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Hinduism is often referred to as Sanatana Dharma (the ‘eternal way’), indicating the religion’s emphasis on eternal truths that are applicable to all of humanity. Thus, it makes sense that a medley of mainstream movies could convey Hindu ideals that resonate strongly with audiences, while not actually talking directly about anything understood by the public as Hindu.

In Groundhog Day, for example, when cynical TV weatherman Phil Collins discovers he is trapped in a time loop, living the same day over and over, only to be released after transforming his character from an egocentric narcissist to a thoughtful and kindhearted philanthropist, it’s hard not to be reminded of the Hindu notion of samsara, a cycle of reincarnation from which a soul attains liberation by realizing its divine nature after lifetimes of spiritual practice. 

Or in The Matrix when Neo chooses the red pill of knowledge over the blue pill of ignorance, and is subsequently unplugged from an illusory world and cast into the truth of reality, the film seems to be conveying a foundational Vedic teaching: that we must transcend our own ignorance — a product of maya, literally meaning “illusion” in Sanskrit — to uncover our true nature. Hindu concepts appear to be further exhibited in Neo’s relationship with Morpheus, which starkly reflects that of a disciple and guru, as the latter reveals to the former the knowledge he needs in order to understand this “true nature.” As Neo’s faith in Morpheus’ words develops, so does his capacity to see past the illusion of the matrix, garnering him the ability to manipulate the laws of this false reality, similar to the Jedi and yogis described earlier.

What do the Matrix, Avatar, Groundhog Day, and Star Wars have to do with Hinduism?

Hindu Americans and the Vedanta philosophy have significantly influenced notable intellectuals such as Henry  David Thoreau, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Walt Whitman, J.D. Salinger, Christopher Isherwood, Aldous Huxley, Huston Smith, and Joseph Campbell just to name a few. Some feel that it started back In 1812, when Thomas Jefferson recommended to John Adams the writings of Joseph Priestley, a Unitarian minister who had published works that compared Christianity to other religions — Hinduism in particular — Adam’s interest was piqued.

Going through Priestley’s writings, Adams became riveted by Hindu thought, as he launched into a five-year exploration of Eastern philosophy. As his knowledge of Hinduism and ancient Indian civilization grew, so did his respect for it. This legacy took shape in the 1830s as Transcendentalism, a philosophical, social, and literary movement that emphasized the spiritual goodness inherent in all people despite the corruption imposed on an individual by society and its institutions. Espousing that divinity pervades all of nature and humanity, Transcendentalists believed divine experience existed in the everyday, and held progressive views on women’s rights, abolition, and education. At the heart of this movement were three of America’s most influential authors: Ralph Waldo Emerson, Walt Whitman, and Henry David Thoreau.

How Hinduism Influenced Some of Americans Greatest Thinkers

Before becoming an Islamic state, Afghanistan was once home to a medley of religious practices, the oldest being Hinduism. A long time ago, much of Afghanistan was part of an ancient kingdom known as Gandhara, which also covered parts of northern Pakistan.Today, many of Afghanistan’s province names, though slightly altered, are clearly Sanskrit in origin, hinting at the region’s ancient past. To cite a few examples, Balkh comes from the Sanskrit Bhalika, Nangarhar from Nagarahara, and Kabul from Kubha. Though Gandhara’s earliest mention can be found in the Vedas, it is better known for its connections to the Hindu epics the Mahabharata and Ramayana. There is also the historic Asamai temple in Kabul located on a hill named after the Hindu Goddess of hope, Asha. The temple has survived numerous conflicts and attacks but it still stands. The temple is a remnant from Hindu Shahi Kings, who ruled from the Kabul Valley as far back as 850 CE. However, Hindus are indigenous but endangered minorities in Afghanistan, numbering approximately 700 out of a community that recently included over 8,000 members. Many have left for new homes, include in New York which is home to a large Afghani Hindu population.

5 Things to Know about Hindus and Sikhs in Afghanistan 

Hinduism Beyond India: Afghanistan

According to the 2021-2022 National Pet Owners Survey, 70% of U.S. households (90.5 million homes) owned a pet as of 2022, with 69 million U.S. households having a pet dog. Recognized for their loyalty, service, companionship, and the special relationship they have with humans, Hinduism’s reverence for dogs is expansive, as they are worshiped in festivals and appreciated in connection to a number of Hindu gods and stories. Observed in Nepal, Bhutan, and the Indian states of Sikkim and West Bengal, Kukar Tihar (the 2nd day of Tihar) honors dogs as messengers that help guide spirits of the deceased across the River of Death. In the Mahabharata, Yudhisthira, his brothers, and the queen Draupadi renounced their kingdom to ascend to the heavens. However, Yudhisthira was the only one that survived along with a dog that had joined them. Yudhisthira refused to go to heaven without the dog, who turned out to be Yamaraj, the God of Death. Sarama, the “female dog of the gods,” was famously asked by Indra to retrieve a herd of cows that were stolen. When the thieves were caught, they tried to bribe Sarama but she refused and now represents those who do not wish to possess but instead find what has been lost. The symbolic import of dogs is further driven in connection with Dattatreya, as he is commonly depicted with four of them to represent the Vedas, the Yugas, the stages of sound, and the inner forces of a human being (will, faculty, hope, and desire).

Dogs and Diwali? 5 Things to Know about Hinduism and hu(man)’s Best Friend

In 2018, the long-running Marvel comic series Black Panther, was brought to the big screen. A more prominent scene is when M’baku, a character vying for the throne of the fictional country of Wakanda, challenges T’Challa/Black Panther, and yells, “Glory to Hanuman.” However, despite dharma as an unsaid aspect of the characters’ interactions, Black Panther relies slightly more on Hindu symbolism than philosophy. But the significance of Hanuman as a transcendent deity cannot be overlooked, especially at a time when dialogues about global migration, the right to worship, and access to natural resources are becoming more overtly racialized. The film provides more than just an entertainment escape: it reimagines a world in which the current racial and theological paradigms are challenged forcefully. With the film expected to have at least several sequels, there will be more opportunities to reference Hinduism and Hindu iconography.

Why Black Panther’s References to Hinduism are Significant in Hollywood

One of the most celebrated Hindu festivals, Diwali (dee-VAH-lee) or Deepavali (dee-PAH-va-lee) commemorates the victory of good over evil during the course of five days. The word refers to rows of diyas — or clay lamps — which are put all around homes and places of worship. The light from these lamps symbolizes the illumination within all of us, which can overcome ignorance, represented by darkness. Devotees gather in local temples, homes, or community centers, to spend time with loved ones, make positive goals, and appreciate life.

Hindu Holidays & Dharmic Days Calendar 

On this day, because Diwali is a time for dana (charitable giving) and seva (selfless service), Hindus traditionally perform a deep cleaning of their homes and surroundings, as cleanliness is believed to invoke the presence and blessings of Goddess Lakshmi who, as mentioned earlier, is the Goddess of wealth and prosperity. Many will also make rangoli or kolum (colored patterns of flowers, powder, rice, or sand made on the floor), which are also said to invite auspiciousness. Observers thus begin Diwali by cultivating a spirit of generosity, doing things like giving money to charities, feeding the hungry, and endeavoring to help those in need.

5 Things to Know About Diwali

The spread of Hinduism to Southeast Asia established powerful Hindu kingdoms in the region, most notably the Khmer Empire that encompassed modern Cambodia and Thailand, and influential kingdoms in the Indonesia archipelago. Though Buddhism and Hinduism co-existed in the region for several centuries, Buddhism (and Islam in Indonesia) eventually replaced Hinduism as a primary religion. Today, there are approximately five million Hindus in Indonesia, primarily in Bali. As Bali is roughly 90 percent Hindu, this makes it a religious enclave in a country that contains the world’s largest Muslim population. There are also roughly 60,000 Cham Hindus in Vietnam, and smaller numbers in Thailand. Hinduism in Fiji, Malaysia, and Singapore is a much more recent phenomenon, with Hindus arriving in the 19th and early 20th centuries as indentured laborers. Today, Hindus are prominent in politics and business in all three countries, though they continue to experience discrimination as religious minorities.

Hinduism Beyond India: Bali

Hinduism Around the World

In 2014, the first Smithsonian exhibition chronicling the experiences of Indian Americans, many of whom are Hindus,  in the US was unveiled at their National Museum of Natural History in Washington, DC. This exhibit was one of the largest ever produced by the Smithsonian Asian Pacific American Center, occupying 5,000 square feet and reaching millions of visitors. The message behind “Beyond Bollywood: Indian Americans Shape the Nation,” aimed to dispel stereotypes and myths that have followed Indian immigrants since they first arrived in the U.S. in 1790. The exhibit explored the heritage, daily experiences, and the many diverse contributions that immigrants and Indian Americans have made to the United States. The exhibition at the Museum of Natural History includes historical and contemporary images and artifacts, including those that document histories of discrimination and resistance, convey daily experiences, and symbolize achievements across the professions. Music and visual artworks provide commentary on the Indian American experience and form an important component of the exhibition. In 2017, this exhibit went on the road, traveling from city to city so that all could see the impact of Indians on American culture.

All About Hindu Heritage Month

Paramahansa Yogananda was a Hindu monk and yogi who came to the United States in 1920 and lived here for the last 32 years of his life. He is considered to be the first major Hindu Guru to settle in the United States. When Swami Yogananda arrived in the US, he made his first speech, made to the International Congress of Religious Liberals, on “The Science of Religion,” and was enthusiastically received. It was soon after that he founded the Self-Realization Fellowship (also known as Yogoda Satsanga Society (YSS) of India) and introduced millions of Americans to the ancient science and philosophy of meditation and Kriya yoga (path of attainment). In 1927, he was invited to the White House by President Calvin Coolidge, making Swami Yogananda the first prominent Indian and Hindu to be hosted in the White House.

Hinduism: Short Answers to Real Questions

Countless Americans Have Been Influenced by Swami Viveknanda

For those of us who are Hindu, we have noticed that some of the biggest Hollywood films produced in the last several decades have mirrored many of Hinduism's most fundamental philosophical ideas. One example is Avatar, a film named for the Sanskrit word avatāra (‘descent’), in which the protagonist, Jake Sully, enters and explores an alien world called Pandora by inhabiting the body of an indigenous 10-foot, blue-skinned being, an idea taken from Hinduism’s depictions of the various avatars of the blue god Vishnu, who are said to descend into our world for upholding dharma. Instead of aligning with the interests of the humans, who merely want to mine Pandora for the valuable mineral unobtanium, Sully fights alongside the alien humanoids native to the world, called Na’vi, who live in harmony with nature, believe all life is sacred, and that all life is connected by a divine force — teachings synonymous with Hinduism. Thus, similar to the avatars of Vishnu, Sully defends and preserves a spiritual culture by defeating those who would destroy it for materialistic pursuit. While this film doesn’t indicate in any direct way that they have anything to do with Hinduism, it’s clear they are communicating Hindu ideas that everyone relates to and understands on a profound level.

The International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON), also known as the Hare Krishna movement, was founded in 1966 by A.C. Bhaktivedanta Swami Prabhupada, a highly respected Vaishnava  (devotion to the god Vishnu and his incarnations avatars) scholar and monk. At the age of 70, Swami Prabhupada traveled from India to New York City to bring the Bhakti tradition, or Krishna Consciousness, to the west. In the 11 years before his passing in 1977, Srila Prabhupada translated, with elaborate commentaries, 60 volumes of Vaishnava literature; established more than 100 temples on six continents; and initiated 5,000 disciples. Today, his writings are studied in universities around the globe and are translated into nearly 100 languages. To date, ISKCON has over 400 temples,  dozens of rural communities and eco-sustainable projects, and nearly 100 vegetarian restaurants world-wide with 56 of them in the US. 

Statement Against Caste Based Discrimination: ISKCON

Who was that Hare Krishna at the start of “Get Back”?

Hinduism came in waves to Africa, with Southern Africa getting Hindu workers during the early years of British colonization, while East and West Africa experienced Hindu migration during the 20th century. Hinduism’s roughly 0.2% presence in Africa is seen as so inconsequential, most data organizations don’t even bother explicitly mentioning it in their census reports. But Hinduism is Ghana's fastest growing religion and one in which there are steady populations in both Northern and Southern African states. Durban is now home to most of South Africa’s 1.3 million Indians, making it, according to some sources, the largest Indian city outside of India, and thus a most powerful hub of Hindu practice. In the US, there are both communities of African Hindus who have migrated, as well as Black Hindus, who according to the 2019 Pew Survey, make up 2% of the Hindu population in the US.

Hinduism Beyond Africa

George Lucas, the creator of Star Wars, drew much of the inspiration for this major cultural phenomenon from the teachings of his mentor who was a lifelong student of Vedanta. In these films, many aspects of Hinduism are interwoven with the story. Some include Hanuman (Chewbaca and Ewoks), Shakti (force,energy), Yodha (Yoda), Brahman (infinite being). Besides the many philosophical parallels that can be highlighted between Star Wars and Hinduism, Star Wars also exhibits similarities in story structure and character roles to one of India’s famous epics, the Ramayana. Never seen the movie? Now might be the time to see how universally relatable Hindu thought can truly be.

The term Ayurveda is derived from the Sanskrit words ayur (life) and veda (science or knowledge), translation to the knowledge of life. Ayurveda is considered to be the oldest healing science, originating in 1000 BCE. Based on the five elements that comprise the universe (space, air, fire, water, and earth), they combine and permutate to create three health principles  that govern the functioning and interplay of a person’s body, mind, and consciousness. These energies are referred to as doshas in Sanskrit. Ayurveda can be used in conjunction with Western medicine and Ayurvedic schools have gained approval as educational institutions in several states.

5 Things to Know About Ayurveda

In Hinduism, What is the Relationship Between Spirituality and Health?

While it’s synonymous to meditation, and seen simply as a doorway to tranquility for yogic practitioners, the true meaning of Om is deeply embedded in Hindu philosophy.

The word Om is defined by Hindu scripture as being the original vibration of the universe, which all other vibrations are able to manifest. Within Hinduism, the meaning and connotations of Om is perceived in a variety of ways. Though heard and often written as “om,” due to the way it sounds when it is repeatedly chanted, the sacred syllable is originally and more accurately spelled as “aum.” Broken down, the three letters of A – U – M represent a number of sacred trinities such as different conditions of consciousness (waking state, dreaming state, and deep sleep state), the deities in charge of the creation, preservation, and destruction of the universe ( Brahma, Vishnu, and Shiva), aspects of time (past, present, and future), among many others. 

5 Things to Know About Om

Religious Symbols

Dr. Anandi Gopal Joshi is credited with being the first woman from India to study medicine in the United States. Born in Bombay in 1865, she was married at the age of ten to an older man who had been her teacher. Dr. Joshi had a child at the age of 13, but the child died when only 10 days old. She believed that with better medical care, the child would have lived, and she frequently cited this as motivation for her desire to attend medical school. Her husband encouraged her in her academic pursuits and in 1883, Joshee joined the Woman’s Medical College of Pennsylvania, now known as the Drexel University College of Medicine in Philadelphia. She graduated in 1886 with her degree in medicine; her M.D. thesis focused on Hindu obstetrics. Unfortunately,  Dr. Joshi was only able to practice medicine for a few months before passing away from tuberculosis.

Science in Hinduism

Hinduism is the religion of almost 25% of Guyana’s population, making it the country with the highest percentage of Hindus in the Western Hemisphere. But from British professional recruiting agents targeting rural and uneducated Indians, to the aggressiveness of Christian proselytization of Hindus with a promise of a better life, Hinduism has been in a steady decline for many decades with many escaping to the United States for better opportunities and to practice their religion freely. Today, over 80% of Guyanese Americans live in the Northeastern United States with heavy concentrations in New Jersey and in New York, where a “Little Guyana”  helps these immigrants stay connected to their Guyanese roots.

Hinduism beyond India: Guyana

Karwa Chauth or Karva Chauth (kuhr-vah-CHOATH) is a North Indian holiday in which wives fast for the longevity and health of their husbands, however, many unmarried women celebrate in hopes of meeting their ideal life partner. Typically, wives spend the day preparing gifts to exchange, and fasting until the moon is visible. It is believed that its light symbolizes love and blessings of a happy life. While there are varying legends behind this holiday’s traditions and meaning, the message of honoring the relationships women form with their family and community prevails.

Karwa Chauth

Hindu Holidays & Dharmic Days Calendar

As sound vibration can affect the most subtle element of creation, it is interpreted in Hindu scriptures that spiritual sound vibrations can affect the atman (soul) in a particularly potent way. Such spiritual sound vibrations are said to have the ability to awaken our original spiritual consciousness and help us remember that we are beyond the ambivalence of life, and actually originate from the Divine. As such, the main goal of many types of Hindu musical expression is to help stir us out of our spiritual slumber by evoking feelings of love and connection that help us to better perceive the presence of the Divine within all. Some of the more popular examples of musical expressions within Hinduism include shlokas (verse, or poem), mantras (sacred syllables repeated in prayer), kirtans (congregational singing of mantras), and bhajans (devotional songs). You can find musical spiritual expressions through the US in temples,  Mandirs, and community centers.

The Power of Music According to Hinduism

What is Kirtan?

Yoga is considered Hinduism’s gift to humanity. At its broadest, yoga, from the root word “yuj” in Sanskrit, means to unite. Most Hindu texts discuss yoga as a practice to control the senses and ultimately, the mind. The most famous is the Bhagavad Gita (dating back to 6th-3rd Century BCE), in which Krishna speaks of four types of yoga – bhakti, or devotion; jnana, or knowledge; karma, or action; and dhyana, or concentration (often referred to as raja yoga, though not all sources agree on the term) – as paths to achieve moksha (enlightenment), the ultimate goal according to Hindu understanding. According to a 2016 study,  in the United States there are an estimated 36.7 million people currently practicing yoga in the United States.

The Hindu Roots of Yoga

According to Vedic cosmology, 108 is the basis of creation, representing the universe and all our existence. As the soul is encased in two types of bodies: the physical body (made of earth, water, fire, air, and ether) and the subtle body (composed of intelligence, mind and ego), Swami Viveknanda is often attributed with bringing Hindu teachings and practices — such as yoga and transcendental meditation — to Western audiences. In 1893, he was officially introduced to the United States at the World’s Parliament of Religions in Chicago, where in his speech he called for religious tolerance and described Hinduism as “a religion which has taught the world both tolerance and universal acceptance.” The day that Swami Vivekananda delivered his speech at the Parliament of Religions is now known as ‘World Brotherhood Day.’ And his birthday, known as Swami Vivekananda Jayanti, is honored on January 12th each year. On this day he is commemorated and recognized for his contributions as a modern Hindu monk and respected guru of the Vedanta philosophy of Hinduism. In 1900, Swami Viveknanda founded the Vedanta Society in California and to date there are 36 Vedanta Society Centers in the United States.

Swami Vivekananda Influenced Countless Americans

According to Vedic cosmology, 108 is the basis of creation, representing the universe and all our existence. As the soul is encased in two types of bodies: the physical body (made of earth, water, fire, air, and ether) and the subtle body (composed of intelligence, mind and ego), 108 plays a significant role in keeping these two bodies healthily connected. Hindus believe the body holds seven chakras, or pools of energy, which begin at the bottom of the spine and go all the way down to the top of the head and it is believed there are 108 energy lines that converge to form the heart chakra. Ayurveda says there are 108 hidden spots in the body called marma points, where various tissues like muscles, veins, and ligaments meet. These are vital points of life force, and when they are out of balance, energy cannot properly flow throughout the body. Sun salutations, yogic asanas that honor the sun god Surya, are generally completed in nine rounds of 12 postures, totaling 108. Mantra meditation is usually chanted on a set of 108 beads.   In Hinduism there are 108 Upanishads, the sacred texts of wisdom from ancient sages. Additionally, in the Sanskrit alphabet, there are 54 letters. Each letter has a feminine, or Shakti, and masculine, or Shiva, quality. 54 multiplied by 2 equals 108. Ultimately, breathwork, chanting, studying scripture, and asana’s help harmonize one’s energy with the energy of the supreme spiritual source. These processes become especially effective when they are performed in connection with the number 108. Hindu scriptures strive to remind people of this divine commonality by continuously highlighting the innumerable threads connecting everything in existence. One of these threads is the number 108.

5 Things to know about 108

Here's How the Number 108 Binds Us to the Universe

A decade after slavery was abolished in 1834, the British government began importing indentured labor from India to work on their estates in other countries such as Trinidad and Tobago.  From 1845 to 1917, the ships would continue to arrive, carrying over 140,000 Indians to the island, facilitating Trinidad's population growth from Indian laborers. Today, there are roughly 240,000 declared Hindus in Trinidad and Tobago, comprising about 18% of the island’s population. There are a total of about 300 temples on the island, welcoming all who wish to enter and where many beloved Hindu festivals take place. But for some, the migration journey doesn’t end as New York and Florida have seen the development of large Indo-Caribbean communities.

Hinduism beyond India: Trinidad and Tobago

From ancient tribes to present-day devotees, tattoos have held a special place in Hinduism for centuries. In the Indian states of Bihar and Madhya Pradesh, the Ramnaami community invoked Rama’s protection with tattoos of the name “Rama” in Sanskrit on every inch of their skin, including the tongue and inside the lips.The Mahabharata tells the story of the Pandavas that were exiled to the Kutch district of Gujarat. Today, their descendants - members of the Ribari tribe - live as their ancestors did, with women covered in tattoos that symbolize their people’s strong spirit for survival. Some Hindus consider tattoos as protective emblems,such as tattoos of Hanuman are often used to relieve physical or mental pain. People will often get tattoos of other deities to invoke their blessings. Mehndi, a plant-based temporary tattoo, is commonly done at weddings and religious ceremonies as a form of celebration of love and spirituality. While tattoos have been in Hindu communities for centuries, tattoos as symbols of honor, devotion, and even fashion are incredibly popular today. Hindus and non Hindus alike adorn themselves with Hindu emblems and tattoos that reflect Hindu teachings.

Guidelines for Commercial Use of Hindu Images

Navaratri (nuhv-uh-RA-three) is a nine night celebration of the feminine divine that occurs four times a year — the spring and fall celebrations being amongst the more widely celebrated. Some traditions honor the nine manifestations of Goddess Durga, while others celebrate the three goddesses (Durga, Lakshmi, and Saraswati) with three days dedicated to each. This is a time to recognize the role in which the loving, compassionate, and gentle — yet sometimes powerful and fierce — feminine energy plays in our lives.

Nine Things to Know About Navaratri

Dussehra (duh-sheh-RAH) or Vijayadashmi (vi-juhyuh-dushuh-mee) celebrates the victory of Lord Rama over the ten-headed demon King Ravana. This also marks the end of Ramalila — a brief retelling of the Ramayana and the story of Rama, Sita, and Lakshman in the form of dramatic reading or dance. It also signifies the end of negativity and evil within us (vices, biases, prejudices) for a fresh new beginning. Dussehra often coincides with the end of Navratri and Duga Puja, and celebrations can last ten days, with huge figures of Ravana set ablaze as a reminder that good always prevails over evil.

Hinduism 101 & Women

Many Hindus hold reverence for the cow as a representation of mother earth, fertility, and Hindu values of selfless service, strength, dignity, and non-harming. Though not all Hindus are vegetarian, for this reason many traditionally abstain from eating beef. This is often linked with the concept of ahimsa (non-violence), which can be applied to diet choices and our interactions with the environment, and potentially determine our next birth, according to the doctrine of karma. This is part of the reason that some Hindus may choose a vegetarian lifestyle as an expression of ahimsa as well as explains the growing number of cow protection projects that are led by individuals who have felt compelled to put their Hindu values into practice. The US is home to several cow protection projects and sanctuaries

Dairy Is Traditionally Sattvic Food, but the Way We Treat Cows Today Can Be Tamasic

Cultured Meat and Animal-Free Dairy Upends the Plant-Based Food Discussion

The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 facilitated the journey of many Indian immigrants to the United States. In this new land, many created home shrines and community temples to practice and hold pujas (services). As Hindu American populations grew in metropolitan and rural areas, so did the need to find a permanent temple site for worship. In 1906, the Vedanta Society built the Old Temple in San Francisco, California but as this was not considered a formal temple, many don’t credit this with being the first. Others believe it is the Shiva Murugan Temple built in 1957 in Concord, California, whereas others believe it is the Maha Vallabha Ganapati Devanstanam in New York that should be considered the first. Today, there are nearly 1,000 temples in the United States . Regardless of where you live, you have the right to practice your faith.

A Guide To Temple Safety and Security

5 Things to Know About Visiting a Hindu Temple

Taking a Point of View on a Debatable Question Concerning Karma and Rebirth

• First Online: 22 December 2023

Cite this chapter

• Frank J. Hoffman 4  

My thesis is that there is a way to mediate between two competing views about karma and rebirth by arguing for a third position. The first, or traditionalist view, is that supernatural agencies are required in the Buddhist system of concepts and that secularism and naturalized karma view will not supply concepts necessary for traditional Buddhism. The second, or modernist view, holds the opposite view. Supernatural agencies are not required in the Buddhist system of concepts, and even without traditional concepts of karma, rebirth, and enlightenment after death, there is still a coherent karma and rebirth theory as applied to experience in this very lifetime. A third position, or mediating view of coexistence, advocates a doctrinal interpretation of Buddhist teachings, a socially engaged practice inspired by mettā, and the theory and practice of satipaṭṭhāna (mindfulness of breathing). I will inquire into each of the above views on karma and rebirth by asking: what it means (the linguistic concern), how does one know (the epistemological concern), and how does it work (the pragmatic concern)? These are three fundamental philosophical questions for meaning, knowledge, and application. Although I will exemplify aspects of each position concerning some Buddhist philosophers, I am mainly interested in the three kinds of positions and the benefits of each one. So, I am not interested in identifying the Buddhist scholar with what many call “the best view” or “the most popular view.” I am interested in identifying the position most likely to bring unity to humankind and benefit the global ecosystem of animals, earth, and people going forward. In sum, to raise the linguistic, epistemological, and pragmatic concerns about the interpretation of karma and rebirth is to raise some of the most significant and consequential questions we can ask about Buddhism in modernity.

A Substantially Different Version of This First Part Was Read at the Association for Core Texts and Courses, Special Meeting, Irvine, California As “Which Asian Texts Should American College Students Read?” at Concordia University and the Atrium Hotel, July 13–15, 2018. An Updated Version Was Previously Written for Publication in the Journal of Philosophy and Religion of Thailand, Vol. 16, No. 1 (2564), Feb. 15, 2022. This Version Is Substantially the Same As That in the Journal Article, and It Was Presented As a Lecture for the Second Time at a Hybrid Conference on 24 March 2023 in the College of Religious Studies, Mahidol University.

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An overview comment about Professor Richard Gombrich’s interview with the Secular Buddhism organization, relates the idea of Buddhism in the modern world thusly:

The term living tradition may seem as much an oxymoron as, well, Secular Buddhism. And yet this organic vitality is a hallmark of Buddhism, even and perhaps especially today. There have been growing pains as Buddhism rubs up against, and eventually becomes part of each different cultural context it encountered, but eventually Buddhism settled in. It’s been an evolutionary tale, as new forms arise from the selective pressures of the environment, while older varieties may still flourish… or at least soldier on. Today is perhaps the greatest assault, as new ideas and cultures are pushing and pulling the tradition with unprecedented rapidity and variety. (Messner, 2017 )

The Appendix of this paper provides detailed text data for a well-rounded understanding of karma and rebirth. It uses a recent publication from Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya Press, Common Buddhist Text : Guidance and Insight from the Buddha , which includes Theravada, Mahayana, and Vajrayana texts and is now available free online. CBT, for short, is a singular development in the study of religion in Thailand today. It is a volume compiled by a team of Buddhist Studies text specialists that authoritatively presents Theravada, Mahayana, and Vajrayana translations of Buddhist texts. The CBT in the Appendix of this paper shows in practice how topics in Buddhism may be presented well in only one volume of a little more than 400 pages.

Socially Engaged Buddhism refers to a process of applying meditation practice and dhamma teachings to situations of social, political, environmental, and economic suffering and injustice. It was mentioned by Walpola Rahaula in 1946 in connection with Buddha’s instruction to monks to travel and spread the teachings widely, and that Buddha’s teachings included social and economic matters. In the 1950s, Ven. Thich Nhat Hanh and Plum Village made the idea influential through his collection of articles, “A Fresh Look at Buddhism”, and in his response to war by community service in 1963 in Vietnam. The humanistic Buddhism movement in China of Taixu and Yinshun was an inspiration (and later Cheng Yen and Hsing Yun in Taiwan). In 1998, the Dalai Lama emphasized on a retreat in Bodh Gaya that, in contrast to Christians, Buddhists have not acted vigorously to address social and political issues. Roshi Pat Enkyo O’Hara has continued the Engaged Buddhist movement for Village Zendo in New York.

Divisions between monastics and laity are perpetuated by traditional beliefs that only ordained persons can attain enlightenment, but Buddhadasa has challenged this way of thinking. For example, Peter Jackson ( 1988 , p. 319) observes that “many monks follow a kammatic form of Buddhism rather than a nibbanic rather than a kammatic form of Buddhism and some lay people follow the nibbanic form of the religion.”

“Beyond” here refers to the emergence of a united Sangha consisting of male and female monastics and laity united on the basis of equality as human beings. These sons and daughters of the Buddha may work together toward common goals of bhavana or body-mind cultivation, facilitating human flourishing on the psychological and artistic levels, world peace, ecological harmony, and mitigating dukkha or suffering of all beings who can feel pain.

The traditionalist and modernist debate started with the exchange between Stephen Batchelor ( 1997 ) and Bhikkhu Bodhi ( 1998 ).

Compare this schema with Batchelor ( 1997 ) and Bodhi ( 1998 , pp. 14–21).

Compare with Batchelor ( 1997 ). See also Batchelor’s interview at Barre Center for Buddhist Studies on his recent book, After Buddhism , which is available at buddhistinquiry.org (accessed October 24, 2021), and Divan Thomas Jones’s review of Batchelor’s books, After Buddhism and Secular Buddhism for the Western Buddhist Review , which is available at thebuddhistcentre.com (accessed October 24, 2021).

My expression of this premise owes much to the ideas of Richard Braithwaite ( 1955 / 1970 ) and Ludwig Wittgenstein ( 1972 ), especially the latter’s idea of “regulative beliefs.”

I owe this point to Bhikkhu Buddhadasa, but the phraseology is mine, so I cannot attribute it exactly to him. Compare this point with some process philosophers.

For related developments in other religions, see inter alia John B. Cobb and David Griffin ( 1976 ), C. Robert Mesle ( 2008 ), and David Ray Griffin ( 2020 ).

A contemporary example is the monastery and eco-village of Ven. Prof. Dr. Hansa Dhammahaso at Sisaket. The eco-village is described in Kanchana Horsaengchai’s dissertation in progress at IBSC MCU.

Most Venerable Phra Brahmapundit et.al, Common Buddhist Text , p. 258.

The four consolations of the Kessamutt Sutta ( Kālāma Sutta ) are: if there is a heaven and I’m free from enmity and ill will, I will experience it; if there is not a heavenly realm, I will still have been free from enmity and ill will; if bad things happen to people who do bad things since I have no bad intentions then I will be unharmed; if bad things don’t happen to people who do bad things, I will be pure anyway (Bhikkhu Sujato, Kesamuttisutta, p. 65). The text is available at the Kālāmas of Kesamutta suttacentral.net .

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Jeremiah Joven Joaquin

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Let us see what the MCU expert translation team of international scholars says about karma and rebirth. Using the recently published Common Buddhist Text : Guidance and Insight from the Buddha (Ayutthaya: Mahaculalongkornrajavidyalaya University Press, 2017 and 2018), it is easily possible to choose a topic, for example, karma and rebirth, and sketch the outlines of the Buddha’s with exact textual references from the Pali, and I now summarize. Footnote 13

In Theravada Buddhism, there is samsara , a cycle of rebirths, but it is without a known beginning. It follows that there is, on this view, no evidence of a first beginning initiated by a monotheistic substance called “God” ( Tinakattha Sutta of Samyutta Nikaya II.178). The reality of rebirth and karma is understood in Theravada Buddhism as independent of sacrifices and gifts, unlike in ancient Hindu rituals. It is an error to deny a future life, how one is reborn depends on one’s conduct, and awakened ones directly know and see this ( Apannaka Sutta of Majjhima Nikaya I.402).

Buddhists think that believing in rebirth and karma is a safe bet, as stated in the third part of the Kālāma Sutta . This last one is a very important and well-known sutta , but it is not one that people typically study deeply and completely: part one is about being self-reliant, part two is about paying attention to the words of the wise ones, viz., the intellectuals ( viññū ), and the third part is the probabilistic argument to the effect that believing in rebirth and karma is a safe bet ( Kesaputta or Kālāma Sutta of Anguttara Nikaya I.192). Footnote 14 Another sutta says that there are five main rebirth realms: purgatory, animal, hungry ghosts, human, or the gods or devas ( Nibbedhika Sutta of Anguttara Nikaya III.415). As Buddhism developed, there came to be a sixth realm, the Titans.

Perhaps the devas are of two types, one benevolent and shining, and another wrathful type who is malevolent and likes to fight. The titans or asuras were divided over time from the benevolent deities to be an independent realm making a sixth rebirth realm. Anyway, rebirth as a human is a precious and rare opportunity, as Nakhasika Sutta explains. If one is fortunate enough to have a human rebirth, then it is prudent to use the opportunity to attain enlightenment ( Nakhasika Sutta of Samyutta Nikaya II.263.). Being born a human who can hear the dhamma is rare ( Dhammapada 182). So, since life is short, it is good to practice while you can ( Dhammapada 47). Our world in the context of the universe is among clusters of worlds throughout the universe ( Abhibhu Sutta of the Anguttara Nikaya I.227–228). Buddha’s view has cycles of cosmic eons ( Pabbata Sutta of the Samyutta Nikaya II.181–182).

Next, to consider karma, karma (Pali: kamma ) is volition ( Nibbedhika Sutta of Anguttara Nikaya III.415), and one’s unskillful actions have a karmic impact sooner or later ( Dhammapada 69–71). One’s actions and thoughts condition one’s rebirth, not the rituals of others ( Asibandhakaputta Sutta of the Samyutta Nikaya IV.312–314). Karma shows how past actions lead to differences among people ( Culakammavibhanga Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya III.203–206).

However, experiences, and skillful and unskillful actions, cannot all be blamed on past karma or a God, but neither are they causeless ( Titthayayatana Sutta of the Anguttara Nikaya I.173–176). Feelings and illnesses are not all due to past karma ( Sivaka Sutta of the Samyutta Nikaya IV.230–231). A good character can dilute the karmic results of a bad action ( Lonakapallaka Sutta of the Anguttara Nikaya , I. 242–250). Self-determination of one’s rebirth occurs through virtue, wisdom, and resolve ( Sankharuppati Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya III.99–104). Karma can mature slowly, and one’s view and attitude at the end of one’s life are important ( Mahakammavibhanga Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya III.214–215).

There are implications of karma and rebirth for attitudes to others. For example, we have experienced in the past both the good times and bad times of others, so sympathy for others and non-attachment to good experiences are wise ( Duggatam and Sukhitam Suttas of the Samyutta Nikaya II.186–187). This life and all rebirths result in aging, sickness, and death; nothing that is conditioned is permanent ( Mahaparinibbana Sutta of the Digha Nikaya II.157; Alagaddupamasutta of the Majjhima Nikaya II.157). There are frailties of human life ( Ratthapala Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya II.70–73), and one must accept the inevitability of death ( Salla Sutta of the Sutta Nipata 574–573). The search for sensual pleasures leads to suffering ( Culadukkhakkhandha Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya I.91–92).

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Hoffman, F.J. (2023). Taking a Point of View on a Debatable Question Concerning Karma and Rebirth. In: Hongladarom, S., Joaquin, J.J., Hoffman, F.J. (eds) Philosophies of Appropriated Religions. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5191-8_8

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1 Karma, Moral Responsibility, and Buddhist Ethics

Bronwyn Finnigan is Senior Lecturer in the School of Philosophy in the Research School of Social Sciences at the Australian National University.

• Published: 20 April 2022
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The Buddha taught that there is no self. He also accepted a version of the doctrine of karmic rebirth, according to which good and bad actions accrue merit and demerit and cause beneficial or harmful events to occur in this life or the next. But how is karmic rebirth possible if there are no selves? The relevant philosophical issues inspired centuries of philosophical reflection and debate. This chapter will contextualize and survey some of the historical and contemporary debates relevant to moral psychology and Buddhist ethics. They include whether the Buddha's teaching of no-self is consistent with the possibility of moral responsibility; the role of retributivism in Buddhist thought; the possibility of a Buddhist account of free will; the scope and viability of recent attempts to naturalize karma to character virtues and vices; and how right action is to be understood within a Buddhist framework.

1.1 Introduction

Buddhism centres on the teachings of the Buddha, who lived and taught somewhere between the sixth and fourth centuries bc . There is some disagreement about what exactly he taught, how to interpret his views, and what they entail. But most agree that the Buddha’s early teaching of the Four Noble Truths is central. This teaching analyzes the metaphysical and moral-psychological causes and conditions of suffering. It identifies attachment to self as a central cause of suffering, but claims that this attachment is rooted in ignorance because (amongst other things) there is, in fact, no self. 1

The Buddha also accepted some version of the doctrine of karmic rebirth. Like most scholars in classical India, the Buddha accepted a cosmology of multiple realms of existence into which sentient beings are born, die, and are reborn in a continuous cycle. 2 The process of rebirth is known as saṃsāra . 3 Where one is reborn is driven by the law of karma, which functions with respect to moral action; good actions generate karmic merit and bad actions generate karmic demerit. An agent’s accumulated karmic debt determines the kind of existence they will have in their next life, and causes some auspicious and inauspicious events to occur in that life. 4 It also partially explains the nature and fact of the agent’s present existence as well as some of the auspicious and inauspicious events that occur in this life.

If we broadly define the concept of ‘moral responsibility’ as the relation by which agents are held to account for their morally evaluable actions, this doctrine offers a transpersonal retributive account of moral responsibility. It is retributive because karmic merit and demerit is a matter of deserved reward and punishment. It is transpersonal because the laws of karma function across lifetimes and modes of existence.

But how is karmic rebirth possible if there are no selves? If there are no selves, it would seem that there are no agents that could be held morally responsible for ‘their’ actions. If actions are those happenings in the world performed by agents, it would seem that there are no actions. And if there are no agents and no actions, then karmic retribution, and morality more broadly, seem to lose application. Historical opponents argued that the Buddha’s teaching of no self was tantamount to moral nihilism. 5 The Buddha, and later Buddhist philosophers, firmly reject this charge.

Historical and contemporary explanations of how and why Buddhism does, in fact, avoid the charge of moral nihilism spans a vast intellectual terrain, engaging issues in metaphysics, moral psychology, and ethics as well as epistemology, phenomenology, and philosophy of mind. These issues also inspired centuries of philosophical reflection and debate, spanning cultures and continents, and resulted in a complex network of competing philosophical positions and schools. Any attempt to survey the relevant literature will provide, at best, a narrow and selective snapshot of available views. However, since many of these issues are relevant to contemporary discussions of ethics and moral psychology, even a limited snapshot is valuable.

This chapter will contextualize and briefly discuss five historical and contemporary debates that emerge from the apparent tension between the Buddha’s teaching of no-self and the possibilities of karmic retribution and morality. These debates concern whether the Buddha’s teaching of no-self is consistent with the possibility of moral responsibility; the role of retributivism in Buddhist thought; the possibility of a Buddhist account of free will; the scope and viability of recent attempts to naturalize karma to character virtues and vices; and whether and how right action is to be understood within a Buddhist framework. This ‘selective snapshot’ of issues covers much philosophical ground. An objective of this chapter is to make explicit the ways in which these issues are intimately related in the Buddhist context.

The chapter will begin by providing an overview of the Buddha’s teaching of the Four Noble Truths, since this teaching provides both the context and justificatory grounds for various Buddhist positions on the above issues.

1.2 The Four Noble Truths

Most contemporary Buddhist philosophers agree that the Buddha’s early teachings of the Four Noble Truths is central to his thought. 6 The first is the truth or fact of suffering; suffering ( duḥkha ) is a pervasive and unwanted feature of sentient life. In the Buddha’s early teachings, the concept of suffering is discussed in terms that range from bodily physical pain to complex psychological states associated with attachment, aversion, and loss.

The second truth diagnoses two main causes of suffering. The first is craving ( tṛṣṇā ): craving for pleasure, for continued existence (of oneself and what one loves), and for non-being (of that to which one is averse). On the Buddha’s analysis, craving conditions attachment which then causes suffering in the face of change or loss. The second cause of suffering is ignorance ( avidyā ). Ignorance, in the Buddhist tradition, is not a lack of knowledge but a confluence of false views, the most significant of which are grounded in a failure to recognize that all things depend on causes and conditions for their existence (they ‘dependently arise’, pratītyasamutpāda ); nothing exists independently of all other things. Since a change to the causes and conditions changes their effect, it is thought to follow that all things are impermanent. This extends to oneself and others. The Buddha taught that there is no permanent and continuing self ( ātman ) that persists through time. The basic thought is that if we analyze ourselves into our constituent parts, we will only discover causally related physical and psychological elements (beliefs, desires, memories, dispositions, etc.). Each of these elements are impermanent; none persists unchanging across lifetimes and each depends on some other elements for its existence. Importantly, there is no single constant, unchanging, underlying substance that unifies them as aspects of ‘me’. The Buddha taught that a thorough understanding of this fact can help remove the grounds for craving and thus the roots of suffering. It can also motivate psychological change by removing the false belief that we have fixed characters and so cannot change the tendencies that detract from our well-being.

The third truth is the assertion that suffering can end. It is possible to change from a state of pervasive suffering to one of happiness or overall well-being. Nirvāṇa is the term for the resulting state or way of life. Why does the Buddha think this is true? Because he thinks that nothing exists permanently: everything depends for its existence on causes and conditions. It follows that if one changes the causes and conditions of some effect, one changes the effect. Psychological change is thus possible if one changes the relevant causes and conditions.

The fourth truth outlines an eightfold path towards achieving this state of overall well-being (or eight constituents of an enlightened way of life). 7 The elements of this path or way of life are standardly organized under three headings; wisdom (right view, right intention), ethical conduct (right action, right speech, right livelihood), and meditation (right effort, right mindfulness, right concentration).

The Buddha’s teaching of the Four Noble Truths inspired centuries of philosophical reflection, and led to extensive debates about how best to understand its substantive points. These debates ranged across issues in metaphysics, logic, epistemology, phenomenology, ethics, and philosophy of mind. They reached their scholarly peak in India between the fourth and ninth centuries ce , and the major philosophical trends were later classified into distinct Indian Buddhist schools. The most prominent were Abhidharma, Madhyamaka, and Yogācāra. 8 These debates were also influenced by the emergence of Mahāyāna Buddhism in the early centuries ce , which attributed additional teachings to the Buddha that sometimes challenged established Buddhist views and advocated a ‘superior’ path to awakening. Buddhism also spans various cultures, countries, and historical periods, and so has been shaped by these different contexts. There is thus no singular ‘Buddhist’ position on most debated issues by Buddhist philosophers; there are many Buddhist views on many substantive philosophical issues. This is particularly true of the issue concerning whether the Buddha’s teaching of no-self is consistent with the possibility of moral responsibility.

1.3 Karma and moral responsibility: historical responses

Historical opponents argued that the Buddha’s teaching of no-self is tantamount to moral nihilism. The Buddha identifies these implications as ‘wrong views’ that can and should be avoided (1995: 618–28). Historical and contemporary Buddhist philosophers offer various explanations of how Buddhism can avoid this charge of moral nihilism. I will begin by considering some historical approaches. A standard strategy of response consists of: (1) elaborating the Buddha’s teaching of no-self in relation to his idea that all existing things dependently arise ( pratītyasamutpāda ); (2) reinterpreting the function of karma in terms that fit this explanation; and (3) explaining away talk of agents and their actions in reference to the Buddhist distinction between ‘two truths’. 9

With respect to (1), most historical Buddhists insist that, in denying a self, the Buddha is not asserting that no one and nothing exists. Rather, according to at least one prominent interpretation, he is rejecting a specific conception of self ( ātman , a permanent, unchanging substance) in favour of a positive analysis of persons as causally related configurations of physical and psychological elements. The Buddha proposes several classifications for these elements. The best-known is his analysis of persons as configurations or aggregates of five types of token elements; the Five Aggregates or skandhas . They are standardly characterized as: (1) physical matter ( rūpa ), (2) feeling ( vedanā ), (3) recognition or cognition ( saṃjñā ), (4) dispositional tendencies ( saṃskāra ), and (5) consciousness ( vijñāna ). 10 The token elements in these configurations are causally related events or states, and any particular element is conditioned by a complex interaction of other elements. These elements are diachronically related, and have synchronic depth insofar as a token element at a given moment can be conditioned by multiple layers of concurrent token elements. However, the configuration or aggregation, itself, is not considered to be a real substance with causal properties. There is no enduring substantial self that unifies these elements as constituents of ‘me’. It follows that if there is a law of karma, it must operate over these causally related configurations of psycho-physical elements. But which elements in these configurations does it target?

This question relates to strategic move (2); reinterpreting the function of karma in terms that fit the above elaboration of the Buddha’s teaching of no-self. According to the Buddha, karma functions over intentions, decisions, or will. 11 ‘It is volition [ cetanā ], O monks, that I call karma; having willed, one acts through body, speech, or mind’ (2012: 963). Many consider this analysis of karma to be one of the Buddha’s great innovations. It is also broadly consistent with the Five Aggregate analysis of persons. If one accepts this analysis, what then should we make of ordinary talk of agents forming intentions, acting intentionally, and the ubiquitous variety of distinctions between oneself and others? This relates to strategic move (3); explaining away talk of agents and their actions in reference to the Buddhist distinction between ‘two truths’. Many Buddhists respond to the above question by appeal to a distinction between conventional truth ( saṃvṛtisatya ) and ultimate truth ( paramārthasatya ). On at least one version of this strategic move, ordinary talk of self and other, agents and their actions, is a matter of social convention and linguistic practice but does not reflect the ultimate nature of reality.

The Simile of the Mango in the Milindapañha provides an early example of the first two strategic moves ( Rhys-David trans. 1965 : 72). 12 In the context of a conversation between King Milinda and the Buddhist monk Nāgasena about the operation of karma, King Milinda proposes a simile of someone stealing a mango from another person’s tree to argue that that person could appeal to the Buddha’s doctrine of no-self to justify their behaviour by saying that the mango they stole was not the same mango as that planted by the other person. But Nāgasena replies that the person is responsible on the ground that the stolen mango exists in causal dependence on the one originally planted. It is analogously reasoned that the person could not justifiably appeal to the Buddha’s teaching of no-self to argue that they are not responsible for stealing the mango yesterday because they are not the same person today. This is because there would be a definite causal connection between the elements that constitute ‘themselves’ yesterday as those that constituted ‘themselves’ today. Gethin (1998) takes the point of this simile to be that, properly understood, ‘the principle of the causal connectedness of phenomena is sufficient [ … ] to answer critics of the teaching of no-self and redeem Buddhism from the charge of nihilism’ (p. 144)

While historical Buddhist responses to the charge of moral nihilism tend to exhibit the above argumentative strategy, Buddhist philosophers vigorously debated the commitments and entailments of its constituent claims. Many disputes focused on the metaphysics and semantics of personal identity but had broader implications for the metaphysics of reality more generally. Competing positions on these issues often function to differentiate Buddhist schools. Here is a brief sketch of some of the salient philosophical differences.

Abhidharma Buddhism is the earliest attempt by Buddhist thinkers to explicate and systematize the Buddha’s teaching into a unified and comprehensive theory. While the details were debated, 13 most Abhidharma Buddhists interpreted the Buddha as proposing a mereological reduction of persons and gesturing towards an exhaustive mereological reduction of conscious experience and reality, a project that they respectively attempt to complete. They consider this project to be motivated by the idea that ‘wholes’ (aggregations, collections, kinds and types) are merely linguistic conventions for grouping otherwise discrete entities. While we might conventionally talk about persons and other kinds of wholes, what ultimately exists, in the Abhidharma view, are simple, causally related, momentary events individuated by essential properties. 14 Madhyamaka and Yogācāra Buddhists reject this analysis of persons and ultimate reality. 15 The main point of contention for Mādhyamikas concerns the status of the individuation criterion for ultimately real entities, and whether it is consistent with the Buddha’s teachings of dependent arising. Mādhyamikas argue that it is not. The positive upshot of this refutation, however, is unclear ( Tillemans 2016 ; Finnigan 2017a ). Contemporary scholars treat Mādhyamikas as holding that there is no ultimate reality, there is no ultimately true reductive base for an analysis of persons, but that ‘our conventional or customary standards of rational acceptance are the only game in town’ ( Siderits 1989 : 238). 16 Yogācārins, by contrast, are traditionally read as proposing some form of metaphysical idealism, in terms of which considerations of personal identity are analyzed as mere reifications of the structural features of (at least some mode of) consciousness (Finnigan 2017b ; 2018b ). 17

There is a lot more to be said (and that has been said) about these different analyses of personal identity and reality. If we return to the issue of whether the Buddhist teaching of no-self is consistent with a morality based in karmic retribution, these different analyses of personal identity face distinct challenges when it comes to explaining the operation of karma. An Abhidharma analysis might be able to account for the creation of karmic debt because it admits intentions in its reductive base. But some Buddhists argue that Abhidharma cannot explain how this debt accumulates and is discharged (for better or worse) at some later time. This is because karmic debt would need to persist through time, but prominent forms of Abhidharma reduce persons to an ontology of momentary psycho-physical elements in causal relations. How could karmic debt persist in such an ontology? Yogācāra Buddhists respond to this challenge by positing an underlying mode of consciousness, called the store-consciousness ( alayavijñāna ), which stores karmic debt as seeds or potentials that ‘sprout’ or generate effects in appropriate circumstances ( Schmithausen 1987 ; Waldron 2003 ). But some Madhyamaka Buddhists object that this is tantamount to reintroducing an enduring, substantial self.

While Buddhists historically debated how best to account for the operation of karma, they did not question its possibility. There are several reasons for this. One reason is that Buddhist thinkers sought to explain the ‘truth’ of the Buddha’s teachings, and the Buddha strongly rejected doctrines which denied karmic retribution (1995: 618–28). To doubt its possibility was said to be a mental defilement because it demotivates moral agency. This reflects Buddhism’s practical orientation. An overarching goal of Buddhist thought and practice is the cessation of suffering. In his early teachings, the Buddha refused to answer substantive philosophical questions if he thought it would obstruct this goal in a particular dialogical context. In a conversation with Vacchagotta, for instance, the Buddha refused to answer questions about the nature of self for the apparent reason that it would cause Vacchagotta further confusion and thus suffering (2005: 1031–3). 18 Later Buddhist scholastics did attempt to answer substantive philosophical questions, but their dialectical context was one of defending the Buddha’s teachings against the sophisticated metaphysical and epistemological systems of their orthodox Hindu rivals. Even in this context, however, the possibility of karma and its transpersonal retributive conception of moral responsibility remained unchallenged.

1.4 Karma naturalized

While historical Buddhists unquestioningly accepted the doctrine of karma, contemporary Buddhist philosophers either (1) ignore it, (2) reject it as inconsistent with a respectably naturalized Buddhist philosophy that fits with a modern scientific point of view, or (3) reinterpret it ‘naturalistically’ by retaining some of its moral psychological features while denying its transcendental commitments, such as rebirth and transpersonal retribution.

The third strategy is increasingly popular. Many naturalize karma to the fairly uncontroversial idea that sentient beings can act intentionally and that their intentional actions have a variety of effects on themselves, others, and their physical and social environment ( Flanagan 2011 ). And most emphasize the intrapersonal effects of action on one’s own character or dispositions to feel, act, and experience a meaningful world ( Keown 1996 ; Wright 2005 ). These approaches typically naturalize karma to a psychological mechanism of character development, where character development is broadly understood as a process of directed change to a constellation of dispositions (behavioural, affective, reactive, discriminating, evaluative) that are conventionally identified as ‘oneself’. Elements of this idea can be found within the traditional doctrine. Buddhists relate the operation of karma to intention ( cetanā ). Contemporary scholars emphasize that the concept of cetanā has a wide interpretive range that extends beyond volition to include one’s orientation or intentional attitudes towards the objects of one’s experiences ( Heim 2013 ). This might look like a conflation of two senses of intentionality; (1) intentions as volitions with objectives that motivate action, and (2) intentionality understood as the thesis that conscious experiences are object directed. However, contemporary work increasingly emphasizes enactive interpretations of conscious experience according to which interests, values, intentions, and habituated dispositions inform both what the subject experiences and the ways in which experienced objects solicit behavioural response ( Mackenzie 2013 ; Ganeri 2017 ). Intentional attitudes such as anger, fear, or jealousy might be said to exemplify this idea if understood as adopted stances which both inform how an object (person or situation) is experienced and implicate modes of behavioural response (Finnigan 2017a ; 2019 ; 2021 ). Such a view might also help explain why the Buddha and later historical Buddhists considered the (otherwise mere) possession and encouragement of these intentional attitudes to be forms of mental activity that accrue karmic merit or demerit.

I think there is a lot to be said for this extended analysis of Buddhist cetanā (pending more detail and argument). However, several problems arise from attempts to use it to ground a naturalized account of karma. For one thing, this extended interpretation of cetanā connects to broader themes in Buddhist moral psychology that make no reference to karma. Most Buddhist philosophers maintain that the Buddhist analysis of persons, as causally related psychological and physical elements, provides a rich and deep account of the psychological causes and conditions of suffering and overall well-being. Most also contend that this generalizes to a broader analysis of the way our inner worlds shape our behaviour in ways that do not necessarily involve conscious acts of choice or decision-making. And many consider this to imply that there are intricate feedback mechanisms between our behaviour and our dispositional modes of experience and response. However, these insights are thought to follow from a thorough analysis of the relationship between the Buddhist doctrines of no-self and dependent arising. It is questionable whether the doctrine of karma is required for their expression.

Further problems arise from the fact that naturalized accounts of karma emphasize the way enacting intentional attitudes, expressing them in bodily action, serves to entrench and reinforce them as habituated dispositions or aspects of character. It is not clear that this captures all relevant aspects of the traditional doctrine of karma. One difficulty concerns how it accommodates the retributive aspect of the traditional doctrine and the sense of agents being held morally responsible by a mechanism of justice that metes out appropriate rewards and punishments ( Reichenbach 1990 ). Many of the historical examples of karmic fruit refer to such goods as fortune, longevity, health, physical appearance, and social influence. While some of these goods might causally relate to character (a conscientious person might, for instance, be disposed to act in ways that positively contribute to their health and longevity), many of these goods relate to character only contingently, at best. A good person is just as susceptible to terminal illness or being severely injured in an accident as anyone else ( Wright 2005 ). Without the doctrine of rebirth to guarantee the proportionality of merit and reward or punishment, these retributive goods have no place in a naturalized conception of karma.

This last objection might not seem to be a problem. A defender of naturalized karma might grant the point but insist that there remains a large and interesting class of intrapersonal and social goods that can be causally related to character development to a sufficiently reliable degree, and that these are the only goods it needs to accommodate. But even so, the retributive aspects of the traditional doctrine and the relevant sense of moral responsibility remain unexplained. The traditional doctrine of karma assumes some sense of moral deserts; agents get what they deserve (in this life or the next) and are thereby held accountable for their actions. But while the behavioural expression of compassion might generate certain psychological and social goods for the compassionate agent, it seems odd to describe this in terms of deserts without some transpersonal or cosmic mechanism to ensure these outcomes. A defender of naturalized karma might respond that the notions of retributive justice and moral desert are irretrievably tied to the notions of rebirth and cosmic justice, or to the notion of self that the Buddha rejected, and so should be jettisoned. But if naturalized karma jettisons the retributive aspects of cosmic karma, how might it alternatively ground moral responsibility? Some argue that the notion of moral responsibility should also be abandoned ( Goodman 2002 ). But this is extreme, and inconsistent with the historical tradition.

1.5 A Buddhist account of free will?

Contemporary Buddhist debates about the possibility of moral responsibility are often related to the question of whether Buddhism can admit a theory of free will ( Repetti 2017a ). Given that the Buddha rejects the existence of a substantial self, it would seem that Buddhists should deny an analysis of free will in terms of agent causation or agents with sui generis causal powers. However, the Buddha also explicitly rejected a version of fatalism or the view that occurrences are inevitably caused (1995: 618–28). This view was thought to be inconsistent with the Four Noble Truths, which collectively assert that it is possible to change one’s state or way of life from that of persistent and unwanted suffering to overall well-being. Intentions, volitions, or decisions ( cetanā ) were proposed as relevant causal determinants of action. This proposal is arguably consistent with some contemporary versions of determinism, however, and it is a live question whether they are compatible with the possibility of moral responsibility. What is the best way to characterize the Buddhist position on freedom and determinism, and is there a contemporary analysis that it best approximates?

Contemporary Buddhist philosophers are all over the map on this issue. Buddhism has been variously characterized as assuming ‘hard-determinism’ ( Goodman 2002 ), ‘neo-compatibilism’ ( Federman 2010 ) ‘paleo-compatibilism’ ( Siderits 2008 ), ‘semi-compatibilism’ ( Repetti 2017b ), and even a form of libertarianism that assumes agent causation ( Griffiths 1982 ). Some argue that Buddhists are illusionists about the possibility of free will ( Harris 2012 ), and others that it is anachronistic to even raise the issue of freedom and determinism in the Buddhist context ( Garfield 2017 ). Debates on this issue are complicated by the fact that these various positions are often contextualized to distinct Buddhist philosophical traditions which do not necessarily share the same metaphysical assumptions. And their contemporary defenders do not necessarily share the same assumptions about what moral responsibility means, requires, and entails.

If one thinks that moral responsibility necessarily presupposes the metaphysical possibility of a free will, then a defender of naturalized karma will need to navigate this contested terrain. However, the field is still young and various possibilities have yet to be thoroughly explored. One promising strategy might involve appeal to contemporary instrumentalist theories of moral responsibility and/or versions of the social regulation view of free will, according to which activities of praise, blame, reward, and punishment function to prospectively regulate behaviour rather than as modes of retribution that track deserts. 19   Breyer (2013) defends a version of this approach in the Buddhist context, arguing that the assignment and acceptance of moral responsibility can be justified in relation to its role in motivating agents to act in ways that eliminate suffering and achieve liberation. Breyer thus proposes a psychological regulation view of moral responsibility justified in terms of a certain interpretation of the goals of Buddhist practice outlined in the Four Noble Truths. 20 While these practices assume conventional distinctions between intentional agents, this is to be treated as just a psychological technique that is normatively justified in terms of efficacy rather than grounded in a robustly substantial metaphysical analysis of free will. While I think a regulatory approach to the attribution of moral responsibility is promising, Breyer’s account seems to exclude the retributive dimension of moral responsibility that is central to the traditional doctrine of karma. While it could be argued that this is the inevitable cost of naturalizing karma, it remains an open question whether some alternative regulatory analysis of Buddhist moral responsibility might admit backward-looking retributive judgments.

1.6 Buddhist normative ethics

Discussions of naturalized karma often occur in the context of debates about how best to understand Buddhist ethics. This is not surprising. Since karma operates over moral action, the doctrine of karma must presuppose some view of the moral determinants of action. Those who naturalize karma as a psychological mechanism of character development tend to argue that character, as a relevantly extended sense of cetanā , is the morally determining factor for good or bad actions. While good consequences correspond to good actions in the doctrine of karma, these consequences presuppose rather than determine the evaluative worth of the action. From this it has been argued that ‘karma, is not a consequentialist ethic but a virtue ethic’ ( Keown 1996 : 346). Others argue, however, that relation to suffering provides a more fundamental evaluative ground, even of intentions and character, and so Buddhist ethics is better understood as some form of consequentialism.

The issue of how best to understand Buddhist moral thought in mainstream normative ethical terms dominates contemporary Buddhist moral philosophy. Some insist that Buddhist ethics is best construed in consequentialist terms (Siderits 2003 ; 2015 , Goodman 2009 ; 2015 ). Others that it is a form of virtue ethics ( Keown 2001 ; Cooper and James 2005 ). Some argue that no version of virtue ethics can provide a viable reconstruction of Buddhist ethics ( Kalupahana 1976 ; Goodman 2009 ; 2015 ; Siderits 2015 ). Others argue that Buddhist ethics ‘cannot be utilitarian’ ( Keown 2001 : 177). Some argue for an integration of these theories into a form of virtue consequentialism ( Clayton 2006 ). Others maintain that Buddhist moral thought is such a complex and messy affair that it resists systematization into a singular ethical theory ( Hallisey 1996 ). And yet others argue that attempting to systematize Buddhist moral thought in terms of Western philosophical categories is moribund because it structurally overlooks what is distinctive of Buddhist moral thought (Garfield 2010–11).

Most participants in these debates accept the observation that Buddhist moral thought is a complex and messy affair. If we take Buddhism in its widest possible sense, spanning countries, cultures, historical periods, and distinct philosophical traditions, we find much agreement in moral views but also different points of moral emphasis, distinct modes of moral reasoning, and disagreements about what the Buddha’s teachings practically entail.

Recall the Four Noble Truths. The fourth truth outlines an eightfold path or way of living. One of its constituents is ‘right action’. In response to queries about what this practically entails, the Buddha provided a set of precepts for his disciples to follow in a monastic setting. This is known as the vinaya . The earliest schisms amongst Buddhist communities after the Buddha’s death (or parinirvāṇa ) concerned the legitimacy and priority of these precepts. There are now several bodies of vinaya precepts accepted by distinct Buddhist communities around the world. 21 The Buddha also did not initially admit the ordination of women. When he did, he provided a more extensive set of vinaya precepts to regulate their behaviour than that of monks. There are contemporary debates about the legitimacy of some of these gender-specific precepts, particularly those that require nuns to demean themselves before monks, such as the requirement that nuns sit below or behind monks regardless of their respective spiritual or hierarchical status ( Banks Findley 2000 ).

Further complexity in Buddhist moral thought relates to the emergence of Mahāyāna in the early centuries ce . Mahāyāna Buddhism distinctively recognizes certain additional teachings of the Buddha (or sūtras ) that are not accepted by all Buddhists. Some of these sūtras make claims that contradict or are in tension with those made in the early teachings. A controversial case concerns vegetarianism ( Finnigan 2017c ). The first precept taught by the Buddha was that of ahiṃsā or non-violence. Ahiṃsā was a common precept or virtue in classical India, and is the center-piece of Jainism. Buddhists often explicate it as the prescription to neither kill nor harm others, where this refers to all sentient beings including animals. The Jains took ahiṃsā to entail vegetarianism. But the Buddha did not prohibit eating meat in his early teachings and there is even some evidence that he may himself have eaten meat. 22 This was historically controversial. However, at least three of the Mahāyāna sūtras ( Laṅkāvatārasūtra , Mahaparinirvāṇasūtra , and Angulimālasūtra ) present the Buddha as explicitly arguing that Buddhists should be vegetarian. And while these sūtras explicitly acknowledge the inconsistency, they explain it away by arguing that the earlier teaching was a mere provisional step towards complete prohibition. These Mahāyāna sūtras were highly influential in China, and vegetarianism is virtually definitive of Chinese Buddhism ( Kieschnick 2005 ; Chuan 2014 ). This was arguably not the case in India, Tibet, or many South East Asian Buddhist countries. While all Buddhists agree that one may not intentionally harm or kill animals, there was (and still is) a lot of disagreement about whether Buddhists should be vegetarian.

The Mahāyāna sūtras also emphasize and champion the bodhisattva ideal. A bodhisattva is a person who has committed to remain in the cycle of rebirth to relieve the suffering of all sentient beings. This commitment is called bodhicitta . The motivation for this commitment is said to be their great compassion ( mahakaruṇā ) for the sufferings of the world. And the enactment or expression of this commitment in action is said to be informed by other moral virtues or perfections, such as loving-kindness ( maitrī ), equanimity ( upekkhā ), and sympathetic joy ( muditā ). There is some debate about whether these ideas constitute a genuine Mahāyāna innovation or just elaborate ideas already contained in the Buddha’s early teachings. They are nevertheless distinctively central to Mahāyāna Buddhist thought, and inform distinct modes of moral emphasis and reasoning. In the context of Mahāyāna, these ideas are bound up with the traditional doctrine of karma in interesting ways. For instance, the typical method by which bodhisattvas assist others is by performing good deeds that only indirectly involved others (if at all) and then dedicating the karmic merit to the benefit of others rather than themselves ( Clayton 2009 ). This practice of ‘dedicating merit’ is replicated in the Chinese Buddhist ritual of animal release whereby Buddhists purchase an animal (typically a small fish or turtle) from a temple, release it into a pond or waterway, and dedicate the karmic merit to the benefit of others.

Given the evident plurality in Buddhist moral concepts and modes of moral reasoning, there is good reason to be skeptical that all Buddhist moral thought can be easily unified into a single normative ethical theory. To some extent, defenders of first-order reconstructions of Buddhist ethics acknowledge this fact by contextualizing their accounts to some Buddhist text taken to be authoritative by some Buddhist tradition. 23 But even so, they anticipate that these contextualized studies will reveal a single evaluative thread that spans Buddhism as a whole and is sufficiently similar to mainstream theories to warrant comparison. If plausible, this has several potential benefits. It might provide grounds for adjudicating intra-Buddhist disagreements about precepts and implications. It might also serve as an informative conversational bridge with mainstream ethics that goes beyond simply asserting, ‘You say this, and Buddhists say this too’, to reveal new justificatory grounds, new modes of reasoning, and new implications for shared evaluative assumptions.

Debates remain as to whether consequentialism or virtue ethics best articulates this general evaluative thread. What might justify one or other of these competing theories as a plausible reconstruction of Buddhist moral thought? Finnigan (2017a) engages this question and identifies three necessary conditions. The first is that the account needs to be consistent with the Buddha’s teachings of the Four Noble Truths. The second is that the account needs to be metaethically consistent with some Buddhist metaphysical or epistemological theory (which will exclude some options and render the final verdict on those included dependent on the outcomes of the metaphysical and epistemological disputes at their justificatory base). And the third is that the account needs to plausibly reconstruct the moral thought or reasoning contained in some Buddhist canonical text.

The first condition is the most important, given that the Buddha’s teaching of the Four Noble Truths is the closest to a central tenet of Buddhism accepted by all Buddhists. If some version of Buddhist normative ethics is inconsistent with this teaching, then it should be rejected as an implausible reconstruction. Finnigan (2017a) provides reasons to think that some version of Buddhist consequentialism and some version of Buddhist virtue ethics can meet this condition. Stated briefly, the Four Noble Truths can justify some version of Buddhist consequentialism if one emphasizes the first noble truth and accepts a specific interpretation of the third. On this reading of the Four Noble Truths, the overarching goal of Buddhist practice is to eliminate suffering and produce nirvāṇa , where nirvāṇa is understood as a state of overall well-being. Actions (intentions, dispositions) are justified as good relative to their role in causing these outcomes. But the Four Noble Truths can also justify some version of Buddhist virtue ethics if one accepts a different interpretation of the third noble truth and emphasizes the fourth. On this alternative reading, the eightfold path characterizes the constituents of nirvāṇa , understood as an enlightened way of life. Actions (intentions, dispositions) are justified as good to the extent that they are mutually dependent and reinforcing constituents of such a way of life and are collectively inconsistent with pervasive and unwanted suffering. Both accounts involve consequences of a sort insofar as they both posit conditional relations between their various constituents. But in one case the evaluative relation is instrumental and assumes an external relation between the evaluated item (means) and the basis of evaluation (effect). And in the other, the evaluative relation is constitutive and assumes an internal regulative relation between the evaluated item and other aspects of the relevant system or way of life.

There is a lot to be said about this distinction. Versions of it are widely employed in contemporary Buddhist scholarship, and are respectively related to utilitarianism and virtue ethics. They do not readily map onto what contemporary Buddhist philosophers defend in their name, however. The Buddhist consequentialism of Goodman (2009) , for instance, looks an awful lot like the version of Buddhist virtue ethics outlined above. There is also reason to think that both reconstructions of Buddhist ethics can satisfy the remaining two conditions Finnigan (2017a) identifies as necessary to count as a justified reconstruction of Buddhist moral thought. This raises important questions about whether we should embrace a genuine pluralism about Buddhist ethics. Leaving this question open, there are several positive and less controversial conclusions one could draw. A potentially positive outcome is that Buddhist consequentialism and Buddhist virtue ethics provide two distinct routes for a defender of naturalized karma to justify practices of ascribing moral responsibility and the various evaluative components of their proposed mechanism for character development. These practices or components can be justified relative to their instrumental role in eliminating suffering and producing overall well-being, or to their constitutive role in reinforcing and regulating an overall good way of living (both individually and socially) that is inconsistent with pervasive suffering. As a result, they provide more grounds for potentially fruitful cross-cultural exchange.

1.7 Conclusion

The Buddha’s teachings of the Four Noble Truths contain several distinctive ideas that are relevant to contemporary discussions of moral psychology. This chapter has focused on debates concerning whether the Buddha’s teaching of no-self is consistent with the possibility of moral responsibility; the role of retributivism in Buddhist thought; the possibility of a Buddhist account of free will; the scope and viability of recent attempts to naturalize karma to character virtues and vices; and whether and how right action is to be understood within a Buddhist framework. The discussion was not exhaustive; Buddhism contains many more themes that are relevant to moral psychology than discussed here, and there is more to be said about those that were discussed. This chapter had a more focused aim: to introduce and explore some of the more distinctive features of Buddhist moral philosophy, in the hope of inspiring further inquiry.

Acknowledgements

Many thanks to Tom Tillemans for informal discussion of the philological background, and to Manuel Vargas and an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments.

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As will become apparent, there is considerable debate about the nature and entailment of this claim.

The Buddha accepted a cosmology of six realms: two heavenly realms, a human realm, a realm of animals, a realm of hungry ghosts, and a realm of hell beings. The Buddha considered each realm to be impermanent and each mode of being to have its faults and limitations. Those born in the heavenly realms, for example, are considered to experience progressively subtle states of meditative calm, but these experiences are obscured by mental defilements, such as pride. The behavioural expression of these defilements accrues karmic demerit and eventually leads to a lower rebirth. See Harvey (2000 : 11–14)

The italicized words in this chapter are in Sanskrit. This chapter will cite concepts discussed in both Pāli and Sanskrit texts, but will only cite the Sanskrit.

I say ‘some’ because Buddhism recognizes other forms of causation and does not explain all possible happenings in terms of karmic causation.

Buddhism is accused of nihilism on several grounds. One ground refers to the Buddhist rejection of Brahmanical conceptions of God (See Patil 2009 ). Another ground refers to a certain understanding of the Madhyamaka Buddhist idea of emptiness ( śūnyatā , see Huntington 1995 ). This article focuses on moral grounds for this charge.

For a succinct formulation of this teaching, see the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta in the Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha (1995) .

This disjunction in thinking of nirvāṇa as a resulting state or way of life informs some contemporary debate about whether Buddhist thought is best reconstructed (if at all) as a form of consequentialism or virtue ethics. I will return to this point.

Although I will use these doxographical distinctions in this chapter, they are in fact not so neatly drawn and are to be treated as broad heuristics. They are useful because debates amongst proponents of these schools often turned on broadly accepted points of difference. But, as is often the case in Western philosophy, how to characterize these differences was a matter of dispute. Distinct philosophical schools also had different points of emphasis (some metaphysical, some epistemological, some phenomenological) which sometimes led to misattribution and misclassification. Prominent defenders of some schools were also prominent defenders of others. And some attempts to clarify the positions of distinct schools led to subclassifications which themselves were fiercely contested. For a general introduction to the philosophical grounds on which these Buddhist schools tend to be distinguished, see Siderits (2007) , Carpenter (2014) , and Westerhoff (2018) .

I introduce this three-part strategy as an organizing device for the sake of clarity rather than to describe an accepted methodology. Historical Buddhist philosophers did not identify or claim to adhere to this strategy, but many of their arguments can be analyzed in terms of it.

There is scholarly discussion of the precise nature of these token elements. Siderits (1997) and Ganeri (2001) argue that they are best understood as trope-like property particulars. There is also some contemporary debate about how these five types of such token elements are best rendered in English. See Davis and Thompson (2014) and Ganeri (2017) for two competing recent accounts.

The interpretative range of the relevant term, cetanā , is broad and more inclusive than the notions of intention, decision and will (which are, themselves, importantly distinct). I will return to this.

The Simile of the Chariot (Rhys-David trans. 1965: 34-38) arguably provides an early example of strategic move (3).

According to tradition, the early Buddhist community subdivided into eighteen distinct Abhidharma schools and lineages, partly in response to doctrinal disputes about how best to interpret the Buddha’s teaching (disputes also concerned which rules of conduct monks should follow). The most prominent of these Abhidharma schools were the Theravāda, Sarvāstivāda, Mahāsaṃghika, Pudgalavāda, and Sautrāntika ( Westerhoff 2018 ). The contemporary category of ‘Abhidharma Buddhism’ encompasses this variety of viewpoints (and brings with it all the tensions involved in combining competing views). See also Ronkin ( 2005 ; 2018 ).

The most prominent contemporary defender of (at least some aspects of) this reductive analysis of persons is Siderits (2003) , who compares it favourably with the reductive analysis of persons defended by Parfit (1984) .

While this is clear in the case of Madhyamaka, it is less so in the case of Yogācāra because the most prominent defenders of Sautrāntika Abhidharma (e.g. Vasubandhu and Dharmakīrti) are also the most prominent defenders of Yogācāra. This raises complicated issues about how these views are related; whether their advocates changed their minds, whether the textual evidence combines the views of separate authors, whether they imply a philosophical progression of insights, or whether these views are compatible or continuous in some philosophically interesting way.

See also Cowherds (2011) for a sustained discussion of the Madhyamaka conception of conventional truth.

Some contemporary scholars argue against this traditional reading and insist that Yogācāra is better understood as some form of phenomenology. This is controversial but influential. See Lusthaus (2002) for its most prominent defence.

Some contest the claim that the Buddha denied the existence of self, arguing that this denial was introduced by later Buddhist scholastics. Supposed evidence is derived from the fact that the Buddha used the terms ‘self’ ( ātman ) and ‘action’ ( karma ) and remained silent in the Vacchagottasutta when directly asked whether the self exists. This is a minority view. Most historical and contemporary Buddhist philosophers consider the Buddha’s analysis of persons to be exhaustive, to render meaningless talk of substantial enduring selves, and that a proper understanding of the two-truth doctrine adequately explains the Buddha’s use of these terms. Gethin (1998 : 160) also convincingly contextualizes the Buddha’s silence in the Vacchagottasutta as relative to his desire not to confuse his interlocutor rather than reflecting a general agnosticism.

See e.g. Schlick (1939) , Dennett (1984) , Arneson (2003) , McGeer ( 2013 ; 2015 ), and Vargas (2013 , this volume ). Vargas argues that there are ways to appeal to forward-looking views of assigning and accepting moral responsibility that allow for some backward-looking retributive judgments within the practice. If plausible, this might accommodate some of the retributive dimensions of karma that would be otherwise lost in a naturalized karma.

Breyer also claims that in order to most effectively enable successful practice, each practitioner should regard herself as fully responsible for her choices, but others as not responsible. Goodman (2017) suggests a modification whereby we (ordinary, unenlightened folk) should hold ourselves but not others responsible for immoral actions, and others but not ourselves responsible for moral actions. Whether this asymmetry consistently coheres with other socially justified notions of justice is an open question.

They include the Vinaya Piṭaka of the Theravāda (followed in Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, Sri Lanka, and Thailand), the Dharmaguptaka (followed in China, Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam), and the Mūlasarvāstivāda (followed in Tibet, Bhutan, Mongolia, Nepal, and Ladakh). Historically, they also included the Mahāsaṃghika , Mahīśāsaka , and Sarvāstivāda Piṭakas. See Keown (2004) .

The Buddha did, however, place some constraints on the practice. See Finnigan (2017c : 8).

Good examples are Clayton (2006) and Goodman (2009) , who reconstruct the moral thought of Śāntideva.

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Gandhi on Caturvarṇa and Niṣkāma Karma: A Re-interpretation

Enakshi ray mitra.

1 Department of Philosophy, University of Delhi, Delhi, 110007 India

2 New Delhi, India

Gandhi’s writings on the issue of Caturvarṇa, despite their apparent lacunas, dogmatic tones and seeming inconsistencies, are available to a convincing reconstruction. With this purpose in view, the first section of this paper will attempt to give an anti-foundational reading of Caturvarṇa—where varṇa is seen to be based neither on the different proportions of the three guṇas (sattva, rajas and tamas), nor on a system of hereditary professions, but as abstract dimensions that are not mutually exclusive—and at best serves to give an orientation to our cognition and actions. This reading, while borrowing heavily from Shri Aurobindo’s reading of Caturvarṇa, will seek to give it a more neutral and expansive direction, shorn of all associated suggestions of intransigence and empirical contingencies, in order to effect the best possible synthesis with Gandhi. The second section of this paper will concentrate on appropriate portions of Gandhi’s commentary on Gῑtā , trying to track down Gandhi’s reservations against any psychological determinism with respect to varṇa. His direct but scattered observations on varṇa and caste will be addressed in the last section—to see how far our neutral reading of Caturvarṇa can be responsibly reconciled with his distinction between varṇa and caste—indicating a way to dissolve the Gandhi-Ambedkar debate on varṇabheda and jātibheda. Overall, this paper attempts a paradigmatic reconstruction of Gandhian Caturvarṇa in the light of his approach to the notion of niṣkāma karma.

Setting the Need for an Anti-foundational Reading of Caturvarṇa

We all know that the caste system as it is practised in India is a distortion of the original principle of Caturvarṇa formulated in the Gῑtā and Vedas. 1 In order to understand the process of distortion, we have to address a well-known symbolic imagery (figuring in the Ŗgveda) associated with the Caturvarṇa, and also a psychological theory of four personality types constituted by a specific proportion of triguṇas, viz. sattva, rajas and tamas. Both the imagery and the psychological theory will be ultimately displaced by a more neutral and anti-foundational reading of Caturvarṇa, where the four varṇas turn out to be the four ethical directions or dimensions of carrying out our cognition and actions. Being four aspects or dimensions of the same content or locus—they will turn out to be not mutually exclusive. Thus, the same human character may have one aspect or direction as more pronounced than the others. In other words, each of these so-called varṇas constitutes a personality type or svabhāva, each type is a marked disposition that is rightfully allowed to follow its own action or svadharma.

Hopefully, there will be no psychological determinism here—rather the criterion of morality is to facilitate the marked aspects or dispositions of one’s character and to navigate them to their fullest efficacy, which in the long run turns out to be the deliverance of niṣkāma karma. Thus, ideally speaking, what the society is grounded on are the personality types or svabhāva—which are constituted by specific aspects or orientations of the triguṇas—which in their turn are articulated by the criterion of morality.

After a brief recount of the well-known imagery of Caturvarṇa, we shall pass over to a concise narration of the tripartite guṇa–karma basis of Caturvarṇa in the Gῑtā line—which also happens to be in consonance with the Yogasūtras. 2 Some basic problems in this traditional guṇa–karma basis of varṇa will ultimately take us to a conceptual or paradigmatic reading of this issue in the style of Aurobindo.

Imagery of Caturvarṇa

The symbol of Caturvarṇa mentioned above was captured in the Puruṣasukta of Ṛgveda where we find an imagery of a Universal Spirit producing four orders or types of men. An English rendition of this Ṛk would be roughly as follows:

His head was the Brāhmaṇa; of His arms Rājanya (Kṣatriya) was made; then His thighs were the Vaiśyas; of His feet were born the Śudra. 3

Triguṇa and Karma: Psychological Basis of Caturvarṇa

Karma as conceived in the Gῑtā broadly stands not only for voluntary actions, but covers the harmonious function of a living and cognizing organism, where the life-breath (prāṇa), the sensory and the motor organs, the mind, ego and buddhi—all cohere in the growth, reproduction and preservation of the human body. ( Gῑtā III.5) 4 In so far as a Yogi can intentionally stop his life-sustaining activities like respiration, digestion, blood circulation, etc., they too are deemed to have a volitional character and hence termed as ‘karma’. Any cognition or volition leaves its subtle impression (saṁskāra) on the subconscious mind stuff (citta) and is enlivened on appropriate occasions. Saṁskāras are like sediments underlying explicit cognitions and volitions—in a manner that every action and cognition scoops up a handful of clay from a pot—which again settles down as a new layer on the old sediments. The word ‘triguṇaiḥ’ in the above-mentioned verse clearly suggests that according to Gῑtā , it is an interplay of the three guṇas—viz. sattva, rajas and tamas—that direct all actions. For this saṁskāra theory, it is the continuous generation and revocation of saṁskāras that make our cognitions and engagements smooth and unhindered.

Let us understand how exactly the personality types are created in accordance with the three different directions and dispositions of the guṇas. A guṇa is a universal mould of our karmaśakti, the latter being the power with which our sense organs and motor organs are equipped for coping with the environment. One disposition of this karmaśakti that maintains the reciprocal balance of several qualities in an even equilibrium through the means of intellection is termed as the sattva guṇa. The rajas helps navigating the karmaśakti, whereas tamas is the term for our inertial tendencies marked by deficient intelligence. All characters are composed of these three guṇas, one or other of which gets primacy over others in some stage of our life.

The primacy of sattva (in maintaining a balance between the three guṇas) is marked by a tendency to bypass the exuberance of external facts and incidents to withdraw into the theoretical or general principles that bind the former. A sāttvik personality accords importance to the empirical richness of data only to the extent to which he can derive the general principles underlying the superficial variety of incidents. If a sāttvik personality is also marked by an appreciable presence of rajas, he will be equipped with the physical prowess and pragmatic skills to apply the abstract principles of knowledge and ethics to the concrete situations—fighting effectively against conflicts and opposition. But an untempered intensity of rajas amounts to an attitude of unqualified egotism, which naturally erupts in such activities as killing, conquering, selfish consumption at the cost of others. Such personalities, only if channelized in the sāttvik direction, can attain spiritual control, spiritual bliss and power. On the other hand, a tāmasik personality yields inertly to the pressures of the external world, without making any effort to resist or recast the imposing barrage of sensory stimulations into a constructive direction. An unqualified concentration of tamas cannot possibly be turned into a balanced synthesis of the three guṇas,—for a minimal presence of the sattva and rajas would at most enable him to assimilate the minimal character of the sensory stimuli—sufficient for his basic survival—not adequate for the assimilation of principles and laws of a higher level of generality.

Further sattva is held to produce pleasure, rajas pain and tamas indifference—which shows that varṇabheda is not only due to guṇabheda but to karmabheda as well. To speak at a more concrete level, the karmas of a Brāhmana are yājana, yajāna, adhyayana and adhyāpanā, while those of the Kṣatriya are the protection of people from external and internal disturbances; Vaiśyas should engage in commerce and agriculture, while the duties of the Śudras are to render service to the upper varṇas. 5

Thus, the tripartite division of personalities is constituted by a tripartite division of guṇa–karma configuration. In more specific terms the specific pattern of the three guṇas for each person constitutes his svadharma. Subbannachar 6 has charted out the three guṇas with respect to the pattern of their possible intermixtures.

Thus, this interpretation enables us to come out at least from the old imagery or the physical symbol of the Ŗgveda and reconceive Caturvarṇa—not as determined by the professions inherited by one’s forefathers, but rather by the psychological principle of one’s svadharma. It is this svadharma that constructs the moral criterion of spiritual elevation.

Theory of Saṁskāras and Its Role in Determining Varṇa

The Yogasūtras 7 speak of two kinds of saṁskāras—(1) smr̩tiphala or vāsanā and (2) trivipāka. Vāsanā or desire is again of three kinds—the desire(unconscious) for jāti (birth), desire for āyu (life span) and desire for bhoga (pleasure and pain)—all of which are characteristically passive, for they can simply reproduce themselves in memory—they cannot produce a new construction. Once the raw elemental force of our sensory and motor organs falls into the three moulds of vāsanās or desires, what we have is the creative functioning of trivipāka, that being directly attached with the powers of our sensory and motor organs leads to volition (ceṣṭā), subsequently bringing relevant changes in our instruments or organs themselves. In fine vāsanas produce the path through which the trivipāka geared to the instrumental powers can navigate to produce further actions and further saṁskāras—not in the present birth, but in the subsequent ones.

The Yogasūtras with which the precepts of Gῑtā on the principal issues of triguṇas, karma and saṁskāras match roughly speak of two types of karmas—puruṣakāra and bhogabhūta. The latter kind comprises those actions where the agent’s will is overpowered by the functioning of his sensory and motor organs—for instance, the activities of digestion, respiration, falling down on the ground, being physically compelled to do something, habitual and impulsive actions. These actions are determined by past saṁskāras and external forces. Puruṣakāra on the other hand are voluntary action in the true sense of the term that characteristically resist sāṁskārik impulsions. Karmas once performed have already generated a repertoire of saṁskāras which in their turn must produce their respective phalas (consequences)—phalas which the agent must suffer—irrevocably, inviolably. If one habitually takes to stealing or frequently gives vent to uncouth passions, these actions will produce their respective saṃskāras that will go on producing further consequences, unless the very nature and direction of those saṃskāras (caura-saṃskāras and krodha saṁskāras 8 ) are reflected upon and steered to a new channel. It is only then that the new trend of saṁskāras (acaura- and akrodha saṁskāras) will start producing a different set of effects, but not before the previous caura and krodha saṁskāras have run the full track of their production. Thus, it turns out that the Indian psychology admits two levels—the first level where actions and cognitions are caught into a deterministic law of causation, and the second level where the human mind can perform an operation with the saṁskāras themselves to channelize them into a different direction.

The content of the verses of Gῑtā III 33–43 roughly matches with the above theory of the Yoga. Let us paraphrase Gandhi’s rendition of verse 37 and 41–43. Lust and anger, kāma and krodha are the ‘two great energies of man [that] drive him to sin’. When man realizes God, ‘his mind will be under His control, not swayed by the sense’. Gandhi further explicates that ‘Controlling the self by the Self’ (saṁstabhya’tmānam ātmanā—verse 43) means ‘overpowering the demoniac impulses in the mind through the Atman, that is through the Godward impulses’.

It is argued that the nature of a jῑva is an outcome of two factors—the one is the saṁskāra of the previous birth and the other is the environmental factors arising out of education and good association in the present birth. That the human nature changes due to the complex intermixture of these two factors is clearly registered in Gῑtā where it enjoins that if the Brāhmaṇic characteristics like Śama, dama, etc., are found in varṇas other individuals than the Brāhmaṇas then they are to be deemed as Brāhmaṇas as well. Many scholars are of the opinion that the so-called varṇabheda cannot be traced in the Vedic era. Ŗgveda contains unambiguous statements about the same family members engaging in different activities. ‘Look here, I am a strotrakāra, my son is a medical practitioner, i.e. vaidya, and my daughter is a yababharjanakāri, i.e. a cook. One can find similar ideas in Aitereya, Chāndogya and Śatapathabrāhmaṇa. It is to be further noted that in Śatapathābrāhmaṇa as well as in Taittirῑya there is no mention of the Śūdras—clearly showing that the notion of Śūdras was contrived and introduced later in the social mainstream. 9

At this juncture the guṇa–karma theory of varṇa gets challenged by the following two options. The first is the aposteriori thesis that we are born first and then acquire the guṇa and karma through the course of our present life, the second is the apriori thesis that we are born with the saṁskāras of the respective varṇas. 10 The Gῑtā theory as well as the Yogasūtras—with their rigourous distinctions between two types of saṁskāras and karmas—with their substantial ontology of trivipāka and bhogabhūta karmas—clearly upholds the apriori theory. It is indeed a common empirical fact that we see people change their karmas and guṇas at different stages of their life—sometimes quite radically and dramatically, but never in an abrupt or sporadic fashion that would give the impression of a total chaos or disorder—where everything follows from everything, and hence nothing follows from anything. This consideration apparently lends a strong support to the apriori theory of the guna–karma vibhāga of Caturvarṇa. On this theory, every action or cognition (in so far as it falls under the category of the bhogabhūta karma) is caused by, and itself gives rise to, an appropriate saṁskāra—thus producing an infinite stretch of sedimentation that runs through the entire series of births and rebirths. However, the theory of Puruṣakāra has to allow that a person has the ability to negotiate with his pre-given saṁskāras and to recast them to create a new flow. Otherwise if the nature and extent to which the saṁskāras can be moulded are already inscribed in the pre-given saṁskāras, then the very notion of Puruṣakāra as well as the promise of freedom from an apriori sediment will turn out to be a hoax. Indeed, when the Shastras enjoin specific duties to specific varṇas with a moral predicate of ‘should’, it virtually negates a psychological determinism and commits itself to the possibility of outgrowing these varṇic norms.

Defects in the Tripartite Guṇa–Karma Basis of Caturvarṇa

First, it seeks to ensure that no action or cognition occurs without a sāṁskārik base; otherwise, it would be a random occurrence magically shooting off in a vacuum—which cannot meaningfully be ascribed to the relevant subject as his action or his cognition and nobody else’s. But how would then a puru ṣ akara that modifies the saṁskāras themselves take place—without having its base in the previous saṁskāras? The problematic character of being inauthentic and agentless will detract the puru ṣ akaras from their crucial role in moral philosophy. Secondly, since vāsanas and trivipāka are by definition unconscious, the talk of the present action or cognition reviving a similar saṁskāra does not make sense. The purported similarity has to be judged by the subject and the agent—and for this both the items of the similarity relation—viz. the present action as well as the past saṁskāra has to be ( per impossibile ) consciously present to the subject—a crucial requirement that cannot be satisfied by the saṁskāra theory. An unrecognized similarity floating in the air and hauling up the relevant saṁskāra does not have any explanatory weight. Overall, the picture of each person being born with a semi-solid sediment of saṁskāras, having a definite proportion of the three guṇas, with a parallel meta-level capability of modifying this sāṁskārik fluid seems to be a problematic piece of ontology. In this theory the guṇas do not figure as exclusive essences, but as specific categories of intermixtures with specific directions, and each type of intermixture constitutes a determinate type of personality. Instead of solid hard entities we have fluids or flows, but each flow is determined with respect to the exact nature and extent to which it flows. Thus, each of the varṇas now is reconstituted as a characteristic fluidity and this fluid-metaphysics cannot avoid the flaws of psychological determinism. 11

It is said that the course of Indian history took a perverse turn where the psychological as well as the moral principles of varṇavyavasthā got completely obscured. The conceptual or paradigmatic basis of the four personality types was forcefully contrived into some artificial sects of the society. What was presented in the Ŗgveda as simply an persuasive imagery or a metaphor underwent an unimaginative and literal degeneration. The Pundits and priests became the caricature of Brāhmaṇatva or sattva guṇa, the idle and despotic landowners came to represent rajas or Kṣatriyatva, the greedy merchants were equated with Vaiśyatva (a rajas–sattva synthesis), and lastly the half-fed labourers were reduced to Śūdratva or tamas. Now it needs to be noted that this very fact of the original ethical and religious principles of Caturvarṇa degenerating into perverse masks or caricatures is again due to the actions of men with specific personality types, where each type is constituted by a specific fluidity of the triguṇas. Thus, the psychological determinism embedded in the guṇa–karma basis of Caturvarṇa is fraught with multiple layers of inconsistencies.

Constructing an Anti-foundational Approach to Caturvarṇa

To avoid this determinism, we have to re interpret Caturvarṇa in a still different way, so that a varṇa or a personality type would not be identified with a pattern of fluidity. The four principles are now reformulated as A. Wisdom (Prajñā) or the knowledge of Ultimate Reality, B. Ultimate Power or Śakti, C. Harmony (Saṁhati) or the sustenance of various parts in a cohesive balance, and D. Work (Karma), i.e. achieving efficiency and completeness in labour. 12 The psychological determinism that marked the previous theory of varṇa should be revised to incorporate puruṣakāra that enables each individual to channelize his saṁskāras to new directions, without being encased in a pre-given network of saṁskāras, and without implicating two levels (a first level and a meta-level) of cognition and actions.

What is the exact flaw in equating a personality type with a specific pattern of flexibility of the guṇas? It is not that one guṇa penetrates into another, rather one supposedly fixed proportion of guṇas penetrates into another supposedly fixed proportion. In order to appreciate how one kind of fluidity penetrates into another kind of fluidity, one has to re-read the four new principles—Prajñā, Śakti, Saṁhati and Karma—as to how they blend intractably into each other. Pure intellection, even in the shape of a conscious and deliberate attempt to withdraw a theory from all possible applications is itself cast into an applicational mould, for a theory whose preliminary routes of application are not incorporated into the theory fails on both moral and intellectual grounds. It fails on moral grounds because the formulation of the theory is not motivated for the sake of knowledge, rather it is the egoistic passions that impel one to submerge the applicational flaws in his theory; it fails on intellectual grounds because a theory which does not incorporate the ceteris paribus clauses of application is failure as a theory itself, and this is not merely a peripheral defect pertaining to the sphere of application.

It is for this reason that the intrusion of Kṣatriyatva into Brāhmaṇatva is necessary, for Kṣatriyatva should be seen as the cognitive power (and not merely muscle power) and contextual sensitivities to implement theories in the face of all resistance and oppositions—whether they are offered by nature or man. Similarly, a person who is capable of increasing productivity should not be doing it for generating money for the sake of money, i.e. amassing a heap of papers or metals. Increasing money should be a symbol of increasing production and a due recognition of a person’s productivity. Similarly, love for work is not passive unimaginative labour or blind obedience, it needs to infuse innovative ideas into labour—thus bridging the gaps that often crop up between theory and practice. Looked at in this way, it connects directly to Kṣatriyatva, extending the general conception of the ceteris paribus clauses to their concrete implementation at the ground level. This is how the work of a technician and a labourer blends with that of a theoretician, this is how Karma blends with Prajñā and Śakti, and all are synthesized under the principle of Saṁhati.

Thus, the Caturvarṇas turn out to be four paradigms with no ontological correlates. A ruler used to measure length only functions through an active exercise of shoving out the unwanted excess of breadth, depth, colour and texture—of both the ruler and the measurable object—an exercise which does not draw anything from a supposedly immaculate length of the ruler.

If we turn back to the original imagery of the Puru ṣ a whose limbs generated the four varṇas, one can see that the four organs of the Puru ṣ a are merely the four dimensions and directions of our cognition and actions. They are four ways of freeing ourselves from constraints—whether they are our passions and inclinations or the external impositions—and work solely through the principle of inner necessitation.

Aurobindo seems to wind up with his insistence that the fourfold powers have to be harmonized and integrated around the soul force or Ātman which surpasses the ego. Now we want to suggest some revisions of Aurobinda’s paradigm to give it a more neutral character so that Gandhi’s approach too can be reconciled with this reading. In this reading the significance of Caturvarṇa and the language of Caturvarṇa turns out to be is somewhat like this. On the one hand, the different varṇas become different paradigms—one is to discard breadth to focus on length, the other is to discard length in favour of breadth, still another is to discard both length and breadth and just to concentrate of the depth. On the other hand, there is an equally compelling demand of one paradigm penetrating into another. Ossifying the four paradigms of varṇa into real entities—real groups of humans—was a degenerative phase of Indian history; similarly, deliberate nullification of paradigms amounts to the perverse practice of using elastic rulers for measurement, or contriving water drops or gas waves as units of counting. On the one hand, there is an unavoidable need for knowledge to recoil into itself, to the extent to resisting the exuberance of empirical data assuming the shape of being the primary objective; on the other hand, both the demand of mere intellectual harmony empty of content and the rhetoric of servility or unquestioning obedience (taking the garb of pure sattva and pure tamas, respectively) should be resisted from being ends in themselves. The exact nature and extent to which the four paradigms should allow and resist interpenetration cannot be decided by external constraint — be it the psychology of impulsion or the logic of utility — but should be motivated by inner necessitation or the principle of niṣkāma karma .

Reading Gandhi’s Commentary of Gῑtā 13 : In View of the Paradigmatic Principle of Caturvarṇa

Browsing through Gandhi’s commentary on Gῑtā —with respect to certain selected portion—can enable one to effectively reconcile his view of varṇa with our paradigmatic reading of the same. Gandhi elaborates IV 13—what is distinctive of a Brahmin is that he knows Brahman, and lives most in the consciousness of God, and imbibes the duty of helping people to realize God. Gandhi emphasizes that ‘[b]esides this particular gift, he will also have the qualities of character that mark the other varnas ’. And it is this context that Gandhi said that the śūdra’s special dharma is service, which he needs to combine with the spirit of yajña, or ‘the motive of public good’. Gandhi further comments: ‘If we regard the person who cleans lavatories as lower and another who reads the Gita as higher, that will be the end of us’. 14 Again in his interpretation of III 35 15 he observes that should a person settled in a particular profession—say a sweeper—allow himself to be drawn away from his duty to become an accountant he would himself be lost and put the community in danger. What needs to be noted is that Gandhi does not translate ‘svadharma’ as one’s ‘law’ or ‘psycho-physical make up’, 16 but renders it simply as ‘one’s duty’. He also observes that ‘before God the work of man will be judged by the spirit in which it is done, not by the nature of the work’. 17 The fact that he does not render the term as ‘one’s law’ suggests that he does not relate varṇa deterministically with a psycho-physical foundation that is given in birth.

We can take such observations as suggestive occasions to lay out the interesting connection between violating one’s svadharma and violating the principle of niṣkāma karma. It is often said that the frog which tries to blow himself up in order to grow as big as a bull explodes itself to death because the svadharma of a frog is to remain a frog. Milk may be better than water, but a fish that insists on living in milk will die. Sun is the source of energy that the earth gets, but we will not survive an attempt to leave the earth and be close to the source, because our svadharma is to live on earth. One may not believe in milk or fire as having unchanging essences, one may not believe in a metaphysical reality of space that encloses every object in an ethereal boundary, but these anti-metaphysical insights should not be stretched to the absurdity that one can bloat one’s frog size to that of a bull. This kind of fallacy is on the same footing with that of traversing space from one point to another without traversing the distance in between. That space qua an external container of objects is unreal, that every space is penetrated by every other, does not consist in magically bloating up the size; and ironically, bloating one size to any other loses sight of the inherent porosity of space and spatial boundaries. It labours under the false imagery of one spatial boundary increasing into another, and this inflammation does not operate by absorption of more and more space, but in magically spreading out the smaller-space container, within which the smaller body was supposed to be encased, into a larger container. Such efforts sway under the impression of putting more content into the container, so that the previous walls would recede to allow more volume within the container—all this happening in the spatial containment model. And such an unnaturally flawed operation cannot be motivated by the sake of duty, i.e. it cannot be performed in the niṣkāma style.

In all these contrived exercises of bloating sizes, ossifying or liquidizing paradigms, it is the immense load of our passions and desires that breaks up the immaculate oneness of space into fragments. Performing actions in a desireless way can only obtain when actions, intentions and consequences are absorbed into a smooth continuity, and this will not accommodate any invalid attempt to outgrow the natural course of one’s faculties, rather one should let one’s rule of action space out gradually into the intention, action and consequences. 18

This internal relation between action, intention and consequences is clearly seen in the principle of niṣkāma karma which enjoins us to abandon the external and contingent consequences (naimittik phalas) of an action, and never the natural or internal (svābhāvik) ones. The Yoga system as well as the Gῑtā theory of karma, saṁsk ā ra and karmaphalas take care to clarify that the irregular and external contingencies invariably associated with our actions are not the phalas in the strict sense of the term, it is only the internal and natural consequences that are to be considered to be the karmaphalas. The exact distinction between these two kinds of phalas can be explained by three examples. (1) A person’s scholarship leading to his cerebral excellence, (2) drinking water contaminated by a COVID-19-infected person due to the saṁskāras of ignorance (3) the action of planting a sapling giving rise to a feeling of pleasure and expectation. These are the natural or internal consequences of the actions or the relevant saṁskāras—while the consequences like getting a post of professorship in case of (1), or contracting COVID-19 disease in the case of (2) or the fruition of the plant in case of (3) are external contingencies. It is the ways we are affected by the external conditions (and not the conditions themselves—viz. those of having a social reputation, contracting COVID-19 disease, fruition of the plant, etc.) that constitute the natural consequences or phalas of an action.

The injunction of performing actions in a niṣkāma style should be understood in the light of the relevant distinction between natural (svābhāvik) phalas and accidental (naimittik) phalas of our actions. The negative particle ‘mā’ in Gῑtā II 47 19 connotes two kinds of negation. First, it makes a factual statement that the agents do not have any control (adhikāra) over the naimittik fruits. Secondly, it needs to be noted that the particle ‘mā’ cannot morally enjoin us to renounce the svābhāvik phalas—say the cerebral excellence generated by one’s scholarship, or the idea of the sown sapling budding in its due course. The natural consequences are conceptually embedded into the actions themselves, and hence, the injunction of renouncing them does not make sense. What the second meaning of ‘mā’ applies to is the moral injunction of renouncing the passionate excess of a craving (or repulsion) for the svābhāvik phalas—not renouncing the svābhāvik phalas themselves.

Gandhi’s translation and commentary of Gῑtā II 47 and 48 may be read as falling in with the distinction between the svābhāvik and naimittik phalas. When Gandhi says : ‘Let not thy motive be the fruit of the action’, when he says that ‘the reward of the work is entirely for Him to give’, Gandhi meant not the svābhāvik phalas that are blended with the very action, but the external and contingent consequences—the occurrence or non-occurrence of which are actually beyond our control. For Gandhi, performing a niṣkāma karma would involve the difficult feat of delinking the apparently svābhāvik phalas from the actions and reconceiving them as the naimittik one; and this involves displacing the latter from the realm of conscious intention and leave it to Nature or God. Giving away the naimittik fruits to God amounts to recasting what seems to be a consciously intended action into a reflex or spontaneous action. In our present example, getting a lucrative job (on the basis of scholarship) is not what can be consciously intended—it rather stands on the footing with reflex or spontaneous actions. If one thinks that the task of protecting our eyes with the lids is what he has consciously designed he has to reconceive that seemingly intentional action into a reflex action that falls within the realm of Nature or God. For Gandhi, giving away the external rewards of action to God is to realize one’s slender and spontaneous link with Him, and it is in this sense that the actions geared to merely the naimittik fruits are comparable with reflex actions. Gandhi’s commentary on II 48 also is an innovative recreation of the injunction not to give up the svābhāvik fruits, but to give up our attachments for it. ‘[W]e should not be attached even to a good cause. Only then will our means remain pure and our actions, too’.

We have to understand how the artificial distortion of varṇa paradigms misconceives naimittik phalas of an action as its svābhāvik ones, thus violating the principle of niṣkāma karma. The principle of Prajñā—say in the discipline of microbiology—evenly balances the theory with conceptual possibility of its application—without diluting the theoretical rigour for the sake of gaining the actual fruits of application. The principle of Śakti will articulate the difference between the purely conceptual possibility of application and the path of its actual applications, while the principle of Karma will turn the actual possibilities into concrete realities. All these paradigms of varṇa complement each other in a way that any of these attempting to outgrow the others results in importing foreign elements—virtually destroying the entire fourfold synthesis. Using the theory of microorganisms for manufacturing viruses (for destroying rival nations) is as much foreign to the discipline of virology as the external motivations of lust for power that triggers off this worst kind of extrapolation—i.e. the worst kind of sakāma conflation of the svābhāvik with the naimittik.

Gῑtā XVIII 41-44 does speak of the duties of Brāhmaṇa, Kṣatriya, Vaiśya and Śūdra—being distributed according to their innate qualifications (svabhāvaprabhāvair guṇair). Gandhi adopts the standard translation of śama and dama—as serenity and self-restraint, ‘tapas’ Gandhi translates as a procedure to keep body, speech and mind under control by hard discipline. Forgiveness he amplifies as wishing well, even for a person who may have hit us with a stone, straightforwardness he translates as having no impurity in one’s eyes. Here one may legitimately claim that having no impurity in one’s eyes is not to see the people under the lens of false categorization (of the fourfold sects)—and this for Gandhi is behaving decently. Knowledge and discriminative knowledge (‘jñānam, vijñānam’) Gandhi translates as knowledge based on experience and not bookish dry knowledge—which supports our ultimate reading of the Caturvarṇas as notional paradigms. Brāhmaṇatva is characterized by Gandhi as a theoretical or intellectual orientation to all phenomena, not overpowered by superficial empirical details. Faith in God (āstikya) is mentioned last among the list of the defining characteristics of a Brāhmaṇa. Serenity is calmness, equanimity, composure—which roughly stands for the quality of not being too elated nor too dejected due to external circumstances, thus keeping a balance of emotions. Gandhi explains that some qualities like serenity and self-discipline with a bad intent or selfish motives like winning prize competitions and wrestling matches fall back on the devotion to God to upgrade themselves as the defining characteristics of Brāhmaṇatva.

With respect to XVIII 43 Gandhi says that both a Brāhmaṇa and a Kṣatriya have to have the qualities like valour (śauryam), spiritedness (tejo), consistency (dhr̩ti), resourcefulness (dākṣyam), etc. This perhaps again shows that Gandhi did not believe in the triguṇavibhāga foundation of Caturvarṇa. Gandhi adds that in this way every individual should display in varying measures the qualities associated with all the castes. (Italics added) The word ‘should’ shows that a person’s character is not determined by a given structure of saṁskāras, otherwise the moral injunction to cultivate all the qualities associated with all the varṇas will not arise. However, Gandhi has added the qualifier, viz. ‘in varying measures’, and he also adds that a person will belong to a caste the virtues of which he possesses in predominant measures. This would hopefully support out adoption of the fourfold principles of Prajñā, Śakti, Saṁhati and Karma and their modes of mutual complementation.

The way we have sought to assimilate Brāhmaṇatva with Kṣatriyatva—in the model of the synthesis between Prajñā and Śakti—may not tally with certain marks of Kṣatriyatva, viz. ‘śauryam’, ‘tejo’, ‘yuddhe … apalayānam’, as demanded in XVIII 43. When Galileo yielded to the pressures of the church to make false confessions about his scientific discovery—this might be a violation of the marks of Kṣatriyatva—in so far as it is a glaring case of fleeing from battle. Hopefully Gandhi will argue that the machinations of a hostile society with vested interests for opposing the exploration of scientific laws of reality cannot be termed as a fair battle (nyāya yuddha), and from this perspective we can further insist that marks of Brāhmaṇatva or Prajñā— qua pure commitment to intellectual principles stands independent of muscle power or heroism that is patently supposed to withstand physical torment or even death for the sake of vindicating truth. 20

Gandhi’s Observations on Varṇa

The problem of eking out a comprehensive account from the bits and pieces of Gandhi’s writings—often seeming to be inconsistent, incoherent and dissipative—is mainly because his view of Caturvarṇa evolved through a long process of transition. Here we can selectively look at certain observations of Gandhi where he had discarded the caste system and the casteist version of varṇāśrama in most unambiguous terms. 21 By early 1930s, Gandhi had declared that caste was ‘a handicap on progress’ 22 and ‘a social evil’ 23 ’ and, by the 1940s he stated that it was ‘an anachronism’ 24 which ‘must go’.

Further he says: ‘The Ashram does not follow the varnashram dharma. Where those in control of the Ashram will take the place of the pupils’ parents and where lifelong vows of celibacy, non-hoarding, etc., are to be observed, varnashram dharma has no scope. The Ashram inmates will be in the stage of sanyasis and so it is not necessary for them to follow the rules of this dharma. Apart from this, the Ashram has a firm belief in the varnashram dharma’. 25 This observation adequately shows that Gandhi did not believe in a dogmatic equation of varṇa and parental professions, nor perhaps with a specific type of triguṇa proportion that comes in the shape of a psychological determinism. The ashrama inmates already have the training to perform actions in the niṣkāma model—through an inner determination free from external constraints of lust and greed, or pragmatic pressures and this equips them to see the Caturvarṇa in their dimensional character. While for Gandhi the obligation to follow the hereditary professions applies normally to people, in order to train their mind for the required paradigmatic reading of the varṇas, the ashrama inmates already cultivating the dimensional principle of Caturvarṇa are exonerated from that obligation.

From our preferred standpoint, we can again look back at Gandhi’s stand according to which untouchability itself is an artificial mask that thwarts the conceptual interpenetration of the four paradigms, thus stopping the moral principle of Caturvarṇa to operate. Actions patently become loaded with external factors like desire and vested interests of preserving untouchability—thus deviating from the ethical principle of niṣkāma karma.

There are many occasions where Gandhi speaks simultaneously of removal of untouchability, equality, and the freedom to take a profession of one’s choice—along with an injunction to adopt the profession of his forefathers. For instance, if we consider these reflections:

‘[A Shudra] may not be called a Brahman in this birth. And it is a good thing for him not to arrogate a varna to which he is not born. It is a sign of true humility. 26 ‘I do not believe the caste system…to be an “odious and vicious dogma.” It has its limitations and its defects, but there is nothing sinful about it…’ 27

Further: ‘The law of varna prescribes that a person should, for his living, follow the lawful occupation of his forefathers. I hold this to be a universal law governing the human family…’

But in the same passage he says: ‘No one is precluded from rendering multitudinous acts of voluntary service and qualifying [educating, training] oneself for it. Thus…[a person] born of Brahmin parents and I born of Vaisya parents may consistently…serve as honorary national volunteers or honorary nurses or honorary scavengers in times of need, though in obedience to that law…I as a Vaisya would be earning my bread by selling drugs or groceries. Everyone is free to render any useful service so long as he does not claim reward for it’. 28

Perhaps in the above excerpts Gandhi thought it obligatory to appreciate the sāttvik aspect of one’s forefathers’ profession and hence his injunction that everybody should follow his forefather’s profession in its sāttvik dimension would have a universalizable character required for it to be a moral rule. It is in this sense that Gandhi as a son of Vaiśya parents can legitimately adopt the profession of a national volunteer or that of a scavenger without taking any remuneration. And in the light of the entire trajectory of this paper—from a psychological reading to a paradigmatic rendition of Caturvarṇa—we can take Gandhi’s prescriptions about being humble about one’s being born in a Śūdra family as connoting a sensitivity to the principle of Work and associated values of expertise in labour.

Again he says: ‘I believe in varnashramadharma but I do not believe in castes. Varanashramadharma means that a man should find satisfaction in getting his livelihood from his ancestral occupation. 29 …I have devoted much thought to the subject of the caste system and come to the conclusion that Hindu society cannot dispense with it, that it lives on because of the discipline of caste. Societies all over the world are organized on the principle of caste or varnavyavastha . Our society was organized in this manner for the purpose of self-control, that is, for self-denial. … So long as there are among human beings impulses which tend to a godly life and those which tend to a demoniac life, so long will the division of society into communities remain. It is a vain effort to replace this structure by one single community’. 30 One can read these observations not in terms of strict triguṇa proportions amounting to a godly personality versus a demoniac personality, nor in terms of different personality types smoothly complementing each other to form a cohesive community. Gandhi’s reflections can only be adopted as a heuristic method—as a tentative tool or starting point to aid a non-foundational reading of these supposed psychological types.

To peruse through some more of his speculations: ‘It is likely that at the end of it we shall all find that there is nothing to fight against in varnashrama. If, however, varnashrama even then looks an ugly thing, the whole of Hindu society will fight it…’ 31 This clearly shows that Gandhi made a distinction between the psychological foundationalism and the paradigmatic reading of varṇāśrama—and ultimately abandoned the former in favour of the latter. The task of matching the reality of Indian society with the four categories was taken up by Gandhi as a programme, which as he clearly suggested, is to be discarded if facts do not meet the theory.

In April 1933, Gandhi declared on the basis of some authoritative texts that varṇa could not be perpetuated or determined merely by birth. He argues: ‘These and numerous other verses from the shastras unmistakeably show that mere birth counts for nothing’. 32 He could not accept, he said in 1934, that in his religion ‘there should be a single human being considered lower than myself’. 33 Besides more significantly Gandhi was conscious of hierarchies among dalits themselves. The scheduled castes, he said in 1937, ‘cannot be expected to appreciate and accept ex-cathedra usages that discriminate between savarṇas and avarṇas and between the different groups among the avarnas themselves, as these smack of invidiousness and offend against reason’. 34 His sensitivity about irrational character of the caste system shows that he was fully open to the purely notional or dimensional interpretation of the Caturvarṇa.

We know that Gandhi wanted to have undivided general elections for the untouchables and virulently opposed the latter to have a separate electorate. We can say that Gandhi’s ideal of merging the Dalits within the mainstream population may well be reconciled with the paradigmatic version of the Caturvarṇa that we have adopted. We may also add—though tentatively—that keeping a separate electorate for the Dalits may have looked like an artificial way to keep one personality trend or one dimension of measurement in strict segregation from the other—which in the long run will freeze the Dalits into a fixed identity, instead of liberating them from the latter.

Many eloquent and moving appeals were made by Gandhi against untouchability—when he said that if we do not incorporate the untouchables into the mainstream society the very notion of swaraj will turn out to be a vacuous one. ‘The advice I receive from one and all is that if I do not exclude the Antyajas [untouchables] from the national schools, the movement for swaraj [self-rule] will end in smoke. If I have even a little of the Vaishnava in me, God will also vouchsafe me the strength to reject the swaraj which may be won by abandoning the Antyajas’. 35 …it is equally necessary for us to give peace to the Panchama (untouchables) before we can with any show of justice or self respect talk of Swaraj….Hence for me the movement of swaraj is a movement of self-purification’. 36 Now what we have sought to argue in the first section is that the Caturvarṇas being conceptual dimensions or paradigms—they can neither be segregated nor merged forcefully—rather keeping a self-governed balance amongst them constitutes the very essence of niṣkāma karma. It is this niṣkāma karma that Gandhi is referring to by the term ‘self-purification’, and his demand of incorporating Dalits within the general population as amounting to an exercise of self-purification seems to be in accordance with this paradigmatic re-construal of the Caturvarṇa. If swaraj is freedom then it should be merged with the moral character of the four paradigms and there is no freedom without the emancipation of the Dalits. Freedom is the freedom from external constraint—like greed or utilitarian agendas—and hence the very notion of a separate class like Dalits is both morally repugnant and conceptually invalid—like the notion of pure length without breadth or depth and vice versa.

Gandhi further said—‘When I ask you to purify your hearts of untouchability, I ask of you nothing less than this—that you should believe in the fundamental unity and equality of man. I invite you all to forget that there are any distinctions of high and low among the children of one and the same God’. 37 Here Gandhi’s words are sensitive not only to the moral flaw of the purportedly fixed essence of each varṇa, but rather to the conceptual flaw in such categorizations. Perhaps Ambedkar’s demand for a separate electorate for the Dalits hurt Gandhi’s sense of the natural interpenetration of the four paradigms—which led him to make such extreme comments about the propriety of his own death—had Dr. Ambedkar taken up decided to go against the Poona Pact and punished the so-called caste Hindus for their ‘sins of generation’. 38

How to interpret Gandhi’s comments about himself suffering more as an untouchable since he was a convert to untouchability and not born into it? We have seen how the purely conceptual paradigms of Caturvarṇa degenerated into arbitrary sects assuming a philosophical mask. Perhaps Gandhi implied that discarding one fake mask—viz. that of a Vaiśya and putting on another fake identity of a Dalit confines him into a more alien form of oppression. This act of putting off one mask and wearing another may also be conceived as wearing mask of a mask—shadow of a shadow—being twice removed from reality and yielding to doubly intense form of intellectual and moral oppression.

Lastly Gandhi’s remarks about the issue of scavenging invite more detailed controversies. ‘In my humble opinion, the dirt that soils the scavenger is physical and can be easily removed. But there are those who have become soiled with untruth and hypocrisy, and this dirt is so subtle that it is very difficult to remove it. If there are any untouchables, they are the people who are filled with untruth and hypocrisy…’ 39 ‘Even if scavengers, potters and barbers are offered the fullest payment, they may or may not serve, as they please; they have a right to decide. If we, too, acknowledge this right of theirs, we shall have qualified ourselves for full swaraj’. 40 ‘ Scavenger , I employ that word in all its meaning. If the members would get out and lend a helping hand to clean up the city, literally and morally, they would be doing a great work’. 41 Further—‘If we had not despised professions which required one to use one’s hands and feet, we would not have fallen into this unhappy state and graduates would have felt no shame in working even as scavengers’. 42

In accordance with the dimensional model of Caturvarṇa that we have accepted, we can say that scavenging should be characterized by a synthesis of the three aspects of the guṇas—the sāttvik mark will consist in cognizing the principles of preserving ecology and environment, the rājasik aspect of scavenging implements them into sustained actions to harmonize theory and practice, whereas the last aspect of tamas would perhaps consist in a dedication to the gritty details of actual labour. It is the synthesis of the four dimensions in the act of scavenging that would render it into a noble profession. In all probability Gandhi did not call the so-called śūdras to practice scavenging, rather he had called on all individuals to be sensitive to the sāttvik, rājasik and tāmasik aspects of scavenging. If he had really insisted on a rightful imposition of the scavenging function on to the śūdras—it would have been the most scandalous and cruel joke, as Ambedkar remarked.

Concluding Remarks

Nauriya ( 2006 ) records that in 1945 Gandhi’s position against the Caturvarṇa became quite definitive and in a new forward to an old anthology in Gujrati where he explicitly asserted that all his older statements on Caturvarṇa that do not cohere with his latest observations are to be rejected. And he even says: ‘But there prevails only one varna today, that is of shudras, or you may call it, ati- ‘shudras’, or harijans or untouchables’. 43

One of his latest comments on varṇa came in February 1947 where he said that caste must go if Hinduism is to survive, and yet qualifying that ‘There was room for varna, as a duty’. According to him: ‘This was true of all religions whether the name used was other than varna. What was a Muslim ‘maulavi’ or a Christian priest but a brahmin if he taught his flock its true duty, not for money but because he possessed the gift of interpretation? And this was true of the other divisions’. 44 Here he seems to be upholding neither a hereditary categorization nor a psychological determinism—but merely certain pronounced dispositions in one’s character and personality which would motivate him to deliver the best performance in a desireless fashion for the sake of duty—unhindered by a false split between an action and its consequences.

Reading Gandhi’s view on varṇa in the paradigmatic mould is apparently nothing new—many stalwart commentators have taken Gandhi to have retained an idealized version of the varṇa system. 45 I have sought to add a new perspective to this trend of thought—viz. that one requires a systematic and rigourous critique of psychological determinism (constituted by definite proportions of triguṇas and corresponding store of saṁskāras) or any other foundational categorization, in order to sustain the idealized reading of the varṇa system. It is through a long and tortuous journey that Gandhi’s initial concessions to the principle of Caturvarṇa finally ended up with an unreserved dismissal of any kind of genetic or sāṁskārik pre-destiny. It is the entire history of his life and his nation that showed him how ethics—in the true sense of the term—has to break free from any metaphysical, psychological or utilitarian impositions.

1 For writing this section, I am chiefly indebted to Basu ( 1995 ) I have been guided by this paper to draw the essential points of Aurobindo’s theory from Ghosh ( 1997a ) Chapters I, XI and XIII; ( 1997b ) Chapters VIII, XIV, XVIII, XIX, XIX, XX; and ( 1999 ) Chapter III.

2 I have used Venkateshananda ( 2001 ) for his translation and commentary of Patanjali’s Yoga Sūtras.

3 For the original couplet, see Web: www.sanskritweb.net/rigveda/rv10-086.pdf .

4 I am specially indebted to Aranya ( 1369 (Bangabda)) for writing the account of saṁskāras, karma and karmaphala. The account ultimately falls back on the Yogasūtras—and the relevant insights about this psychological theory are scattered all over the body of the sūtras. However, specific details about different kinds of saṁskaras, memory and karmaphala can be tracked down in Chapter II, verses 12–15, Chapter IV 8–10, while more generic inputs figure in Chapter I, verses 6, 11, 18, 19, 34, 43, 50. (See footnote 2).

5 See Chakrabarti ( 2010 ) pp. 36–37.

6 Subbannachar ( 1966 ). (Table 9, pp. 259 & 323), also cited in Basu ( 1995 ) endnote 14.

7 See footnote 4.

8 These phrases can be translated, respectively, as 'cleptomaniac and wrathful dispositions'.

9 See Chattopadhyay ( 1401 (Bangabda)) specially p 703, and also Chakrabarti ( 2010 ) for other such details.

10 See Chakrabarti ( 2010 ) for constructing these two options, as for other relevant points of defence as well.

11 See Mitra ( 2014 ) for a more detailed account of the theory of karma and samskāras and its flaws, pp. 62–67.

12 Insights about these four principles can be related to Kapali Sastry ( 1948 ), pp. 95, 98–99. Also cited in Basu ( 1995 ).

13 Strohmeirer (Ed.) ( 2009 ) All references to Gῑtā have been marked as the verse number in decimal notation preceded by the chapter number in Roman letters.

14 Ibid , pp. 59–60.

15 Śre y ān sva-dharmo viguṇaḥ para-dharmāt svanuṣțhitāt/svadharme nidhanaṁ śreya para-dharmo bhayāvahaḥ’. I have used Radhakrishnan ( 1949 ) for citing original verses from Gῑtā .

16 This is how Radhakrishnan renders the crucial term ‘svadharma’. See Radhakrishnan ( 1949 ) pp. 146–147.

17 Strohmeirer, J (Ed), pp. 50, 51.

18 See Mitra ( 2014 ) for an elaboration of this point.

19 Karmaṇy eva’dhikāras te/mā phaleṣu kadācana/mā karmaphalahetur bhur/mā te saṅgo’stv akarmaṇi.

20 In this respect one can remember Galileo’s pertinent observation, when he was admonished by his student Andrea, for making false confessions before the clergymen to save his own skin. When Andrea swore: ‘Unhappy the land that has no heroes’, Galileo replied: ‘No, Unhappy the land that is in need of heroes’. See Brecht, B. (1939), Life of Galileo .

21 For this I heavily rely on Nauriya ( 2006 ).

22 Gandhi ( 2015 ) Young India, 4-6-1931.

23 Ibid, Advance , 15-10-1932.

24 Ibid, Varnavyavastha , pp. 13–14.

25 Ibid, VARNASHRAM, p. 456.

26 Ibid, VOL. 40: 2 SEPTEMBER, 1927—1 DECEMBER, 1927, p. 484.

27 Ibid , VOL. 59: 13 JANUARY, 1933—9 MARCH, 1933, p.228.

28 Ibid , VOL. 40: 2 SEPTEMBER, 1927—1 DECEMBER, 1927, pp. 384, 385.

29 Ibid , VOL. 15: 21 MAY, 1915—31 AUGUST, 1917. P. 79.

30 Ibid, Vol. 15: 21 MAY, 1915—31 AUGUST, 1917, pp. 226–227.

31 Quoted in Nauria ( 2006 ), p. 1835.

33 Ibid, p. 1836.

35 Gandhi ( 2015 ) VOL. 22: 23 NOVEMBER, 1920—5 APRIL, 1921, p. 57.

36 Ibid, Young India, 12-6-1924, p. 138.

37 Ibid , Harijan, 16-2-1934, p. 146.

38 Ibid , VOL. 57: 5 SEPTEMBER, 1932—15 NOVEMBER, 1932, p. 123.

39 Ibid, VOL. 16: 1 SEPTEMBER, 1917—23 APRIL, 1918, p. 138.

40 Ibid , VOL.17: 26 APRIL, 1918 - APRIL, 1919, p. 30.

41 Ibid , quoted from Young India , 25-2-1920, p. 336.

42 Ibid , VOL. 19: 29 SEPTEMBER, 1919—24 MARCH, 1920, p. 105.

43 Nauria ( 2006 ), p. 1837.

45 For instance, Singh ( 2014 ), has presented a comparative analysis of the commentaries of Thomas Pantham, Ramchandra Guha and Partha Chatterjee - where Gandhi’s idealistic approach to Caturvarṇa has been differently deployed to settle (or unsettle) the Gandhi-Ambedkar debate. However, their idealistic reading has a focus different from the agenda of this paper.

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Home > Theses and Dissertations > 3163

Theses and Dissertations

The moderating role of karma in the relationship between other-gain vs. self-gain appeal frames and charitable giving.

Katina Kulow , University of South Carolina - Columbia Follow

Date of Award

Document type.

Open Access Dissertation

Moore School of Business

First Advisor

Thomas Kramer

This dissertation examines the impact of strength of karmic beliefs, operating as a peculiar belief, on the relationship between appeals framed as other-gains vs. self-gains and charitable giving. Across seven studies, the present research shows that while there is positive relationship between karma and prosocial behavior, stronger karmic beliefs result in greater donation intentions only when appeals are framed as other-(vs. self-) gains. More specifically, this research shows that when charitable appeals are framed as other-gains, either by highlighting other-benefits, minimizing gender identity salience, not offering incentives or offering only other-incentives conditional upon donation, individuals with strong (vs. weak) beliefs in karma express greater donation intentions. This interactive effect of karma and appeal frame on charitable giving is driven by the potential donors’ focus with respect to their donation, which is influenced by the framing of appeals. Further, a boundary condition of donation type is identified, such that these effects occur for donations of time, but not for donations of money. Lastly, a boundary condition of perceived social distance of the charity’s recipients is identified, such that individuals with strong (vs. weak) karmic beliefs donate more when appeals are framed as other-gains only when the perceived recipients of the charity are at a far social distance. These findings provide implications for the prosocial behavior and peculiar beliefs literatures, in addition to managerial implications for charities.

© 2015, Katina Kulow

Recommended Citation

Kulow, K.(2015). The Moderating Role of Karma in the Relationship Between Other-Gain vs. Self-Gain Appeal Frames and Charitable Giving. (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd/3163

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Graduate Thesis Or Dissertation

Karma as an "apparatus": the etiology of non-normative sexualities in classical āyurveda public deposited.

• This thesis examines the Hindu notion of karma as an etiological factor in the development of individuals of non-normative sexualities in classical Indian medicine. Sweet and Zwilling (1993) argue that Foucault was mistaken in arguing that the notion of homosexuals as a distinct "species" of human being originated in the nineteenth century West, locating a similar phenomenon in Ayurvedic texts penned two millennia earlier. Here, I suggest that their analysis overlooks the critical etiological factor of karma, and that to understand the formation of sexualized subjectivity in an early Indian context we may productively use Giorgio Agamben's discussion of the Foucaultian "apparatus." The notion of karma, of circumstance linked to one's past deeds and past lives, is itself an apparatus. Further, I propose that medicalization arises from an ontological issue key to our understanding of karma as an apparatus in the formation of subjectivity as articulated in early Indian medical texts.
• Brooks, Lisa Allette
• Religious Studies
• Biernacki, Loriliai
• Jan, Najeeb
• Johnson, Greg
• University of Colorado Boulder
• parental karma
• Masters Thesis
• In Copyright
• English [eng]

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Buddhism and Karma

Introduction to the Buddhist Understanding of Karma

Ganymede Photography/Getty Images

• Origins and Developments
• Figures and Texts
• Becoming A Buddhist
• Tibetan and Vajrayana Buddhism
• B.J., Journalism, University of Missouri

Karma is a word everyone knows, yet few in the West understand what it means. Westerners too often think it means "fate" or is some kind of cosmic justice system. This is not a Buddhist understanding of karma, however.

Karma is a Sanskrit word that means "action." Sometimes you might see the Pali spelling, kamma , which means the same thing. In Buddhism, karma has a more specific meaning, which is volitional or willful action. Things we choose to do or say or think set karma into motion. The law of karma is therefore a law of cause and effect as defined in Buddhism . 

Sometimes Westerners use the word karma to mean the result of karma. For example, someone might say John lost his job because "that's his karma." However, as Buddhists use the word, karma is the action, not the result. The effects of karma are spoken of as the "fruits" or the "result" of karma.

Teachings on the laws of karma originated in Hinduism, but Buddhists understand karma somewhat differently from Hindus.  The historical Buddha lived 26 centuries ago in what are now Nepal and India, and on his quest for enlightenment he sought out Hindu teachers. However, the Buddha took what he learned from his teachers in some very new and different directions.

The Liberating Potential of Karma

Theravada Buddhist teacher Thanissaro Bhikkhu explains some of these differences in this illuminating essay on karma . In the Buddha's day, most religions of India taught that karma operated in a simple straight line- past actions influence the present; present actions influence the future. But to Buddhists, karma is non-linear and complex. Karma, the Ven. Thanissaro Bhikku says, "acts in multiple feedback loops, with the present moment being shaped both by past and by present actions; present actions shape not only the future but also the present."

Thus, in Buddhism, although the past has some influence on the present, the present also is shaped by the actions of the present. Walpola Rahula explained in What the Buddha Taught (Grove Press, 1959, 1974) why this is significant:

"...instead of promoting resigned powerlessness, the early Buddhist notion of karma focused on the liberating potential of what the mind is doing with every moment. Who you are — what you come from — is not anywhere near as important as the mind's motives for what it is doing right now. Even though the past may account for many of the inequalities we see in life, our measure as human beings is not the hand we've been dealt, for that hand can change at any moment. We take our own measure by how well we play the hand we've got."

What You Do Is What Happens to You

When we seem stuck in old, destructive patterns, it may not be the karma of the past that's causing us to be stuck. If we're stuck, it's more likely that we're re-creating the same old patterns with our present thoughts and attitudes. To change our karma and change our lives, we have to change our minds. Zen teacher John Daido Loori said, "Cause and effect are one thing. And what is that one thing? You. That’s why what you do and what happens to you are the same thing."

Certainly, the karma of the past impacts your present life, but change is always possible.

No Judge, No Justice

Buddhism also teaches that there are other forces besides karma that shape our lives. These include natural forces such as the changing seasons and gravity. When a natural disaster such as an earthquake strikes a community, this is not some kind of collective karmic punishment. It's an unfortunate event that requires a compassionate response, not judgment.

Some people have a hard time understanding karma is created by our own actions. Perhaps because they are raised with other religious models, they want to believe there is some kind of mysterious cosmic force directing karma, rewarding good people and punishing bad people. This is not the position of Buddhism. Buddhist scholar Walpola Rahula said,

"The theory of karma should not be confused with so-called 'moral justice' or 'reward and punishment'. The idea of moral justice, or reward and punishment, arises out of the conception of a supreme being, a God, who sits in judgment, who is a law-giver and who decides what is right and wrong. The term 'justice' is ambiguous and dangerous, and in its name more harm than good is done to humanity. The theory of karma is the theory of cause and effect, of action and reaction; it is a natural law, which has nothing to do with the idea of justice or reward and punishment."

The Good, the Bad and the Karma

Sometimes people talk about "good" and "bad" (or "evil") karma. Buddhist understanding of "good" and "evil" is somewhat different from the way Westerners usually understand these terms. To see the Buddhist perspective, it's useful to substitute the words "wholesome" and "unwholesome" for "good" and "evil." Wholesome actions spring from selfless compassion, loving-kindness and wisdom. Unwholesome actions spring from greed, hate, and ignorance. Some teachers use similar terms, such as "helpful and unhelpful," to convey this idea. 

• Karma and Rebirth

The way most people understand reincarnation is that a soul, or some autonomous essence of self, survives death and is reborn into a new body. In that case, it's easy to imagine the karma of a past life sticking to that self and being carried over to a new life. This is largely the position of Hindu philosophy, where it is believed that a discrete soul is reborn again and again. But Buddhist teachings are very different.

The Buddha taught a doctrine called anatman , or anatta — no soul, or no self. According to this doctrine, there is no "self" in the sense of a permanent, integral, autonomous being within an individual existence. What we think of as our self, our personality and ego, are temporary creations that do not survive death.

In light of this doctrine — what is it that is reborn? And where does karma fit in?

When asked this question, the renowned Tibetan Buddhist teacher Chogyam Trungpa Rinpoche, borrowing concepts from modern psychological theory, said that what gets reborn is our neurosis — meaning that it is our karmic bad habits and ignorance that gets reborn — until such time as we awaken fully. The question is a complex one for Buddhists, and not one for which there is a single answer. Certainly, there are Buddhists that believe in literal rebirth from one life to the next, but there are also others who adopt a modern interpretation, suggesting that rebirth refers to the repetitious cycle of bad habits we may follow if we have an insufficient understanding of our true natures. 

Whatever interpretation is offered, though, Buddhists are united in the belief that our actions affect both current and future conditions, and that escape from the karmic cycle of dissatisfaction and suffering is possible. 

• Buddhism and Evil
• Buddhism: 11 Common Misunderstandings and Mistakes
• Rebirth and Reincarnation in Buddhism
• An Examination of Free Will and Buddhism
• The Five Niyamas
• The Four Seals of the Dharma
• Bardo Thodol: The Tibetan Book of the Dead
• Buddhism and Morality
• Buddhist Perspectives on the Abortion Debate
• The Second Precept of Buddhism: Not Stealing
• What Do Buddhists Mean by 'Enlightenment'?
• Buddhist Teachings on the Self
• The Search for Original Buddhism
• What Does "Samsara" Mean in Buddhism?
• Reincarnation Without Souls?

Home — Essay Samples — Religion — Karma — Understanding The Concept Of Karma

The Concept of Karma: True Or False

• Categories: Karma

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Published: Nov 6, 2018

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