving only $100 and simultaneously worse and more wrong than giving $10,000. A related contrastivist consequentialism could say that one ought to give $1000 in contrast with $100 but not in contrast with $10,000 (cf. Snedegar 2017). Such positions can also hold that less or less severe negative sanctions are justified when an agent’s act is worse than a smaller set of alternatives compared to when the agent’s act is worse than a larger set of alternatives. This approach then becomes less demanding, both because it sees less negative sanctions as justified when the agent fails to do the best act possible, and also because it avoids saying that everyday actions are simply wrong without comparison to any set of alternatives.

Opponents still object that all such consequentialist theories are misdirected. When I decide to visit a friend instead of working for a charity, I can know that my act is not immoral even if I have not calculated that the visit will create enough overall good or that it will improve the world. These critics hold that friendship requires us to do certain favors for friends without weighing our friends’ welfare impartially against the welfare of strangers. Similarly, if I need to choose between saving my drowning wife and saving a drowning stranger, it would be “one thought too many” (Williams 1981) for me to calculate the consequences of each act. I morally should save my wife straightaway without calculating utilities.

In response, utilitarians can remind critics that the principle of utility is intended as only a criterion of right and not as a decision procedure, so utilitarianism does not imply that people ought to calculate utilities before acting (Railton 1984). Consequentialists can also allow the special perspective of a friend or spouse to be reflected in agent-relative value assessments (Sen 1982, Broome 1991, Portmore 2001, 2003) or probability assessments (Jackson 1991). It remains controversial, however, whether any form of consequentialism can adequately incorporate common moral intuitions about friendship.

Even if consequentialists can accommodate or explain away common moral intuitions, that might seem only to answer objections without yet giving any positive reason to accept consequentialism. However, most people begin with the presumption that we morally ought to make the world better when we can. The question then is only whether any moral constraints or moral options need to be added to the basic consequentialist factor in moral reasoning. (Kagan 1989, 1998) If no objection reveals any need for anything beyond consequences, then consequences alone seem to determine what is morally right or wrong, just as consequentialists claim.

This line of reasoning will not convince opponents who remain unsatisfied by consequentialist responses to objections. Moreover, even if consequentialists do respond adequately to every proposed objection, that would not show that consequentialism is correct or even defensible. It might face new problems that nobody has yet recognized. Even if every possible objection is refuted, we might have no reason to reject consequentialism but still no reason to accept it.

In case a positive reason is needed, consequentialists present a wide variety of arguments. One common move attacks opponents. If the only plausible options in moral theory lie on a certain list (say, Kantianism, contractarianism, virtue theory, pluralistic intuitionism, and consequentialism), then consequentialists can argue for their own theory by criticizing the others. This disjunctive syllogism or process of elimination will be only as strong as the set of objections to the alternatives, and the argument fails if even one competitor survives. Moreover, the argument assumes that the original list is complete. It is hard to see how that assumption could be justified.

Consequentialism also might be supported by an inference to the best explanation of our moral intuitions. This argument might surprise those who think of consequentialism as counterintuitive, but in fact consequentialists can explain many moral intuitions that trouble deontological theories. Moderate deontologists, for example, often judge that it is morally wrong to kill one person to save five but not morally wrong to kill one person to save a million. They never specify the line between what is morally wrong and what is not morally wrong, and it is hard to imagine any non-arbitrary way for deontologists to justify a cutoff point. In contrast, consequentialists can simply say that the line belongs wherever the benefits most outweigh the costs, including any bad side effects (cf. Sinnott-Armstrong 2007). Similarly, when two promises conflict, it often seems clear which one we should keep, and that intuition can often be explained by the amount of harm that would be caused by breaking each promise. In contrast, deontologists are hard pressed to explain which promise is overriding if the reason to keep each promise is simply that it was made (Sinnott-Armstrong 2009). If consequentialists can better explain more common moral intuitions, then consequentialism might have more explanatory coherence overall, despite being counterintuitive in some cases. (Compare Sidgwick 1907, Book IV, Chap. III; and Sverdlik 2011.) And even if act consequentialists cannot argue in this way, it still might work for rule consequentialists (such as Hooker 2000).

Consequentialists also might be supported by deductive arguments from abstract moral intuitions. Sidgwick (1907, Book III, Chap. XIII) seemed to think that the principle of utility follows from certain very general self-evident principles, including universalizability (if an act ought to be done, then every other act that resembles it in all relevant respects also ought to be done), rationality (one ought to aim at the good generally rather than at any particular part of the good), and equality (“the good of any one individual is of no more importance, from the point of view ... of the Universe, than the good of any other”).

Other consequentialists are more skeptical about moral intuitions, so they seek foundations outside morality, either in non-normative facts or in non-moral norms. Mill (1861) is infamous for his “proof” of the principle of utility from empirical observations about what we desire (cf. Sayre-McCord 2001). In contrast, Hare (1963, 1981) tries to derive his version of utilitarianism from substantively neutral accounts of morality, of moral language, and of rationality (cf. Sinnott-Armstrong 2001). Similarly, Gewirth (1978) tries to derive his variant of consequentialism from metaphysical truths about actions.

Yet another argument for a kind of consequentialism is contractarian . Harsanyi (1977, 1978) argues that all informed, rational people whose impartiality is ensured because they do not know their place in society would favor a kind of consequentialism. Broome (1991) elaborates and extends Harsanyi’s argument.

Other forms of arguments have also been invoked on behalf of consequentialism (e.g. Cummiskey 1996, P. Singer 1993; Sinnott-Armstrong 1992). However, each of these arguments has also been subjected to criticisms.

Even if none of these arguments proves consequentialism, there still might be no adequate reason to deny consequentialism. We might have no reason either to deny consequentialism or to assert it. Consequentialism could then remain a live option even if it is not proven.

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Utilitarianism

John stuart mill, ask litcharts ai: the answer to your questions.

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Utilitarianism: Introduction

Utilitarianism: plot summary, utilitarianism: detailed summary & analysis, utilitarianism: themes, utilitarianism: quotes, utilitarianism: characters, utilitarianism: terms, utilitarianism: symbols, utilitarianism: literary devices, utilitarianism: theme wheel, brief biography of john stuart mill.

Historical Context of Utilitarianism

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• Full Title: Utilitarianism
• When Written: Mid-1850s onward
• Where Written: London
• When Published: 1861 in Fraser’s Magazine , 1863 in book form
• Literary Period: Victorian
• Genre: Philosophical essay, ethical theory, classical liberalism
• Point of View: First-person

Extra Credit for Utilitarianism

Academic Ironies. Although Mill spent his entire childhood reading voraciously and ended up running a university late in life, he never actually completed a degree.

Remote Work. Similarly, while he spent more than two decades working for the British East India company, Mill, like his father, never visited India.

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Utilitarianism

Utilitarianism is an ethical theory that asserts that right and wrong are best determined by focusing on outcomes of actions and choices.

Utilitarianism is an ethical theory that determines right from wrong by focusing on outcomes. It is a form of consequentialism.

Utilitarianism holds that the most ethical choice is the one that will produce the greatest good for the greatest number. It is the only moral framework that can be used to justify military force or war. It is also the most common approach to moral reasoning used in business because of the way in which it accounts for costs and benefits.

However, because we cannot predict the future, it’s difficult to know with certainty whether the consequences of our actions will be good or bad. This is one of the limitations of utilitarianism.

Utilitarianism also has trouble accounting for values such as justice and individual rights.  For example, assume a hospital has four people whose lives depend upon receiving organ transplants: a heart, lungs, a kidney, and a liver. If a healthy person wanders into the hospital, his organs could be harvested to save four lives at the expense of one life. This would arguably produce the greatest good for the greatest number. But few would consider it an acceptable course of action, let alone the most ethical one.

So, although utilitarianism is arguably the most reason-based approach to determining right and wrong, it has obvious limitations.

Related Terms

Consequentialism

Consequentialism is an ethical theory that judges an action’s moral correctness by its consequences.

Moral Philosophy

Moral Philosophy studies what is right and wrong, and related philosophical issues.

Moral Reasoning

Moral Reasoning is the branch of philosophy that attempts to answer questions with moral dimensions.

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Calculating Consequences:The Utilitarian Approach to Ethics

Imagine that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency gets wind of a plot to set off a dirty bomb in a major American city. Agents capture a suspect who, they believe, has information about where the bomb is planted. Is it permissible for them to torture the suspect into revealing the bomb's whereabouts? Can the dignity of one individual be violated in order to save many others?

Greatest Balance of Goods Over Harms If you answered yes, you were probably using a form of moral reasoning called "utilitarianism." Stripped down to its essentials, utilitarianism is a moral principle that holds that the morally right course of action in any situation is the one that produces the greatest balance of benefits over harms for everyone affected. So long as a course of action produces maximum benefits for everyone, utilitarianism does not care whether the benefits are produced by lies, manipulation, or coercion.

Many of us use this type of moral reasoning frequently in our daily decisions. When asked to explain why we feel we have a moral duty to perform some action, we often point to the good that will come from the action or the harm it will prevent. Business analysts, legislators, and scientists weigh daily the resulting benefits and harms of policies when deciding, for example, whether to invest resources in a certain public project, whether to approve a new drug, or whether to ban a certain pesticide.

Utilitarianism offers a relatively straightforward method for deciding the morally right course of action for any particular situation we may find ourselves in. To discover what we ought to do in any situation, we first identify the various courses of action that we could perform. Second, we determine all of the foreseeable benefits and harms that would result from each course of action for everyone affected by the action. And third, we choose the course of action that provides the greatest benefits after the costs have been taken into account.

The principle of utilitarianism can be traced to the writings of Jeremy Bentham, who lived in England during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Bentham, a legal reformer, sought an objective basis that would provide a publicly acceptable norm for determining what kinds of laws England should enact. He believed that the most promising way of reaching such an agreement was to choose that policy that would bring about the greatest net benefits to society once the harms had been taken into account. His motto, a familiar one now, was "the greatest good for the greatest number."

Over the years, the principle of utilitarianism has been expanded and refined so that today there are many variations of the principle. For example, Bentham defined benefits and harms in terms of pleasure and pain. John Stuart Mill, a great 19th century utilitarian figure, spoke of benefits and harms not in terms of pleasure and pain alone but in terms of the quality or intensity of such pleasure and pain. Today utilitarians often describe benefits and harms in terms of the satisfaction of personal preferences or in purely economic terms of monetary benefits over monetary costs.

Utilitarians also differ in their views about the kind of question we ought to ask ourselves when making an ethical decision. Some utilitarians maintain that in making an ethical decision, we must ask ourselves: "What effect will my doing this act in this situation have on the general balance of good over evil?" If lying would produce the best consequences in a particular situation, we ought to lie. Others, known as rule utilitarians, claim that we must choose that act that conforms to the general rule that would have the best consequences. In other words, we must ask ourselves: "What effect would everyone's doing this kind of action have on the general balance of good over evil?" So, for example, the rule "to always tell the truth" in general promotes the good of everyone and therefore should always be followed, even if in a certain situation lying would produce the best consequences. Despite such differences among utilitarians, however, most hold to the general principle that morality must depend on balancing the beneficial and harmful consequences of our conduct.

Problems With Utilitarianism While utilitarianism is currently a very popular ethical theory, there are some difficulties in relying on it as a sole method for moral decision-making. First, the utilitarian calculation requires that we assign values to the benefits and harms resulting from our actions and compare them with the benefits and harms that might result from other actions. But it's often difficult, if not impossible, to measure and compare the values of certain benefits and costs. How do we go about assigning a value to life or to art? And how do we go about comparing the value of money with, for example, the value of life, the value of time, or the value of human dignity? Moreover, can we ever be really certain about all of the consequences of our actions? Our ability to measure and to predict the benefits and harms resulting from a course of action or a moral rule is dubious, to say the least.

Perhaps the greatest difficulty with utilitarianism is that it fails to take into account considerations of justice. We can imagine instances where a certain course of action would produce great benefits for society, but they would be clearly unjust. During the apartheid regime in South Africa in the last century, South African whites, for example, sometimes claimed that all South Africans—including blacks—were better off under white rule. These whites claimed that in those African nations that have traded a whites-only government for a black or mixed one, social conditions have rapidly deteriorated. Civil wars, economic decline, famine, and unrest, they predicted, will be the result of allowing the black majority of South Africa to run the government. If such a prediction were true—and the end of apartheid has shown that the prediction was false—then the white government of South Africa would have been morally justified by utilitarianism, in spite of its injustice.

If our moral decisions are to take into account considerations of justice, then apparently utilitarianism cannot be the sole principle guiding our decisions. It can, however, play a role in these decisions. The principle of utilitarianism invites us to consider the immediate and the less immediate consequences of our actions. Given its insistence on summing the benefits and harms of all people, utilitarianism asks us to look beyond self-interest to consider impartially the interests of all persons affected by our actions. As John Stuart Mill once wrote:

The happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not...(one's) own happiness, but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator.

In an era today that some have characterized as "the age of self-interest," utilitarianism is a powerful reminder that morality calls us to look beyond the self to the good of all.

The views expressed do not necessarily represent the position of the Markkula Center for Applied Ethics at Santa Clara University. We welcome your comments, suggestions, or alternative points of view.

This article appeared originally in Issues in Ethics V2 N1 (Winter 1989)

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Utilitarianism Essays

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Essays on Utilitarianism

Utilitarianism essay topics for college students.

As a college student, choosing the right essay topic is crucial to the success of your assignment. This page aims to provide you with a variety of Utilitarianism essay topics to inspire your creativity and personal interests.

Essay Types and Topics

Argumentative essay topics.

• The ethical implications of utilitarianism in healthcare
• Utilitarianism vs. deontology: a critical analysis
• Utilitarianism and its application in environmental ethics

Paragraph Example:

Utilitarianism, as a moral theory, has sparked debates and discussions in various fields, especially in healthcare ethics. This essay aims to critically analyze the ethical implications of utilitarianism in healthcare, shedding light on its potential benefits and drawbacks.

Thesis statement: While utilitarianism provides a framework for making ethical decisions, its application in healthcare raises important questions about individual rights and justice.

The ethical implications of utilitarianism in healthcare are complex and multifaceted. This essay has highlighted the need for a balanced approach that considers both the greater good and individual rights, urging for further research and ethical discussions in this field.

Compare and Contrast Essay Topics

• Utilitarianism and Kantian ethics: a comparative analysis
• Utilitarianism in Western vs. Eastern philosophical traditions
• The utilitarian perspective on animal rights vs. human rights

Descriptive Essay Topics

• Utilitarianism in everyday decision-making
• The impact of utilitarianism on social welfare policies
• A day in the life of a utilitarian thinker

Persuasive Essay Topics

• Advocating for utilitarian principles in public policy
• Challenging common misconceptions about utilitarianism
• Utilitarianism as a moral framework for the 21st century

Narrative Essay Topics

• Personal reflections on applying utilitarianism in real-life situations
• An imaginary world governed by utilitarian principles
• A historical narrative of utilitarianism's impact on society

Engagement and Creativity

As you explore these Utilitarianism essay topics, we encourage you to engage with your interests and critical thinking skills. Utilitarianism is a rich and complex philosophical theory that can be applied to various aspects of life, giving you ample opportunities to express your creativity and analytical abilities through your essays.

Educational Value

Each essay type offers unique learning outcomes, allowing you to develop different skills such as analytical thinking, persuasive writing, descriptive abilities, and narrative techniques. By delving into Utilitarianism through these essays, you will not only deepen your understanding of the theory but also enhance your academic and intellectual capabilities.

Difference Between Utilitarianism and Consequentialism

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Jeremy Bentham's Utilitarianism Theory

Deontology versus utilitarianism in everyday life, utilitarianism and hedonism as philosophical theories, act vs. rule utilitarian: comparison of mill’s adopted stances, let us write you an essay from scratch.

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Comparison of Utilitarian and Deontological Theories

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Deontology Vs Utilitarianism: Volkswagen's Emissions-cheating Scandal

Similarities between deontology and utilitarianism, the notions of lower and higher pleasures in utilitarianism, death penalty: viewpoint of immanuel kant, the view on fairness of the judgment process from the utilitarian perspective, resolving the discrepancies in mill’s preference-based utilitarianism, reflection on ethical theories: utilitarianism and deontology, jeremy bentham and the foundation of utilitarianism, ethical structure in business decision making, utilitarianism and the 13th amendment, ethical theories: deontology and utilitarianism, analysis of the case of transcanada in terms of kant’s moral theory and utilitarian perspective, history and ethics: conflicting theories in areas of knowledge, analysis of economic inequality within mill’s utilitarian theory, deontology versus utilitarianism in terms of morality in one’s actions, the ‘trolley problem’: utilitarianism vs deontology, utilitarianism vs deontology: a case study, the two ethical frameworks are utilitarianism and deontology, utilitarianism and deontological in ethical theory, discussion on whether the use of public funding for life-saving drugs is acceptable, relevant topics.

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Utilitarian Analysis Essays

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Utilitarian Analysis and Stakeholder Analysis Term Paper

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Introduction

Utilitarianism deals with the need to give an answer to what is right that a man has to do. According to utilitarianism, an act ought to the best consequences possible. At the core of utilitarianism is the question of morality especially from a religious point of view.

On that note utilitarianism beliefs argue that morality is not about pleasing God rather it’s about doing what makes one happy so long as the action does not have negative consequences on the rest of the people (elements of philosophy, p. 97). The social reformers and philosophers who were the forces behind utilitarianism believed religion was too rigid and curtailed people’s freedoms effectively denying them happiness.

They alleged that blanket belief in God and the following abstract moral rules set by religion was not right (elements of philosophy, p 98). In effect, they advocated for the prevalence of the free will of human beings in pursuit of happiness. Utilitarianism thinking can be applied on numerous controversial issues that affect human beings on everyday life. The controversy stems from the conservative approach that has informed the beliefs that govern such issues.

The include drug abuse like marijuana smoking, homosexuality and treatment of non-human animals. In business, some business ethics can be analyzed through utilitarianism and stockholder and stakeholder analysis (Cosans, 2009, p. 391). The theories advanced by Freeman and Friedman can be jointly analyzed especially when utilitarianism is concerned in making profits and treating company stakeholders (Moylan, 2005, p. 33).

Homosexual employee

Homosexuality remains a controversial topic in western societies. Religion, politics, and social life have different looks on the issue. Unfortunately, the attitudes towards homosexuality have trickled through to the corporate world where homosexuals may be treated according to the ideology that governs the particular corporation or industry.

The analysis of the case will be done on two levels, utilitarianism/stockholder analysis, and stakeholder analysis. Human habits greatly determine the success of the endeavors they engage (Covey, 2004, p. 20). Similarly, the habits of employees affect the success of business firms.

Utilitarianism/Stockholder Analysis

Managers are not owners of businesses, stockholders are. Managers act on behalf of the stockholders and sometimes stakeholders to help the business generate revenue (Friedman, 1979, p. 309).

Though employees have individual freedoms, issues like sexual orientation may easily attract unnecessary attention that adversely affect business. John’s case is unique. He is an accomplished middle level manager who also is gay. Before a business decision is made, it is important to consider the utilitarian approach to this issue as well as the interests of stockholders.

According to prevalent culture, homosexuality is not permissible as it’s is unnatural. The conservative environment that the business operates does not make things easier. Furthermore, the law prohibits such practices in the state. According to tradition and religious teaching, what john dopes is unacceptable.

According to utilitarianism, John has not committed any wrongdoing. He is simply pursuing his happiness and his actions have not so far affected anybody including his job. According to Mill (1859) as quoted in (elements of philosophy, p. 101), utilitarianism will approach John’s situation b asking what alternatives are available to him. Being heterosexual cannot make John happy which limits his sources of happiness.

In the contemplation of firing John, one will consider the morality of homosexuality, which is the case in point. According to Bentham as quoted in (elements of philosophy 1967, p. 100), the religious believes that the people around the company’s operation have embodied do not make sense when looked at critically.

It is not fair for their religious beliefs to condemn homosexuality while that is the only way of life that John feels happy to follow. Though John’s actions are not morally upright according g to the prevailing opinions, his way of life makes him happy and that is what matters. Utilitarianism will protect John based on the three most tenets that informs it. John’s actions are to be judged to be right or wrong based on their consequences. On this front, there are no proven negative consequences of John’s actions so far.

However, there may be backlash form some sections of the client base towards the company for retaining a gay employee. Nevertheless, firing John may still fail to persuade some of the clients who may think the company knew all along but hid it from them. Firing therefore will not solve the problem. Utilitarianism also believes that consequences of an action like John’s homosexuality should be judged on the amount of happiness or unhappiness that it’s has created (elements of philosophy p. 109).

John’s actions are likely to make some people unhappy, but personally, he is happy and that is what counts. Besides, firing him may not make colleagues and stockholders happy which gives the manager less reasons to fire him. Finally, utilitarianism believes that each person’s happiness counts the same (elements of philosophy, p. 109). In this case, the happiness of the customers and that of John count the same. For that reason, he should retain his job.

On the other hand, the stockholders who own the company are in pursuit of profits and anything that acts contrary to that is a derailment. Freeman (1984, p. 409) says that stockholders must be granted certain rights and privileges and rights by the management since they are the owners of the firm. Freeman further argues that management should always aim at reinforcing the primacy of stockholders.

Since the main objective of stockholders is to make profits, any action therefore that will adversely affect the operations of the company will be in contravention of stockholder interests. John is a priced asset of the company. He has experience, has helped close lucrative deals for the company besides blending well with everybody in the work environment. The company stands to lose all the above plus possible negative effects on the rest of the workforce.

Stakeholder Analysis

Freeman defines stakeholders as those groups that can lay a stake in the firm or business. They include employees, customers, suppliers, and the local community that surrounds them (Freeman, 1984, p. 410).

According to Freeman, each of the above groups has a right to be treated importantly because they in one way or the other help the in achieving success of the company. According to Beth (2005), the actions that a company takes in regards to stakeholders is somehow influenced by the company’s corporate social responsibility policy (p. 56).

In this case, the employees of the company, John being one of them, the local community that is overly conservative, the suppliers and the stockholders are important in their own ways. its important to note that the main point of this stakeholder analysis will be examine to whose ultimate interest the management of the firm will be carried out.

Though the role of stockholders in determining the direction of the firm has been constrained lately, the interests and roles of customers, employees, and local community are still subordinate to those of the stockholders (Freeman, 1984, p. 410). The local community may be disgruntled over the company’s decision to retain a gay employee but stockholder interest superseded their views and that may help John retain his job.

According to Bowie & Hogue (2005, p. 90), the survival of the company is determined the stakeholders. They can be divided into two groups. Those that determine the survival of the company, and, those that whose actions and those of the corporation affect each other (Freeman, 1984, p. 415).

The owners who own the company through stocks and bonds are the main financial backers of the firm. Their interest must therefore be catered for since the operations of the firm can easily ground to a halt. Employees on their part are the owners of skills and the stockholders compensate them for their skills.

According to Freeman the stockholders are supposed to cater for the welfare of the employees by taking them through the most difficult times (1984, p. 411). In this case, the stockholders are expected to stand firm with John especially considering his productivity.

Suppliers help the firm in supplying with raw materials in whatever sense that help it producing products. The most important of all stakeholders according to Freeman, are the customers. These same people comprise of the local community that in this case is very conservative. Freeman further says that the customers are the lifeblood f the firm (1984, p. 412). Before John is fired, its important for the manager to consider who the most important of these groups is. Stockholders and customers come first.

Employees with the same skills and suppliers with same quality materials can easily be replaced (Bowie & Hogue, 2005, p. 86). Retaining John is likely to drive away a significant portion of the clientele away. The stakeholders may not risk such a move. Though the employees like John are important, the cost of losing one experienced employee is less compared to losing a significant portion of the client base.

As a manager, its will be a painful decision to fire John but when looked at from the stakeholders’ point of views, it will be necessary to safeguard the interests of the company. Additionally, the manager would not have committed any gross violation of the laws of the state.

Beth, K. J. G. (2005). Corporate Social Responsibility as Risk Management: A Model for Multinationals. Cambridge: Harvard University: John F. Kennedy School of Government.

Bowie, E, N. & Hogue, P. (2005). Management ethics, Volume 5 of Foundations of business ethics . New York: Blackwell Pub.

Cosans, C. (2009). Does Milton Friedman Support a Vigorous Business Ethics? Journal of Business Ethics, 391-399.

Covey, R. S. (2004). Seven habits of highly effective people personal workbook . New York: Fireside. Elements of Philosophy: ( N.D)

Freeman, R. E. (1984). Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach. New York : Pitman Publishing.

Friedman, M. (1979). Greed . New York: Pitman Publishers.

Moylan, W. (2005). Ethics in Construction Bidding: Considering the “Friedman” vs. the “Freeman” view. Nait Selected Papers, 32-36.

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Guest Essay

A Federal Judge Wonders: How Could Alito Have Been So Foolish?

By Michael Ponsor

Judge Ponsor is a senior judge on the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. He was appointed by President Bill Clinton in 1994 after serving 10 years as a federal magistrate judge.

The controversy about the decision to fly an upside-down American flag outside the home of Justice Samuel Alito recalls St. Paul’s admonition that while some things may be lawful, “not all things are helpful.”

I can offer no opinion as to whether the flag display at the justice’s house was unlawful. I won’t even opine whether my flying the flag upside-down at my house would have constituted a violation of the code of ethics that binds me and all federal judges — except the justices.

To me, the flag issue is much simpler. The fact is that, regardless of its legality, displaying the flag in that way, at that time, shouldn’t have happened. To put it bluntly, any judge with reasonable ethical instincts would have realized immediately that flying the flag then and in that way was improper. And dumb.

The same goes for the flying of an “Appeal to Heaven” flag at Justice Alito’s vacation house along the New Jersey shore. Like the upside-down flag, this flag is viewed by a great many people as a banner of allegiance on partisan issues that are or could be before the court.

Courts work because people trust judges. Taking sides in this way erodes that trust.

In four decades as a federal judge, I have known scores, possibly hundreds, of federal trial and appellate judges pretty well. I can’t think of a single one, no matter who appointed her or him, who has engaged or would engage in conduct like that. You just don’t do that sort of thing, whether it may be considered over the line, or just edging up to the margin. Flying those flags was tantamount to sticking a “Stop the steal” bumper sticker on your car. You just don’t do it.

Assuming it is true that it was Justice Alito’s wife who raised the inverted American flag, apparently in response to some provocative behavior from a neighbor, I do sympathize. (How the “Appeal to Heaven” flag came to be flown at his house is not known.) Being a judge’s spouse is not easy. On the one hand, a person should not have to forfeit the right to free expression at the marriage altar. On the other hand, it is not unreasonable to expect a spouse to avoid embarrassing a loved one or complicating his or her professional life. This is true not only for Supreme Court justices but also for people in many walks of life.

Let me offer an example. About 25 years ago, I presided over a death penalty case involving a nurse charged with murdering several of her patients at a Veterans Affairs hospital in Western Massachusetts. It was a tough case, regularly on the front pages of our local papers. Let’s say my wife was strongly opposed to the death penalty and wished to speak out publicly against it. I’m not saying this is true, but let’s imagine it. The primary emotional current in our marriage is, of course, deep and passionate love, but right next to that is equally deep and passionate respect. We would have had a problem, and we would have needed to talk.

In this hypothetical situation, I hope that my wife would have held off making any public statements about capital punishment, and restrained herself from talking about the issue with me, while the trial unfolded. On the other hand, if my wife had felt strongly that she needed to espouse her viewpoint publicly, I would have had to recuse myself from presiding over the case, based on the appearance of partiality.

However this issue came out, by the way, I certainly would not have had the temerity to claim that my wife and I never discussed the problem. Any protestation of this sort would have provoked raucous laughter from our circle of friends. They know very well that we talk about everything.

Did Justice Alito and his wife discuss the issue of the upside-down flag before it went up? I don’t know, of course. But I do know they should have. And I know that some other method should have been found to express the couple’s unhappiness with their neighbor’s possibly crummy conduct.

The court recently adopted an ethics code to “guide the conduct” of the justices. One of its canons states that a justice should “act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.” That’s all very well. But basic ethical behavior should not rely on laws or regulations. It should be folded into a judge’s DNA. That didn’t happen here. The flag display may or may not have been unlawful, but as far as the public’s perception of the court’s integrity, it certainly was not helpful.

Michael Ponsor is a senior judge on the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. He was appointed by President Bill Clinton in 1994 after serving 10 years as a federal magistrate judge.

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Purdue Hospitality and Tourism Management graduate student wins best paper award for innovative technology research

Written By: Rebecca Hoffa, [email protected]

Evita Ma poses with the fellow Purdue HTM attendees at the 29th Annual Graduate Education and Graduate Student Research Conference in Hospitality and Tourism in January. (Photo provided)

As Starship robots deliver food to hungry Boilermakers across Purdue University’s West Lafayette campus, their presence is often welcomed like that of a neighborhood pet — students are often seen helping them when they get stuck or smiling and moving out of their way when they meet them on the sidewalk. When Alei (Aileen) Fan , associate professor in the White Lodging-J.W. Marriott, Jr. School of Hospitality and Tourism Management (HTM) and an expert in service innovation and experience design, helped one along its way one day, she was met with a low-tone, male voice saying, “Thank you.” This contradicted the “cute” vision Fan had in her mind of the robots being like her dog at home.

When Fan relayed the experience to her PhD student Chang (Evita) Ma , the College of Health and Human Sciences graduate student was inspired to investigate deeper how the combination of appearance and voice impacted the consumer’s overall experience in the service encounter.  

Evita Ma poses with her best paper award at the 29th Annual Graduate Education and Graduate Student Research Conference in Hospitality and Tourism. (Photo provided)

These efforts culminated in winning a best paper award at the 29th Annual Graduate Education and Graduate Student Research Conference in Hospitality and Tourism in January.

“I’m really honored,” Ma said. “As far as I know, for the past three years or so, no one from our school has gotten the award, so it was a pleasure to have that. It’s very competitive — over the 130-some presentations, I was selected as one of the four winners.”

The study looked at how people’s reactions differed when comparing matched, or congruent, voice and appearance and mismatched, or incongruent, voice and appearance. The researchers found that depending on the robot’s function, people tended to be either more or less accepting of when a robot’s voice does not match its appearance.

In a utilitarian scenario where the consumer really only desires the robot to perform a job function and doesn’t care as much about having an emotional connection, people often prefer the congruent voice and appearance because they feel the incongruent one is not well-designed or not capable of performing their desired outcome. When consumers are in a hedonic scenario where they don’t care as much about the functions the robot is performing but simply wish to have a connection or engage with the robot, the congruency doesn’t matter as much, and some of the surprising elements, such as the mismatched voice and appearance, may attract people to engage with it.

“We as human beings actually view things holistically,” Ma said. “We don’t separate the different parts.”

Considering how these distinct factors work together to shape consumer perceptions could ultimately shape the characteristics of future service robots to improve service encounters across the industry.

“It’s a timely topic,” Fan said. “Whether you like it or not, technology takes up a lot of our lives. This research provided practical guidelines for industries and companies on how to design different robots to better serve our customer.”

This study resulted as a product of Ma’s study “Decoding the Shared Pathways of Consumer Technology Experience in Hospitality and Tourism: A Meta-Analysis,” which examined the literature currently available to investigate the different types of technology and how humans interact with them. Ma ultimately noticed a gap in papers that combined elements — many simply looked at appearance or voice independently.

“Very few of the papers actually combine all the different subtle elements together; they just focus on one single perspective like appearance or voice,” Ma said. “So, I began looking at: What is the combination between those? Our initial idea was we wanted to know how the combination of design elements of service robots impacts the customer’s reactions and feelings of the service in different scenarios.”

Prior to coming to Purdue, Ma spent four years gaining industry experience at the Hospitality Financial and Technology Professionals nonprofit in Hong Kong, where she made many connections on the technology side of the industry and solidified her interest in coming to a very technology-focused university to earn her PhD.

“Purdue has such a strong background in terms of technology and engineering, so that was also one of the reasons I wanted to keep focusing on that for my research area,” Ma said. “After taking a class with Dr. Fan, I decided to join her team.”

Beyond research, Ma has fully immersed herself in the teaching and engagement areas of graduate student life as well. Ma teaches two 200-level marketing courses to undergraduate HTM students, where she’s maximized opportunities for the students to engage in experiential education. She’s also working on curriculum development with HTM faculty and has become involved in several graduate student organizations, including the Purdue Graduate Student Government, where she is a senator.

After graduating from the program, Ma plans to pursue a faculty position that allows her to combine her passion for research with her love for teaching and service.

“She’s really the star student,” Fan said. “When we evaluate a PhD student, there are three aspects: research, teaching and service. Evita is excellent in all of these.”